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HodgesFoundationforPhilosophicalOrientation
ThreeGuidestothePhilosophyofOrientation
C.
CourageousBeginnings:
25SituationsofNewOrientations
intheHistoryofPhilosophy
byWernerStegmaier
HodgesFoundationforPhilosophicalOrientation
Nashville,Tennessee
2019
2
Contents
Introduction–4
I.AntiquityandMiddleAges–7
1.AlternativeLimitationsoftheInfinite:AnaximanderandPythagoras–8
2.TheAlternativeofeitherExcludingTimeorGettingInvolvedwithIt:
ParmenidesandHeraclitus–9
3.AlternativeDesignsoftheTemporalBlendingandDecompositionofMattersin
PreservingtheOneTimelessBeing:Empedocles,Anaxagoras,andDemocritus12
4.TheAlternativeofRelyingonIndividualAbilitiesofOrientationinDecisionSitua-
tionsoronaCommonReasonandaSharedTruthIndependentofSituations:
TheSophistsandSocrates–14
5.AlternativeConceptualFramingsofBeing,Becoming,andEvaluating:
PlatoandAristotle–16
6.AlternativesintheArtofLiving:HellenisticSchools–20
7.AlternativePhilosophicalConclusionsfromChristianFaith:
Augustine,AnselmofCanterbury,ThomasAquinas,WilliamofOccam,
andNicholasofCusa–22
II.Modernity–28
8.AlternativeSecularizationsofPhilosophy:
Machiavelli,Bruno,Montaigne,Bacon,andHobbes–29
9.AlternativeFoundationsoftheSelf-ReferentialOrientationinSubstances:
Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz–33
10.AlternativeCertainties:Pascal–41
11.AlternativeConceptualizationsofLawfulness:
Locke,Berkeley,Hume,andKant–45
12.AlternativeConceptionsofMorality,Politics,andEconomy:
Smith,Rousseau,Kant,andBentham–56
13.AlternativeWaysofConceptualizingHowOneCanOrientOneself:
Mendelssohn,Kant,andHerder–69
14.AlternativeSurveysofKnowledge:
3
TheEncyclopediasbyd’Alembert&DiderotandbyHegel–78
15.AlternativeCompositionsofKnowledge:
Hegel’sandSchleiermacher’sDialectic–91
III.Postmodernity–102
16.AlternativesintheRevaluationoftheUniversalandtheIndividual:
EmersonandStirner,SchopenhauerandKierkegaard–103
17.AlternativesintheMoral-PoliticalCommitmentofPhilosophy:
MarxandMill–116
18.AlternativeWaysofLiberatingPhilosophyfromMetaphysics:
Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJames–122
***SectionstofollowinaSecondEdition***
19.AlternativesinDesigningPhilosophyinViewofTime:
Nietzsche,Bergson,andWhitehead
20.AlternativesinDesigningPhilosophyinViewofLanguage:
Frege,Wittgenstein,andAnalyticPhilosophy–PeirceandPhilosophiesofSign
21.AlternativesinScrutizingthe‘Given‘:PhenomenologyandHermeneutics22.AlternativesinConceptualizingHumanBeing:
Anthropology,ExistentialPhilosophy,andStructuralism23.AlternativesinConceptualizingSociety:
SociologicalSystemsTheoryandCriticalTheory,CommunitarianismandLiber-alism
24.AlternativesinConceptualizingEthics:
TheoryofJustice(Rawls),DiscourseEthics(Habermas),Metaethics,andEthicsStartingfromtheOther(LevinasandDerrida)
25.AlternativesinCourageouslyReversingOne’sOwnOrientation:
WittgensteinandHeidegger
4
Introduction
Allthinkinghasaprehistory.Theprehistoryofthephilosophyoforientationisthe
historyofWesternphilosophy.Mostoftenthishistoryisportrayedasaprogressin
increasing and justifying knowledge. However, acquiring knowledge is only one
among othermeans of human orientation.Orientation is the attempt to, time and
again,findone’swayinaworldthatchangescontinually.Knowledgerequiresorien-
tation,andphilosophyhasalwayslookedbeyondthemereincreaseandjustification
of knowledge. In new historical situations, philosophy has repeatedly re-oriented
itself.Thefollowingsketchoutlinesinstancesoffundamentalphilosophicalreorien-
tation and realignment, which have been efficacious down to the present day: as
pathsleadingtoaphilosophyoforientationintheworldoftoday.
Ifonelooksbackonhistory,onedoessofromtheperspectiveofthepresent,
inevitably. At the beginning of the 19th century, the pinnacle of German idealism,
GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,wasthefirsttodraftaphilosophicalhistoryofphi-
losophy.Hewanted to substantiate that philosophy, as he comprehended it in his
day,alsoevolvedinhistory.TherebyHegeltriedtocatchupwiththecourseoftime
andtoretrieveitinthepresent:philosophywassupposedtoproceedconsequently
from its beginnings inGreek antiquity until thepresentwithout anyhazards, sur-
prises,orcontingency.Butthiseffort,too,haditstime:inthecourseofthe19thcen-
tury,one learned toobservehowhistory factuallyoccurred,andby theendof the
19th century, most of all Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Nietzsche radically ques-
tioned philosophical systems like Hegel’s: history could be interpreted in many
ways,andthefutureappearedtobeopenagain.Byandlarge,thisisstillthecasein
the21stcentury,eventhoughthehistoryofphilosophyhasremainedabattlefieldof
ideologies and ideological criticism. History itself as well as historiography have
turnedintoanopen-endedprocessoforientation.
History, however, is interesting and relevant for the present day only if the
ongoingprocessoforientationcanbedescribedaswell;otherwise,historyisnoth-
ingbutthecollectionofpiecesofdeadknowledge.Weareheretryingtoprovidea
5
briefsynopsisofturningpointsinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy.Thissynopsis
isthehistoricalcounterparttoFearlessFindings:25Footholds forthePhilosophyof
Orientation; yet correlations cannot be traced item by item. Instead, we highlight
alternativeorientationdecisionsinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy.
ThesealternativedecisionsappearalreadyinearlyGreekphilosophy,firstof
allinthedefiningcontrastbetweenthethinkingofParmenidesandthethinkingof
Heraclitusinthe6thcenturyBC–thealternativeofeitherexcludingtimeorputting
everything under its command. In elaborating on this alternative, that which has
beencalled‘philosophy’sincethetimeofSocratesandPlato,hasformedtheunityof
anacademicdisciplineandrefined itselfaccording to itsownstandards.However,
thesestandardshaveneverbeenwithoutalternativeones;onthecontrary,thefact
that alternative standards have always been possible provoked self-reflection and
self-criticism, thereby coercing philosophy to develop further, though this has not
alwayshappened in a consistentmanner. This surveymarks those orientingdeci-
sions that have led to additional self-reflection and self-criticism in the history of
philosophy. The alternative to count on such decisionswould be to disregard the
conditionsoforientationandtoinsistonfixedtruthsintheformofmetaphysics.
Asitisneitherintendednorpossibletoelaborateonthehistoryofphilosophy
indetail, the surveyathand isnot comprehensive.Thehistoryand thepresentof
philosophyislikethesea:onecaneasilygetlost.Forthisreason,wetrytosteerthe
course and stay on target by limiting ourselves to 25 situations of orienting deci-
sions,whichseemtobelong to themost importantones in thehistoryofWestern
philosophy.Ofcourse,otherchoicesarepossible,too.
Great reorientations in philosophy are strikingly often connected with new
forms of philosophical writing. If one conforms to traditional genres such as dia-
logue, treatise, confession or meditation, one risks adopting unrecognized condi-
tions of orientation and losing a critical distance to one’s predecessors. With the
help of new forms of writing one can – if one succeeds – create new plausibility
standards. That which is new in the history of philosophy can often only be ex-
pressedinnewforms.Thisaspectwillbeanotherfootholdinthefollowingaccount.
Ourpresentation isorientedto thestateofrecentresearchonthehistoryof
philosophy,withoutthatitsresultscanbepresentedanddiscussedhere.Theoutline
isintendedtobeaccessibletolaypeople,too.Wepresupposeonlyacertainfamiliar-
ity with essential features of the history of philosophy, which can be acquired
6
through handbooks or the internet, e.g. throughWikipedia. Yet, sincewe develop
thissurveyofthehistoryof(Western)philosophyinlightofmajorinstancesofreor-
ientation,thefollowingmightinsomerespectsbesurprisingevenforexperts.
7
I.AntiquityandMiddleAges
TheNeedforanOverview–CompetingOrientations
InGreekantiquity,themaritimetradeandatthesametimethecontactwithforeign
cultureshadexpandedsincethe8thcenturyBC;moreandmorecitiesandcolonies
were founded in the Mediterranean world. This increased the need for a wide-
ranginggeographicorientationintheGreeksettlementarea.Theconsciousnessofa
sharedHellenismwaspreservedacrossthesea,andtheneedforacommonintellec-
tualorientationhelpeddemocracytoadvanceandcreatetheexpectationofarelia-
ble social orientation. At the beginning, single ‘wise men’ at the periphery of the
Greekworldofferedcompetingoverviewsofwhatwashappeningintheworld;later
Athensbecamethepoliticalandintellectualcenter.Insteadofreferringtotheunob-
servableanduncontrollableinterventionofmanifolddeitieswithconfusingperson-
al relations to each other, one then created order through concepts like ‘the ele-
ment,’ ‘the infinite,’ and ‘number’ inorder tocreateanoverviewofoccurrences in
theworld.
Yet,theneedsforoverview,forobservation,andforreliabilityarefulfilledin
differentways, and therefore the new orientation remained problematic from the
verystart.Thus,newphilosophicalorientationsare forced toorient themselves to
eachotherandtoreflectupontheveryprocessoforientation.Self-reflexivephilo-
sophical orientation,which persisted next to the faith in gods, consolidates in the
courseoftime,becomesexemplary,andleadstotheemergenceofdivergingschools.
From the earlyGreekphilosophersbeforePlato, only few fragmentary testi-
moniesareconveyedintheformofquotesfromlaterauthors,andthesefragments
are open tomany interpretations.We understand them as sources that testify to
philosophicalreorientations.
8
1.AlternativeLimitationsoftheInfinite:
AnaximanderandPythagoras
Intheage-oldseatradecityMiletus,whichwasdestroyedseveraltimesandrebuilt
in Ionia (Minor Asia), which was ruled by the Persian king, THALES (ca. 624/23-
548/44BC)daredtoconceiveofthefirstgreatphilosophicalthesisthateverything
emergesfromoneelement,namelywater.Thaleswascrediblebecauseofhismathe-
matical discoveries, astronomical predictions, and economic and political success.
Soontheelementwaterwasconfrontedwithotherelements(earth,air,fire),which
alsoseemedplausibleastheoriginofallthings.
ThiswasnotsatisfactoryforThales’presumablediscipleANAXIMANDERofMi-
letus(ca.610-547BC).Heisreportedtohavedraftedamapoftheinhabitedworld,
construed a sphaira, a celestial globe andmodel of the cosmos, and perhaps also
created a detailed description of all peoples living on the earth. If the reports are
true,hestrivedafteranorientationasweunderstandittoday,firstofallafterageo-
graphicorientation.Furthermore,heattempted themostcourageousphilosophical
beginningever:hedidnotpresuppose limitsor limitationsof somesort,noteven
betweenapparentelements,butratherassumedsomethingprincipallyunlimitedand
limitless, which defines itself in the generation and corruption of things, thereby
formingtemporaryconfigurations(Ordnungen).Accordingly,Anaximander isquot-
edtohavesaidthefollowing:“Butfromwherethingshavetheirorigin,intothattoo
their passing away occurs according as it is proper; for they pay recompense and
penaltytooneanotherfortheirrecklessness,accordingtotheorderoftime.”
Anaximander understands the always newly emerging and vanishing limits
within the unlimited (tò ápeiron – a word that possibly stems from Aristotle) as
‘knots,’ ‘holders,’ ‘pointsofattachmentandtransition’(peírata),thatis,asakindof
footholds,andtheápeiron incontrast to themastheunstablechangingof limits. In
theGreekepicpoems,theearthandtheseawereregardedasápeiron,astheirlimits
werenot in sight and couldbe reachedonlyby the gods.ThearchaicpoetHESIOD
(before700BC) also called the immeasurabledepthof the subterraneanabyss, in
whichonecannotevenhitgroundafterfallingdownforawholeyear,tòápeiron.
In the above quote, Anaximander ethically justifies the unlimited (in a very
broad sense): in the length of time, according to him, all limitation is unfair. He
seems not to distinguish something like thinking, neither in relation to theworld
9
processnoraspartoftheprocessitself.Thus,hisdiscipleANAXIMENESinterpretstò
ápeironasmatter,thoughthelightestandmostversatilematter,namelyairthatcan
condenseanddiluteand,inthisway,constantlydisplaceitslimits.
PYTHAGORAS(570-510BC),wholivedandtaughtontheothersideoftheHel-
lenisticworld,inLowerItaly,andalreadyestablishedaschool,seekstocapturethe
limits within the unlimited as numbers, thereby bringing them into a well-
structuredandcalculablesystemofordering.Numbers,too,setlimits–butaccording
to pregiven rules; and numbers can also be continuedad infinitum. Pythagoras is
abletomakethisnumberedorderplausiblebyshowingrelationsinwholenumbers
thatarevalidbothinmusicandintheorbitsoftheplanets;thus,hededucesahar-
monyofthespheres,which,however,onlyisheardbyhimalone.Possiblythishar-
mony is not so much based onmathematics but rather on numerical symbolism.
Nonetheless,Pythagorascreatesahighlysuccessfulmodelofhowtheworldprocess
asawholecanbesurveyedwiththehelpofmathematics.
The philosophy of orientation – likeAnaximander – keeps time infinitely open
for the becoming and passing away of things. It relies on orderliness and ar-
rangementsof things sorting themselvesoutover time.But thisprocesscan in
manycases–asPythagorasfirstassumed–beclarifiedmathematically.
2.TheAlternativeofeitherExcludingTimeorGettingInvolvedwithIt:
ParmenidesandHeraclitus
PARMENIDES(ca.540-470BC),wholivedattheoppositecoastofLowerItaly,inElea,
begantorefertohis(notexplicitlymentioned)precursorsandcontemporariesand
theirproposalsofhowoneorientsoneself–onlytorejectthemexplicitly.Hepress-
esforaradicalreorientation:hedegradeseverythingobservable,whichchangesin-
cessantly, to mere appearance in order to find an absolute hold in the non-
observable,abeing,whichisaccessibletopurethinkingalone.Parmenides’reorien-
tationbecomesthemostfatefulinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy.
Inordertomakehisphilosophicalreorientationplausible,heoutlinesagreat
scenariooforientation (which, again, is explicable inmanyways): fromHesiod,he
adopts thevenerable formof thedidacticpoemabout the fateofgodsandhuman
10
beings, andhassunmaidsdriveayoungman toanamelessgoddesswhomhe in-
ventshimself.Thegoddessgiveshimthechoicebetweentwoways:oneleadingto
previous opinions, the other one to the truth, in front of which, however, lies a
yawningchasm,symboloftotaldisorientation.Themythicalgoddessshallauthorize
the new, unprecedented path of thought, which is praised as the only one that is
trustworthy,tenableandreliable.
Oneonlyhassignsorclues(sáemata)forthisnewpath,butlikestrongshack-
les, they delimit and define a clear leeway. The truth, which emerges within this
space,isnotsupportedwithreasonsbyParmenides(forifhecouldjustifythetruth,
anothertruthwouldprecedeitandleaditsway).Inhisview,it isself-evidentthat
onlybeing(tòeón)canbe,whilenon-beingcannotbe.Thisimpliesthat,accordingto
Parmenides,everythingtemporalbelongstonon-beingbecausethetemporalisnot
yetornotanymore.Therefore,timemustbeexcludedfromthebeingofthatwhich
trulyisbeing.
Consequently,thatwhichtrulyisbeingmustbenon-temporal.Ithasnotcome
intobeingandcannotperish;itmustbeindivisibleandimmovable.Assuch,itisan
absolutely stable and durable foothold of human orientation. It is not an individual
beingnext toother things,butrather thatwhichall thingshave incommon:being
itself (tò eînai).Being itselfmustbeconceivedwithoutanyempiricallyobservable
referencepoints,andtothisend,onemustthinkuppurethoughtthatcannotbeob-
servedandthatisnotdependentonconcretereferencepoints.Thisthinkingthinks
nothingbutbeingitself.Inthissense,then,thinkingandbeingarethesame(tògàr
autòvoeînestínkaíeînai),asParmenideshasit.Subsequentphilosophershavetaken
upParmenides’accountof‘purebeing’and‘purethinking’soappreciativelythatitis
oftentakenforgranteduptothepresentdaywithoutquestion.Ithasbecomeanew
plausibility standard,which is formulated in themostdifferentiatedwaybyHegel
(sec.14and15).
However,HERACLITUSofEphesusinIona(ca.550-480BC)showsthatthereis
analternativetothisapproach.Heraclitus,too,usesthemetaphorofthetwoways,
yetwithoutleadingustopredefinedgoals:onedoesnotreachlimits,hesays,even
thoughonefollowseachwayinquiringly.Headheresmuchmorecloselytotheeve-
rydayexperienceoforientation,thecharacteristicbehaviorofthehumanbeing,ashe
callsit:âethosanthróopoodaímoon(characterishumandestiny).Heformulatesdif-
ferentkindsofshortandconcisesayings,yetwithoutclarifyingtheirfactualconnec-
11
tion. He likewise pointedly dismisses other suggestions regarding human orienta-
tion;however,itisunclearwhetherhethereinreferstoParmenides(andParmeni-
destohim).Bothofthemspeakauthoritatively:theyclaimadecisivesuperiorityto
their audience inmatters of orientation, and this attitude becomes a standard for
philosophersthatwouldappealparticularlytoNietzsche.
Heraclitus’languageisregardedasdark,buthelooksfororientationprecisely
in thedarknessof language.Forexample is itpossible tospeakofnon-being,even
thoughthere‘is’nonon-being.NeitherHeraclitusnorParmenideseschewthepara-
doxality of thebeingofanon-being;onlyAristotle states theprincipleofexcluded
contradiction.Thelógos,Heraclitus’expressionfororderedrelationsinthecosmos,
whichcanbediscoveredbythought,andforthinkingitself,remainshiddeninsigns
andcanonlybeextrapolatedfromsigns:Heraclitusorientshimselfbysigns,being
wellawareoftheleewaysofinterpretationthattheyopenup.Furthermore,heuses
images and similes. He does not create concepts for pure thought or for theories
conceivedbypurethought.
AsHeraclitusdemonstrates, the lógos discriminates thingsaccording to con-
trasts,while both extremes are of equal value, not asymmetrical like Parmenides’
distinction between being and the semblance of beingwhere this very distinction
predetermineswhat is to be preferred. Instead, the contrasts persist in a reverse
harmony(palíntroposharmoníae)wheretheoneextremeholdsontotheother.For
thisreason,everythingcanalwaysberegardedfromdifferentangles,anditdepends
onone’sperspectivehowonedefinesthatwhichisbeforeone’seyes.
Thus,allknowledge isdependentondecisions.There isnopregivenprimalor
superiorunity;allseparatethingscanbecomeonething,andoneisconnectedwith
all others through certain ties or links (synápseis). All ordered structures arise
throughtheconflictor ‘war’betweenall things(pólemospántoonpatáer);andit is
thecourseoftime(aióon)that–justasachildatplay–createsexpectable,yetalso
surprising and unfathomable connections. However, there are various degrees of
insight into theseprocesses; the less insightful canagreewith themore insightful,
yetonecannotforceanyonetoagree.
Obviously,itisHeraclitus’greatestconcerntomovebetweenbothsidesofpo-
lar opposites.He iswell awareof thedecidability of all knowledge,whichhelps to
better understand reality and to orient oneself in it. Hence, orientation always
‘flows.’Waterthatdiffusesandcollectseverything,wavesapproachinganddepart-
12
ing,andtheriverthatalreadyhaschangedwhenonewantstostepintoitagain(so
thatonecannotsteptwiceintothesameriver),isHeraclitus’mostpowerfulimage
forthefluxofallthings,andthisimagehassurviveduntiltoday.
Thephilosophyoforientationrecognizes–followingParmenides–theneedfor
a firmfoothold,yetwithout lookingfor it inabeingperse,which isaccessible
onlytoanalleged‘pure’thought.Atthesametime,thephilosophyoforientation
followsHeraclitus in regardingeverythingasbeingmediatedby signsandan-
tagonisms in thought,whichcompriseorientingdecisions.Allknowledge isde-
pendentonsuchdecisionsandthusremainsinflux.
3.AlternativeDesignsoftheTemporalBlendingandDecomposition
ofMattersinPreservingtheOneTimelessBeing:
Empedocles,Anaxagoras,andDemocritus
The last generation of the great early Greek, pre-Socratic or pre-Platonic philoso-
phers tries tounite the insightsof their ancestors innewandwidelydifferingde-
signs.WithParmenides, theycling to the imperishable, everlastingbeing,but they
pluralizeit,andasaresult,theycanconceiveofmovementandchange.
EMPEDOCLESofAkragas,aGreekcityinSicily,isenvelopedinmyth.Hisdatesof
birthanddeathareunclear.Hewantedtohavetraveledaroundasagodrebornin
humanshape,accompaniedbymanyfollowers.JustlikeParmenides,healsocreated
epic didactic poetry, but he assumed manifold sources or roots (rhizóomata) to
whichhegavethenamesofgods.Theyarenotsupposedtomergeintoeachother,
butrathertoagainandagainbecomeintermingledandseparated fromeachother
by the opposed forces of love and hate. Next to the elements, these interrelating
forcesareessentialforhim.Forthefirsttime,theworlddoesnotsomuchappearas
anaccumulationofmaterialsorthings,butratherasawebofrelationships.Therein
loveistocreatecalm(theAllbecomesspherical,asphaîros),whilehatecreatesun-
settlement(stirringuptheAll).Correspondingtoourordinaryorientation,thedis-
tinctionbetweencalmandunsettlementprecedesthedistinctionbetweentruthand
errororlie.ForEmpedocles,bothofitblazesthetrailforatheoryofbiogenesis,the
workingsofthesensesandapsychologyandanthropologythatmakessoulandbody
13
closelydependentoneachother.AsEmpedoclesassumesthattheuniverseisinfinite
in regard to time, but finite in regard to space, he also becomes a pioneer of the
thoughtofaneternalrecurrenceofthesame.
ANAXAGORAS(ca.500-425BC),whowent fromClazomenae inIonatoAthens,
metawarmreceptionfromtheillustriouscirclearoundPERICLES(ca.490-429BC),
butwas charged of impiety (evenbefore Socrates). Anaxagoras contributes to the
ideaoftheaggregationanddisruptionofanindeterminablenumberofinfinitelydi-
visiblemattersthatintermixandinterpenetrate,sothatonecontainsmany,andall
ofthemisineverything(pántaenpantì),beingpartofeverything.Unityandmulti-
plicityarenotfixedperse. It isreason(nûs)thattakescareofconnectionsanddis-
connections. For Anaxagoras, reason is the finest matter that interweaves every-
thing,causesrotatingwhirlsinwhichentitiesdevelop(synkrisis),grow,solidify,and
differentiate(apókrisis,diákrisis).Thatway,alwaysnewworldsbecomepossible.
DEMOCRITUSofAbderainThrace(ca.460-380BC)extendsthedoctrinesoflat-
erlittle-knownLEUCIPPUSandbringsthemtoAthens,withoutpeoplethereknowing
himorwantingtoknowhim.Democritusdoesnotletthedivisibilityoftheintermix-
ingandseparatingelementsgoendlessly;hestops thisdivisionassumingsmallest
indivisible and impenetrable elements (átoma), which amount to formations that
canbeperceivedwhentheyclashorcollapse.Insteadofinterfusingeachotherina
complex manner, the atoms are thought to cohere and form a great sum. Thus,
Democritus’atomismoffersafirmbutunobservablefootingintheconfusingmixture
oftheworld.Theperceivingsenses, too,areformationsofatomsthat interactwith
theperceivedsothatnothingcanbeperceivedasitmaybeinitself–allentitiesper-
ceivedbecomequestionable.Democritushypothesizesthevoid(tòkenón)asbeing
aroundtheatomsinordertomaketheirspatialmovementconceivable.Therefore,
thevoidmustbepenetrable.Asaconsequence,theconceptofacompactbeingthat
prevailedsinceParmenidesbecomesrisky.
Thephilosophyoforientationadmitsvariousclassificationsof theworld’spro-
cessaccordingtomaterials,elements,forces,etc.,insofarastheymakeintelli-
gible the flexibility, alterability, and temporality of the world’s structures. In
whatever way one chooses concepts and classifications, they do not refer to
pregivenentities,butconstitutecalmingabbreviations,whichcanbeconnected
toeachotherindifferentways,therebyformingdifferentworlds.Theabbrevia-
14
tions or short cuts themselves belong to the respective worlds through which
theyareformed.
4.TheAlternativeofRelyingonIndividualAbilitiesofOrientation
inDecisionSituationsoronaCommonReasonandaSharedTruthIn-
dependentofSituations:TheSophistsandSocrates
ThestepwisetransitionfromaristocracytodemocracyintheheydayofAthensen-
forced strong educational efforts for the citizens wanting to convince each other
with theirarguments in thedecretorypopularassemblies.That ishowtheprofes-
sion of wisdom teachers (sophists) emerged. In most cases they came to Athens
fromotherplaces,hadnocivilrightsanddidnotjointhefray.Instead,againstpay-
mentofa fee, theyhelpedcitizens toacquireavirtueorcapacity(aretáe) through
which they could distinguish themselves, above all an enhanced ability to orient
oneself,tojudgeanddecide.Therebythesophistsfreedtheirclientsfromhelpless-
nessandperplexity(amaechanía)intheircommunicationwithothers,andtheybe-
cameable tomaster theactual situation in thepopularassemblies.Theaforemen-
tionedvirtuewaspraisedasthepowertobringforwardspeciousarguments.Infact,
the sophistswere something likeprofessional teachers of orientation, without this
notionhavingexistedatthetime,someofthemwithhighearningsandcorrespond-
ing self-confidence. Men like Pericles and Alcibiades were greatly influenced by
them.
Thesophistscomingfromoutsideweremigratoryteachers,movedfromcity
tocity,becameacquaintedwithdifferentopinionsandmoralsand learned todeal
withtheminasuperiormanner.Theynotonlywrotespeechesforothers,butalso
enteredthepublicstage fortheirownpurposes.Fromamarkedlycriticaldistance
they developed first philosophies of cognition and knowledge, of language and
communication, of law andmorals, thereby exploring the societal and political di-
mensionofallknowledge.Theysetasidethequestionoftheoriginandorderofthe
world’s process and its truebeing, or they treated it ironicallywith the argument
thatsuchatruebeingisneitheridentifiablenorcommunicable.
In order to showcase the perspectivity of all assertions, they ostentatiously
tookupdifferentorevenantitheticalpositions.Competingwitheachother,theydid
15
notcommitthemselvestocommonstandsandteachings,butratherpreservedtheir
personalsovereignty.ParticularlyPROTAGORASofAbderainThrace(ca.490-411BC)
becamefamousformakingallassessmentsofthingsandpersonsdependentonthe
viewpointandsituationofthehumanbeingassuchandtherespectivestandpoints
ofsingleindividuals.GORGIASofLeontinoiinSicily(between490and485untilafter
396BC)didnotacceptstatementsandvaluationsequallybindingeveryone; instead,
heerectedagoldenstatueforhimselfinDelphi.PRODICOSofCeos(between470and
460until after399BC) advocated the thesis thatgodsare invented for the sakeof
one’sindividualneedsanddesires.Atthesametime,hewaswell-knownforhisme-
ticulous distinctions of concepts. Furthermore, Prodicos is said to have purported
thestoryaboutHeraclesatthecrossroads,whichbecametheparadigmofdecisions
onmoralorientation.
SOCRATES(ca.469-399BC),too,wasinhisdayregardedasasophistcompet-
ingwithotherssophists,thoughwiththeuniquefeaturethathedidnottakemoney
for his interlocutions and thus set the example of unselfish philosophizing that is
committedtothemorallygood.Accordingtothefewpiecesofinformationwehave
about him, hewas undemanding in his life with his (perhaps two)wives and his
three sons. He stemmed from Athens and practiced his civic rights and duties,
among them togo towar,whereheprovedhimself outstandingly, and toplayhis
part in the law courts,wherehe insisted on strict law-abidance.He respected the
lawsofhishometownevenwhenhewassentenced todeath,although theverdict
appearedclearlyunjusttohim.
However,heseemstobeassureofthegoodasParmenideswasofbeing.And
likeParmenides,Socratesisthereinsupportedbyhisgodlikedaimonion,whichpre-
ventshimfromevil,butdoesnotpositivelybringthegoodtohisknowledge.Coming
fromapoorbackgroundandbeingunhandsomebyGreekstandards,henonetheless
knowstofascinatethebestandmostbeautifulyoungaristocratsasnootherphilos-
opher, despite the fact that hedoesnot offer themknowledge.However, after the
oracleinDelphihasproclaimedthatnooneiswiserthanSocrates,hedarestocheck
this sentence on the grounds of the paradoxical premise that he, Socrates, knows
that he knows nothing. Hence, he questions everyonewho pretends to be knowl-
edgeableorwhomhepresumestobeknowledgeable, inordertofindoutwhether
thisknowledgeprovestrueinadiscussion.
16
Socrates is successful in his superiormoderation of the disputes by leading
everyoneintoirresolvableinternalcontradiction(aporía)ordisorientation.Heirri-
tatesandfascinateshisaudienceatthesametime.Therebyhecreatesareflexiveand
paradoxical orientation through disorientation: one knowsmore if one knows that
oneknowsnothing.
Theresultismostoftenthattheyoungmenwanttocontinuetheconversation
withhim.For,althoughitdoesnotproducetrueknowledge,theconversationmust
alwaysbeguidedbyaconcertedtruthandbeconductedonthegroundofacommon
reason–ofwhichonelikewisecannotknowanything.
SincePlatohasturnedSocratesintotheprotagonistofhisdialoguesandcon-
fronted himwith the other sophists, discrediting them severely, Socrates has be-
come the ideal type of the philosopher, andhis ethos of incessant self-examination
hasbecometherolemodelofallproponentsoftheEnlightenment.
The philosophy of orientation feels close to the sophists including Socrates, as
theyproceedfromthemerestatementofputativelytrueknowledgetoargumen-
tative disputes about inquiry and scholarly research in a sense that is still in
force today.Socrates’premiseofacommonreasonandaconcerted truthsup-
portsorientationsignificantly–providedthatoneshareshisknowledgethat,ul-
timately,thepromiseoftrueknowledgecannotbeproved.
5.AlternativeConceptualFramingsofBeing,Becoming,andEvaluating:
PlatoandAristotle
WhileSocratesknowsthatheknowsnothingandisconstantly involvedinanapo-
reticcommunicationof thatwhich isandshouldbe,PLATO(428/427-348/347BC)
partlyrenders,partlyinventshisdialogues.maintainingthathewillnotwritedown
hisown teaching.Plato’sworkconsistsofdialogues inwhichhehimself isabsent;
onceheexcuseshisabsencebyreferringtosickness.Hisworkisthefirstthatsur-
vivesona large scale.Plato’s dialoguesperformanddemonstratehowopinionsare
bound to individuals, how distinctions are introduced, and how one decides for or
againstthem.Inlettingothersspeak,Platoavoidsprofessingtruthsonhisown,too.
The ironyof thePlatonicSocrates liesprecisely inthe fact thatonedoesnotknow
17
whenhespeaksironically.Throughthemouthofhisprotagonists,Platononetheless
speakswithsuperiorauthority,yetwithout takinga theoretical standpoint ‘above’
things.At placeswherepositivedoctrines are expected, Plato’s protagonistsmake
do with unverified narrations (mythoi) including the famous parables. Here, too,
thereremainwidespacesfordiverginginterpretations.
Thus, Plato’s introduction of ideas that he puts into Socrates’mouth can be
understoodaspartofacomprehensivetheoryofprinciples,whichshallonlybeac-
cessible to Plato’s own school. But it can also be understood as ameremeans to
makeconceivablethecompatibilityofperspectivalorientationsintheapprehension
ofobjects:as freelyselectablepointsofview,whichcanbekept fora time, for in-
stancethetimeofadialogue.Thereisevidenceforthelatterapproach,sincePlato
hasSocratesintroducetheideasindifferentdialogues, i.e. indifferentsituationsof
communicationbetweendifferentpeopleandindifferentways.Thereby,heshows
thatSocrateswantstoconvinceeachdialoguepartnerinaspecificway,yetwithout
itbeingclearwhetherhealwayswantstoconveyoneandthesamemessage.
InsofarastheyoungSocratesfollowsParmenidesinattributingabeingperse
totheideas,PlatoletstheoldParmenidesinthesame-nameddialogueconsiderthis
asbeinguntenable,encouragingSocratestorehearsetheuseofideas.Insteadofaf-
firmingaconsistentandsustainabledoctrineoftheideas,whatthematureSocrates
brings toproof inPlato is thealwaysconvincinguseof ideas.Thus, it seems tobe
theirorientingusethatiscrucialforPlato.Consequently,thehighestideaofthegood
wouldthen,accordingtothePlatonicSocrates,betheideaofthegooduseofideas,
i.e.ofagoodorientation.
In times when democracy is constantly threated from outside by wars and
frominsidebypowerstruggles,philosophyestablishesitself intheformofschools
intowhichitwithdraws.Plato’shugepoliticalexperimentof,togetherwiththeruler
of Syracuse, creating a state governed by ideas fails spectacularly. Philosophical
schools like, forexample, thePythagoreanschooldeveloptheoriesconcernedwith
completeness, complexity, and internal consistency. Plato’s critical student
ARISTOTLE (384-322BC) creates themost impressive and influential theoryof this
kind.
While Plato descended from a highbred, upscale family in Athens, Aristotle
camefromelsewhere,namelyfromStagiraonthepeninsulaChalkidiki.Later,Aris-
totleassumedtheresponsibilityfortheeducationofAlexanderattheroyalcourtof
18
PhilipIIofMacedon,whoin338annexedAthensandotherGreekcitiestohisking-
dom.DuringAristotle’s lifetime,Philip’sson,AlexandertheGreat,createdhisgreat
empire, while Aristotle founded his own school in Athens and developed it as a
properresearchacademy.
Forhisowntheoryandhisacademy,Aristotleinventstheliterarygenreofthe
treatise,whichhasadetermininginfluenceonscience:thesober,purelyfact-bound
andlucidroundupofthoroughlyinvestigatedtruths,publishedinone’sownnamein
an ongoing calibration with other doctrines and the scientific consensus. Though
individual,thetreatiseshallnolongerberegardedasapurelyindividualintellectual
product.Rather,itissupposedtoallowforclearlyidentifiable,unequivocalbounda-
ries,not least inthequestionofbecoming,whichhadbeencontroversialsincePar-
menidesandHeraclitusandwasstillnotoriouslycontestedinPlato.AgainstAnaxi-
mander,Aristotlemaintainsthateverythingthat‘is’mustbesomethinglimited,for
otherwiseitcannotbecomprehended.Forthisreason,AristotlealsodiscardsPlato’s
ideas as ameansofdeterminingbeingandbecoming. For if ideas are rulesdeter-
mininghowtoseethings,oneinturnneedsrulesfortheapplicationoftheserules.
This leads into an infinite regress, which, for Aristotle, is an indication of their
wrongness. Thinking, by contrast, must be a determination of limits (horismós)
where it stops (anánkae stâenai). In Aristotle’s view, philosophy’s primary task is
thisdeterminationoflimitsorofprocessescomingtoastandstill.Hetherebypresup-
posesnatureasacosmosthatis internallylimitedandwell-guardedinsuchaway
thatallthinking,aswellasthethinkingofthinking,ispartofit.
Aristotle solves the problem of becoming in distinguishing between abiding
beingandshiftingqualities.Therebyhecapturestherelativityofmovement,oneof
the most important footholds of everyday orientation until today; when change,
movementorfluctuationisobserved,itmustbecomparedtosomethinginrelation
towhichitchanges,moves,orfluctuates.However,Aristotleatthesametimedraws
fast boundaries: he isolates that which abides during the apprehension of the
movementasanon-temporalsubstance(ousía)fromtemporallyalternatingattrib-
utes,whichhedevaluates asbeingonly accidental (symbebaekóta) and thusunes-
sential. In doing so, he establishes an asymmetry between that which abides and
thatwhichchanges.Inrankingtheabidingsubstanceabovethechangingattributes,
he introduces avaluingdistinction,where the higher value, i.e. the higher-ranking
substance,isregardedasprovidingsufficientfootholdfororientation.
19
Inordertograspthesubstanceasindependent(chooristón)fromthechange
of its environment, Aristotle furthermore determines it as the underlying cause
(hypokeímenon) of the change of its attributes. This under-lying substance (Latin:
standing-beneath:sub-stantia),however,turnsouttobeexplicableinmultipleways:
(a)asmerematterthatcanadoptevernewforms,itselfbeinginfinitelychangeable;
(b)asmaterialthat is formedtoindividualthingsthatabide,whiletheirattributes
change,withthegoalof their formationalreadybeing intrinsic inthem(enteléche-
ia);(c)astheformitselfthatshapesmatter(morpháe,eîdos)andthatbecomesvisi-
bleinabiologicalspeciesthatremainsthesameregardlessofindividualsbeingborn
anddyingaway;(d)astheultimategroundofthisformation,whichAristotleinhis
latercompilatedbooksofhislaterso-called‘metaphysics’definesasthedivineun-
moved mover. The changing determinations of the abiding substance show that,
paradoxically,theverydeterminationremainsinflux:itisitselffluctuant.
Aristotleconnectshismetaphysicswithhislogic,whichlikewisehasremained
relevantthroughthemillennia.Herethinkingis limitedbyaninterrelatedorderof
forms according towhichone concept canbededuced fromanother and, through
gradualabstractionofcontents,bepileduptoneatlyarrangedpyramidsofconcepts
derived from each other. Substances enter as subjects into propositions in which
characteristicsareattributedtothemaspredicates.Thatonecannotattributeanti-
theticalattributestothematthesametime(háma)inthesamerespect,thisprinci-
ple is Aristotle’smost solid ground of thinking (bebaiotátae tôon archôon), which
excludesHeraclitus’ approach to orientation.However, one can attribute opposite
characteristics tooneand the samesubstance– atdifferentpointsof time; for in-
stance,somethingcanrestrightnow,thenmove.Butinthingschangingtheirposi-
tionsandbecomingdifferent,theproblemoftimereturns.Yet,accordingtoAristo-
tle’smetaphysicsandlogic,timeinturnistobeconceivedonlyparadoxically:time
is,asAristotlehimselfdiscovers,simultaneouslyabidingandchanging;the‘Now’is
alwaysthesameandalwaysanother.Thus, theprincipleofnon-contradictiononly
applieswhentimeisexcluded.
Ashumanaction isperformed in timeand in changing situations,Aristotle’s
pointofdepartureisexpresslydifferentfromhisapproachinepistemology.Indefin-
ingthevirtues,hedoesnot,likePlato,startwithanideal,butratherwiththehabitu-
albehavior (éthos) common in a society shapedbymale aristocrats, andobserves
howamanisabletoexcelinit.Thereby,Aristotledifferentiatesbetweentypicalsit-
20
uations of action, for instancewar, appearing on the scene of assemblies, dealing
withlust,withmoney,withthetruth,andbehavingonsocialoccasions.HereAristo-
tleworksmethodicallywithleewaysofactioninsteadofabstractnorms.Theethical
leewaysare limitedatbothsidesbybadextremes,betweenwhichonehas to find
therightmiddle.Aristotledescribestheprocessofethicalorientationinshiftingsitu-
ationsinawaythatisplausibleuntiltoday.
The philosophy of orientationworks – like Plato’s Socrates in his dialogues –
withideasascommonpointsofviewthatcanbechosenandusedforthedeter-
minationofthatwhichisandshallbeinagivensituation,withoutanindepend-
ent being belonging to the ideas. Further, the philosophy of orientation starts
outfromAristotle’stheoreticalinsightintherelativityofmovement,yetwithout
bringing themovement to a standstill through substancemetaphysics. Aristo-
tle’sownattemptstodeterminetheconceptofsubstancedemonstratethatthe
content of this concept, too, is fluctuant. In his practical philosophy, Aristotle
providesamodelofhowonecanthinkinleeways.
6.AlternativesintheArtofLiving:HellenisticSchools
InthetimeoforiginallytheGreco-Macedonian,thenoftheRomanEmpire,philoso-
phycontinuedtoconsolidateinschools.Schoolsaretheexpressionforthefactthat
philosophicalorientationsaresharedbymanyandarehandeddownthroughmany
generations.TheHellenisticschoolsofStoicism,Epicureanism,andSkepticismhad
held their ground for centuries inwhich the Roman Empire steadily grew; it also
remainedstableduringinternalpoliticalfightsforitsleadership,andforthisreason,
it was experienced as a guarantor of order. Yet, although philosophy never orga-
nizeditselfasclearlyandwasneveraspopularasitbecameinthetimeofHellenism
– philosophy reached the tops of society up to an emperor of theRomanEmpire,
MARCUSAURELIUS(121-180)–nodoctrineemergesthatwouldbetheonlyvalidone;
rather,theschoolscontinuedtocompetewitheachother.
