Cold Mlemnories: An Examination Of 1'.S. Army DoctrineFor" Combat In Cold Regions

Mla.ior Richard V. VaughnInfantry

Scdfiool Uf Advanced 1iilitary StudiesU.S. Arm, Command And General Staff College

Fort LUavenworth. Kanmsas

14 Irlarch 1988

Ai)proved [or publicC relcasol distribit.ion Ls tinliinite.d.

88-2409

\ame. at Student: MIajor Richard F. Vaughn

T itle~ ot 'Iotiograph: Co~d Memories: An FExawinat ion Oif I .S. Nvwx 1i04Ir in I-o

Combat in Cold Regions

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ABSTRACT

COLI: :'1EMORIE~: iI\J EXtHIINATlON OF I.J.~. I\R~IY OOCTlll~E FOil CllMllAT j.\JCO\.lI IlE(;IONS by ~IA.J Rlebard F. VallKhn. lIS,\. -17 pnl<p_~.

This monograph examines the U.S.' Army's need for a centrally-munaged.detailed doctrine for combat in cold re1U0I1S. It is important for the U.S. Army t.o maintain adequate doctrine for combat in cold regions. The Soviets are prepared to fight in the cold and have significant forces stationed in cold regions 101 hich challlmge U.S. and Allied interests. The monograph determines if there are any gaps or deficiencies in our doctrine for cold weatlier operations; if units 101 hich have a stake in the doctrine and equipment developed for combat in the cold are suffidently involved and prepared; and if an adequate institut;ional memory is benl< mainl.ained on cold weather issues.

Basic theoretical tactical concel'ts are addressed with respect to ope....dtions in the cold. Th" monograph t.hen defmes and describes cold ""gions and t.he clTeclS of cold on personnel. equil'ment. and combat 0serations. Two historical combat case studies ._- the 1{usso-FlIInish war. 1939-19'1 . and the II .5. Army's Ileconquestof .\ ttll in 1943 -- provide insights into the needs for adequate doct.rine for colel weather combat. operations. Combat develop 01 ent.s from ww II lo today at'" examined. with brief histories given for primary agencies involved wilh cold weather opel'ltions, training, materiel development and testing. and doctrinal developmen\'..

Tbe monojl,ral'h concludes ~bat there are several requirements tor the L.S. Arm:/'s success 111 future operations in cold [·"gions. Among th""e al'c: cl~ntrally mUnflged. detailed doctrine. maintained by one ajl,ency with adequate funds. pers'Jnnel, aud Iluthorit.y; amendment of current. regulatory l',uidance ['or matoriel developments to remove any ambiguities in defininjl, requirements for cold weather function; im mediate update or replacement of existing doctrinal field manuals for cold weather operations and support; accession and special management of pers"nnel specially trained for cold weather and mountain operations; designationof "I?ecific duty position identifiers in unit TOEs for cold weather specialists; and t.he mcluding of supplemental cold weather tasks by unit <:010 manders in developinjl, theil' Mission Essential Task Lists for traininjl,.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Pap<!

I . I . . .N.l'lllll~U~~Clll~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

I 1 . NILITARY OPERATIONS IN EXTREMEENVIRONMENTS: THE THEORY ........................................ 2

I l l . COLD REGIONS ....................................................... 1Definitions..................................................... -Cold .Regions Phenomena ......................................... -

.-keather.....................................................Terrain.................................................... 6

Effects of Cold Regions Phenomena on Nnteriel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .nEffects of Cold Regions Phenomena on Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Physical Effect. s ...........................................Psychological Effects ..................................... [.

LOEffects of Cold llegions Phenomena on Nilitary Operations ......................................... 11Genernl ................................................... 11 0perationaI.Consideratio.ns ................................ 12Combat Service Support (.onsiderat,ions. .................... 14Leadership Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1~

I V . RUSSO-FINNISH UAR . 1939-1940 ...................................... 16General Account of Events ..................................... 16Victory at Suomassalmi ........................................ 18

V . RECONQUEST OF ATCU . 1943.......................................... 20 VI . POSTWAR U .S . A I W COLD WEATHER DOCTRINAL

DEVELOPMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Historical Accounts of Major Army AgenciesDealing With Cold Weather Issues ............................ 26

U .S . Army Northern Warfare Training Center - NklC .................................. 26

Cold Regions Ilesearch nnd Engineerin Laborator CRREL .......................... 27

U.S. Army Cotd Regions {At Center - CII'CC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28Combined Arms CenterLiaison Office (Alaska) - CAC LO (AK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Coamittees................................................ 29 V I 1 . CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ...................................... 32

?lateriel...................................................... 32Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Care 111 Thc Cold .......................................... 33Personnel Management ...................................... 36

Force Structure............................................... 3 4 Doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Trniiiing.................................................. :15Doctrine Proponeiicv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3h

Lendersliig.................................................... 37Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

NOT~:S............................................................ N 1

BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................... B-1

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I - I N T R O D U C T I O N

"How can you expect a man who's warm to underntand a man who's cold!"

Alexnnder Solzhenitsyn'

There are basically three components tn military operations: soldiers.

equipment, and environment. O f these, the environment is the factor over which

an army has l itt le, if any. influence or control. Therefore. i i n army must. clevalop

and use doctrine and equipment designed for success in the environment and for

the preservation of its force'. How, Lliough. should an army devcdop pro41w

doclrine and cquipnienl Lor c:oiiibnt. in t).t%rwne cnvironmenrs'?

This monograph w i l l answer the following question: Is there a requirement.

for mnint.aining a centrally-IiinnaRed. detailed I1 .S. Army doctrine for i:onduc(ling

combat in cold regions, or should che issue remain a matter for units regionallv

deployed in, or with contingencies for. cold regions? It w i l l also answer o(;her

related questions. Are there any deficiencies or gags: i n the Army's definitions and

doctrine for cold weat,her operations? A r e units which have n stake in t,he

doctrine and equipment developed for combat in the cold sufficiently involved and

prepared? Is HII institutionnl memory being maintnined on cold weather isut?s or

w i l l the A r m y have to re-learn all the lessons learned previously during combat

operations i n the cold?

Additionally, this monograph w i l l address the current, state of 1i.S. A r m y

doctrine for Cighting in cold regions. It w i l l define and describe cold regions illid

use historical examples to illustrate the impact of proper preparation for. comI)al.

therx?. 11. w i l l tmce the Iiist,ory of' U .S. Army doctrinnl dcveloi~mcn~s. Finnllv. this

auLlior w i l l draw conclusions about the U S . Army's doctrine for modern combat, in

the cold and determine iC there nre UIIY pertinent implicntions Cor I,lic futurc.

It is important that the U S . A r m y remain ready to conduct combat opcnitions

in Llie cold. There nre A r m y units in Alaska. Upstate New Yorb. iind Lhc

mountainous regions of Europe. Wartime contingencies for both forward-deployed

and CONIIS-based A r m y units call for deployment to cold areas. 'Tlius. the Ariiiu should consider current doctrine and pruper equipment for operating i n the cold and

preservntion of the Porcc as miLior com bat. developnienlx issues.

I 1 - MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS: T l l E T l l E O R Y

Theoreticians h a v e not a d d r e s e d operating in t h e cold as a distinct area of

study. Inswad. they have called f o r adaptating basic theories of warfare to

special environmental or weather conditions. Early theoreticians. such as Clausewitz

and Jomini. saw little need f o r considering warfare in t h e winter or the cold.

Armies in their day, a s a general rule, went into winter quarters t o awaiL t h e

warm campaigning season. A s Jomini s t a t e d in his work, Tbe A r t Of gar.'

khen w i n t e r approaches, t h e armies will either go into qiitlrteps, or t h e field will be,Ite t, by the.army. which hns obtained decisive ? u c c q and IS $esirow',' ot proflung to t,heutmcxt by its superiority.

Clausewitz considered t h e wealher as a n element of chance in his des(:riptioii

of friction and chatice in his treatise. On U m lle staLed:

friction ...is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about e f fec ts t h a t...nry largely due to chance. Ilne. for example. 1s t h e weather.

Later in t h e same work, he described h i s thoughts on t h e impact of Reography and terrain in terms of mobility. t a rge t acquisition, and protection:

geography and t h e charac te r of t h e ground bear a close and 9 v e r p r e s e n t relation to warfare. Tliev have a decisive influence on t h e engagement. both as to its course and to its planning r!nd exploitation....T!ie rincipal e f f e c t [oftermnl lies in t h e raalm of tactxs. g u t t h e outcome IS a macter of s%rq.tegy....Geography and ground can a f f e c t military operatlons i n t h r e e ways: as an obstacle to t h e approach. as an impedimFnt to visibility. and as cover trom fire. All other progertles can be t raced back to these three?

After t h e t i m e of Clausewitz and Jomini. t h e only 19th-Century coltures

inaintaining significant populations o r i n t e m t s in cold reRions w e r e Lhe .Inria~iese,

t h e Scandinavians. and t h e Russians. After t h e establishment of t h e Soviet Union.

official doctrine reflected many valuable lesions learned in previous batt.les between

t h e Imperial Russian Army and its recu r ren t antagonists: t h e Finns. Swedes, and

Japanese.

The 1936 Field Regulations of t h e Red Army s ta ted t h a t pmperly protecting,

training. and equipping t,he individual soldier gave a n army t h e ability to (:arry out

its operations i n t h e cold effectively:

Winter coinb a t operutions i m pwe a special responsibility iiuont h e commanders and rear services w i t h respect co.pmtectingpersonnel. maintaining health mid combat. activity of t h e

2

soldiers. and eiisuring optimum use 0 1 we~ipoiis mid quipinent ....T h e mobiliLy and manouveralilitv of the t.roopsin winter depends entirely uiioii t1it:ir t,r:iining. t.lioir wiiit.w equipment. and tlie terrain of t h e winter hnt.tlefield. rroops not. tniined and ipuffic:ient,ly equipped I:or w iiiter: o~)a:ra~ioiisquickly lose their combat capability, and equipment not adnpted for winter use only serves to become a burden Lo t h e m . If such deficiencies are detected in t h e e n e p y . t h e ymust be resolutely and t;lrelessly used tor lus defeat.

Today's U .S.Army appreciation of military operations in extreme environnieuts

is somewhat superficial. U.S. doctrine writers assume t h e risk t h a t large-scale

opemtions in cold regions will not occur in t h e near future. Field Yaiiii~I ( F Y )

100-5, /I~erat~onsstates:

...t h e likelihood is small that large forces will be committed to such an extreme environment. Neverthc?lt?ss. t h e Army must. be, able to em loy smal15combined arms forces in t h e a rc tx Lsicl regions if required.

Current U .S . Army doctrinal manuak saeaifically written f o r operaLing i n t h e

cold w e considerably out of date. Field Manual (FM) 31-70, Basic Cold k/eafJer

Yanuul detailing individual and small unit techniques. was Inst. upclated in 1969.

Field Yanual (FM) 31-71. A'orZherri UoeratIbm an outstanding manual for geiieral

tacticnl operations. curries a 1971 date . Field Mnnunl (FN) 9-.207, Uwr71tkwi and

:Yahtenance of Ordnance Materiel in Cold Veatber 10" to -654% daled 1978.

requires updating to ref lect improvements in technology. The currency of manuals

such as these could pmve critical in t h e event of a modern t h r e a t in cold regions.

There is still a need for modern cold weather doctrine based on the tlireat.

Chri.. Donnelly. a B r i t i s h scholar of Soviet military affairs, gives one likely scenario

for this. Ile believes t h e Soviets will try to protect Murmanslc by conducting

tactical amphibious landings in Northern Norway in time of war. T h i s will expand

their capahiliW to extend t.lic nir defensc coverwge of the K o l a I'eninsulu and

Murmansk. T h e y will t r y to decoy much of N A T O ' s cfFort to t h e north. weakeninv. its Central Front'.

N A T D is only one area which is threatened. Since 1355, the Soviets have

built up a s u M a n t i a l presence in t h e Siberian Peninsula'. Awarding to one

report. as of 1978. about one-third of t h e Soviet f l e e t and about oiie.-lourth 01'

their ground and tact ical air forces are stationed in t h e Far East cold regions'.

These could pcssibly be drawn into conflict with U S . forccs by adveiitm-ism on Ihc

part of t h e Soviet client state of North Korea.

T h e Soviet Army is prepared t o f ight in the extreme cold. They Lwue no

speoiitl eqiiipmc?nt t.o Lhc troop.. for cold w c i i L l i w operations. Inslcirid. l.hc?y i1csir:ii

t h e i r standard clothing and equipment for use in all environments. Their training

and doctrine f o r fighting in t h e cold is thorough. based on their belief that. they

can win in winter'.

111 - COLD REGIONS

D e f h i t b m How does one define t h e term cold regions? Ambient a i r temperature is t h e

primary physical parameter arsociat,ed with cold rezioils. It, serves as a basis For

describing their geographical aspects. T h e term Arctic k not siifficientlv exact for

use in describing them. While cold regions do include Arctic regions. they d s o

include subarctic and other areas. The line encircling both t h e Arctic and

subarctic regions circumscribes whiiL is known in the sciuntiEic coiii munity us Llie

50'F temperature isotherm'.

On a global scale, cold regions cover 20 per cent of t h e sur face of t h e

earth. They include Asian and European Russia. Canada. Scandinavia. hlusku. and

t h e Iranian mountains. Cold regions terrain is generally characterized by marshes.

lakes. boreal forests. and muskeg. The area tias few roads and communications

routes and is sparsely populated'.

The 1J.S. Army accepts t h e Jon north parallel of lati tude as t h e southern

boundary of t h e cold regions in t h e Northern Hemisphere. I t is interesting 1.0 note

t h a t t h e coldest portions of t h e Northern Hemisphere a r e not a t t h e Eiorth Pole:. nor are they exclusively atiove the Arctic Circle'.

Army Regulation 70-38. Resetfmh and fJevefo.ume//L;ThsC and EvafuatiofJ uf

fYater!te/ for t:l.tltme Lfimatk Londiuons. defines several c a t e g o r i s of cold.

fntermediute cofd defines t h e operational range of ~ e m p e r a t u r e s between -5°F and -25°F. Cold defines t h e range between -3YF and -50°F. Last ly . E:Ytmme

cold defines the range between -60°F and -70°F'. The reader should note t h e

loo g a w between t h e temperature ranges defined here. Temperature is not t h e only criterion used in describing cold regions. I n

northern latitudes, t h e large changes i n the k ? l l K t h [if daylight periods result, in

corresponding changes in t h e amount of available solar radiation, a term known as

hisofation. As c;he days get short.er. and the insolnlion lessens. them is i i

3

correspondinl: r;idi;ition I c x s I'roin t.hc: nrouiid surface. 'Tliis l'act,or coin1iiia:s w i1.h

convection settling of dense cold air , and t.he Lrapping of Llie cold air by

tt?mperature invtxsions. 'l'liese cause local concent.tations of oxtremolu low aiubient,

air temperatures. Thus. short days can cause t h e subarctic regioils of Siberia.

Alaska, and Canada to produce t h e coldest temperatures on Earth'.

C W m

The phenomena of cold regions are grouped into two principal classifications:

weather and tmrain. The weather offers Challenges primarily throu8h precipitatioii

and cold temperaturer. The terrain principally offers mobility challenges.

Weather Perhaw t h e Pour most unusual weather phenomena i n cold regions are ice fog.

temperature inversion. whiteout. and blowinu snow. Ice fix forms a t about -30°F when water passes from vapor directlu into i i

solid. freezing around any particle avnilable in the air . Sinco t,hc ~ibsoliil.a

moisture content of t h e a i r a t these low temperatures is so small. any moiszure-producing source will cause ice fog. This include? gasoline and dieqel engines. t h e

combustion of propellants of small arms and heavy weapons. and t h e vapor trails

from missiles. Ice fog limits t h e unit's ability t o reduce i ts signature o n tho battlefield. Heavy weapons will obscure their own line of sight f o r second shots

and reveal themselves to t h e enemg.

