CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWAsHINGTON 25. D. c.

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IRONtBARK 9 M AY 1%? DIVISION-HR70-14 DATE:05-21-2012

MEMADUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Combat Against Enemy MissileSubmarines", by Rear Admiral 0. Zhukovskiy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article whichappeared in the TOP SECRET S cial Collection of Articles of theJournal "Military Thought" ( Vo ennaya tysl") published by theMinistry of Defense, USSR, and dstributed down to the level ofArmy Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, thecodeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of "OP SECRETCSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. .e wordIRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only amongpersons authorised to read and handle this material.

3. IRONBARKshould be handled on a need-to-kow basis witi n your office.Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization ofany part of this document in any other form should be addressedto the originating office.

Richard HelmsDeputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure APPlORVED FOR RELEASEDATE: fEO 2004

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! NBARK Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs

The Director of I.'.elligence and Research,Department. of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,The Joint Staff

The Assist .nt Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department of the Army

The Director of Naval IntelligenceDepartment of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelligenceU. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence.Atomic Energy Commission ,

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and AstronauticsIntelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Repcrts

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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NBARK

28 May 1962

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IRONi.3A FK

COUNTRY : : USSR

SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT: "Combat Against EnemyMissile Submarines", by Rear Admiral0. Zhukovskiy

DATE OF INFO: October 1961

APPRAISAL OFCONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an articletitled "Combat Against Enemy Missile Submarines", writtenby Read Admiral O. Zhukovskiy.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issueof a special version of the Soviet military journalVoyennaya Myel (Military Thought). This journal ispulisd irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET bythe Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on20 October 1961.

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Combat Against Enemy Missile Submarines .

by Rear Admiral O. Zhukovskiy

The application of atomic energy to the submarinehas decisively changed the character of its activity:the operating range of submarines has grown immeasurably,and their speed, especially their submerged speed, theirendurance, and their diving depth, have been increasedconsiderably. The arming of submarines with ballisticmissiles (ballisticheskaya raketa) with nuclear warheadsmakes it possible to use submarines extensively in anuclear attack, assigning them missions to destroyimportant operational-strategic objectives in enemyterritory from great distances. Thus, atomic missile(atomnaya raketnaya) submarines have acquired independentstrategic significance, unlike other arms of forces ofthe navy.

The military leadership of the United States considersthat in the .ext ten years atomic missile submarines willbecome one of the decisive means of combat at sea and willreplace aircraft carriers as the main striking force of thenavy. Therefore, the United States is devoting great~ tention to the construction of atomic submarines equippedth "Polaris" missiles. To allot the maximum possible

amount of money for the construction of atomic submarines,the AMnited States has abandoned the further constructionof aircraft carriers for the time being.

In the United States there are now three typesof atomic missile submarines in service and under construction:the "GEORGE WASHINGTON", "ETHAN ALLEN", and "LAFAYETTE",which differ somewhat in their performance characteristics(taktiko-tekhnicheskiye dannyye). According to the referencebook Jane's Fighting Ships, in 1960-1961 the United Statesshould have five submarines of the "GEORGE WASHINGTON"type, five of the "ETHAN ALLEN" type, and four of the"LAFAYETTE" type. In addition, it is planned to buildseven more submarines of the "ETHAN ALLEN" type in thenext few years.

In October 1960, there were the following atomicsubmarines in the US Navy: the missile (raketnaya)submarines °GEORGE WAS IINGTON'and 'PATRJCK HENRY'; the torpedo

tornednaya) submarines "NAUTILUS, 'SEAWOLF" "SARGO', 'SKATE"IORDFISH, SEADRAGON' 'SKIPJACK, and 'SCORPION, the guided missile (URS)

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submarine "HALIBUT", and the radar picket RLDT -uD-rar-e"TRITON". Of the submarines under construction, two shouldjoin the fleet at the erd of 1960, and tie remainder onthe following dates:

--the missile submarines "T. ROOSEVELT", "ROBERT LiB", and"ABRAHAM LINCOLN" at the beginning of 1961, the "THOMAS EDISON"in Mlay 1961, and the "J. MARSHALL" in June 1961;

--the torpedo submarines, five in 1961, seven in 1962,and four in 1963.

Data on the Constro tiop of Atomic Submarines in the UnitedStates as of Octobe 1960

in Under Planned forType of Atomic Submarines Service Construction Construction Total

Missile Submarines 2* 7 12 21

Torpedo Submarines 8 18 4 30

Guided Missile Submarines 1 - - 1(PL URS)

Radar Picket Submarines 1 - - 1(PL radiolokatsionnog~dazora)

Total 12 25 16eThere are now five atomic missile submarines in service inthe US Navy.

Altogether, according to data from the foreign press,by 1970 the shipbuilding program of the United States envtsagesbringing the number of atomic missile submarines in thenavy up to 45, and the number of antisubmarine submarinesup to 100.