OnlylateandquasioutofcompetitionPLOTINUS(ca.204-270AD)daredtode-
velopanewphilosophicalgreatdesign.HecombinesPlatonic,Aristotelian,andStoic
doctrines in his idea of an all-encompassingOne andGoodwhose overabundance
21
emanatesprogressively,flowsintoharmoniousformsofspiritandmatter,andsolid-
ifies in them.This isonemore large-scalecomprehensionsuspending thecontrast
betweenParmenides andHeraclitus, nowpresupposingPlato’smetaphysicallyde-
fined ideasandobfuscatingallmaterial texture.Onthebasisof thisNeoplatonism,
Christianitycanallytophilosophy.
InHellenism (from the 3rd centuryBCuntil the 4th centuryAD), philosophy,
whichwaswell-establishedatthattime,differentiatedinaseriesofspecializedsci-
ences,amongthemmathematicsandmedicine,grammarandphilology.Greatlibrar-
iesweresetup.Unitywassoughtlessinalastgroundbutmoreincompilationand
overview.Mostnotably,philosophyturnedintoanartofliving,andtheartofliving
wasapartoftheartoforientation.Whilearationalitypervadingtheworldcouldbe
presumedjustasitcouldbecontested,acommonfocus,whichwasemphasizedes-
peciallybytheRomancitizenCICERO(106-43AD),wasthequestionofhowphiloso-
phycancontributetothelifeorientationofthesingleindividualintimeswhenfaith
inthedivinedeclines.
ThephilosophyoforientationisclosertotheEpicureanandSkepticalHellenistic
schools than to Stoicism. The Stoic assumption that reason presides over the
worldisnolongerplausibletoday,buttheStoicdistinctionbetweenthatwhich
is beneficial and that which is detrimental in appropriating the world is still
trustworthy,andsoistheStoiccriterionofreassuranceversusdisturbance.
FollowingEpicureanism, for thetimebeingthephilosophyoforientation
holdstotheobservableandtherebykeepsopenleewaysforbuildingandusing
conceptsdifferently.InanEpicureanmanner,theeverydayroutinesoforienta-
tiondealwithpeacefulnessandtheavoidanceoftrouble.Butorientationalways
beginswith‘skepticism,’whichliterallymeans‘tolookaround’forrelevantfoot-
holds ina situation,whichonegaugesand towhichone first commits oneself
when one is urged to act. Skepticismwith its ‘tropes’, i.e. ‘turns of cognition,’
preciselyreflectsthesituatednessandrelativityofknowing.Consideringthefact
thattherearemultiplestandpoints,thatasituationcanbeinterpretedinvari-
ousways,andthateachpersoncanrelyondifferentfootholds,orientationmust
alsobeskepticalinordertobesuccessful.
22
7.AlternativePhilosophicalConclusionsfromChristianFaith:
Augustine,AnselmofCanterbury,ThomasAquinas,
WilliamofOccam,andNicholasofCusa
Christianity that spread increasingly in the Roman Empire, organized itself as a
church, formulateddogmas suitable formission, establishedauthorities, conferred
holyorders, and canonized theHoly Scriptures, incorporatedmany thoughts from
prior philosophers, in particular from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. However, it
causedstrongforward-lookingrealignmentsinphilosophyaswell.Throughthebe-
lief in one almighty, omniscient and infinitely goodGodwho is beyonddoubt and
therefore gives human beings absolute security, Christian philosophy is able to
questionallotherfootholds.Inthisway,ithelpstoreorientphilosophyasawhole.
Its point of departure is the self-humiliation of the human being before God:
determinedbyHimanddependentonHimineverything,humanbeingsaresinners
before God and cannot live up to His commandments. Nothing is concealed from
Him,butHeisconcealedfromthem;alltruthisthankstoHim,butnobodycanun-
derstandHistruth.Christianphilosophystartsfromtheparadoxthateverythingis
to be comprehended in and through God without Himself being comprehensible.
Christianphilosophyshowshowtomakeparadoxesfruitful.Amongthemisthepar-
adoxthatChristianknowledgeisrevealedtofaithandyet istobeverifiedthrough
reasonandlogic:asthesourceofrevelation,theBiblecontainsanumberofobvious
contradictions;thus,humanreasonmustdecideabouttheveracityofdivinerevela-
tion.Thenewintertwinementoffaithandknowledgeopensupunforeseenpathsof
thought.
Humblefaith,however,questionshumanknowledgealtogetherand,ultimate-
ly,itself.Faithmustleaveitopenwhetherhumanbeingscanspeakadequatelyabout
Godandeverythingcomingfromhim,whetherhumanbeingscanspeakadequately
abouttruerealityatallinhumanterms,andwhetheronewouldnotratherdojus-
ticetoGodifonenegatedone’sconceptsofhim,speakingabouthimonlythrougha
negativetheologyorremainingsilentabouthim.Inthecertaintyoffaith,knowledge
becomesuncertain,includingtheknowledgeofone’sownfaith;onehastomistrust
notonlyone’sknowledge–muchmoreradicallythaninskepticism–butalsoone’s
23
faith,andonehastoabstain fromconcluding judgmentsabout it.Expressed in the
languageoforientation:onecanonlyhaveclues,hints,indicatos,signs,or,aswecall
them,footholdsofGod’sbeing,essence,work,andoftherightfaithinHim.AllChris-
tianphilosophyandalltheologymovewithintheleewaysofthesefootholds.
In the second and third century after Christ, the movement that later was
calledGNOSTICISM,whichfedonmultifarioussources,combinedahighlyspeculative
knowledge of God and his secrets in a comparatively unwarped manner. Then
AUGUSTINE(354-430AD),sonofapatricianoftheoldstyle,laterbishopofHippoin
Northern Africa and one of the church fathers, reflected in an exemplaryway his
route to Christian faith through the philosophical approaches that were well-
establishedinthosedays,butdisappointedAugustine,sohedelineatedthelongpro-
cessofhisownreorientation.Tothisend,hecreatedthenewliteraryformofConfes-
siones:paradoxically,heconfesseshis sinfulaberrations,whichhenowrecognizes
assuch,toGodwho,ofcourse,alreadyknowseverything.
TheinvestigationofhissinfulnessforcesAugustinetoturnawayfromthe‘ex-
ternal’worldand its footholds,whichareequallyobservablebyeveryone, and in-
steadtoconceiveofthatwhichsincetheniscalled‘theinward.’Thisinsideofwhich
we until today speak until today as if it were amatter of course is a paradoxical
placeandnon-placeat thesame time: it cannotbe localized.Butan innerbeing is
nowattributedtoeveryhumanbeing.Itisregardedassomethingwhichyoucanon-
lyobserveyourself:youexperienceitasthesceneofyourfeelings,yourconscious-
ness,yourwill,andyourconscience.Consciousness,will,andconscience,whichare
accessible only to yourself, become leading points of reference for philosophy in
modernity:theorientationintheworldopenforallisdeepenedbytheorientationby
one'sowninnerbeing.
Yet, forAugustine, ever newabysses of instability openup. For him, human
inwardnessisthe–alwaysquestionable–locusoffaith:onlyherecanGodbefound,
onlyherecanonespeaktoHim,onlyhereHewillrespond.However,thehumanin-
sideisonlygiveninmemory(memoria),andthismeansthat,basically,Iamtheone
whoremembersandwhomIremember(egosum,quimemini).Mymemory,though,
is idiosyncratic and unfathomable: something can come intomymind or not, and
sometimesIrememberitinoneway,sometimesinanotherway.Thishasreasonsin
lifeorientation:accordingtoAugustine,memoriaislikeastomachthatdigestsone’s
experiencessuchthatoneinnewsituationscanlivewithitinthebestpossibleway.
24
By thismeans, further self-examination can leadme to inner caves that aremore
andmoreconcealed(caveaeabditiores),andasaconsequence,Ineverreachastable
andconcludingconceptofmyself(necegoipsecapiototum,quodsum).The(sinful)
inward withdraws just like the horizons of my orientation when I try to approach
them.Hence,beforeGodIbecomeaquestiontomyself(mihiquaestiofactussum).
Thelackoffootingintensifiesinregardtotime.Inexploringmemoria,Augus-
tinerealizesthatthepastandthefutureareaccessibleonlyinthepresent(asthat
whichisrememberedorexpected),butthepresentitselfisonlythetransitionfrom
thepast tothe future.Thus,time itself iswithoutany firmfoothold,whichAristotle
stillfoundintheeternalorbitalmovementofthestars.Augustineconceivesoftime
inrelationtothehumaninterior,which,beingitselfsubjectedtotime,‘extends’time
(distentio).Thus, one cannot saywhat time is – andyetone canhandle itwithout
anyproblems(Sinemoexmequaerat,scio;siquaerentiexplicarevelim,nescio).Inhis
ConfessionsbeforeGod,Augustinediscoversanorientationabilitythatisindependent
ofconceptualknowledge.Ashe trusts in the incomprehensibleGod,hecan trust in
hisownorientation–byGod’sgrace.TheunfathomableandmercifulGodmeetshim
as voice (vox) and countenance (facies); he speakswith Him in love. Love entails
communicationbeyond concepts. Inhis face to face communicationwithGod,Au-
gustinediscoversloveastheconditionforsuccessfulcommunicationbetweenindivid-
uals.
Manycenturies later, thestrongestalternativephilosophicalconclusionfrom
Christian faith followed in a form comparable to the one Augustine had chosen,
namelytheformofprayer.ANSELMOFCANTERBURY(ca.1033-1109AD),whoalsoin
person turns toGod, conceives of God – paradoxically again – as “a being beyond
which nothing greater can be conceived” (aliquid quomaius nihil cogitari potest).
With thehelpof nothingbut this concept,which alsowaspreparedbyAugustine,
Anselm demonstrates that God really exists – if ‘real being’ is something greater
(maius)thanjust‘being-thought.’Thus,onecanbuildfaithinGodbasedonconcep-
tual thinking – and vice versa. Down to the present day, it is not finally settled
whetherAnselm’s so-called ontological argument forGod’s existence is tenable or
not.Itcouldbelogicallycorrectbutnonethelessmisleading.
Intheco-calleduniversalscontroversy,conceptsand ‘thegeneral’assuchbe-
camedoubtful.Thoseinvolvedinthecontroversycontinuedtoaskontologicalques-
tions:douniversalsexistindependentlyoftheparticularsexemplifyingthem(real-
25
ism), or only as conceptswithin themind (conceptualism), or are universals only
names, only words invented by human beings (nominalism)? All options were
thinkablewithin the framework of God’s creation, and this controversy is neither
settledtodate.Everyonewhoseeksafirmfootholdoforientationinuniversals–beit
concepts,laws,methods,norms,orvalues–willstilltendtorealism,butonlythen.
Themostponderousrepresentativesofso-calledscholasticism,thescholastic
ordidacticclarificationandconcatenationoftheguidingconceptsofChristianfaith,
namelyALBERTUSMAGNUS(ca.1206-1280AD)andTHOMASAQUINAS(1225-1274AD),
adopta conciliatoryposition in theuniversals controversy:universalsare, in their
view,ontologicallyat the same time in thedivine intellectbefore creationand the
existenceofparticulars(anterem); theymaybewithinthethingsofthisworld(in
re),orinhumanthoughtsubsequenttotheexistenceofparticulars(postrem).Espe-
ciallyThomas countson thephilosophyofAristotle,whichwashandeddownand
worked through by Islamic translators and commentators. Aristotle also provides
thelogicalmeansforthecouplingofconcepts.InAristotle,Thomasfindsthedeepest
andmostbroadlyelaboratedknowledgeofancientphilosophy.Inthisway,hecre-
atesthehithertomostcomprehensiveandtenableorientationthatenablesphilosoph-
icalthinkingonthebasisofbothfaithandknowledge.Hissystemoforientationcan
betaughtat thebloominguniversitiesasstandardizedbasicknowledge,whichthe
CatholicChurchofthe19thcenturyadoptsasthebasisofitsdogmatics.Thus,here-
siescanbeclearlymarkedoff,whiledeviatingobservationshavetobematchedwith
it.Tothisend,scholasticismcreatesanewspecialliteraryform,thequaestio,which
includesthecoherentweightingofargumentsfororagainstaspecificissue,andthe
summa, i.e. theexhaustiveandself-consistentcompilationofquaestiones –agenre
whichThomasperfected.
Few generations later,WILLIAM OF OCCAM (1280/5-1347/8 AD) continues to
holdontobothfaithandAristotelianlogic,which,forhim,pertainstoGod’sthink-
ing.Yet,heconcedesthatGodcouldalsohavewilledtocreatetheworlddifferently.
Asanalternativetothe ‘oldway’oforientation(viaantiqua),Occamconfessesthe
contingencyoftheworldaspartofthe‘modernway’(viamoderna).Logic,then,isno
longerameansofjustifyingtheAristotelianorderoftheworld,butratherbecomes
acriteriontoassesscontingentpossibleworlds;conceptsturnintonakednamesfor
the purpose of appellation,which saynothing about the essenceof things.William
also refrains fromprinciples: he introduces themethodical principleof renouncing
26
themultiplication of content-related principles, whichwere prevailing in scholasti-
cism.Therebyhecourageouslyopensupnew,eventhenmuch-noticedbutequally
combated ways that a contemporary philosophy of orientation still cannot tread
withoutoppositions.Williamalreadyfightsfortheseparationofecclesialandimpe-
rial power. Already during his lifetime, the university of Paris prohibits his doc-
trines.
InthelightofChristianfaith,NICHOLASOFCUSA(1401-1464AD)alsoquestions
logicinsofarasitisusedasacriterionforthecontentsofbelief.Ashelikewisedoes
nothopetorecognizeGodintheorderoftheworld,hedrawsuponthesourcesof
Neoplatonism, mysticism, and mathematics – and thereby works forcefully with
paradoxes.Hewasnotonlyawell-versed,accomplishedscientistanduniversitypro-
fessor,butalsoanundogmaticspiritualdiplomat,asignificantchurchpoliticianand
reformer,whoforatimebravelyantagonizedthePope,abishopwhohadtofightfor
the survival of hisdiocese alsomilitarily; hehad to subsist on it (andmanyother
benefices he knew tomake available for himself). Intermediately hewas a Curial
Cardinal.Heknewtheworldwell,alsoinpoliticalandeconomicrespects.
Philosophically,hestartsfromthepremisethateverycreatureintheworldis
other (aliud) than all other creatures, and that there is, in the final analysis, no
sameness,which iswhyonecandiscernonly similarities.This ispossible through
distinctions or contrasts,which at some point touch each other: a polygonwhose
nooks aremultipliedmore andmore draws closer to a circle, and themore it in-
creases in size, theperipheryof the circle converges toa straight line. Ina coinci-
denceofopposites,humanextremescollapse in infinity,beyondthisworld, inGod
(coincidentiaoppositorum).Ourknowledgeis learnedignorance(doctaignorantia).
Thefinitecanbedeterminedbyhumanreason(ratio)onlybykeepingawaythein-
finite.With thehelpofparadoxes,however, the intellect (intellectus)mightnotbe
abletocomprehendtheinfinite(and,consequently,God),butat leastborderonit;
thereby,theintellectcan‘fold’theworldintoGod(complicatio)and‘unfold’itfrom
Him(explicatio);andinperformingthisactivity,humancognitionitselfcanbecome
creative.
Ithastakenmanycenturiesuntilonelearnedtothinkinthiswayagain.Nicho-
las of Cusa already employed the imagery of orientation: the human spirit is de-
scribedasa‘cosmograph’that,inourlanguage,draftsmapsoftheworldontheba-
27
sisoffootholdswhichitgraspsinordertoorientateitselfintheworld.Complexge-
ographicmapswerelatercalled“Cusanus-maps.”
Thephilosophyoforientation findsstrong impulses in themedievalphilosophy
which often is unjustly by-passed. TheChristian philosophy of theMiddleAges
has vigorously expanded the possibilities of humanorientation: it demandsno
longerjusttograsptheincomprehensiblestartingfromthecomprehensible,but
at the same time tograsp theonly seeminglycomprehensibleproceeding from
theincomprehensible,whichispersonalizedasGod.Withthisdoublemove,one’s
owncomprehensioniscomprehendedinitsdecidability.
Onthegroundofalargelyunquestionedfaith,medievalphilosophycould,
on theonehand, constructabasicorientation that formanypeople is stillac-
ceptable;on theotherhand,medievalphilosophycouldalso radicallyquestion
thisbasicorientation:Augustinediscoversorcreates‘theinward’ofthehuman
being as the (non-)place of that which we call consciousness, will, and con-
science.Theuniversals controversy shows thatone candecideon the statusof
thegeneralanduniversal.WilliamofOccamopenstheorientationofthebeliev-
ersforthecontingencyoftheworldandthemethodologicaleconomyindealing
withmetaphysicalprinciples.NicholasofCusaallows fora creativeworkwith
paradoxes. In general, humanorientation remains reliant on faith evenwhere
“faithintheChristianGodhasbecomeincredible”(Nietzsche).Itneedskindsof
faithinordertoenjoysufficientcertaintiesforactingintheworldandshaping
the world despite all uncertainties of the world and even of the scientific
knowledgeaboutit.
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II.Modernity
Towardstheendofthe15thcentury,apathosofcompletereorientationemerged,ofa
freshstartbothintheconceptualizationofknowledgeandinthestylingandconduct
ofhuman life.Onedidnot turnagainstChristianbelief,butbroke resolutelyaway
fromitsmeanwhilehighlycontroversialpreceptsforphilosophizing.Thescholastic
knowledgewasbymanyregardedasobsoleteandoutdated.ProceedingfromItaly,
one orientated oneself afresh in the name of the human being (humanism) and
wantedtoregain the imageof thehuman,also in theshapeofbodilybeauty, from
antiquity,thetimeprecedingChristianity.Theworldlyconditionsofthehumanbe-
ingand,inadditiontonature,alsohistoryandlanguagegainedcenterstagetogether
with the individual.The individualorientinghim-orherselfbecame themiddleof
his orher respectiveworld andpursued the ideal of self-perfection (uomouniver-
sale)irrespectiveofcorporatistandclericalorders.
Manifolddiscoveries,inventions,anddesignsstirredandpromotedacompre-
hensivereorientation,firstandforemost
• the discovery of America and the circumnavigation of the Earth, which became
possible with the help of the (re-)invention of the compass (which was formerly
knowninChina):itopenednewhorizonsforgeographicorientation;
•therearrangementofcenterandperipheryintheastronomicalorientation:forthe
sakeofaneasiermathematicalcalculationoftheorbitsoftheplanetsandthestars,
COPERNICUSmoved the earth away from themiddle of theworld andmade it to a
merestandpointintheuniverse;
• the development of perspectival painting, i.e. the geometrical reconstruction of
naturalseeing:theseeminglynaturalimpressionintheperceptionofspaces,which
isimportantforsensoryorientation,wasthenproducedbycalculableillusions;
•theinventionofprintingenabledthedisseminationofknowledgeofallkind–in-
dependentofchanceriesandchurches,onanonymousmarkets,foranever-growing
audience: everyonewho learns to read (initially only very few) can expandhis or
herintellectualorientationasdesired,adlibitum;
29
•Protestantismincludingone’sownreligiousorientationbytheBible,whichevery-
onecouldreadinhisorherownlanguageinsteadofbowingdowntoecclesialdoc-
trines;
• the beginning capitalist organization of global trade, the economic orientation
guidedbymarkets;
• the political orientation to dominion as such, without any moral and religious
guidelines;
•themomentousinventionofgunpowderwithitsconsequencesformilitaryorien-
tation;
•thedesignofutopia,oflifeworldsandworldsoforientationasawhole,whichhave
ancientpredecessors,forinstanceinPlato,yetwerepresentedtentatively,playfully,
sometimessatiricallyasa‘non-place,’asdeliberate,thoughhardlypracticablealter-
nativestotheexistingworld;THOMASMORE(1478-1535),whoreinventedtheliter-
aryform,transferredhisvisionofthe“beststateofarepublic”toa“newisland.”
Thenewscientificknowledge isnowno longerbasedonessentialdetermina-
tions,asitwasinAristotle,butratheronmereobservationsandcalculations.Inex-
periments,onecombinesboth,whereverthisispossible.AsGALILEOGALILEI(1564-
1642)hasshown,observationsunderclearlydefinedcircumstances(i.e.underpur-
poseful exclusion of situational conditions) allow for accuratemeasurements and
mathematicalcalculations.Insteadofrelyingonreligiousandmetaphysicalassump-
tionsabouttheworldasawhole,onemethodicallyplacesone’srelianceuponown
selectionofparametersforexperimentsandconstruedphysicalvaluesinfunctional
dependencyfromeachother.Withthehelpoftheunambiguouslanguageofmathe-
matical symbols, limitedcertaintiesarecreated indemarcatedrespects,whichcan
alwaysbesupersededbynewtheoriesandnewexperiments.
8.AlternativeSecularizationsofPhilosophy:
Machiavelli,Bruno,Montaigne,Bacon,andHobbes
Philosophy participates in this huge reorientation with different, but spectacular
newapproaches.Philosophypansthespotlightinsweepingwaysuntilitfreshlyfo-
calizesandconsolidatesitselfinthemiddleofthe16thcentury.Allphilosophersthat
willbementionedinwhatfollowsbringnewexperiencesfromoutsidetheuniversi-
30
tiesalongwith themselves.Allof themare(moreor less)concernedwith thenew
confessionalconflictsintheirday.
NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI (1469-1527) revolutionizes the political orientation,
forcedbythehighlydynamicbalancesofpowerinItaly,wherethepopesalso,with-
outinhibition,actasworldlyrulers.Machiavelli,whooverdecadeshastorepresent
theinterestsoftheRepublicofFlorencewhichisoneofthestrongestandmostrisk-
takingrepublics,followsasrealisticallyaspossiblepolitics’own“law”infightingfor
thepreservationofdominion.MachiavellimakesthegovernanceoftheRepublicau-
tonomousinrelationtomoralityandreligion.NotonlyCesareBorgia,thesonofthe
Pope,but alsoMosesarehispointsof reference.Morality and religion themselves
turnintofunctionsofpolitics:onefollowsthemonlyinsofarasthey–ortheirpre-
tense–areusefulinthestruggleforpower.Rulersdonotshyawayfromlies,breach
ofpromise,cruelty,andthefearofit;whentheyavoidimmorality,thentheydoso
notformoral,butratherforpoliticalreasons.However,dominionisestablishedand
stabilizedmostsustainablythroughrespectfortheruled,fromwhateversourcethat
respectmayflow.Rulersaredependentoncareful,farseeingorientation:theymust
constantly reckon with situations that may threaten their existence, the more so
whentheyhaverecentlyacquiredrulership.Machiavellidistinguishesbetweensitu-
ationandorientationbymeansofthenotionsof fortuna, i.e. fortunatecoincidence,
and virtù, the ability to confidently master even the most difficult situations in
bravelytakingadvantageoftheopportunitiespresentingthemselves.
Personally,Machiavellistandsupforarepublicgovernedbyfreeandeffective
councils. Subsequently, the autonomy of the secular state authority, which he
demonstrated,isagainbasedondivine,natural,orrationallaw;therebythemodern
stateundertheruleoflawcomestothefore.Oncethestateoflawestablisheditself
inthecourseofthecenturies,suchrationales,whichalwaysremaindisputable,can
recedeagain.Thenpoliticsisentirelyreleasedtoitsautonomy.
GIORDANOBRUNO(1548-1600),whofirstwasamonk,butseveraltimesshifted
hisdenomination,gavelecturesatmanyEuropeanuniversitiesandcourtsandwas
expelledagainandagain.Hedirectlyattackstraditionalphilosophical thinkingand
ecclesialdoctrinesrestinguponit,andeventually,heisexecutedbytheRomanIn-
quisition. By contrast,MICHEL DEMONTAIGNE (1533-1592) –whowas raised a hu-
manist andbecameurbane through appointments andmany travels –manages to
accomplish intermittent peace during the fierce confessional wars in France. He
31
doessothroughpersonalencounterswiththeinvolvedkingsandthePope.This is
possiblesincehetakesupaskepticalstancetowardseverydogmaticphilosophyand
theology.Montaigne is the first “free spirit” inNietzsche’s sense. He unreservedly
faces the uncertainty of all knowledge and the insecurity of human existence, but
nonetheless,heshowshowonecansuccessfullyfindone’swayaroundintheworld
andfindfootinginit:throughorientationtooneself,toone’sownlifeexperiencein
allitsfacets(rightuptoMontaigne’storturingkidneystones).Heassureshimselfof
his orientation through Essais (attempts or experiments), whose literary form he
inventsespecially for thispurposeandwhichhe renewsconstantly. In contrast to
themedievalsummaeandtothelatersystems,essaysletthemindmeanderwithout
anypredefinedmethodorsystematicorderofthought.So,oneunbiasedlydiscovers
somethingnew,whichcanthenbedevelopedmethodicallyandorderedsystemati-
cally.Montaignelivedtheidealofasovereignpersonalorientation.
FRANCISBACON(1561-1626)madeit far inhispoliticalcareer:hebecamethe
LordChancelloroftheBritishCrownuntilhewasoverthrownbecauseofhiscontin-
uingaccumulationofdebtandaccusationsofbribery.Healsoresortedtotheliterary
formoftheessay,butparceleditin“aphorisms”thatcanberearrangedorextended
adhoc.Baconregardedthe fieldofscienceas fieldoforientation:anunfamiliarter-
rainthroughwhichonehastofindever-newwaysthatremainonlypreliminary.Ba-
con expressly assumed “the role of a guide” (indicis tantummodo persona) who
showsanew“way”(via)toscienceassuchandpromisesa“greatrenewalofthesci-
ences” (instauratiomagnascientiarum).Compared toAristotelian logicandanalyt-
ics, a “new tool” (novum organon) is needed. One no longer needs to deduce
knowledgeinascholasticmannerandthereby‘anticipate’theresultsoftheexplora-
tionbutratherfollowthecomplexityofnatureitself–Baconspeaksofits“subtlety”
(subtilitas).This shallbedone “empirically”and “inductively” ina tentative “inter-
pretation,”whichgeneralizesobservationscarefullyandprogressively,andrevises
itsgeneralizationsagainandagaininregardtodeviatingcases.Generalizationscan
havedifferentdegreesofcertainty.Thismeansthatoneonlyhasveritable“clues”or
“indications”(indiciavera)aspointsofdepartureforone’sinterpretationofnature.
This procedure can be hampered not only by conventional concepts, but also by
mathematical calculations, while diverse approaches can support it. Through this
cautiouslyandcircumspectlyorientingmethod,aswecall it,sciencecan,according
toBacon,gainrealpowerovernature(“knowledgeispower”)andcanhelptograd-
32
uallyimprovehumanlivingconditions.Moreover,natureisdefeatedbyobeyingna-
ture(naturaparendovincitur).
However,asorientation,thismethodhas,accordingtoBacon,alsoitslimitsin
theminditself:(1)theIdolsoftheTribe,i.e.logicalfallacieswhichareduetothena-
tureoftheintellectandthesensesofthehumanbeingpreferringincorrectconclu-
sions; (2) the Idolsof theCave, i.e. thestateofeverysinglehumanbeing including
individualpassionsandideologies;(3)theIdolsoftheMarketplace,i.e.thelinguistic
possibilities andproblemsof a society that canusewords tomislead; and (4) the
Idols of the Theater, i.e. the philosophical and scientific presuppositions of an era
that are held onto like dogmas.Humanorientationmust always be aware of such
constraintsandconstantlyworkagainsttheminordertoconqueritsleewayforre-
vealingthegivensofnatureandmakingthemeffectiveforone’sownuse.Baconis
thefirsttoseethatbothscientificandeverydayorientationtakesplaceinleeways,in
whichevernewvitalfootholds(signaturasatqueimpressiones)areobserved.Scien-
tifictheoriesandsystemscanthenconnecttothesefootholds.
THOMASHOBBES (1588-1679) came fromamodestbackground.He livedasa
hometutorinaleadingEnglishnoblefamily,andhencehadthepossibilitytotravel
extensively.Onsomeof these tripshegot toknow,amongothers,GalileiandDes-
cartes.TemporarilyhehadtofleetoFranceinordertoescapepersecutionsbecause
ofhiswritings;however,heenjoyedtheprotectionoftheBritishCrown.Histhought
was influenced by the severewars of his day.He combines the sober impulses of
particularlyMachiavelliandBacon(whosesecretaryhewasforashorttime)inde-
signing the first comprehensive philosophical system of modernity (Elementa
Philosophiae),whichhemodelsonEuclid’sworkonthefoundationofgeometry,the
Elements (Greek: Stoicheîa, Latin:Elementa). In hisElementa Philosophiae,Hobbes
rebuildsphilosophy from logic through toreligion,now inaharshandrealistic,of
hiscriticsso-called‘materialist’spirit.
Concerningcognitionandconcepts,headjoinsnominalism,whichisleastde-
mandingintermsofpremises;concerningthedeterminationofthehumanbeing,he
assumes simple self-preservation. Concerning ethics, Hobbes dismisses the belief
thatoneactsforthesakeofthegooditself;onedoesnotdesiresomethingbecauseit
is good, as Socrates has postulated, but rather something appears to be good be-
causeonedesiresit.Thus,Hobbesreversestheclassicmoralorientation.Inhisrealis-
tic view, humanbeings arenot goodbynature, but are rather (moreor less) in a
33
permanentwarofallagainstall(bellumomniumcontraomnes).Forthesakeoftheir
safety,theyaffirmabsoluterule.Here,however,Hobbesengageswiththeeuphemis-
ticfictionthathumanbeingsvolunteertoenteracontract(“Covenant”)thatisbind-
ingforeveryoneapartfromtheruler.Lateronehastimeandagaingratefullydrawn
onthisfiction,whileHobbesmarkeditasafiction:“Covenants,withouttheSword,
arebutWords.”Thismeans:thephilosophyoflawandofthestatecannotgetalong
withoutfictions.
Thephilosophyoforientationappreciates the senseof reality that thephiloso-
phersattheoutsetofmodernitydemonstrateforthesakeofclarity:theygloss
over nothing. Preeminent footholds are NiccolòMachiavelli’s disturbing expo-
sureofthehardcoreofpoliticalthinking,ThomasHobbes’paradoxicalthought
to safeguard freedom through the submission under an absolute rule, Francis
Bacon’s attempt to develop an orienting method of research that is always
awareofitscontingenciesinthesciences,andMicheldeMontaigne’ssovereign
personalorientationwhich isskepticalagainstallgeneralguidelinesandfinds
stabilityinitself.Fromhere,basicsoforientationarerevealed,forinstancethe
distinctionbetweensituationandorientation(Machiavelli’s fortunaandvirtù),
meandering thinkingas preparing regulative thought (Montaigne’s Essai), the
limitation of orientation through leeways, which can be expanded within lee-
ways again (Bacon’s Idola), and the necessity of fictions for societal issues
(Hobbes’socialcontract).
9.AlternativeFoundationsoftheSelf-ReferentialOrientation
inSubstances:Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz
In the 17th century, the so-called ‘rationalism’ ofmodernity takes shape in closely
connected leading orientation decisions. Nations still have little significance; even
thoughonebegins topublishmoreandmore innational languages,Latin remains
thecommonlanguage.TheNetherlands,whichenduredferociousfightsforfreedom,
offeredaplaceofrefugewithahigh,thoughnotunlimiteddegreeoffreedomofreli-
gionandofthought.TheCatholicFrenchmanRENÉDESCARTES(1596-1650), theSe-
phardicJewBARUCHDESPINOZA(1632-1677),whosefamilyfledfromPortugaltothe
34
Netherlands,andtheProtestantGermanGOTTFRIEDWILHELMLEIBNIZ(1646-1716)all
livedalone,remainedunmarried,didnotteachatuniversities(justasBlaisePascal,
sec.10),toacertainextentundertookdiplomatictasks,andpaidfortheirlivingei-
therofprivatemeans(Descartes),throughskilledmanualwork(Spinoza,whowas
bannedbytheAmsterdamJewishcommunitybecauseofhiswritings,grindedlenses
forthenewtelescopes),orthroughemploymentatroyalcourts(Leibniz).However,
allof thembuiltuptightnetworkswithotherscholars,which isreflected inarich
exchange of letters. Leibniz visited Spinoza personally in order to hear his un-
publishedthoughtsandfelttheywere“paradoxical.”
DESCARTES,whose familybelonged to thenobilityofoffice, enjoyedanexcel-
lent school education at a prestigious Jesuit college. Initially, he led the life of a
young nobleman in Paris society, participated then in the Thirty Years’War as a
commissioned officer, traveled extensively through Europe, but then, after having
got toknowtheworld,withdrew into theNetherlands inorder todirecthis study
inward:“tostudywithinmyselfaswell”(étudieraussienmoi-même).IntheNether-
lands,too,helivedinhiding,warnedbytheprocessoftheInquisitionagainstGalileo
Galilei (1633). In view of the controversialness of all questions of faith and
knowledge, he wanted to put science on a radically new and unwavering ground
(fundamentum inconcussum). This was preceded by experiences of disorientation
andreorientation,whichshockedandunsettledhimtothecore.
In order to illuminate these experiences, he created multiple new literary
formsofwriting:first,thenarrativeofasequenceofthreedreamsthathedatedpre-
ciselyonNovember10,1619,andlocatedthematamilitarycampnearUlmatthe
Danube.Hedreamtthefollowing:Onthestreet,heisseizedbyawhirlwindoraver-
tigo,isalwaysafraidtofall,wantstoescapeinacollegewhosemembershecansee
standingfirmlyontheground;hethinksheispersecutedbythedevil,istheninhis
roomhauntedbythunderandsparksoffirethatheseekstoexplainwiththehelpof
availablescience,yetwithoutsuccess; finally, inabookofpoetry,hecomesacross
thequestionoforientationparexcellence:“WhichwayoflifewillIfollow?(Quodvi-
taesectaboriter)?”Inthisquestion,causedbyhis“heatedbrain,”the“spiritoftruth”
seemstoappeartohim,forwhichhethinkshehastothankGodalone.
Decades of widely spread research on physics, astronomy, physiology, psy-
chology,andmathematicsensue;amongotherthings,Descartesdevelopedtheana-
lytic geometry. About all this he reports in hisDiscourse on theMethod of Rightly
35
ConductingOne’sReasonandof Seeking theTruth in the Sciences.He calls thisdis-
courseastory(histoire)or fairy tale(fable). Introductorily,he tellsofhispersonal
waytoamethod,whichhehastriedouteffectivelyandwhichherecommendsasthe
foundation of a newuniversal science.WithMethods, human orientation becomes
autonomous fromspecificknowledgeand fromconcretesituations; itgives itselfa
specific direction that others in different situations can follow; it chooses its own
way.Descarteselucidatesthisthroughatraveler’sexperienceoforientation:having
losthiswayintheforestandwanderingarounddesperately,hedoesthebestinor-
dertoorienthimselfifhewalksstraightaheadinwhateverdirection;inthisway,he
will comeoutof thewoods sometimeand regainanoverview inopen country.At
that time, “forests” designated also loose collections of things to know;Bacon, for
instance,hadpresentedaworkentitledSylvaSylvarum.
Gaininganoverview in themidst of a confusing situation is another essential
feature of orientation. This is, as Descartes emphasizes, not inherent in reason as
such,aseveryoneobviouslygoes“differentways”(diversesvoies)withit.Therefore,
humanreasonneedsinstructionsforitsproperuse.Descartesinstructshisreaders
todivideandcompartmentalizecomplex,difficult,andthusinsolubleproblemsinto
somesurveyableandcompletelyevidentconnectionsuntiltheproblemsseemeasily
solvable,and thenrecombine theevidentconnectionsaccording toclearandcom-
prehensibleruleswhichonechoosesfreely.
Thisisthemethodofsurveyablerepresentation(übersichtlicheDarstellung),as
Wittgenstein latercalls it.Thereby,Descartesargues, intuitionsofrightandwrong
alsoplayarole;eveniftheymaybeerroneous,theycannotbequestionedanymore;
the philosophy of orientation calls them plausibility standards. According to Des-
cartes, the final criterion is the ease (facilité) of understanding. Thus, orientation
precedestruth.Descartesrevolutionizesphilosophybyrecommendingtofollowthe
“orderofone’sowndeliberations(ordredesraisons)”andbyrenouncingtosayany-
thingaboutthe“orderofthingsthemselves(ordredeschoses).”
In hisDiscours, Descartes designs related rules for the leading of one’s life,
whichhecalls“preliminary lifeorientation(moraleparprovision).”Whereonecan-
notidentifythetruestopinions(lesplusvraiesopinions),itisbesttofollowthemost
probableones(lesplusprobables)thathavestoodthetestoftime.Iftheycannotbe
identifiedwithsufficientclarity,oneshouldtakedecisionsdependingonhowfarthe
opinionsorattitudesinquestioncanbeappliedtopractice,andthenclingtothem,
36
followthemwithresoluteness.Onthewhole,oneshouldrathertrytoovercomeone-
selfthanfate(fortune),ratherchangeone’sownwishesthantheorderoftheworld
(l'ordredumonde).Whereverpossible,oneshouldmakeavirtueofnecessity(faire
denécessitévertu).Infact,weusetodosoineverydayorientation.
Thebasicprecondition for this is “toprovideacomprehensiveview(unere-
vue)ofthediverseactivitiesofthehumanbeinginthislife,inordertotrytomake
thebestchoice.”Firstandforemost,anorientationarisesfromtheoverviewofother
orientations:thismakesone’sownorientationdecisionseasier.
IntheMeditationesdeprimaphilosophia,DescartesdeepenshisDiscours toa
“FirstPhilosophy,”agroundworkofphilosophyingeneral,nolongerinFrenchfora
broadaudience,butinLatinforthephilosophicalexpertaudience.Hegiveshismed-
itationstheformofspiritualexercisesashegotthemtoknowattheJesuitcollege:
theroutineofconsequentlypressingforwardtoone’sinnermostinteriorityinorder
topurifyoneselfbeforeGodfromone’ssinful incentives.DescartesappliestheAu-
gustinianmodeltoscientificthinking,tracksdownallthatisdubiousinordertoun-
cover the indubitable.Hewants to, as hewrites, once in a lifetime (semel in vita)
turneverythingonitshead(evertere)fromthegroundup(funditus),inordertosta-
bilizethesciencesinsomethingfirmandabiding(firmumetmansurumstabilire).
Here, however, he sees himself slide down an abyssal vortex (in profundum
gurgitemeximprovisodelapsus);theexperienceofdisorientationincreases,heloses
thegroundunterhis feet,canno longersupporthimselfanywhereandmustwork
hardtoswimoutofthevortex(enîti).Thenewfootholdisthemereself-relationof
thinking,which cannotdoubt that it doubts –whichmeans that thinkingdoesnot
acceptanythingastruebesidesdoubtingitself.Theself-relationinthe“Ithink,Iam”
(egocogito,egosum)cutsoffeveryexternalrelation.Beingonone’sownisthestart-
ing point of so-called ‘rationalism.’ Descartes emphasizes that this self-relation of
thinking is always a temporal process: thereby orientation as awhole is put on a
temporalcertainty.
Methodically, Descartes turns this first temporal certainty of the pure self-
relationofthinkingintothegoldstandardofallfurthercertainties:everythingthat
istobeconsideredastruemustbecomparedwiththisprimarycertainty.However,
atthesametime,theAristoteliansubstancemetaphysicsremainsplausiblebeyond
questionforDescartes.Hence,inhiseyes,atemporalprocessmustbeanaccidental
quality of a firm substance, and self-referential thinking must exist as a thinking
37
substance (res cogitans). And since the process of thinking cannot be bodily and
physically extended, corporeality must be excluded from it. A separate extended
substance (res extensa) is opposed to the thinking substance. Thereby, Descartes
establishes a dualism of ‘reason versus nature’ and of ‘soul versus body’ allowing
himtodemonstratetheimmortalityofthesoul,theexistenceofGodandtherefrom
alsotheexistenceofbodilybeings.Yet,atthesametimethisdualismsplitshuman
orientation insuchaway that it for centurieshasdifficulties inunitingbothparts
andlosestheorientationaboutitself.
Finally,Descartesputsthesedeliberationsintotheliteraryformofatreatise,
thePrincipia philosophiae. Here the empirical judgment ego cogito, ego sum turns
into a syllogism connecting the cogitoand the sumwith ergo: “I think, therefore I
am” (cogito ergo sum). SPINOZA thenbegins to consequently construe thePrincipia
philosophiae deductively according to themethodofmathematics (moregeometri-
co),againalongthelinesofEuclid’sgeometry.Thereinallbasicprinciplesoforienta-
tionseemtovanishbecauseamathematicaldeductionexcludesallindividualpoints
of view and standpoints. However, Spinozawants to exclude allmerewishes and
specialpurposes fromphilosophical thinking, i.e. stopallwishful thinking.Theas-
sumptionofanabsolutefreedomofthewilliswishfulthinking,too,forhim.
However,theCartesianself-relationremains.SPINOZAtranslocatesittonature
assuch–orGod.TheAristoteliannotionofsubstanceandDescartes’ownconcep-
tionforcehimtodoso:toacceptonlyonesubstance.ForDescartes,thethinkingand
theextendedsubstancesareindependentofeachother,butbothofthemare‘finite
substances’and,assuch,dependentonthe ‘infinitesubstance’that isGodwhohas
creatednatureasawholeandpreservesall things intheirbeing.Yet,accordingto
theAristotelianconceptofsubstance,substancesmustbeindependententities,and
thatiswhy‘finitesubstances’becomeparadoxicalintheirdependencyonGod.Seen
from the Judeo-Christianpoint of view, the res cogitansand the res extensaare at
once substances and not substances, and there remains only one real substance,
which is God or nature (deus sive natura). Since everything depends on this sub-
stance,philosophymustbeginwithit.