Often in cold regions. temperaturn invemom set, in which can last. for rleus.

Temperature inversions <:awe wurm a i r i:r.enLod by iiisoliiti~intsi cool as it. rises

t.hmilgh cold a i r layers. Convection settling of L l i e cooler air into low regions

then occurs. As t h i s t.empenituro inversion lingers. air temperatiirc miiy lowcw (.o

t h e dew point, resulting in radiation fogs. As t h e s e become cooler. they form t h e

ice FOB ment.ioned above'.

Sometimes during a temperature inversion. solar radiation will warm t.he RroUnd

causing t h e inversion to rise 10 to 30 f e e t above the ground. Couplcd w i t h

ground reflection of t h e sunlight off t h e snow, t h e sun ' s diffusion down thmuuh fog

or clouds caus(3s whiteout. Whiteout, creates it lass of perception and degradcs tho

ability to navigate. Drivers and pilots quickly tire and lose depth perception.

Pilots have been known Lo luse clieir sense of t,he ground's location relativo 1.0

their craft, Hiid crash. Wliit.eoiit obviously impacts t:normoilsly on 11 imit.'s i i l i i l it .v 1.0

conduct. a i r assault operationss.

B/owi/,K snow can disrupt operations by its ef fec ts on equipment.. Very L'inc!

particles of blown snow penetrate every crack or groove and melt, on warm surfaces. Cold temperatures cause t h e melted snow to f reeze and bind crit ical

mechanisms. Blowing snow is t h e grea tes t visiMlit,y-limiting factor ossocinted k i t h

ground operations'.

Snow adversely a f f e c t s mines. causing diEficulties f o r countermobility plans in

an already difficult region. Most costly to t h e ohstacle plan is Lhe snow's

negation of blast effects. Scat terable mines delivered by helicopter may not arm

if snnw k e e w the mine fmm striking t h e surface hard enough. Snow may hlow

over or away from minefields. exposing them. A n unstable base caused by s o f t

snow or tiindrn can cause m i n e s Lo sh i f t or tilt. Til t rfids can break. Trip wirw

can break from being brit t le or t h e y can be sufficiently covered by snow to be

iiseless. Marking minetields may prove especially difficult in snow conditions and

recovery may prove impossible. Burying mines in frozen ground may also be

impossible, dictating strictly surface laying. Mines frozen to t h e ground a f t e r H

brief thaw may require blowing in place rather than attempts at removal. The

compresion devices or mechanisms can experience thawing and Preozing of snow.

causing e i ther no function or premature function. Electrically detonated Claymore

mines may pmve difficult t o we, as t h e electrical leads inay become brit t le and

break. ?law of t h e mines require t h e soldier to remove h i s gloves in order to

emplace or recover them, creating a danger of cold injury to the soldier's hands".

Terrain

Terrain varies greatly in cold regions depending on proximity to t h e coast..

altitude. and latitude. There are. however, some character is t i rs which BI'C corn mnn

to most cold regions. T h e r e are many lakes and rivers. T h e regions present

complex and abnormal paLterm of steep-walled valleys, hnitirlg approaclies and crossing sites f o r streams and rivers. The systems of cross-compartments are

complex, characterized by locally s teep slopes. There are vast a reas of taiga

(boreal forest). and tundra (boggy arctic plains)".

In addition to t h e sur face phenomena peculiar to cold regions. a suhsurface

e hen omen on called permafmst has significant impact on operations. Permnfmst is ii

layer of soil and ground moisture which remains frozen y e a r m o n d . Abont one-half

6

of t h e combined land mass of Canada. t h e US.. and t h e II.S.S.H. has permafrost

benca th the I I ~ I I I ? ~laver of soil. Depth iind thickness of pcrmnfrost, v w v w i t . h soil

texture. temperature. precipitation. and topography. 'The frozen layer beneath t h e

surface does not allow water to seep into t h e ground. Thin layers of soil over

permafrost inhibit g rowth of large trees requiring deep roots. Thawing and freezing of t h e upper portion of permafrost cause t h e ground over it to heave and dip. This a f f e c t s t h e stability of highways, bridges, and buildings constructed over

permafrost".

Trafficability for cross-country and road movement is best in winter. even when one considers t h e special nat.ure of moving over snow and ice. During t h e

other seasons of breakup. summer. and freezeup. trafficability is worse.

I'ermnfmst's contribution to t h e vast expanses of standing water and bo%% and the

many flowing water ohstecles combine to make mobility t h e m o s t Significant problem

encountered in cold regions". In these other seasons, mud causes the largest.

mobility problem".

Mobility in winter r e q u i m special equipment for oversnow operations. Individual mobility requires skis, snowshoes, crampons, or snow machines (snowmobiles). Mobility f o r personnel. weapons, supplies. and equipment requires trucks, personnel carriers, or sled sets called ahtiice. Wheeled vehicles are restricted to roads or specially prepared winter trnils, made from digging out or packing down snow. Personnel and weapons carriers should b e oversnow vehicles. but t h e r e are few of t h e s e currently in t h e U S . Army. Ahkio groups are not restricted to any particular area, but t h e e f for t required by squads ond sections in pulling them over t h e snow is demanding on t h e unit. Large sca le unit operations

therefore rely heavily on a i r transport nnd contml of t h e 1imit.ed road networks".

Historical examples show operations in which successful armed forces

overcame mobility difficulties in t h e cold regions. The Finns in their fight with t h e Soviets in 1939 had little difficulty in moving soldiers over t h e battlefield. U S . units today do not DOSSBSS t h e oversnow capability of t h e Finns.

Consequently, improvements in t h e technology f o r .oveisnow vehicles and o ther

equipment have become impottant f o r SUCCBSS".

7

E f f e c t s Of Cold Reniornr Phenomena On Materiel Cold ef fec ts on equipment require special attention by the materiel developers

and the users. A clear understanding of cold regions phenomena is a prerequisite

f o r development and use of equipment in t h e cold. Phenomena have different

e f fec ts on different i t e m s .

Storage battery efficiency, f o r example, drops when exposed to low

temperatures. Charging is especially difficult. The cold, therefore, threatens any

high-technology item requiring a battery".

Electronic devices and components respond well in t h e cold. They do.

however, require care. Solid state components require less at tent ion than

mechanically manipulated components, but require longer warm-up periods a t low

power before operation. Mechanically manipulated components respond be t te r t.0 t h e

cold if t h e materials used in the i r construction are compatible and similar in reaction to t h e cold. They also require proper lubrication".

Conventional engine lubricants (mineral-based) have proven to be unsuited for

cold weather operations. They harden and hinder engine star t ing below freezing.

N e w synthet ic lubricants are b e t t e r f o r operations in t h e cold'*. Different materials used in manufacturing experience different e f fec ts from

exposure to cold. Some metals become bri t t le a t low tempera tures . While the i r

terrpile s t rengths may increase with lower t e m p e r a t u m , their resistances to shock loading or impact may actually decrease". Plastics lose resistance to impact and

lose st rength as temperature decreases". Rubber experiences very gradual

crystallization, losr: in resilience, and a n increase in st iffness and hardness. Rubber

hoses used f o r fuel, hydraulic fluids, oils. and lubricants deter iorate faster than

those f o r other materials. This is due to t h e chemical reactions induced by t h e s e fluids in rubber in t h e cold. Rubber tires may develop f l a t spots and settle out

of round if vehicles remain stationary f o r long t i m e s a t low temperatures".

The Army m u s t develop materiel i t e m s which can withstand t h e cold or, if

they are available, purchase them off-the-shelf. In t h e past, t h e Army materiel

developers have adapted materiel items originally developed f o r use in temperate or hot zones and used them in the cold. They have very of ten given unsatisfactory

m u l t s at Army test facilities. Today, technology and research are smducing new

products and ideas t h a t can asgist in developing items specifically designed to overcome cold effects. allowing for successful military operations while minimizing t h e e f fec ts of prolonged cold on personnel.

a

E f f e c t s OE Cold Regions Phenomena O n Pemonnel

EffecQ

Combat experiences have shown that knowledge and training contribute directly

t o the extent to which the cold affects soldiers physically. The skills which best

serve the soldier in this environment are those concerning regulation of body heat

production and body heat 10s. Heat production comes f r o m the soldier’s eating.

drinking, daily hygiene measures. and his own particular body metabolism. He

increases heat production by eating and exercising more. He controls his heat 1 0 s

by dressing appropriately. using heated shelter. or pacing himself while operating

out in the cold environment. Both heat production iind heat loss re1nt.e t.o the

maintenance of his body cum The core is that portion of the body in which the

body temperature does not drop as rapidly o r as much as the skin temperature.

The soldier has control of a l l of the factors contributing to heat production and

loss: i n t.he cope except those relating to his own peculiar metabolism. Thus, he

m u s t be aware of his own capabilities, limitations, and requirements in the cold.

especially when he chooses clothing”.

Appropriate clothing w i t h sufficient space for trapping dead air is very

important in the reduction of body heat loss:. The trapped air m u s t remain

immobile t o retain the body heat, w h i l e allowing for freedom of movement and

dissipation of moisture. The trade-off between warmth and adequate mobility or

dexterity allowed by the clothing m u s t be examined with respect t o the soldier’s

body extremities. such as fingers and toes. Theae extremities are farthest from tho

body core and are subject to heat loss more quickly than other parts of the

body. They require dexterity and flexibility in conducting military tasks.

necessitating less bulk in outer insulation. Soldiers and leaders must balance the

requirements of mission accomplishment and preserving adequnte warmth For t.he

soldier’s safety. Each soldier‘s clothing requirement w i l l vary with his metabolisin

and work level. Thus, there is no such t,lling as the avem&3 soldier; so one

uniPorm dresr: for a l l w i l l not be appropriate fo r the be& performance by unit

m embed’.

The effect of acclimatization of soldiers can act as a combat multiplier. A n

acclimatized soldier maintains a lower mebbolism. His body more readily adjusls to

the heat 1 0 s . He maintains a smaller body core. Thus, he is better able to

store heat. reserves and operate in the cold over longer periods. Acclimatization

offers t,lie soldier severol other advantaiges. I le endures stress belter. He r e w i r w

less: exercise. to keep him f r o m shivering. His circulation is better. especially in

his extremities. This enhances his dexterity arid reduces the danger of cold

in.jury".

Cold injuries can affect the whole body or local areas. Whole body cooling.

or hypothermia. results when the body's overall heat loss rate exceeds its heat

production rate. Local cold injuries include frrrstbite. trenchfoot. chillblain. and

immersion foot. These result f r o m heat loss or inadequate care of extremities.

While local in.juries can lead to loss or degradation of the extremities. hypothermia

can be deadly. Clean, adequate clothing. which traps warm air trelter. and

supervised daily hygiene, allowing soldiers to check each other for symptoms. can

l i m i t the effects of cold in.juries. Training and experience. however. serve best to

ward off the occurrences of cold injuries".

Besides causing cold injuries, temperature and snow lead to other adverse

physical effects on soldiers. Dehydration results from the soldier's exertions in the

cold, requiring leaders to check that their soldiers are drinking enough water.

Sunburn results P r o m reflection of solar radiation off the snow and ice. Snow

blindness occurs when soldien fa i l t o use sunglasses to lessen the effects of

reflected l ight off of snow and ice".

Fsycholoaical Eff ects Humans respond psychologically to the cold regions i n a variety of ways.

The psychologicol factors prevailing in the cold are lower morale. isolation.

disorientation, and reduced social interaction".

Winter operations in cold regions can cause psychological adjustment problems.

seriously affecting morale. T e s t s have shown that these problems of adjustment

lead to lack of motivation, insomnia. d e p d o n , and dissatisfaction. Over longer

periods. scientists document such behavior patterns as conceit, .jealousy. excitability.

and suspicion".

Just the idea of isolation can cause people to react negatively to the cold

regions. When operations stop during extreme cold, feelings of anxiety and

isolation develop. Since these operations are characteristically conducted in remote

areas. these feelings grow. Feelings of isolation can contribute to an irmtionsl

fear of the cold in untrained soldiers".

LO

I)isorient.ution also coiitriliiit,es 1.0 psyc:hologicaI st,rms. Siia~:ious iireiis of'

I.undra and wildorncss do IIUL offer many landmarks. I n dense Laiga. visibilitv b oxtxemely limited. Fow contour lines on ~ i i i i p s . 11 lack of: coiitrt~st..and an akenc:t?

of man-made ohjects in aerial imagery complicate locating reference points. Heavy

snow may cover roads, trails. and o ther laiidmarks. Wliiteout, will o€ten olscure t,hc

horizon and hide terrain relief patterns. Thus. one can expect t h e stress caused

by these phenomena to be a significant fac tor in military operat.ions".

Problems of social interaction can be overcome by good unit cohesion and

leaders who are good motivators. If t h e motivation to achieve a Rt-iNIp goal is

high. then t h e individuals in t h e group feel less frustration and st.w\x. Tonin

cohesion and a high state of training readiness help to reduce Lhe s t r ~ s s e son t h e

members of t.he group. Lcuders must, however. be alvrt f o r thuse in the groiiri

who can not respond well t o t h e demands of t h e cold regions. They m u s t realize

t h a t knowing their people. and conditioning arid tmining them well prior to

conducting operations in t h e cold leads to bet ter psychological prepamtion".

Sleep cnn assist leaders in gett ing their soldiers out of the pessimistic:

lethargy brought on by t h e stresses of t h e cold environment. Leaders m u s t still.

however, set. examples of aggressiveness and require the same from t.hcir

subordinates. T h e men m u s t keep busy so t h a t exercise can be used to generate

warmth in their body cores. Group chores w i l l bring soldiers into constitiit contact.

w i t h each other , relieving t h e feelings of isolation prevailing in t h e cold rePjons".

Strong individual leadership and t h e development. of il sense ol' Rroiip

responsibility can solve m o s t of t h e psychological problems involved with military

operatioils in Lhe cold. Once lie meets t h e needs of t.lie individiiul s o l d i c ? ~ .I.lic?

leader can readily consider t h e more detailed operational requirements of missions

in the cold.

E rn 0 M" 0 - q

GG259d There are several interrelated factors contributing to t h e difficulty of military

operations in cold reKiOW. Foremost among these arc? t h e laxstile clinialt?.

formidable t e r r a i n , extensive water and ice o k t a c l e s . and the i r ac:companyinR

tmfficabili ty problems. ?lrisuive distances, poor lines of cum munical.ion. l o w

poi3ulatioii donsiticks, and an ~acconipanyinK liick of slidtor and developod resoiircc-is

compound L h e problems a military force can expect. I t is Lempting to say that. no

urmod force could success€ully operate in t h e face of' these conditions. It istory

proves, however, t h a t armed forces can and do operate in cold regions and m i s t

plan f o r future operations there. While there are significant population centers in

t h e cold regions. grea t distances of ten separate them and wilderness surrounds

them. The infrastruct.ure of roads. airfields. railroads, and industrial centers

becomes crit ical to t h e planning of large sca le operations. With such a sparse

population, h o s t nation support. €or labor. transport, shelter. and com munications is

eaually sparse".

ODerat ional considemt.iom I n order t o employ combat power successfully. a n armed force requires

intelligence of t h e capabilities, vulnerabilities. and likely actions of t h e enemy.

