combat operations with firearms volume 2 chapter 2 maneuvering and positioning release 2013 0422

7/28/2019 Combat Operations With Firearms Volume 2 Chapter 2 Maneuvering and Positioning Release 2013 0422

1/66

Volume 2. Operations.

Chapter 2. Maneuver and Positioning.

WARNING:

This media is not created with the intent to describe the legality of whatis expressed in it. The content should not be considered as a legal

advice. The reader is responsible for ensuring any action taken inrelation to this document's content is legal in the reader's jurisdiction.

The document is written for research purpose.

Terms defined

-Operator:Operator refers to a person who is engaged in a combat operation.

Operators' action is the subject of this text. The term was chosenpartly because of lack of better words to describe the subject person

of this text. Shooter only means a person who is engaged in a shooting

activity. Also, the person had to be distinguished from militarydefinition of combatant.


2/66

2. Maneuver and positioning

To react to hostile forces in an area, operator will need to do one or more

of the following, which is not limited to:

-Move to a safer location-Examine an area for safety

-Locate opponent-Occupy position of advantage

-Take evasive action

All of those involve moving or taking a certain position. That will consistmost part of the operation, and all tactical factors need to be considered

in deciding in what matter maneuvering and positioning are done.

Terms defined:

Individual work space:Individual work space is a certain volume of space that needs to be

clear of obstructions in order for an operator to be able occupy andperform tasks, such as assuming a good shooting platform, without

being hindered.

If it the space is not intruded by obstructions, it consists of avolume of space that can contain a single operator in stationary

position with that operator being able to form a shooting platformand orient the shooting platform in any direction plus a volume of

space around it that would allow enough distance from any surroundingobjects that can hinder operator's actions, such as adjusting shooting

platform or other posture, manipulation of gear, moving in and out ofthe position the operator is currently occupying, etc.

Size of optimal unrestricted individual work space is not static. It

depends on how much unobstructed movement range an operator needs in agiven moment. The movement range consideration for individual work

space is usually limited to space an operator can immediately occupy

without significant maneuver movement and space required for theoperator to maneuver in and out of the space currently being occupied.

Clear space needed for maneuvering will be covered separately.


3/66

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Principles of maneuvering and positioning:

There are certain principles that needs to be observed for operator's

safety. Those include, but not limited to, the following:

-Manner of maneuver conducted in a way that operator can properlyexamine new area the operator is exposed to and react to anything

inside it. Operator not exposed to anymore new unexamined area thanthe operator can properly process.

-POEZs, opponents, unexamined area an operator is exposed to should be

minimized. If the operator is exposed to it out of necessity, the timeof exposure should be limited, and so is the frequency of such

exposure. However, an operator may need to position oneself in a way

that multiple opponents or POEZs are in view for observation purposes,which may also expose the operator to them. In such case, positioning

should be done in a manner that exposed POEZs or opponents are allwithin field of view and angular dispersion of those POEZs oropponents are low.

-A space that an operator intends to enter should be examined before

entering as much as feasible.

-POEZs or opponents an operator is exposed to should be kept inoperator's field of view as much as possible. And, its directional

dispersal should be minimized.

-Maximized use of terrain, structure, and objects in the environmentfor protection, including protection from gun fire, protection from

detection, etc.

-Intrusion of any obstruction into individual work space beingminimized as feasible.

-Operators think about contingency plan regarding escape or retreat

from a path taken or a space entered before taking the path orentering the space.

Human and equipment tasking limitation and characteristics comes into play.Limitations and characteristics such as:

-Operator can usually only handle one POEZ or opponent at a time withmaximum efficiency.

-Most firearms can only be effectively used to attack one target at a


4/66

time.

-Limit of amount of information a human can process in a given time.

Above factors will make it favorable for operators to maneuver slow andhandle as smaller area as possible at a given time. It may even be

favorable for the operator to occupy a position of advantage and not moveat all. However, certain situation poses risk for an operator to remaining

in one location. For example, more time the operator remain stationary mayallow more time for the opponent to discover or improvise a means to find

advantage over the operator's position, or get additional man power, etc.There may also be situation where incapacitating the opponent would be

favorable and the risk of doing so can increase as more time elapses. So,the operator needs to control the speed of the movement when maneuvering so

that risk moving faster or moving slower would be balanced and overall risk

would be minimized.

The faster the operator moves, more the probability of information processworkload increases, as it may make new elements of significance appear at afaster rate. If too many of those elements has to be processed at the same

time or shorter period of time, more workload for the mind, and lessinformation process efficiency. Some of those cannot be controlled, but

some can be.---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Controlled exposure method:

There are times where exposing unexamined area needs to be done while

risking the operator being exposed to the new exposed area. In such case,the manner of exposure, both that of the unexamined area and the operator,

needs to be controlled.

The primary need for such control is related to possible contact withopponents in the new exposed area. It's about the operators ability to

process everything within the new revealed area, and ability of the

opponents possibly in the area to react to the operator.

Exposing unrevealed area takes a big part of combat operations. Actiontaken to expose unrevealed area needs to be in a manner that keeps the

exposure of the operator to the new area the operator is being exposed to

to a minimum.

In a situation where an operator is exposing an unrevealed area, andoperator would be also exposed to the new exposed area while doing so, the


5/66

operator needs to execute the process in a manner that keeps the amount ofnew information, such as opponent observed in the new exposed area, would

be kept with in the limit of what the operator can properly react to.Controlling the amount of the exposure of unrevealed area and speed of the

exposure, and also controlling the amount of operators exposure and speedof exposure to the new revealed area, in that manner is the one method of

controlled exposure.