However,theassumptionthatthereisonlyonesinglesubstanceisparadoxi-
calaswell,forthereremainsnothingfromwhichitcanbeindependent.Therefore,
this stand-alone substancemustbe the causeof itself (causa sui), andasnot even
time can precede it, God’s creation of theworldmust not be a temporal process.
38
However,ifGodiscoinstantaneouswithhiscreationandthecausecoincideswithits
effect,Godcannotbediscernedfromhiscreation,butisratheridenticalwithit:God
ornature.ThenonecanbythesametokensaythatGodiseverything(pantheism)
andthatheisnotatall(atheism).Godbecomesconfusinglyparadoxical,too,which
hastriggeredpassionatedebatesthat finallyhave ledtothephilosophyoforienta-
tion.
InthenotionofthecausasuiwithwhichSpinozabeginshisEthica,thedistinc-
tionbetweencauseandeffect isshort-circuited:whenbothsidescoincide, thedis-
tinctioneitherhasnothingtodifferentiatebetween,oreverythinginnaturecanbe
regardedasbothacause(naturanaturans)andaneffect(naturanaturata).Thereis
muchtobesaidforthis.Thelogicalfigureoftheparadox,whichSpinozauseswith-
outdesignatingitassuch,hereleadsbeyondthemechanisticunderstandingofna-
turethatprevaileduntiltheendofthe19thcentury:ifGodisindiscerniblefromna-
turecreatedbyhim,thennatureis justas incomprehensibleasGod.Toreachade-
quateknowledge is themeasureofallcognition,buthumanbeingsarenotable to
achieveit.
Ifthebodyandthespiritarenotindependentsubstances,accordingtotheAr-
istotelian model, they must be attributes (attributa) of the one divine substance;
theyareourperspectives(subspecie)onit;aninfinitenumberofattributesorper-
spectivesispossible.Infact,thebody-soul-oppositionisonlyaperspectivalcontrast,
andSpinoza initiatesperspectivism.Asaconsequence, individualsaremodi,varie-
tiesoftheattributesandtherebypartsofthewholenature.Forthesakeoftheirown
self-preservation,theymustbeinterestedinoverlookingnatureasawhole,sothat
theyareabletoconductthemselvessuccessfullyandpersistinit(conatusinsuoesse
perseverandi).However,modi of thewhole can survey thewholeonly to a limited
extent.AccordingtoSpinoza,thisfindsexpressioninemotions(affectus)directedto
somethingthateithersupportsone’sownself-preservation(thentheemotionsare
pleasant)orimpairsit(thentheemotionsareunpleasant).Inordertoactrationally,
whichheremeansprudentandconsiderate,itisinone’sowninteresttolearntoex-
plainnegativeemotionsandtherebydissolvethem.
Hence,Spinoza’smetaphysicsoftheoneandonlysubstanceresultsinthefol-
lowingethicalconsequence:ifitisGodwhoaffectshimselfinallpartsofnature,he
turnsallpartsandthusinprinciplealsoallhumanbeingstoeachotherwithoutres-
ervation.Hobbes’homohominilupus(manisawolftoman)turnsintohomohomini
39
deus(thehumanbeingisGodtothehumanbeing).Theparadoxofthecausasuiin-
ferred from Descartes’ Principia ultimately leads to the paradox of God’s rational
love tohimself (amorDei intellectualis): ifweconsider thingsrationally,wecan in
actual factonly loveeachotheras jointpartsofnatureandthusofGod; for inthis
love,Godloveshimself.Justastheconceptof‘cause,’Spinozaalsotracestheconcept
of‘love’backtoitself.Inhissystem,freedombecomesparadoxical,too,becauseitis,
as freedom from affects, insight in (divine) necessity. In the final analysis, human
conceptsandnormsofgoodandevilareinadequate.Spinoza’scontemporariesde-
scribedhimassomeonewhoactuallylivedinthisspirit.
LEIBNIZ,sonandgrandsonofprofessors,polymath, inventorof (amongother
things)acombinatorics,of infinitesimalcalculus(probablyinventedindependently
ofNewton)andacalculatingmachine,whooccasionallyworksasadiplomatonhis
own initiative, philosophizes only on the side, but also rigorously.He pursues the
way begun byDescartes and Spinoza and introduces the notions of ‘perspectives’
andof‘standpoints’intophilosophy.
LEIBNIZ abolishes the substantiality of the res extensa: since all corporeal
things are divisible, they cannot be substance. However,withDescartes, hemain-
tains thesubstantialityof thenon-corporeal substances.However, likeSpinoza,he
regards themnot as effectsof thedivine substance, butbrings them into apurely
logicalrelationto the latter.Heunderstandsthedivinesubstanceas thesubjectof
allpossiblepredicatesandthusofallpossibledeterminationsoftheworld(concep-
tusprimitivus,notioprimitiva),whichare limitedineachofthenon-corporealsub-
stancesinanindividualway.Theselimitedindividualsubstances(monades)are,in
thisway,mirrors (miroirs) of theuniverse (univers) orperspectives (perspectives)
on it, each takingadifferent standpoint (pointde vue).Eachmonadexpresses, ac-
cordingtoLeibniz,theuniverseinanindividualmanner(exprimerl‘Univers).
Hence, Leibniz no longer understands the substances through thinking (as
Descartes did), but more comprehensively as observations of the world (percep-
tions),whichmostoftenremainunreflectedorunconscious(petitesperceptions)and
only in special cases proceed reflectively or consciously (apperceptions). Leibniz’s
notionofobservation turns theoppositionbetweenperceivingand thinking intoa
merelygradualdifference.Asaresult,theworldconsistsofobservationsobserving
eachother: it is auniversal systemof observation inwhich the substancesbecome
40
merehubsofrelations.Thereby,spaceandtimearenothingbutorderparametersof
theobservations.
InLeibniz’ construction, themonadsdonotobserveeachother immediately
becausetheycannottranscendtheirrespectiveperspectivesandare,inthisregard,
“windowless,” that is,mere self-relation. Their self-relation, however, is not (as in
Descartes) the immediate self-relation of thinking, but includes a broadly deter-
minedrelationtotheother,astheself-relationrunsviathedivinesubstance(asin
Spinoza).Thisunityofself-relationandrelationtotheotherispossiblebecause,ac-
cordingtoLeibniz,thedivinesubstanceunitesallmonadsorperspectivesinitselfas
the “centralmonad”; ithas from thevery startdetermined thealgorithmsof their
interactionsandcommunicationsinapre-establishedharmony.
Hence, God is the perfect observerwho encompasses all observations of all
perspectives.Hehasalwaysalreadyaperfectoverviewoftheworld,andforhim,eve-
rythingfollowstheprincipleofsufficientreason.Hazards,surprises,reorientations,
anddistinctionsofgoodandevilexistonlyifseenfromlimitedperspectivesandlim-
itedstandpointswithinthelimitedsystemsofobservation.
TheoptimismencouragedbyLeibniz’s rationalisticdesignhas firstbeenad-
miredandthenbeenderided.Thisoptimismstandsandfallswiththemetaphysical
assumptionofaGodgivingussecurityineverything.Leibniz’designdisplaysaper-
spectivismoforientation,whichiscarriedoutwithlogicalcalculus–butwithoutthe
risksoforientation.
The philosophy of orientation does not seem to comply with the fundamental
featureof the rationalistic tradition in thephilosophyofmodernityand its in-
sistence onultimate, logically justified certainties. In fact, inDescartes it finds
the impressive description of profound experiences of disorientation and the
consequentreorientation fromtruth toaneligiblemethodof itsowncertainty
and itsownplausibility standards, that is,a radical changeover toorientation
decisions. In Spinoza, the philosophy of orientation finds the potential to gain
newreligious,philosophical,andscientificpossibilitiesofthinkingandacting–
bymakingparadoxicalthehithertostrongestfootholdofEuropeanphilosophy,
namelysubstancemetaphysics.InLeibniz,thephilosophyoforientationfindsa
logicallyandsystematicallyimplementedperspectivismonthebasisofbothself-
relatedandother-relatedobservations.
41
10.AlternativeCertainties:Pascal
WithBLAISEPASCAL(1623-1662),Augustine’sabsolutecertaintyoffaithreturnedin
earlymodernity. He questioned the new orientations ofMontaigne and Descartes
anew–andtherebyunveiledevendeeperconditionsoforientation.
Pascalhadallrequirementsforthis:healsobelongedtoahighlyrespected
familyintheserviceoftheKing,hisfathereducatedhimfollowingMontaigne’shu-
manisticprogram(nomathematics).Nonetheless,Pascalbecameabrilliantmathe-
maticianandexperimentalphysicist.Hedevelopedamongotherthingsacalculusof
probabilities(géométrieduhasard),andheshonebrightlyasadisputatiousauthor.
Asayoungman,hebecameso famous thatDescarteswent to seehimpersonally.
Forsomeyears,helikewiseplungedintothelifeofaParisian.Butthroughouthislife
hewastormentedbysomekindofparalysisandseverepain.Finally,hewithdrew
intoamonasteryasahermitor“solitary”(solitaire)andsubmittedhimselftostrict
penances. InFrance, thekingstillpursuedanausterepoliticsofreligionunderthe
influenceoftheJesuits.ThetreatisebytheFlemishbishopCorneliusJansen(1585-
1638)aboutAugustine,whichinflamedanewmovementofreformationwithinthe
Catholic Church andwhich also ignited Pascal’s religious consciousness,was soon
putontheindex.
AccordingtohisMemorial,datedfromthenightbetweenNovember23and
24,1654,PascalexperiencedasecondconversiontoGod,the“GodofAbraham,God
ofIsaac,GodofJacob,notofphilosophersandscholars.”HediscardsproofsofGod’s
existence:onecannotteachreligion,butonlymakeitvenerableandamiableagain.
Inhisperson,Pascalunitesthelargerangeofmathematical-scientific,religious,and
philosophical thought. He combines themethodical-mathematical certainty on the
onehandwiththeresolutecertaintyoffaith(certitude)ontheother,andin-between
them,heopensupnewphilosophicalhorizonsforthatwhichwetodaycallorienta-
tion,includinglifeorientation.
Pascalmakesuseofseveralgenresofwriting:thetreatise,theessay,and–to
greatsuccess–alsothe(fictive)letter.Lateron,andmoreorlessunintentionally,he
findstheformthatismostsuitableforhisthinking:notesorfragmentsofdifferent
length.SystemthinkingneitherdoesjusticetoGod’sworld,heassumes;confronted
42
to it, everyordersplinters.Pascalnotes individual thoughts (pensées) like random
ideas–asmerefootholdsforhimandhisreaders.Therebyheforceshisreadersto
orientthemselvesontheirown.
InhisPensées,Pascalspeaksasan“I”withoutpresupposingitsunity.Asan“I”
reflectinguponitself,itisself-referentialandexists.However,inPascal’sview,Des-
cartes’doubtsareonlythoughtup:nohumanbeingcanreallydoubtwhetherheor
sheexists.The“I” takescenterstage,as if ithada firmposition.Buttherebyitbe-
comesanuisance forothers,wants tosubjugate them, isunfair in itself (injusteen
soi)andhateable (haïssable). It isneitherpure thinkingnora fundamentum incon-
cussum,butonly,aswecallit,astandpointoforientation.
However, one can doubt logical contradictions: “Diverse secure things have
beencontradicted–diversefalsethingsareacceptedwithoutopposition.”Therules
ofmathematics(whichnooneatthattimeknewbetterthanPascal)are,intheend,
onlyroutines thathavedevelopedaccidentallyandtowhichonecould imagineal-
ternatives.Reasonadjuststoeverything,getsalongwitheverythingandfollowsthe
respectiveneeds(laraisonétantflexibleàtout).Thehumanbeingisathinkingwa-
ter reed (roseau pensant); and yet, human dignity (dignité) lies entirely in human
thought(pensée)andconstituteshumangreatness(grandeur).
Disorientationdeepens:itnotonlyconcernsthehumanknowledgeaboutthe
world, but also the human position in the world: the human being is a monster
(monstre), a chaos (chaos), something self-contradictory (sujet de contradiction), a
sewerofuncertaintyanderror;andyet,thehumanbeingjudgesallthings(jugede
touteschoses), isthegloryandscumoftheuniverse(gloireetrebutde l’Univers),a
paradoxforhim-orherself(paradoxeàvous-même).
Macro-andmicrophysically,thehumanbeingisplacedastheintangiblemid-
dle between two infinities: the infinite largeness of the universe on the one hand,
andtheinfinitesmallnessofitselementsontheother;thehumanbeinglooksinan
abyss(abîme)onbothsides.Theworldthatcanbeobservedscientificallyisaninfi-
nitesphere(sphèreinfinie)whosecenter(centre)iseverywhereandwhoseperiph-
ery(circonférence)isnowhere.Thehumanbeinggoesastrayinit(égaré),isanoth-
ing(unnéant)comparedtotheinfinite(l'infini),butanall(untout)comparedtothe
void, sort of in-between nothing and everything, infinitely far away from compre-
hending theextremes (comprendre les extrêmes). In termsof cognition,wehuman
beings drive on a vastmilieu (voguons sur unmilieu vaste), having neither secure
43
knowledgenorbeingcompletelyunknowing.Humanbeingsarealwaysinsecureand
wavering (incertains et flottants), pushed fromone end to the other (poussés d'un
boutversl'autre).Everyfoothold(terme,appui)whichwetrytoholdonto(attach-
er) andmake firm (affermir) fluctuates and withdraws from us (il branle et nous
quitte), and when we pursue it, it escapes our grasp (prises), slips away from us
(nousglisse) and flees in aneternal flight (fuite éternelle).Nothing stands still and
staysforus(Riennes'arrêtepournous).
Like no other, Pascal describes the basic situation of human orientation. He
concludesthatthepointcannotbetoseekassurance(assurance)andfirmness(fer-
meté).Heresolutelyshiftsfromcertaintytouncertainty:onehastoworkfortheun-
certain,goacrossthesea,rideonaboard(travaillerpourl'incertain;allersurlamer;
passersuruneplanche).Andhumanbeingsaretunedtothis:inalltheirmisery(tout
le malheur), they search for repose (repos), which, however, soon again becomes
unbearableforthem,sothattheyfallbackintorestlessness.
And yet, even in this abysmal disorientation, orientation is still possible – if
onebethinks of its scope (portée: the scopeof thrownobjects) in everyday life as
wellasinscience.Justasapointofacertainsizeseemsindivisibletothesenses,so
we dowe produce principles (principes) that appear as final ones to our intellect
without really being what they seem to be. Involuntarily, we draw horizon lines
whereourthinkingends;Pascalcallstheorientationthatcreatessuchlinesafeeling
(sentiment) and locates this feeling in the heart (coeur). He outlines a logic of the
heart (logiqueducoeur)as thebasisofhumanorientation.According to this logic,
we decide which principles and certainties we adopt in a given situation. These
principles can be felt, Pascal says, and from those principleswe have adoptedwe
deducetheorems(Lesprincipessesentent,lespropositionsseconcluent).
Theabilitytodisposeofprinciplesconstitutesthespirit(esprit).Accordingto
Pascal,whose experience extends further than anyone else’s in thesematters, the
spirit shows itself in threedegrees: initially as the “spirit of accuracyand correct-
ness”(espritdejustesse),whenitisabouttheuseoffamiliarprinciples;thenasthe
“spiritofgeometry”(espritdegéométrie)whenprinciplesneedtobeselectedspecif-
ically,whichdemandsalreadyacertainamplitudeofthespirit(amplituded'esprit);
andfinally,inthe“spiritoffinenessandsubtlety”(espritdefinesse),whenprinciples
firstofallneedtobefound.AsPascalventilatesinmanynotes,thisespritdefinesse,
whichcomprisestheskillsandvirtuesoforientation,isreliantonaconvenientenvi-
44
ronment,anappropriatepaceinobservingandthinking,afavorabledistancetothe
object,andasuitableperspective.Thesubtlespiritconsidersalternativetruthsnext
toeverytruththatitbelievestohavefound.Itmistrustsfictions,butreckonswithits
ownweakness(faiblesse).Itisexposedtodesires(concupiscence),whichmayleadto
correspondingphilosophies. It follows styles of cultureswithout being able to say
clearlywhattheyconsistin.Itorientsitselfwiththecommonsensewithoutrelying
onit.Itcannotbetiedtoaspecificprofession.
Just as Augustine before him, Pascal dares to look that far down into the
abyssesofhumanorientationbecausehestilloranewseesfaithinGodasgranting
thehumanbeing’struefelicity(vraiefélicité).However,inregardtoGod,too,weon-
lyhaveasign(marque)oranemptytrace(tracetoutevide)whichcouldbewilledby
Godhimselfinordertoengagehumanbeingstodecideinfavorofhim.Reasoncan-
not take this decision; reason can only prepare it by detaching the human being
fromhabitualwaysofthinkingwiththehelpofdoubts.Theforceofreason(force)is
abletodecidewhattodoubtandwhattotrust.Pascaldoesnolongeraimtoprove
God’sexistence.Rather,hewantstoshowthatitisarationaldecisiontosurrender
toreligion.Heregardsthisdecisionasabet,asagame(jeu)withhappenstanceand
hazard(hasard)thatonecanonlywindespitealluncertainty(incertitude):youcan
gaineternalbliss(béatitude)butcannotloseanythingapartfromthepresentmiser-
ablelife.Yet, inPascal’sview,everyonemustbeinterestedineternalbliss–this is
hisultimatecertainty.
Thephilosophyoforientation isconfrontedwith thedeepestabyssesofhuman
disorientation when encountering the mathematician, physicist, philosopher,
andstaunchChristianPascal.Pascalportraysthesituation,withwhichhuman
orientationhastocope,inthewidesthorizonand,atthesametime,verydense-
ly: the humanbeing’s intangible position in the cosmos; the “I” that is not the
firmsubjectofself-referentialthinking,butamerestandpointoforientation;in-
steadofanythingfirm,fluctuatingfootholdsandelusivehorizons;humanthink-
ingthatisinfinitelyflexible;mathematicallogicthatseemstoprovideultimate
certainty as well-practiced routine; the necessity of deciding between always
preliminary certainties; andmanifold conditions that facilitate or compromise
this.Thephilosophyoforientationcouldnearlyhavebeenwrittenasacommen-
taryonPascal.
45
11.AlternativeConceptualizationsofLawfulness:
Locke,Berkeley,Hume,andKant
InthetimeoftheEnlightenment,thesometimesstillprofoundreligiouspietybitby
bitgavewaytoapurelyrationalfaithina“Godofphilosophers”(Pascal)andfinally,
forsomepeople,tosheerdisbelief.Togetherwiththeamplesupernatural foothold
ofhumanorientation,theconjectureofaGod-grantedlawfulnessoftheworldbegan
tototter.Lawfulnessthenrequiredconfirmationbymeansofnewevidence.
Therapidlydevelopingnaturalsciencesofferedthemselvesasnewevidence,still
underthenameof‘philosophyofnature’;inmanyrespectstheywereirreconcilable
with thebiblical assertions.Thenewevidencebecame spectacular and irrefutable
with ISAACNEWTON (1642-1726/27). In hisPhilosophiae naturalis principiamathe-
matica(1687),hebasestheunderstandingofnatureonmathematicalprinciples,but
expressly dispenseswithmetaphysical presuppositions (hypotheses non fingo). In-
stead,heinsistsonexperimentalempiricalevidence.Inthisway,hecanconsistently
explainprocessesonearthandintheuniversethroughcommonlaws,especiallythe
lawsofmotionandthelawofgravitation.
WhileNewton,whowasquitedevout,stillsurroundshisdiscoverieswiththeo-
logical,butalsowithalchemicalandmagicalspeculations,whichhe,however,keeps
secret,thenewlawfulnessestablishesitselfasadescriptionofpurposelessregulari-
ties,whichmanifestthemselvesinexperimentsandcanbeusedinordertopredict
natural processes. As there are only minor and controllable deviations from this
lawfulness, it seems absolutely reliable to a hitherto unknowndegree of scientific
certainty.Thenatural lawsand the forces thatworkaccording to themcan justas
littlebeobserveddirectlyasParmenides’ ‘being’could;butnow,theyseemtocon-
stitutetherealbeingofallthings.Their ‘discovery’(nottheirconstruction)iscele-
bratedasthenewtriumphofreason,whichisequallyavailabletoeveryoneandap-
plied methodically to experience. Thereby, modernity creates – in Hans Blumen-
berg’swords–anew‘legitimacy’againsttheoldreligiousone.Theneedforanulti-
mate,unconditionalfootholdforhumanorientationisfulfilledinanew,purposeless
way:theforcesandthelawsaccordingwithwhichtheyworkareindifferenttoward
thehumanbeing,eventhoughtheycanbeutilizedmeaningfully.Hence,humanbe-
46
ingsfindthemselvesinanakedandcolduniversewithoutpurposeandhavetoori-
entthemselvesafresh.
Philosopherscanrelatetothisnewlawfulnessinalternativeways.However,at
the same time, national traditions develop in philosophy, especially an English,
French,andGermanone. Indifferent languagesandcultures,onethinks incharac-
teristicvariations;andexactly in theevaluationof theunconditional lawfulnessof
nature, the situatedness (Situativität) of philosophical orientation appears. In the
EnglandofWilliamofOccam,FrancisBacon,andThomasHobbes,butnowalsoof
Isaac Newton, the traditional skepticism against realism and abstractions persist,
andthusalsoagainstlawsofnatureassuminganindependentreality.Themostim-
portant French and German philosophers, however, still trust in the hold on con-
cepts,constructions,andsystemsbuiltofconcepts.
JOHNLOCKE(1632-1704),whoinitiallywasaFellowatChristChurchCollegein
Oxford,butthenlefttheuniversityinordertobecomethepersonaldoctorandadvi-
sorofaleading,yetalsothreatenedpolitician.Thisearnedhimalotofpoliticaland
economic experience, but also intermittently exiled him to Paris and the Nether-
lands.LockewasonfriendlytermswithNewton.
Hewantedtodescribehowourworldarisesintheideasofourmind.Usingprin-
ciplessparingly,heclungtotheassumptionofsubstances,whichhasbornetheAris-
totelianmetaphysicalandalso therationalistic lineof tradition fromDescartesvia
SpinozauptoLeibniz.However,unlikeDescartesandLeibniz,henolongerpresup-
poses“innateideas,”whichtheyassumedinordertoensuretruthandcertainty.On
theotherhand,alreadyDescartesdidnot limitconsciousnesstothemerethinking
ofthought,butincludedsensoryexperienceandimagination,feelingsandpassions,
appetiteandwill.With suchclassifications,differentoptionsofhumanorientation
aretraditionallyweighteddifferently.TheEnglish languageleavesa larger leeway:
withthehelpoftheconceptsofthe‘mind’andof‘understanding,’whichLockeuses
inasimilarway,thatwhichisconsideredassensualandspiritual,unconsciousand
conscious, receptive and spontaneous can be comprehended as a unity, while the
French notion of esprit and theGermannotion ofGeist clearly give precedence to
thinkingandsuggesttheattributionofspecifictruthstoit.Itisimpossibletoargu-
mentatively decide between the empirical evidence onwhich theBritish tradition
insists and the evidence of reason that the French and German tradition prefers.
Henceforth, they take root as lasting philosophical alternatives. The British ap-
47
proachmorestronglybearsinmindthefactualconditionsofeverydayandscientific
orientation.
Locke considers themind itself to be able to divide its ideas into those that
spring fromsomephysical causalprocesses,whichaffect thenervesand thebrain
andwhich he calls “sensations,” and those that themind reflects upon in its own
way,i.e.the“reflections.”Furthermore,Lockeconceivesofthemindasbeingableto
differentiate its ideas, regarded as “objects of the mind,” and decide from which
senses they stem, whether they are simple or complex, which of them represent
primaryandwhichofthemsecondaryqualitiesofthings,etc.Hereby,Lockeincludes
thedistinctionbetweensubstanceandaccidentintoempiricalevidence.Atthesame
time,hepaysattentiontosignsasmeanstocommunicate ideas; forhim,signsare
also products of the mind itself. The identity of a person rests upon his or her
memoryof such signs; this alone guarantees the continuity of consciousness.As a
result,thelawfulnessofnaturebecomesprecarious:accordingtoLocke,itispartof
theconnectionsofideasandcanbegrantedonlybyGod.
GEORGE BERKELEY (1685-1753), who also traveled extensively, finally became
bishopandmarried(whichwasstillarareexceptionamongphilosophers),drewthe
consequences from Locke’s reorientation: if one begins with consciousness, one
must abandon the assumption of an externalworld that exists independently. For
Berkeley, this assumption is the source of allmaterialism and atheism. He agrees
with Leibniz’ pioneering insight that being can only be conceived of as being per-
ceived(esseestpercipi).Themindthatperceiveseverythingingraspingitbyitside-
as candistinguishbetween these ideasonly through the criterionofhow livelyor
vivid–or,aswecall it:attractiveandstriking–theyare.Thesignsthroughwhich
themindregistersitsideascanbeusedmoreorlessgenerally;theyopenleewaysto
subsumemoreorlessthingsunderthem,andthisinturncreatesleewaysforacting
invarioussituations.However,signscaneasilydeceiveus,forideasare“mixed,asit
were,andblendedtogether”;signsthatsymbolize“abstractgeneralideas”arbitrari-
lyseparateandconnecttheseideasatthesametime.“Principles”areabstractcon-
structions and “general laws of nature,” with the help of whichwe try to explain
phenomena; principles are nothingmore andnothing less than “ruleswe take for
principles, which we cannot evidently know.” For Berkeley – who disputes with
Newtonwithoutmentioninghim–Godremainsthesupremeauthoritytoguarantee
theregularcorrelationofideasencodedbysigns.
48
Onegenerationlater,DAVIDHUME(1711-1776)deniedhimselftoresorttothis
authoritythatwouldsafeguardcertainty–andbecamethemostsignificantBritish
philosopher.DescendingfromimpoverishedScottishnobles,hedug,againstthewill
ofhisfamily,intothestudyofphilosophy.Hedidthatsointenselythatitmadehim
sick.He thenearnedhis living as anamanuensisof anEnglishmerchant; later, he
wenttoLaFlècheinFrance,whereDescartesattendedschool,and,inthedeceptive
hopeofrapidliteraryfame,workedonhisTreatiseofHumanNature.
Herehenotonlydescribes“humanunderstanding,”butalso“humannature”
on thewhole, consequently avoidingmetaphysical hypotheses. Proceeding from a
“freeconfessionofhisignorance”concerningan“originalandultimateprinciple,”he
strives for a “cautious observation of human life.”One can readHume’swork as a
withdrawalfromapparentphilosophicalscienceintoactualhumanorientation.Sure,
hetriestotransferNewton’sexperimentalmethodtophilosophy,butthismeansfor
himtobuildcompletelyontheevidenceofexperiencewithoutdrawingonmathe-
matics.For“thesciencesofmathematics,naturalphilosophy,andnaturalreligion,”
too,dependon“thescienceofman.”Humeproposes“acompletesystemofthesci-
encesbuiltonafoundationalmostentirelynew,andtheonlyoneuponwhichthey
canstandwithanysecurity”;foritspart,thenewscience’snewfooting“laidonex-
perienceandobservation”ispossibleonlyin“alandoftoleranceandofliberty.”
This has led to the strongest disillusionment of philosophy in the course of its
historysincetheancientskeptics.However,Hume’sphilosophicalskepticism,which
now focuses above all on “an original and ultimate principle,” pushes him into a
strongexperienceofdisorientation.Notbefore,butafterhiscomprehensivecritique
of knowledge in Book I of his Treatise, he sees himself “having narrowly escap’d
shipwreck inpassing a small frith” intowhich “thewretched condition,weakness,
anddisorder” of the faculties of understandingbrought him; “despair”makeshim
“resolvetoperishonthebarrenrock,onwhichIamatpresent,ratherthanventure
myselfuponthatboundlessocean,whichrunsoutintoimmensity.”Forinmostcas-
es,ourunderstandingis“foundedontheimagination,orthevivacityofourideas”;
but imagination is“aprincipleso inconstantandfallacious” that itmaycreate illu-
sions and contradictions everywhere. Then, “the question is, how farwe ought to
yield to these illusions”;butagain, there isno sufficient reason todecidebetween
them;thuswecan“onlyobservewhatiscommonlydone.”
49
In addition,Hume feels “affrightened and confoundedwith that forlorn soli-
tude,inwhichIamplac’dinmyphilosophy,andfancymyselfsomestrangeuncouth
monster.”Sincehehascontradictedallpreviousphilosophy,heexpectsforhispart
onlycontradiction, finding inhimself “nothingbutdoubtand ignorance”or “philo-
sophicalmelancholy and delirium.” However, after “all examination and enquiry,”
hismindreturnsto“thatassurance,whichalwaysarisesfromanexactandfullsur-
veyofanobject.”Hedecidestomaintainhisskepticismratherthanyieldtoreligious
superstition.Heoscillatesbetweentheunsettlementbyphilosophyandthereassur-
ancethroughthe“commonaffairsoflife”withoutfleeingintoallegedlyuncondition-
alcertainties,nomatterhowdesirabletheymaybe.Nordoesheexpressawishto
change theworld.He resolutely exposes himself to the conditions of life orientation
thatarealwaysuncertain.
In fact,heencounters fierceresistancewithhisTreatise.Thereupon,he tries
out a variety of literary formswhichmakehimmore andmore successful; but he
failswhenapplyingforprofessorialchairsinEdinburghandGlasgow.Fromthenon,
fora longtimehelivesonappointmentsbynoblemen.Laterheworksina library,
which gains him access to a plethora of literatures, and finally, he comes to fame,
mostnotablyinParis.Moreover,hebecomesrich–becauseofhissix-volumeHisto-
ryofEngland,whichheregardsbothassourceandasapplicationofhisscienceof
man. Before that, he has presented aNatural History of Religion inwhich he pro-
ceedsgenealogically,askingaftertheneedforthereligiousbeliefthathehasleftbe-
hind.Hecourageouslydefendssuicideagainstthewidespreadargumentthatsuicide
is a crime against God and one’s fellow human beings. Although Hume does not
commithimselftomattersofreligioninpublic,heisregardedasanatheist,andhis
workwasputontheindex.
Inexploringtheexperiencethatheassumestobesufficientforunderstanding
howhumanbeingscopewiththeirlife–whichinvolvesthesciences,morals,politi-
calinstitutions,andreligions–,HumefollowsBerkeleyinproceedingfrom“impres-
sions,” “passions” and “emotions,” which impose themselves in being particularly
vivid.The“ideas,”amongwhichHumecountsthoughts,memories,andfantasies,are
comparativelyfaintandineffective;theycopyimpressionsandassociateeachother
according to the criteria of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. Descartes’ and
Locke’ssubstancesandNewton’sabsolutespaceandabsolutetimebelongtothese
50
mere ideas,while the impressions sustain theundeniable convictionof situational
reality.
Humeholdson to theways inwhicheverydayorientation takesplace.Heob-
servesandrespectsthefactthatideasareassociatedindifferentwaysineachindi-
vidual,buthedoesnotyetdifferentiatebetweendifferentstandpoints,perspectives,
footholds,thedoublecontingencyofcommunication,etc.Hereducestheassumption
ofnatural laws to theobservationof regular sequencesofevents,whichare inter-
pretedaschainsofcausesandeffects.Thatis,hereducesnaturallawstocustomsof
observation and expectationor, if you like, to the regularity of routines.As things
canalwayshappen(orbeconceivedof)indifferentways,inferencesfromparticular
experiences, which constitute general rules, are always preliminary. Even if one
stronglybelieves in the lawsofnature, theyarenot themselvesgiven toempirical
observation.Hence,asHumeputs it inhisEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstand-
ing, besides logic andmathematics “all other sciences are reduced to probability.”
Humetakesfundamentallynewphilosophicaldecisionsoforientationinordertoface
theuncertaintyofallhumanorientation.
Inhisinsistenceonexperience,Humealsorenouncesthehypothesisofapar-
ticularselfor“I”becauseonehasnoimpressionsofitanditisnoidentifiableentity
inthemind.Humeranksitas“abundleofperceptions”thatconstantlyre-organizes
itselfonthebasisofnewexperiences.Thisprocesscanbeobservedwiththehelpof
memory. Hume already uses themetaphor of a continually reconstructed ship to
designatefluctuantidentities.InhisDialogues,heplayswithidentitiesindeliberate-
lykeepingitopenwithwhichofhisprotagonistsheidentifies.
Askepticalempiricist likeHumeneedsnottodenythefreewill,butcancon-
ceptualize it non-metaphysically as the human leeway of decision in the natural
world, fornaturalprocessesareonlypartlyassessableandmanageable forhuman
beingswhononethelessmustrelyontheseprocessesintheirdecisions.Ifonewants
to consider someoneas accountable forhisorher action, onemust assumea free
will inthissense.Still,onecanobservethatreasoninfluencesactiononlytoa lim-
itedextent:“Reasonis,andoughtonlytobetheslaveofthepassions,andcannever
pretendtoanyotherofficethantoserveandobeythem.”
Bycontrast,morals,withoutwhichhumanco-existencewouldnotbepossible,
canbe empirically rooted inmoral sentiment,which includesmutual sympathyof
humanbeingsforeachotherandwhichisconstantlyschooledbyobservingandas-
51
sessingthebehaviorofotherpersons.Humeassumesthatmoralsandothersocietal
regulations–insofarastheyareusefulforeveryone–workoutandchangeonthis
basis,includingthestandardsforjusticeandreliability.
Hume’sHistoryofEngland,whichhe,despite the contemporary conflictsbe-
tween the parties, largely keeps impartial and inwhichhe includes literature and
science, is at heart a history of human freedom.When it comes to politics, Hume
supportsastrictseparationofpowersandtheruleoflaw.Onthewhole,hechampi-
onspoliticalstabilityand,wherenecessary,asconsideratereformsaspossible.He
advocatesAmericanindependence.Heturnsdowntheproposaltocontinuehisvery
successfulHistoryofEnglandonthegroundsthathehasbecometooold,toofat,too
lazy,andtoorich.Loyaltohisphilosophy,Hume’slifecamefullcircle.Hewasfond
ofcompanyandsociality.ThenewstreetinEdinburgh,wherehebuilthiscomforta-
blehouse,wascalledSt.DavidStreet.
Inhisearlyexperienceofdisorientation,Humearrivedat the followingcon-
clusion:“Wehave,therefore,nochoiceleftbutbetwixtafalsereasonandnoneatall.
Formypart, Iknownotwhatought tobedone in thepresent case.”WhileHume,
admitting the all-encompassinguncertainty of life, remembered and turned to the
good life among friends, IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804 AD), by contrast, reacted to
Hume’sexperienceofdisorientationbywritingtheCritiqueofPureReason–where
reasonisjudgedbyreasonitself.KantholdsontotheCartesianself-referentialityof
thinking throughwhich thinkingquestions itselfand findshold in itself.Following
theexamplesetbyCopernicus,hestartsa“revolution”inthinking,agreattheoreti-
cal reorientation according towhichwe “we can recognize of things a priori only
whatweourselveshaveputintothem.”Kantassurestheefficiencyofreasonbylim-
itingit.Thisgivesrisetothemostconciseandconsistentphilosophyweknow.
Kanttenaciouslycarvedouthisuniversitycareer,whileLockehadgivenitup
andHumefailedtosucceedinit.Kant’sbackgroundwastheGermanuniversityphi-
losophy,whichhadbecomeestablished.Heremained(nearly)alwaysinKönigsberg
intheeasternmostGermany,acquiringhislargeknowledgeoftheworldfromtravel
storiesandbooks.Heexperiencedchangingreignsinhiscity,butwasnotinvolved
inpoliticsanddiplomacy.Beingrathersociable,hewasnotedforhisdinnerparties;
nonetheless, he lived alone for hiswhole life. Inspired byRousseau, hewelcomed
theFrenchRevolution, yetwithout concedingageneral right to incite revolutions.
Heresignedhimselftotheenlightened,butoftenstilloppressiveroyalruleinPrus-
52
sia;headmiredFredericktheGreat.Inhisnarrowsphereoflife,hededicatedhim-
selfentirelytotherenewalofphilosophyonthehighestacademiclevel.Accordingto
Kant’sownconfession,thecrucialincentivetothisrenewalwasduetoDavidHume;
heprefacedthesecond,moresuccessfuleditionofhisCritiqueofPureReasonwitha
quotefromFrancisBacon’sInstauratiomagna.LikenootherphilosophersinceAris-
totleandDescartes,Kanthasbecomeoneofthehighestauthoritiesinphilosophyto
thisday.
AsheelaboratesinthePrefacetothefirsteditionofhisCritiqueofPureRea-
son,Kant seesphilosophy involved in a “battle-fieldof endless controversies”pre-
ciselyatthepointwhereit,intherationalistictradition,hasbounditselftoreason.
Thus,Kantdraftsascenarioofreorientationforphilosophyitself.Humanreasonhas
precipitated itself “into darkness and contradictions.” As Kant announces in the
PrefacetothesecondeditionoftheCritiqueofPureReason,philosophymustthere-
fore,inthetreatmentofknowledgebyreason,finallyentera“securecourseofasci-
ence,”whichissomethingthat“cansoonbejudgedbyitssuccess.”Wherethetreat-
ment is stuck, onemust “often go back again and take another path.” In order to
avoid “mere groping about,” Kant intends to find the path that reason could take,
eventhoughmanythoughtsformedbeforewithoutthenecessarydeliberationhave
tobeabandonedasfutile.
Kantbelievessostrongly inreasonthatheassumesitcannotbedisposedso
unfortunatebynaturethatitcannotsolveitsownproblems.Hefindsthepathtothe
solutioninadheringtotheBritishtraditionthattrustsinexperience.Followingthis
path,hewantstodojusticetothelawfulnessofnature,whichNewtonhadexhibited
soconvincinglyandwhichwassincethen,accordingtoKant,a“fact.”TherebyKant
doesnothaverecoursetodivinehelp,which,sinceHume’stimes,hadbecomealto-
getherquestionable.Kant’ssolution isadmittedlycumbersomeanddifficult,and it
raisesnewproblemsoforientation.
Actually,Kantonlyshiftstheperspective–withfar-reachingconsequences:if
reasonshallcontributetotheknowledgeofnatureandmakeitslawfulnessintelligi-
ble, reasonmustconformtoexperience,but insuchawaythatreasondetermines
andshapesexperience.Asa result, reasonbecomes independentof thesituational
conditions of experience or, in short: unconditioned.Only in thisway can it claim
universalvalidity.
53
FollowingLocke,Berkeley,andHume,Kantdismissesthebeliefinmetaphysi-
calsubstances;atthesametime,however,hebuildshis“transcendentalphilosophy”
onAristotle’s equallymetaphysical distinction between form andmatter or,more
abstractly,betweenformandcontent.Downtothepresentday,Kanthasconvinced
manypeoplewithhisassumptionthatsensoryperceptiononlyprovidesunclassified
datawhichareshapedbytheconceptsoftheintellect(Verstand),whichisapartof
humanreason(Vernunft).Theseunclassifieddataare tobecomeobjectivelydeter-
minableforeveryone,alsoandpreciselyinthelawfulsequenceofcauseandeffect.
Onecanthenmake ‘transcendental’statementsaprioriaboutthisform-givingrea-
son.These ‘transcendental’statementsare independentofspecificexperiencesbut
nonethelessfirmlyfocusedonexperience–while‘transcendent’statementsleadus
beyondallexperience.Onthebasisofsuchtranscendentaldeterminations,Kantde-
velopsthe“system”ofa“purenaturalscience”thatshallbefundamentalforallem-
pirical science: it shall consistofprinciples that reasondoesnot readoff fromna-
ture,butthatit“prescribes”tonature.
Sincelawfulnessassuchisnotperceivable,reasoncanonlyspeakaboutlaws
throughitsownlawfulforms.Thatistosay,theprincipleofcausalitythatNewton’s
naturalsciencepresupposescanonlybeunderstoodasaninterpretationofnature
throughhumanreason.Yet,Newton’s(andother)lawsofnatureareempiricallaws,
determinedbyanexperimentalmethod.Incontrastto‘pure’lawsof(theinterpreta-
tionof)nature,theycanalwaysbeenlargedandcorrectedbynewobservationsand
experiments. Thus, transcendental philosophy only contributes the certainty that
naturecanbeunderstoodas lawfulatall, for,accordingtoanother formulationby
Kant, “reasonhas insightonly into thatwhich it itself createsaccording to itsown
design.” Expressed in contemporary terminology, this is professed constructivism:
weorientourselvesbyourownspecifications,alsoandespeciallyinthenaturalsci-
ences.InKant’sview,weneverdealwith“thingsperse”butonlywith“appearanc-
es,”andhumanreasonprescribestheconditionsofthelawfulnessoftheseappear-
ances.
Inordertoprovidea“system”ofprinciplesofapurenaturalscience,Kantde-
ducesthemina“transcendentaldeduction”fromthelogicalformofjudgmentwhich
entails that the subject of a judgment is determined by a predicate. From the in-
stancesofthis logical form,Kantextracts“categories,”which,undertheconditions
ofspaceandtime,canbeformulatedas“principles.”WhileNewtonconceptualized
54
absolutespaceandabsolutetimemetaphysicallyassensoriumDei,Kantapprehends
themasthehumanbeing’s“pureformsofintuition.”When,forinstance,thelogical
relationof“groundandconsequence”(GrundundFolge)istransposedintothepure
spatialandtemporalformsofintuition,itturnsintothecausalrelationofaspatially
separateandtemporallyprecedingphysicalcausetoatemporallysucceedingphysi-
caleffect(UrsacheundWirkung).Asaresult,thelawofcausalityprincipallyapplies
tohumanexperiencedeterminedby,ontheonehand,theformsofhumanreasoning
and,ontheotherhand,theformsofintuition.