The main centers or construction of atomic Submarinesin the United States e:

1. General Dynamics Corporation in Groton, Connecticut.

2. Portsmouth Shipyard in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

3. Mare Island Shipyard -in Vallejo, California,

1. The bulletin "Naval Equipment", No. 4, 1961.

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4. The New Shipbuilding Corporation in Pascagoula,Mississippi.

5. Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia.

6. The New York Shipbuilding Corporation in Camden,New York /eic7.

The missile submarines are being built primarily inGroton and Camden. The antisubmarine submarines are beingbuilt primarily in Camden, Pascagoula, ^nd Vallejo.

At present, the missile atomic submarines of the US: Navyare armed with type A-1 Polaris ballistic missiles with rrange of 2000 km and a nuclear warhead with a trotylequivalent of .6 megatons. Later they are expected to-takeon board for their armament A-2 and A-3 type Polaris missiles

with ranges of 2800 and 3200 km and a warhead with a trotylequivalent of three megatons.

According to data from the foreign press, experimentallaunchings of Polaris missiles from a submarine have shown

that it is possible to use this weapon at a speed of 2 to 3

knots, from a depth of 30 meters, and with a sea state ofnot more than six balls, conducting the firing with an

interval of 15 minutes between firings. Later on, it is

proposed to increase the rate of firing, decreasing theinterval between firings to 2 t.o 3 minutes.. The accuracy

of firing Polaris missiles from a submarine against groundtargets with specified coordinates is sufficiently high.According to preliminary calculations, their average

probable deviation from target at maximum range is threemiles (5.5 kim) .

The complex navigation equipment of the submarinesallows them to sail submerged for a long time and determinetheir own position exactly without coming to the surface,and this ensures the launching of the missiles against

specified coastal targets.

The systems for biological protection of personnelfrom radiation, and regeneratioin 'an conditioning of the

ait, which are installed on atomic submarines, and also the

quality of the outfitting of the internal quarters, providethe comparatively good habitability of the submarines and

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the necessary conditions for the crew of a submarine ,continuously submerged for almost two months.

According to the views of the military leadership ofthe United States, the use of missile submarines in asurprise nuclear attack should be sufficiently effective.The Pentagon believes that to achieve this effectiveness,up to two thirds of all the missile atomic submarines mustbe constantly at sea.

At the present time, American atomic missile submarinescontinuously patrol in the Northeast Atlantic area inreadiness to deliver nuclear/missile strikes againstpreviously designated targets in the territory of our country,just as the bombers of the strategic aviation of the UnitedStates, with their load of atomic and hydrogen bombs, patrolin the air. Thus, the atomic missile submarine (PLAR) "GEORGEWASHINGTON"arrived in the patrolling area for the firsttime on 24 November 1960 and returned to New London (in theUnited States) on 21 January 1961. This submarine carriedout patrolling for the second time from 3 March 1961 to27 April 1961. Thc atomic missile submarine rPATRICK HENRY"was on patrol from 28 December 1960 to 8 March 1961. Therelief of submarines is carried out on station, and thisensures the continuity of the patrolling and the possibilityfor immediate use of the sissiles. As new missile submarinesare put in service, the number of patrolling submarines willbe increased.

As a result of the ever-increasing importance of atomicmissile submarines in the plans of our probable enemyprimarily in a surprise nuclear attack, combat agAinst themmust be considered one of the main missions of our navy.This combat must be a combination of offensive and defensive -operations carried out in the entire depth. of possiblelocation of enemy submarines in a given sea (ocean) theaterof military operations.

In our opinion, under modern conditions combat againstsubmarines should envisage the following:

--destruction of the points of basing and constructionof missile submarines, and also the destruction of thesubmarines at these points;

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--the searching out and destruction of missile submarinesat the exits from bases, during sea passage, on the approachesto the launch positions, and in the area of launch positions(startovaya pozitsiya);

-- frustrating and hampering the missile submarines in theuse of their weapons;

--destruction o; the forces and means of combat supportof the missile submarines.

The experience of the past war testifies to theconsiderable effectiveness of strikes against the systemof construction and basing of submarines. Thus, for example,despite several measures carried out by the German commandto defend the points of construction and basing of submarines(construction at the shipyards of special con crete-coveredshelters ii which were carried cut the construction andassembly of submarines, construction of shelters for thebasing and repair of operating submarines, strengtheningof the antiaircraft defense of the points of constructionand basing, etc.), submarine losses sustained by the formerGerman fleet at bases were very substantial. Directly at bases, fromthe strikes of aviation, 83 submarines were lost,150 submarines were lost in the process of construction --at assembly yards, at outfitting yards, and in transport--and 22 submarines were lost during trials and combat training.A total of 235 submarines were destroyed at bases, and inthe process of construction and trials; this amounts to25.2 percent of the total German submarine losses.

In addition, as a result of bomber strikes againstGerman shipbuilding centers and other industrial enterprisescooperating with them, German submarine shipbuildingsystematically failed to fulfil submarine construction plans.During the years of the war, this nonfulfilment reached29.5 percent of the plan and amounted to 462 submarines.(See 'Causes of German Submarine Losses During Their Stayat Bases and in the brocess of Construction and Combat rainingby A. L. Eifshits, published by the Naval Academy ofbShip-building and Armaments 1/n Krylov (YMAKV im. Krrlova) in 1961.)