For example, an operator may place oneself behind an object large enough toconceal him or her from the unrevealed area. Then the operator would move

in a way that the unexamined area behind the object would be exposed insmall portion while utilizing that object as concealment and protection

from possible incoming fire. The speed of the exposure and the size of theportion controlled so that operator can mentally process and respond to

anything in that portion of area properly in a timely manner. That

technique is commonly known as "slicing the pie."

Another method involved is to limit the time of operator's exposure to thenew revealed area shorter than the expected time it takes for any opponentwho may be present in the area that observes the operator to make an

effective attack. This is usually employed when examining area where theoperator must protrude one's body into that has a high risk of getting

effective attack from any opponent possibly inside the area. Usually, themethod takes form of a technique involving a quick peeking motion.

There is also the technique of Exposure Point Movement Technique explained

in Volume 2 Chapter 1 Tactics section.

These methods can be used in any combination that suits the operators need.So, controlled exposure method is not about being slow. It's about keeping

the rate of new revealed area within the limit of what an operator caneffectively process while keeping the risk of exposure to a minimum.


6/66

The above is one example of controlled exposure technique in use.


7/66

The primary reason for employing this technique is to limit the amount ofnew revealed entities the operator has to process, minimize exposure, and

allow slow movement for increased stealth and information process capacity

to new information ratio.

Keep in mind that interaction with new revealing space is 3 dimentional.

Some people state that "slicing the pie" technique is to see to be able to

see an opponent before being seen by the opponent. It may have that effectin some cases, but not always so. That depends on the degree of body

protrusion exposed to unexamined space before operator's eye gets intoposition to see the unexamined area. It also depends on relative distance

of the operator, opponent, and the object the unexamined space is beingrevealed from behind. It does not guarantee the operator seeing the

opponent before the opponent seeing the operator.

However, more important point is that that is not the primary reason thetechnique is used, as some people suggest.

The speed and manner of maneuvering while utilizing Controlled Exposure

Method should be adjusted for minimum risk. If movement is too fast or the

amount of new area revealed is too much, it increases the risk of operatornot being able to recognize a threat or anything of tactical significance


8/66

inside that area fast enough for the operator to properly react. If themovement is too slow, then it also increases the risk of an operator being

observed by an opponent before the operator can observe any threat, becausein many occasions there are certain portion of the operator's body or

anything on the operator that is exposed to the area to be revealed that isnot yet observed by the operator. Moving slow can increase the time that

portion of an operator's body or things on the operator being visible to anopponent before the operator can see the opponent.

One way to manage that risk is to divide the angular width of the new area

to be revealed into sections with each of that section kept to maximum sizethe operator can examine with switch movement while limiting the section to

a size that the operator is expected to recognize any opponent or thing oftactical significance without taking too much time. Then the operator can

examine the section one at a time, making swift movement when each section

is revealed.

Another way to manage that risk is to maneuver in a constant motion whilespeeding up or slowing down according to how much time it takes for theoperator to mentally process the new revealed area and recognize any

opponents or things of tactical significance within that area.

This means operators has to control the phase, speed, and manner ofmaneuver to minimize the time and chance any portion of the operators' body

or anything that is on the operators being exposed to the area to berevealed before operator can observe that area, while keeping the speed of

maneuver slow enough and amount of new area being revealed small enough forthe operators to have control of the maneuver and properly recognize things

in the new revealed area fast enough for the operator to properly respond.


9/66


10/66


11/66


12/66


13/66

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


14/66

Entering spaces:

There are two approaches in regards to entering spaces and examining thespace. One can be described as "examine before entering" and the other can

be described as "Enter as examining ." What those mean is exactly how itsounds. "Examine before entering" is an approach that operators examine a

space and process anything of tactical significance observed prior toentering that space as much as possible. "Enter as examining" is a method

of entering a space in order to examine it before all possible examinationfrom outside can be done. As far as operator safety is involved, "examine

before entering" approach will have the advantage, unless the operator isin a situation where taking time to do so will result in high probability

of receiving effective attack. An example of "examine before entering"approach is illustrated below.


15/66

This does not mean "clear and enter" method requires all part of the spaceis examined, because there may be spots in the area that cannot be examined

without entering. It only means the space is examined before entering asmuch as possible.

Below is an example of "enter as examining" approach.

"Enter as examining" method is usually used for speed. For the sake ofoperator safety, its utility is very limited because it would involve


16/66

protruding into a space that is mostly unexamined, and the operator doingsuch maneuver would have to deal with a large width of new revealed area

that has to be precessed in a very short amount of time.

Not all "enter as examining" tactic is the same. There are situations whereaction and time taken to examine a space before entering is likely to alert

the opponent inside, and give the opponents increased opportunity toprepare for the operator's entry. However, situations where that reason

justify "enter as examining" tactic is rare. For that justification to beused, an operator has to know that the opponents inside is not prepared for

certain, how many opponents are inside, exact location and status of eachopponent, and whether if the unprepared opponents inside are within the

limit of what the operator can handle once the entry is made. Thatinformation is usually not available until examination of the space is done

prior to entry. And, that's only if the operator have a specific reason to

enter and make contact.

Even more of a danger is involved when "enter as examining" method is usedwith no information about the space the operator is entering. That kind of"blind enter and clear" method approach should not be taken unless an

operator is in some rare circumstances where not doing so is likely toresult in extreme danger for the operator, especially when opponents are

expecting operators to make contact.