Euually important is t h e requirement f o r intelligence about t h e environment i n which t h e force will be operating. Considerations about t h e environment's imtmct.

will cen ter on its influence on t h e method and direction of at tack. and t h e

capabilities of t h e soldiers and equipment to perform w h i l e exposed t.0 it".

Intelligence sum maries on operational areas normally ref lect statist ical means when describing environmental effects. Unfortunately, means will not adequately

prepare a €orce deployed in the hostile. cold refions for t,he rapid. dramatic l ocd

changes in t h e weather experienced there. T h e coin mander's specific intelligence

needs will probably best be provided by local inhabitants or specialized groiiw.

trained and experienced in the region". When inclement weather grounded t h e air

assets during a 1965 .joint s t ra tegic mobility exercise, intelligence dropped t o almost nothing. Thus. a well-rounded int,elligence system that. can continue in 1:he

f a c e of t h e lass of one medium of collection is essential".

Cover and concealment. tAce on new dimensions in cold regions. Target

acquisition depends largely on t h e amount of camouflage used. Snow in t h e winter cnl ls for white camouflage. Ice fog generated by running vehicles mandates care

in positioning in order to reduce t h e Signature".

12

U nil--9 will prwbatily Fight. major engagements i n t h e cold regioia for poSscx4on

of routes and supply lines. Historical accountS of ouerations by the Russians.

F i n n s , and Germans support. this observation. Since indepeiidenl. task forces will

probably perform these predicted engagements, open flanks will be routine. and t h e

risk of envelopment high".

In 1964. Combat Developments Agency. Alaska ( C D A I A K J ) , developed a

general concept f o r small scale northern operations. The ideal force for these

types of missions had several characteristics: relatively small size considering t h e

area it. COVBIS: equipped with full cross-country mobility for u// elements. not, just,

combat elements; and containing mobile direct support logistic elements. T h e ideal

size recoinmended f o r these types of operations was a battalion or brigade t.uslc

force wiLh combat support.. and mobile combat service s u p ~ o r t . elements attached

rat,her than SU.UW&>IZ This force w a s t.o receive allocation of enough air'cral't, 1.0

support and/or sustain operations over large distances".

'The findings by CIIA ( A K ) supported those of an earlier study conducted i i i

1962 by The Arctic Inst i tute of North America. T h e A I N A estimated tha t hrinv

bat t le groups larger than company size could not be adequately susmined wit.lioiit.

massive airlift. They did not believe t h a t a group as large as a battalion could

remain mobile in t h e field in mid-winter sheltered only by seini-permanent. tenting.

Supplied by t h e vehicles available in t h e era of t h e early 196uS. t h e y estimated

that. 200 m i l e s w a s t h e maximum distance from a support base t h a t t h e force could

operate. Additionally, operating at t h a t distance, they estimated t h a t t h e demands

of the force would probably exceed t h e capabilkies of t h e logistical system".

In addition t,o t h e problems of tailoring a supportnlile force, (:om manders inlist,

recognize t h e slower pace of operations i n t h e cold. Operations require. more time

due to t.lie many a.ssoc:iatod survival and ii1ainLenmice tasks. Acclimal.i~iit.iiii~0 1

soldiers and u n i t s will help, but commanders m u s t be a le r t f o r an acclimatized

enemy who gets an early start on Llie opttration".

Trailmaking in the undeveloped regions of Lhe nor th becomes a crucial

requirement in order to conduct operations. s u p ~ l y uni ts , and evacuate wounded.

Trails become important when planning for coin niitment of reserves or countemI.t.ack

forces". In any offensive, trailbreaking begins as soon as u n i t s receive t h e

orders. This includes cutt ing brush below t h e snow l ine t o faci1it.at.e skiing and

t.lie pulling of ahkios. A n mtimat,c?d one-fourth of t h e unit could he brcwltinc! Lmil

13

a t any ono l i m e . 'Therefore. for a brigade-size cil.t,ack. one t~al.t.alion I.nslc lorc:i?

can be cxpect.et1 t o be breaking trail . T h i s will allow for t h e troops in the at.tuclc

to arr ive in a staLe ot.her than sheer exhaustion. Furt.her. a brigade attuclt will

probably require three trails. with t h e trailbreaking parties departing in advance of

t h e main body by a t i m e fact.or of one hour f o r every f ive kilometers to be

cleared".

With t h e restrictions of ground mobility in t h e cold regions, t h e U.S. relies heavily on air transport f o r movement and SUPP~Yin order to maintain tact ical

momentum. Momentum is difficult to achieve because of the limited mobility of t h e

region and the requimment to rapt troops frequently. Once momentum is ~ a i n e d .it,

is easily 10% Lines of communication become so vital in t h e cold region t h a t

comniitnient. of as many troops t.o route maintenance, supply. and evacuation as :ire

fighting may not be uncommon".

With o r without trails, moving units rapidly offers a challenge f o r leadership

and judgement. During Exercise WILLOW F R E E Z E i n 1962. soldiers of Company E,

187th Airborne Battle Group. attempted to carry only essentials f o r combat in their

rucksacks. These weighed about 68 pounds pe r man. By doing this t h e y cut, ou t about 100 pounds per rucksack of essentials f o r survival. After a very short time,

t h e trade-off of survival gear for purely combat Rear took its toll. T h e unit w a s

withdrawn from t h e exercise as combat ineffective. The lesson h e r e is t h a t

survival gear is as important as combat equigment. Moving between 1/2 and one

mile per hour f o r eight to ten hours. carrying his rucksack and weapon, and pulling

an ahkio sled with his shelter, food. and heating mat.erials, t h e soldier is too

exhausted t o perform combat tasks. T h e stms of combat adds to t h e problem.

He needs a tracked oversnow vehicle to bring forward some 01: the load".

Combat Sernce. SUDmrt camniderationsr There are three aspects oE t h e cold regions which a f f e c t logistical ulaiiiiiiig

and support efforts: t h e nature of t h e hostile environment, to include t h e weather

and k r r a i n ; t h e increased t i m e requirement f o r successful lo~is t ic i i l support; and

t h e increased scale of support required. S u c c e d u l operations may require e i ther

delivery or pregositioning of over one and one-third short tons of supplies per

month per soldier". Combat service support units will find that. they m i l s t have

c w - c o u n t r y movement capability on par w i t h o r exceeding t h e movement capability

of t h e siipported units".

14

In t.he final rwor t . of Exercise I'll 1. A H ST I1 I Kk:, Iiold in Llie w i n t w ol: l'h5,

Lhe C o m inantler, IISA I1 A I.. recoin mended t.hat. exercises i n I.hn Tiltore stres- t.li(?

logisticril plaiiniiig. execution. aud impact for units operating. ill t h e cold reg.ioiw. Ile believed t h a t t h e major military problems facing units in cold regions were t h e

problems of supply, medical, and mnint.enance support".

Maintenance in cold environment t.akes considerably longer than in t h e

temperate zone. Some estimates place it a t f ive times as long. This should

emphasize nt,lier than de t rac t from its importance! Isolated units will depend on

proper maintenance of equipment. f o r their survival. Priorities f o r maintenance will

require careful planning so t h e right items are prepured at, t.he right. time, wliile

allowing f o r pmper rest f o r t h e operators and mechanics. Shelter f o r maintenance

operalions will be mandntory in order to perform t,hem adequ;iLc?ly".

Shelter. so essential to successful cold weather operations. in i i sL be i)roperly

designed for t h e purpose. Improper shelters. such as t e n t s without pmper linetx or weather seals, do no t provide sufficiene warmth. Thcy wnste precious he1 in viiin

attempts t o warm them, and t a k e up transport space be t te r used to carry other i t e m s . In short. they are a liability ra ther than a benefit?'.

Storage requires special consideration also. Dry storago slioiild be on dunniigo

and under shelter. Cold s torage will not be a problem f o r some items. but, speciol

items like medicines will still require cnrofully controlled teinpemtiires. I I n i t s must.

not leave small items of supply on t h e ground o r t h e y will be lost in t h e snows*.

Tactical siLuations i n t h e cold regions will require highlv mobile medical

facilities. T h i s requires tracked vehicles to move facil i t ies and evacuate wounded

in warmth. protected from t h e elementsa'.

L e a d e w Corrpiderations

T h e leaders of s u c c e s f u l units m u s t endure t h e same difficulties a s t h e i r

soldiers. Wlion a leader maintains close nssociatioiir w i L h his subordinules in cmltl

situations, h i s weaknesses in personality and emotional structure are magnified. O n e

of his m o s t . valuable assets will be his own inLernal gauge t o Lcll h i m when he

needs to separate himself periodically from his men to reflect on his behavior

within his com mand".

OperaLing in t h e cold places special leadership wquircmenls on units. E v e r y

leader in t h e u n i t must have t h e pmper ltnow1edg.o nnd skills 1;o operntx in tlio

cold, plus t h e commitment to t h e mission which is so essential in helping soldiers

overcome t,heir fear of t h e envi ronment . 'The. leaders m i i s t actively work LO biiild

soldiers' coiifidciiiw i l l t.lic4r txainiiix 'They I I I I ~ S I .pay oxtrii : i I , ~ . ~ i i ~ i ~ i i iiiiid ~ X ~ I I ~ I ) I I I ~ ? I I I , .

t o detail when planning and executing operations in the coltl. Leaders must have

t h e courage to tistiiblish top-t.o-bott,oin leadership strength among t.lie soldiers: each

soldier mus t share par t of t h e responsibility f o r t h e uni t ' s well-being. Each

member must fee l t h e responsibility f o r checking o ther members of his squad or

team f o r symptoms of t h e physical or psychological e f fec ts of t h e cold. Each man

m u s t conduct proper maintenance on h i s own and unit equipment".

The following two chapters illustrnto how t h e leademhip. training. and I.lic?

equipping of t h e fighting forces have been the keys to succezs of combat units in

t,he cold. This will he depicccd in 1:wo historical examples: 0 1 1 0 , a victory within

a defeat: the other. a defea t within a victory.

I V - RUSSO-FINNISH W A R , 1939-1940

General Account of Events T h e Czar of Russia had ordered t h e Finnish Army to disband a t t h e start of

t h e 20th CenLury. His downfall a f t e r the 1917 Hussirin llevolution removed this

limitation on the Finns. Out of an internal dispute and victory over t h e Finnish

Bolsheviks. t h e Finnkh Army w a s reborn. Training began w i t h hasic com bat, skills.

then progressed to winter warfare skills. In 1925, t h e Army added traininR in

military skiing to its instruction f o r winter warfare. T h e alikio sled. long a usefol

tool in t h e interior. was militarized. The Army also performed many tests i n t h e

development, of a t.cnt, system that canre to be t h e envy iind the model T.or many

other armies. and would prnve invaluable in t.he coining fight with t h e Soviets'.

The I'rotcctive? Corps, which had its root9 as f a r tiack as I100 iindt:r tho

Swedish domination of Finland. was t h e foundation of t h e Finnish Army thaL fouRht

the Soviets i n 1939--40.Since the early 192Os, the Army had encouraged civilian

skiing competitions and military ski training in all of the Protective Corps districts

of Finland. I h t h l o n competitions (ski and shoot,) were added Lo t.hc programs i i i

1925. along w i t h orienteering. both of which helped build physical stamina and

endurunce. I'rnt.ective Corps boys' detoc1iment.r. similar 1,o Iloy Scoiils, tiegan

forming .just before 1930. These youths practiced skiing, shooting. and camouflage

skills. Thus. the I:inns hud preparcd well for wiiiLer warfare i n northern Kui.ope'.

lb

T h e Soviet Army. on t h e othcr hand. was not properly prepared for war on the Finnish I'roiit.. 'Tlioir f;iilurt> 1:o prepare proper ly for cold --rc?l;it.i.d prohlosis

caused t h e m t.housands of casualties. Not only did t h e y not. h a v e adequate

equipment. hut t h e mKjorit,y of Soviet soldiers who crcwed t h e lirontier in 1939

wore khaki uniforms. The leaders. s u r e of quick victory, did noL even call f o r

vehicles and equipment to be camouflaged'.

The Soview believed t h a t t h e offensive spirit. which pervaded the Hod Army

would c a m them to easy victory. Their poorly trained officers adhered strictly to

regulatory hat t le drills, even in t h e f a c e of needs f o r adaptation. Tactics wort!.

therefore. mass tactics. Eventually, t h e Soviet ability to draw on wave a f t e r wave

of Soviet soldiers P r o m che large populntion base defeat.ed the Finns. 'Thus, t h e

war was won by attrition, but only a f t e r t h e Finns Latight t h e Soviets many lessons

ahout. fighting in the cold'.

T h e Finns' early recognition t h a t t h e Soviets remained near t h e roads gave

them a basis for their t,act,ics. They conducted extensive rc:connui.ssanct? aimed i l l .

finding t r a i n s locations. Once t h e Finns located t h e t ra ins containing the Soviet.

field kitchens and shelter, they mounted raids using highly motii le ski--mouiitc.:d

battalions. Without these trains, the Soviet. advances came t o G halt,. T h e Finns

then isolated ulemenl-s in Llie culuinils amid destroyed them in small increments.

The Soviets' lack of oversnow movement capability held them close t o t h e

roads. Even though t,hey had many ski sets uvnilrible. they had no tmiiiiiu; in

their use. Thus. t h e Soviets rarely ventured more than 400 meters from the main

roads'. The inessnge is clear ttint combat ui i i t s must. hnve inwmtiow capability :it.

least equal t o t h a t of t h e expected enemy force.

'The Finns. in c:ont.rast t o their enemy. trnvoled easily Lhroiigh t.he snow mid

forests: and protected their forces from t h e elements . They w e d lighl. eciuipmenl

and ncc1i.mat.izr.d soldiers who wc?m well-trnined i n skiing. snowshoc!ing. and ol;lic:r

methods of cross-country movement. in t h e cold re?,ions. T h e y made winter roads,

culled /.o/vitie. through t h e snow and over' frozen bodies ol' wtil .er. using horse-

drawn snow plows. These roads allowed them to supply their forces and evacuate

their wounded. For shelter, they used squad-size t e n t s called .ioukkoLefCu. warmed

by small s toves burning birch wood. Troops rotated o u t of combat every two houm

to warm t,liemselves in the tents'.

17

Utwt i i s e elie hiaclc?qiiat.c? preparii~.ioiis atid ot.litx- IIIIL'O~C:SB~?II tliPl:iciilLies wtwc itot.

r)roditcin& a ciuick so vie^ victory, SLalin was furioiis. He firad Natxhal Voroshilov

as Commissar f o r Del:ense. replacing h i m with 'Titnoslienko. Hc inride Tintuslienko

Commanderin-Chief of Red forces in t h e Finnish theater . Providing t h e Soviet

forces with new political officers and fresh supplies, Timashenlto resumed Ihc

offensive and pressed until both sides signed a cease-fire agreement on 12 March

1940'.

In t h e end, t h e Finns la%23,157 killed and 43.557 wounded. T h e Soviets

lost nlmast, 10 t i m e s those numbers. but they did not fee l the impact. LLS much iis

less-populous Finland'. Other significant casualties of this war were tlte old ideas

in t h e Soviet Red Army about combat in t h e cold. To discuss these and ut.hor

lessons learned from t h e Winter W w . 11 special meeting was Iield in Ihc) Krc?nlliri

between 14-17 April 1940 t o discuss t h e campaign in Finland. Critics s ta ted that

I.he poor showing by t h e Red Army was aLt,ributable to several ltoy Fact:ots:

inapwopriate force s t ructure f o r infantry divisions; poor state of training a t t.he

individual soldier leval: lack of illfantry firepower; sliortage of oversnow ~moliility

means and winter clothing; lack of winter warfare training; and difficultiev in

the supply and maintenance systems. Many reforms came out of: this meeting w h i d i

l e f t t h e Red Army in good s tead in preparation for t h e war wi th Germany in the

following years'.