Thus, although the main German submarine losses weresustained during their conduct of combat operations at sea,even during the past war the tendency of a relative decrease

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of submarine losses at sea and a relative increase ofsubmarine losses at construction bases became evident.In a future nuclear/missile war this tendency probably willbecome more evident. with the appearance of atomic submarinespossessing high maneuvering capabilities and great endurance,combat with them at sea has become much more difficultand complicated than in the past. The nature of probableoperations of these submarines differs sharply from thenature of operations of submarines in past wars, when theywere forced to approach vessels and ships to the rangeof a torpedo salvo because the basic mission of submarineswas to destroy vessels and ships, i.e., the destructionof sea targets. In approaching the targets being attacked,sibmarines were forced to break through the line of protection,exposed themselves, underwent pursu- ", and some of them weredestroyed.

As has already been indicated above, atomic missilesubmarines have as their basic mission the destruction ofimportant coastal targets. Therefore, one can anticipatethat while bound for launch positions to fire ballisticmissiles they will avoid meeting any vessels so that theywill not be detected prematurely. If it is taken intoconsideration that the launch positions and the routes ofmovement to them can be situated in vast spaces of oceanin areas where the operations of our antisubrarine -forcesare hampered, then the advisability of delivering strikesagainst points of basing and construction of missilesubmarines, to destroy the latter before they put out tosea, becomes evident.

However, it is necessary to keep in mind that thegoals of combat against missile submarines cannot beachieved completely by means of strikes against bases andconstruction points, because a. large portion of the enemysubmarines (according to American views, up to two thirdsof the effective strength) always will be at sea. Therefore,despite all the complexity of its organization and the largeeconomic expenditures, direct combat against enemy submarinesat sea continues to remain one of the main methods of combatagainst missile submarines, along with their Annihilationat bases and the destruction of shipbuilding centers.

The missions of destroying missile submarines at basesapnd destroying naval bases, shipbuilding, and missile-building

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plants, and also other important industrial enterprisescooperating with these plants, can be assigned to the missiletroops. It is obvious that the operations of the missiletroops in fulfilling these missions differ in no way inprinciple from operations to annihilate or destroy otherimportant targets; therefore, they are not being examinedin the present article.

With the present state of coastal missile weapons,the destruction of submarines at sea can be carried outonly by the navy. Taking into consideration the complexityof combat against submarines at sea, let us examine in moredetail the basic principles of the organization and conductof combat operations to destroy submarines by naval forces.

In view of the fact that it is difficult or evenimpossible to distinguish missile submarines from submarinesof other types at sea, combat against them will develop intocombat against all submarines. It must be waged in vastareas of oceans and seas, including even Arctic areas. Thiscombat demands a considerable quantity of forces and vigorousexertion of them. . To destroy a missile submarine atsea or bar the use of its missile weapons against importantcoastal targets, it is necessary to detect the submarineeven before the approach to launch positions and to concentrateantisubmarine forces for its pursuit and destruction in thearea of detection. Of course, it is difficult to carry outa mission of this sort by haphazard operations of specialnaval antisubmarine forces without advance equipping ofthe sea (ocean) theater of military operations with variousantisubmarine means.

We believe that combat against submarines at sea canbe successful when the use of antisubmarine forces issupported by a previously prepared and continuously operatingsystem of antisubmarine de ense in the theater.

A continuously operating system of antisubmarine defensemust be a set of measures for the special equipping of thetheater and organizing the combat operations Qf naval forcesdirected toward combat against enemy submarines, and must include:

--stationary means and maneuvering forces used for anti-submarine observation and for warning about detected enemysubmarines;

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--mine and net barriers, restricting the penetrationof submarines into defended areas;

--antisubmarine forces used for seeking and destroyingsubmarines on antisubmarine lines and in open areas of thesea, and also the means to control them.

Taking into consideration the threat of delivery ofsurprise concentrated strikes by missile submarines ofthe probable enemy which are continuously at sea, it isadvisable to create and use a system of antisubmarinedefense, of necessity, even in peacetime, like the systemof antiair defense of the country.

In our opinion, the maketp of the system of antisubmarinedefense must conform to the following basic principles:

1. Antisubmarine defense in a theater should be createdto a deptn ofnot less tnan tne iiring range oi caisticmissles from enemy submarines against important operational-

Territory of the country.

There is no doubt that the best system would be oneoperating within the limits of the entire theater right upto the exits from the points of basing of the enemy submariLnes.However, actual capabilities are inadequate to create such acomplex system of antisubmarine defense (pLO) over the entireexpanse of the seas and oceans. Therefore, we speak of adepth of not less than the range of fire of the ballisticmissiles as the necessary minimum. On various axes of thetheater, it is necessary to determine the depth of theantisubmarine defense on the basis of the military-geographicconditions, the location of objectives being defended, thedegree of threat from enemy missile submarines, and thecapabilities and performance characteristics (taktiko-tekhnicheskoye svoystvo) of the antisubmarine forces and means.