When the objective of the operation is something other than the operator'ssecurity, such as hostage rescue operation, there may be situation where

speed is critical and there is not enough time for information collection.Such circumstances may lead to the necessity of "blind enter and clear"

method, but handling of those cases should be reserved only for specializedteams with proficiency in highly coordinated techniques and special

equipments that members consist of people who is willing to takeexceptionally high risk.

Even in situations where operators decides to take higher risk by speeding

up maneuvering process to rescue others, such as "active shooter" type ofsituation, "enter as examining" tactics should be avoided. "Examine before

entering" method done in increased speed would be a better compromise."Enter as examining" tactics are high risk tactics even for specialized

teams. With opponent in position of advantage expecting operators to make

contact, operator who is not acting as a part of a specialized teammimicking SWAT tactics to employ "enter as examining" tactics has

unacceptable probability of survival. *****Refer to Volume 3 "The TacticalCritic" section for more details.


17/66


18/66


19/66

Object that hides unexamined area behind also conceals the operators

movement from that area. This can be used to maneuver through the area that

is blocked from view from the unexamined area. As the operator maneuvers,

some portion of the the unexamined area will be exposed and examined. Also,it will create new areas that are blocked from operator's view bysurrounding objects that makes the operator also blocked from view from

that area. The relationship will keep changing as the operator maneuvers.


20/66

As the operator examines new areas, POEZ will be cleared, and more area

will become accessible from that new examined area for the operator tomaneuver through as the operator utilizes surrounding objects to shield the

operator from other unexamined area as much as possible.


21/66

Often an operator may be exposed to multiple POEZs at the same time. But,

in most cases, in order to completely examine one POEZ an operator may have

to maneuver while not being able to properly observe other POEZs. In suchcase, maneuvering to expose and examine a portion of those other POEZs

while they can be kept in view can create some space the operator can

maneuver through while only being exposed to those areas of other POEZ

portions that is already examined.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


22/66

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Managing factors:

Here, application of tactical factors and balancing of those factors in in

maneuver and positioning will be explained.

Operators need to make constant effort to utilize surrounding objects forprotection. However, surrounding objects themselves also are POEZs

concealing unexamined areas behind. Maneuvering has to be done in such amanner that controlled exposure techniques or other methods to examine

unrevealed area while utilizing objects for protection as much as possible.

Some times operator needs leave an area where the surroundings provideprotection. Operators need a plan of action for situations when they come

into contact with opponents in such situations. As far as utilization of

surrounding objects for protection goes, an operator in such situation mayfeel the urge to move quickly to the nearest place where surroundings

provide protection from the opponent the operator came in contact with.However, if movement to that nearest place means moving into area that isexposed to areas that are not examined without an opportunity to examine

the unexamined areas, there is a substantial risk. The nearest area may notprovide protection as operator expected before moving in. And, there is

also a possibility of presence additional opponents in the unexaminedareas.

Attacking the opponent while staying in the open, moving to the nearest

area that appears to be protected by surrounding that would expose theoperator to unexamined area while attacking the opponent, or moving to the

last known area that is protected by surroundings each have its own risksand benefits. Which one would provide most benefit and least risk will vary

according to the given situation.


23/66

Directional distribution of POEZs or opponents in contact needs to beminimized. This also helps placing group of POEZs or opponents in

operators' field of view and minimize response time when a gunnery processis initiated against one of the opponent in contact. That also helps with

utilization of objects that provide protection because range of direction

an object that provide protection from is usually limited.


24/66

In situations where objects available for protection does not provide

protection from all direction POEZs or opponents are present, the operator

needs to assess the processing priority of each POEZ or opponent andrelative threat level of each POEZ or opponent. The operator then needs to

position oneself so that the object will provide protection from the

direction of POEZ or opponent group of highest threat level while allowing

the operator to process highest priority POEZ or opponent to be processed.

Which POEZ or opponent group to shield oneself from and which of those the

operator needs to process first is not always the same. Opponents, newrevealed areas, POEZs are the primary elements of concern for visual

information. If more than one of these are present and an operator cannotput all of them in field of view, those elements have to be handled by

order of priority. An operator should attempt to put many elements ofconcern in field of view as possible, and at the same time minimize the


25/66

field of direction the operator can be seen from.

Narrowing the angular width of operator exposure helps minimizing number of

opponents or POEZ group size. One method is to make surrounding objects

that provides protection to block exposure from as much direction as

possible with the direction that the objects are not covering forming anaperture the operator can observe through to examine unrevealed areas orobserve opponents. More distance from that aperture would make the angular

width exposes through the area narrower. Closer distance would mean theopposite.

Imagine an operator totally encased in a armored box with a movable port

that the operator can observe and shoot through with least amount ofexposure as possible. From protection point of view, the operator should


26/66

maneuver in a way that the surroundings would work as such.

Minimizing number of POEZs encountered needlessly should be a factor in

maneuver path planning.

Combined space management:

Final positioning decision would be made with consideration of only asingle factor. It's based on combined multiple factors such as distance to


27/66

POEZ, individual work space, objects that offer protection, etc.

When utilizing an object that provides protection from gun fire, operatorswould usually get more coverage available when they are positioned closer

to the object. However, if an operator is too close to such an object, thenit intrudes into operator's individual work space, possibly restricting

gunnery process, ability to maneuver in and out of the position, etc. Also,the close positioning can place the operator close to a potential opponent

emerging from behind the object if the area behind the object is a POEZ.