TheconstructivismofKant’stranscendentalphilosophyremainsboundtothe
possibilityofexperience,eveninthe“pure”knowledge(orinterpretation)ofnature.
FollowingtheAristotelianconceptofform,theformmustalwaysbetheformofcer-
taincontents.AccordingtoKant,thesecontentsaretheexperiences,andtheseexpe-
riencesmustbegainedbya“consciousness,”an“I”ora“subject.”Insofarasthissub-
jectpredeterminesthe“conditionsofpossibility”orthe“forms”ofexperience,Kant
callsitthe“transcendentalsubject.”PickingupatermfromLeibniz,hedesignatesit
astheoriginal“syntheticunityofapperception.”ForKantjustasforHume,thesub-
ject is not a substance, but amere “function of the unity,” i.e. a “synthesis”which
turnslogicallydisparateideasintologicallycoherentideas.Thissynthesiscannotbe
justifiedanymore,itisthe“highestpoint”atwhichthe“transcendentalphilosophy”
istobe“affixed.”Tothisday,manypeopleaffixthewholephilosophytothispoint.
However,thesyntheticunityofapperceptionisonlya“conditionofpossibil-
ity”thatistomakeconceivableobjectiveknowledgeofnaturebeyondHume’sskep-
ticalempiricism.Assuch,itdoesnotgrantatruthofnature,whichremainsan“un-
knownX”alsoforKant.Kantprovidesforphilosophyitsowntranscendentalspace
ofcertaintybetweenthespacesofexperienceandtranscendence.Thespaceofmere
experience isa spacewithout laws,while thespaceof transcendence isa space in
which human reason runs intowrong conclusions (“paralogisms”) and paradoxes
(“antinomies”)andthusintotheaforementioned“endlesscontroversies”thatdiso-
rientit.Inregardtothe“I,”theworld,andGod,onecanapparentlyproveantithet-
icalcertainties;andKantprovesthat thesecertaintiesareunprovable. Inthisway,
certaintiesaresubjectsofuncertainty.Thisislikewiseparadoxical.Indeed,Kantuses
paradoxesforthesakeofaccumulatingevidence:
• In order to be able tomake statementsa priori about the “form” of knowledge,
Kant followsAristotle inseparatingthe formandthecontentofknowledge.Yet,at
55
thesametime,hestartsfromthepremisethatitisimpossibletoseparateformand
contentinrealempiricalknowledge.Forthinkingbecomesknowingonlyifitrelates
to experience (“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts
areblind”).
•Kantusesthedistinctionbetweenformandcontentinsuchawaythatheclassifies
thepureformsofintuition(spaceandtime)alsoasthecontentofthepureformsof
theintellect.Hence,thepureformsofintuitionareatthesametimecontents,thus
beingparadoxical.
•Evenin itstranscendental justification, theobjectivityoftheknowledgeacquired
with thehelpof thenatural sciences isnota fact,butamereought: theempirical
subjectisaskedtode-subjectivizeitselfinordertobecomecapableofobjectiveem-
piricaljudgments.Thisde-subjectivizationoftheempiricalsubject,turningitintoa
transcendentalsubject,can,however,onlyproceedempirically;yet,thisispossible
onlytoalimitedextent,anditisneververifiableobjectively.
• If,according toKant’sCritiqueofPureReason,only that is toberegardedasreal
whichcanalsobeanobjectofexperience, thenreason itself,pursuing itsowncri-
tique,isnotreal,forreasoncannotbeanobjectofexperience.
However,thisdoesnotmeanthatTheCritiqueofPureReasonisinvalid.Orien-
tationcanalsobebasedonparadoxes.Onlywhenparadoxesaredebunkeddothey
increase disorientation. Kant seems to have noticed this. He was the first to ask:
WhatDoes ItMean toOrientOneself in Thinking? In this treatise, he also operates
withparadoxes(sec.13).
The philosophy of orientation cannot be formulated in laws, but precedes the
formulationoflaws.TheBritishtraditionontheonehand,whichreliesonexpe-
rience,andKantontheotherhand,whomakesreasonthecenteroforientation,
takeexemplarypositionsonthemathematicallyformulatedpurposelesslawsof
nature,whichsinceGalileiandespeciallysinceNewtonhavebecomefirmrefer-
encesofscientificorientation.
Humanorientationrequiresbothalternativeoptionsoforientation,empirical
evidence on the one hand and rational insight on the other. Yet, as the argu-
ments fromLocke toKant show, it is impossible todecideargumentativelybe-
tween these options. While Locke and Berkeley leave the certainty of natural
lawstoGodandwhileHumeholdstheircertaintyinskepticalsuspense,Kantde-
56
duces it from pure reason – at the same time delimiting the scope of rational
cognition to the sphere of experience in which there is no absolute certainty.
Bothalternativesconcurinonlyattributinglawstonaturewithoutbeingableto
ascertainwhether thesealsoare the lawsofnatureper se.Hence, they canbe
nothing but footholds for scientific orientation, albeit very strong ones. Kant,
who provides a specific space of certainty between empirical experience and
metaphysical transcendence in formulatingtranscendentalprinciplesofphilos-
ophy, runs into productive paradoxes when distinguishing between form and
content, subjectandobject, realityanduseofpure reason,which leadshim to
theproblemoforientationinthinkingassuch.
12.AlternativeConceptionsofMorality,Politics,andEconomy:
Smith,Rousseau,Kant,andBentham
In the secondhalf of the18th century, the living conditions inEuropeand in colo-
nized America, particularly Northern America, changed drastically: the economic
productivityandthewealthofnationsgrew,andwiththemtheattentiontothedis-
tribution of riches and the pressure on the old estate-based system that now ap-
pearedasunfair.Likewise,thepoliticalandmoralchallengesincreased:questionsof
socialjustice,ofthedemocratizationofsociety,ofslavery,andwiththemtheques-
tionoftheobligatorinessofmoralityingeneral.Bydevelopinghelpfulideas,philos-
ophybecamepracticallyefficientasneverbefore.Inconvertingtheponderousgov-
ernmental economy, so-called mercantilism, into the much more productive free
enterpriseeconomy, thereigningprincescould invokeAdamSmith; theauthorsof
theUnitedStatesDeclarationofIndependencecouldrefertoJohnLocke;theFrench
revolutionaries to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the Britishmembers of parliament,
who were concerned about distributive justice, to Jeremy Bentham. Just like Im-
manuelKant,allofthemproceededfromthefreedomofdecision.However,theydid
so in variousways; after all, onehad to philosophically decide on themodality of
orientationto freedom.Smith’s,Rousseau’s,Kant’s,andBentham’salternativecon-
ceptionsofpracticalphilosophyshowhowdifferentthescopesfordecision-making
canbeconceivedofandwhichnewpossibilitiesoforientationarisefromthem.
57
ADAMSMITH(1723-1790)grewupintheScottishschoolofmoralphilosophy,
whichwasleadinginGreatBritainattheendofthe18thcentury.Thisschoolslowly
brokeaway from theologicalprecepts; it supportedhumanbeingsdeveloping into
independent and enjoyable personalities. The ideal emanating from aristocracy,
formulatedbyANTHONYASHLEY-COOPER, the thirdEarl of Shaftesbury(1671-1713),
was the perfect harmony of right conduct. Smith’s teacher FRANCIS HUTCHESON
(1694-1746)placedthis idealwithinacontext,whichalsoembraceseconomyand
politics, while Smith himself, just as his predecessors, based them on a “moral
sense,”i.e.afeelingforthatwhichismorallycorrectandguidedbythe“sympathy”
withothers.Heintroduceda“politicaleconomy.”
Smithwasveryyoungwhenhebecameaprofessoroflogicandlaterofmoral
philosophy.Yet,hedidnot limithimself tophilosophy;rather,after thetraditional
multiannualgrand tour throughEuropewhenheaccompaniedayoungnobleman,
hewasappointedascommissionerof customs inScotlandandrefloated theailing
Scottishmonetary system.After his firstmajorwork in philosophy,TheTheory of
MoralSentiments(1759),whichhepublishedwhilebeingaprofessor,hewentdown
in history with his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(1776).Being theclassic justificationof freemarketeconomy, this latterworkap-
pearedintheyearoftheUnitedStatesDeclarationofIndependence;itwasquickly
receivedandsuccessfullyimplemented.
AdmiringNewton,Smithconfigureshiscomprehensivemoralphilosophyasa
side piece of the philosophy of nature. He tries to express it in preferably simple
lawsofwhichtheagentneedsnotbeaware;theyareobeyedwhileremaininglarge-
lyindependentoftheagent’sgoodwill.Inhistwomajorworks,Smithbuildsonthe
plainobservationthathumanbeingsareinterestedintheexchangewitheachother,
both in perceivingmoral conduct and judgment and in economic copingwith life.
Putinthelanguageofthephilosophyoforientation,Smith’spointofdepartureisthe
orientation of human beings to other human beings, which is not yet guided by
norms.
ForSmith,thenotionof“sympathy”doesnotsomuchmeanmutualaffection,
butrathermutualempathyandbeinginterestedincommunicatingwitheachother.
Throughempathy,humanbeingsascertaintheproprietyoftheirmoralconductand
judgment insociety; if the latter is indeedappropriate, theywillberewardedwith
respect.Smiththerebyproceedstowhatwetodaywouldcallasociologicalorsoci-
58
opsychological description ofmorality,which he then extends to an observation of
theeconomicconductofhumanbeingsatmarkets. Inthisway,moralconductand
judgmentbecomediscernablealsoasmarketbehavior.Smithdoesnotelaborateon
this,yet,inbothcases,theorientationbythemarketprecedesthemoraldistinction
betweengoodandevil,betweenaltruismandegoism.
The observation of themoral conduct and judgment of others becomes, ac-
cordingtoSmith,allthemorerevealingthemoreonecanabsolveoneselffromone’s
ownmoralattachmentsandoccupy thepositionofan impartial spectator.Yet,God
aloneisacompletelyimpartialspectatorspeakingthroughconscience.Thatiswhy
Smith–differentfromhisfriendHume–stillseeksanultimatefootholdinreligion.
However,atthesametime,Smithreferstothefactthatonecandistinguishoneself
and one’s conscience by deliberately changing perspectives. In Smith’s view, one
therebylearnstorestrainandcontroloneself,becomesmoreindependent inone’s
self-assessment and thus in turn abetterobserver. Indoing so, one cannever ex-
cludeself-deceit;yet,independentobserverscandetectit.Bycontrast,factionalism
andfanatismmaketheobservationbiasedandone-sided.
Starting from mutual observation, Smith’s implicit transition to economic
thinkinginOntheWealthofNationsbecomesplausible.Inaneconomiccontext,itis
observedunderwhichconditionsothersoptfortheexchangeofgoodsorservices,
andthemarketconsistsexactlyinthemutualobservationoftheseobservations.In-
sofar as themarket isnot limitedby explicit rules, it is just asnon-transparent in
economicdecisionsasourfeelingsareinmoraldecisions.Onecanonlyorientone-
selfbyobservingtheireffectsonthebehavioroftheinvolvedpersons.Inbothcases,
thesedecisions’effectsaredependentonincalculableindividualneedsandinterests.
Justasrealorobservablemoralityconsistsintheinteractionofallindividualmoral
decisions,sodoesthemarketconsist inthe interactionorsynergyofall individual
economicdecisions.InSmith’sapproach,moralityis–toputininNiklasLuhmann’s
words–amarketofesteem,whileontheeconomicmarkettheneedsandinterests
ofanonymousothersareobserved,followed,andrespected.
Incontrasttothemoralmarket,theeconomicmarkethasnoclearfootholdin
pricing,whichresultsfromthemutualobservationofthefactualeconomicdecisions
oftheparticipants;whoandwhatisrespectedmorallycannotbescaledlikemoney.
But just as the price on the economicmarket rises or falls through the change of
supplyanddemand,sodoesthevalueofrespectonthemoralmarket, ifaspecific
59
moralachievementismoreorlessindemand.The‘natural’valueofaneconomicor
amoralgood,whichismeasuredbytheexpenditureaffordedforit,recedesbehind
themarketvaluedeterminedbysupplyanddemand.Thiscanseverelyinjuremoral
feelings.Yet,atthesametime,morallycontemptibleself-interestcangenerategrow-
ing affluence for everyone on the economicmarket, though only in the long (and
sometimestheverylong)runandnevertothesameextentforeveryone.
The presupposition of this is that, in a society based on labor division, self-
interest increases the productivity of this society on the whole. BERNARD DE
MANDEVILLE (1670-1733), aLondondoctorof Frenchorigin, hadalready calledat-
tention to the fact that, on a free economicmarket, private vices turn into public
benefits,i.e.evilturnsintogood.HedidsoinpolemicalandsatiricalforminTheFa-
bleoftheBees.Heargues:ifnoonewantstotakeadvantageoftheotheroutofmoral
consideration,nothingstimulatestheincreaseofproductivityandthewholesociety
becomesimpoverished.Inprinciple,thishasprovedtrue.
Mandevillepresentedplausibleexamplesfromeverydaylifethatheobserved
closely.Therebyheexposedmoralidealizationofallkinds,whilehisopponentsfu-
riously insistedon it. Smith, too, distancedhimself fromMandeville, resolutely re-
pudiating the blatant inferences Mandeville deduced from his thought. However,
Smithborrowedthe ideaof therevaluationof the(morallyspeaking)evil intogood
andelaboratedonthisidea.While,accordingtoHobbes,the“selfishsystem”leadsto
theenthronementofasovereign,accordingtoSmith,itentailstheincreaseofevery-
one’s freedomon a freemarket. In addition, the “commercial society” canbe con-
strainedbyruleswhichturnsitintoa“naturalsystemofliberty.”
Inthemarket,Smithdiscoversanovelkindofgeneralization.Thisisunprece-
dentedbythe(deductive)generalizationofmetaphysics,the(inductive)generaliza-
tionofBritishempiricism,andthemathematicallyformulatedgeneralizationofthe
experimentalphilosophyofnature.Thisnovelideaofgeneralizationarisesthrough
theinscrutableinteractionofindividualgivensbeingvolatileallthetime.Itcanonly
becomprehendedthroughcontinuouscomparativestudyand,therefore,itcanonly
begraspedprovisionally.What isat stakehere isnot truth,but ratherstatistically
determinableprobability.Thus, in everynew situation, onehas todecide anew to
whatextentonewantstorelyonit.Thegeneralizationonthemarket–i.e.economic
and moral generalization at the same time – can constantly change through the
changesoftheindividualcircumstancesanddecisions.Itisthegeneralizationofori-
60
entation, inwhichtherelativecertaintyofthepriceorthevalidityofcertainmoral
valuesisrelatedtotherelativeuncertaintyofwhetheritisworthdealingingoodsat
thispriceororientingone’smoralconductaccordingtothevaluesofrespect.Ona
freemarket,beittheeconomicorthemoralmarket,uncertaintybecomesproductive.
Smithhimself puts theparadoxof evil unwillinglyproducing something good into
thewell-establishedshapeorfigureofan“invisiblehand”–anundeterminedtheo-
logicalmetaphorthatissupposedtotideoversomethingdifficulttocomprehend.
Asanalternative,Smith’sFrenchcontemporaryJEAN-JACQUESROUSSEAU(1712-
1778)alsoproceededfromthepre-reflectivefeelingforthegood,butarrivedatthe
contraryconceptionofthemoral,political,andeconomic.WhileSmithlimitshimself
to sober observation and description, Rousseau projects ideal states. He does so
withapowerfullyeloquentmoralpassion.Inthefirst instance,heradically ‘resets’
reason–inordertothenturnitintoanunconditionalfootholdforeveryone’sorien-
tation.Heextremelyextendstheleewayoffreedomandobligationinsociety.Butfol-
lowing the French tradition of governmentalmercantilist economy, he leaps over
thepotentialoffreeenterpriseeconomytoformafreesociety.Instead,heimagines
astateofnatureofhumanbeingsinwhicheveryoneisself-sufficient,freeandequal
–aspeoplehappilycoexistinpeacelackinganyeconomicorsocialsystematall.But
thenthesocialorderweknowdestroysthishappypeace,andanewpeacecanonly
beestablishedwiththehelpofareasonablewillthatobligeseveryone.
Rousseau’sconstructionmayalsohavehadpersonalreasons.Heliveddiffer-
entlythanSmith:inunattached,unsecuredandunstablelivingconditions.Hegrew
upwithoutamotherandthenalsowithoutafather;hedidnotpassthroughregular
studies;heswitcheddenominationsjustasheinterchangedhislifepartnerships;he
didnotcommithimselftoonesingleprofession,butshoneasaphilosopher,educa-
tionist,writer,playwright,composer,andmusicologistat thesametime.Herisked
hisbooksbeingbannedandburnt,himselfbeingpersecuted;heconfusedandunset-
tledhisfriendsandnumerous,mostlyaristocraticpatrons;helongedforsolitude–
increasinglyembitteredabout thesocietyofhis times–andyetpushedhimself to
the fore and went public. He had a strong need for self-expression and self-
justification,andhesearchedandfoundholdinhimselfandhisownideasaboutthe
complete refounding of an egalitarian society. With these ideas he fascinated the
‘higher’educatedupper-classcirclesrightuptotheleadingphilosophersofhisday.
61
OnlyfewpeopleinWesternculturalhistoryhavecausedsimilarlystrongreorienta-
tionsashedid.
LikeSmith’s,Rousseau’sconceptionisnoteasytooverlookandthereforecon-
troversial.Rousseau’sconstrualofanamiable,yetunrealisticstateofnatureofthe
humanbeingiscondensedinhisearlydiscourses,namelytheDiscourssurlesscienc-
esetlesarts(DiscourseontheArtsandSciences,1750),whichRousseautracedback
toa great experienceof inspiration resembling thoseofDescartes andPascal, and
theDiscourssurl’origineetlesfondementsdel’inégalitéparmileshommes(Discourse
ontheOriginandBasisofInequalityAmongMen,1755):theanimal-likestateofna-
ture is supposed to have been disturbed just by themutual observation ofmoral
conductandjudgment,fromwhichSmithexpectedthedevelopmentofamoreand
moreappropriatemorality.InRousseau’sopinion,thelabor-divisionofcommercial
societyleadstoadestructivecompetitionthatmakeshumanbeingsmoreandmore
unequalandmostofthemunfree.
Rousseau’sopinion is justasplausibleasSmith’s.Thesetwoderiveopposite
conclusions from one and the same starting point: an original moral sentiment.
WhileSmithreckonswithamoralreversalofgoodintoevil,Rousseausupposesthat
thegoodturnsintoevilinsociety.Thus,forRousseau,anewradicalconversionbe-
comesnecessary.Heindicatestwopathstoit:oneofthemleadsviaeducation(the
individualshallre-acquire itsnatural freedom),theotherviathecreationofacivil
society(sociétécivile),whichisbasedonfreedomandequalrightsandinwhichthe
individuals,raisedfree,canburgeonequalbeforethelaw.Withthelatterideas,ap-
pealinguntiltoday,Rousseauhasexertedhisstrongestinfluence.
Inhis famoustreatiseDucontratsocialouessaisur la formede larépublique
(TheSocialContract,orPrinciplesofPoliticalRight,1762),heconceivesof thenew
society as one where everyone silently enters into a contract with everyone else
through which human beings commit themselves to politically act according to a
generalwill (volontégénérale).The ideaofa tacitsocialcontract isbasedonmere
reason: a goodand just society ispossibleonly if everyone shares the rational in-
sightintoacommongoodandjustice.Thus,inthepoliticalformofarepublic,pru-
dentpeoplearetheirownandonlysovereign.Representativedemocracyandmajor-
itydecisionsbecomesuperfluous.There isno space for individualorientations,nei-
therinthestateofnature,norinsociety’sstateofreason.Ideally,inbothofthemitis
perfectcertaintythatreigns.
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However,thisisnotpossiblewithoutparadoxes.InhiseducationnovelÉmile,
Rousseauexpresslyacknowledgesthem:“Theaveragemanmayforgivememypar-
adoxes–oneneedsthemforreflection.Andwhateverobjectiononemightbringup
againstme–Ipreferbeingamanofparadoxestobeingamanofprejudices.”Itfol-
lowsthat
• human beings are good only in a state of nature that cannot be observed; they
were turned into evil creatures by society – which they were and still are them-
selves;
•theseevilhumanbeingsshallcreateanewsocietythroughthetacitcompletionof
acontractaboutacommonlegalorder–yet, inordertocompletesuchacontract,
theymustalreadybelegalpersonsand,inaddition,personsfreefrompersonalin-
terests;
• through this contract, they shall secure their personal liberty in recognizing the
absolute sovereignty of the community, the people – they shall understand them-
selvesasfreepreciselyinfreelysurrenderingtoalawthatisbindingforeveryone.
Rousseaucallsthisthetotalalienation(aliénationtotale)oftheindividualwills(vo-
lontés particulières) from themselves for the sake of the general will (volonté gé-
nérale).Whensomeoneassertsaspecial,particularwill,hewillbeforcedtobefree
(onleforceraàêtrelibre).
In order tomake these paradoxes of humannature, the social contract, and
political freedommoreplausible–whichcontinues tohaveaneffectuntil today–,
Rousseauassumes
• that everyone concludes a contractwith himself in order to cling to the general
will. Yet, one cannot enter into contractswith oneself, and society as such cannot
utterageneralwillandcannoteffectuateitinaconcretesituationofaction.
• Since only individuals representing society can do so, these individualsmust be
chosencarefully.Inordertoestablishasuitablesystemoflaws,Rousseauthinksan
especiallywiselegislatorisnecessary.Yet,thisimpliesthattherearedifferencesin
theendowmentwithor theuseofreasonamong individuals. Ifwecannotpresup-
posecommoninsightsstemmingfromcollectivereason,wemustassumethatsome
individualsaresuperiorintheirorientation.
•Thecommitmentorbondcreatedbyrationalinsightinthegeneralwillofthepeo-
pleisnotsufficientinRousseau’seyes.Accordingtohim,arepublicneedsacivilre-
ligionwithdogmasinwhicheveryonemustbelieveunconditionally:dogmasofper-
63
sonal immortality, of God’s justice arranging punishment or reward, and the holi-
nessofthesocialcontract.Yet,ifonemustbelieveinsomethingspecific,itisonlyof
limitedcredibility.
•InÉmile,Rousseaurecommendsthefollowingforaneducationthatissupposedto
resultinfreedom:“Leadthepupilalwaystobelievethatheisthemaster,butinreal-
ity,youmustbethemaster.Thereisnosubmissionthatismorecompletethanthe
one thathas theappearanceof freedom. In thisway,youcanconquerandcontrol
thepupil’swill.”
•Rousseauconcealssuchongoingparadoxesbyusingtheancientmetaphorof the
body(corps):Ifallmembersofsocietyformanorganism,theyfulfillavitalfunction
in it; if they, by contrast, assert personal interests, they endanger the body as a
wholeandarethentobeconsideredassick.Yet,societyisnotabody.
While Smith andRousseau extended thehorizonofmoral orientation in the
transitionfromtheearliertotheirlaterworks,whichtheydidnotconnectsystemat-
ically with each other, Kant and Bentham begin with one single principle: Kant’s
pointofdepartureisthegoodwill,Bentham’sthebenefitofaction.
KANTdemandsunconditionality, also inmoralphilosophy, inorder to justify
hisclaimtooftheuniversalityofmorals.Forthisreason,themoralityofactionmust
notbebasedonfeelingsorobservations,needsorintereststhatcanvaryfromplace
toplace;rather,itmustbebasedexclusivelyonreasonitself–KantperformsaCo-
pernican revolution also in moral philosophy. As a consequence, reasonmust – as
reason–ignoreallsituationalcircumstances.Itmustignoreallconditionsandrami-
ficationsofhumanactionforwhichnoonecanbemademorallyresponsible.Reason
mustadheretonothingelsethantheintentionoftheagent.Thisintentioncannotbe
readoffanfromactionbecauseitisaninnercommitment.Justasreason‘prescribes’
itslawsinthetheoreticalcognitionofnature,sodoesdutyprescribethelawaccord-
ingtowhichweshallact.Tothisend,reasonmustpresupposea freewill thatcan
choosegoodorevil;itismoralwhenitchoosesthegood,andunconditionallymoral
whenitwantsthegoodforitsownsake,indeferencetothegood–eventhoughthe
goodisalwaysdeterminedbyaconfusingvarietyofcircumstancesframingasitua-
tionofaction, though itcanalwayshavebadconsequences,andthusthegoodcan
onlybethecomparativelybest.
Thegoodwillprescribeswhat is tobedone.Reasoncan, in itspracticaluse,
giveanapriori form toaction just as it, in its theoreticaluse, cangiveanapriori
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form to knowledge.Thisapriori form for action is the “categorical imperative.” It
commands unconditionally that one is to follow reason alone, notmore, not less.
Morality in the form of reason as an authoritative command is “themere form of
universallaw-making.”Thecontentsfittingintothisformcannotbeconcreteactions
thatalwaysdependonspecificcircumstances,butrathertheguidingintentionsthat
alwaysleadone’saction,or,asKantcallsthem,one’sown“maxims”or“subjective”
practicalprinciples.
Therebyeveryoneisdirectedtohim-orherself:onecanexperiencetheinner
coercionofdutyonlyasanindividual;others’reasonis,accordingtoKant,“foreign
reason”;inthelivesofdifferenthumanbeings,differentmaximscanarise.Thus,the
categorical imperativecommands toexamine the leadingmaximsofone’sownac-
tioninregardtothequestionofwhetheronecouldgivethemtheformofauniversal
lawat any time. If this is possiblewithout contradiction, one is allowed to act ac-
cordingtothesemaxims,forinstancethemaximalwaystobehonest.Ifacontradic-
tionarises,onemustrestrainoneselffromthemaxim.Forinstance,ifonereserves
therighttolieoccasionallyforoneself,onecannotcountonhonestyanywhereany-
moreonceoccasionallieshavebecomeauniversallaw.
Kanthasguidelinesforone’sactioninmindthataresupposedtobeinforcea
wholelifetime.However,healsoheredemandsde-subjectivization–inthiscontext
notforthepurposeofobjectivecognition,butratherforthepurposeofmoralaction
disregarding one’s own advantage and any exception for oneself. Kant’s most ex-
treme example is that of a suicidal person who despite of world weariness feels
compelled to go on living because suicide cannot become a principle of universal
legislation. The condition for de-subjectivization is not that others proceed in the
same way; otherwise the categorical imperative would not mean more than the
GoldenRule,i.e.theprincipleoftreatingothersasonewouldwishtobetreatedby
them.Kantexpresslydismissesthisinterpretationofthecategoricalimperative,for
thelatterwouldthenbeanobligationundercertainconditions,a“hypotheticalim-
perative.” On the other hand, the examination of one’s own maxims cannot set
norms forothers.Everypersonmust rationallycheckhisorherownmaxims.The
categoricalimperativedoesnotprescribehowothersshouldact;rather,itdelimits
one’sownaction inrelationtoothers.Asaresult, ithelpsmetodistancemefrom
myownmaximsandencouragesmetobecarefulwithmyownmorality.Putinthe
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termsofthephilosophyoforientation,thecategoricalimperativeopensupthetran-
sitionfrommoraltoethicalorientation.
From this starting point, Kant conceptualizes the law and politics. The law
regulatesthewaysinwhichwe,visiblyforeveryone,socializewithothers.Thelaw
referstoindividualactionsthatcanbeobservedbyothersinthe‘outer’worldand
does usually not take into account an agent’s intentions that cannot be observed.
Thelawpresupposesthatallhumanbeingsoftheageofconsentareequallyfreeto
actmorally,i.e.ofgoodwill.However,onecannotexpectthatallpeopleinfactactin
thisway.Therefore,inordertoprotecthumanbeingsfromeachother,externalco-
ercionisnecessary,sothatone’sownarbitrarinesscancoexistwiththefreedomof
othersaccordingtoalawthatisvalidforeveryone.
Kantdefinespoliticsas“executivejurisprudence”andobligesittocommitit-
selftomorality,knowingfullwellthatcommonwealthcomesintoexistencethrough
differentkindsofviolence.Kantsetsthe“moralpolitician”whoputshispoliticsun-
der the control of unconditionalmorality, against the “politicalmoralist”who– in
thesenseofMachiavelli(sec.8)–concoctsamoralitythatfitstohispurposes.Kant
alsotreatseconomyinhistheoryoflaw,yetonlyatthesidelines.Hedoesnotgointo
Smith’sconceptofafreeenterprisesystem,whichdoesnotbuildonthe‘ought.’
Ontheonehand,inhisCritiqueofPracticalReason,Kantdissolvestheparadox
oftheunrealityofreasonwiththehelpofterminologytakenfromtheCritiqueofPure
Reason(sec.11);yet,ontheotherhand,hecreatesnewparadoxes.Althoughthere-
alityofreasonisnotperceptibletothesenses,reasonissupposedtomanifestitself
in itspracticalusage,whichmustbeobservable inaway. Inorder todissolve the
paradox, Kant employs a bodily metaphor: in the categorical imperative and its
command (“Act like this!”), onehears the “voice”of reason.Kantunderstands this
beingcoercedbyaninnervoiceasa“fact”ofitsownkind,whichcannotbeturned
down,even less thanobservable factsofnaturethat, inhiseyes,aremereappear-
ances.Forthesakeofmorality,heintroducesanewkindoffact.
Thismeansthattheassumptionofafreedomofchoicebetweengoodandevil
isindispensable,despiteitsinconceivability.Thisfreedomofchoiceisproduced“by
thedeed”(eventhoughitcannotbeobservedinthedeed).ForKant,an“intelligible
world”opensuphere,whichhewiththehighestpathoscallsthe“reignoffreedom”;
Fichtewill fall into linewith this (sec.14).However,according toKant’snotionof
thegoodwill,thewillisnottochoose,butonlytowantthegoodmotivatingaction.
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Infact,oneonlyspeaksofthegoodwillwhenmoralactionhasproducedunpleasant
effectsorhasturnedouttobeuselessordetrimental.Thenthisactionisretrospec-
tively justifiedwith reference to the goodwill that provoked it. In thisway, Kant
viewsmoralactionfromtheverystartfromtheperspectiveofjustification.Thereby
heremovesalltaken-for-grantedness,naturalness,andeasefrommoralactionthat
mightprovokeothers’sympathy(inAdamSmith’ssense)andconsent.Thealterna-
tiveof ‘self-obligationversus sympathy,’ though, confrontsuswith thequestionof
theutilityofmoralactioningeneral.ThisisBentham’sstartingpoint.
JEREMYBENTHAM (1748-1832AD),whogrewupasamiracle child inapros-
perousfamily,studiedlaw,yetwithouteverhavingtopursueaprofession,develops
moral philosophy starting from the notion of usefulness – Kant’s and Bentham’s
conceptsofthemoralandthepoliticalareclassicalternativesinthehistoryofphi-
losophy.Bentham’s Introduction to thePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislationof1789
wassupposedtoserveausefulgoal:tosystematicallyoutlineapenallawforGreat
BritainthatcouldbepassedbyParliamentandthusbeofrealbenefittotheentire
population.Thus, themoral philosophywithwhichhe corroboratedhis penal law
hadtobeimmediatelyplausible;itisdifficulttodenythateveryonestrivesforhap-
piness.ThatwhichKantexcludedfrommorality,is,accordingtoBentham,itsend.If
needed, thepurposeof happinesswould justify amoral reorientation à laMande-
villeandSmith:even“ifhappinesswerebetterpromotedbywhatiscalledimmorali-
ty,immoralitywouldbecomeaduty;virtueandvicewouldchangeplaces.”
Happinesscansimplybegraspedasthepreponderanceofpleasureoverpain.
Notonlyhumanbeings,butalsoanimalswanttoavoidpainandfindpleasureinthe
longrun.Thus,Bentham,too,reliesonsentimentextendingfromtherethehorizon
ofmoralandlegalphilosophyinhisway.Atthesametime,hefocusesononesingle
principle,comparabletogravityinNewton’sphilosophyofnature.Utilityisnotonly
themeasureofevery individual’sorgovernment’ssuccessfulaction; instrivingfor
one’s own advantage, one also promotes others’ happiness insofar as one’s own
happinessdependsonthem.
According toBentham,onedoesneitherneed to interpolatea revaluationof
eviltogoodonthefreeeconomicmarketnorassumeasocialcontract.Benthamre-
gardstheindividualsdirectlyas“members”ofthe“fictitiousbody”ofthecommuni-
ty.Hence,inasimpletotaling,theinterestofthecommunityis“thesumoftheinter-
estsoftheseveralmemberswhocomposeit.”Inaddition,inBentham’sviewhappi-
67
nesscanbescaledlikethepricesonthemarket.Inordertocreatethegreatesthap-
pinessof the greatestnumber, heproposes a “hedonistic orfelicific calculus”with
thefollowingvariablesorvectors:intensity,duration,certaintyoruncertainty,pro-
pinquityor remoteness, fecundity (doeshappinessbegetmorehappiness?),purity
(does happiness not havenegative consequences?), and extent (howmanypeople
enjoyhappiness?).Allpeopleshallcountequally.Thus,Bentham’sprinciple isuni-
versalaswell.
Finally,theconceptionofmoralactioninregardtohappinessincludesalsoan
‘ought’forBentham:thatwhichisusefulis“arightaction”andoughttobedone;this
is,inBentham’sview,theonlysenseofwhatwe’ought’todo.Themoralprincipleof
happinessorutilitycannotandneedsnottobeproven;instead,onecanproveeve-
rythingelsefromit.Theprincipleofhappinessorutilityisnotalwaysfollowedde-
liberately;oftenitisconcealedbyprejudice.Still,itcanonlybecombattedbybeing
assumednonethelessbecauseanyotherprinciplewouldalsohavetobe“goodfor”
something. Finally, this principle does not need any safeguardingwith the help of
religiousbelief.Benthamopenlyconfessedhisatheism.
Hisprincipleofhappinessorutilitycreatedadistance tocertainmoralsand
theircompulsions.Benthamadvocated liberalizationatall fronts,also inquestions
ofraceandsexuality.Hecampaignedfordemocratization, for thestateof law,and
against slavery. He wanted to supplement the three by then classic state powers
(legislative,executive,andjudiciary)withafourthandsupremepower:thepeople
or ‘theconstitutive’;however,hedidnotsucceedwiththispoliticalreform.Insofar
aswearenot reallyable tocalculate thesumofhappiness, since thehappinessof
onepersonisonlytoalimitedextentcomparabletothehappinessofanother,Ben-
thamhascreatedwithhisprincipleofthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber
anewgenerality inorientingoneself:hisprincipleorientsasageneralbenchmark
instructingustodetectanddeleteinequality.LikeSmith’sgeneralityofthemarketis
itamorallyorientinggenerality.
Ofcourse,eventheprincipleofthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber
turnsouttobeambiguous.Accordingto it,minoritiescaneasilybeoutvoted;Ben-
thamallowseven torture, if itbenefits thewhole. Insofaraseverysocietyneedsa
commonmorality,Benthamsuggestsamoraleducationofeveryonethroughasys-
temof sanctions including physical, religious, political, and public inconveniences.
Hearguesagainstacriminallawbasedonguiltandpleadsforacriminallawbased
68
ondeterrence. In the lackof idealisticguidelines, the freedomof thesinglehuman
beingconsistsonlyinsafetyagainsttheothers,whichisgrantedbythepoliceandby
the law,and inprotectionagainst illegalmeasuresof thegovernment.Without the
premiseofself-obligation,apowerfulgovernmentalsurveillanceandcontrolappa-
ratusbecomesnecessary,whichpermanentlymonitors thebehaviorofhumanbe-
ings (evenwith the help of informers and investigators) in order to punish every
wrongdoingwithsanctionsandcorrectit.Benthamwasmostinterestedinthepenal
system,for“themorestrictlywearewatched,thebetterwebehave.”Smith’sprinci-
pleofobservationhereturnsouttoberepressiveratherthaninspiring.
Thephilosophyoforientationgainsnew leewaysandalternative techniquesof
distinction through alternative conceptions of orientation that emerged in the
fieldofpracticalphilosophyattheendofthe18thcentury.Inthemoral,political,
andeconomic realms, the footholds fororientationarewidely spreadandam-
biguous;thatiswhytheneedforclearandreliablefootholdsforone’sactionde-
cisionsincreases.Ontheonehand,situationofactionsrequireahighsensitivity
ofobservationwhich,however,canbeangledindifferentdirections;ontheoth-
erhand,actiondecisionsare facilitatedbyprinciplesthatcanbebackedupby
differentkindsofevidence.
Smithcountsonthesensitivityofobservation,Rousseauonsensitivityand
reasonatonce,whileKantgroundspracticalreasonontheprincipleofthegood
will;Benthamputsallactiondecisionsunderthecontroloftheprincipleofhu-
mansearchforhappiness.Despitecontrarydistinctions,allofthemstillrelyona
benevolent nature. Smith and Rousseau drive forth contrary moral reorienta-
tions in extended leeways ofmoral orientation: according to Smith, one’s bad
owninterestspromotethewelfareofeveryoneinafreecommercialsociety;ac-
cording to Rousseau, human beings that are good by nature become evil in a
commercialsocietythatcreatesinequality;KantandBenthamfocusoncontrary
benchmarksofmoralorientation: thegoodwillof the individualor thehappi-
nessofall.
Smith upgrades observation to a second-order observation of observa-
tions.Thereby,hediscoversanewgenerality inorientation,which interrelates
uncertaintiessuchthattheybecomedynamicandproductive.Inmorality,thisis
proper behavior, on the economicmarket it is pricing. In this way, Smith can
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movefrommoralestimationtoeconomicrating,tyingtogethermoralityandthe
market.RousseausupportstheFrenchRevolution,butalsoitsterror,byseeking
anunconditionalcertaintyinanewcivilsocietybasedonreason.Kantabstracts
fromtheindividualsituationofactionsinordertomakeconceivableauniversal
validity ofmorality, but can onlymorally appeal to politics. Bentham, by con-
trast, can give a concrete handle to the political legislative power in reducing
themotivationforactingtothepursuitofhappiness,butrunsintoalegallyau-
thorizedandgovernmentallyorganizedobservationofthepopulation.
Thepresentmoral,economic,andpoliticalorientationhastotakeintoac-
countallthesealternativeoptions.
13.AlternativeWaysofConceptualizingHowOneCanOrientOneself:
Mendelssohn,Kant,andHerder
The notion of ‘orienting oneself’ stems from geography and came to Germany
through the so-called pantheism controversy in philosophy. The Jew MOSES
MENDELSSOHN(1729-1786AD),nexttoKantoneoftheleadingphilosophersofGer-
manEnlightenment, tried to settle theconflictabout ‘faithversus reason’with the
helpof thenotionoforientation.DisputatiousChristians forcedhim into that con-
flict.Mendelssohnwasbornandrearedinhumblecircumstances.Hewasverysmall
instatureandinfrailhealth.Heworkedasahometutor,bookkeeper,Torahinstruc-
tor,writer,andmanagerofasilkfactory.HetranslatedRousseau’sDiscourseonthe
OriginandBasisofInequalityAmongMen intoGermanandupdatedLocke’sLetters
ConcerningTolerationforJudaism.Hewonascientificprizecompetitiontothedis-
favor of Kant, andwith numerous contributions, he rendered great service to the
recognition of Jews in society andphilosophy in thosedays.Mendelssohnwas re-
gardedastheGerman-JewishSocrates.HisfriendGOTTHOLDEPHRAIMLESSING(1729-
1781AD),themostprominentGermanpoetofEnlightenment,hadMendelssohnin
mindastheprototypeofhisprotagonistNathantheWise.Nonetheless,FrederickII,
KingofPrussia,whowasfamousforhispromotionoftheEnlightenmentandhistol-
erance,deniedhimadmissiontothePrussianAcademyofSciences.
InMendelssohn’seyes, Judaismcanbetolerantbecauseit isnotbasedondog-
mas,butratheronaformoflifewhoselawsitextractsfromtheTorah.Judaismori-
70
ents itselfby theTorahwithoutclaiming toeverbecapable tounderstand it fully.
Theword ‘Torah’meansdirectionandguidance, i.e.,orientation.AccordingtoJew-
ish tradition, the Torah is authored by God himself. Thus, the alternative of ‘faith
versusreason’doesnotariseatallinJudaism.
Yet,itispreciselythisalternativeonwhichthedecidedandinfluentialChristian
FRIEDRICHHEINRICH JACOBI (1743-1819AD) insistedwhenhe accused the deceased
LessingoffollowingthephilosophyoftheJewSpinoza(sec.9)andhence,according
tothecommoninterpretationinGermanyatthattime,ofcontemptibleatheism.Ja-
cobichallengedMendelssohntoacknowledgeChristianityandconfessitstheological
dogmas (several ofMendelssohn’s children did this later on). Through thismove,
Jacobi pointedly questioned the whole of Mendelssohn’s lifework. Under Jacobi’s
attack,Mendelssohn’sfriendshiptoLessingandhisservicetoJudaismandphiloso-
phygot tangledup. In thisseverepersonalemergencysituation,Mendelssohnwas
compelledtoreorientation,andthatwhichhelpedhimoutwastheconceptof ‘ori-
entingoneself.’