2. Antisubmarine defense in a theater should be echeloned:this is achieved by the organization on separate axes of aseries of successive operations of antisubmarine forces onseveral lines (in several zones).

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This principle is necessitated by the-impos--x-1--tyof reliably accomplishing the mission of search anddestruction of enemy submarines on one line and isdirected toward the achievement of higher probabilitiesoi destruction of enemy submarines.

3. The density of the antisubmarine forces and meansconprisin the system of antisubmarine defense shouldcorres on to the de ree of threat of enem submarineoperat ons rom var ous axes, an a so with t e c abilitieso antimissile defense on t ese axes ecause e securityof targets being defended is ensured by the destructionnot only of the submarine:..missile carriers, but also

t missiles themselves.

This principle conforms with the requirement of theoptimum bf te system of antisubmarine defense, ie., theachievement of its maximum effectiveness, defined as thegreatest probability of destruction of enemy submarinesand the least damage inflicted on our coastal targets throughthe efficient disposition of antisubmarine stationaryfacilities and maneuvering forces in a theater.

4. Antisubmarine defense in a theater should possesshigh combat stability and constant readiness o repel asurprise attack of enemy submarines.

This is especially important for the initial periodof a war, when the enemy will try to use simultaneously allof the strike forces of his fleet which have been deployedat sea beforehand to wage a nuclear attack.

The system of antisubmarine defense should be tiedin with the reconnaissance and the patrol service and .with theorganization of observation in the theater as a whole,and also with the antiaircraft (antimissile) defense ofthe country.

Such are the basic principles for building a systemof antisubmarine defense in a theater, and the observanee.of them,in our opinion, will ensure the success of operationsof the naval forces for the destruction of enemy missilesubmarines at sea.

Who should exercise control over the system of anti-submarine defense in a theater?

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There can be only one answer to that question -- the

commander of a fleet, for only he has sufficient meansakailable and is capable of resolving the entire group ofproblems connected with waging combat against submarines

within the limits of a theater as a whole.

In accordance with possibilities for using various

types of weapons by enemy submarines and the performance

characteristics of antisubmarine forces and means, thesearch for and destruction of submarines at sea is organized

into near and far zones of antisubmarine defense.

It is accepted practice to consider that the nearzone of the antisubmarine defense will be establishedin the coastal part of a sea. The basic mission ofantisubmarine forces operating in the near zone is todefend its lines of communicatioq , vessels and shipsat bases and points of disperstl :, and coastal installationsagainst action by enemy submarines.

The search for and destruction of submarines inthe near zone is carried out by antisubmarine surfacevesshs, aircraft, and helicopters. Fixed antisubmarinemeans are also widely used for combating submarines inthe uear zone.

The far zone of the antisubmarine defense includesthe water space from the outer limit of the near zone ofthe antisubmarine defense to the maximum possible distanceaway of the launching line for ballistic missiles fromenemy submarines against the most important targets onthe coast and in the depth of the territory of the country.The basic mission of the antisubmarine forces operatingin the far zone of the antisubmarine defense is to barstrikes by enemy missile submarines against coastal

installations.

The search for and destruction of missile submarinesin the far zone of the antisubmarine defense is carriedout by antisubmarine submarines, aircraft, helicopters,

and surf ace vessels.

Antisubmarine submarines possess a number of positivecharacteristical a considerable operating radius, greatendurance, and the capability to operate under ice cover.

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she antisubmarine submarines have means t aeure-renemsubmarines and antisubmarine weapons to destroy them.

Such characteristics of atomic antisubmarine submarinesas range of operation, endurance, and the capability ofsailing under ice are practically unlimited and will dependmainly on the physical condition and morale of the crewand also on the presence of equipment for regeneration ofthe air. The range of operation and endurance of diesel-electric submarines are determined by fuel supplies, andtheir endurance and range of sailing under ice are determinedby the capacity of their storage batteries.

The possibility of antisubmarine submarines' choosingsailing depth and low-noise speeds in a favorable hydrologicrelationship contributes to more effective use et thehydroacoustic equipment for observation through the watermedium and detection of submarines.

Surface antisubmarine vessels also have a number offavorable characteristics enabling them to wage combatagainst submarines both in near and far zones of theantisubmarine defense. Among such characteristics arethe following:

-=lage'nailing ranges and endurance;

--the capability of carrying out the search and pursuitof submarines under difficult hydrometeorological conditions;

--the availability of powerful antisubmarine weapons '.which, because of their weights and sizes, cannot be usedby other arms of the forces;

--the opportunity to establish well-equ';ped commandposts making it possible to control the heterogeneopsantisubmarine forces directly at sea.