So, in regards to the problem of utilizing an object for protection, theoperator would have to assess the risk and benefits of closer distance

making possible POEZ being close, causing individual work space to beintruded, possibly increasing coverage provided by the object for

protection, increasing field of view behind the object, etc., then decide

the optimal distance to the object.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Light considerations:

Maneuvering or positioning in darker areas can be utilized to lower

probability of operator being detected.


28/66

Maneuvering or positioning next to a relatively bright light source may

also lower operator's probability of being detected in certain conditions.

When that method is used, operator needs to take caution so that the lightsource will not make the operator more visible.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cautions for using visual concealment for maneuvering and positioning:

Operators should keep in mind that most that such concealment can to isshield operator from opponent's direct view. This does not in any way mean


29/66

opponents cannot detect operators by other means, such as indirect view ofoperator's image reflected on surfaces of objects, detection of ambient

light level change by operator's presence, sound emission, etc. So, stealthis required for concealment to be effective.

Concealment can be used to hide an operator from being seen until operator

gets to a position where contact is made and opponents become aware of thecontact. That is the aspect of concealment use that is most discussed.

However, operation does not only involve getting to the point of contact.Once opponents become aware of the contact, two things can happen. Operator

can succeed in attacking those opponents and concealment becomes a non-issue as long as there is no other opponents. However, if the operator

fails to incapacitate all of those opponents, a concealment can now be anobstacle that obstructs an operator's movement and also a visual shielding

that would hide the operator's evasive maneuver.

So, maneuvering and positioning in regards to concealment has to be planned

in a way that it becomes less obstacle and more visual shielding forevasive maneuver in case of contact. In order to achieve that, operatorsshould avoid positioning oneself behind concealment that has no space for

evasive maneuver behind it. Such concealments should not be used forguarding an area while remaining stationary.


30/66


31/66


32/66

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Avoidance of tactically unfavorable areas:

Any area that gives operators a tactical disadvantage should be avoided asmuch as possible.


33/66

Path through areas that offer a narrow path for maneuver poses high risks

when it does not have any objects that provide protection from gun fire orobservation. The area itself does not have to be narrow for it to pose such

risk, it only needs to restrict the area operators can move on to a narrowpath. The risk of going through such areas increases if the path is linear

and leads to a direction of a POEZ. Even more risk is involved when it islonger.

When an opponent emerge from a POEZ the area is exposed to, the operator is

exposed to opponents' gun fire until the operators can get out of the zoneand the operators cannot make much angular movement from opponent's point

of view which means the opponents need little or no adjustment in aim whenoperator executes evasive maneuver. Simply put, operators is that path is

a very easy target until they get out of the area which may take some time.

Maneuver through such areas should be avoided as much as possible. Time in

maneuvering through those areas or other areas exposed to POEZ withoutobjects that give protection should be minimized. It is beneficial todetermine what to do when attacked while in these area before entering.

When moving through relatively high risk area, operator should note areasthat provide possible protection from POEZ along the path, and develop

plans to move to those areas, or integrate it with path selection.

Even if there is nothing in the terrain that limits maneuvering, taking a

path that is lined toward a POEZ, or positioning oneself along that line ifpath to get in or out of that position also involves that line, increases

risk. If an operator leaves a protected position and takes such path, ashortest path back to protected position would not make significant lateral

movement of the operator in opponent's point of view if an opponent emergesfrom that POEZ.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hold position or move?

It is good to move position if it is likely that the operator's position

information is revealed to an opponent, and it is not necessary to hold the

position, and the risk involved in the move itself is not greater than thatof remaining in position.

Position of advantage should be kept unless there is a specific and


34/66

justifiable reason to leave the advantage it offers. Following is some ofthe characteristics an operator should seek in positioning:

-Escape route available for operator.

-Hard for opponents to observe, approach.

-Minimum number of approach path for the opponent to reach the area

that allows effective attack against operators.

-Approach route for opponents and POEZs exposed to operators attackand concentrated in limited range of direction operator can

effectively observe and respond.

-Area offers objects and terrain that protects operator from

observation and gun fire without obstructing field of view oropening for attack operator wants.

-Opponent has to leave protected area in order to approach or attackan operator.

An intelligent opponent will not knowingly and willingly approach or attack

an operator in an area with the above conditions unless they believe theyhave some means to nullify the advantage the operator has. If the opponent

has the positional advantage, the operator should avoid entering an areathat would put oneself in a disadvantage. Either case will result in one

party willing to keep the position and the other being reluctant to makecontact, which may result in temporary security.

If the operator strictly adheres to maintaining or enhancing positional

advantage, the possibility of contact with the opponent lies with theopponents aggressiveness, making the opponent enter a position of

vulnerability or leave a position of advantage, in order to attack orpursue the operator. Some opponents do leave position of advantage and

enter an area where operators have tactical advantage. So, operators needto be aware that a tactical advantage a position offers need to be enough

that the risk of keeping the position is low enough even if opponents doattack than seeking another position or leaving the area. Some opponents do

not care about casualties, and some opponents fail to assess the advantage

or disadvantage they have. Some opponents may belong to a an institutionthat forces them to act according to certain doctrine or scripted plan. The

doctrine or plan may include wrong assumptions, miscalculations, and thoseinstitutions may still coerce their members to act according to it when it

can endanger the members.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


35/66

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Securing a sector:

Positioning in a certain location often involves an operator trying tosecure a sector. However, "securing" a sector cannot be done in a sound

manner until the following conditions are met:

Regarding all POEZs in an operator's sector:

-The operator is able to detect any emerging opponents fromany POEZ.