In regard to Spinozism,Mendelssohndistinguishesbetween soundhumanun-
derstandingand speculative reason, so thathe can concede thatSpinozawent too
farintermsofspeculativereasonwithhismetaphysicalconstructions;yet,amoder-
ate or refined “chastenedpantheism” is not to be condemned.He shows that, like
Lessing,onecanorientoneselfbySpinozismwithoutcommittingoneselftoit–and
thishappenedinGermanIdealism(sec.14).
However,Mendelssohndoesnotleaveitthere.Instead,hebeginstounderstand
reason itself in the senseof orientingoneself. Already inhis treatise on the senti-
ments (ÜberdieEmpfindungen),whichwasamuchdiscussed topicat the time,he
givesinapathbreakingmannerthoughttothesteeringofattentionintheexplora-
tionofobjects:putincontemporaryterms,onehastoselect,evaluate,andassociate
footholdsuntil theobtainedoverviewproducestheexciting“total impression”ofa
vibrantwhole.AccordingtoMendelssohn,thinkingisonlyoneoftheabilitiesthatis
inplayhere,andallofthisdoesnothappenconsciously,butonlysemi-consciously,
somnambulistically,asitwere.
Therefore,Mendelssohnexplicatesthenotionof‘orientingoneself’inanallegor-
icaldreamofreason,anarrationinwhichhetranslocatestheimageof“theparting
of theways”shapedbyProdicos (sec.4) to theSwissAlps.Thereby, the figuresof
“soundhumanunderstanding”and“speculativereason”appearasmountainguides.
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They come into conflictwith each other, so thewayfarers,whohave no sufficient
overviewofthesituation,areconfrontedwiththequestionoforientation.Mendels-
sohnputstheanswertothisquestionintothemouthofathirdperson,thefigureof
“prudentreason” that isequivalentwith the “I” in itsneed toorient itself.Hecon-
cludesthatonecantrustinprudentreason,whichreflectsuponbothsides.Onecan
holdontoitoronecantrustit.Prudentreasondoesnotcomeupwithprecepts;it
onlyrelatesthesignpoststoeachotherinsuchawaythatapassableroadappears.
AsMendelssohnhasit,prudentreason“orientsitself”bysoundhumanunderstand-
ing or common sense, and at the same time, it “corrects” common sensewith the
helpofthedeliberationsandconclusionsofspeculativereason.Thereasonableness
oforientationliesintheprudentweighingofbothsides.The“I”followingthiskind
of reasonableness changes constantly; inMendelssohn’s opinion, it has not a firm
apprehensionandconceptof itself; it is thecontinuously renewing self-referenceof
orientingoneself.Thus,whatevolvesoutof thecrisis inwhichtheChristiandispu-
tantJacobicasttheJewishenlightenerMendelssohn, isreasonasaself-referenceof
orientation.
WhenailingMendelssohndiedatthebeginningoftheyear1786,KANTwanted
tocometotherescueofthecaseandconcernofthisphilosopherofEnlightenment
whomhehighlyesteemed.He tookupMendelssohn’snotionof ‘orientingoneself,’
butrealigneditintermsofthepresettingofhisCritiqueofPureReason.
Kanthimselfwasalreadyclosetotheorientationproblem.IntheIntroductionto
his lectureon logic thathe gave regularly and thathisdisciple Jäsche later recon-
structed from Kant’s notes and his listeners’ transcripts, Kant places all insights
(mundaneones justasscientificandphilosophicalones) in “horizons” thatarenot
only“logically”determinedaccordingto“theinterestoftheintellect,”butalso“aes-
thetically,”accordingto“tasteinrelationtotheinterestoffeeling”aswellas“practi-
cally,”accordingto“utilityinrelationtotheinterestofthewill.”Inusingthemeta-
phorofthehorizon,heaffiliateswithadebatethatwaswell-establishedsinceLeib-
niz (sec. 9). Kant orients himself toward ALEXANDER GOTTLIEB BAUMGARTEN (1714-
1762AD)andGEORGEFRIEDRICHMEIER (1718-1777AD).Logic itselfdealswithun-
conditionallaws;yettheintroductiontologicisaboutrecommendablerulesormax-
imsthatorientordinaryandscientificthinking,i.e.aboutakindofpreorientation.In
this line,Kantsuggests“pre-determiningtheabsolutehorizonof thewholehuman
species(inregardtopastandfuturetimes)”andalso“definingthepositionthatour
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scholarshiptakes inthehorizonofknowledgeasawhole”;dependingonhowit is
categorizedandoriented, itbecomesanother character.Thismeans thatorienting
decisionsaretaken,forinstancetopredefinecognitioninthesenseofstrictlyobjec-
tiveorunconditionalknowledge,ormoralaction in thesenseof theunconditional
form of the categorical imperative.The preceding orienting decision conditions the
unconditional.However,accordingtoKant,thisdecisiononlyiscapableofconditioned
certainty. Thus, the decision for unconditional certainty is takenwithin the terms of
conditionedcertainty.
In his Introduction to Logic, Kant without further ado incorporates Mendels-
sohn’sdefinitionof‘orientingoneself.’Itisstatedapprovingly(inJäsche’srendition)
that philosophers shall “orient themselves in thinking,or in the use of speculative
reason throughcommonsense […]as a test toevaluate theveracityof speculative
reason[…]inordertodiscoverthemistakesoftheartificialuseoftheintellect.”Just
likeMendelssohn,Kantemphasizesheretheimportantroleofsoundhumanunder-
standing: the “judgments” of others can give one a “hint” so that one can review
one’sown“procedureof judging”withouthaving togive itup immediately incase
thata“contradiction”occurs.Saidinourlanguage:everydayorientationandschol-
arlyorientationareimprovedifotherorientationsareincludedinthem.
Kantcountersthescholasticconceptofphilosophy,accordingtowhichphiloso-
phersonlyturntootherphilosophersandexposethemselvestotheircriticism,with
a “worldly concept” of philosophy, according to which it delivers itself up to a
broaderpublicandthusalsotosoundhumanunderstanding.ForKant,thisworldly
conceptofphilosophyiscrucial.Foritis“essentialtocheckaninsightinthefaceof
humanbeingswhose intellect does not cling to any school.” Thosewho canmake
themselves understood to these publicly demonstrates “the complete insight in a
certainmatter.”Kantendorseseventhe“preliminaryjudgment”withwhichthede-
cisionabout the truthofa judgment ispostponedwhen it isnot (yet)clearwhere
the truth is tobe found.Commonsensemostoften judges itsmatters in thisway,
unless it is fooled by prejudices that it deems definitive judgments. According to
Kant, thepreliminary judgmentthat istypicaloforientationcanguidetheintellect
“inallmeditationand investigation”andshowmeansandways tomakeprogress;
moreover,itcan“sense”goalsthatcanbeachieved.Kantproposessomethinglikean
art of orientingoneself,withoutdesignating it such: “one couldevenprovide rules
abouthowtojudgeprovisionallyaboutanobject.”
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Yet, for Kant this does notmean that philosophers shall orient themselves by
commonsense.Inhistreatiseonthepantheismcontroversyof1786,whichisenti-
tledWasheißt: Sich imDenkenorientieren? (Whatdoes itmean toorientoneself in
thinking?),KantnotonlycountersJacobi,whomheconsidersareligiousenthusiast
or fanatic, but he also correctsMendelssohn’s understanding of what itmeans to
orientoneself.Kantdoessothroughhisowncritiqueofreason–withtheresultthat
heleadshiscritiquebeyond.InthediscussionofSpinoza,herestrainshimselfafter
somepeoplehadascribedSpinozismtohim,too.
Kantbeginshistreatisewiththeremarkthatnotionslike‘toorientoneself’are
good examples of how “pictorial representations (bildliche Vorstellungen)” make
conceptssuitableforusageandhow“manyausefulmaxim”canbewonfromthem
“even in abstract thinking.” In contrast, invoking common sense, in which all are
supposedtocoincide,isalwaysonlyafinal“emergencyrelief,”asKantnotedacou-
pleofyearsbeforeinthePrefacetohisProlegomenaintroducingintohisCritiqueof
PureReason.Whereitisaboutthepossibilitiesofphilosophyitself,“thestalestchat-
terer can take it on with the most thorough head.” Philosophymust insist on its
competence.AllthemoreisitKant’saimtodesignatereasonitselfasauthorityofits
orientation, whereas Mendelssohn has not drawn a sharp line between common
senseandspeculativereason.Therefore,inKant’sview,Mendelssohnfostered“the
completedethronementofreason”byJacobi.
Kant defines the notion of orientation starting from its original geographic
meaning:thefourcardinaldirections,orthefourpointsofthecompass,aredeter-
minedbythesunrise(soloriens).Butalreadyinhisearliertreatiseonthedifferenti-
ationbetweendifferentregionsinspace,OntheUltimateGroundoftheDifferentia-
tionofRegions inSpace (VondemerstenGrundedesUnterschiedesderGegendenim
Raume,1768),Kantcameacrosstheproblemofright-left-distinction.Thelattermay
appearself-evident,butthereisneitherasensorynora logiccriterionforthisdis-
tinction:onecanneitherperceivenordefinerightand leftwithoutentering intoa
circularargument.Therefore, thedifferencebetweenrightandleftconfusesKant’s
basic determination of cognition as a synthesis of sensory perception and logical
thinking.AsKantstatedelsewhere,thedistinctionofrightandleftis“givenwithout
being understood” (dari, non intelligi). One can only learn to distinguish between
rightandleftbypracticingthisdistinction.
74
Beingcaught inthisquandary,Kanttriestofindawayout inhis1786treatise
on orienting oneself: he allocates the distinction between the four cardinal direc-
tions(andwith it theright-left-distinction) to “feeling.”Yet,onedoesnot feelany-
thinginemployingthisdistinction;rather,thisdistinctionisalsoa“subjectiveprin-
ciple”fillinginwherethe“objectiveprinciplesofreason”arenotsufficient.Toorient
oneselfisapreconditionintheusageofreason.
Reason,arguesKant,realizesthis“shortcoming,”whichinturninducesafeeling,
namelythe“feelingofneed.”Thisistheneedtoorientoneself.Thereby,reasonloses
its supposed autonomy and turns into aneedy reason. Here, reasonhas no longer
“freeinsight.”Instead,therightofsubjectiveneedwringsfromita“precondition”:a
“rational faith based on reason” (Vernunftglauben) rather than “rational insight”
(Vernunfteinsicht).
The term Vernunftglaube (literally: “reason-faith”) is obviously paradoxical: it
combines twoalternativeconcepts,betweenwhich Jacobi letMendelssohnchoose,
inonesingleterm.Thistermisinherentlycontradictory;withthisparadoxicalterm,
Kantreplaces the termof ‘orientingoneself’ thathelpedMendelssohntogetby; in
doingso,heerasestheleewaywhichMendelssohnwantedtogainthroughtheterm.
Kantproceedssystematically:heabstractsgraduallyfromgeographicorientationin
whichright-left-distinctioniscrucial,movesontoso-called“mathematical”orienta-
tion inwhichpositional relationships independentof theright-left-distinctionpre-
vail,andfinallyreaches“logical”orientationinwhichallconnectionswiththespatial
are transcended. In thisway,Kant arrives in the realmof the supernatural,which
wasthe“battleground”offormermetaphysicsandwhich,inKant’spracticalphilos-
ophy,becomes“thereignoffreedom”(sec.12).Here,whereorientationhasneither
footholdsnorleewaysforconsideration,reason’s“right”to“orientitselfthroughits
ownneed”(orthroughtheVernunftglaube)getsachance.Themeaningoforienta-
tionmergeswiththepracticalcertaintyofreasonanditsobligationtomoralaction.
Kantdoesnotusethenotionof‘orientingoneself’intheremainingchaptersofthis
treatiseandinhislaterwork.Reasonshalltriumph,albeitparadoxically.
The pureVernunftglaube is understood as faith in a Godwho rewards human
effortstobecomeworthyofhappinessbymeansofmoralaction,atleastinatrans-
cendentimmortallife.Vernunftglaubeisnotaformofknowledge,butratherfaithin
an “ideal of pure reason”whose conceivabilityKant has clarified in hisCritique of
PureReason(sec.11)andwhosepracticalsignificancehehasdefinedinhisCritique
75
ofPracticalReason(sec.12):theidealofa“highestgood”inwhichGlückwürdigkeit,
one’sbeingworthyofhappiness, andGlückseligkeit, one’s factualhappiness,unite.
Yet, this ideal servesasamere instrument for “orientingoneself in thinking,”pre-
cisely in the contextofmoral thinkingandacting, as a kindof “guidepostor com-
pass.”Ithelpsustoabandonthethoughtofanyadvantageorrewardformoralac-
tion, but it is notmandatory. At the end of his treatise on orienting oneself, Kant
mainlycampaignsforamoralconceptofGodinordertoforestallreligiousenthusi-
asm or fanaticism.With this inmind, he argues that reasonmust remain autono-
mous:thisispossibleifreasonorientsitselfthroughitselfalonewheneveritfeelsa
needfororientation.
JOHANNGOTTFRIEDHERDER(1744-1803AD), sonofapious teacherandastu-
dentofKant’sinKönigsberg,reactedpolemicallytoKant’streatise.Herdersoonbe-
cameacquaintedwith themostbrilliantmindsofhisday;heheldhighofficesand
posts in ecclesiastical and cultural authorities, and became one of the strongest
stimulators of his day in the fields of linguistic and literary studies, philosophy of
historyandofculture.Ashewrites inThisTooaPhilosophyofHistory for theFor-
mation of Humanity (1774), hewants to betake himself to the open seaswithout
abandoningthepolesaroundwhicheverythingrevolves:truth,consciousnessofbe-
nevolence, and happiness of humankind (Wahrheit, Bewusstsein desWohlwollens,
GlückseligkeitderMenschheit);yet,hoveringatseaonmassivewaves,inghostlight
andfoglightthatmightbeworsethantheblackestnight,hewantsto“diligentlytake
a look at these stars that point theway and givedirections, safety,and calm,” and
then steer the ship’s course “with devotion and industriousness.” In short: Herder
wantstoorienthimselfatanendlessanddangerousopensea.
Infact,heleadsphilosophybacktothefieldinwhichtheproblemsoforienta-
tion are most pressing, and he deliberately seeks situations of disorientation –
though starting from secure certainties of orientation. On thisway, he develops a
newunderstandingofhumanitywhosepointofdepartureistheexistingvarietyof
culturesandnations.Thereby,Herdermoreandmoregivesupontheuniversalism
ofEnlightenmentthinking.Fromthispointofview, inhis lateworkUnderstanding
andExperience:AMetacritiqueoftheCritiqueofPureReason(1799),heitembyitem
settles a scorewith Kant’s transcendental philosophy,more embittered than pru-
dent,andthusnotalwayswithconvincingarguments.
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TherehealsoinsertsanoteconcerningKant’streatiseonorientation.Herder
initiallyremindshisreadersoftheoriginallygeographicsenseofthenotionof‘ori-
entingoneself’–asensefromwhichKantaimedtoabsolvetheterm:“toorientone-
selfmeanstofindthefourcardinaldirectionsinspace(Weltgegenden)fororienting
maps,sails,etc.”ThenHerdermarksamistakeinKantwherethere isnone:hear-
guesthatthefourcardinaldirectionsarepresentevenwhennobodypaysattention
to them,and thatonecanneitherdeterminenorchange themthroughbeingposi-
tionedtotherightorthe left; forthechangeablehorizonofasinglepersondoes–
accordingtoHerder–notchangethe“firmhorizonoftheworld.”Herderisrightin
presupposingthatthereisaworldinwhichwemustorientourselves;yet,thedis-
tinctionsbetweeneastandwestorbetweenrightandleftobviouslyaredependent
on the standpoint or position that one takes up in the world. The notion of the
‘standpoint’wasingeneraluseatleastsinceSpinozaandLeibniz;Kantusesitoften.
Inthisrespect,Herderfallsshortofinsightsalreadygained.
HerdercontinueshisnoteonKantas follows: “Already thenotion that Ican
orientmyselfinthinkingimpliesthatImustorientmyself,thatis,thattherearefirm
pointsinsidemeandoutsideofmyselfthatIhavetobringintoaccord.”Thisisright
insofarastheonewhohastoorienthim-orherselfcoordinatespointsofreference,
which attract attention in his situation, putting them together to neatly arranged
patternsthatmakesense forhimorher.Still, thesearenot firmpoints,butrather
preliminary footholds that can prove tenable or not. There are no unconditioned
pointsorthingsinourhumanorientation.Herderhimselfadmitsthiswhenidentify-
ingorientingoneselfwith“findingoutwhereoneisintheworldandhowitrelates
tousandhowwerelatetotheworld.”
Yet,thenagainheonlylooksattheothersidedetachingtheself-referenceof
orientationfromitsreferencetotheworld:“IfIonlyorientmyselfwithmyself,this
meansthatIthrowallpartsoftheworldintomeanddefinetheminaccordwithmy
idiosyncraticegoism,and in thisway, I canbeverydisoriented in the trueworld.”
Forsure,thedisconnectionoforientationfromtheworldanditsfootholdsresultsin
disorientation. However, it is precisely the meaning of orienting oneself that one
doesnotdisconnectoneselffromtheworldanditschanges,butratherremainscon-
stantlyattentivetothem.Herder,bycontrast,drawsanabsurdconclusion,whichis
coherentonly forhimself: “WereI toorient theworldbymyself, Iwoulddisorient
theworldasIrevolvearoundmyself,orasIfeeldizzy.Theegoismorientingworlds
77
cannotendupotherwisethan inthe formofaphilosophyofvertigo;hereone isat
one’swit’sendwithallcertainty.”Herderplayswith theequivocalnessof theGer-
manwordSchwindel,whichstandsfor‘vertigo’andfor‘fraud,’inordertoinsinuate
thatKantattemptedtodefraud.Kantdidnotgointothatanymore.
Mendelssohn, Kant, and Herder were not yet ready to pose the problem of
‘orienting oneself’ in its whole breadth and depth. Kant’s distortion of Mendels-
sohn’s philosophical concept of ‘orienting oneself’ and Herder’s polemics against
Kant’sownuseofthisconcepthavenotbeenabletostopthe‘career’ofthisconcept
inthehistoryofphilosophy,though;onthecontrary,itscareerhasbeenaccelerated
throughtheirdispute.
Thephilosophyoforientationowesitsbasicnotionof‘orientingoneself’toacon-
troversyabout ‘faithversusreason.’Themostwell-knownthinkers inGermany
at theendof the18th centurywere involved in this controversy: thecombative
Christian Jacobi attacked the considerate JewMendelssohn because of his de-
ceasedfriendLessing’sunderstandingofSpinoza,whichwassuspectedofathe-
ism.Mendelssohn, theprototypeof Lessing’sNathan theWise, sought to coun-
terbalancethesituationofcombatwiththehelpoftheoldgeographicmetaphor
ofthecrossroads,animageofpausinginordertoorientoneself.Fromthis,Kant
extractedthenotionofanunconditionalVernunftglaube,throughwhichreason
orientsitselfintherealmoftheextrasensoryorsupernatural.
Herder, who with his philosophy of language, history, and culture went
beyondthescopeofaphilosophyshapedbyrationality,criticizedKantandre-
claimed the notion of ‘orienting oneself’ for the sensoryworld.Due to the fact
thatthenotionof‘orientingoneself’wasatthecenterofahistoricalcrisisofori-
entationthatwasaggravatedbypersonalpolemics,thisnotionbecamesoprom-
inentthatitsoonwonthroughinphilosophy,thesciences,andeverydaylifeand
gainedacceptanceintheformofthenoun‘orientation.’Theconceptoforienta-
tionhasthenforalongtimebeentakenforgranted,whichisthereasonwhyno
oneconsideredelucidatingitevenmore.
78
14.AlternativeSurveysofKnowledge:TheEncyclopedias
byd’Alembert&DiderotandbyHegel
Whatisatstakeinorientingoneselfisnotonlytofindone’swayinacertainsitua-
tion,butalsotoobtainalong-termorientation–throughknowledge.Philosophersin
Franceinthesecondhalfofthe18thcenturywantedtoprovideasurveyofallavaila-
bleknowledge,alsoinordertopreparedemocracyandthegreatesthappinessofthe
greatestnumber.AFrenchgroupofpublishersgavethetaskoftranslatingandex-
tendingtheEnglishtwo-volumeCyclopaediaorUniversalDictionaryofArtsandSci-
encesbyEPHRAIMCHAMBERS(1680-1740AD)toDENISDIDEROT(1713-1784AD)and
JEANLERONDD’ALEMBERT(1717-1783AD). Inthecourseofthreedecades,between
1751 and 1780, these two volumes grew into 17 volumes of texts, 11 volumes of
plates,5supplementaryvolumes,and2volumescontainingindices.Allofthesevol-
umesconstitutetheEncyclopédieouDictionnaireraisonnédessciences,desartsetdes
métiers,parune sociétédegensde lettres, inEnglish:Encyclopedia, oraSystematic
DictionaryoftheSciences,Arts,andCrafts.Thisencyclopedia,whichwasworkedout
inacollaborationbetweenthebrightestmindsofFrenchEnlightenment,isratedas
the greatest achievement of French Enlightenment. In Germany, GEORG WILHELM
FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770-1831 AD) alone created an encyclopedia in the form of a
philosophical “system” thatdevelops and justifies itself on its ownaccord, theEn-
zyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. This Encyclopedia of
PhilosophicalSciencesinBasicOutlinehassetthehigheststandardinphilosophically
orderingandjustifyingknowledgeandmakingitsurveyable.
Probably it was the humanist and librarian at the French royal court,
GUILLAUMEBUDÉ(1468-1540AD),whointroducedtheterm‘encyclopedia.’Thisterm
combinestheGreekwordsenkyklios(enclosinginacircle)andpaideía(education);
justastheGermanwordBildung,itcomprisesboththeprocessandtheobjectofed-
ucation.TheFrenchenlightenersofthe18thcentury,whocalledthemselvesplainly
les philosophes (i.e. the philosophers) and their own times siècle philosophe (i.e. a
philosophicalage), integratedknowledgefromthesciencesandtheartsandcrafts.
Theeditorsof thisencyclopediawenttotheworkshopsof theworkers inorderto
receiveprecisedescriptionsoftheircrafts,tools,andmachinesinthepropertermi-
nology. According toDiderot, until thenmostworkers just followed their instinct,
79
but did not understand their machines; they work spontaneously and intuitively,
attending to the immediate situation. The Encyclopédie also describes routines,
whichguideordinary,artisanal,and technicalworks.Beingdescribedbyconcepts,
they can be comparedwith otherworks and thus be refined. The comprehensive
viewof all availableknowledge is supposed toprovideorientation in the senseof
creatingnewpossibilitiesofaction.
TheFrenchEncyclopédieistheresultofacollaborationofFrenchauthors(so-
ciétédegensdelettres), includingexpertsfromdifferentfieldsandtheleadingphi-
losophers of the day, among them as diverse thinkers as Montesquieu, Voltaire,
Rousseau,andd’Holbach.Manyofthemmetregularlyincafés,salons,theaters,edi-
torialoffices,andFreemasons’lodges;someofthembecamefriends,andallofthem
triedtoinfluencethemediaoftheirtimes:newspapers,stages,bookmarkets.Every
oneofthemwasanindependentthinker,yettheyorientedthemselvestowardeach
other.Asaconsequence,theFrenchEncyclopédiedidnotcomeintobeingontheba-
sisofknowledgethatequallyobligatedeveryone,butratherinthemodeofmutual
orientation.
Thatwhichconnectedthegroupofauthorswasfirstandforemostanantago-
nismagainsttheCatholicChurchinsofarasittriedtocontrolthepublicopinionby
imposing censorship. Voltaire called the group franc-penseurs, the free thinkers.
They constituted something like an intellectual scene that was in touch with the
highestsocialcircles.Despiteimpendingpublicationbansandincarceration,allau-
thorsenjoyedthebenevolenceoftheFrenchchiefcensorandofabsolutemonarchs
likeFrederickII.ofPrussiaandCatherineII.ofRussia.
Hence,theEncyclopédiespringsfrompersonalorientationswithoutanyinsti-
tutionalrestrictions.Theresponsibility for itwasnotplacedinasuperordinate in-
stitutionlikeanacademy,auniversity,oragovernmentaldepartment,butratherin
theeditors’hands:later,whend’Alembertvacatedhispositionbecauseofconstant
attacksontheEncyclopédie,Diderottookthetaskalone.Againstthewilloftheedi-
tors,onlythepublishersintervenedsometimesinordertopreventpublicationbans.
The editors complemented each other beautifully, although they were very
differentpersonalities.D’Alembert,illegitimatesonofacardinalandamarquise,an
outstandingmathematicianandphysicist,authoredarticlesmostlyfromthesefields.
He also authored the Preliminary Discourse of the Encyclopedia (Discours Prélimi-
nairedel’Encyclopédie),whereheinacalmandstraightforwardmannerexplicates
80
thecommonphilosophicalorientationofthewholegroupofauthors.Hewashighly
recognizedandbecamegeneralsecretaryoftheAcadémiefrançaiseforlife.Diderot,
instead, similar to Rousseau,withwhom hewas friends, led a dissipated life that
lackedanycleardirection.Tothedislikeofhisfather,amasterknifemaker,henev-
er lived in a stableposition,was temporarily imprisonedby the censors, followed
variousinterestsandgainednumerouscontactsandfriendships,whichhelpedhim
torecruittheauthorsfortheEncyclopédie.Hehadplentyofloveaffairs,fromwhich
hisfrankliteraryproductionbenefited.
Diderot’s thought was meandering, experimental, self-ironic, and he loved
paradoxes;heloathedstreamlinedrationalsystems;hewasvigilantagainstabsolute
claims, appreciated dissidents, and had the strength to leave things undecided.
However,duetohisbroadsphereofinterest,hegainedthereputationofbeingable
tooverlooktheknowledgeofhisdayandmakeitusefulforthegeneralpublic.Inthe
Encyclopédie,hefoundthetaskofhislifeandtheholdforhislife.Inthiscontext,he
workedconcentratedandaccordingtoschedule.
Hefacilitatedtheotherauthors’interestsandorientationsindeliberatelygiv-
ing them leeway for shaping the content and style of their articles on their own.
EvenhithertounknownresearchthattheauthorsoftheEncyclopédiehadconducted
forotherpurposes,wasallowed toappear.Theeditorsdemandednothingbutex-
actness,clarity,brevity,andoriginalityofeveryone.Thelatterrequirementwasdue
to the fact thatThe Comprehensive Universal Lexicon of All Sciences and Arts (Das
GrossevollständigeUniversal-LexiconAllerWissenschafftenundKünste),publishedin
1732-1754bytheGermanbooksellerandpublisherJOHANNHEINRICHZEDLER(1706-
1751AD), repeatedlywas accused of plagiarism.However, theEncyclopédie could
notavoidborrowingandadoptingsomearticlesfromothersources,forinstancethe
oneaboutorienter,s’orienter.
A large-scale endeavor like theEncyclopédie runs into the paradox that the
intendedsurveyofallup-to-dateknowledgegetslostagainduringthelongtimeof
preparation.Diderotstatedthat“ithasbecomenearlyasdifficulttofindone’sway
inalibraryasintheuniverse.”Forthisreason,asecond-ordersurveybecamenec-
essary:asurveyofthesurvey,andwithitanewself-referentialorientation.TheEncy-
clopédiecreatesitinafivefoldway:
(1.) Firstly, through thealphabetical order of the articles. Fordictionaries, it
datesbacktoAntiquity.Yet,thealphabeticalorderisnotmandatory,foradictionary
81
couldalsobestructuredaccordingtowordfamiliesortofactualcoherencies.When
itcomestoencyclopedias,structuringthemaccordingtofactualcoherencieswould
bemoreobvious;here,thealphabetizationmeansrandomization.Theobjectiveco-
herenciesthatreallymatteraredissolvedand,attheirplace,anartificial,buteasily
achievableoverview isestablished;hereintheEncyclopédie followsoneof therules
ofDescartes’method(sec.9).Thearbitraryalphabeticalorder iseasyto learnand
fulfills thebasicneed fororientation: toquickly find information for a certainpur-
poseinacertainsituation.Thedecisionforthealphabeticalorderisadecisiononthe
wayoforientation:forfastfindingofknowledgeandagainstfactualcoherences.
Thisdecisionismomentous,forthealphabeticalorderenforcesthefragmen-
tationofknowledgein‘articles’(literally:smalllimbsorlinks)inwhichinformation
is condensed and abbreviated by a headword or catchword that shall capture or
channelattention.Diderotdiscussesindetailhowthefactualinterrelationshipsare
brokendowninthiswayintodifferentarticles.Atthesametime,the lengthofthe
articlesmustbe limitedsuchthattheycanbereadin limitedtimebecausethehu-
mancapacities fororientationcanonlygraspa limitednumberof informationina
limitedtimeframe.Theoverviewmustnotgetlostintheindividualarticles.Inaddi-
tion,thelengthofthearticlesmustcorrespondtotheimportanceofthesubjectmat-
ter, which becomes difficult if their authors have a huge leeway, as every one of
themconsidershisorherknowledgetobethemostimportant.Diderotreflectsthis
in detail, too. As there is no general law of how to produce an encyclopedia, he
thinks that specific virtues are demanded of the editor: power of judgment (juge-
ment), richnessof ideas (esprit), and thepenetrationof thematerial (pénétration),
that is,specificcapacities fororientation.Diderotalsodemandsaestheticsconcern-
ingthearticles:monotonyandboredomshouldbeavoidedasfaraspossible.
(2.) As descriptions and definitions hardly suffice in regard to handicraft
gadgets, and since they evenmight confuse the readers, the Encyclopédie supple-
mentsmanyarticleswithimagesandillustrationsthatshallhelpthereaderstocon-
structandoperate theappliances inquestion.As the illustrationsmustbe labeled,
theproblemof the rightnumberof orientingguideposts and roadmaps arises. For
Diderot, it isenoughtohaveguidepostsatplaceswhere travelersare indangerof
losingtheirway:“Wedidnotwanttolooklikeamanwhowouldplantguidepostsat
everysteponaroad,forfearthattravelerswoulddeviatefromit:itisenoughthat
therearesomeguidepostsattheplaceswheretravelersareatriskofgettinglost.”If
82
therearetoomanyguideposts,hints,andfootholdsfororientation,onelosestrack
ofthem.
(3.)However, ina schematicgeneaology (arbregénéalogique), theeditorsof
theEncyclopédie trytoprovideanoverviewofthefactualcoherenceandinterrela-
tionof the articles.D’Alembert&Diderotheredivide theunderstanding (entende-
ment) into memory (mémoire), reason (raison) and imagination (imagination); to
memory,theyascribethehistoryofthecraftsdevelopingthroughtradition,torea-
son the sciences and to imagination the arts. After every keyword, theymark its
placeinthebranchesofknowledge.Yet,theyfreelyconfessthatotherdispositions
and systems would also be possible andmeaningful. A genealogy as such cannot
countasknowledge,butonlyasaprovisionalorientationaboutpossible factualco-
herencesinthesphereoftheknowable.
(4.) All the more significant becomes the internal concatenation (enchaîne-
ment)ofthearticleswiththehelpofreferences(renvoie).AsDiderothasit,concate-
nation transforms thewayof thinking (la façon communedepenser): “In scientific
treatises,theconcatenationofideasorphenomenagovernsthemethodologicalpro-
cedure; to theextent thatonemakesheadway, the themedevelops,generalizesor
diversifiesdependingonthemethodoneprefers.”Inordertodiscoversuchconcat-
enations,onealsoneedsspecificcapacitiesoforientationlike,forinstance,powerof
combination (esprit de combinaison), a sure feeling (instinct) if not genius (génie),
andinallofthis,oneneedshonesty(honnêteté)andcourage(courage).This isthe
casebecausethereferencesgrantampleleewaysandmultipleoptionsofinterpreta-
tion:theymayaimatthingsorwords,atnearbyordistantthings,oratdifferentas-
pectsofathing.
Over timeawidespreadsystemof referencesemerges.Diderothoped thata
properuseofsignswouldeventuallyenableconcatenationsjustaspreciseandtran-
sitionsjustasswiftasinmathematics.Plausibility(laforcedeladémonstration)in-
creasesinaccordancewiththedensificationofrelations(rapports,liaisons);ultimate-
ly, theencyclopedicorder(l’ordreencyclopédique) lies in theefficiencyof itsrefer-
ences,whichalsoshowsgapstobefilled.Whenevernewarticlescomeinaddition,
the editormust check anew the ‘parcours’ of references he established andmake
surethattheydonotatanyplacegraspatnothing.Inthisway,theencyclopedicor-
dercanbeimproved–untilitbecomesunsurveyable.
83
(5.)DiderotdedicatesaspecialarticleontheEncyclopédieintheEncyclopédie,
therebyprovidinganoverviewabouttheoverviewwithintheoverview,correspond-
ingtohoworientationaboutasituationtakesplaceintheverysituationinquestion.
Diderot’sarticlecontainsnotsomuchahistoricalandsystematicaccountof‘theen-
cyclopedia’ as a statement of accounts from thework at the present encyclopedic
project.Diderothereprovidesaphilosophyoforientationinanutshell.Alreadyinhis
Prospectus,hedescribestheorientationthattheEncyclopédieissupposedtogiveas
“aliteraryjourneyaroundtheworld[...]withoutgettinglost.”Expressedinourlan-
guage, one has to stick tomere clues that appear everywhere, under themost di-
verseconditions:“ifthereareanyfootholdsonthisseaofobjectsthatsurroundsus,
footholds like rocks that seem to pierce the surface and tower above other rocks,
this is onlydue toparticular systems, to vague conventions, and to certain events
thatareoutsidethephysicalunderstandingofbeingsandtothetrueachievements
ofphilosophy.”
InhisarticleontheEncyclopédieintheEncyclopédie,heemphasizesthisonce
againandaddsthat“thegenericencyclopedicorderis,asitwere,amapoftheworld
[…],thedetaileddescriptionofalltopics,thewellthoughtoutuniversaltopography
ofallthatwhichweknowintheintelligibleandthevisibleworld;andthereferences
serveasroutesbetweenthesetwoworlds,wherebythevisiblecanberegardedas
theoldworldandtheintelligibleasthenewworld.”
At the same time, oneneeds ideas regarding the goals of one’s research, i.e.
ideasof“firstandgeneralreasons”or,inshort:a“metaphysicsofthings,"whichcan
givedirectiontoonewhileoneisgropinginthedark,departingfromaccidentalbe-
ginnings.Inhisthirdcritique,theCritiqueofJudgement,Kantcalledthem“regulative
ideas”;wecallthemvanishingpointsoforientation.Yet,these“metaphysics”maybe
shapeddifferently:“Thewriter,thescholar,andtheartistleadthewayinthedark-
ness; when theymake progress, this is due to fortuity; they reach the goal like a
travelerwhohasgoneastrayandthengoestherightwaywithoutknowingthathe
doesso.”DuetothespiritofEnlightenment,onone’swaytothegoalonemustnot
just follow authorities, but also keep in sight the reasons forwhyoneprogresses,
and onemust remember one’s doubts – one has to distinguish between certainty
anduncertainty.TheEncyclopédieasawholeisorganizedasaneventoforientation.
Thethreestellar ‘Germanidealists,’ JOHANNGOTTLIEBFICHTE(1762-1814AD),
FRIEDRICHWILHELMJOSEPHSCHELLING(1775-1854AD),andGEORGWILHELMFRIEDRICH
84
HEGEL(1770-1831AD),donotwanttoleaveitatphilosophycollecting,testing,and
orderingknowledgeabouttheworld.Theywanttosecureanunconditionalandtrue
knowledge that from the very start includes knowledge about God. Thereby, they
drawontheapriorideterminationsthatKant,inhisself-referentialcritiqueofrea-
son,hasworkedoutasnecessaryconditionsforobjectiveknowledgeandmoralac-
tion.Fichte,Schelling,andHegelbringthesedeterminationstogethertoa“doctrine”
or“system”of“philosophicalscience”thathasitsowntruth.SinceKanthasexclud-
edtherecognizabilityofthingsastheyareinthemselves,andtherebyalsotruthin
thetraditionalsense,Hegelstates inhisEncyclopediathata“stateofdespair”, that
is:akindofphilosophicaldisorientation,hasentered,whichneeds toberemoved.
That this ispossible throughreason’s self-reference is thekeypointof theGerman
idealists.
ForFICHTE,whooriginatedfrompoorcircumstancesandyetbecametherec-
torofthenewlyfoundedBerlinreformuniversity,reason’sself-referenceisthegate
tothat“reignoffreedom”thatwasamatterofinsightforRousseauandamatterof
the‘ought’forKant(sec.12).AlreadyforDescartes(sec.9),theself-referenceofthe
“Ithink”consistsinthinkingbeingperformed;forFichte,itisamatterofaction,of
thedeedorfact-act(Tathandlung):itisnotapre-givenobjectofknowledge,butra-
ther knowledge that the “I think” itself produces, and thus an unconditional
knowledgethatcannotbewrong.Fichtearguesthatthewholetheoryofscienceor
epistemology(Wissenschaftslehre)mustbuilduponthisknowledge. Itneedsnoat-
tentiontotheempiricalworldandthe individualityof the“I.”Fichtecomprehends
the“I”amereself-distinctionfromthe“non-I.”Ifoneappliesthisdistinctiontothe
distinction between “I” and “non-I” itself and so on, more and more knowledge
comes intobeing. In thisway,Fichtepreparedapurely constructive theoryofdis-
tinction.Thefactthattheconstructivelyprogressivefact-actofdistinctioncreatesits
own realm may have encouraged Fichte to always appear courageous and com-
bative,forinstancetoresolutelyraisehisvoicefortheFrenchRevolutionandlater
tofightjustasresolutelyagainstNapoleon’sruleoverEurope.
SCHELLING, already as a child conspicuously talented, was reared in an es-
teemedSwabianfamilyofpastors;intheTübingerStift,hestudiedProtestantThe-
ologytogetherwithHölderlinandHegel,andthroughGoethe’sintercession,hewas
appointedprofessorofphilosophyinJenaalreadyasa23-year-old. Inhis longlife,
Schellingpassedthroughavariedandinfluentialacademiccareer.Hewasatutorof
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Bavarian princes and finally became the successor of Fichte’s successor in Berlin,
namelyHegel.FollowingSpinoza(sec.9),heurgedtokeepnatureinmindinthedis-
tinctionsoftheself-referential“I”inordertomakenatureconceivableinthespirit
andthespiritinnature.Forthesamereason,heunderlinedtheunityoridentitythat
is eitherpresupposedorbroughtaboutbydistinctions.Asnotall things innature
canbediscernedconsciously,Schellingprobedintoaphilosophicalconceptionofthe
unconscious.ThereinheconvergeswiththeGermanromantics.
With hismost highly developed technique of distinction, his “dialectic” (sec.
15), HEGEL created the leading model of a self-contained system of philosophical
knowledge.Inthissystem,hewasabletobringallphilosophicalfieldsthatweredis-
cussedinhisdayaswellasallimportanthistoricalandcontemporaryphilosophical
positionsintoacoherentnexus,whichremainedconvincingfordecadestocome.He
expoundedthisnexusinhisEnzyklopädie,thephilosophicalalternativetotheEncy-
clopédieoftheFrenchenlightenerswhosepointofviewHegelalsointegrated.
Hegel’sacademiccareerwasslower thanSchelling’s.Grownup inaSwabian
family of civil servants and having studied theology in Tübingen, heworked as a
hometutor;thenhemovedtoJenabecauseofSchelling’s intercessionandcollabo-
ratedcloselywithhim.InNapoleoninvadingJena,hesawthenewspiritofthetime.
Hebecame themanaging editor of a newspaper inBamberg, the rector of an aca-
demichighschoolinNuremberg,andfinallyaprofessorofphilosophy,firstinHei-
delberg,theninBerlin.LikeFichteandSchelling,Hegelwasmarriedandhadseveral
children.
In 1801, Hegel started his publications with a comparison of Fichte’s and
Schelling’s philosophical systems. He wrote that he felt the “speculative need” to
gainanewunityoutofdifference.Tothisend,heintroducestheconceptofcompre-
hension(Begreifen),understoodascognizingcognitionorself-referentialknowing.In
thisshape,theprocessofcognitioncanhaveitsownunconditionaltruth.AsinPar-
menides(sec.2),thinkingandbeingturnouttobethesame.Inpositioningoneself
whollyonthesideof “speculative thought”andthemediationofconcepts thatare
independent of empirical evidence,Hegel from the outset excludesMendelssohn’s
andKant’squestionofhowtoorientoneself (sec.13). InHegel’sview,speculation
cancorrectcommonsense,butcommonsensecannotcontributeanythingtospecu-
lativethought.Inthereignoffreedomandtruth,theremustnotbeanyleewayorin-
determinationthatwouldrequireanykindoforientation.