However, the combat use of antisubmarine surfacevessels is hampered by a number of shortcomings. Theseshortcomings are first of all, low combat capabilitiesto rel air attacks, and this makes it necessary toprotect in a special way their stay at sea; less rangeof hydroacoustic detection in comparison with the hydroacousticsets of submarines, and this reduces the effectiveness of

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their search for submarines; and little concealment ofthe operations of antisubmarine surface vessels from enemyreconnaissance, and this facilitates the selection of axesof movement for submarines' breaking through.

Antisubmarine aviation, having available modern airplanes.and helicopters of long and short range magnetometric andradio hydroacoustic means of observation through the watermedium, and with japecial types of antisubmarine weaponsis capable of waging effective combat against submarinesat sea.

The favorable characteristics of antisubmarine aviationare:

--the capability of searching, in short periods of time,large spaces of sea to the entire extent of possible useof missiles from submarines by the enemy;

--high readiness for operations and the capability ofarriving in areas where submarines might be located in theshortest time;

--the potential for quickly concentrating the necessarynumber of airplanes and helicopters on the required axisof operations.

The shortcomings of antisubmarine aviation, hamperingits combat use, include the following:

--dependence on meteorological conditions and the statusof airfield basing;

--the relatively iow endurance of ^irplanes (helicopters);

--limited potential for carrying out combat operationsin kctic areas.

Planning the operations of the forces of s fleet todestroy enemy submarines at sea is done by the staff ofthe fleet, taking into account the combat capabilities ofthe enemy submarines and its own forces, their operationaland tactical characteristics, and also the possibilitiesof pupporting combat operations, ani the military-geographicconditions of the theater.

It 1e advisable to carry out combat operations to destroyenemy submarines at sea, particularly in the initial~period

of war, by enlieting the maximum ossible quantity of anti-submarine forces and facilities of ̂ te fleetd andalso theships and aviation of the maritime fleet, the fishingindustry, and the Chief Directorate of the"Northern SeaRoute, which are capable of carrying out observation of enemysubmarines. In the period preceding the initiation ofcombat operations, all of the forces mentioned should bedeployed in the zone covered by the system of antisubmarinedefense in the theater, beyond the limits of this zone onthe approaches to the points of basing of the submarinerof the probable enemy, and on the routes of their movementinto areas of combat operations.

The great difficulty of operations of antisubmarineforces in a theater during a period of threat is that, nothaving the right to use their weapons,~They are, in pointof fact, deprived of the opportunity to prevent activelythe deployment of missile submarines of the probable enemyto launch positions or, in general, to any areas of sealocated beyond the limits of our territorial waters.

In our opinion, under these conditions the use ofantisubmarine forces should be organized in the followingmanner. Before the signal of the beginning of militaryoperations, antisubmarine forces operating beyond thelimits of territorial waters establish observation ofevery detected submarine, information about which istransmitted from some groupings of forces, individual vessels(ships), and means of observation to others located on thepath of the submariner movement, Such escorting ofdetected submarines must be done without the use of weaponsuntil the signal of the start of military operations oruntil the moment. of use of weapons by enemy submarinesagainst our antisubmarine forces. Upon receipt of thesignal for the start of military operations, attacksagainst all detected submarines are carried out by thoseforces in whose area of operations they are located.

With the start of military operations it is advisableto carry out immediately the establishment of antisubmarinebarriers in previously planned areas in which they could not

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be established earlier because of peacetime conditions.

In our opinion, the sequence of operations of theantisubmarine forces to destroy submarines at sea isdetermined by the operational organization of the anti-submarine forces resulting from the decision of the commanderof the fleet and depends on what area the initial detectionof an enemy submarine is made in and what forces or means .it is madp by. By areas, the sequence of operations mightbe approximately the following:

Beyond the .limits of the zones covered by an .antisubmarinedefense system, destruction of enemy submarines at sea mustbe carried out by our submarines deployed on approaches tothe bases of enemy submarines, in remote areas of the sea,at exits from straits, and also on probable routes ofmovement of enemy submarines to -launch positions.

Prior to the approach of enemy submarines to the anti-submarine lines and lines of observation, action againstthem can be carried out by our submarines deployed tofulfil other missions (operations against aircraft carrierstrike forces and on the lines of communication:) in areasthrough which pass the routes of movement of enemy submarines.In the operations of' our antisubmarine forces in the Arctic,a systematic search for and destruction of enemy submarines austbe carried out-by atomic submarines under the ice and byantisubmarine aviation in open water areas in the ice(ledovoye razvodye) and in the open water areas beyond thelandfast ice (zapripaynaya polynya).

With the approach of enemy submarines to the antisubmarinelinesl antisubmarine submarines are moved to the sector ofprobable courses in accordance with information fromreconnaissance and stationary means of observation. Theantisubmarine submarines attack the enemy 'ubmaries_in sequence and direct antisubmarine aviation and surfacevessels against those submarines which have broken throughinto the depth of our defense. Aviation and antisubmarinesurface vessels in tactical coordination carry out thesearch for and destruction of enemy submarines which havebroken through within the limits of the areas assigned tothem.

gith the disooetoy of the axes of operations of theenemy submarines, a redeployment of forces ensuring a1. The term antisubmarine line (protivolodochnyy iubezh)means an echeloned barrier of various fixed means and maneuveringantisubmarine forces, in relatively narrow axes of sea on

- probable routes of movement of enemy submari

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strengthening of efforts on the main axes should be carriedout in the system of antisubmarine defense of the theater.In addition, in the areas of probable launch positions itis necessary to carry out systematically a search for enemysubmarines which have broken through, with the goal ofdestroying them and hampering the use of their missiles.