-The operator is able to effectively attack any opponentemerging from any POEZ.

-The operator is able to react to any opponent emerging fromfrom those POEZs faster than the opponent reacts to the

operator.

It is a critical error to assume a certain fan of area is secured by anoperator only because there is an operator looking down that area with a

weapon in ready position. If there is a POEZ in that sector, and it is hardfor the operator to see an an opponent emerging from it, the operator is

nothing more than a good target for an opponent in that POEZ.

No area is secure until an operator can detect all relevant activities inthe area and effectively react to deny opponent's offensive actions. The

amount of workload each operator has to handle must not be overwhelming,and the position needs to be relatively secure one that provides tactical

advantages.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Escape, contingency, depth of defense:

Positioning or maneuvering route selection should involve consideration for

possible escape route. Operators should favor paths or positions that hasalternative options, and avoid path that its escape route is easily

blocked.


36/66

If there are multiple position of advantage along the escape path where

operators can move to and attack the opponents, to deter them from pursuingor cause attrition, etc., it would even be more effective. That may have to

be the plan if operators are fighting against numerically superior opposing

force. For this reason, area of certain length or "depth" operators can

conduct evasive maneuver through is desirable. Operators should avoidholding position in an area where different position to relocate or escaperoute is not available when the position is overwhelmed.


37/66


38/66

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Movement Speed:

Slower movement is better for recognition and analysis of surroundings. Itis also better for responding to new emerging threats. Faster movement is

better for moving through position of tactical disadvantage, moving throughor bypassing OAZ, evasive maneuvers to make an opponents' targeting

difficult etc. However, operators need to balance the movement speed whenthe need for slower movement and need for faster movement conflicts with


39/66

each other.

Operators would want to shorten the time spent maneuvering through areas ofdisadvantage as possible, which requires faster movement. But, at the same

time, operators would not want to be detected by opponents while in areasof disadvantage. Faster movement will increase the likely hood of operators

being detected by opponents when operators would want to avoid contact themost.

Also, certain degree of speed is necessary, if an operator maneuvering has

to maneuver a certain distance within a certain time limit. For example: Ifan operator is maneuvering to escape from area opponents are expected to

gain tactical advantage over before opponents are expected to positionthemselves for that goal, there would be some degree of speed needed.

Another example is if operators need to get in certain position in certain

amount of time for that position to be of use.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


40/66

2.1. POEZ and OAZ handling.

When operators come in contact with a POEZ, they have a few choices abouthow it will be handled:

-Examine : Operators can examine the area behind the POEZ to check if there

is an opponent and process opponents that comes in contact as necessary.

-Bypass: Operators can maneuver past the POEZ without examining areaconcealed behind the POEZ where opponents may emerge from.

-Seal: Operators can place barriers so that opponents cannot emerge from

the POEZ.

-Surveillance: Operators can observe the POEZ, preferably from position of

advantage, ready to handle contacts with any opponents that emerge from thePOEZ.

If an operator needs to maneuver past the area that would be exposed to anopponent who emerges from a POEZ, the operator needs to choose to

How much risk is involved in approaching it?

How will it be examined?How much risk in involved in examining it?

In situation where operators need to move through an area that would be

exposed to an opponents who emerges from a POEZ, operators need to evaluatethe risk involved in examining, bypassing, and sealing the POEZ then select

what involves minimum risk.


41/66

If the risk involved with clearing a POEZ is too high, operator can choose

to bypass it. However, it may not be possible to know exactly how much of arisk clearing a certain POEZ poses until an operator starts to examining

the POEZ, which may result in the operator deciding to abort the

examination and bypass a POEZ during its already started examination.

The examination starts by moving to where area concealed by objects formingthe POEZ to check if there is an opponent in the concealed area. If no

opponent is present, the operator examines whether if an opponent hasaccess to the area. If no opponent is in the area, and the opponent has no

access to the area behind the POEZ, the POEZ is cleared. It is no longer a

POEZ. One such example is a room with a single door as the only accesspoint. The door may be a POEZ. But, once it is confirmed that no one is in

the room, and there is no way, other than the single door, to get in the

room, it is unlikely that anyone can come out the door.


42/66

If no opponent is in the area, but there are access points to the area,

other than the POEZ, the operator may continue examining all connected

areas until the operator confirms that all combined areas are contained.However, this has its own risks. If there are multiple areas that are

connected to the area concealed behind the POEZ, then it may take a long

time to process the POEZ. Also, the areas that are connected to the area

that was concealed behind the POEZ often are connected by another POEZ.Once example of that is an entrance that leads on to a room which is a POEZwhen the room leads to another separate room through another door which is

another POEZ. It's even more work and involves more risk if the areaconcealed by POEZ contains multiple additional POEZs, such as POEZ that

leads to a hallway which contains entrances to multiple rooms. For the POEZthat came into initial contact to be examined, all additional POEZs in

those scenarios need to be examined. For an operator to choose to examinethe POEZ may result in maneuvering through areas of disadvantage in order


43/66

to examine those additional POEZs.

In situations where complete examination of a POEZ is not desirable, an

operator may check only a limited amount of areas beyond the POEZ, and try

to maneuver away from the POEZ before an opponent enters the area beyondthe POEZ from an access point other than the POEZ then emerge from thePOEZ.