One of t h e major batt les i n Finland studied by t h e Soviets, and later by t h e

U.S.. was t h e bat t le of Suomssalmi. The Pollowing sectiun describes t h e cvetiLs 01

t h a t batt le.

V ~ a tN S u o m a s a l m i

In December 1939, t h e Soviet Ninth Army attacked w e s t w a r d into Finland to

bisect t h e country at its narrow waist., sending t h e 44th Motorized InfanLry Ilivision

and t h e 163d Infantry Division as t h e elements to accomplish this task. T h e 163tl

had reached t h e hamlet of Suomassnlmi. 25 miles Prom tlte Soviet border rind I 0 0

miles south of t h e Arctic Circle. by 7 December. The snow there was a s deep as

three f e e t over t h e countryside. and t h e temperatures dropped to -30°F and

colder. By Christmas. a Finnish division hastily organized from t h r e e .ia,ger

regiments (light. infantry. of which two repjments were reservists) began 1.0

counterattack against the 163d. After t w o days of f ie rce fighting. t h e Soviet.

division disint.egrnt,ed rind w a s rout.ed hack to Ll t e Soviet. fronl.ic>r. ' l i e Finns now

18

~:~i i i ( :~?~~t .r i i t .~~dI . l i e ,141.11 Flotrirized IIivision. 21 I:Icriiinit~n divisioi~. ; ip~~ror ic I~ i~ i~ ; 011

Siioinamalrni f i ~ i ~ n onet.he soiiLheasT. iilong t h e ovnilablo

'l'lie Finns had est.nblislied a roadb1uc:k to slow the progrcw of t;ht: Sovir%

44th Division and keep it from linking UP w i t h t h e 163d Division. Because of the

madbound operations of t h e 44th. and t.he lack of experience in cold weather

operations among t h e Ukrainians from t h e plains. two Finnish companies and some

mortars proved capable of completely st,opping t h e Soviet Division.

The 44th Division's 50 tanks: and its troow, who were not even trained

suffic:ient,ly to don their allocation of 200 pairs of skis, did not vent.ure more tliiin

a P e w hundred meters from t h e road. T h e highly mobile Finns w e r e able to move

at. will nround t,he Soviet formations and c:onduct extonsivc: 'l'liorecoi~~i : l i~a~i[ :~: .

Finnish division was constructing a winter snow road LO support a major at,taclc

against, t h e helplesslu immobile 44th. I.at.er. the Finnish com mnndtrr o r d e r 4 ~iiiu~.licr

winter road built around t h e 44th. These winter roads allowed f o r harassing

at tncks and. finally, a major a t tack as deer, as 15 miles past tlic rondhlock along

t h e Soviet. column".

By the end of December. t h e Soviet Commander of t h e 44th Division ordered

his units to dig in and defend. His soldiers hod no portable shelters. so many 01'

t h e m built lean-to shelters or snow holes. ?lanu f roze to death in their sleep.

Estimatw placed nonbnttle casualties due t o cold as high as h a t t k c:nslirilticls. Tho

Finnish probes made even t h e lighting of warming f i res too dangerous. 111 contrast ,

t h e Finnish combat units hauled 20-man tents on nlikio sleds. These 1.enl.s had

small, wood-burning stoves, which allowed rest periods for t h e Finnish soldiers in

relative warm1.h.

Once t h e Finnish at tacks began in earnesT... t h e winter roads wert? ext.ended t.o

points iminediat.nly behind tlie hat,tla arcns. Ilere, tlie Finns Iind hot. h o d rind

drink.. prepared in warm shelters. The troops not i n immediate cont,acL. as

indicnt.ed earlier, rot.ated int.0 these t e n t s about. every t,wo hours'*.

I n contrast to c;lie well-supplied rind warm Finns, the Soviets were IiiinRry and

cold. The i r morale began to bottom out, very quickly. T h e Finns had deliberatelu

made Soviet field kitchens high priority Largots, gradunlly destroying or caphiring

all 55 of the ones deployed by t h e Soviets. On 4 January. t h e F inns began

nt,t.nc:ks in sLrength against t h e 44t,h Ilivkion. Hy 1at.e on tlie 6th 0 1 January, t.hc:

44th Ilivision Corn mander ordered a general retreat.. authorizing subordinates 1.0

exfi l t ra te back to t.he Pronlier. The Finns were able t,o ~ i i u t i i r c ?4 3 of Llic? 44th

19

Division's tanllS. 70 field l\,ms, 278 other vehic:les, :300 machinel\uns. b,OOO rifles,

and 1,170 live draul\ht horses. They estimated Soviet losses in t.his action at.

22.500. "hill' losinl\ only ahout 2.700. Th" Soviet 114th Divi~ion cOlillna",ll,r

escaped. only to be shot upon his return to the U.S.S. R."

The primary conclusions drawn from examining the Battle of Suomassalmi

concern mobility, equipment. training, and protection of the soldiers.

Mobility difficulties in the terrain of the far north hinder the ability to mass

large formations. Winter favors the offense more than any other season in this

region. The finns' building of winter roads to overcome mobility pmblems dircetly

supported the front line troops. Where there were no roads. Finnish oversnow

movement techniques proved to be invaluable, especially in the a",'a of

reconnaissance.

Proper equipment and clothing for the soldier. to include overwhites for

camouflage, protected and concealed t.he Finnish t.roops in the snow and cold.

Individual training, especially Finnish ski training, was a ma.jor key to tactical

success. The best lesson to eome out of the war wus tho one about sled-portahle

tent and ~tove groups to provide warm shelter for the troops, thus prolonging their

ability to sustain combat operations.

v - RECONQUEST OF ATTU. 1943

Attu, located about 2.000 miles from Juneau, Alaska, in the Aleutians. is the

only inhabited island of North Amedea lying within the Eastern Hemisphere. Tho

local inhabitants and veterans of the 1943 bat.tle on IItt.u claim that it has the

world's wor'St weather. Const.ant winds reach speeds as high liS 11\0 mil'''' 1)('" hour.

and fog shrouds m~t of the island, in spite of the high winds. In describing the

terrain, local inhabitants indicate there are no t.rep_~ hecause the consl.llnl. winds

will not allow them t.o take root. The ground is covered by combinations of

tundra, matted grasses over volcanic topsoil, and muskeg. Tundra is not tmfficablc

for tanks, ,jeeps, or lan<ling aircraft. The mud is thick enoul(h to pull the boots

off a walkinl( soldier'.

20

On tho inoriiiiig of 7 Jwic I9U. 2.5110 nrivril inFmt,rvmt?ii 111: t.la! .I;ipruiwc?

I mperial Nnrthern I;loeL Inndetl iinopposetl on severnl islands in the? Aleut.ians'. 011

29 0c:t.ober 1942. B bal.t;nlion 01' .lapnnuse inPalnl;rv h i d e d in Ilrikz Uav on z\I.I.u'.

In rill. there were about 2,600 Japanese on Attu tiy Llie the U.S. forces began

landings six months later.

I n early 1943, t h e Army chose t h e 7th Motorized Division to retake t h e

Aleutian islands of Kiska and Attu. This uni t w a s , until that. time. training in t h e

California deser t f o r we in North Africa. Against protests by commanders in

Alaska. t h e 7th was rfivort.ed f o r u s e in the Aleutians. The Army had no reril

experience in conducting amphibious island fighting. Still, t.he War I)epartinent. gave

the 7th only t.hrt:e mont.hs t.o transition from i i mo~.orizc?ddesert- Porc:~t.0 iiii

amphibious Arctic Force.

During t h e preparation f o r departure from San Diego. experienced officew

from Alaska tried t.0 emphasize t.he requirements for t h e campaign. The oriticiil

requirements were supply and f i re support. After weeks of arguing. authorities

siipiilied I (15m ni howitzers (;0 the division to replace cho '75m m pack howic.zcr

normally used by t h e 7th. Staff officers ridiculed an estimate I.hat. e v e r y mie

combat soldier needed t w o soldiers to kcep him supplied in t h e iiiidevcI~~pc:d

terrain. Adding to t h e problem was t h e overall supply situation. T h e Army's

supply of wint,er clothing and equipment w o s in England and Africa i n preprinit.ioii

for t h e invasion and campaign in Italy'.

T h e 7 t h had no place to practice landings on t e m i n similar Lo At.ta. All

t.hey had w e r e t,he benches of San Clement,e Island and Montorov in C:ilifornir~'.

I n an effort, to pmtect the secrecy or t.he coming mission. the mon 01' the '71.11

received short-sleeved tropical uniforms and cla.sses on tropical diseases. 'Thus, t h e

individual soldiers recoived no ma1 enviroiimenc;al trnining preparntion l:or oper.;i\.iiiR

in t h e cold. On 24 April 1943, t h e assault force set sail from California in f i v e

overcrowded sh iw. unnware (;hat. t h e environment. w a s 1.0 b s r i worse RIICIIIY t.hrin

t h e Japanese'.

Upon arriving at Cold Bay, Alaska. t h e 7Lh Division did not. t ake the

0pport:unity to acclimatize t h e men. 'L'here were no fac:ilii.ies ashore and Lhe ships

provided t h e only warmth. The only u n i t t o t ry t,o t r a in and acclimatize was t h e

I'rovisional Scout. Ratt.alion, who used t h e week in harbor to practice rishore'.

21

Tile Provisional Scout Battalion had formed under corn inand of' Captaiii Uilliain

I t . W i l lo~i~lil iy. W illoiifililiu crc:rrt.od c.liis unit, of 4 LO Iiuntl--~iicltc:dofPic:t!ts rind iiioii

by recruiting from all over t h e 7 t h Division and Fort Ord area. T h e Scouts w e r e

physically tough and able to march over mountains c:irrying Piil l packs with IiLtle

effort'.

The plan of a t tack on Attu called f o r landings of one r e g i m e n t a t Holtz Bay

in t h e north, one reg iment a t Massacre Bay in the southeast. and Willouglihy's

Scouts in t h e w e s t . These forces would link UP i n t h e mountain pass senarat.ing them and move northeast to destroy the supposedly cut-oEP .lapanme garrisrin i n

Chichagof Harbor. 'The third divisional regiment would rema in on board ship a s a

rwserve force. O n 3 May 1943. radio intercepls revealed that t h e Ji~panesc~t i i d

discovered the plan f o r t h e invasion of Attu. T h e garrison was on 23 hour sLand-

by alert'.

Storms in t h e islands caused postponements of t h e landing. Secrecy. stresred

since before leaving Cnlifomia. was so poor thaL a kirilter Winchell broadcast, diiring

t h e week before t h e landing advised the world t,o watch t h e Aleutians. 111

preparation for t h e expected invasion. t h e Japanese corn mander moved his troo;is

away from t h e coast. Knowing t h e difficulties involved w i t h trafficability on t h e

island. he wanted to f ight t h e invaders in the hills. as f a r fmm Lhe siipplies on

t h e beaches a s possible. O n 11 May. t h e U S . Army conducted its f i w t amphibious

island landing in history ~inoppused".

B Y 1700 hours on U-Day, t h e main bodies of t h e Scoots and both t h e

Northern and Southeistern Forces had landed with no opposit;ion. Arlillery pinci?s

and t,lieir t rac tor prime movels: landed, but got no fur ther than 75 metem from the

shore as Lhe vehicles lost traction in t . 1 ~t.undra mud and snow pal,ches. The firt:

support would h a v e to be from t h e beach area. A wide-tracked vehicle. siicli a s

an OVH~SIIOW vehicle. would have avoided Lhis problem,

Over t h e nex t f ive days. t h e a t tack by t h e Southeast force. spearheaded by

the 17 th Regiment. required Imnta l assiiullx up Lhe moirntain p a s in the open

terrain. w i t h devastating. resul ts . Finally. they dug positions in t h e snow and

tundra and wailed.

T h e supply situation became critical. Since all vehicles ashore had sunk i n the nitid. combnt troops w e r e wilhdrawn and required to carry supplies". A

supervised bearc?r system should have been incliided in t.he plan I r n m L h e starL. 11s

t h e Alaska officers had warned.

22

On t h e f i t s t . night. aFtcr lie Sorit.lieiisL F o r w sot. up dolcrnsivo poskioiis, ~ . l r c .

inen, exhausted by t h e climb and t h e i r f'irst comhal. slopL wherever t.liev could,

expmed t,o the elements. Many awoke w i L h sevnrt> frustbito. I n Lht: morriiiig. Llie

fog lifted part way up t h e mountains, concealing t h e Japanese. but expasing t h e

Americans. who had not. had food delivered to them since landing. .Japanese snipers

kept movement by t h e Americans to a minimum". T h e weather and terrain were already taking the i r toll. All during t h e f i r s t

Pour days. t h e weather kept U S . bombers and clcse support, aircraft. from ei ther

taking off or finding targets on Attu. The wounded a t Massacre Bay had been

lying in t h e we t . and cold a t unit aid stations f a r as lon~as 48 hours. Radio

t.raffic was disrupted by static, not unusual in t h e northern regions. whic:li

int.c?rfi?red wi th coin inand iind control".

Nearly half of t h e Scouts on t h e western side of t h e island w e r e casualt ie?

from Im%hite . sickness, or wounds by the fourth day. If leaders did not

constantly watch them. t h e men would not move around or change wet socks. One

plat,oon Pmm t h e Southeastern Force w a s cut, off for four days. when t.hey were liiL

by Japanese mechinegun fire. When t h e platoon leader tried to g e t t h e men LO

meneuver. they were mentally niimh with the cold and hunKer and would iiot. movo.

I.'inally, a squad leader got his men to take out t h e enemy gun". The need f o r

strong top-to-bottom lendership became apparent.

In view of t h e difficulties: experienced by t h e 7 t h ashore. Admiral Kincaid.

com mander of forces in Alaska and tlic? Aleutians, decided to relieve !la.ior Gc?noral

Albert E. B r o w n . t h e 7th Division Commander. He replaced him with Major General

Eugene M. Landrum, an experienced Alaska hand".

By t,he sevcnt,h diiy of t.lie haLtle. L l i c A mcriciins had siifferod 1. I00

casualties, 500 of them cold in.juries. A s clcse air support elements could not. get.

in because oC weat.her, naval gunfire had 1.0 provide this SupporL, rapidly dwlct.iiig

t h e fleet 's ammunition. Ship-to-shore supply dwindled almost t o nothing by t h e

eighth day, as '30 of t h e original 93 landing c r a f t had sunk, either striking reels

or swamping in t h e winds and storm-induced high surf. Ashom. t h e f i rs t a t tempts

were begun by t h e engineers to build a road f o r t h e artillery and supplies. I n tho

cold and rain, t h e Americans began to strip t h e dead Japanese bodies of the i r

effective cold weather clothing. even though it created t h e risk of Lheir hein% slrol.

by friendly fire". They found t h a t t h e y needed a means of identifyinK friend

from foc when both dressed similarly against t h e cold.

On day t w e l v e , some of t h e frontline battalions returned to t h e beach.

Thete. leaders discovorod t,liat some of the ineii hiid iiot. rr?i~ii,vc?dtlioir bciols in

thirteen days. resulting in miiltiple foot and cold in.iuries. Small unit. leaders

should have been constantly checking Co avoid this kind of neglect.

By day thirteen. t h e new division commander realized t h a t vehicles would not be able to move t h e artillery forward. l ie ordered t h e artillery pieces as well ILS

t h e 105mm shells. weighing 54 pounds each, moved forward by hand.