The most crucial and difficult measure in combatingsubmarines at sea is searching for them. There are variousmethods of operations of forces of a fleet in searchingfor enemy submarines. Specific selection of methods shouldbe determined with consideration of the'operational-combatcapabilities of one's own forces and the enery, the military-geographic features of the area of combat operations, itsprovision with antisubmarine barriers and stationary anddrifting means of antisubmarine observation, and also theimportance of the arca in the over-all system of combatingsubmarines in the theater.

In carrying out the search for and delivery of strikesagainst enemy submarines at sea, antisubmarine submarinescan use the following methods:

- -- the position (pozitsionnyy) method (when carrying outindependent operations on routes of passage of submarinesthrough straits and narrows);

--the position-maneuvering (pozitsionno-manevrennyy)method (when carrying out operations jointly with otherforces and when operating on the basis of data on initialdetection of enemy submarines from stationary means ofobservation);

--and the cruising (kreyserstvo) method (when carryingout independent operations in areas of possible positions,in a zone of pack ice, and on approaches to points whereenemy missile submarines are based)"

Antisubmarine submarines an position search the areasassigned to them, running at low-noise speeds at depthsproviding the greatest operating range for their hydroacousticmeans of observation.

After detection of enemy submarines, antisubmarine

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submarines determine the elements of the enemy movement andmaneuver to take favorable fire positions with speeds anddepths ensuring advantage in the operating range of theirhydroacoustic equipment. After the attack, depending onthe results of the attack, the antisubmarine submarineseither occupy positions for a repeated attack or continuesearching. Later, at the first opportunity, these submarinesreport on the attack, its results, and the further movementof the enemy.

The basic method of operations of antisubmarine aviationfor the destruction of enemy submarines is active search -

by groups of antisubmarine airplanes, either independentlyor on the basis of information of initial detection ofsubmarines by other arms of forces or from stationarymeans of observation.

Operating independently in assigned areas or on lines,hunter-killer groups of antisubmarine aviation carry outthe following:

-- the laying of barriers of moored radio hydroacousticbuoys (radiogidroakusticheskiy yakornyy buy), set out inlines perpendicular to the probable axis of movement ofenemy submarines;

--the laying in open areas of sea of drifting 'radio hydroacoustic buoys (radiogidroakusticheskiydreyfuyushchiy buy) in the form of a zone of dense coverage(several parallel lines, in a circle or in a spiral), withthe calculation of obtaining contact with a submarine atany point in the area of its assumed location;

--the laying of drifting radio hydroacoustic buoys inlines covering an area subject to search, with simultaneoussearch in the area with the aid of hydroacoustic setslowered into the water by helicopters or of aerialmagnetometric equipment (aeromagnetometricheskaya apparatura).

In accomplishing the mission of search and destructionof submarines on the basis of data of initial detection*by other forces, it is most advisable to lay intersectingbarriers of several parallel lines of drifting radiohydroacoustic buoys in the sector of possible courses ofsubmarinas detected earlier.

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To reduce enemy counteraction against antisubmarineaviation, it is essential to choose, when possible, areasof its operation and flight routes to these areas whichare outside the zone of operation of enemy fighter aviation.After detecting enemy submarines, aviation hunter-killergroups attack them, using antisubmarine aerial bombs witha special charge or antisubmarine aerial torpedos to destroythe submarines. Airplanes which have not dischrrged theirweapon loads or antisubmarine surface vessels located inthe wAiting areas are directed against the undestroyedsubmarines.

The basic method of operations of antisubmarine surfacevessels is carrying out the search for and destruction ofsubmarines as components of vessel Lunter-killer groups'.Taking into account the high maneuvering capabilities ofmissile submarines and their advantages overt surface vesselsin range of detection by hydroacoustic meana'of observation,surface vessels should be used for searching for submarinesjointly with airplanes of the antisubmarine aviation andhelicopters which are com nents of hunter-killer groupsand also independently on 'he bsis of data of initialdetection of submarines by oter arms of forces or bythe Stationary iets. of antisubmarine observation. Afterdetecting enemy submarines, the vessel hunter-killer groupscarry out a number of successive attacks against thedetected submarines, using rocket (reaktivnyy) depth charges,ordinary depth charges, and antisubmarine torpedoes.

The basic principle of the use of antitpbmarineforces to destroy enemy submarines at sea is their jointoperations, which make it possible to carry out combatmissions more effectively. Joint operations can becarried out by grapig tf antisubmarine forges with thefollowing possible combinations of heterogeneous forcesof the fleet:

--antisubmarine submarines and airplanes (helicopters);

--antisubmarine airplanes (helicopters) and surfacevessels;

--antisubmarine submarines and surface vessels;

--antisubmarine submarines., airplanes(helicopters), and surface vessels.