In many situations, for operators to completely examine a POEZ that

conceals an area containing multiple POEZ of the same characteristics isnot feasible. If an operator is in a structure with all rooms connected

with each other, with more than one access points, no area in the structureis contained without enough number of operators to secure all additional


44/66

access points all combined area has or have those access points sealed.And, even when there are enough operators for that, there may be problems

with placing some operators to secure some access points when there is noposition of advantage to secure it from.

If the operator only examines a limited area beyond the POEZ that has an

access points other than the POEZ, the operator will only be able to knowif there is an opponent who can immediately emerge from behind the POEZ.

The zone will remain a POEZ, and the operator may need to keep observingthe POEZ while maneuvering away from it, which may not always be possible.

The purpose of starting an examination of a POEZ while knowing that only alimited area beyond a POEZ would be examined is to lower the probability of

opponent emerging from that POEZ after the examination for a limited amountof time. That time would depend on the time it is expected to take for an

opponent to traverse the distance of the space examined beyond that POEZ.

In other cases, an operator may have intended to clear the POEZ, butdiscovered that it would take too much time or the risk is too high.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Contact concealable POEZ:

This is a type of POEZ that can conceal an opponent that have contact with

an operator. That means an opponent in that POEZ can observe or attack theoperator while being concealed. Any partial optical barrier, such as a

plant life that a person hiding behind can easily see through that anobserver far from it has low probability of detecting the person hiding

behind, is also a POEZ. In addition to partial optical barrier problemmentioned in Signature Control section, this also presents a problem that

opponent may still be concealed even when a contact is made and opponent isattacking the operator. It's a POEZ that can conceal a contact, which will

from now on be referred to as contact concealable POEZ.

Being exposed to an object that may be concealing an opponent when thatopponent is capable of attacking the operator while being concealed is a

losing proposition. Using objects or terrain features that provides

protection to shield the operator from contact concealable POEZ point ofview as much as possible is a way to deal with the problem, and this is the

most used method. Another method to deal with such POEZ is to attack withenough firepower to ensure that any opponent that may be concealed behind

it would be incapacitated or contact concealable POEZ itself is destroyed.

That is not a likely method to be used to deal with every contactconcealable POEZ because of limited firepower operators can carry, danger

of exposing the operator using that method, and legality issues. However,it can be a viable method in dealing with one or limited number of contact


45/66

concealable POEZ when operator has a reason to think there is a probabilitybeyond a mere potential that there is an opponent concealed by the

particular POEZ object, and the probability is acceptable enough to riskexposure by attacking it, in situation where such action would be

justifiable. That approach was adopted in counter ambush techniques. Inwilderness area, it is likely that operators may have low probability of

detecting attacking opponents well concealed behind plants. Operators canassess the features of the area and determine which spot is likely that an

opponent may be hiding and saturate the area with gun fire. However, inmost situation, such approach and methods should only be used when there

are no better options. Ammunition attrition is very high, it increases theprobability of operators being detected, and its effect is harder to

assess.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

OAZ differs from POEZ in that an opponents reaction is expected to be

faster and more effective when the operator comes in contact with theopponent through that zone, because the opponent is expecting to come in

contact with the operator through the zone. Any attempt to go through an

OAZ should be avoided as long as there are better alternatives.

An example of an OAZ single doorway of a room with the single door as theonly access point when contains an opponents who knows your presence.


46/66

Maneuver through or near POEZs or OAZs should be avoided as much as

possible. The path selection should be designed to include less POEZ or OAZinvolvement as possible and plans on how to deal with the in cases where it

cannot be avoided.

When maneuvering through or near OAZs cannot be avoided, an operator needsto assess the risk involved with handling each OAZ and select the OAZ thatposes less risk to handle to maneuver through or maneuver near by. Same

principles are involved with POEZ. It is very unlikely situation that anoperator has a good reason to go through what is certain to be an OAZ to an

opponent occupied space. However, there can be situations where an operatormay have to go near or pass in front of an OAZ, such as escaping from a

more dangerous area. If the exposure time to opponents behind the OAZ canbe made short enough, then operator can prevent giving an opponent the


47/66

opportunity to attack.

Another possible situation is an operator partially exposing oneself to anopponent through the OAZ in order to see the opponent and attack. (More

details in Chapter 3 Contact Management.)


48/66

2.2. Common obstacles.

2.2.1. Closed Doors.

Opening a closed door in order to go through the doorway or examine a space

behind it poses following risk on top of regular maneuvering problems:

-It places operators in predictable location while a door is beingmanipulated.

-Opening and other manipulation, forced breaching of a door can expose

operator's location.

-It conceals what is in the space, usually unexamined area, behind it.

-Limited maneuver and positioning options for controlled exposuretechniques.

Dealing with closed doors would involve minimizing the risk presented by

above and apply the principles of maneuvering and positioning to gaintactical advantage as much as possible. Just like any other maneuver path

decision, operators should think about whether if the risk of going throughor examining a space behind a particular closed door is favorable compared

to other possible options. Some times, are other doorways that gives accessto area an operator is interested in that can be processed at lower risk.

There can be different openings that an operator can use to examine thespace behind the door the operator is interested in.

First thing an operator can do to examine space behind a closed door is to

use any opening, gap, or transparent part on or between the parts thatsurrounds the space behind the door. There can be a gap between a door an

its door frame. A door may have opening made by faulty door lock that isloose or fallen out of place. There can be a window on the door or a wall

next to the door. However, an operator needs to be cautious not to bedetected while observing thorough such things. The risk increases when the

ambient light level of the operator's area is high and that of the area

behind the door is low.