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Hegeldoesnotwant to leave itatKant’spureandparadoxicalVernunftglau-
beneither.Rather,hewillfullycontinuestouseparadoxesor,asKantcallsthem,an-
tinomies,whichheturnsintoaprincipleofhistechniqueofdistinction.Heleavesbe-
hindthemereabstraction,i.e.themereomissionofdistinctions,forthesakeofever
more general and evermorehollow concepts throughwhich the concept of being
becomestheemptiestconcept;abstract“being”canbestatedofeverything,evenof
“nothing.”Spinozasublatedtheoppositionsbetweencauseandeffect,Godandna-
ture,partandwholebymergingthemintotheonedivinesubstancethatcontainsall
determinations in itself; in lieu of this substance, Kant placed the transcendental
subjectproducingallconceptualdeterminationsonitsown,eventhoughinspiredby
sensoryperception;Hegelnowsublatesthedistinctionbetweensubstanceandsub-
ject.Heusestheconceptof“system”inordertomakeconceivabletheunityofSpi-
noza’sdivinesubstanceandKant’s transcendentalsubjectasaunitythatproduces
itself.Onecanneitherimaginenorthinkthisunityabstractly;onemustgothedia-
lecticalwayofcomprehendingit.Andinordertodoso,oneneedsinstructions,one
needstobeorientedbyHegel–who,however,doeseverythingtomakethisprocess
look differently, namely in such away that the process of comprehending pushes
itselfforward.Theorientationthatseemstobecomesuperfluousinthecontextofphil-
osophicalknowledgeisneededagainonthewaytothisknowledge.
Inthefirstelaborationofhissystem,thePhenomenologyofSpirit(1807),He-
gel leads the individual out of its immediate situation and guides it to “absolute
knowing.” The individual departs from its “spiritless” and “uneducated point of
view”where itsconsciousness isnothingbut“sense-certainty”takingeverything it
perceives to be the real and true; underHegel’s guidance, consciousness becomes
aware of the fact that it is “self-conscious spirit.” Seeking formore certainty, con-
sciousnessexperiencesthatnewfootholdsturnouttobeuntenable,orthatonlythe
experienceofthesedisappointmentsiscertain.Thelattercontinuesuntilalldisap-
pointmentsaredealtwithintheprocessofcomprehension.Intheend,everythingis
clear;oneisfamiliarwithone’scertainties;oneisabletosovereignlydecidewhich
certaintyisappropriateinwhichsituation;andthisimpliesthatonecanorientone-
selfmasterfullyamongvariouscertainties. In the sovereignorientationof “absolute
knowing,”theneedfororientationdisappearsagain.Hegeloutlinesadialecticalway
thatleadstosovereignorientationthroughdisorientationandreorientation.
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Hegel’sEnzyklopädiewas first drafted for his pupils at the Nuremberg high
school.InHeidelbergandBerlin,heworkeditoutforhisstudents“fortheuseinhis
lectures”andreworkeditseveraltimesbeforehisdeath.ThetitleEnzyklopädieder
philosophischenWissenschaften im Grundrisse was already common in Germany. A
Grundrissisanoutlinethatistoprovideanoverview:Hegelwantedtogiveanover-
viewofthesystematicorderofphilosophicalconcepts.Beingitssingleauthor,hetried
toshowthathedidnotplayanyroleasaperson.
Hegelgivesanoverviewalreadythroughhistableofcontents,whichhecalls
an“indicationofcontents”(Inhalts-Anzeige).Thematerialsarenotregisteredinret-
rospectasinusualtablesofcontents;Hegelneitherleavesitatanapparentlynatu-
ralgenealogicaltreeofknowledge.Instead,hisencyclopediademonstratestheself-
differentiationoftheunityofphilosophicalknowledge,whichisasuccessionofphilo-
sophicalconceptsthatdevelopsitselfstepbystepatuptofivelevelsofdifferentia-
tion.Alllevelsaredividedintothreeparts,whichisduetothedialectic(sec.15).The
supremeandmostoverseeabledivisionisthatwhichconsistsofthefollowingthree
parts:TheScienceofLogic,ThePhilosophyofNature,andThePhilosophyofSpirit.At
the second level,The Science of Logic divides into the “doctrines” of being, of es-
sence, and of the concept itself;ThePhilosophy ofNature intomechanics, physics,
and organics; andThe Philosophy of Spirit into subjective, objective, and absolute
spirit.Atthethirdlevel,thesectionon“Theabsolutespirit”comprisesart,religion,
and philosophy. Hence, theway of comprehension leads to philosophy itself. It is
philosophy’s achievement to comprehend the entire systematic coherence of the
concepts throughwhichwe comprehend theworld. The system closes by leading
backtoitsbeginning,andphilosophyturnsouttobetheleadingscience.
Thedivisionof theEnzyklopädie into the threemainpartsmeans thatphilo-
sophicalthinkingfirstofallcomprehendsitselfinTheScienceofLogic,thoughnotin
aformallogicthatKanttakesasabasisforhisCritiqueofPureReason.Hegelinstead
developsalogicthatatthesametimeismetaphysics;forAristotelianlogiccanonly
beunderstoodinitscloseconnectionwithAristotelianmetaphysics.Thentheprob-
lemof the transition fromThe Science of Logic toThePhilosophy ofNature arises,
which is not immediately plausible and thus controversial: once one has compre-
hended(inHegel’ssense)thatbeing,asParmenidesthoughtit(sec.2),canonlybe
being-as-thought,thedifferencebetweenbeingandthinkingissublated.Thenthey
becomeaunityhavingthesamestructureasintuition,namelyimmediategivenness.
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Hegel calls thisunity the “absolute idea,” literallyan intuitionor representationof
thinking,which isabsolvedfromtheeffortsof thinking.Assuch, itappearsas“na-
ture.”
ThePhilosophyofSpiritcanthenbuildonThePhilosophyofNature:theHege-
lian“Organik”leadstothe“animalorganism,”whichinturnleadstothe“reproduc-
tive process” (Gattungsprozess). The “subjective spirit” begins with the “doctrine”
(Lehre)aboutthenaturalhumanbeing,i.e.with“anthropology.”Herefrom,the“spir-
ituality” (Geistigkeit) of the person emerges, thereafter the spirituality of social
structures, i.e. the law,morality, and the state. The “absolute spirit” embraces the
totalityofallstructuresthattranscendsociality,initiallyinworksofart,theninreli-
gious ideas,andfinally intheconceptsofphilosophy. Inthisway,theconceptsbe-
comemoreabstractandformahierarchyofsub-andsuperordinationsontheone
hand;buton theotherhand, theygraspbeing inevermorenuancedandcomplex
ways.Nowphilosophicalthinkingdoesnotonlyorientitselfmasterfullyaboutitscer-
tainties,butalsointherealmofbeingitself,whichconsistsofitsbeing-thought.
ThesectionsinHegel’sEnzyklopädiearenumberedparagraphs,whichcontain
a sequence of consequently successive steps of thought (altogether 577). Like the
articles of theEncyclopédie, the paragraphs can be read and thought trough inde-
pendentlyofeachother;forinstance,youcanlearnwhatisspaceandtimeorspirit,
morality, and civil society. But the paragraphs obviously belong to the systematic
totalityinwhosecontextalonetheycanbereallyunderstood.Thiscontextdispens-
eswithasystemofreferencesandwithmetaphysicalvanishingpointsliketheones
in the Encyclopédie. Still, occasional references can also be found in Hegel’s En-
zyklopädie.
HegelglossestheparagraphswithAnmerkungen,i.e.withnotesthataretypo-
graphicallydistinguished from the §§; afterhisdeath, therewere addedextensive
Zusätzeoradditions,carriedtogetherfromhisstudents’ lecturenotes.Theannota-
tionsandtheadditionsdobothoftenhelpusunderstandthepurelyconceptualcon-
nections in the §§; they can be short or long, and they give us hints pointing into
completely different directions. Inmost cases, the notes and additions are factual
remarks, often on current or previous scientific or philosophical discussions; now
andthen,misunderstandingsarewardedoff.Inthisway,thesystembecomescross-
linkedwithitsnon-systematiccircumstances.Thishappensinvariousways,without
systematic stringency.On thewhole, the annotationsmultiply the coverage of the
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Enzyklopädie – and threaten to, again,make it confusing. However, one is able to
concentrateontheparagraphsthemselvesduetotheclearseparationbetweenthem
and their annotations. Thus, crossing the borders of the system, theEnzyklopädie
createsagradedpracticeoforientation. It integratesthescholasticandtheworldly
conceptofphilosophypointbypoint,whileKantassignedthemtodifferentwritings
(sec.13).
Nonetheless,onemustsomehowenterintothephilosophicalsystem.Thatis,
onemustfindthewayfromtheindividualandempirical-scientificstandpointtothe
standpointofphilosophicalknowledge.Hegeloffersseveralapproachesfromdiffer-
ent standpoints (Standpunkte). The first is the aforementioned approach from the
“uneducatedstandpoint”of“sense-certainty”whichisexplainedinthePhenomenol-
ogyofSpiritof1807.Onthe“educatedstandpoint”of“absoluteknowing”orofThe
ScienceofLogic,whichHegelatfirstpublishedseparatelyin1812-1816intwovol-
umes, one proceeds from the insight that subject and object do not differ in true
knowledgetotheconcretephilosophyofnatureandofspiritintheEnzyklopädie.
Yet, theEnzyklopädie, the completed system, has its own Introduction.Here
Hegel starts from the ideas of religion andeveryday experience and the empirical
sciences. For him, they “incite” philosophical thinking altogether and convert the
accidentaltonecessity.Hegelexplainsthisasfollows:philosophyrelatestoexperi-
ence like eating to food: the former is there thanks to the latter, but it provesun-
grateful insofar as food is consumedby eating. In current terms: the environment
constantly irritates the autonomous system, and the system is motivated to inte-
gratetheenvironmentaccordingtoitsownconcepts.
AsHegelwrites in his Introduction to theEnzyklopädie, every philosophy is
duetoearlierphilosophies,thatis,tothehistoryofphilosophy.Hegel’sphilosophy
incorporateshistoryinsuchawaythatitrecognizesthestepsinhistoryasstepsin
hisownsystematicdevelopment;historyturnsouttobeasystematicprogresslead-
ingtomostrecentphilosophy.Hence,Hegelhasalsoportrayedhissystemasahis-
toryofphilosophy.
As a result, one can approach the system from one’s own individual stand-
point,fromthestandpointofreligion,fromthestandpointoftheempiricalsciences,
fromthestandpointoftheabsoluteknowledgeoflogic,andfromthestandpointsof
historicalphilosophies.However,onedoesonlyapproachthesystemifonehasthe
speculativeneed forphilosophical,unconditional,and trueknowledge.Conversely,
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thesystemisnotdependentonallthesestandpointsandapproaches.Hegelshows
thisby integratingtheminhisEnzyklopädie itself; thePhenomenologyofSpirit,the
ScienceofLogic,andtheHistoryofPhilosophybecome, inrevisedversions,partsof
theEnzyklopädie.Thelatterthusdisposesofapproachestoitself.
Still, theEnzyklopädie has, inHegel’s eyes, also a “standpoint” (Standpunkt).
HereHegel’smost famous sentence applies: “thatwhich is reasonable is real, and
thatwhichisrealisreasonable.”(wasvernünftigist,dasistwirklich,undwaswirklich
ist,dasistvernünftig.)Seenfromthestandpointofthe“uneducated”individualthat
observeshowitsworldconstantlychangesinmoreorlesschaoticways,thequoteis
nonsense;seenfromapoliticalstandpoint,thequoteisoutrageousbecauseitseems
to justify theexistingpolitical conditions, so thatonecouldsee thephilosopherof
the Prussian state in Hegel; yet, seen from the standpoint of philosophical
knowledge,thequoteistrue:simplybecause,inHegel’ssense,onecanonlyspeakof
‘reason,’‘reality,’and‘truth’ifonehascomprehendedtheminanunconditionalsys-
temofknowledge.Inthissystem,realityisreasonableandtrue.
It isno coincidence thatHegel’s systembeginswith the standpointofphilo-
sophicalthinkingbecausethecircleoftheself-referentialsystemreturningtoitself
has,strictlyspeaking,nostartingpoint;anystandpointisastandpointonlyfromthe
perspectiveofother, conditioned standpoints.Therefore, thebeginningof the sys-
temisnothingbutthedecisiontogetoneselfintophilosophyandtoorientoneself
by it. Yet, this is a decision. In the draft to his first Berlin lecture about the En-
zyklopädie,Hegelnoteddown:“Thedecisiontophilosophizecasts itself intothink-
ing like intoanendlessocean; all thebright colors, all the footholds (Stützpunkte)
havedisappeared, all the other friendly lights are extinguished.Only the one star,
theinnerstarofthespirit,shines;itisthepolarstar.”
Yet,Hegelisalsoawareofthefactthatphilosophyinevitablyisthephilosophy
ofacertainageandtakesthepointofviewofitsday.Healsowritesthatphilosophy
is“itstimecapturedinthoughts”andthat ithasbecometimeforphilosophytobe
elevatedtothestatusofscience.Hegelisnotasnaiveastobelievethatphilosophy
andtimewillendwithhisphilosophy.Sure,oncephilosophyhasachievedthetrue
philosophicalknowledgeinHegel’ssense,itwillnotbeabletodevelopitselffurther.
Buttimewillgoonandpassby.Afterhavingbeenintenselyefficaciousfordecades,
Hegel’sphilosophyhassimplybecomeoutdated.Fromvariouspointsofview,ithas
beendeclaredone-sided,incorrect,or“dead”–inmostcases,ithasnotbeenunder-
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stoodanylonger.Hegel’sphilosophyhaslostitsplausibilityinadifferentageorina
newsituation,withoutitbeingpossibletoadduceaclear,unambiguousortruerea-
sonforthat.Onehasorientedoneselfanew.
The philosophy of orientation finds alternativemodels of creating permanent
overviews of knowledge in d’Alembert’s & Diderot’sEncyclopédie ou Diction-
naire raisonné des sciences, des arts et desmétiers on the one hand, and in
Hegel’s Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse:
ZumGebrauchseinerVorlesungenontheother.
D’Alembert&Diderotprovideacollectionof scientific,artistic,andcraft
knowledgerelevant for thedevelopmentofall fieldsof society;aseditors, they
collaboratewithmanyotherauthors.Theyleaveampleleewayfortheircapaci-
tiesfororientation.Theystructureknowledgeaccordingtotheorientingprinci-
pleofrapidretrieval,i.e.throughanalphabeticalorderthatiseasytooverlook,
but in factarbitrary inregardto thesubjectmatter inquestion.Thisprinciple
enforces thedecompositionanddispersalofknowledge in (moreor less) small
articles.Thismakesa second-orderoverviewnecessary, i.e. anoverviewof the
overview: d’Alembert & Diderot try to create a schematic genealogy of
knowledge, a reference system among the articles, metaphysics as vanishing
pointforthesearch,andanoverviewoftheproductionofoverviewinaspecial
EncyclopédiearticlewithintheEncyclopédieitself.
InhisEnzyklopädie,Hegeloffersoppositiontotheattentioneconomyor-
ganizing theFrenchEncyclopédieasaprocessoforientation.Hegelcountson
the inner logicofasystemofphilosophicalconceptsdeveloping itselfoutof it-
self.Herethedialecticofconceptsistheorganizingprincipleaccordingtowhich
acomprehensive,reasonedandoverseeableunityofknowledgeiscreated.Hegel
aimstoenableunconditionalknowledgeinphilosophyandanindependentphil-
osophical truth. So, philosophy becomes sovereign and can fully follow its
“speculativeneed.”However,theneedfororientationarisesanewwhenitcomes
totheinterpretationofphilosophicalconceptsintheempiricalworldandtothe
approachoraccesstothesystemofknowledgefromdifferent“standpoints.”He-
geltakesthisintoaccount,too,throughagradedpracticeoforientationwithin
thesystem.However,hetherebycreatesanewparadox:thesystematoncepre-
supposesorientationandrendersitredundantinsublatingitdialectically.Hegel
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knows that the standpoint of his philosophy can only be a standpoint in time,
that it isdependentonnon-philosophicalorientation,and that theorientation
thathisphilosophyprovideshasitstimeaswell.
15.AlternativeCompositionsofKnowledge:
Hegel’sandSchleiermacher’sDialectic
Hegel’sdialecticwasalreadyinHegel’slifetimeconfrontedwithanalternative:one
thatstarts fromthe individual inneedoforientationandstayswith it,namely the
dialecticofFRIEDRICHDANIELERNSTSCHLEIERMACHER(1768-1834AD).Schleiermacher
wasa theologianand aphilosopher,who,on theonehand, implementeda radical
reformofProtestanttheology,whichheshapedformorethanacentury,and,onthe
otherhand,developedageneraloutlineof a realisticphilosophyoforientationon
thebasisofoneandthesamepivotal idea.BothHegelandSchleiermacherworked
with new, but alternative techniques of distinction. The meaning of Hegel’s and
Schleiermacher’svaryingkindsofdialecticisnotoriouslycontested;wetrytoclarify
itincontraposingtheiralternativetechniquesofdistinction.
Inhisdialectic,Hegel–likeFichte–setsoutfromthedistinctionitself inthe
formof ‘A iseitherXornon-X.’AccordingtoSpinoza’s formulaomnisdeterminatio
estnegatioquotedbyHegel,everydeterminationisthenegationofanother.Hence,
determinationsworkwithoppositesthatexcludeeachother;theyareexclusivedis-
tinctions.InthePhenomenologyofSpirit,thewayto“absoluteknowledge”(sec.14)
is away of negating all apparently certain determinations of truth; it leads to the
critical truthabout truth.Hegel labels this “wayofdespair” as “skepticismaccom-
plishingitself.”Hepresentsitasawayonwhichtheindividualispushedondespite
itself:a“necessarypassage.”Followingthis logic,which isnotpurely formal,para-
doxically,negationintheformofa“determinatenegation”bringsforthpositivede-
terminations.
Formallogicassumesthatconceptsretaintheirmeaningwhenbeingconnect-
edwitheachother.Therefore,theycanbeabbreviatedasformalsignslikeAandB.
Already Aristotle, the father of this logic, proceeded like this.Mathematics,which
doesnotknowanysemanticshiftsofitssigns,restsonthisassumption.Yet,infact,
conceptschangetheirmeaningwhentheyaretiedtogether,arguesHegel.IfIsayof
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arosethatitisred,thisisnotanabstractred,butratherthisveryspecificredofthat
concreterose,hardlydeterminable in itsnuances;and therosedeterminedby the
propositionofbeingred,isnotjustanyrose,butpreciselythisrose,whichisdeter-
mined such and such. In this respect, formal logic has an antinomic, paradoxical
premise:indeterminingitsobjects,itdeprivesthemoftheirdeterminations.
Thisparadoxcannotbeavoided,butonecanmakeitfruitful,whichHegeldid
throughhisdialectical logic. Itsaysthat, indistinguishinganobjectvianegationof
onesideof thedistinction,anewdeterminationemerges; yet, thereby thedistinc-
tionitselfchanges;thatiswhyitisnecessarytoalsodeterminetheunityofthedis-
tinctionaccording towhich thedetermination ismade.Subsequently, theobject is
determined inanewandricherwayandbecomespartofa largercontext, though
notsimplythroughabstraction,butratherthroughaconceptemergingfromthede-
terminatenegation.
Thesimplestexample is theonewithwhichHegelhimselfbegins inTheSci-
enceofLogic,thedeterminationofbeing.As‘being’canbestatedofabsolutelyeve-
rything(everything thatexists issomehow,andbe itasamere ideaor invention),
‘being’ itself cannot be determined by anything; thus, its determination is also its
negation:‘nothing.’Itfollowsthat‘being’immediatelytransitionsinto‘nothing,’and,
asmentionedabove,of ‘nothing’onecanalsosaythat it ‘is’(‘it isnothing’). ‘Being’
and ‘nothing’are,paradoxically,atoncedifferentiatedandnotdifferentiated.They
haveonethingincommon:theytransitionimmediatelyintoeachother.Theunityof
their distinction is becoming: ‘being’becomes ‘nothing,’ and ‘nothing’becomes ‘be-
ing.’Thenotionof ‘becoming’ abolishes theparadox, for in ‘becoming,’ ‘being’ and
‘nothing’areatoncepreservedanddisappear,or,asHegelputsit,‘being’and‘noth-
ing’are“sublated.”
However,theunityof ‘becoming’includesanewparadoxbecause‘becoming’
enduresanddisappearsincessantly.ForHegel,itis“anunstableunrestthatcollaps-
es into a calm result.” Its paradoxical determination can only be preserved if the
paradoxis,inturn,abolishedbyanotherdetermination:thebeing-there(Dasein)of
something(Etwas)thatcanbethiswayorthatwayortransformitself–withever
newparadoxespushingaheadthe“necessarypassage.”
Another,easilyaccessibleexampleisthenotionoffamilyinthechapterabout
“ObjectiveSpirit” inHegel’sEncyclopedia. In the family,naturally grownmoral life
(Sittlichkeit)canbedeterminedasfollows:allfamilymemberstrytrustfullyandlov-
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inglytodojusticetotheindividualneedsoftheothers.Itbelongstothisnaturalde-
terminationofthefamilythatitmultipliesitselfinthisspirit.Yet,whenacertainde-
greeofmultiplicationisreached,thefamilymembersdriftapartandlosetheirnatu-
ralattachments.Inthisway,thefamilyentersintosociety(Gesellschaft)andthereby
intoanothersystemofneedssatisfaction:thecompetitiononmarketsbasedonthe
divisionoflabor,wherethenaturalvalueofthingsandtheconsensualparticipation
inthemgetslost.Everythingbecomesware,commodity,merchandise(sec.12,17),
andthemorallifeofthefamilyisnegatedbyanopposedmorallife.Yet,thisalsohas
an advantage: societal needs satisfaction is regulated by the state, which thereby
createsahigherandricherSittlichkeit.Boththefamilyandthecivilsocietyaresub-
latedinit.
ThecomparisonoftheseexamplesshowsthatthemethodofHegel’sdialectic
cannotbeformalized(forinstanceintheschemethesis–antithesis–synthesis),but
israther,asHegelsays,“theparticularmethodofeachsubjectmatteritself”;thede-
terminatenegation takesplace in a peculiarway in every situation, dependent on
themeaningsoftherespectiveconcepts.AndyetisitHegel’sclaimthatthedetermi-
natenegationtakesplaceina“necessarymovement”oftheself-referentialconcept
of the concept,whichmeans: an exclusively self-determined and insofar uncondi-
tioneddetermining-itself-further of the initial determinationof being.To this end,
thePhenomenologyofSpiritpresupposesanindividualconsciousness,whichdiffer-
entiatesitselfassubjectfromitsrespectiveobjects,orwhichdifferentiatesitscon-
ceptsfromthingsexistingbythemselves.Thesubjectobservesstepbystephowits
determinationsbecomeparadoxicalandhowtheparadoxesaredissolvedagainby
new concepts. Then, inThe Science of Logic and theEncyclopedia of Philosophical
SciencesinBasicOutline,thedistinctionbetweenconceptandobjectissublated,and
theself-referentialconceptoftheconceptmovesaheadbyitself.
However,Hegel researchhasevinced that thepathof this conceptualmove-
mentrestslessoninternalnecessitiesthanonparticulardecisions.Thetransitions
arenotwithoutanyalternative;rather,themeaningsoftheconceptsuseddepend,
asHegelhimselfpointsout,on leeways: “oneandthesameword”canbeused“for
twoopposeddeterminations.”Forexample, “becoming” (Werden) caneithermean
an incessantgenerationandcorruptionor the steadycontinuationof thisprocess;
theGermanwordAufheben can equallymean “to cease, to put an end to” and “to
preserve.” Within the semantic leeways of such words, different movements are
95
possible, for instancealternativesubsumptionsofpreviouslyopposedconcepts. In
thisway,movementcanbeclassifiedasresting(inthesenseof‘restingatacertain
placeineachmoment,’asZenon,astudentofParmenides,pointedout),andnecessi-
ty as freedom, and vice versa. Which path is taken must be decided, seemingly
throughtheself-referentialmovementoftheconceptoftheconcept,yetinfact,itis
decided by the author arranging this movement. The apparent necessity of the
movementarises through theresolutenessof theauthor,whoclings to thealready
achievedremovalof therespectiveparadoxes.That is,hedrawson thepreviously
accomplished conceptswherever this ismeaningful, butheno longer regresses to
thelesscomplexones.
ThetransitionsHegelcreatesrequiretheartofcombination,asurefeelingor
intuition, ifnotgenius– justasDiderot’sreferencesbeneaththelexiconentriesdo
(sec. 14). For the readers, dialectical developments first become plausible if the
nameofthenewconceptismentioned,whichisusuallyfamiliar,i.e.obtainedfrom
the previous everyday orientation and thus immediately understandable, but now
becomes relevant in its significance for the coherence of the system.According to
Hegel,wethinkinnames,andeventheapparentlypurelyself-referentialconstruc-
tionisthereforealsoareconstructionthatreferstootherthings,persons,andcom-
monly used concepts. The familiar names are the footholds of a pre-orientation
withoutwhichonecannotunderstandtheargumentationoftheEncyclopediaandits
dialectic.
SCHLEIERMACHER, sonofapastor, raisedaPietist,distancedhimself fromPie-
tism,workedaspreacherandprofessorat thenewly foundedUniversityofBerlin.
Hehadahugepublicinfluence.HecreatedthetranslationofPlatothathasbeenau-
thoritativeuntiltoday.Hewasmarried,verysociableandhighlyesteemedalsoasa
humanbeing.HemovedintheBerlinsalonsofintellectualsanddefendedascandal-
ousnovel justashedefendedtheemancipationoftheJews.Heachievedaffluence,
united the Protestant churches in Prussia, developed a progressive educational
movement,hadnumeroussuccessfuldisciples–andcompeted fiercelywithHegel.
This competition increased in his disciples. Schleiermacher’s philosophy, inwhich
he follows Spinoza, is similarly broad in scope asHegel’s, but deliberately not de-
signedasa system.Schleiermacher, aGerman idealistof another fashion, sparsely
interestedinpolemics,wantedtoleadKant’scritiquebacktolifeinsteadofconclud-
ing it through a system. In thisway, Schleiermacher came across the basic condi-
96
tionsoforientingoneself. Just likeFichte,heregularlyusedthenotionoforienting
oneself,butdidnotyetturnitintoatopiconitsownandneitherdevelopedhisthe-
ologyandphilosophyonthebasisofthisnotion.HegelandSchleiermacherdidnot
engageinadeeperphilosophicaldispute.
InhisSpeechesonReligionof1799(authoredlongbeforeHegel’sPhenomenol-
ogyofSpirit),SchleiermacherbeginswitharevolutionoftheunderstandingofGod:
insteadofbeingabletocomprehendGod,Godisexperiencedinthe“feelingofabso-
lutedependency”(Gefühl schlechthinnigerAbhängigkeit,asheput it inaphrasehe
coined later). The phrase “feeling of absolute dependency” is a deliberately non-
religious formulation designating religion. With this phrase, Schleiermacher ad-
dressestheundeniablefactthatone–despiteofallfreedomofthoughtandfreedom
of choice – all around remains dependent on circumstances and processes in the
worldfromwhichonecannotfreeoneself,butwhichoneexperiencesstronglywith-
outbeingable toput them intowords.Thisdependencycan,butneedsnotneces-
sarilyberelatedtoGod,whetheritbeaSpinozisticall-embracingorapersonalGod.
Thus,theascertainmentofthisdependencyisatthesametimeaphilosophicalbasic
statement,acourageousreorientationalso inphilosophy:Schleiermacherassumes
thefundamentalcontingencyorsituativityofallhumanthought,decision,judgment,
and action,which one can never understand completely, let alone comprehend in
Hegel’s sense; andone cannever freeoneself from this contingencyor situativity.
Seenfromaphilosophicalperspective,thefeelingofabsolutedependencyisthebasic
moodoforientationinviewofincessantlychangingsituations.
Asafeeling,itisthefeelingofanindividual.ForSchleiermacher,theindividual
is and remains the locus and the basis of all possible knowledge. Involved in the
conditionsoftheworldthatitcannotoverview,theindividualisforitselfasincom-
prehensibleasisGod,anditcanonlytoalimitedextentexpressitselfbythemeans
oflanguage.Schleiermacher’sdialecticproceedsfromthispointofdeparture,which
isalso,thoughinawhollydifferentmanner,thecoreofhisphilosophy.Helectured
aboutitagainandagainonthebasisoffewfootholdsinordertocontinuouslyenrich
it with new insights in vivid talks. In this literary form Schleiermacher’s dialectic
couldremaininflux;firstafterhisdeathwasitwrittenoutindifferentversionsand
editedasabook.Inthisformitcontinuedtobeinflux.
InKant,dialecticwasconceivedasaflawedformofthinkingorreason’slapse
intoillusions,whichappearsinevitablywhenreasondoesnotheeditscriticallimits
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andwhichcanonlyberectifiedthroughcritique.InHegel,dialecticbecameameth-
odofleadingtheself-referentialcritiqueofreason,andinthiscontext,thedialectical
methodacquiredaconstructivemeaning.Schleiermacher,bycontrast,drawsonthe
Platonic senseof dialectic anddefines it as “the art of holding talks in the field of
pure thinking” (kunstmäßige Gesprächsführung im Gebiet des reinen Denkens); he
bindshisdialectic to thedialogueamong individualswho canonly strive forpure
thinking, but unlike Kant and Hegel, he does not presuppose it. Schleiermacher
thereby radically questions the principles of knowledge or, if there is no definite
knowledge,ofknowledgeacquisition.Onemustalwaysstartfromthepremisethat
thereis“materialforundiscovereddispute.”Seenfromtheperspectiveoftheindi-
vidual,itisrealistictoassumethat“arbitrarybeginnings”arepossibleinallfieldsof
knowledge.
However,knowledgethatisconvincingalsoforothersemergesfirstwhenitis
broughtintosystematicshape,withoutithavingtobeasystemàlaHegel.Ifthecon-
ceptsthatindividualsputforwardshallconvinceothersandthuspossiblyturninto
generallyvalidknowledge,theseconceptsmust(incurrentterms)beconsistent,i.e.
compatible with each other; coherent, i.e. interrelated; and consequent, i.e. to be
brought intoa logicalorder. Inshort: theymust just fit togetherandsupporteach
otherinaway.Inphilosophy,thisdoesnotresultinabsolutelycertainknowledgein
Hegel’ssense;thereonlyremains“beliefinknowledge”(GlaubenandasWissen).In
linewiththisbelief,knowledgecanalwaysremaininbecomingandthereforemove
withthetimes.
AccordingtoSchleiermacher,too,the“construction”ofknowledgeworkswith
distinctions.However,heunderstandsdistinctionsotherwise:notasexclusive,but
ratheras inclusivedistinctions;hespeaksof “negative”and“positive”or “relative”
opposites:plausibledistinctionsarecontrasts.Theoppositesofacontrastmustbe
containedineachotherinordertorefertoeachotheratall,justasthehumanbeing
onlyishumaninthespecificcontrasttotheanimal(orforreligiousthinkersincon-
trasttoGod),andjustasawomanisawomanonlyinthespecificcontrasttoaman,
andtheNorthPoleistheNorthPoleonlyinthespecificcontrasttotheSouthPole.
Parmenides’(non-)distinctionbetweenbeingandthinking(sec.2)issuchaninclu-
sivedistinction–acontrastinwhichbothsidesemergefromeachotherandarenot
distinguishable from outside. The unity of a distinction, which, in Hegel’s view,
‘jumpsoutof’andexits thenegationofadetermination,must, inSchleiermacher’s
98
view, already implicitly be contained in it. For this reason, Schleiermacher under-
standsoppositesas “poles”ofadeterminationbywhichone “orientsoneself”; fol-
lowingtheexampleofAristotle’spracticalphilosophy(sec.5),everydetermination
ofobjectsmoveswithintheleewaysofsuchpoles.Thus,determinationscanalways
remainprovisional, i.e. theycanandmustbedeterminedfurther innewsituations,
andthegeneralthatresults fromthem, issomethinguniversalonlyforthesakeof
orientingindividualswithindividualstandpoints.
Schleiermacher appraises the contrasts between being and thinking, nature
and reason, the real and the ideal, individuality or particularity (Eigentümlichkeit)
andidentityorcommunality(Gemeinschaftlichkeit)assuchpolarities.Thefactthat
the respective sides never occur ‘purely’ prevents their dogmatization and their
turningintometaphysicalopposites. Inthisway,Schleiermacher’sdialectic iscriti-
cal.Itsconstructivesideisthoughtwiththehelpofthepolarityof“chaos”(asmate-
rial of construction) and the “highest substantial force” of shaping this chaos; the
shapingorstructuringitselfisinturnconceptualizedwiththehelpofthepolarityof
practical“organizing”(Organisieren)andthetheoretical“discerning”(Erkennen)or
“symbolizing” (Symbolisieren),whichcannotbeseparated, since they intertwineat
alltimes.Seenfromatheologicalperspective,thepolarity“chaos”and“highestsub-
stantial force”(inSpinoza’ssense)aswellasthepolarity“fate”(understoodasthe
incalculabilityofoccurrences)and“providence”(understoodastotalpredictability)
can serve as divine names. Here God is understood in the context of pre-defined
leeways. Later on, the paradoxes or polarities involved here have become usual
techniquesofapproachingGodandtheworld.
Such equipped, Schleiermacher’s philosophy has substantially prepared the
present philosophy of orientation. The acquisition and composition of knowledge
movebetweenpolaritiesinan‘oscillatingprocedure,’sothattheconceptformation
cando justice toevernewsituationsandconcept constellations.Thereby thecon-
ceptsare continuallyadjusted to theobservedobjectsand theobservationsofob-
jectstotheconcepts.ThesameappliestoHegel’sdialectic.However,Schleiermacher
maintainsthatknowledgeacquisitiondoesnotworkwithfixedconcepts,butrather
with always preliminary ‘schemata’ that leave leeways for the choice of linguistic
fixation and thus also for displacements. Kant had introduced the notion of the
scheme as an auxiliary termmediating concept and intuition; for Schleiermacher,
this notion becomes central in the construction of knowledge. In the processes of
99
oscillation, skepticismon theonehandand imaginationon theothergetachance,
too.
For Schleiermacher, the individuals’ need to get around to a general
knowledge that is valid in their living together is, ultimately, an ethical need. The
differencebetweentheoreticalandpracticalphilosophyis,inhiseyes,notanexclu-
sive,butratheran inclusivecontrast; the twocoalesce ina theoryofhuman living
together. Schleiermacher constructs the coexistence of individuals, too, through
crossingthepolaritiesoforganizingandsymbolizing,andofindividualityandcom-
munalidentity.Four“relativespheres”ofcoexistenceensue:(1)thecommunal,for
everyone identically organized,world of communicating and socializing (Verkehr)
whosemostimmediateareaofeducation(Bildungsgebiet)isthebodyoftheindivid-
ualandthegreatestthejointlyinhabitedworld;(2)theindividuallyorganizedworld
of conviviality, friendship, and hospitality, which lives on mutual recognition
(Anerkennung)andopening-upoftheindividuals(Aufschließung)intheirindividual-
ity;(3)thecommunal,foreveryoneidenticallysymbolizedworldofscienceinwhich
signs are used as unambiguously as possible; and (4) the individually symbolized
world of art and religion. The “relative” spheres aremutually dependent on each
otherwithouttherebeingahierarchyamongthem.Inthecurrentsociologicalsys-
temstheory,theyaretakenasfunctionalsystemsofsocietalcommunication.
ForSchleiermacher,justas(later)forNietzscheand(stilllater)forRorty,phi-
losophyisanartbeforeitcanbecomeascience.Philosophycanbebasedonrules,
but these rules require individual skills. Thus, in contrast to what Hegel tried to
makeusbelieve, it ismadeclear thatphilosophy– justasanyotherscience–can
neveracquireanydefiniteknowledge,sinceallknowledgeacquiredunderthefactu-
alconditionsofknowledgeacquisitioncanbecontestedagainorsimplybecomeob-
solete. But in philosophy, the differentiation between art and science (or, as one
would say today with reference to Thomas S. Kuhn: between revolutionary and
normal science) is only an orienting distinction. So, manifold scientific and philo-
sophicalsystemscansubsistafterandnexttoeachother.Progressioninknowledge
isalwaysprogressionviewedfromastandpointthatonecanchange.
To thinking as such, one can neither ascribe universal validity according to
Schleiermacher, since thinking occurs in various forms and in different languages,
andsince italsodiffersdependingonindividual livingconditions.However,differ-
entlanguagesandindividualstandpointsinknowledgeacquisitionarenottobeex-
100
ecutedanddeleted;rather, inSchleiermacher’sopinion, theyenrichknowledgeac-
quisition–andhumanorientationasawhole: even thealignmentwitha focuson
universalvalidityisonlyonepossibilityoforientationnexttoothers.Thequestionis
then:whocanconvincewhominwhatcasewithwhichargument;whoisinterested
inwhose thoughtsandmessages;andhowcanonedecideabout this fromcase to
case?Schleiermacherheredistinguishesbetween(1)“commercial”thinking,which
is directed to utility and power, (2) “artistic” thinking, which inspires others, but
leaves them free in their decisions, and (3) “pure” thinking, which – like Hegel’s
thinking–initselftriestoreachsomethingsteadyandfirminknowledge.Inallcas-
es,thinkingisanethicalhandlingof“foreignthinking,”anditis“signofamorelim-
itedmind”ifitseekstoinsistonitself.
Thephilosophyoforientationhas,inHegel’sandSchleiermacher’srespectivedi-
alectic,alternativemodelsofhowapermanentoverviewoforientationcanbe
achievedthroughknowledge; furthermore, ithasalternativemodelsregarding
theconstruction(Aufbau)ofknowledge.BothHegelandSchleiermacheraddress
alternativesasanissue:Hegeldoessobyconstrainingtheleewaysofalternative
trainsofthought,Schleiermacherbyexpandingthem.EventhoughHegel’sand
Schleiermacher’svocabularymaytodayappeartobecumbersome inmanyas-
pects, it can still advance the philosophy of orientation as awhole. Taken to-
gether, Hegel’s and Schleiermacher’s philosophies outline the leeway between,
ontheonehand,theidealofhumanorientation,andtherealityofhumanorien-
tationontheother.
Hegel’s dialectic, the logic of “the movement of the concept” that takes
place as a “determinatenegation” of everynewdetermination or definition of
theconceptofthinkingandbeing,or:ofthetruth,workswithgradualstepsin
creatingandovercomingparadoxes;inthisway,itmustnotfendoffcontradic-
tions,butcanmakethemfruitfulforasovereignorientation.However,Hegelob-
fuscatesthedecisionsthattherebycanbemadeinonewayoranother–tothe
benefitofatarget-aimed“necessity”withwhichthemovementoftheconceptis
meant to close itself into a self-explanatory and self-substantiating “system”
withoutanyalternative.
Schleiermacher,bycontrast,reckonsfromtheverystartwiththefactthat
conceptscanbedeterminedinalternativeways.Tothisend,healsodevelopsa
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newtechniqueofdistinction thatproceedsnot fromexclusive,but rather from
inclusivecontrasts,inwhichtheoppositesalreadycontaineachother;thatisto
say,heproceedsfrompolesinsteadofnegations.Theleewaysorscopesthatthey
extendarealreadyimpliedinthem.Intheoscillationbetweenconceptualpoles,
humanorientationcandecideineveryconcretesituationabouttheappropriate
determination;yet,thelatterremainspreliminary,i.e.,innewsituationsnewde-
cisionscan(orhaveto)betaken.Accordingtothecurrentstateoftheart,hu-
manorientationindeedseemstoworkinthismanner.
102
III.Postmodernity
The alternative constructions of knowledgewe sawwithin German Idealism have
broughtphilosophical thought inanewsituation:Hegelprovidesthebroadestand
deepestphilosophicalaccesstotheworldaswellasthemostconsequentdifferenti-
ationandthemoststableindependenceofphilosophicalthought.Inintegratingthe
historyofphilosophical thought inhissystemand justifying it throughhissystem,
heinthemostsuccessfulmannerabsolvesphilosophicalthoughtfromthesituativity
and temporality ofwhat happens in theworld. Therein philosophy lives up to its
highestaspirationandgainsthegreatestprestige;philosophyappearsastheprom-
iseofguidingtheorientationofhumankindthroughsystematicallyreasoneddefini-
tions of concepts. In themidst of spectacular political upheavals in Europe – civil
revolution, regicide, nationalwars of conquest and liberation (so-called battles of
nations),politicalreformsandmonarchicalrestauration–philosophyofferedrelia-
bleorientationintheformofHegel’sencyclopediaandtheoptimisticcertaintythat
theworldwouldfinditstrueorderinthenearfutureifitlistenstothespirit.
Schleiermacher’salternativetheologyandphilosophy isno lessoptimistic than
Hegel’s.Yet, inthetraditionoftheology,Schleiermacherdrawstighterlimitstothe
powerofthinking.Accordingtotheformulaof“thefeelingofabsolutedependency,”
which ismeant to be religious, but can also be understood in non-religiousways,
thinking,too,isdependentonsomethingthatisnotatitsdisposalandthatitcannot
conceptualize definitively and neither shape spontaneously. Schleiermacher keeps
alivetheawarenessofthesituativityalsoofallphilosophicalthought.Thelattercan
nonetheless,withappropriatenewdistinctions,conceiveofthesituativityofhuman
orientationandalsoof the relocatabilityof its limits; it can integrate time in itself
withouttherebymakingitselfentirely independentoftime.Theparadoxicalsimul-
taneityofmasteringthesituationandtimeontheonehand,andofbeing-mastered
by it on the other, became the theme of the most courageous new beginnings of
philosophicalthoughtafterHegel;theyworkedthroughHegelwithoutalwaysmen-
tioningorrealizingit.
