CASE NO. 4

JUAREZ VS. TURON

( 51 PHIL. 736); 3 -19- 28

1. What were the three periods of prescription provided in Act 2710?

The three periods of prescription provided in Act 2710 are : (a) An action for

divorce cannot be filed except with one year from and after the date on which

the complainant became cognizant of the cause; (b) An action for divorce

must be filed within five years from and after the date when such cause

occurred; and (c) when the cause occurred prior to the date on which this act

took effect (March 11, 1917), then the action for divorce must be commenced

within one year from and after such date.

2. Justice Johnson states in his concurring opinion; “ I prefer to leave the

discussions of the incongruities of Section 4 of Act No. 2710 until the question

is squarely presented, hoping that in the meantime the Legislature may have

time to make it more plain if that seems necessary.” What incongruities do you

think did he refer to?

The incongruities referred to by Justice Johnson in his concurring opinion

were the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 4 of Act 2710.

According to him, it is difficult to harmonize such provisions. He further stated

in his opinion that the provision must mean, first, that the aggrieved partymust

bring his action for divorce within one year after he had knowledge of the

cause and, second, that such action cannot be maintained after the lapse of five

years from the date when such cause occurred, whether the complaint was

cognizant of the cause or not.

3. Why does Justice Villamor and Villa – Real consider the one- year period from

knowledge by the complainant of the cause of action as the year of grace for

the parties in a divorce case? What is the basis of their argument?

Justice Villamor and Villa – Real in their dissenting opinion enunciated

that one- year from knowledge by the complainant of the cause of action is

considered as the year of grace for the parties because it is the time that the law

grants the spouses to make reconciliation. Their argument is founded on the fact

that the State is more interested in the continuance of the legal union than in the

separation of the spouses, for the welfare of the family and society.

4. The two justices mentioned further state that if the majority opinion is

followed, the distinction between the prescription for causes of action

occurring before the passage of Act 2710 and causes of action occurring after

its effectivity, will disappear. How can you explain this argument?

The two justices just meant that if the opinion of the majority affirming

the decision of the lower court to prevail, then it would amount to amending the law

by judicial decision. It would defeat the very intention of the law. According to them,

the reason for the two prescriptive periods of action rests on the fact that when the

cause of action took place before the Divorce Law becomes effective, the legislator

intended to limit the effects of this law, so as not to to favour institution of divorce

proceedings; and when the cause of action occurred after said law had become

effective, the same legislator took into account the precedents of several States of

America, such as Arkansas, Kentucky,, etc., which fix the period of five years for the

commencement of the action, to be reckoned from the date of the act giving rise

to it.( See Hirsh, Tabulated Digest of The Divorce Law of The United States,) At any

rate, no matter how arbitrary the fixing of this second period may seem, the law has

deemed it wise to establish a period of five years to be reckoned from the date

following on which the plaintiff became aware of the cause of action for the filing of

action for divorce has prescribed because it was instituted two and a half years after

the plaintiff became aware of the cause of action.

5. Considering the fact that the intent of the law is the preservation of the family

unity, do you think the one year period of prescription is conducive to that

purpose? Discuss your answer.

No. Since each divorce case is different, the length of time within which

to make reparations for the marriage may also varies significantly. What I mean

is that for other cases one year prescriptive period may be enough, but this is only

true to cases with slight issues that have to be resolved. Those cases that arose from

having grounds which are so serious, then one year is not enough for the espouses

to patch things up. It takes a lot of stages that has to be considered in making a

reconciliation. My opinion is that they should have made it for at least three

years, so that the grace period may serve its purpose, of preserving the family unity,

to those cases having serious grounds.

6. Explain how Justice Villamor justified the reversal of the decision of the lower

court which he advocated.

Justice Villamor , in justifying his vote for the reversal of the judgment of the lower

court, briefly set forth first the grounds for the dismissal of the judgment appealed

from, wherein he manifested that such grounds were untenable. Then when he

already presented such grounds he proceeded with his certain interpretations that

could lead to the real intention of the law as regards prescriptions on divorce cases.

The grounds that he presented were: (1) Because the action was instituted out of

time: and (2) because the final judgment in a criminal action for adultery is

insufficient.

In the first ground for dismissal, he asserted that the action having been

instituted on February 10, 1927, said action was filed within the period of time

authorized by the law.

The explanation for this is that as August 1, 1924, was the date on which the

plaintiff learned of the adultery, the action for divorce does not arise from said date,

but from the August 1, 1925, or one year from August 1,1924.The year from

August, 1924 to August 1925,is not to be counted for the purpose of prescription but

for the reconciliation that the law grants for spouses, because the state is more

interested in the continuance of legal union than in the separation of spouses, for

the welfare of the family and society. If according to the law, the plaintiff's action

lasts from years from August 1, 1925, he may bring it any time between then and

August 1, 1930.

With respect to the second ground for dismissal, he manifested that while

a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case for libel is no bar to the institution of a

civil action for damages caused by the libel, a judgment of acquittal for adultery kills

the action for divorce. While pursuant to Act no. 277, the civil action maybe

commenced and prosecuted until the rendering of judgment independently of the

criminal action; under Act 2710, the action for divorce cannot be prosecuted,

although it may be commenced, until judgment is rendered in the criminal action for

adultery or concubinage. In consideration of his justifications, he is of the opinion

that the lower court committed an error prejudicial to the appellants rights in

dismissing the action.