In certain situations, opening a door quietly only a small amount andexamining space behind the door way through the small opening as much as

possible before opening it further can be a feasible method. The

feasibility depends on opponents' expected alertness level, and thelikeliness and expected response time of opponents' attack on the operator

in the doorway area if the door movement is detected. It may be a feasibleoption when opponents are not alert or aware of the operator's presence. It


49/66

is also an alternative when flinging doors fully open creates more risk,usually because fully opening doors in one motion is more conspicuous.

However, it can be very conspicuous from some door to be open even if it'sa very small degree, making use of the method less feasible. In this

document this method will be called "limited stealth opening" from now on.

If door and the wall does not provide protection from gun fire, operatoropening a door would have to minimize the time manipulating the door,usually by quickly pushing or pulling the door so that it would move by

inertia all the way without the operator moving with the door. This wouldminimize the time the operator is in a position where an opponent can

predict where a person opening the door would need to be, and prevent inoperator from following an inward opening door into an unexamined space.

However, the operator remaining near the doorway covered by wall that does


50/66

not offer protection from gun fire can make the operator vulnerable to apotential opponent who detected the door opening shooting at area near the

doorway through the walls.

If there is a position where operator can be in or move in to immediatelyafter manipulating the door that provides protection and other tactical

advantages, the operator can use that position. Otherwise, the operator mayhave to execute a negated concealment counter action by moving away from

the door way. After that, the operator can re-approach the door way toexamine the space behind the doorway, when there was no attack and it

appears that any potential opponents on the other side of the doorway isunlikely to have an idea of the exact location of the operator. If the

walls surrounding the doorway offers protection from gun fire, negatedconcealment counter action may not be necessary.

The force applied in pushing or pulling a door should not exceed the levelthat is estimated to make the door move to the end of its motion range or

other desired level. If the force is excessive, the door is likely to hitthe edge of its motion range and bounce back, closing itself to varyingdegrees.

Operators should avoid being exposed to unexamined area behind a doorway in

an uncontrolled manner, as a closed door opens. If too much space isrevealed to an operator at a very short time frame, the operator may not

recognize things that the operator need to react to in a timely manner. Itmay be better for an operator to position oneself in a way that would

minimize the amount of area the operator would be exposed to that wasbehind a closed door, after that door is opened. Then the operator can use

controlled exposure techniques to examine the the area that is notexamined. However, if an operator has information about the situation

behind a closed door, and is able to react to everything inside it fastenough for operator's safety, the operator can choose to position oneself

where maximum amount of space that was behind the closed door would berevealed, as the door is opened. However, the priority is to have a

positioning that would give an operator maximum advantage over anypotential contact rather than how much increase in volume of space an

operator choose to be exposed to in order to examine it.


51/66

However, it is not always possible to keep the amount of space behind a

close door the operator would be exposed to after the door is open low.

There are other methods to increase operators tactical advantage inpotential contact with an opponent who was behind a closed door, when they

both become exposed to each other as the door opens. Use of available

protection object, even moving such object near operator's side of doorway,

and keeping distance from the doorway would lower the probability of hit ofopponent's gun fire. Making the operator's side of the area dark may hinderopponent's ability to react to the operator.


52/66

Most doors would have a space concealed behind it even when it is opened to

its fullest degree. Those unexamined areas should not be ignored. With

hinged doors, there usually is a gap between the door and the door frame on

the hinged side that allows operators to examine those spaces.

When positioning oneself next to the door, hinge side position would make

an operator get exposed to area behind the doorway as the door open soonercompared to the door knob side, if the door opens by swinging away from the

operator, as the operator would face the door knob side that gets revealedfirst. Placing oneself on the door knob side when the door opens by

swinging toward the operator has the same effect. This can reduce timeavailable for an operator to execute a negated concealment maneuver or get


53/66

a gun back in ready position if the gun was taken out of ready position inorder to open the door.

Auto closing door:

This increases the difficulty of operators dealing with closed doors. A

door need to be open in order for an operator to examine maximum volume ofa space through a door way without special observation tools. If a door

automatically close from full open position, an operator may not haveenough time to maneuver in order to execute a controlled exposure technique

to observe all the space that would be examinable through the door frame ifthe door was kept open.

For an operator to avoid entering maneuvering into area that is not

properly examined, the operator would either have to examine the space

behind the door frame quickly while the door is open or use some method tokeep the door from closing.

One way to keep a auto closing door that swings away from an operator as itopens is to lean an object on the door so that the object would fall toward

the space behind the door as the door opens. That can prevent the door fromclosing. An object used can be something like a chair. Even if a door is

not open to its max motion range, a hinged door open even about 45 degreemay give enough opening to examine as much space as when it is fully open

if there is a gap between the door and the door frame on the hinged sidethat allows operators to examine space behind the door.


54/66

For auto closing door that swings toward an operator as it opens, a cord

looped around a door knob can be used to open the door and get some

distance from the doorway after the door is open. The door can then be heldopen by the cord being tied to an anchor point or objects placed to block

the door from closing. Such method may not be necessary if the walls around

the doorway provides protection from gun fire.

If there are no tools or objects that can be improvised to keep an autoclosing door open, an operator can push or pull the door open then use

momentary exposure technique to examine the space that was concealed behindthe door before the door closes. This has a risk of delaying negated

concealment maneuver if it needs to follow immediately after the door isopened. Also, the hasty observation can resulting an operator failing to

see things of tactical significance.