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Coordination between antisubmarine submarines andantisubmarine aviation and also between antisubmarine sub-marines and surface vessels consists of agreement upontime and location of search for enemy submarines carriedout by these forces independently within the limits ofassigned lines (areas). Coordination is achieved throughdirction, by the combat fleet command post (BFKP) of thecommander of the fleet, of antisubmarine aviation or surfacevessels against enemy submarines detected and not destroyedby our antisubmarine submarines and through the designat~onof demarcation zones petween areas of operations of variousforces.

Coordination between antisubmarine'aviation andsurface vessels consists of agreement upon time and placeof search efforts and attacks against enemy submarinescarried out by vessels and airplanes (helicopters) indep~endehtlor jointly. Coordination is achieved through dirctmutual-Tfrection of vessels and airplanes and determination ofthe sequence of attack during joint operations or throughdirection of hunter-killer groups against enemy submarinesby the combat fleet command post of the commander of thefleet during independent operations. Direction of vesselsagainst detected submarines by airplanes can be carriedout by radio information (radioinformatsiya).methods,radio homing (radioprived), leading (lidirovaniye), andwith the aid of visual signals. Direction of airplanesagainst detected submarines by vessels is carried out byissuing information on t:eir own location and the bearingand range of the submarine.

Combat against enemy missile submarines does not amountonly to operations for the direct destruction of the submarinesthemselves, the carriers of missile weapons. Yt is alsonecessary to strive for the creation of conditions whichhamper the control of the submarines and their use of theirweapons. This can be achieved by the following:

--destroying the coastal control points of the submarines,the transmitting and receiving radio centers with the goalof making it difficult for the enemy to control his submarinesat sea;

--destroying or putting out of operation coastal systemsof radio navigation and destroying satellite (sputnikovyy)

Systems of navigation to make it difficult for enemysubmarines to determine their position at sea and thusreduce the accuracy of their firing of ballistic missiles;

--radiocountermeaskues (radioprotivodeystviye) against

systems of control of missile weapons, radio navigationsystems, and communications installations.

Preparing for an aggressive war against the USSRand the countries of the Socialist Camp, the militaryleadership of the United States began to devote greatattention to the Arctic as a possible base of operationsfor a surprise nuclear attack. With this goal, theintensive study and mastery of the Arctic, primarily byatomic submarines, began. Thus, since Obtober 1957,American atomic submarines have carried out a total ofseven voyages, passing under the ice of the CentralArctic Basin by various routes. Considering the threatof the use of missile submarines from this axis, it isadvisable to provide for the establishment of an anti-submarine defense in the Arctic areas.

Considerable influence on the organization of anti-submarine defense in the Arctic is exerted by its physicaland geographic features. Bad meteorological conditionsduring the larger part of the year and ice cover hamperthe use of antisubmarine forces, particularly aviationand surface vessels. Frequent magnetic and ionosphericdisturbances complicate the organization of .continuous24-hour communications with antisubmarine forces. Thepresence of great depths, drifting icebergs, and theforward and rotating movement of icefields hinder theestablishment of stationary systems of observation ofsubmarines.

In addition to the measures enumerated earlier, thesuccess of operations of the forces of the fleet for thedestruction of enemy submarines in Arctic waters should beensured by the following:

--use of antisubmarine submarines to search for anddestroy enemy submarines under the ice;

--use of antisubmarine aviation to search for and destroyenemy submarines in open water areas in the ice and in theopen water areas beyond landfaet ice in areas of probable launchpositions;

--establishment of antisubmarine barriers in straits andnarrows on possible routes of penetration of submarines

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into Arctic areas to launch positions;

"ide use for antisubmarine observation of ice hydroacousticstations in a zone of pack ice, and cable-connectedhydrophone lines (kabelno-gidrofonnaya liniya), coastalhydrophone stations (beregovaya shumopelengatornaya stantsiya),and stationary radio hydroacoustic buoys near the ice edge,together with the antisubmarine forces permanently locatedin these areas;

--continuous ice, hydrometeorological, and geophysicalreconnaissance, making it possible to Jredict ice movement,hydrological characteristics, and the transmission of radiowaves of various length, and in accordance with this tocorrect the system of antisubmarine observation, redistributeantisubmarine forces by areas, and ensure uninterruptedcommunications with them by the proper selection offrequencies;

--the establishment of far forward ice airfields andpoints of material-technical support, making it possibleto carry out a broad maneuver by antisubmarine aviationin ice areas in accordance with the mobility of the iceand the presence of open water areas in the ice and openwater areas beyond the landfast ice;

--the establishment on the Arctic islands of remotecontrol posts (vynosnyy post upravleniya) for the anti-submarine forces and repeater centers of communications(repetichnyy uzel svyazi), ensuring the possibility ofcontrolling forces directly in areas of combat operations.