On day eighteen, with his original 2.600-man force reduced to 800 comtiat

capable soldiers and 600 wounded, t h e Japanese commander ordered a night attack

against t h e supplies of t h e 7 t h Division. The tactics were simple: chargce. and

keep charging until t h e American supplies were taken. Then, t h e Japanese force

would retire to Lhe hills and wait, f o r t h e unsupplied Americans to either leave 1:Ii i~

island or starve". On t h e evening of 28 May, t h e Japanese commander killed o r

ordered t h e suicide of all of h i s wounded and assembled f o r h i s final a t tack .

When t h e att.aclt began, it, penetrated a weak sector. Some engineers w i t h s in i i l l

arms. bayonets, and grenades finally stopped it. A t t h a t point, t h e 500 remaining

Japanese committed mass suicide w i t h grenades. thus ending t h e bat t le t o rot,alce

Attu".

The bat t le f o r Attu w a s second only to Iwo Jirna a s t h e m o s t costly American

bat t le in t h e I'acific. considering t h e casualties as a perCentage of t h e total forc:t.s

employed. Of t h e estimated 14.000 men ashore at Attu. t h e unit suffered 549

killed, 1.148 wounded, 614 suffering from disease including exposure, 318 other

casualties less cold in.juries. and 1,200 severe cold injuries. T h e enormous loss of coinhat power due to cold injuries caused a massive study by t h e Surgeon Geiwral's

office before t h e invasion of I ta ly . and t h e immediate acqukition of n e w footwear.

clothing. ten&, bednills. and rations.

The reports from Attu saved hundreds of American lives in the months Lo

come. but this was small comfort, to t h e hundreds of A L t u veternns who underwent.

amputation of fmstbi t ten l i m k " . They had simply confronted a bett,er equipped

enemy on Attu. As early as 1933, t h e Japanese had issued their soldiers knee-high

boots made of leather and felt . The f e l t lining w a s heavy enough t;o trap w i i r m

air to keep t h e f e e t warm. The undersoles were rubber, molded in a corriigated

design to allow f o r easier foot movement acrcm icy surfaces. A l l Japanese soldiers

received two sets of wool insoles, which they changed regularly to allow thorn t o

24

dry. 'To pmLect their hands. they received mithns lined with shetm wool n ~ i dRoat.

hair exLeiidiiig 1:roin I.lie cuL'ts nl l the W I L Y to the fing~?rtips?.

A mdor conclusioii drawn froin tho bnttlc was t.hnt the ground I'orw

commander cannot always count, on air power in cold regions f o r several reasons.

The visibility a t an airfield could change from 5,000 feet. to compleiely fogged in

within six minutes. 'The winds were so high on m o s t days t h a t bombing runs took

six hours to t h e target arid only two hours back. 'The cold e f fec ts on t h e nircrnft.

and crews caused difficulties in operation and maintenance". Along w i t h

teinperaLure t?ffec(;s, high winds wreaked havoc. 'They ofLon reached wind speeds as

high as 140 miles per hour. There w e n ? 174 aircraf t lost in t h e Eleventh Air Force due la weatlier and mcchanical pruhlems. c:ompared 1.0 on lu ,111 lost. i n

coinbat. The Navy Fleet Air Wing lost 35 aircraf t to bad weather. compared LO

only I 6 in combat. 'The Japanese suffered too, with as many 21s 200 airi:rnft. ICA.L

in storms and fog, compared to 69 lost in action. T h e s e e f fec ts of Lhe weather

on a i r opera(;ions in t h e Aleutiails l e f t t h e ground troniw w i t h the correct

impression thaL one simply could n o t rely on air su~por t" .

The other major lc~~onslearned pointed to t h e obvioim needs lor p ~ i p e r

individual training. equipment, force structure. and doctrine f o r conducting

operatioils in cold regions.

V I - POSTWAR US. ARMY COLD WEATHER DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

G&BSI.B!

T h e [IS.Army became concerned about cold weather warfare in the early

stngHs of W W 11. 0,s. Army docmine devalopers had nolxd t h e iiiiprwsivo

pert'ormance. of Lhe Finns in their war w i t h t h e U.S.S.R. They looked at. t h e need

for units trained f o r operations in mountains and t h e cold'.

A t t h e end of t h e war. t h e Army kicir College pcsed a series of ciuclstioiis to

a gmup of German general officers, all of which had fought in t h e 1I.S.S.R. during

winter. The questions deal t with requirements f o r s u c c ~ f u l large scale wint,er

operations in the cold. The respondents indicated t h e primary requirements as: equipment designed to withstand t h e cold; trained. acclimatized soldicrs;

exceptionally determined and physically f i t officers of all ranks; fully mobile

coinbat and supply vehicles. capable of cIyxss--counCry niovement. iii deep SIIOW m c l

25

mud; suitable riitions; t,echnicnl I'ncilities hnrdenod iigainsl. t h e cold; iind a

thoroughly prepnred a i r force'.

A vat4et.y of agencies established during and a f t e r UW 11 h a v e contributed t.o

t,he Army's c u m n t . ability to wage war ui t h e cold. Brief histories, rules, and

missions follow on t h e major agencies.

Historical A c c o u n t s Of M a b r A r m y A K C Y I C ~ Dealinr( W i t h Cold Weather 1-U.S. A r m y Nathern Wa&am Traininn Center - NWTC The U.S. Army Arctic Indoctrination Cent,er formed in t h e winter of l194Wl9,

a t Big Delta. Alaska. I t s original mission was t o train combat arms and servicw officers in basic Arc:l,ic operatious. I t oriented on termin. wnntlier. survivnl.

logistics, and small unit operations'.

In 1951, t h e Combined-Joint Committee on Arctic Operations, meeting a t Forr.

Leavenworth. recoin mended t.he Arctic Indoctrinntion Cent.er as t h e single-soiirce

proponent agent f o r Arctic operations. T h e center would be t h e proponent for several activit ies: development and supervision of long-range programs for the

Arctic; development and t s t i n g of doctrine; establishment of requirements for

developing A r r t i c materiel and supervision of testing; publication and maintenance of institutional memory of written material pertinent t o Arctic operations;

preparation of individual and unit training pmgmms; develownent of f o r c e

.stnictiii'e~ for units which were tasked f o r or likely to operate in cold regions;

and coordination w i t h sister services in Arctic tact ical research and development,'.

In 1957, t h e U.S. Army Arctic Indoctrination Center nlso received t h e cold

weather and mountain training mission previously performed a t Camp Hale, Colondo

s ince Sept.einber 1042. Special emphasis was placed 011 devc?loying individunls

qualified to perform a s ins t ruc tom With t h e acceptance of t h e s e missions, t h e

scltool's name became t h e U S . Army Cold Weather and Mountnin Scliool (CWMS).

The school still retained its original mission. but proponency for Arctic matters soon changod hands'.

Beginning in mid-1962, t h e U S . Army Combat Developments Command formed

and ahsorbed t h e U.S. Army. Alnska ( U S A R A L ) Comhat Developments ( C D ) olfice,

which will be covered later in this chapter. The U S A R A L C D off ice reported tha t

on 25 September 19h2. tho doctrinal pmponency for both nort:hern rind rnounhin

operations had moved from t h e U.S. Army Cold Weather and Mountain School t.o

26

ConibaL Uevelopmeiits Agency. Alaska ( C U A ( A K ) ) , t h e new name f o r Lhe IISABAL

(: 1) office’.

I n 1963. Lhe CkiMS was redesignated t h e 1j.S. Army Northern W a r f a r e Traiiiing

Cent,er ( N WTC). with emehasis on training cadre members f o r units opernting in L l i e

cold regions. Today. NWTC trains cadre members f o r units and agencies with

missions or interests in cold weather warfare. I t trains company-sized units and

sometimes assists: battalion-size units in conducting environmental training in

Alaska. NWTC is staffed for t.ri%iningonly and does not have enough personnel 1.0

manage eroponency f o r cold weather warfare doctrine.

I.TC Sheehan. conimandant of t h e N WTC in 1967. recommended that, 1J.S.

Continental Army Command (IISCON A R C ) Regular Army officers and N C O s attend

N WTC on an iiidividual hasis. They could t h e n t.akc thc basic cold w e i i l . h w riltills

back to the i r C O N US-based units. He recommended special selection and aSSigniiIt?Iit

nf soldiers trained to fight and survive in t h e cold and mountninoils regions’.

Col1. h L r a - CRRELR e W W I 1 saw requirements for U S . Forces to build airfields and Cacilities in

areas with permafrost and snow. The Frost Effects Laboratory (FEL), established

in Unston. August 1944. coordinated studies on how to analyze thc%e t y p e s of

terrain, execute effect ive construction on them, and conduct mobility over them.

I n February 1945. VEL eat,ablished t h e Alaska Field St,ation n e w Fiiirhunks t.o

condiict tests. In 1953. combining several investigative agencies of t h e Corps of

Engineers. t.he Army established t h e Arctic Construction and YrosL EFfecVs

Laboratory ( A C F E L ) . I n 1961. restructuring of the efforts of ACFEL. and another

agency pmduced the II5. Army Cold Regions Research mid Envjneering I.;ibornLors

(CHREL). C R H E L moved from t h e Corps of Engineers t.0 t h e Army Materiel

Command in July 1962. C R ItKL’s primary mission involvcs studies of snow. ice, I I I I ~

Frozen ground. and t h e engineering aspects: of construction and mobi1it.y i n these

conditions’. The narmw €ocw of its mission prevents CI<ItI.:l. Pmm heing the

proponent agent. f o r cold weather doctrine. but it can perform special stiidita: in

support of doct,rine development.

27

U.S. A r m y Cold Regiom T& Center - CRTC

(; I fTC originally formed in l.he onrly 1.~40snL Rig Ilolta, Alaslte. (is tlie Army

Arctic T e s t Branch. Th i s facility belonged to t h e Chief. Army Field Forces. t h e n

to USCONARC. Later, when Training and Uoctrine Command (TRAIIOC) and Arinv

Materiel Command (AMC) formed, AMC assumed control of t h e center, now referred

to as t h e U S . Army Arctic T e s t Center. In t h e early 197Ur. t h e center' became

t h e U S . Army Cold Regions T e s t Center. Throughout these changes, it retained

t h e mission to perform engineering design tests. feasibility tests. developmental

tes-. and initial production model tests. Supposedly, all materiel developed by and

f o r t h e U.S. Army and not intended solely f o r desert, 1:ropical. or temperato

climates is tes ted t h e r e . While C R T C provides excellent insights for t.he Army in t h e area of cold e f fec ts o n materiel, iLs char te r s part, of A M C limits: its

capability f o r doctrinal developments.

Combined Arms Center Liaison O f f i c a (Alaska) - CAC LO (AK)

A s early as 1952. USCONARC bestowed proponency f o r Arctic wnrfaro t o

U S A R A L . BY 1955, U S C O N A R C had also granted proponency f o r Arctic doctrine and Arctic Field Manuals to I J S A H A L . In June of 1956. C O N A R C endorsed

USARAL's r e q u e s t f o r establishing a Combat Ueveloprnent (CU) Section, w i t h t h e

m i s s i o n s to: oversee t h e testing of tactics. techniques. and doctrine; recommend

modifications t o t h e force s t ructure to s u i t operations in cold regions; review and

analyze t h e family of Arctic field manuals: determine mi1it.at-y characterist ics

required of Army equipment; determine t h e environmental e f fec ts of t.he Arctic on

personnel: rwort annually on tlie Army's ability to conduct a rc t ic wnrfnrc?:

examine supply requirements f o r operations in cold regions; determine unique reqiiirements f o r arctic airborne operntions: and explore im~irovemenbin cr(m country movement of troow and equipment . 'These functions were performed

throtii?,li coordination with t h e Army Arctic Indoctrination Center (later callcd

N WTC)". Additionally, t h e new Combat Developments office coordinated testing of

equipment with t h e Army Field Forces' Arctic Test B r a n c h ( la ter called CR'IC)". A s explained in t h e NWTC section. t h e li.S. Army CombaL IlevelopnieiiLs

Command absorbed t h e USA R A L Combat Ueveloprnents off ice in mid-1962.

Doct.rinal Droponency f o r both northern and mountain ouerations moved from the

CWMS t o t h e Combat. Uevelopmenw Agency (Alaska). ( C U A ( A K ) ) . t h e new name for

t h e CI) office".

28

I n t l ie iiren of doct.rina1 publicntions. [.he n e w (1 I) A ( A K ) giiiiic!d rc?si)~,iir;iliilit.v

f o r inaintaininp and uptlatinx F?l 3 1--70. /lasic Lbfd fveather :!faniiaf,' F?l 31 -71.

Ahthem 0pwzit.i~ms: rind C'M 3 1 72, UperwLiom'. In ctarlv lOb3. t h ei%~ii~itah

C D A ( A K ) reviewed 'TOES in order to establish northern operations and mountain

operations annexes. They coordinated troop tests of clot,hing and equipment in tlie

cold regions. In t h i s way , a recognized agency had act ive proponency and

aiithority to iict on miitters iiivolviiig doctrine development. t.est,ing. trniniiig. and

a f t e r action reports of exercises. Because of t h i s , t h e Army read their reports

and applied t h e lessons learned f r o m

In t h e late 1970s. t h e Combined A r m s Center ahsorbed C D A ( A K ) and wnaincd

it: the Combined Arms Center Liaison Office ( A Iaslta). office lost. its'Ik? mponsibil i ty and aut,hority as t h e one c/eariiit house of doctr im and combat.

developinents f o r cold regions. 'That responsibility now resides a t Fort.

Leavenworth. Kansas. Today, t h e Alaska office conducts liaison w i t h the agencies

in Alu.rka. inost. notably t h e 6th Infantry Ilivision (Light), N WTC. and CIITC. It. is

the most suitable agency available to serve a s t h e proponent aRenCy for cnld

weat.lier doctrine.

Conm i t t e q

Since World War 11. t h e r e have been a number of committees concerned with

combaL developiiients, doctrine, and combat operatioils in cold regions. One of Lla:

f i rs t postwar committees was formed a t Fort Leavenworth in the la te 1940s or

early 1950s. calling itself the Combined-Joint C o m mitetee on Arctic Operatinns. 111

1951. it issued its recommendations on proponency issues. 'The A r m y Arctic

Indoctrinalion CenLer, the coin ni ittee stac;ed. would tie tho proponent. For sc?vnral

activities. as indicated previously in t h e section on N WTC". l h e committee.

however. identifiod its own st,rut:ture as a inxior hirrdroiwc. The coiii mil.t.ce w i i s nd

boc. with no priorities or precedence concerning members' duily duties. No fund

cites w e r e established for defraying Lelephone and telegraph c(wts nor WHS iiiiy

money allocated for travel. Consequently. t h i s burdened t h e Com rnand and General

Staff Collegc faculty and rvsourccs. In order to solve thesc difficiilties. tho

committee recommended the following: membership f o r any s u c h committee or

agency in t h e future be t h e primary duty of each member: t h e c o m m i L L c e oss;ur?mblc:

i n one location and remain in session until all issues are atldr.t.s3.c?tl; the Army

iil1oc:iit.t: funds for I.rnvel. long -distance corn inuiii(:nt.ions. iniiil, mid civilirin rop,iil;ir

20

aiid ( i v c r t i m e pay; the Arny grant. direct. coordination autliority betwettii part.inc?nt. agencies; and tha t t h e personnel s y s t e m support c.he nssigninenl. and trackinr: of t t iosc? service mt?nihers with L l i e expertise in operatiois i n ~ ~ i l d ' l ' l i wrcKioiis.

fur ther recommended their own disbandment".