103
The later 19th centurywas characterized by new and unprecedented scientific
andtechnical,politicalandsocialchangesinEuropeandtheUSA,andbythe(first)
industrialrevolution.Thisrevolutionoccurredfasterandinterfereddeeperwiththe
conditions of living and the orientation of human beings than ever before; it re-
quired totallyneworientationsalso in thoughtand in the thinkingof thought.For
the sake of these orientations, new distinctions and techniques of distinction had
firsttobedeveloped.Theymoreandmoreabsolvedthemselvesfromtheformerly
highest ‘foothold’ofadivinegovernanceoftheworld,andtheyweremorecontro-
versialthaneverbefore.Therefore,onecouldlessandlessbecertainoftheseorien-
tations;philosophybecame,asNietzsche thencalled it, “experimentalphilosophy.”
Whilethephilosopherswhowerepermanentlyappointedasprofessorsatauniver-
sityinmostcasessoughttoextendandcombinethedesignsoftheirgreatpredeces-
sors–firstandforemostKant,Schleiermacher,Fichte,Schelling,andHegel–itwas
againthroughoutsiderswhooftendidnotknoweachotherthatvitalneworienta-
tionswereinitiated.Modernitywasdrivenfurtherintothatwhichwe,inthelackof
amorepreciseterm,forthetimebeingcall‘postmodernity.’Inpostmodernity,are-
valuationoftherelationbetweentheuniversalandtheindividualisinthemaking,
andwith it the insight that individualorientationprecedesall constructionsof the
universal.
16.AlternativesintheRevaluationoftheUniversalandtheIndividual:
EmersonandStirner,SchopenhauerandKierkegaard
Largely independentlyofeachother, thefollowing individualthinkers initiatedthe
resolute revaluation of the universal and the individual: RALPH WALDO EMERSON
(1803-1882 AD) in the USA, and ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860 AD), MAX
STIRNER(1806-1856AD),andSØRENKIERKEGAARD(1813-1855AD)inEurope.Emer-
sonandStirneraswellasSchopenhauerandKierkegaardsketchedoutcharacteris-
ticallydifferentpaths:thetwofirst-mentioneddidsoinrelationtotheindividuality
ofallthinking,thetwolast-mentionedinrelationtothelimitsofthinkingingeneral.
EMERSONoriginated fromaChristian familyofpreachers,butdistancedhim-
selffromspecificdenominationsandchurches.Hewaswell-traveled,alsoinEurope,
andlivedasafreeorator,writer,andpoet.Hecountedlessontheorythanonrhe-
104
toricalpersuasiveness.Hewroteessaysandmadecircularizedhisphilosophyper-
sonally through lectures, first and foremost via popular education in the so-called
lyceummovement.Hewasengagedpoliticallyintheabolitionofslaveryanddeliv-
eredtheeulogyatAbrahamLincoln’sfuneral.HewasthoroughlyeducatedinEuro-
pean,particularlyGermanphilosophy.Bybreakingconsciouslywiththetraditional
themesthatwerediscussedattheuniversitiesandinaimingatthepersonalconduct
oflife,i.e.orientationinlifequitegenerally,hefoundedanewanduniquephilosoph-
icaltraditionintheUSA.Thistraditionbeganwithhis‘intellectualdeclarationofin-
dependence,’assomecalledit.
Atthattime–justasinthebeginningsofGreekphilosophy–anewoptimistic
spiritofawakeningprevailedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica:newlandwasinhabit-
ed;soonexcellentuniversitieswerefoundedthere;thepoliticalindependenceofthe
USAwassuccessfullydeclared;acomprehensive freedomofreligiouspracticewas
created;theUSAliberatedthemselvesdemocraticallyfromtheestates-basedossifi-
cationsofEuropeansocietiesandgeneratedgreatpersonalitiesforstateleadership.
Onegraduallyexpandedone’slivingspacethroughconquestorpurchase,onedealt
withaconstantlydisplacedfrontier,coulddisposeofgoodfarmlandandrichtreas-
uresofthesoil,andoneexperiencedagrowingeconomicprosperity.Venturesome
immigrants, capitalism thatwas unimpeded for a long time, industrialization, and
the extension of the infrastructure in grand style prompted the hithertomost dy-
namicandmostsuccessfuldevelopmentofastateintheworld.Eventhoughtherule
ofconflictingparties,corruptionandmoraldeclinespread,eventhoughstrongso-
cialcontrastsandeconomiccriseseventuated,moralvalueswereplacedaboveeco-
nomic interests: in a severe civil war, the hard-won liberation of the slaves was
achieved. Inallareasof life,onewasattunedtocontinualreorientationanddevel-
opedroutinesofreorientation.
Emersongivesaphilosophicalexpressiontothespiritofincessantreorienta-
tion. His thinking,which is close to poetry, appears improvising, preliminary, and
fluid.Heworkswith concepts that leavewide leeways for interpretation andpro-
gression.Hemasterstheartofaphoristicabbreviationandtheessayisticunfolding
of far-reaching thoughts. Just as Nicholas of Cusa, Spinoza, and Schleiermacher in
Europe,hecapturescontrastsaspolesthatincludeoneanotherandcreateleeways
fordynamicconceptualdevelopments.Heoftenchoosesalternativeviewsandloves
paradoxes.He speaks less out of philosophical erudition thanhis ownpersonality
105
andlifeexperience;hedoesnotwanttoreservewisdomforscholars.HENRYDAVID
THOREAU(1817-1862AD)setsanexampleofthiswayoflife.
Without building on the concept of orientation itself, Emerson laysweighty
milestonesonthewaytoaphilosophyoforientation.AshestatesinhisspeechThe
AmericanScholar,heseeksa“nearerreferencetothetimeandtothiscountry.”“In-
steadofthesublimeandbeautiful,”heexploresandpoetizes“thenear,thelow,the
common.” He gives “the single person” a “new importance.” At the same time, he
stronglyintegratesthepersonintonature:natureflowsthroughhumanbeingsand
causesthemtospeak,tothink,andtoact.Assuchandasawhole,naturecannotbe
determinedtheoretically.Emersonexpressesthiswiththehelpofthenotionsofthe
“soul,”“over-soul,”and“God.”Insuch“transcendentalbeliefs,”theinprincipleidio-
syncratic and therein solitary standpoint of each one is always already connected
withthestandpointsofothers–withouttheneedoftheoreticaldefinitions.
Individualscan,likenatureitself,communicateimmediatelyinsignsandsym-
bolsthatneednofurtherdeterminationorexplanation.InNature,Emersonformu-
latesthisasfollows:“Iamnothing;Iseeall.”Thoughtisonlyfunctiontherein.Inthis
way,abasicattitudeofobserving,receiving,venerating,andobeyingarises,andthe
opennessfora“stairwayofsurprise.”Humanbeingssearchreassuranceinconcep-
tualdeterminations.However,identificationsandclassificationsarealwaysprelimi-
nary: “science is nothing but the finding of analogy, identity, in the most remote
parts,”asEmersonsaysinTheAmericanScholar.Everyonehashisorherownsight
ofprinciples;everyonecanmakethediversityofmeaningsfruitfulforhim-orher-
selfandbecreativeunderthespecificconditionsinhisorherownpresent–andthis
isnecessarybecausepracticalworkanddistressesforceourhand.Onemustdelib-
eratelyexposeoneself tounsettling.Over time, thecompulsion tocreativityoutof
adversityletsgrowhumanbeings’confidenceintheirownprogressandinthepro-
gress ofmutual understanding andpromotion of each other; in Emerson’swords:
humanbeingslearntotrustinvirtueandlove.Inourwords,whatgrowsistrustin
theability toorientoneself inregard toothers in lifesituations thatareuncertain
foreveryone.
The“genius”cangiveorientationtoothers;inhisorherorientation,thegeni-
uscancountoncompleteself-reliance.AccordingtoEmerson,single“representative
men”–personalities,philosophers,andpoets–setsignsforothers,i.e.footholdsto
whichotherscanadhereforthesakeoftheirownorientationandontheirowncon-
106
ditions.Yet, these footholdscannotbe theoreticallygeneralizedordogmaticallybe
predefined. Emerson describes such single individuals as complete human beings
whowiththeir lifecanexpressthewholeofnatureandhumanpossibilities. Inre-
gardtoreligion,theyfindGodinfindingtheirownmidpoint;therebyhighidealsof
truthfulness,clarityandsimplicitybecomelivedrealities.Emerson’s“representative
men”standoutdueto“courage”inmasteringdailyproblems.Courageisthemood
againstthecontrarymoodofanxiety.Inthepersistentinsecurityandendangerment
oflife,onemust,asEmersonputsit,“dayafterdayovercomeanxiety.”Knowledge,
custom, and reason may help; but courage also grows in repeated coping with
threatening situations, and in thisway, a “prophetic instinct that isbetter thanall
wisdom”develops,asEmerson lastlywrites inSocietyandSolitude.This is trust in
one’sownorientationabilities.
WithhisDerEinzigeundseinEigentumof1844(TheEgoandItsOwn,literally,
TheIndividualandHisProperty,alsoknownasTheUniqueandItsProperty),andits
motto“Nothingismoretomethanmyself!”(borrowedfromGoethe),STIRNERmarks
a philosophical extreme. He insisted radically and dogmatically on his claim that
everything,boththematerialandthespiritual,canultimatelyonlybetheproperty
ofindividuals–foronlyindividualscanrelatetosomethingelsefromtheirinevita-
bly individualstandpoint.StirnerstudiedwithHegelandSchleiermacher, livedun-
dernarrowcircumstances,committedhimselftothecircleofLeftHegelians,tookup
someoftheirideas,butalsoquestionedthem.Hehadtooncemorefaceprohibition
andpersecution,eventhoughheforphilosophicalreasonsdidnotparticipateinthe
politicalrevolutionthatwaspreparedalsoinGermanyinthetimesofpoliticalres-
tauration. Stirner translated, among other books, theWealth of Nations by Adam
Smith(sec.12).HehadtheworkDasWesendesChristentums(TheEssenceofChristi-
anity)byLUDWIGFEUERBACH (1804-1872AD) inmind,where the traditionaldeter-
minationsoftheideaofGodaredescribedashumanprojections,sothatthehuman
speciesitselfcanappropriatedivinity.Yet,Stirnertracesthehumanspeciesbackto
theindividual.Asasingleindividual,heappealstoothersingleindividualsincom-
mitted,pathetic,andpolemicalways.Initially,hecausesastir,andthenheisforgot-
tenforalongtime.Emerson’supbuildingkeynoteisinGermanynotconfrontedwith
anyother,morecriticalandmilitant,tonethanStirner’s.
Stirnerfightsagainsttheuniversalinsofarasitisbelievedtobesacrosanct,as
“holy.”Through the assumptionof something general oruniversal, the individuals
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expropriatethemselves,hebelieves.Thentheindividualsarereadytosubmitthem-
selvestosocietalandgovernmentalorderswithoutanyreservation,andtheycanbe
connectedandseparatedthroughdifferentgeneraltermssubsumingthem.Howev-
er,Stirnerthinksthatinallconstructionsoftheuniversal,egoismcontinuestohave
aneffect:throughgeneralterms,claims,andorders,humanbeingsshallbewonfor
somethingthatisintheinterestofcertainindividuals.Stirnerwantstofreetheego
from the fixation on such allegedly unconditional and unegotistical universalities,
andmakeapointof“egoism.”Forhimaswell,itistruethattheegoisnothingand
yetthereferencepointforeverythingelse;andforhimaswell,therearisesperfect
freedomofthoughtandactionandthecoerciontobecomecreative,alsoinregardto
conceptsforexistence.Hedoesnotwanttosimplyabolishthegeneraloruniversal,
whichwouldbeunthinkable,butrather,likeEmerson,allowonlyalimitedfunction
toit.Stirnerexpectedseriouslaborunrestinthenearfutureand,soonerorlater,the
breakdownofthestateasanorderofdependencies;thatiswhyhewasregardedas
adangerous“anarchist.”Intheremotefuture,however,heexpectedalifeofenjoy-
mentinsteadofalifeofsacrifice.
SCHOPENHAUERandKIERKEGAARDdonotfocusontherightandthestrengthof
individualthought,butratheronthelimitsofthoughtandthusofuniversalityalto-
gether. Their biographies showastonishing parallels. Both of them stemmed from
wealthymerchantfamilies,sothattheywereeconomicallyindependentalltheirlife
and not reliant upon the employment at a university; thus, they could distance
themselvesmore easily from traditional thought. Nonetheless, both of themwere
deeply rooted in tradition; on their own volition, they acquired a comprehensive
humanistic education.Bothof themwereheadstrong characters; they cultivated a
life that inmanyaspectsseemedstrange;manyanecdotestestify to that.Schopen-
hauer andKierkegaard appeared as knottedmaverickswith pronounced views; if
necessary, theywere ready todispute inpublic.Bothof themhadprecarious love
relations and shied away fromamarriage.Bothof thempresented theirmost im-
portantworkswhentheywerearound30yearsoldandfelttheydidnotreceivethe
recognitiontheydeserved;yettheydidnotlosecourageandcontinuedwriting.Both
KierkegaardandSchopenhauerresortedtopolemicswhenrationalesbecameprob-
lematic.Schopenhauer,at thattimea little-knownlecturerat theBerlinuniversity,
dared to compete openlywithHegel and failed; Kierkegaard, disappointed by the
BerlinuniversitywhereheattendedthelecturesofagedSchelling,competedinhis
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home town Copenhagen with the highly esteemed Copenhagen bishopMynster –
afterhavingbecomeapubliccaricatureinthecourseoffeudwithasatiricalmaga-
zine.
However, there are also conspicuous differences between Kierkegaard and
Schopenhauer:whileSchopenhauerearlyon (throughhismother, a successful au-
thorwhokeptasaloninWeimar)wasappreciatedbyGoethe,thehighestintellectu-
al authority of his day, Kierkegaard (who definitely loved the opera and theater)
was, like his old father, afflicted with melancholia. Schopenhauer was a staunch
atheistwhononetheless incorporated religiousdogmas like the one aboutheredi-
tarysininhisphilosophy,whereasKierkegaardwasajustasstaunchChristianwho
nonethelessstruggledagainsttheofficial,establishedChristendom,theChurchand
itsdogmas.
While Schopenhauer, in his philosophical authorship, clings to the literary
formofthetreatise(mostofhispopularAphorismsontheWisdomofLifeareminor
treatises),Kierkegaardinventsplentyofnewliteraryformsofwritingtoexpresshis
philosophical thinking; yet, in regard to religion, he cultivates devotional writing
called “upbuildingdiscourses.”With his clearly arrangedmainworkTheWorld as
WillandRepresentation,whichfirstbecamefamousafteraquarterofacenturyinits
secondedition,Schopenhauerbyand largeremainscaught in theold (particularly
Kantian)opposites,eventhoughherevaluatesthemresolutely.Kierkegaard,bycon-
trast, experimentswithin the short period of a decadewith new opposites as ex-
pressedinacascadeofworksrespondingtoeachother.Kierkegaard’sphilosophical
rankisrecognizedevenlaterthanSchopenhauer’s.
Intheirrespectivephilosophies,bothKierkegaardandSchopenhauerdethrone
self-aggrandizingreasononthebasisofafeelingofabsolutedependency.Asanathe-
ist,Schopenhauerregardsreasonasbeingdependentonablind,irrationalwillthat
instrumentalizesandpropelsreason;asaChristian,Kierkegaardregardsreasonas
beingdependentonthemoodofanxietythatisafraidofsin.Withouthavingknown
each other (Kierkegaard became aware of Schopenhauer at a late point of time),
bothofthemexperienceacontinual,unsettlingcompulsiontothink,whichreasonis
notabletosettleandappease.Inthisrestlessness,bothofthemrealizefundamental-
lyneworientationneeds,andbothofthemrelyonimmediatepersonalexperiences.
SCHOPENHAUERaddressesalsothebodilinessofthinking.Obviously,thebodyis
theorganofallcognition,theoriginofallideas,andthepointofdepartureofallori-
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entationintheworld.Thethinkingsubjectfindsitselfasabodyintheworld,beinga
partoftheworld;throughthebody,it isentangledintheworldandexposedtoits
influences.Thismeansthatthebodyisatonceaobservingsubjectandanobserved
object; thus, thesubject-object-distinction issuspended.Emerson, too,emphasized
thispoint.Yet,forSchopenhauer,thebodyis,firstofall,somethingthatincessantly
“wants to do” something, namely to live and to sustain and propagate itself; the
strongest testimony of thiswill is sexual desire,which has its bodily shape in the
genitals.Schopenhauerresolutelystoppedeuphemizingsexualdesire.
JustasEmersonintegratestheindividualinnature’scontinuum,Schopenhau-
erintegratestheindividualwillinauniversalwilltolive–whereitsuniversalityisa
naturalinsteadofaconceptualone.Inthisuniversalwilltolive,orjusttobethere,
hebelievestohavefoundthething-in-itselfthatKantvainlytriedtothink.Continu-
ingtothinkinKantiancategories,SchopenhauerturnstheX,whichwasabsolutely
unknowableforKant, intosomethingrealthatcanbeexperienced, infact intothat
whichismoststronglyexperiencedasreal.Thiswillcanbeexperiencedpreciselyin
the irrational being-driven of reason, and, according to Schopenhauer, this being-
drivendetermineshumanorientationintotal.The“blindwill”utilizesreasonasits
“tool”provoking“ideas”or“representations”(Vorstellungen)thatreasontakestobe
its own because it does not comprehend its own bodily causes. Therein Schopen-
hauerdiscoversanongoingplanlessself-deceptionandillusion;followingafamous
metaphor, “the strong blind one bears the seeing lamed one on his shoulders.” In
thisway, the human being never reaches the truth and cannot opt for it, because
evenbeforeonecandecideanythingconsciouslyandrationally,thewillhasalready
decidedon it.Schopenhauer’sresponseto thiscondition is therecourseto theno-
tion of orientation. He writes: “it is in the interest of the will that something is
thought at all, so that one is aswell-orientedaspossible for anyeventuality.”Yet,
thisorientation is stillkindofblind,andalsoSchopenhauerdoesnotelaborateon
thenotionoforientationitself.
In Schopenhauer’s thought, theblindwill is just as omnipotent asGod– yet
being unknowing, senseless, and planless instead of omniscient. This results in a
crucial change of mood in philosophical thinking: the idealistic “optimism” that
SchopenhauerwouldhavediscoveredalsoinEmerson’sphilosophyifhehadknown
it,giveswaytothedeep“pessimism”ofsenselesslybeingdrivenfromoneillusion-
ary wish to the next. In this context, Schopenhauer discovers the significance of
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moodsforphilosophy:in“theplayofthecontinuoustransitionfromthewishtoits
satisfaction,andfromthelattertotheformer”persistsonlythedisturbingchangeof
ideas. However, unlike Emerson, Schopenhauer does not experience this disturb-
anceasadynamic,butratherasanagonizingmalfunction,andtheso-called“clearly
consciousthoughts”asthemere“surface”ofanunclearandunconsciousstreaming.
LikeEmerson,Schopenhauerobservesthattheconsciousprocessofthoughtisme-
andering,floating,fragmentaryandsubjecttoshiftingmoods,andheregardsthisas
an “essential imperfection of the intellect”which requires to “orient oneself” ever
anew.Thinkinglacks,forSchopenhauer,firmfootholds.
Schopenhauer’s declaredpessimism, thenearlyunbearablemoodof just be-
ing-there,ofanexistencethatknowsthatitisledbyablind,meaning-andpurpose-
lesswilltolive,causeshimtocultivateideasofwhichhecanhardlyknowwhether
they are tenable, although he pretends to do so. Devaluating (1) life as a whole,
Schopenhauerconcedes(2)aneedforredemptionfromit,whichistobefulfilledby
thePlatonicideasinwhich“theonlyimmediateobjectivity”ofthewillappears;to-
gether with Kant’s thing-in-itself, these ideas shall constitute “the two great dark
paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of the Occident.” The Platonic ideas
shall, inturn,becometheobjectof“pure”representationand, inthisway,stabilize
representation (Vorstellung) over against thewill; the power of thewill shall end
here and turn the “negation of thewill to live” into the “affirmation of thewill to
live.”Thesemetaphysicalhypothesesshallmakeconceivable(3)acalm,“contempla-
tive”philosophicalknowledgeofthenexusofideas,whichSchopenhauerclaimsfor
himself.
Inthisway,philosophicalinsightacquiresalsoinSchopenhauer(4)anewre-
ligiouscharacter:infollowingtheurgeofthewillinitsneedforredemption,philos-
ophybecomes,asSchopenhauernoteddown,the“truegospel,”namelythegospelof
“fatalism.”JustlikeEmerson,SchopenhauerfindsconfirmationofhisideasinIndian
Buddhism;bothof themdeliberately crossed thebordersofEuropeanphilosophy.
Yet,Schopenhauerbuildsethicsoncompassion,understoodasthecommonsuffer-
ingfromthewill,andinthisway,hefightsagainstmoralidealization.Moreover,he
praises(5)art,particularlymusic,asthe“quieting(Quietiv)ofthewill”andempha-
sizesitspoweroftransfiguration.Musicis,forhim,animageofthewillinwhichthe
will can calm down. Therefore, “the true philosophy”would be “a perfectly right,
complete, and detailed explanation of music.” Last but not least, Schopenhauer
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maintainsthathisteachingliberates(6)fromthefearofdeath,forinsufferingfrom
thewill,deathcomesas“grace.”
Graceistheforgivenessofguiltthatcannotbeundonethroughone’sowndo-
ing.ThedisbelieverSchopenhauershowsthedeepestappreciationforChristianity’s
“greattruth”of“hereditarysin.”Inhisview,Adamsymbolizestheaffirmationofthe
willtolive,andChristitsnegation,theredemptionfromthiswill.Ultimately,thisis–
forSchopenhauer–alsothetruthofphilosophy,the“transitionintotheemptynoth-
ing.”The latter isnotanabsolutenothing,whichwouldbeunthinkable,butrather
thenothing intheworldof ideas, the“nirvana”ofBuddhism,whereSchopenhauer
finds “that peace that is higher than reason.” Although Schopenhauer’s pessimism
wasforeigntoAmericans,hewasreceivedas“GermanBuddha” inthefieldofphi-
losophy,particularlybythetranscendentalistsfollowingEmerson.
InKIERKEGAARD, the anxiety of faithbeing afraidof sin corresponds to Scho-
penhauer’s disturbance caused by the blind will. Kierkegaard’s philosophizing is
bornebyChristian faith, but it is in nowayoptimistic. Seen fromaChristianper-
spective,sinisfreedomvis-à-visGod,thepossibilityofmissingGodduetowrongdo-
ing.AsGod’swillisconcealedtohumanbeings,theymustassumethatthispossibil-
ityisalwaysalreadyactuality.God’swillisnotblind,buthumanbeingsareblindfor
it,andtotheextentthattheyknowthis,theyliveintheanxietyofperishinginsin,at
least if they takeChristian faith as seriously asKierkegaard. Seriousness does not
consistincomprehendingsininHegelianterms.AccordingtoKierkegaard,onecan-
notdojusticetosinbycomprehendingit;onthecontrary:thetheoreticalstanceto-
wards sin is frivolous and reckless because it provides an apparent foothold and
creates a pervertedmood. The latter turns into earnestness only in acting, i.e. in
fightingagainstsin.
Inhisreligiousapproach,Kierkegaardobservesthatallconcepts,notonlythe
conceptofsin,acquireanewmeaningiftheyareusedinanothermood,forinstance
inhumor.However, thisaspect isoverlooked intheoreticaldeterminationsofcon-
cepts.Themood isthemostsituative, futile,andincomprehensivefeatureofthink-
ingand,likeoptimismandpessimismforSchopenhauer,atoncethatwhichpropels
andguidescomprehension.InKierkegaard’sview,too,thinkingisherestretchedto
itslimits.Yet,incontrasttotheblendingwillinSchopenhauer,Kierkegaardiananxi-
etyisrevealing: itclairvoyantlydisclosestheeffortstoconceal it.But justasevery
calmingsatisfactionofthewillagainrevertsintoanewunsettlingwillingforScho-
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penhauer,forKierkegaardeverycalmingofanxietyturnsintoanewanxietyofthe
constantly returning anxiety.Anxietybecomesdespair that cannotbe tranquilized
anymore,and this is thebasic situationof thehumanbeingbeforeGod:aperma-
nent, sometimesmore, sometimes less conscious vertigo, which – like the will in
Schopenhauer–turnsintohabitualdisorientation.
AnxietyanddespairareKierkegaard’sgreatreligiousthemes,whichencroach
on psychology and philosophy. Anxiety and despair can neither be appeased by
thinkingand itsuniversalitiesnorbysomeredeemingmetaphysics inwhichScho-
penhauerindulgedhimself.KierkegaardunsettlesChristianfaiththroughphilosoph-
icalthinking,andviceversa,andinthisway,headvanceswithgreatstridesthedis-
coveryofconditionsandpossibilitiesforhumanorientation:
(1) Thinking, which is habitually exposed to moods, becomes a passion for
Kierkegaard;itlosesthemasteryoveritself.
(2)Themoodsof anxiety anddespairmake all thingsquestionable and am-
biguous.Conceptsbecomemeresignsthatcanalwaysbeunderstoodinonewayor
another.InChristianfaithàlaKierkegaard,thisappliesfirstandforemosttoChrist
himself:heactsasthe“God-man”withoutanyonebeingabletoseeanddefinehim
assuch;heappearsincognito.Philosophically,thesignis,accordingtoKierkegaard,
thecontradictionof“negatedimmediacy”:italwaysmeanssomethingotherthanit
is(otherwiseitwouldnotbeasign).However,onecanonlyinterpretsignsthrough
signs, in amoveof “double reflection” that also allowsdoublemisunderstandings.
Thus,signsconfrontuswiththechoiceofwhetherwewanttobelieveinthemornot.
Assuch,theyremainaperpetual“offense,”andthisisexactlywhatChristwantedto
be,accordingtoKierkegaard,foronlyinthiswaycouldhepreventdogmaticdeter-
minationsofChristianfaith,whichsootheandreassure,whereasChristianfaithre-
quiresustoexisttroubledandconcerned.
(3) Logically, theoffense is theparadox. Kierkegaard turns theparadox into
thebasicfigureofthoughtinordertoconfrontthinkingwithitstrueexistence.Itisa
logicaloffenseornuisancethatoneshallbelieve insin inordertobe forgivenand
redeemedfromdespair.TheannoyingparadoxopensupChristianityandclosesitat
thesametime.Logicalthinkingcanrefutetheparadox,butitcannotdissolveitand
thusitcannotevadeit;ingettingannoyedattheparadox,onepreciselyshowsone’s
interest in it. Philosophy is always facedwith a paradoxwhen it shall understand
how the supratemporal,withwhichneither theological nor philosophical thinking
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candispense,canbepresentintime.Itis,asKierkegaardputsit,“thehighestpara-
dox”ofthinking“thatitwantstodiscoversomethingthatitcannotthink.”Thus,the
paradoxexcitesthe“paradoxicalpassion”ofthought.
(4)ThetitleofKierkegaard’sbookTheConceptofAnxiety(1844)isparadoxi-
calaswell, insofarasthemoodofanxietydisturbsourconceptswithoutadefinite
conceptofanxietybeingavailabletous.Thesubtitle,ASimplePsychologicallyOrient-
ingDeliberationontheDogmaticIssueofHereditarySin,indicatesthathereditarysin,
whichprovokesanxiety,isnotanotionthatwouldbeimmediatelydogmatic;rather,
it ispresent inan indirectway, in the formofsimple footholds thatare implied in
severalotherperspectivessuchaspsychological,philosophical,andtheologicalper-
spectives. Inourcurrent terminology,onewouldalsosay,asKierkegaarddid, that
hereditarysinisapproachedinanorientingdeliberation.
Kierkegaard practices a deliberately confusing philosophical “authorship”
withthehelpofshiftingpseudonyms,behindwhichheisclearlyrecognizableas“edi-
tor”–andyet,hispseudonymsarenotidenticalwithhimself.Hispseudonymsare,
ashecalledthem,pseudonymsin“psychologicallyvarieddifferencesofindividuali-
ty.”Kierkegaardletsthemrespondtoeachotherjustasindividualsdo;heletsthem
interact. Subjectivity is reflectedbyanother’s subjectivitywithout this resulting in
objectivity.All themoreso,as thepseudonymscreate freedomforthoughtexperi-
ments:theytouchonanemptycenterthatKierkegaarddeliberatelykeepsfree;for,
inrelationtofaithand,particularly,inrelationtosin,noonecanbeobjective.
‘Thepseudonyms allow the authornot to have to commit himself to certain
opinionsand,bycontrast, tobeable togivevoice toopposingstandpoints (for in-
stance with the help of the inversely related pseudonyms “Climacus” and “Anti-
Climacus”).Withhisoftensaltatory, light-footed,apparentlysuperficial style,Kier-
kegaardrejectsallclaimsforultimateauthority.Healsobreakswiththeauthorityof
the author towhich Schopenhauer still clung.This is a nuisance for all thosewho
expectunambiguousnessofawriter–anexpectationthatwasstillself-evident for
Schopenhauer.Kierkegaard,bycontrast,wantstoavoidall“immediatecommunica-
tionofparagraphsinthemannerofprofessors.”
(5)Inanxietyanddespair,theselfalsolosesitsfootholdandself-reliance.In
his latebookTheSicknessuntoDeath (1849),Kierkegaard– likeSchleiermacher–
graspstheselfexclusivelythroughrelationsliketherelationbetweensoulandbody,
infinityandfinitude,temporalityandeternity,freedomandnecessity.Whatmatters
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forhim is themereself-relationof theselfbehindwhichthere isnosubstance,no
subject,andnostableconfidenceinone’sownorientationabilities.ForKierkegaard,
itiscrucialto‘balance’theserelations.Thisfigureofbalancemakesconceivablethat
theselfcanalwaysbethrownintoturmoilandmustfinditsbalanceanew–morein
anxietythan,asEmersonhasit,incourage.Duetoitsunstableself-relation,theself
canreacttodisturbancesandcopewiththem,but it isalsoalways indangertobe
destroyedby them.Philosophically, this is theduplexity fromwhich theself’sdes-
pairarises.ForKierkegaard,theChristian,thehighestformofdespairisthedespair
ofinsistingonwillingtobeoneself–againstandwithoutthehelpofGod,onwhom
one in fact depends in everything, following Christian faith. Kierkegaard believed
that true Christian faith must pass through such despair. The deliverance from a
dogmatic philosophy on theway to a philosophy of orientation requires a similar
transition.
Thephilosophyof orientation is, in the transition frommodern topostmodern
philosophy, facedwith newand completely different footholds in its investiga-
tionoftheconditionsandstructuresofhumanorientation.Thefirstpathbreak-
ingalternativesinorientingoneselfrefertothelimitsofthinkingasawholeand
revaluetheuniversaltothebenefitoftheindividual.EmersonandStirner,Scho-
penhauerandKierkegaard saw themselvesasheroic lone fightersand therein,
theybuiltresolutelyontheirownexperience.Theyinvokedmoods,whichphilos-
ophy hitherto had excluded; yet, all thinking and acting is co-determined by
moods,whichgiveanewmeaning to commonconcepts, for instancemoodsof
courageandcombat,ofwearinessandanxiety,optimismandpessimism.
Emersonconsciouslycallsbacktoone’spersonalorientationandprovides
uswithpioneeringfootholdsforitsinvestigation.Whoevertrustsinthesuccess
ofone’sownorientationcanbecomeasignandstandardforotherorientations
–EmersondidsofirstandforemostforNietzsche.However,hestill(inanideal-
isticor transcendental fashion) reliesona friendlynature sharedbyeveryone,
which inspiresand supports thinkingandacting thatprovesadvantageous for
everyone. Stirner,by contrast,whowants to secure the individual’s right to its
ownaccesstotheworld,assumesaratherdefiantattitudeagainstallseemingly
pre-givengeneralorders.ForSchopenhauerandKierkegaard,Emersonandlat-
erNietzsche,ablindurgeofthewill,distressoranxietyfuelthinking;thedistinc-
115
tionbetweencalminganddisturbance(ordespair)becomesmoredecisivethan
thedistinctionbetweentruthand falsity.Schopenhauer’sdethronementofrea-
son results in thewish for permanent rest in nothingness; Kierkegaard, in his
certaintyoffaith,triesinsteadtomakethehandlingofanxietyfruitfulforanew
determinationoftheself-relationinthesenseofamere‘keepingone’sbalance’–
inwhichonecansucceedorfail.
WhileSchopenhaueradherestotheconceptofphilosophyasa“complete
repetition,amirroringof theworld inabstractterms,as itwere,”Kierkegaard
asksafter theeffectofphilosophicalconcepts,whichcandeprive thedescribed
relations of their earnestness in rendering themmerely in abstract terms. The
despairoverastablebeing-able-to-be-oneself,understoodashabitualanxietyin
thesenseofa fearofsinor“sicknessuntodeath,”bringsusclosetodeath.But
forthisveryreason,italsocoercesusintocommittingourselvestonewprojects
of thought or philosophical reorientation. While Schopenhauer still professes
sovereigninsightsofanewmetaphysicsthatisexpresslyintendedtoredeem,i.e.
lesstoconvincethantoconsole,Kierkegaardrenouncesallpowerofauthorityin
thinkingwiththehelpofanetworkofpseudonymspresentingdifferentopinions
fromdifferentperspectives.Heseeksparadoxesandworkscreativelywiththem.
BothSchopenhauerandKierkegaardconceptualizetheconcreteuniversal
ofanimalsandthehumanspeciesinanewway,namelyasatemporalkindofa
generaloruniversalbeing,whichemergesthroughthepropagationofindividu-
alswithindividuals,staysforsometime,andperishesagain.AccordingtoScho-
penhauer, individualsandthespeciesmutuallygenerateeachother;according
to Kierkegaard, “hereditary sin” can, within a Christian framework, only be
thoughtinsuchawaythatAdamdoesnotbeartheblameforallsin,butrather
that all otherhumanbeingshave to take responsibility for it in their thinking
and acting. They have to do so ever anew in their respective situation. In this
way,evenbeforeDarwin,theconceptofatemporal,alwayschanginggeneralor
universalbeingispreparedphilosophically:theconceptoffluctuance.
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17.AlternativesintheMoral-PoliticalCommitmentofPhilosophy:
MarxandMill
After the FrenchRevolution, a seething revolutionary atmosphere held sway over
Europe.Theindustrialrevolutioncreatedmassivenewsocio-economicrealities:the
capitalistmarketeconomyon theonehand,whichgeneratedgreat riches,and the
impoverishmentof theworkingclass,whichwasusedtoproducetheserichesand
resources,ontheother.Theextremelyunevendistributionofrichesprovokedphil-
osophicalstatements.InGreatBritainandtheUnitedStates,oneurgedinthetradi-
tionof JeremyBentham’sutilitarianismtomakepossiblethegreatesthappinessof
thegreatestnumber(sec.12). InGermany,Hegel’sphilosophyprevailed.However,
afterHegel’sdeath,hissentence,“thatwhichisreasonableisreal,andthatwhichis
realisreasonable”(sec.14),wasinterpretedintwoalternativeways:eitherasback-
ingtheexistingstateofPrussiaandjustifyingthecurrentsocial,economic,andpolit-
ical conditions,orasanappeal to change theseconditions, since the reasonable is
yettoberealizedinsociety.
BothinEuropeandinAmerica,theworkers’povertycausedamoralcommit-
ment inphilosophytobecomepracticalphilosophyas longaseconomyandpolitics
accepted that the social conditions deteriorated further. Philosophy began to be-
comethemoralconscienceoftheworld,andthereinittookoverataskofthedisap-
pearingreligion.Insofarasphilosophydidnotbecomepractical,i.e.insofarasitdid
not urge to put its thought into action, philosophy appeared as mere theory, as
somethingmadeup;ithadtoandwantedtoregainitscredibilitythroughapractical
test.With itscritiqueof theexistingeconomic, social, andpolitical reality, it at the
sametimeexposeditselftoacritiquebythisreality.Philosophyturnedfromanob-
serverintoafellowplayerinhistory,inwhichitcanpersistorperish.Intheend,itis
historythatprovesitrightorwrong.Themostaccentuatedexampleshereofare,in
the19thandthe20thcentury,thephilosophiesofKARLMARX(1818-1883AD)onthe
onehand,andofJOHNSTUARTMILL(1806-1873AD)ontheother.
MARX, thegrandsonofrabbis,sonofabaptized lawyer,studied lawandphi-
losophy, and as a journalist, he learned how to make use of the media. He cam-
paignedpoliticallyintheorganizationoftheinternationalworkers’movement,and
finally, together with his friend FRIEDRICH ENGELS (1820-1895 AD), he dedicated
117
himselfmoreandmore toasocio-criticalphilosophy.Engelswas thebroad-gauge,
economically(amongotherthings,throughstocktrading)successfulsonofatextile
factoryownerwhosupportedMarxfinancially.Strickenwithdisease,Marxwasnot
able to complete his large-scale magnum opus,Das Kapital (Capital). Perpetually
persecutedforpoliticalreasonsand,timeandagain,beingexpelledfromtheStates,
MarxlivedunderpoorcircumstancesinBrussels,Paris,andfinallyinLondon.
Philosophically,Marxproceeds fromHegel’s dialectic philosophyon the one
hand, and fromFeuerbach’s anthropology on the other,who in the essence of the
ancientGodrecognized the trueessenceof thehumanbeing,whichwasonlypro-
jected onto God. ForMarx and Engels, both Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s philosophies
haveremainedpuretheories;nowtheythinkthetimehascometotransformthem
intorevolutionarypractice.Tothisend,MarxandEngelssharpenHegel’sandFeu-
erbach’sphilosophies:unlikeFeuerbach,theydonotbasetheessenceofmanonits
bodily-sensory, but rather on the comprehensive societal production of means to
live,andtheyturnHegel’sdialecticintoamethodofdemonstratinganecessaryse-
quenceinthehistoryoftheproductionofmeansto live;thissequenceshouldalso
allowforprognoses.Withthehelpofmasterfulreversalsintheirformulations,they
wanttoturndialecticupsidedown,sothatitisput“fromtheheadtothefeet.”How-
ever, the scientific, propagandistic, and agitating commitment ofMarx and Engels
firsthasitsfulleffectwhenVLADIMIRILYICHLENIN(1870-1924AD)createsanideolo-
gywithmassimpactforthepurposesoftheRussianRevolution.
MarxandEngels,whoregardshimselfas “secondviolin” inrelation toMarx,
directphilosophy’sattention to the fact that thematerialhardshipsandneedsde-
terminehumanlifetosuchanextentthattheyalsodominatemorals,religion,poli-
tics, and even philosophy itself. Where the practical coping with life is at stake,
thinkinglosesitssupposedautonomy;purethinkingbecomesamereappearance;in
fact,thinkingistheorganandfunctionoftherespectivecircumstancesoflife.Think-
ingorientshumanbeingsundertheseconditions;iftheychange,thiswillresultalso
inradicalreorientationsinthinking.Whereseverepovertyobtainsobviously,such
as the poverty of the workers descending into misery, reorientation is triggered
morally: others’ emergency coerces human orientation into helping these others
immediately,andnowthishelpmustbeimplementedpolitically.
Marxaimsforemancipationinthesenseofenlightenedhumanism,forthelib-
eration of the human being as such, now above all from the hardships and con-
118
straintstowhichthecapitalistmarketeconomysubjectsthemajorityofhumanbe-
ings:dayafterday,theyhavetofightforsubsistenceminimumbyworkingpainstak-
inglyhardintheserviceofotherswhoprofitfromtheirwork.Marxalsoemploysthe
meansofuniversalization,totalization,andradicalization.Firstofall,heonesidedly
declareslabor(Arbeit)asthecoreandcriterionofsocietalconditionsandprocesses
togainbettermeansof life. Forhim, thismeans that laborpower turns into com-
modity(Ware)andtherebylosesitsdignityinthecapitalistmarketeconomyandits
moreandmoredifferentiated labordivision.Due to the fact that theownerof the
meansofproduction,thecapitalist,skimsthe“surplusvalue”(Mehrwert)createdby
laborers, the laborers are alienated from theobjects of thework, from theirwork
itself, and finally from themselves as human beings. Capitalism engenders human
self-alienation.
ForMarx, this becomes evident in the laborers’ increasing pauperization as
proletariatthathasnothingbutitslaborpower,whichtheymustsell,anddescend-
antswho,again,musthirethemselvesoutas laborers.Thisanti-humanisticecono-
mymust,according toMarxand thehistorical lawfulnessheprofesses, lead to the
revolutionoftheproletarians,whointheendwillcreateaclasslesscommunistsoci-
etyofcompletelyemancipatedhumanbeingsandcancelallalienation.Inmakingthe
laborvaluetheorytheprincipleofnationaleconomics,Marxmarginalizespricefor-
mationonthemarketandthepossibilitythatmarketeconomy,asAdamSmith(sec.
12)argued,offersthelong-termenhancementofthegoodofall.Thisenhancement
ofgeneralwelfarehasoccurredinhistory,eventhoughtoaveryvariableextentand
after long times of increasing exploitation of theworkers, of economic crises, and
outrageousmiseryallovertheworld,justasMarxhaspredicted.Marxism-Leninism,
however, historically failed as the real existing socialismwhichmany countries in
theworldexperienced.Inthisregard,philosophyhasnotpassedthepracticaltest.