As is generally known, since November 1960 ^ne ortwo American missile submarines constantly patrol in thearea of the Lofoten Islands near the coast of Norway,.. Itshould be expected that they can take up launch positionsamong the Norwegian fiords. Therefore, it is necessaryto devote attention to the organization of combat againstmissile submarines with launch positions in fiord areasof the enemy seacoast. The location of these areas outsidethe limits of our antisubmarine observation, in a zone ofpowerful enemy antiaircraft and antisubmarine defense,and also the difficult navlgtional and hydrographicconditions for sailing, hamper the use of our antisubmarineforces directly among the fiords.

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To hinder or eliminate the operations of missilesubmarines in fiord areas, there can be carried out

systematically the concentrated laying of antisubmarinemines, the destruction of the system of channels amor.gthe fioruJs, and the search for and destruction of enemymissile submarines at entrances to fiord areas and in openreaches. The success of combating missile submarinesin a fiord area depends to a great extent on the organizationof agent intelligence (agenturnaya razvedka) and radiointelligence (radiorazvedka). which in this case partlallyperform the functions of antisubmarine observation.

Summing up this brief examination of the basic problemsof organizing and waging combat against enemy missile submarines,it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

1. Combat against enemy missile submarines is anintricate complex of combat operations and measurescarried out not only by the navy but also by the armedforces of the country as a whole.

2. Successful combat against missile submarines atsea requires the creation of special highly effectiveantisubmarine forces and means and the use of them in aquantity which ensures high probabilities of destructionof enemy submarines .

3. Despite the over-all complexity of combat againstenemy missile submarines at sea, it can be sufficientlysuccessful if there are the following: a system of anti-submarine defense previously deployed during peacetime,high combat readiness of antisubmarine forces, and mobileuse of them during combat operations.

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CE NTRL-I IT:Luner rsr maanwasNMINTO# 25. D. C.

2 9 MAY 1962

IRONBARK

MDORANIUM FCIt Director of Central Intelligence

SUTBJECT: : Preliminary C _its on Article fron Soviet PublicationMlilitary 1dough

1. Ihis article cites the increasing threat to the iSR of the

rapidly groing Polaris submarine fleet and stresses the development

of Soviet atisubmarine warfare (ABW) capability. It contains the

first comprehensive intelligence available on broad sta'ategic and

operational doctrines proposed for Soviet ASB. lhe view expressed do

not appear radical and seen to be in general agreement with state-

mnts by other ahralsn.

'2. 'se author reiterates the fear of the threat of surprise

attack and cites as an esanple the patrols in the nrthwest Atlantic

of Polaris subanrines "in readiness to deliver nuclear/issile strikes

against previously designated targets in tie territory of our country."

3. Soviet ABE, according to the author, should envision the

following actions as man. for countering attacks:

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I NBAR!

a. Destruction of missile submarines at operational bases,

shipbuilding and missile building plants saind other support

activities;

b. A previously prepared and continuously operating system

for destruction of subasrines at sea;

c. Joint operations -- antisubmarine submarines, airplanes

and helicopters, and surface vessels.

4. h author considers the destruction of rlaris submarines at

sea to be one of the gain missions of the Soviet Navy but the destruction

of missile submarine bases and other Limed targets "can be assigned

to the missile troops." He advocates the operational requireent, even

in peacetine, for detecting, tracking, and escorting by Swriet ASW

forces all US subiarines operating vithin a strike zone. He further

suggests that in the initial period of a war, all possible ships,

including merchant and fishing vessels, should be pressed into ASW

service. Soviet submarine detectio systeas will include antisubmarine

subarines (rincipally nuclaar-powred), surface ships, aircraft

(including helicopters), mooren and drifting hydroacoustic buoys with

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tRONSARK|

radio transmitters, and bydrophones suspssend beneath the Arctic ice.

ASW weapons will include haoing torpedoes launched by ships and air-

craft as well as "special" (probablry unclear) depth charges drapped

from aircraft.

5. '!he author descri -., several types of submarine detection and

A8W weapon systems, some uf which are new, but he does not clearly

indicate tilch of tbese are operationl or which are still under

develoaient. Se considers that patrols of nuclear-powered antisubmarine

submarines should be extended to the exits of Polaris bases and be

dePloyed on the operational axes of Polaris submarines. He devotes

Gost of the discussion to AMi barrier operations and to operations in

the launch sones of Polaris submrines. In this regard, the author

confd.rms other evidence thet. the Soviets believe the US will use the

Arctic as a Polaris launch area and are concentrating, or urging the

concentration of, considerable ABW effort in this area.

ty Director (Intelligence)Distribution:

DCI - Copy #1 CSR - Copy #14EXO - Copy #2 BR/RT - Copy #15EXO - Copy #3 SR/9 - Copy #16DDC- Copy #k SR/Rp - Copy #17DDI - Copy #5DDI - Copy #6 - 3 -AD/NE - CopyAD/CI - Copy

AD/RR - Copy #9AD/SI - Copy #10DDP - Copy #11A/DDP - Copy #12CFI - Copy #13

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