A similar committee formed in t h e mid-1950s in Alaska. T h e Arctic Guidance Board. a s it w a s called, was a non-standing committee consisting of off'icnrs

assigned to key positions within U S A R A L . The Board met once a month. but could not tackle the difficult issues. as t,he membem, due tn demands of their regiilar

duties. could not, concentrate on doctrinal items to t h e ex ten t required". Thus.

this committee also folded.

In November 1976. a Cold kieather materiel Requirements Conference convened

a t tlie U S . Army Combined Arms Center at E'ort. 1.eavenwoi-th. T l i e s t a t e d gurpchsc?

of t h e conference was to "identify and synthesize t h e materiel development and acquisition problems resulting froin mquireinentx f o r cnpubilities to operate in cold

weather and to provide or confirm recoin mended solutions"". O n c e convened. though. t,he conference began to address some of the problems in development-% of

stocks and equipment available f o r U S . Forces. 'lost of t h e s e stocks were geared for o p e r a t i o i ~ ~in Southeast Asia. Because of perceived overlap of responsibiliti(%

between C D A ( A K ) and t h e various proponent T R A D O C schools. t h e conference

coiicluded t h a t T R A I)OC publish a new policy directive. 'This pnlicy would emphasize t h e ioroponent TRAUDC schw/s as having responsibility f o r establishing req&men& for operalion, storage, and Lransport, of matariel in cold weather 01 I<

70-38). not t h e agencies assigned to and working in the cold". 'The corn mittee addressed 12 crit ical materiel problems. They recoin ~nencletl

consideration, in 10 of t h e 12 cases, f o r improvements o r studies of .-?,&&kt equipment o r materiel Drimiirily by Army Materiel Corn mand agencies. 'l'lic ot.hr?r

two cases involved acquisition of off-the-shelf items already available o r

development, of requirements f o r acquisition of new items. 111 tlie 10 CIISCS not,

involving new items, t h e thinking focused on money savings and forcing of old

syslems. not previoirsly suited f o r operatioms at lower temperatures. to meet i i c w

requirements using winterization kits or adaptations". They believed that t h e k i t

system was the only cost effect ive means. since "wlatively small qiian1.ities 101

Army materiel are1 required f o r cold weather employment"".

I n 19131. NW'I'C voiced t h e opinion that t h e Cold Weather Materiel Hnadine.~

Coiilcw?ncc he ld ii i I07b 111: Fort I.c?;ivnnworl:h Iiad IIrought iio i io~.icoali I~~iwml ls .

They discussed the ad hoc Winter Warfare Committee I'ormed in 1076 a t C l < l < l < l .

which had evolved into t h e Winter Warfare Board. but. which had not m e L as of

1981. The NWTC opinion was: "We m u s t s top examining t h e problems. and start

dciing something nbout them"", They recommended r:hat MILPEIIC1:N develop u

sys tem to t rack NWTC-trained personnel in a manner similar to master gunners i n MILPE HCE N's Armor Uranch. Additionally, t o o many uni ts were cuncelling trnining

during e x t r e m e l y cold periods, rather than continuing t.0 train in the face of t.he

exLremes, w l i i l o taking care to apply common sense. 'They voiced c~incerntlial. II. Y

YO-11, t h e long-awaited cold weather doctrine manual, was still noL published.

C U A ( A K ) c:iitbacks left, no one with t h e primary docc;rinal mi&on for cxild wf?al:lii?i~

warfare. 'Too much equipment was not being tes ted in t h e cold. 'They also

recommended F 0 RSC0 M proponency f o r cold weather warfare doctrine in p1uc:e of

T R A D OC**. I n 1985, Commander. T H A D O C . took over from C R H l i L t h e adhoc Winter

Wurfam Board's responsibilities. T It A D DC wroLe a draf t mgulution t?sl.iihlishing, a

new Winter Warfare Board. The Deputy Chief of Staff f o r Operations and Plans at,

Uepurtinent. of t.he Army, however. disnpproved Lhe Board's ~Lubli.~liiii~?~iL".

In February 1987. t h e Coa inanding General. T R A U OC. ossigned the

responsibility of identifying and overcoming deficiencies in IJ .S. Army doctrine and

materiel designed f o r operations in cold regions to t h e Comliined Arms Center at.

Fort Leavenworth. In August 1987, t h e Commander, Combined Arms C e n t e r und

Fort I.etrvenwortli (IJSAC A C & t ' L ) , assigned t.he Combined A r m s Combat. Ileveloi,iiianLs

Activity ( C A C D A ) as t h e primary activity i n t h e establishment of 8 Northern

Operatioms Working Party ( N 0 WI'). C A C D A fiirther assignt?d t h e Combined Arms

integration DirectoraLe ( C A I U ) as t h e Executive Agent in developiiig a plan for.

resolving cold r e ~ o n s issues". This w a s fortunate, as t h e I)itx?c:tor. C A I I I , hnd

commanded an artillery battalion in Alaska. The unfortunate aspect was that .

T H A U O C ullocated no addithiin1 personnel or funds. ' T l ~ u s ,t.he N 0 WI' was begun in

1987 i n much Lhe same manner as t h e Arctic Warfare Committee had been in 1951.

w i t h part-time members. no funds, and no real teeth.

Today, t h e Army has no real proponent agent in t h e field f o r cold weather

w arfare doctrine w it,h the necessary funds, persounel. and uut.liori1.v.

31

V I I - C O N C L U S I O N S A N D I M P L I C A T I O N S

T h e patt.ern of U S . Army combat developments since kik I 1 lius nvoidecl.

overlooked, or simply forgotten many of t h e requirements f o r combat readiness: in

cold regions. Several conclusions about combat readiness in t h a t arena drawn by

this author and the i r implications appear below. They have been separated int.0

t h e categories of materiel. personnel. force structure. doctrine. and leadership.

Materisl Mobility, a major area of concern f o r combat forces, requires reliable

equipment und vehicles. The A r m y must design them in accordanae wi t ,h specific:

environmental criteria. Unfortunately. t h e Army develops its materiel nround gross

climatic and terrain conditions f o r likely are= of employment, ra ther than around

specific requirements'. There exis- in the Army today an example of an item

designed specifically f o r t h e cold which is proving its worth. In t h e mid-1980s.

t h e Army bought the RV--206 Small Unit, Support Vehicle (SIISV) for units stationed

in Alaska. Soon. t h e Army will purchase more of t h e s e SUSVs from Sweden.

These should benefit both t h e units in Alaska and units wit,li cold region-

deployment contingencies.

Success in t h e cold requirts equipment specifically designed f o r operations in

t h e cold. A H 70-38. however , only require9 "st,andard general purpnw

materiel...designed f o r...effect ive use under specified conditions of t h e basic climatic

design t y ~ e " ' . Th i s means t h a t standard eauipnient must, operutx k ithoiil.

requirement f o r add-on kits from + l l O n F down to only -25". Any items f o r iise

in colder temperatures may e i ther be special it,c?ascapahle of , or solely ~lesignc?d

for, such use. Developers may modify standard items to meet t h e s e extrernm by

using modification k i t s . llsoully. Lhe least cxpensive and most: popular method of

procurement of equipment f o r u s e in cold regions involves t h e ModificaLion Kit.

appmacli'.

If t h e Army desires t h a t a system satisfactorily perform, and is maintainable

and supportable i n the cold. then it m u s t require this P r o m t h e materiel

developers. This means d w & u h g t h e system to perform a t temperatures as low a s

--50°I?. Add--on kits have proven to be ineffective and comborsome.

IJnfortunately. t h e Army h a s decided to take t h e risk associated w i L l i this aspect of

matmiel developinnnL in order to siivc on development. cwts'. These CCAS~S k i l l

probably be morc than offset. by Lhe s;lviligs down t,he line if (Ievt:lopc:ix desien L l i e

systx:iii 1.0 pt?rl'orm ~)ropc:rly in the colcl I'rom the start.. Addit.ioiiiilly, thxv is I.lic?

unquantifiable cost savinw associated w i t h a soldier's survival.

There are g a p in t h e Army llegulation ( A l l ) 70-38. As noted in the f i rs t

chapter. there are 10'F temperature gaps between t h e defined cold t.emperat,ure

ranges mcognized by t h e Army. These incowisLencia can only confuse developers

unless t h e Army corrects t h e m .

'Technology can be applied in t h e development of basic troop care and

hygiene it.ctns. For exatnple, pruviding adequate drinking wator is ii rec:urring

problem on exercises and deployments. Un i t s cannot simply melt snow. a s t .hk

wastes more fuel than &he effor t is worth. A1t.ernut.e mctliotls includt: drilline

through ice over a body of water and pumping out and purifying the w i l t . w From

undcrnentli'. The Army should purchase an inexpensive ice augur. or drill. lcir

u n i t s w i t h missions in cold regions.

Personnel

C W

A shel ter and warming plan f o r soldiers operating in t h e cold is s s e n t i a l for conducting sustained operat.ions. L e a d e n must include these pliins iis par?. 01:

opemtional planning. In Alaska, uni t s normally rutate men into warm-up she l t e r s

w e r y four hours. 'The Finns did this evary t.wo Iiours during L l i o I<usso-Finnish

bar'. Several different conclusions may be drawn. 'The Armv can s tay w i t h the

10-man Arctic tent and ahkio sled group for squads and teams. 'Tht-?y can also OPL

lor IigliLer configural.ions. such as the :3- mi in pulk sled grour), used in Sw(:dt!n. lor

special openLions Forces. Finally, they could settle on a reasonable mixture of

the L w o systems. This would of fe r t,he uniL the opportunit.y 1.0 detmiii ine tlit:

optimuin load and distance plans, and warming frequencies required for operations.

Pliysicol conditioning i.r t h e principal means of r)reparing soldiers 1.0 li&lit.

anywhere i n t h e world. In t h e cold regions conditioning is critical if soldiers are

to move c w - c o u n t r y over hostile te rmin , carrying Iienvy loads. T l i i s is (we(: i i i l ly

cri t ical if. while wearing snowshoes o r skis and heavy clothing, Lhey am. to be a

vil.al fighting foroe upon arrival tit. Llieir dcst.inotion'.

Shelter and physical conditioning k i l l not b e enough if' t h e so ld i e r does i i n t

c!;it. p r n p w l ~ in order to pruduco :idtxiiiut.c: hotly htxit,. For this rwisoii. plaiiiicm

must includc su f f i c i en t ctuantit.ics and d i e t a ry mixes of rn t ions in t ra ining and

opern t iona l plans.

Personnel Management

Acquiring and managing personnel with proper t ra in ing and ski l ls and t h e

mnintenance of a n ins t i tu t iona l memory for cold wea the r war fa re could prove

invaluable i n f u t u r e confl ic ts . These could provide t h e cont inui ty of readi i ies

needed For conibnt in t h e cold. As John Sater. an anulys t for t,he Arctic I i ~ s t i t u t e

of North America wrote :

Continuity must b e maint.aincd in mnny . . .programs if t h o s e r)rogruins am to be of innximuin vnlue. kithoot, t h e meansof maintaining cont inuous programs it will n o t b e possible to obta in t h e services of ndequa te numbers of suf f ic ien t lyt ra ined ...people capab le of solving problems of t h e Arctlc'.

r lanngement of so ld ie rs w it.h special ski l ls which apply Lo cold regions slioiild kiw;in

with recru i tment . A s shown ea r l i e r , t h o s e who are t ra ined i n t h e s e ski l ls should I.,t?

individually managt?d and assigned to gnin t h e maxinium payoff For the Army. Ono

method of doing th i s is designnting regimental l inkage be tween uni t s in the 6th

Infnnt ry Uivision (Light) . i n Alaska. and t h e IOt,li Infan t ry 1)ivision (Light.). in #c?w

York. I t should b e a p p a r e n t to personnel managers t h a t management of special ly t r a ined personnel would be a very cist-conscious step.

E m Structure

Each l ight in fan t ry . air assaul t . and a i rborne bat tnl ion TOE should r e f l e c t ;I

space For somenne with t l ie additionii l skil l iiidicator of Nortliern Warfare Expert:.

This would n o t r equ i r e a n addi t ional person. hiit, would des igna ted TOE slots for those so ld ie rs in tlie uni ts who have a l r eady rece ived co ld wencher training.

T h e uni ts with cold regions cont ingency missions should r ece ive at, least

twenLy--five SIJSVs per division: f i f t e e n for gene ra l t ranspor t . t,en for medical

evacuat ion . a l l l oca t ed in t h e DISCOMs. This would ensu re t h a t t h e s e uni ts are fnmil iar with t h e r e a u i m r n e n b for opera t ing and maintnining tlie SUSVs boforc? ncti ial deployment .

34

Training

The Army may not. need specialized truop uni t s specifically trained and

organized f o r a particular envimnment. but it does need units which can adtipt

quickly to operations i n t h o s e special environments ' . One method of enSlinnR more

rapid adaptation is tlic presence of u n i t cold weather cadre mestleis. as indiciiwd

above.

Trailbreaking is an absolute m u s t for training plans involving preparation for

operating in cold regimls. 'The majority of tAe lorce may IIOL he propt?rly t.rniiit:iI

in oversnow movement. T h e effor ts of a trained few to hreak ti-ail. Iiowever. can

significantly enliiincs t,he ability of L h e unit. t o reach its ob.iect,ivt: w i t h i i t : Iioiiii:

too exhausted to execute its intended mission". N WTC and u n i t s of the 6 t h

Infantry Division (Light), 10th Mount.iiin Division (Light.), and 1st. Special 0periil.ioiis

Command m u s t emphasize and practice this skill, a s i L may pruve to be crucial if

uiiits are deployed in t,he snow -covered northlaiid.

Low intensi ty conflict (LIC) operations are possible in cold regions. 'The

winter aids counterguerrilla operatioiw. Swamps ereeze in t h e winter. PaciliLntin~?

t h e movement of regular combat units. 'Trails used by insurgents are easier to

de tec t nnd lack of veget;ntion in t h e wint,er minimizes cover and conoealiiien(.",

Support functions For independent combat, forces in cold wgions shoulrl be

performed on an area support basis by attached elements. Mobile facilillc%should

be used for performiiig direct support. functions. Specific Lliroiighput sh(iuld iwhice

normal echeloning of supplies. Un i t distribution of supplies oft.en throughput 1.0

Corwurd uniis and bypiissing bnttnlion txains. should be t h e norm ral.her Lhan s i i i ~ ~ i l ~

DoinL diseribution". Modern major exercises: in t h e cold regions should iiiclude c.liis

concept of command and control and support arrangements. I t is not. the normal

method of doing business in t h e Army. triit. may P ~ I V Hinvriluablc! for susl;iiiic?d

combat operations in t h e cold envirunment.

The NWTC nnd t h e Army National G u a r d Mountnincering School in Vermont. iiri?

powerful Army assets for increasing ti-aining readiness in mountain nnd cold regions

operations. 'The Army N ationonal Guard Mountnineering School Lc.cuclios u n i t s

techniques f o r operating in mountainous terrain. T h e Northern Warfare 'Training

Cr?nt.er at. Fort Gt-eely. Alaska. Lruins primarily light int'nnt,ry units For cointiat i n

mountainous and cold regions envirnnments. It. elso teach- an Assault. Cliinhew

0-

Course for advanced mounLaineers and a course specially Lailorccl for reconnaiwanct:

o t ' SCOIII. c?lnments'" i j i i i L (:om in:ittdt:rs who :ire sc?rioiis :iliout; iiicw5;isinx 1;Iicir i t i t i t s '

ability to conduct operations in t.he cold should actively seek to enroll as many of

their soldiers as possible in courses taught by these schools. Commanders should

make maximum use of t h e cadre of these schools if the i r u n i t s are deploying on

training exercises to cold regions.

Cold weather doctrine requires an appropriate organization authorized t.o serve

as Lhe proponent agency. In March 1951, t h e C tiSC-directed Combined ..loinl.