MILL’swaytothebecoming-practicalofphilosophywasdifferent,eventhough
it,timeandagain,overlapswithMarx’sway.MilldidnotreacttoMarx,albeitbothof
themlivedinLondonfora longtime;Marx,however,respondedtoMill.Following
theBritishtradition,Millworkslesswithdeductionsfromgeneralpropositionsthan
with inductions from concrete observations; he foregrounds not so much groups
thatfightjointlyfortheirmoral,social,andpoliticalright,butrathertheindividuals
andtheir freedom.Millbears inminda“Civil,orSocialLiberty”whichdevelops in
the individuals’ leeways over against the power of society involving its economy,
119
politics,publicopinion,andmorality.AccordingtoMill,theseleewaysweighheavy
forthe“weakermembersofthecommunity.”Eventhoughthepowerless,inthefirst
instance,havelittleusefortheseleeways,theycanbeextendedovertime;according
toMill,theyshouldnotbesecuredthroughrevolutionarypropagandaandviolence,
butratherparliamentarily,throughlegislation.
Thestateoflawregulatestheuseofpoliticalpower,whichisinevitablealsoin
ademocracy.Inademocracy,however,nogeneralwillinRousseau’ssense(sec.12)
needstobepresupposed.Onthecontrary,theindividualmustbeprotectedagainst
the “tyranny of the majority”; and ultimately, all individuals must be protected
againstassaultsoneachother.Therefore,asocietymust finda “fittingadjustment
betweenindividualindependenceandsocialcontrol”throughthelawandmorality.
Millpresupposes thateveryone’s “standardof judgment ishisown liking.”There-
fore,everyoneshallbefreetoachievehisorherownwellbeingaccordingtohisor
herown ideas, since the individual isbestat that,provided thatno-elseelse is in-
jured.
Millconcedesthatthisthoughtisnotoriginal.ComparedtoMarx’sandEngels’
social-revolutionarypathos,Milladherestoacalmsenseofreality,whichweighsall
circumstances,alsoinmoral-politicaldedication.Educatedbyhisfather,JamesMill,
intheteachingsofhisfather’sfriendJeremyBentham(sec.12),Millregards“utility
as theultimateappealonallethicalquestions.”Alreadyasa small childunder the
guidanceofhis father,Millhasbeguntoacquireacomprehensiveeducation inthe
spiritofacoolrationalism,andsincethen,hehasworkeduntilhesufferedanervous
breakdown anddepression. This causes him a severe personal disorientation that
awakesinhimimportantnewphilosophicalperspectivesbeyondtheclassicutilitar-
ianism.He reorients utilitarianism: the greatest happiness of the greatest number
must not occur at the expense of the happiness of the individual; rather, it must
summarizethehappinessoftheindividuals.
Just likehis father,Mill is for decades employedby theEast IndiaCompany,
oneof themightiestcapitalistorganizationsofhisday.However,healsoperceives
themisery of the working class and seeks to combat it, for some years also as a
MemberofParliament,throughgradualreforms.InspiredandsupportedbyHarriet
Taylor,hislaterwife,headvocatesequalrightsofmenandwomen.Hefightsagainst
the privileges of the land-owning aristocracy, believes in democracy, and tries to
strengthenitbyextendingtherighttovote.Atthesametime,hefearsthedemocrat-
120
icdriveforequityanddemandsthatthepublicspiritandfactionalismmustnotwin
through.LikeMarx,he regards the stateasprovisional in the transition toamore
liberalsocietywithoutstrongleadershipstructures.Hedoessounderthebannerof
liberalism:thestateshallprotectthefreedom,security,andwelfareoftheindividu-
als–andrestrictthemaslittleaspossible.Societyshallnotdominateovertheindi-
viduals,andtheindividualsshallnotdominateoversociety;rather,societyandthe
individualsshallrealignandcoordinatetheirinterests.
Mill mistrusts not only tradition and habits, but also the masses’ power of
judgment.Withoutillusions,heorientshimselftothatwhichisrealizablepolitically
andavoidstodebateprinciples.Inordertolaunchnewdevelopments,hespeaksup
forcompetitionandinnovationnotonlyineconomy,butalsoinregimes;however,
hedoesnotendorseunlimitedgrowth.Millwants tocharge independentandedu-
catedpersonalities(likehimself)withthegovernmentofthestate;thesepersonali-
tiesshallrepresentthepeoplealsointheparliaments.Heexpectsthegreatestwel-
fareofall fromeveryone’sactiveparticipationintheshapingofsocietyontheone
hand,andfromthecompetenceoftheelectedrepresentativesandtherulersonthe
other.Thewisdomofthepeoplelies,forhim,intheelectionofwiseleaders.Putin
thelanguageofthephilosophyoforientation:asfaraspossible,Milltriestotiepolit-
ical power to fact-orientation and personal superiority in orienting oneself and
providing orientation for others; for him, the party system and the antagonismof
governmentandoppositionindemocracyareoflowerinterest.
Even in regard to Mill’s approach to social problems, the practical test re-
vealedlimits,betheyinstitutionalorpersonalones.Nonetheless,GreatBritain,the
atthattimepremiereconomicpoweroftheworld,succeededinavoidingaradical
socialupheavalinthecountry–despiterepeatedlyflamingupprotests–bycarrying
outgradualreformsoflawsandoftheparliament,towhichMillpersonallycontrib-
uted. However, Britain enjoyed rich earnings from a worldwide colonial empire,
whichdidnotenjoycomparableparliamentaryrights.ButneitherinGermanynorin
France,therevolutionoftheworkingclassproclaimedbyMarxcametopass;ithap-
penedonlyinRussia,whichMarxdidnotdeemmatureforitandwherethedesired
freedomofallcouldnotberealized.
ThephilosophyoforientationcaninviewofMarx’sandMill’salternativeorien-
tationdecisionsexploretheleewaysinwhichphilosophycancommititselfmor-
121
allyandpoliticallyand,inthissense,becomepractical.Sincethejustificationof
Christiandogmatics in theMiddleAges and thedesignof the state of law, the
marketeconomy,anddemocracyinmodernity,Marx’sandMill’spracticalpro-
jectshavebeenthehithertomostcomprehensiveandinfluentialonesinthehis-
toryofphilosophy;bothprojectshave changed the societal circumstances ina
sustainedmanner.
BothMarxandMillregardsocietyasasocietyofindividuals:theindividuals
aredependentonasocietyinordertobeabletoliveasindividuals,andsociety
isdependentondifferentindividualsinordertobeabletomakeprogress.While
Mill targets the good of the individual, Marx targets the good of society as a
whole, though at first the good of themajority in a society, but both of them
wanttoenhancethegoodofall.Further,bothofthemfindindemocracythepo-
litical form toachieve this end, andbothof themadvancepolitical economics,
yetinalternativeways.
Mill builds democracy on themutual restriction of leeways,which can be
determined anew in new situations, i.e. be changed through reforms. This re-
quiresacomparativelylowdegreeofideology,whichunitestheindividualstoa
community,andahighdegreeof individualorientationabilitiesandvirtues in
order tounderstandandsupport theconstitutionaldemocratic structures that
becomemoreandmorecomplex.
Marx, on the other hand, observes that in societalmisery, revolutionary
transformationsarerequiredfromamoralpointofview.Hepredictsthatthese
transformationsoccuraccordingtoeconomicandhistoricallaws.Still,therevo-
lutionary upheavalmust be carried out by human beingswho suffer from the
situation,andforthispurpose,theyneedguidingideasthatunitethemandmo-
tivatethemtofight,i.e.,theyneedastrongideology,asLeninhaspronouncedit
plainly.Throughan ideology, the individualorientationsaredeterminedbyan
assertivepoliticalprogramwithmassimpactsubordinatingtheindividuals’ide-
as and aims to common interests.When a society suffers bitter hardships, the
orientationtowardsthebenefitof thewholecommunityprevailsoverthe indi-
vidualorientations.
Itmaybeforsituationalreasonsthatcommunismfailedhistoricallyasan
attempttofreeallmembersofasocietyfrommisery;incountrieswherepolitical
leaders still cling to the communistic ideology, it can only be upheld by force.
122
However,thefailureofcommunismcanalsobeduetothefactthatphilosophy
overestimatesthegeneralwhenitbelievesitcandeveloppoliticalprogramsac-
cordingtowhichanentiresocietycanbechangedrevolutionarily;toallowsuch
programs tobe successful, the livingconditionsofa society seemtobe far too
complex,andindividualorientationsseemtovarytoomuch.
Yet, suchastatement, too, isundersuspicionof ideology ifwe followthe
Marxian theoryaccording towhichphilosophymust bea criticismof ideology
(Ideologiekritik). The reason is that philosophy cannot completely refuse the
suspiciontobearepresentativeofindividualorsocietalinterestsand,sinceone
can orient oneself about a situation only in this situation, one cannot explore
one’ssituationintotal.Philosophyis,forMarx,alwayspartofa“superstructure
(Überbau)”whose “base (Basis)” it comprehends only to a limited extent. The
philosophy of orientation is aware of the fact that every philosophy inevitably
springs fromasituatedstandpoint.Yet, thisentails thattheorientationofphi-
losophers,too,isalwaysalreadypracticalbecausetheyreflect,correct,andcon-
tinuously reform their ideas in regard to relevant footholds of new situations.
Therefore, philosophy as orientationmust prudently abstain from exceedingly
universalizing,totalizing,andradicalizing.
18.AlternativeWaysofLiberatingPhilosophyfromMetaphysics:
Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJames
WILHELMDILTHEY(1833-1911AD),FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE(1844-1889/1900AD)and
WILLIAMJAMES(1842-1910AD)consciouslydriveforwardanepochalchangewithin
the field of philosophy. They proceed largely independently of each other, but go
ahead in the samedirection.They insiston theirownorientationdecisions and in-
clude themalso into theirphilosophies. In this context, they resolutelybreakwith
metaphysics and begin to investigate the conditions and structures of orientation
decisionsassuch.
Their curricula vitae resemble each other inmany aspects, and yet, Dilthey,
Nietzsche, and James represent different types of personalities. Nietzsche, whose
father died early, originated from narrow circumstances, while Dilthey stemmed
from a prosperous, and James from awealthy family. Dilthey andNietzschewere
123
sonsofpastors,whoturnedawayfromtheologyandremainedcriticalagainstChris-
tianreligion throughout their life; James,bycontrast, atall timeskepthisways to
Godopen.Allthreeofthemattendedtheverybestschoolsandweredeeplyrooted
inEuropeanthought;JamescametoEurope13timesinhislife,particularlytoGer-
many,whileDiltheyandNietzscheneverreachedbeyondEurope.
Allthreeofthemwereuniversityprofessors.Dilthey,whobecameaprofessor
ofphilosophy first inBasel, then inKiel,Breslau,andBerlin,and James, forwhom
HarvardUniversity established anewprofessorial chair, enjoyed a successful aca-
demiccareer,whereasNietzsche,whowasappointedtoaprofessorshipinBaselal-
readyasastudentofclassicalphilology,hadtoresignhispositionaftertenyearsfor
reasonsofhealthandbecauseheinthemeantimehadturnedcompletelytophilos-
ophy.Sincethen,Nietzsche livedatchangingplacesprimarily in ItalyandSwitzer-
landasastatelessmigrant.Hehadtofindplaceswhoseclimatewasendurablefor
him; yet, also for the sake of his intellectual freedom, he never settled down. All
three of them entered philosophy starting fromdifferent disciplines:Dilthey from
theology,Nietzschefromclassicalphilology,andJamesfrommedicineandpsychol-
ogy. This facilitated their break with tradition. Each of them was tormented by
chronicailmentsthatbroughtthemperiodsofdepressionandhamperedtheirabili-
tiestocarryouttheirduties.Theirailmentsmadethemawareofthefactthatthink-
inginlargemeasuredependsonphysicalconditions.Nonetheless,DiltheyandJames
werehappilymarried,whileNietzschetriedtomarry,butthenrefrainedfromdoing
soandremainedalone.
Diltheywasthetypeofagentlescholarwhointenselycarriedouthisresearch
and was closely interconnected with his colleagues. He was cautious in valuing,
avoidedeverythingtoopersonal,andpresentedhisprofoundphilosophicalreorien-
tations inclassic treatises.Hedidso insereneandcomposed trust inhis research
andwiththeauthorityofamanofletters;hecultivatedaclosephilosophicalfriend-
shipwiththearistocratPAULYORCKOFWARTENBURG(1835-1897AD).James,whose
godfatherwasRalphWaldoEmersonandwhosebrotherwas the likewise famous
author Henry James, synchronizedwith his friend CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE (1839-
1914AD),withJOHNDEWEY(1859-1952AD),andF.C.S.SCHILLER(1864-1937AD)in
ordertoadvancepragmatismasajointundertaking.Nietzsche,bycontrast,cultivat-
edhisimageasasolitarygenius–againstthetypeofamerescholarandtothedis-
may of Dilthey and James. To this, Schopenhauer (sec. 16) encouraged him as his
124
intellectualteacher,andhisearly,closefriendshipwiththeillustriousRichardWag-
nerandhiswifeCosimaenhancedit.
Nietzscheenteredintophilosophyinaverypersonal,pathetic,andpolemical
waywithhispathbreakingtreatiseTheBirthofTragedyfromtheSpiritofMusic(Die
GeburtderTragödieausdemGeistederMusik),whichturnedupsidedowntheclassic
view of the ancient Greeks, and with his Untimely Meditations (Unzeitgemäße
Betrachtungen) that challenged the scholarlyworldofhisday.Nietzschecreateda
hitherto unknown diversity of literary forms for his philosophy and learned pro-
gressivelyhowtodeepenandatthesametimequestionhisphilosophicalteachings
byusingthese literary forms.Throughthe“subtler lawsofhisstyle,”Nietzsche,as
author,madeamysteryofhimself,sothatonenevercantakehimimmediatelyathis
word,but is forced intodecisionsof interpretationandorientation. In this regard,
NietzscheremindsusofPlato.
Nexttotreatises(likeTheBirthofTragedy)andessays(likeUntimelyMedita-
tions),Nietzscheonabigscalecreatedvolumescontainingaphorisms, for instance
Human,AllTooHuman(Menschliches,Allzumenschliches),TheGayScience(Diefröh-
licheWissenschaft),andBeyondGoodandEvil(JenseitsvonGutundBöse),wherehe
presentshisthoughtsfromvariousperspectives.Inaddition,heauthoredevermore
polemicpapersandpamphletslikeOntheGenealogyofMorality(ZurGenealogieder
Moral), Götzen-Dämmerung (Twilight of the Idols), and The Antichrist (Der Anti-
christ), but also poems likeDionysian-Dithyrambs (Dionysos-Dithyramben). InEcce
homo,whichcontains thegenealogyofhisown thinking,Nietzschehighlightedhis
didacticpoemThusSpokeZarathustra (AlsosprachZarathustra),whichunitesepic
anddramatic,dialogicalandlyricalfeatures.HereNietzscheletshisprotagonistfail
becausenoonecansufficientlyunderstandhisteachings.
Nietzscheraisedasensationthroughstartlingformulalike“thedeathofGod,”
“nihilism,” “the will to power,” “the overman” (earlier translated as “superman”),
and“theeternalrecurrenceof thesame,”whichhedidnotconnectsystematically.
Such formula easily conceal the richness and depth of his philosophy, and it took
decades beforeNietzschewas discovered as a great philosopher. In contradistinc-
tion toDiltheyand James,andalso tohisownwork inclassicphilology,Nietzsche
offered little hard-earned knowledge in his philosophy; on the contrary, he often
used secondhand knowledge. So much the more, he always anew surprised (and
surprises) people with interesting perspectives, sharp evaluations, and trenchant
125
judgments.Nonetheless(orexactlyforthisreason)heremained,otherthanDilthey
andJames,largelyunsuccessfulwithhiswritingsaslongashismentalfacultieswere
unimpaired; however, when he suffered from insanity, he quickly was known
worldwide. His impact went far beyond philosophical professional circles, and it
continuesunabatedlydowntothepresentday.Nietzschehas–afterSocrates–wide
appealasthetypeofgeniusphilosopherassuch.
Allthethree,Dewey,Nietzsche,andJames,turnedawayfrommetaphysicsina
productivewaybyalsofreeingthemselvesfromalltranscendentandtranscendental
doctrines.Theyregardallphilosophicaldoctrines,whichclaimtobeunconditionally
certain,asmetaphysics. Inobserving thatmetaphysicsandreligionare in thepro-
cessofdissolution, theynoteven try todisprove them,butonlyput them,asNie-
tzsche and James say, “on ice.” Instead, theywant to reveal “thewhole, full, non-
mutilatedexperience,”asDiltheyputsit,inalltheabundancewithwhichthisexpe-
rienceprovidesus,startingfromnaturalbodilylifeandtheindividualconsciousness
rightthroughtoculture,history,andthecommunicationsystemsofsocietythatde-
pend on each other inmanifoldways.What is revealed here is the reality by and
largeignoredandconcealedbymetaphysics:therealityofeverydayorientation.
Dewey, Nietzsche, and James consider metaphysics as a historical and thus
bygone phenomenon. In his first main work, Introduction to the Human Sciences
(Einleitung in dieGeisteswissenschaften,published in 1883),Diltheypresents a de-
tailed history of the “rule” and “decay” ofmetaphysics; he calls its historicization,
against whichmetaphysics always has strived, its “euthanasia.” Dilthey’s result is
that “metaphysics cannotovercome the relativityof the circleof experiences from
whichitsconceptsaretaken.”Thiscircleofexperienceschangesallthetimeandis
“unpredictable,relative,andrestricted;”itcannotbeunderstoodmetaphysicallyasa
“logical coherence of theworld.” This isNietzsche’s view, too. For sure, hewrites
thatmetaphysicsitselfwasa“stepintheprocessofliberation”–namelyfromreli-
giousclaimsassertinganultimatecertainty,andtherein,metaphysicshasits“histor-
icalandpsychologicalright.”Inthemeantime,however,metaphysicshasbecomea
signofweakness ifonestillwants torelyona “science” that “dealswith thebasic
errorsofhumankind–thoughinsuchaway,asiftheywerebasictruths.”
That which Dilthey and Nietzsche address as “metaphysics” includes, for
James, the continental tradition of rationalism. To bid adieu to rationalisticmeta-
physicsiseasierwhencomingfromtheBritishandAmericantraditionthatfollows
126
nominalism,empirism,andutilitarism,anditcanappealtocommonsense,whichis
not possible in the German tradition. That which James calls “pragmatism” turns
away “fromabstraction and insufficiency, fromverbal solutions, frombadapriori
reasons,fromfixedprinciples,closedsystems,andpretendedabsolutesandorigins.”
Instead,pragmatismturns “towardsconcretenessandadequacy, towards facts, to-
wardsaction,andtowardspower.”Inhis“disbeliefintheAbsolute,”Jamestakes,as
he says, “moral holidays” in which he leaves metaphysics behind. Nonetheless,
Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJamesacknowledgethatonecandrawonmetaphysicswhen
nothingelseleadstothetargetedobjective,forinstanceconcerningtherelationbe-
tweenconsciousnessandbrain,ortheethically inevitableproblemofthefreewill.
However,onemustthenbeawareofthefactthatoneonlydealswithmetaphysics
andmust acceptmetaphysical paradoxes. Yet, for James, pragmatismdoesnot ex-
cludethesearchforGod.
In James’ view, when investigating concreteness, our state of the art corre-
spondstotheoneofphysicsbeforeGalilei:everythingisprovisionalandremainsin
needofrevision.AstoDiltheyandNietzsche,thedissolutionofmetaphysicsleavesa
generaldisorientation.AsNietzschestatesinaposthumousnoteofJune10,1887,in
whichhesought toacquireanoverviewof thestatusofphilosophy ingeneraland
hisownphilosophyinparticular,lifebecomes“uncertain,accidental,nonsensicalin
ourEurope”;onecannolongerappreciatetheoldandhasnotyetlearnttoappreci-
atethenewthatonestillknowstoolittle.Nietzscheconcludes:“Oneinterpretation”
–namelythemetaphysical interpretation–“perished;since itwasregardedasthe
interpretation, it seems as if existence was meaningless, as if everything was in
vain.”Nietzschecallsthis“nihilism.”Fromthisnihilismresultsa“revaluationofall
values,” which challenges humanity to create new values. Dilthey confirms Nie-
tzsche’s diagnosis, speaks of the “perplexity of the spirit about itself” or a “con-
sciousnessofanarchyloominginalldeeperconvictions,”andcontinues:“Maybethe
ultimate suppositions of human life and actionhavenever to such an extent been
exposedtodisintegration.”
James,by contrast, remainsoptimistic.Withhispsychologyand thephiloso-
phyofpragmatism,hehasalreadyfoundanewfoothold.Hetruststhatthesuccessful
orientationofthinkingmanifestsitselfinaction.Thisimplies,inhisopinion,thatwe
have to look “away from first things,principles, ‘categories,’ supposednecessities”
and instead “toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts.”Moreover, he recom-
127
mends “linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor”
and,indoingso,maintaininga“maximumofcontinuity.”Truthsarevalidonlyfora
timeincertainsituations.Theyfirstappearastruthsandstandthetestwhenandas
longtheymakeadifferenceinaction,orwhenonecanmakeuseoftheminsucha
waythattheresultsaresatisfactory.
Jamesarguesthattruthscanhavea“functionofagreeableleading,”i.e.anori-
entingfunction.Thetruthsthatprovesuccessfulinorientation,areconsultedagain
incomparablesituations:“Trueideasarethosethatwecanassimilate,validate,and
verify.False ideasare those thatwecannot.”This is their “cashvalue,”andwith it
arises something like a “credit system” of truth. Something is regarded as true as
longassomeonedisagrees;justasmoneyisvalidaslongasitisnolongeraccepted.
However,somewheretheremustalsobe“directface-to-faceverifications”;without
them,“thefabricoftruthcollapseslikeafinancialsystemwithnocash-basiswhat-
ever.Youacceptmyverificationofonething, Iyoursofanother.Wetradeoneach
other’s truth.” In this exchange, orientation finds a sufficient foothold,withoutde-
mandingunconditionalcertainties.Thisisagooddescriptionoffundamentalstruc-
turesandprocessesofeverydayorientation.
Justlike,longago,Newton’sphysics(sec.11)createdanewsituationforphi-
losophy,sodidalsoDarwin’sevolutionarybiology.Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJamesaf-
firmedit–whileraisingspecificobjectionsandwithoutplacingDarwin’stheoryin
thecenterof theirphilosophies.Darwin’sOriginofSpecies (1859)wasphilosophi-
cally significant insofar as Darwin empirically demonstrated that the apparently
constantbiological speciesonwhichAristotleprimarilyhadbuilthismetaphysical
conceptoftheconcept(sec.5)changeincessantlyinmoreorlesslonglapsesoftime.
Strictly speaking, there are no biological species with invariable attributes or no
steady forms that only changematter. Instead, individuals always beget different
individualswithdifferent individuals underdifferent circumstances. The apparent
substancesthatAristotleregardedas‘beingitself’are,inthelanguageofthephilos-
ophyoforientation, in fact fluctuances. Inaddition,whileNewton’s lawscould, fol-
lowingKant,stillbeunderstoodphilosophicallyinthesensethattheyareconstrued
by thehuman intellect itself, theDarwinianevolutionof livingbeingsoccursocca-
sionally. Asmatters stand in the 19th century, the evolutionary process cannot be
construedandpredicted,butonlybedescribed.
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Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJamesaswellproceedtoadescriptivemethod.Instead
ofabidingbyprinciples,theyobserveexperienceableprocesses.Inthedescriptionof
theconditionsandstructuresofhumanorientationthatprecedescientificandmeta-
physical thinking, Dilthey, Nietzsche, and James largely agree. Nietzsche describes
theminthemoststimulatingway,Diltheyinthemostdifferentiatedway,andJames
most concisely. Dilthey experiments with the notion of “being-oriented” (Orien-
tiertsein), Nietzsche with the notions of “perspective” and “interpretation”; and
Jamescallspragmatismon thewhole “anattitudeoforientation.”Their respective
descriptionsextend to the fieldsof (1)culture, (2)history, (3) life,and(4)experi-
ence.Forthispurpose,theydevelopnewandspecificmodesofdistinction.
(1)Culture: InNietzsche’s eyes, an “eraof comparison”hasbegun: “all steps
andkindsofmoralityandcustomsofcultures”areaccessiblethroughtraveling,the
mixtureofdifferentpeoples,themediaandthesciences;theyarecomparedtoeach
other in its valueand canbe “experienced sideby side.”Thus, theyareobligatory
onlytoalimitedextent.Today,thisphenomenonisdescribedaspostmodernglobal-
ization.Thecomparativemethodorientsitselfbydescribingculturaldifferences,yet
without assuming that different cultures have something in common. The differ-
encesareregisteredwiththehelpof footholdsthatare, fortheirpart,notbinding.
Theyconstitutenoessentialattributes.Onearticulatescontrastsinordertogainan
overview.Comparisonscanpossiblybedrawninalldirections.
(2)History:Undertheprogrammatictitle“critiqueofhistoricalreason”(Kritik
der historischen Vernunft), Dilthey conducts extensive historiography, focusing on
thehistoryof ideasthatcomparesandcontrastsdifferentepochs.Nietzschewants
tobeginaneweraof“historicalphilosophizing”andaimsfora“formationhistoryof
thinking”(EntstehungsgeschichtedesDenkens).Thishistoryshallbekindofanatu-
ralistic “chemistry of concepts and sentiments” (Chemie der Begriffe und Emp-
findungen).Butitcanalsoproceedalternatively,namely“antiquarian”incompiling
sources and facts; “monumentalizing” in giving prominence to great examples; or,
whatmatters toNietzsche, “critical” in comparing itsown timewithearlier times,
which enablesus todecideonourown standards. In any case, history shall serve
life.
(3)Life: James concentrates on accounting for all intellectual and spiritual
lifeasaprocessofnaturallife.Hisbroadconceptoflife,whichemphasizesdiversity
and transformation, includes culture and history as well. For James just as for
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DiltheyandNietzsche,theconceptoflifehasthefunctionofreplacingapriorijudg-
ments: life does not require any transcendent or transcendental justification. Life
regulates itself,butcanalsobeshaped; it isalways tobepresupposedasawhole,
but it can never be grasped as a whole – like Spinoza’s deus sive natura (sec. 9).
Dilthey understands life as mere interrelation and interdependency (Zusammen-
hang).Inthe“interrelationoflife”(Lebenszusammenhang),thereconstantlyemerge
connections of structures (Strukturzusammenhänge) or, in brief, structures
(Strukturen)thatdissociatethemselvesfromtheirenvironment,sustainthemselves
within it, and can react upon it. This happens fortuitously, under favorable condi-
tions.Therespectivestructurescanincorporateelementsandotherconnectionsof
structures that are in their environment, but they can also divide themselves and
dissolveagain.Thecrucialnewthoughtis:thesestructurespreservethemselvesasa
netofmereconnectionsandnotbecauseofisolatedrelationsofcausality;theyare
individuallikeeverylivingcreature.Diltheyspeaksofan“acquiredstructuralinter-
relation” (erworbener Strukturzusammenhang), while Nietzsche aggressively uses
thekeywordofthewilltopower;for“initsbasicfunctions,”lifeis“violating,raping,
exploiting,devastating,” too. InNietzsche,uncountablewills topowerengagewith
other wills to power without any pregiven laws; this is, Nietzsche supposes, the
mosteconomicalhypothesishelpingustounderstandlifeassuch.
Sinceonecannotstepoutoflifewithoutlosingone’slife,onecanonlydojus-
ticetoitbyunderstandingitonitsownterms,notbyexplainingitwithreferenceto
somethingelse.Ourunderstandingis,inturn,boundtocontextsoflife.Forthisrea-
son,understandingisalwaysindividual,ontheonehand,andcomprehensiveonthe
other:inunderstanding,objectsarenotfirstisolatedandthenconnectedaccording
toone-dimensionalrelationssuchascausality;rather, theyare fromtheverystart
contextualized,apprehendedintheirrespectiverelations,whichcanbedifferentiat-
ed or abbreviated dependent on the requirements of the situation.Understanding
thereby proceeds in an oscillatingmanner and in a hermeneutic circle: individual
thingscanbeunderstoodintheirrelationstoawhole,andthewholecanbeunder-
stoodinrelationtoitsindividualparts.Thisisthebasicmodeloforientationinasit-
uation.
Nietzscheconsidersunderstanding, too,asawill topower,namelyasanap-
propriationofothernessonone’sown terms. Inprinciple, the latter is thereforea
misunderstanding,sincethere isnosuperordinatecriterionforclearlydistinguish-
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ingatruefromafalseunderstanding.Itis,asweallknow,difficulttobeunderstood.
Hence, Nietzsche’s point of departure is not being-understood, but rather being-
misunderstood. Among human beings, understanding is, for him, a “leeway and
playgroundofmisunderstanding (SpielraumundTummelplatz desMissverständnis-
ses).”Hegoesevenfurther:thewilltotruthandthevalueoftruthitselfcouldbea
metaphysical prejudice, for human life is also in need of deception and self-
deception.Onemust “admituntruthasa condition in life,” and logic,metaphysics,
andmoralitycould, inNietzsche’sview,belongtountruthsthatarevital for life.In
philosophy,alltruthsincludingthewilltotruthappeartobeconditionedbylifeand
thus not equally true for everyone: “all the basic instincts of humanbeings” have,
accordingtoNietzsche,“alreadyphilosophized.”Thismeansthatphilosophyis“the
most intellectualwill topower,”andphysics, too, is “nothingbutan interpretation
and design of the world (Auslegung und Zurechtlegung),” a kind of “world-
interpretation (Welt-Interpretation) that wants to divest existence of its naturally
“equivocalcharacter.”
ForJames,theorientationbylifecontextsinsteadofisolatedobjectsrequires
thepragmatistic self-restraintofphilosophy.Heconceptualizesakindofcritiqueof
active,livingreason,whichimpliesthatlifecannotbehaltedforthesakeofenabling
objective insights. For this reason, truths must be parts of life contexts. Truths
emerge from experiences; in their light, new experiences are gained in a self-
referentialprocess,andfromthesenewexperiences,newtruthsoriginate,etc.James
describesanongoingprocessoforientation:incontextualization,“linesofinfluence”
takeshapeandarelinkedby“conductors”thatofferthemselvesatsomeplacesand
can fail to appear at other places. James uses already themetaphor of fibers in a
thread,whichbecamefamousthroughWittgenstein.Ifunderstandingistheintegra-
tionintocontexts,themereintegrationofobservations,objects,andsentences,etc.,
makes them already true. Theremay bemanifold systems of integration, but one
cannot escape from integration in some form. Nonetheless, “the ‘absolutely’ true,
meaningwhat no farther experiencewill ever alter,” is still thinkable, but only as
“thatidealvanishing-pointtowardswhichweimaginethatallourtemporarytruths
willsomedayconverge.”Suchvanishing-pointsarealsopartsoftheveryprocessof
orientation.InJames’eyes,allexperiences“leanoneachother,”butthewholeofex-
periencesleansonnothing.Whatremainsisa“stateofrelativeinsecurity.”
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James,justlikeDiltheyandNietzsche,doesnotfindanybadrelativisminthis
current stateof insecurity,but ratherarealism towhichphilosophymust faceup.
Onenotonly(followingHobbes,sec.8)regardssomethingasgoodbecauseonede-
siresit,butcanalsoregardsomethingastruebecauseoneisokaywithittotheex-
tentthatitfitswelltotheroutinesofone’sownlife.Truthsonlycatchattentionas
suchwhentheymakeadifference,i.e.whentheyrenderactionmoreorlesssuccess-
ful–whereby thesuccess isassessedby theagents themselves in their respective
situations.Asregardsabstractthinking,NietzscheandJamesclarifythatitssuccess
liesinitsorientingsteeringfunction.Nietzschedesignateslanguageasawholeasa
“processofabbreviation(Abkürzungs-Prozess).”Seen fromahistoricalperspective,
languagedevelopsviaevernewusagesinevernewsituations.However,atalltimes,
languageandtheconceptsitoffersgiveapre-orientation,andallthinkingandacting
isunderthe“spell”ofthispre-orientation:“thespellofcertaingrammaticfunctions
isultimatelythespellofphysiologicalvaluejudgmentsandracialconditions.”
AccordingtoJames,thesingleconceptsinparticularare“onlyartificialshort-
cuts”:“Theirgreatuseistosummarizeoldfactsandtoleadtonewones.”Allcomes
downtothis“beingguided”byaconcept,andeveryagreementissaidtobe“anaf-
fairof leading.”Logical linksworkwithabstracted features; yet, theway inwhich
oneabstractssomefeaturesfromsomeentities,andthequestionofwhichfeatureis
regardedascrucial(for instancethemortalityofSocrates inthe logicalparadeex-
ample‘Socratesismortal’),allthisdependsontherespectivepurposesandinterests
thatareimpliedinanargumentation.Thetrulyinterestingaspectofsyllogismisthe
decisionforcertainfeaturesandcertaindirectionsofabstraction.Therearevarious
kindsofunionandseparation;yet,Jamesarguesthatundertherespectivetermsof
“greatsystemsof logicalandmathematical truths,” thesensible factsofexperience
“eventuallyarrangethemselves,sothatoureternaltruthsholdgoodofrealitiesalso.
Thismarriageoffactandtheoryisendlesslyfertile.”
Theprocessoforientation,aswecallit,sediments,forJames,inthe‘common
sense’oftheEnglishtradition.Thecommonsensecollectsplausibilitiesthatcanand
neednottobejustifiedanymore.Atthispoint,theprocessoforientationcomesto
rest.AsJamesputsitin“TheMeaningofTruth”(1909),“thecommon-sensestageis
aperfectlydefinitehaltingplaceof thought,primarily forpurposesofaction.”Seen
from rationalistic points of view, this stage is “vague, confused andmixed,” but in
concretesituations,itis“auseusuallysuggestedsufficientlybythecircumstancesof
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thespecialcase.”Itorientsus“inanextraordinarilysuccessfulway”:Jamesbelieves
thatit“sufficesforallthenecessaryendsoflife.”Afterall,the“economyinthought”is
crucialinallsituationsoforientation.
(4)Experience:However,understandingpresupposesadistancetotheobjects
andcontextstobeunderstood.Withhisnotionofexperience(Erleben),Diltheyeven
goesback ‘behind’understanding.Life is experienced immediately in life contexts,
anditisexperiencedbyindividualconsciousness.Thewaysinwhichweexperience
life individually, the ‘how’ of experience, is investigated in psychology. Especially
throughWILHELMWUNDT(1832-1920AD),psychologywasinGermanydevelopedas
anempiricalsciencethatrestsonaphysiologicalfundament,anditwasconducted
as individual and folk psychology.Dilthey and Jamespresuppose this kind of psy-
chologyandadvanceit.JamesdoessowithhisvoluminousPrinciplesofPsychology
of1890,whichturnedhimintothefoundingfatherofpsychologyintheUSA;Dilthey
doessowithintheframeworkofhisfoundationofthehumanitiesinhisIdeasfora
DescriptiveandAnalyticPsychology(Ideenübereinebeschreibendeundzergliedernde
Psychologie,1894).Bothofthemgobeyondthescientificexplanatoryexperimental
psychology in order to describe coherencies that, asDilthey formulates it, are not
just“thoughtoutordeduced,butexperienced.”Thereby, the footholdsare“typical
humanbeings.”
Inthisnewpsychology,everythingthathithertohasbeendiscussedunderthe
title ‘epistemology’ shall be suspended:psychologynowno longer assumesa sub-
ject-object- or body-soul-dichotomy, but rather proceeds from functional life con-
texts. James,who often combines his descriptionswith pedagogical recommenda-
tions, focuses on the “stream of consciousness,” in which different states of con-
sciousnessalternatecontinuously,anddiscussesstepbystep theroleofattention,
conception,discriminationandassociation,ofthesenseoftime,ofmemoryandim-
agination,ofperception, reasoning, emotion, and instinct, and finallyof thewill in
thisstreamofconsciousness.Nietzschedispenseswithsystematicdeliberations.He
aggressivelytakespsychologytobecriticalanddebunking,andheusesitinorderto
disclose hidden personalmotives behind all claims for absolute certainty that are
particularlyprominent inmoralphilosophy. Inhispsychology,heseesanew“way
tothebasicproblems”ofphilosophy.Hisgenealogyofmoralscanbeunderstoodas
thefoundationofacriticalmoralpsychology.
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Inregardtothetechniqueofdistinction,theproductiveliberationfrommeta-
physicswithitsunconditionalcertaintiesthatarebuiltonabstractconceptsleadsto
anewtypeofgeneralization,namely typing (Typisierung).Dilthey typesorcatego-
rizesworldviewsthatdevelopincertaincircumstancesoflife(forinstancenatural-
ism,idealismoffreedom,objectiveidealism);Nietzschetypecastssocialfiguresthat
becomerelevantinthelifeofsociety(namelytheeducatedphilistine(Bildungsphil-
ister), themanand thewoman, the strongand theweak, the sovereign individual,
thecriminal)aswellasindividualstowhomheascribesaspecialweightinhistory,
society, and literature (for instance the types of Socrates, Jesus, and Zarathustra);
Jamescategorizeswaysofactingthatcanmakeadifference(ordonot).Allthreeof
themcompareandcontrastthesetypeswithothers,interpretthempsychologically
andcharacterizethemasmodels–notinordertofindfixedgeneraltermsforacer-
taincaseorasharplycircumscribedassemblageofcases,butratherinordertogive
somepreliminaryfootholdsofhowtheycouldbecaptured.
Typingservesorientation,both theorientationof thosewho typecastandof
others.ParticularlyinNietzsche’scase,typingresultsobviouslyinindividualcharac-
terizationsandinterpretationsthatrevealhisownwilltopowerandtherebycom-
promise him. One can always counter the preliminary footholds, which appear
throughtyping,withotherfootholds;typingleavesaleewayforotherformsoftyp-
ing.Hence,generalizationsremainflexible;theyalwaysremaingeneralizationswith
reservations. Everyone can decide on his or her ownwhether he or shewants to
adoptgeneralizationsortypesforhisorherownorientation.Intheend,everysin-
gle individual is responsible for the general. Dilthey,Nietzsche, and James discuss
thisproblem,andNietzschealsodemonstratesitineverymomentwiththehelpof
hispointedandfasttypinginhismanifoldformsofphilosophicalauthorship.
The philosophy of orientation is still dealingwith the paradoxes thatWilliam
Jamesplacesatthebeginningandtheendofhisoverviewofpragmatism:“Phi-
losophy isatonce themost sublimeand themost trivialofhumanpursuits.”–
“Ontheonesidetheuniverseisabsolutelysecure,ontheotheritisstillpursuing
itsadventures.”Bothparadoxesarise throughtheendofmetaphysicsorof the
beliefintruthsofunconditionalcertainty.Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJamesliberate
themselves productively frommetaphysics in investigating the conditions and
structuresofhumanorientationthatmetaphysicshasconcealed;formetaphys-
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icsemergesexactlyifoneignorestheconditionsandstructuresofhumanorien-
tation.
Whenthelattercomeintoview,James’paradoxesdissolve.Humanorien-
tation, which seems to be trivial, proves to be highly sublime. According to
Dilthey,Nietzsche,and James,orientationworkswithdescriptive, comparative,
and hermeneutic procedures that clarify structural contexts or connections of
structures, Strukturzusammenhänge, as Dilthey calls them: they can crop up
spontaneously,isolatethemselvesfromtheirenvironment,sustainthemselvesin
it or react upon it; they can change under shifting conditions and dissipate
again.Thesestructureshavetheirfootholdsinthemereinterrelationandinter-
dependency (Zusammenhang) of their parts,which is the reasonwhy they do
notneedanymetaphysicalfoundation.Nietzschecoinedtheformulaofthe“mu-
sicoflife”thatmustbere-learnedbyidealisticphilosophers.
The“truths”atwhichhumanorientationarrivesbelongtosuchlivingin-
terrelationsandcontexts.Humanorientationcontrolsthem,accordingtoJames,
inregardtowhatdifferencetheymakeforaction.Thisimpliesthathumanori-
entation can generalize its footholds only for a time and with reservation, or
that it can only preliminarily typecast that which it observes, as Nietzsche
demonstrates effectively with his entire work. Thereby, human orientation
workswithconceptualshort-cutstotheobservablefootholdsinchangingsitua-
tions,anditalwaysleavesleewayfornewfootholdsandthesemanticdeferralof
itsconcepts.Inthisway,humanorientation–aswellasthephilosophyoforien-
tation–cankeepupwiththetimes.
***Tobecontinued***
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SectionstofollowinaSecondEdition:
19.AlternativesinDesigningPhilosophyinViewofTime:
Nietzsche,Bergson,andWhitehead
20.AlternativesinDesigningPhilosophyinViewofLanguage:
Frege,Wittgenstein,andAnalyticPhilosophy–PeirceandPhilosophiesofSign
21.AlternativesinScrutizingthe‘Given‘:PhenomenologyandHermeneutics
22.AlternativesinConceptualizingHumanBeing:Anthropology,ExistentialPhilosophy,andStructuralism
23.AlternativesinConceptualizingSociety:SociologicalSystemsTheoryandCriticalTheory,
CommunitarianismandLiberalism
24.AlternativesinConceptualizingEthics:TheoryofJustice(Rawls),DiscourseEthics(Habermas),Metaethics,
andEthicsStartingfromtheOther(LevinasandDerrida)
25.AlternativesinCourageouslyReversingOne’sOwnOrientation:WittgensteinandHeidegger
TranslatedwiththegreathelpofClaudiaWelz,
towhomIowemysincerethanks.