55/66

If the door opens by swinging towards an operator the operator has anoption to execute a controlled exposure technique to examine the space that

was behind the door either as the operator is opening the door by pullingit slightly open then pushing it with operator's body while moving side

ways or after the door is held in full open position. This can be donebecause the operator does not have to enter the space that was concealed

behind the door when the door opens. However, this requires the operator toremain near the doorway right after the door is opened, which is a problem

if the walls around the doorway does not protect the operator from gunfire.

It may be feasible for an operator to remain near the doorway an hold the

door open while executing a limited stealth opening, regardless of whichway the door opens.


56/66

2.3. Examples of application

These examples are hypothetical, and the intent is to show how principlesof tactics can be applied. Methods shown are not meant to be presented as

the definitive way to handle all similar situations.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Terms defined:

Individual space occupation: This will refer to the space large enough

for an operator with desirable ready posture to occupy, and have somedistance from the objects surrounding the operator to freely

maneuver.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Example scenario:

In this scenario, an operator and the operators opponent are located witha hallway in between them, and both are located at the opposing end of the

hallway with a corner of a wall as a cover. If both sides expose themselvesto look down the hallway to control the entire hallway area, both will be

exposed to same degree, and will have equal probability of incapacitatingtheir opponent and being shot themselves.

If the objective is to control much of the hallway area as possible,

exposure to a degree that will allow the observation of the POEZ corner atthe other end may be necessary. However, if the objective is to deny the

opponent from closing in using the hallway, the operator can positiononeself in a manner that will force the opponent to leave cover if the

opponent intends to attack. For example, the operator can position oneselfin a manner that the POEZ corner at the other end, the one the opponent is

using as cover, will not be visible. This will also make the operator

invisible to the opponent looking down the hallway from the other end usingthat corner as a cover.


57/66

If the opponent intends view the operator for attack, the opponent has tomove out from behind the corner to get more field of view into the room at

the other end of the hallway. The opponent may also have to move in the

hallway to do so. Depending on the exact shape, size, and length of thestructure, the opponent may be standing in the open when the operator still

has cover.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


58/66

Example scenario:

Problem with maneuvering into a part of a hallway when the entry point is

not at an end of the hallway is that once an operator starts to approachthe hallway, the operator would be exposed to at least two different

direction the hallway extends from the entry point at the same time withthe hallway often extending in opposite directions. The directional

dispersion is too high for an operator to examine hallway that extends bothdirection at the same time. So, one side has to be examined first, then the

other. When the operator exposes oneself to unexamined area of one side,the operator will also be exposed to the opposite side.

One way to manage this problem is to first use momentary exposure technique

to examine a portion of one side, then use controlled exposure technique to

examine a portion of the other side. When momentary exposure technique isused to examine the first side, that will create an area where the operator

can maneuver into while examining the second side without exposing oneselfto unexamined area of the first side. The operator will maneuver throughthe space that is exposed to the area that is already examined by momentary

exposure technique.

A good example of this is entering a "T" shaped intersection of hallways.Example procedure is as follows:


59/66

An operator will approach a "T" shaped intersection. As the operator getcloser to the intersection more and more area of both sides of the

intersecting hallway will be revealed. At some point the directionaldispersion of area of the two sides of the hallway will become too wide for

the operator to see at the same time. Operator will have to stop straightin approach at that point.


60/66

The operator will then use momentary exposure technique to examine aportion of unexamined area of one side of the intersecting hallway. That

will make the operator be exposed to unexamined area of the other side ofthe hallway without the operator being able to see, but the risk is

controlled by short exposure time.

Then the operator can examine the other side using controlled exposuremethod. This time, the examination can be done without exposing oneself to

an unexamined area because the portion of the first examined side area theoperator is exposed to while examining the second examined side area is

already examined by momentary exposure technique.


61/66

By using this method, the operator maneuvers to use controlled exposuretechnique to systematically reveal the side of the intersecting hallway the

operator intends to move in while using the momentary exposure techniqueprior to each of that controlled exposure movement to examine the other

side and gain space the operator can maneuver into without being exposed toportion of the other side that is not examined by the momentary exposure

technique. This action is repeated as many times as necessary, but it mayonly need to be repeated as low as a single time, depending on the

operator's exposure characteristics to each side.

Side of the body a rifle or pistol is positioned may have to be changed inorder to minimize exposure and maximize the utilization of protection. This

may be harder with a rifle or other type of long guns, but there is a

technique to change the side of shoulder a long gun is positioned


62/66

quickly(*****More details in Ready Posture section and Volume 1 CombatGunnery Section.)


63/66


64/66

As the operator get more closer to the intersection, the directional

dispersal of two POEZs gets too wide for operator to process both at the

same time. Now, the operator above decides to examine the unexamined areabehind the two corners by fractions of it one side at a time.

Operator gets closer to one corner to get better field of view of area that

was behind the other corner. To prevent protruding part of one's body orpart of any equipment into space exposed to unexamined area, operator takesa posture that is more compressed and less protruding. Although this is

easier with a pistol, it can also be done with rifle.


65/66

As the operator is about to enter the hallway intersecting with the one the

operator is in, the operator will be in a zone where more examinationcannot be done without being significantly exposed to both POEZs while not

being able to observe both at the same time. The operator decides to use

Momentary exposure technique to examine the space behind the corner that iscloser, making it hard for any opponent that may be in the other POEZ to

have enough time to make effective fire on the operator.


66/66

Now the rest of the unexamined area is processed.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

combat operations with firearms volume 2 chapter 2 maneuvering and positioning release 2013 0422

Documents