Committee on Arctic Operations recommended t h a t the Army establish an agency for

this, to lie cnllc~d t h e U .S. Army Arctic: Center. appointtxl as the cenLral a$:en(:y

f o r doctrinal developments with respect to cold weather operations". I n 1977,

Colonel Yrancis King recommended in an ar t ic le in /Yifitary Review that, t h e Army

form such a center and call it t h e Northern Warfare C e n t e r . Ile recognized t h a t

f o r t h e organization t.o hnve any tee th i t would need a command group. He I:ok t h a t without this s y s t e m . t h e cold weather aspects of military operations would

continue to receive low priority, much to the detriment of the Army's ~ x ? a d i n e s ' ~ .

A s shown previously. committees do not work when they have 110 direct. vmLcd

interest i n t h e issues. or when they h a v e ne i the r dedicated personnel nor funds for

use in resolving the issues. In order to e n s u r e t h a t action is taken on shortfiills

in t h e Army concerning cold regions doctrine. training. personnel. and materiel

issues , t h e C A C L O ( A K ) should receive complete aut,hority LO supervise a//i:old

related doctrinal activities. This would include researching. coordinating directly

w ith appropriate agencies, aiid publishing doct,rinal literature t o include lieltl

manuals. With this responsibility and authority, C A C L O ( A K ) should receive

personnel allocat,ions and specific Funding for those items indicated. T 13A I1O C

should require its branch-proponent schools to seek C A C L O ( A K ) ' s concurrence on

cold-.related maLterS, rather than t h e other way around. I n t h a t manner. iLoiiis

relating to cold regions will n o t be relegated to funding in t h e out .y88m nor w i l l

they be t ied up in lengthy staffing.

Concerning doctrinal publications, F M 31-70. Basic Cofd Ueather hnuaf,' FM

31-71, Northern Opemtiom! Opemtiori mid Marhtt~~c~r~ceand FM 9-207. uf Urdhunm

/Yater~kf hi Cofd Uc?ather to -6P%% or their replacements, t w i l l i r e immetliaLe

update und disLriI~~~tion.F M 90--11, suppauedly replacing F M 3 1 -71, hris

O~en promisod 1.0 t.lic i'ic!ltl siiicc! ;it-. Ic!iist, Llie oiirly 1980's. 'Tlic iipdat.(: prn(:ws I'or

t.his manual is not. even scheduled 1.0 start unLil second quarl.t?r F Y 00". Similarly.

t h e start, d a t e I:or iipdnt.ing F M 3-70 is not. inilil second qimrLw I;' Y 8'3'' ,

T R A D O C should update F Y 9-207 and enhance it to serve RS a l o g i s ~ i msunplemcmt to FM 90-11". In 1984, C R T C attempted such an effor t , and their excellent staffing draf t of F?l 9-207 is available from C R T C today".

Lf?.a&E3&

As John Sater, an analyst f o r t h e Arctic Ins t i t u t e of North America wmte:

Success in t.he hi h Arctic is dependent upoii near perfpctperformance of afi weapons. materiel, and men. A h i h sl;atc ot training. outst.aiidiiiI: morale. and e x iiii)iiic~nt.w a l l 5w signed f o r a rc t ic use are F e n t i a l if even t.be siriplest o p e rntion is t.0 siict:eocl. I herelore small. speciiilized, o1it.c.: units: of volunteers shoultl be or anized antl held in readi-ness for special operdkms in t%e ArcLlc Basin...Ciindl be effective in t h e air. and on land. water, and ice."

Solecc;c?d I1 .S. Army light forces mid special operiiCions forces. prcisuinobly, iirc:

already earmarked f o r these regions. Leaders f o r these u n i t s require more thorough

Screening than those earmarked €or other reKions because of t h e iiniciue leadorship

requirements f o r cold weather operations. Successful leaders in cold regions

assignments should be considered f o r repeated tours in t .hwe tireiis.

The ability of soldiers t o function optimally in cold regions is directly related

Lo the weat.her, t,errain conditions. physicnl condition of the t.roop... and c.hc?ir

training. equipment. and leadership. The well-trained. well-led, antl acc1irnaLize.d

Finns had no iiroblem in moving great. distmices rind sustaining thnir forced' .

Summarv

T h e Army needs a centrally-managed, detailed doctrine for conducting cotnbat

in cold regions. Doctrine should norinrilly he generiil enough to rcoiriin siiit-.alily

flexible f o r adapting to any given situation. The special requirements for operating

in t,hc cold necwsitatc inow detailed doctrine than those f o r o~)cr~t ingiinder ot.hcr

conditions. T h e maintenance of t h e Army's institutional memory f o r managing these

details should he the resyoisibility of a single. soit.nbly located iind rwoiirc:etl

agency. The m o s t suitable agency f o r t h i s function, in this author's opinion. is the

Combined Arms (:cnt.cr Liaison Office (A1ask:i). C A C 1.0 ( A K ) would n:qnilu?

additional personnel, funding. and authority f o r semi--independent action in fulfilling

c.liis mission. The r(?t.urn nil invcstmant. for L l i i s would he iinqiiniit.~iiibl(!: the:

probabiliLy of saving many l ives in c:old weaLlier coinbal.

There are deficiencies in Lhe Army's definitions and doctrine For c:old wtmt.lirv

operaLioiis. rlost. i;liiring, I.lit:r'c: iiro IU'F I.aiii~iar;itiirc.&:;ipsin C:lic (Idiiiitions 0 1

operating temperature range requirements i n t h e Army's primary regulation for

development of equipment. A H 70-38. These should be amended. so t h a t materiel

developers will not be tempted to exploit inconsistencies in requirements and so

t,hat users will not expect too much from a system which tins specific limitations.

T h e r e are other deficiencies in Army doctrine besides shortfalls in

definitions. The existing series of cold weat,her doclx-inol Field nianuuls needs

immediate update and issuance t o t h e field. N e w technology and t h e concepb

contained in t,hc framework for Airl.aiid BiiLtlti doctrine must, be liddressed w itli

respect to combat operations and support in t h e cold. Unic;s planning to conduct coinbat operations or per€orni suiipor~.in I . l ic (:old,

either because of current basing location or deployment contingencies. m tist. remain ready for combat under tlie special condit.ions brought, on by t h e cold. 'Tlicsso uni l s

should train and specially manage selecLed individuals chosen as cold weather cadre For their units. They should atLempt. to conduct environmenctil u n i t troininR i n cold

regions whenever fonds and time allow, taking advantage of the e x p e r t k e of Lheir

own unit. cadre and t h a t of organizations such us t h e NWTC and t h e Army Nationnl

Guard Mountaineering School. Further, they should seek t o add supplemental tasks relating to cold weather operations to their Mission Essential T a s k Lists as pmT of

t h e i r Battle Focus f o r training. Finally. they should inspect t h e contingency item

stored f o r i ssue to them in the event of their deployment, to cold regions; I:liis

will g i v e them an idea of how well t h e y will be supplied w i t h essential eciuipment

if they must deploy and Piglit. in t h e cold. Like t h e Finns, the U S . Army has, in the past, demonstrated its potential t o

right. in the cold. The dilficulties todny l ie simply w i t A prioriLies. As more of

t h e old soldiers who fought in t h e Appenines Mountains of Italy. on A t t u . and around the Chosin Reservoir in Korea rotire and pass tiway. tlic: risk increases IAiiit,

their experiences will not. be preserved f o r Lhe Army's use. N o w t h a t t h e s e

soldiers are no longer in t.lie act ive force, t h e Army must, r e t u r n to tlie study of t h e cold e f fec ts throughout h i s t o r y or be forced to re-learn them through bi t ter

struggle on some cold fu ture battlefield.

38

NOTES

NOTES O N CllAPTER 1

I . IJ .S. Army Cold Kegions Test. Ct:ntx?r, #on and iYnterief I ~ J Zhe Co/r/ N ~ W O I I . ~(Part fA (Fort Greely, A K . undated). P. 1. Het-eatter referred to as L l t T C .

2. ?1Jor, Williain 6 . Cash. Northern Uffe'enrLive 0,uemtiom (Fort Leavenworth. 1965). P. vi.

N O T E S ON C H A P T E R 11 1 . General Antoine tlenri Baron d e .lomini. The ,417:of Vnfi translated by (:apt.G . H . MendeJl and Lieut. W .l'. Craighill, (l'liiladelphia: J.13. I.ipincott, & C o . ,1862; reprinted Westport, C N : Greenwood P-. 1977: repmduced bor t I.eavcnwort;li: SAYS. 1987). p. 68.

2. Carl von Clauswitz. ffn Uar: edited and transloted by Michael Howard arid Peter Pnrct.. (I'rinceton. N.1: Princeton IJniv. l'ms. 1084), p. 120. 3. fkff..348.p.

,4. Pmv&onaf Fiefd Hezu/atiqnr of the KKKA 1936 IFN 1.936A translated byJoint Publicahon Hesearch Service. (Muwow, 1937: NRS. 1986), p. 93.

5. Field nanual (FM) 100-5. Opemt2om (Washington: H Q D A , 1986), P. 84.

6 . Cliristopher N . Ilo~inelly,et. a]., Sovht A rru/ufiibm Opemtir,ns.' /iiip/!cntioimfor the Securir,v of NA TO'S Northern F/nnfr, (The Hague: SII AI;E Tectiniqral CenLrc,Miirr:h I"35). pp. 238-23'3. Also. 1.1.. Col. ( A r m y ) G . D . Ilunt.. (,;madion E orccs. " R einlorcing t,he iU AT0 North Flank: rhe Canadian Experience. CanadIh Ueli7/,ccOmtrerlv. X V I (Spriiig 19137). PP. 31-32. Ilunt. indicates thaL Northern Norwnv noL

only covers t h e a c c w to sh ip ins lanes t o Europe f o r t h e N A T O Allies; it also covers t h e ex i t rnr1t.e f o r tlie goviet. Northern Fleet into t h e hllantic. Fully six1.v percent of the Soviet Navy, according LO Hunt, is stationed i n t h e Kola Peninsula region opposite Norway.

7. U..S. ,Army., Alaska, A R A C G , Letter, subject : U.S. A r m Cold Weather and Plounlxun Trnuollg. November 1959: forwarded by II 0 . I1 5. 8ontinent.al ArmyCommond. Letter, suhiec t . S A B . 29 January 1960; staffed hy USACGSC Chief of I)octrine. I I F , s u h e c t : SAD. 2 February I )6O: respotwe by IJSALGSL, A L L I I O C . Letter, subject: b A B . 8 February 1960.

13. LiliLa I) zirkals. Shiet Polic .S"ntertmO. MJd kfif12nrv D/?P~c2vmf?ntsin ,2/urc/,v~:s~Asis. (Sant.a Monica. C A : Ther Land Corp.. October. 1930). PP. 2'3--26.

9. It obort. I.. St.c!arm;m, Prwhfeiiis of Cheiiiicd /I&eim LJpmatifms iii Lktnwe Lbfd, (llug,way. U I : IJSAIIPG, June 1985). p. 37.

N O T E S O N CllAPTER 111

I . Clt'l'C, up. ui.,p. 4.

2. 1j.S. Army, Alaska, A K A C D , . sc r ip t - fqr briefing. siihjec;t: Combat DevelopinentAgency, USA I< A l . I'resent.ahon tor C I)( . h n f on 1/2-ton Sqd Carrier. IF9 Novembei~ 1962.

3. CHTC. OP. uk.. P. 7.

4. Army. Hegulation (A.R) 70-38. Reseamh, Devefoprent, Test, nnd Evnfuatjo/, of Nntcrid f o r Extreme C/!mnt~cCondiuom (W ashingt,on : H Q I) A , 1 August. 1979:

change 1. 15 September 1979). p. 2-2.

5. (:It T C , UlJ. /:it.,p. 7. N-1

10. Virgil Lunatdini, et. a l p flhe/Countermine Pmblems Durinx Winter Wadare,(Hnnover. N i l : C R R E I . , September 1981). pp. 39-41. 11. C R T C . op. uk..pp. 56-57. 12. pp. 17-18. 13. ftui?’.. 18.P.

14. Ifid. p, 57. 15. h d . p. 58. 16. Gay Ham merman, et. a/., Cold-Weather CombaDot.’ Annloties to Chemika/ Comht, (Alexandria: I D A . h i e 1985). PP. 5-6. 17. James Y. Welsh. Compendhm oE c l i z ~ ~et. a[.* A LhvirOnmental fnforma~on~ ( N S T L . MS: N U R I I A . March 1986). p. 57. 18. C R ’ T C . OD. uk,pp. 43-45. 19. /fix p. 42.

20. fhd, pp. 40-41. 21. /Ed.p. 41. 22. f.d* D. 41. 23. fbid., DP. 48-51. 24. fEd, UP. 49-50. 25. 1.d. pp. 50--51. 26. 1 . d . DP. 51-54.

27. [bid, pp. 54-55. 28. 1b.1d. p. 47. 29 * IfJid

30. f.d

31. hd . . pp. 47--48.

32. r m 9 P. 48 3.Cnsh, on. uk,pp. 43-44. 34. C R T C , OP. cit... DP. 7-8, 10. 35. John E..Sater. ed., of Envimnmental F8ctors AEEecOiit A r m yf7pemcronS in the A m t i c A $ d ~ ’ ~ n t t - e a L Ouehec: Awtlc Insutute of N o r t h America, February 1962). p. 1. :3b. /hid,, p. 2.

37. U.S. Army. .Alaska. A R A G T - M . Report, subject: Final Report, Exercise POL.AH S T I I I K E . Ih April 1’365, P. 130.

N -2

40. U S . Army , Alaska. A R A C D - D Report. suhiect: General LoncepL of Small Scale Northern O p e r a t i o i ~ ~(1102-b4). 11 September 1964. pp. 2-11.

41. Sater. op. cit.. p. 8.

42. llammerman. up, cit., p. 5. 43. /hid,:,PO. 34-35.

44. Cosli. op. cit...LIP. 101-.102.

45. Hammerman. up. uk.pp. 34-35. 46. I1 .S.Army. hlnsltu. A I<ACI), , scr ig . For hriefing. sub.iw1;: (h~nbacI)evelopmr~~~t,Agency. USARAL Presentauon tor C (. Conf on 1/2--tonSqd Carnor. 0-9 Novemher 1962.

'17. k;elsh, 00. u%..U. 59.

'18. (:rlsb. 00.[;It., u. b8.

49. U S . Army, ,Alaska, A R A G T - M , Report, subject: Final Report. Exercise P(I1.A K STRIKE, 16 April 1965. Trnnsmit.ta1 Le1,ter.

50. llammerman, op. u?.~ pp. 4-5.

51. hid.. p. 3. 52. Cash, up. uk,p. 83.

53. fkud.*pp. 7576. 54. Sater. 00. ax.. pp. 6-7. 55. Iiammerinan, op, cit.. pp. 2-3.

NOTES - CIIAPTER I V

I . Major Walther Schumann (Austria), "Ski Soldiers and Winter Coinba~'Throughthe Ages". A//.emeine Sihweizerkbche !fi/itarzei&chrKG transl+sl.sd by 'l'ec:ht.riln Corporation for the Fowign Science and Technology Lenter. (Vienna: December 1969: FSTC: 13 August. 1071), PP. 113-211.

2. LI.. Col . Jouni, Kerpvuo,ri (Finland), The R~wo- f i i~nkh/Jar 193'V-f940: A Sicmdy fn Lmdmdiip. 7niinm.& mid Lsprit-de-Corps, (1:nrlisle I3arnicks: IISA WC,15 March 1985). pp. 11--1 - 11--8.

3. A l f Meyerhoffer, fiihnish and h'us~im U h i e r I'ocLim, (Hunovcr. N H: C R REL. SogLemher 1974), pp. 2.4.

4. Cash. OD, cit., pp. 94-Y5.

5. llammerman. ou. ciL p. 19.

6. K~t-avu0t-i. op. Cit.. PP. 111-18 - 111-22.

7. fflla.,pp. 111-23 - I V - 5 .

8. fhiff., pp. IV.-6 -. IV-7.

9. Allen t:. Chew, "Heating I.he Russians in the Snow: The Finns and t.hc Rusirriis. 1040". ,%!!taw Koview, (.June 1'3130), p. 39.

10. fhid. pv. 4 0 4 1 .

I I . f,hX pp. 4 - - 4 4 .

12. /h iX . pp. 8 1 4 4’7. 13. Kevaroui. OD. uk., pp. V - 3 - V-12.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

1. 8.rian tiarfield. .The Thowand !!fileUur.’ Uorld Mar 11 1ii A/mku and the NeuUans, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1969). pp. 57-58.

2. /Ed, PP. 130-.u2. 3. /Ed.pp. 148-149.

4. h d . , PI). 193-194.

5. /Ed,PP. 196-199.

h. /Ed.UP. 199-200.

7. f . X pp. 201-206. 8. ILCid., pp. 199-200.

9. fhd, pp. 201--204.

10. /Ed.pp. 205-208.

11. /Ed,PP. 205-216.

12. fbd , PP. 216--224.

13. lbid

14. /MA, PP. 226-228.

15. Ifid., PD. 230-232.

16. hd., pp. 235-239.

17. fEd, DP. 244-252.

113. VP. 252255.

19. ftu”.. pp. 256-257.

20. U S . Army Technical InteHiRence Center, Re 01%.suh’ect: Report No. 43 -Japanese Army (,old Weatlier Llothiiig. 9 march 1846, PD. /9-.27.

21. Garfield. op. uk., up. 125-127.

22. St.eorniun, UD, at., P. 5.

NOTES F O R CHAPTER V I

1 . Mn.ior Melvin E . Richmond, Jr.. Corn&. T e m h . ’eperaUons & /’/u~cmta~norrsA m United Stat- A q w L 2 h t /nfaantcv D ~ v m u mh@arwig/+wperlv?, (I:or~.Leavenworth: USACLSC. 1987). P. 19.

2. U S . Army War ColleRe. U8r co//eZe Pm&t, (Carlisle Barrack: IISAWC. 1948), pp. 68-69.

N -4

4. 1 1 5 . . Army Command and General S ta f f College. A.LLEII, .Report. sub.ject:I3eport ot Combined-Joint (;ommittee on Arctlc Operatlons, wit.li 1st. hid. ALLI:I\ 461. 26 March 1951.

5. Ilichmond, up. ax.,pp. 30, 35.

6. U S . Army.. Alaska, A R A C G . Letter, s u b j e c t : U.S. Arm Co!d Weather and ?lountnin Training. November 1959; forwarded by H 4. I1.S. &mt;lnental ArmyCommand. L e t t e r , sub.iect: SAB. 29 J a n u a r 1960; s t a f f e d h. USACGSC Chief of 1)octrine. D.F. sub.'ect: S A B . 2 F e b r u w y L k O : t'psiionse liy IlSACtiSC. AI.L.I)(IC.L e t t e r , s u b ~ e c t : iAB, 8 February 1960.

7. I: . S . Army, Alnsltn, A H A C D . l,ett,er, s u h i c c t : IJSA IIAI. t \c t ivi t ies Iloporl.. 22 Oct b2.

8. I j S . Army, Alaska. A R C A C . L e t t e r . sub. 'ect ' Memoim Edward F. Slieehun. l .TC. Infiintry. 0:33-22-6949, IJSN W T C , Fort dm&. AInsltn. I I May 1'470. lip. 111- 1 ' 4 .

9. IJ .S. A r m y Cold Regions Hesearch and Engineering Laboratory. Urznniz/#Cio//und rcimcclbn. ( I lanover . N II: CRREL. (at.) 31 .lulv 1 0 6 4 , DP. 1-4.

LO. U . S . Army. Alaska, AH A G 6-322. Letter. s u b j e c t : Establishment. of CoinbaL I)ovelopmenL Sect ion in I I S A P A L . 8 . hn 56. with hid by [ ISCON A R C , t\TSW I1 -X2.29 Jun 56.

11. /fJkf.

12. 1I.S. Army. Alaska, A H A C D . L e t t e r , sub.ject,: U S A R A L Act ivi t ies IIeport . 22( I c t 62,

13. U.S. Army, Alaska, A R A C D . Letter. sub.ject,: I I S A R A L . Combat Developments Agency Act iv i t ies Report, 25 April 1963.

14. U S . Army Command and General S ta f f College. ALLER. Report, s u b j e c t :Ileport: of Comhined-Joint Committee o n Arctic Opentions, with 1st Ind. ALI.I<U ,161, 26 March 1951.

15. /bib'.

16. U .S. Army, Alaska. A R A G 6-322. Letter. s u h i e c t : Establ ishment of CoinbnL Ilevalopment, Sect.ioii in USA H A L . I1 .Iun 5b. with lnd by IISCO S A IIC, ATSW l)-:32L29 Jun 56. 17. I! S. Army Combined Arms Center , Co/d UeaWer h t e x y k / /feqi/ift=wenfsCon/&wce A f h r AcLion Kepofl,, (I. ort Leavonworth: I j S A C A C , 9 I)ecoiiitier 1076). pp. Ll-1v.

in. f m .

19. /bid.* pp.iv-vii.

20. ffJld.,p. 2 21. U S . Army Northern Warfare Training Center , Dra f t Letter. s u b j e c t : Shor t fa l l in t h e Army Approach to Northern Opern t io i i . 1981.

22. fhid.

Operat ions Working I'arty.

24. ffJid.,PI>. 1-2.

N 5

NOTES O N CHAPTER V11 I . S;it.c:r‘. [JP. cit., I). 1.

2. AII 70--38. pp. 1-3, 2-2.

3. h d ,p. 2-2.

4. CRTC. up. a?.,P. 58 5. Hammermm. up. cit.. PP. 17-18.

6. ffid, p. 23. 7. Cash, up. u?.,PP. 56-87.

8. S a t e r , on cit., p. 5.

9. Richmond. up. Cic., P. 71.

10. Cash. op, uk,PP. 61-62.

11. I.I.S. Army, Alaska. A R A C D . Letter. s u b j e c t : U S A R A I , Act iv i t ies Report. 8 Aiig 62. rip. 2-3.

12. U S . Army. Alaska. ARACD, Report., s u h i e c t : Logistic Suppor t of t h e Batt,le Cniup in Nort!i,ern Operat ions, USA R A L 58-1 (Study I’ro.iect 1601-58). 15 March 1962. pp. u-m. 13. Riclimond. op. uk.. PP. 72-73.

14. L A . Army CominaFd and GFneral S t a f f College. A L L E H . ,Report. s u b j e c t :Reeort of Combined-Joint. Corn niittee o n Arctic Operations. wit,h 1st Ind. AI.LKII 461, 26 March 1951.

15. ,Cot. Francis Kin , ”Cold Weather Warfare: Gha t Would Happen?”. Nifitau Hewew, (November I477), pp. 94-95.

16. U S . A r m Combined Arms Combat Developments Act ivi ty , ATZL-CAI-I. Report., su ect’ Coinzined Arms Cen te r Northern Operatioms Action Plan. 23 Septt?mber19% p: 5.

17. Ifid. B. 6.

18. f . d ,pp. 7--R.

19. T h e s t a f f i n g d r a f t of Field Manual (FY) 9-207 ( D r a f t ) was published by C R T C in response 1.0 a reques t fnim the U S . Arniv Combined A r m s Cen te r iii 1984. Since . tha t time. n o ac t ion h a s been t a k e n to pyblish t h e updated f?lin f inal forin for dlst r ibut lon t.0 t h e Army ils n whole. I J S A C A C passed t h e iict.1oii to t.he [ J.5. Army Ordnance Cen te r and School a t Abenleen Proving Gmond, M D . w h e m no f inal ac t ion is planned unt i l FY89.

20. Sater. op. cit.. p. 10.

21. Il;immcrmau, OD. a%..up. 24-25

N -6

I .

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PER10 DICALS

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Ham merman, Gay. e t d . Co/r/-Weatber Coi!ihat' Anafogias to Cbeiiikal ComhL I I) A Paper P -186:1. Aloxandria: IiEtitutx: For I),eft:nsc?Analyses, June 1985 [papers in monograph au thor ' s p m e s s i o n .ava i lab le on demand l .

Lunardini, Virgil e d . /Yihe/Counterm~iiePrwh1em.s Uurihg hhiitc~Waifaft?. Suecia1 Report 81;20. Ilanover. N H: I1 .S . Army (.old Rc .ions Research and Engmeering Labora tory , Sep tember 1981. C A R L .

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Meyerhoffer. Alf. l?nn*b and Rm&n Winter. Tac&+. Hunover. N H :U .S. Army Cold Regions Resea rch and Kiiaiieering Laboratory.Sep tember 1974. A D A002379. C A R L .

U emthns h i Lbe A r c i c Bamn. Montreal. Quebec : Arctic InsLltuLe o f North America. Fehrunry 1062. Ihc. Nr. N--l7547.10. CARI..

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8.

9.

10.

11.

U S . Army. Alaska, A H A C D . Letter, s u b j e c t : Lo k$ic Suppor t of I.heIhttle Group in Northern Operxt.ioi~s. IJSA H A f. d - - 1 (Sl.udy l'ro,.ci:\.A R A C U 1601-58). 15 March 1962. Doc. Nr. N-18508.16. C A R / . .

, APACD, L e t t e r , siihject: 11SAllAI. Act ivi t ies Reporl,..-8-KiZisE-l462, Doc. Nr. N-18508-A. CARL.

A H A C D . L e t t e r , s u b j e c t : I jSARAL Ac:tivit i t .s IIoport..2 2 ~ ~ ~ E t G E e F 1 9 6 2 .Doc. Nr. N-18508-A. C A R L .

I3 - 1

1 3 . A R A C D . LeLter. suhject: llSAIIAL Combat --lKeG3t$Teiit>- Agency Ac1.ivitie.s Report.. 25 April 1963. Uoc. Nr.

N-18508-A. C A R L .

14. , A R A C D . scri t f o r briefing. sub'ect: Combat e v e opment A ency. U S A R A LPresentation for J C D C Conference on t h e

YIZ-jon Squad %arner. 8-9 November 1962. Doc. Nr. N-18508.27. LAHI. .

15. A R A C D - D . Letter. su ect: General Concept of -= 'cae o k h e r n 0 erations ( A H A v I ) 002--64). 11 September l(364.Docn N",. k-?8508.22. t A R L .

16. A R A C G , Lett.er. subject: 1I.S. A r m Cold Weocller ?mber 1959. EorwadinE l e t t e r from

Weather and Yountnin 'Training, 8 February 196ti.. U w . Xr,N-ln6nn 1 1 r h P l

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18. A R A G T T Y , Report. subject: F i n d Report, Exercise --mTI.AH STRTKt. 16 April 1965. Doc. Nr. N--15286.21-II. C A R L .

19. A R C A C . Letter. Subject: Memoirs. Edward F..'lee a n '7;T%, 'Infantry. 033-22-6949. U S A N WTC. Fort Greely, Al+slca. &ed" l i May 1970 [papers in monograph author's possession. available on demandl .

20. U.S. A r m Cold Re ions Research and Engineerin Laboratory. Orgmim&onorid Junm~n.5xatiover, N t1: C H H E L . (at)3 1 July 1 w i . Doc:. Nr.N-18982.52. CARL.

21. I!.% Army Cold Hep+iorls T e s t Center. /fan mid .!?fater~elh1 the Cold h'e.g.uns(2'~t-t 0. Fort Greely, A K : CH'I'C. undated. A D A06:17rJ2. C A R L .

22. U S . Army Combined Arms Center. Cold Weather Pfnterlel Keqiukmerits Cbtif??reticeAfter Actibti Kepor% A C N 23264. Ft. I.cavon worth : I JSACAC. 9 December 1976. Conference conducted 10-11 November 1976. Doc. Nr. N-19813.27. C A R L .

23. 11.5. Army Combined .Arms Cen te r and Fort ,Leavenworth. A T Z l . - C A I . Menioranduin, s u b . y t : N o r t h y i Operations, 28 August 1387. Lp~pcmin monograph a u t or's possession, available on demandl.

21. I J S . Army Combined .Arms CombaL I)evelopmcnt~ Activity. AT%I.-CAI- I ( 5 - W IMemqrandum, subject : Northern Operations Working I'arty (N0 WP)

I 6 September 1987. [papers i n monograph outtior's passtssion, !:%#A on demandl.

25. , A T Z L - C A I - I .- R e p ~ s u b j e c t - X X l G F i i 3 perationiiX3LGiYPlan, 23 Septemher 1987.

[papers in monograph author's ptmession. rivailuble on demand1. 26. U S . Army Command and General Staff Colle e A L L E R , Letter, sub.ject.:

R e o r t of Combined-Joint. Cornmittee on %&tic 0psmt.ions. 26 March 19& with 1st Ind, ALLEB 461. 26 March 1951. Doc. Nr. N--17547.2.C A U L .

H-2

27.

28.

29. U S . Army War Colle e War College Pmiect. Carlisle: I J S A W C , 1948. This IS the p u b l i g i d results of a Ilepart..nient oP the ArmyQuestionnaire posed to several high rankin6 German general officers who w e = interviewed extensive1 aft,er W 11. The rcwilts were compiled by t h e Office of t h e C k f Historian. U S . Euroeean Coinmand.

30.

1.

2. Field Manual (FN) l(l0-5. Uperatiom Washington: Department of l.he Ariiiv, 5 May 1986.

3.

BOOKS, TllESES 8 MONOGRAPHS

1. Cash. Major Williain ti. rVortliern Uffensi'vt? U{ywtbm. Y M AS T l i r s i s . L't.. Leavenworth: IJSACGSC, 1965. Doc. N r . 19052.:33--3. C A 111..

2. Chew Allen F. Fia/,Cin the kw8m ih Wihter: ?bee Case Stiidiex~

Leavenworth Papers %umber 5. For t Lenvenworth: CSI. IISACGSC,1981. 355.480947 C52Yf. C A R L .

3. Cluusewitz. Carl von. On Wan Edited wid t.ranslnted by Micl i r i e l Iloward and Peter Pamt. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1984.

4. (4rirfield. I3rian. Tbe I'boinmand ?file War.' Ihr/d War I / ih Aiaskii zind t/irAleiitkws Garden C i t y . N Y : Doubleday. 19h9. 940.5428 62311.. C A I t I . .

6. Jomini. An tn ine Ilenri. Genoral. Ralrm de. Ybe A r t of idm 'TranslaLccl b v (hpl,. t i . 1 1 . Meiidell and l.ieiit, W .I'. Craigliill. l'liila~l~~lpliia:J . R .L i incot t & Co., 1862; reprinted W e s t om. C N : Greenwood Press. 1Y%; reproduced I.o r t 1.eavenworth. K.!: SA MS. 1Y87.

6. Keravuori. 1.t. Col. Jouni. ?be h'iiss-~~?fini~b / I .5/.if& 111War I % X - / W U :Leadelship, Triiihhz and Eiwrit-df? -.Corps, I1SA W (: ?Iilitary SLiidies Propam Paper. C a r h e Barracks:: 11.5. Army War College, 15 March 19th. A D A159713--2. C A R L .

7.