https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090016297 2018-05-28T16:17:50+00:00Z

CSM EPS LessonsCSM EPS Lessons

11 Power Generation System (PGS)Power Generation System (PGS)11 Power Generation System (PGS)Power Generation System (PGS)1.1. Power Generation System (PGS)Power Generation System (PGS)

22 Power Reactant Distribution System (PRDS)Power Reactant Distribution System (PRDS)

1.1. Power Generation System (PGS)Power Generation System (PGS)

22 Power Reactant Distribution System (PRDS)Power Reactant Distribution System (PRDS)2.2. Power Reactant Distribution System (PRDS)Power Reactant Distribution System (PRDS)

El t i l P Di t ib ti S t (EPDS)El t i l P Di t ib ti S t (EPDS)

2.2. Power Reactant Distribution System (PRDS)Power Reactant Distribution System (PRDS)

El t i l P Di t ib ti S t (EPDS)El t i l P Di t ib ti S t (EPDS)3.3. Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS)Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS)3.3. Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS)Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS)

4.4. BatteriesBatteries4.4. BatteriesBatteries

ObjectivesObjectives

State Basic Design Criteria for FC’sState Basic Design Criteria for FC’sState Basic Design Criteria for FC s

Design considerations during developmental

State Basic Design Criteria for FC s

Design considerations during developmentalDesign considerations during developmental phase that affected Block I and Block II vehiclesDesign considerations during developmental phase that affected Block I and Block II vehicles

Summarize the conditions that led to the failure of components in FC’sSummarize the conditions that led to the failure of components in FC’sof components in FC s

State the solutions implemented for each failure

of components in FC s

State the solutions implemented for each failureState the solutions implemented for each failureState the solutions implemented for each failure

OverviewOverview

Location of FC’sLocation of FC’sLocation of FC’sLocation of FC’sLocation of FC’sLocation of FC’sFC Theory and FC OverviewFC Theory and FC OverviewLocation of FC’sLocation of FC’sFC Theory and FC OverviewFC Theory and FC OverviewDesign Criteria going into Development PhaseDesign Criteria going into Development PhaseDesign Considerations coming fromDesign Considerations coming fromDesign Criteria going into Development PhaseDesign Criteria going into Development PhaseDesign Considerations coming fromDesign Considerations coming fromDesign Considerations coming from Design Considerations coming from Development PhaseDevelopment PhaseBlock I Failures and SolutionsBlock I Failures and Solutions

Design Considerations coming from Design Considerations coming from Development PhaseDevelopment PhaseBlock I Failures and SolutionsBlock I Failures and SolutionsBlock I Failures and SolutionsBlock I Failures and SolutionsBlock II Failures and SolutionsBlock II Failures and SolutionsBlock I Failures and SolutionsBlock I Failures and SolutionsBlock II Failures and SolutionsBlock II Failures and SolutionsLessons LearnedLessons LearnedLessons LearnedLessons Learned

Alkaline Fuel Cell LocationAlkaline Fuel Cell Location

Alkaline Fuel Cell TheoryAlkaline Fuel Cell Theory

Alkaline Fuel Cell Overview Alkaline Fuel Cell Overview

FC’s produce DC electrical power over a normal rangeFC’s produce DC electrical power over a normal rangeFC’s produce DC electrical power over a normal rangeFC’s produce DC electrical power over a normal rangeFC s produce DC electrical power over a normal range FC s produce DC electrical power over a normal range of 563 to 1420 (W) at a voltage of 27 to 31 (V).of 563 to 1420 (W) at a voltage of 27 to 31 (V).FC s produce DC electrical power over a normal range FC s produce DC electrical power over a normal range of 563 to 1420 (W) at a voltage of 27 to 31 (V).of 563 to 1420 (W) at a voltage of 27 to 31 (V).

1.1. Energy Conversion SectionEnergy Conversion Section1.1. Energy Conversion SectionEnergy Conversion Section

2.2. ReactantReactant--Control SectionControl Section2.2. ReactantReactant--Control SectionControl Section

3.3. ThermalThermal--Control SectionControl Section3.3. ThermalThermal--Control SectionControl Section

4.4. WaterWater--Removal SectionRemoval Section4.4. WaterWater--Removal SectionRemoval Section

Design CriteriaDesign CriteriaCriteria:Criteria:Criteria:Criteria:Criteria:Criteria:

“Shall be designed to supply, regulate, and distribute all “Shall be designed to supply, regulate, and distribute all electrical power required by CSM for mission requirements, and electrical power required by CSM for mission requirements, and LEM during checkout and monitoring.”LEM during checkout and monitoring.”

Criteria:Criteria:“Shall be designed to supply, regulate, and distribute all “Shall be designed to supply, regulate, and distribute all electrical power required by CSM for mission requirements, and electrical power required by CSM for mission requirements, and LEM during checkout and monitoring.”LEM during checkout and monitoring.”g gg g

System had to possess adequate mission flexibilitySystem had to possess adequate mission flexibilityNo constraints imposed on launch datesNo constraints imposed on launch dates

g gg g

System had to possess adequate mission flexibilitySystem had to possess adequate mission flexibilityNo constraints imposed on launch datesNo constraints imposed on launch datesNo constraints imposed on launch datesNo constraints imposed on launch datesHad to be operationally adaptable to changing requirements for Had to be operationally adaptable to changing requirements for successive missions without a subsequent requirement for successive missions without a subsequent requirement for design changesdesign changes

No constraints imposed on launch datesNo constraints imposed on launch datesHad to be operationally adaptable to changing requirements for Had to be operationally adaptable to changing requirements for successive missions without a subsequent requirement for successive missions without a subsequent requirement for design changesdesign changesdesign changesdesign changes

High reliability and safety that were consistent with High reliability and safety that were consistent with t i htt i ht

design changesdesign changes

High reliability and safety that were consistent with High reliability and safety that were consistent with t i htt i htsystem weightsystem weight

Factors affecting reliability, such as multiple starts, were to be Factors affecting reliability, such as multiple starts, were to be avoided, and simplicity of design was desiredavoided, and simplicity of design was desired

system weightsystem weightFactors affecting reliability, such as multiple starts, were to be Factors affecting reliability, such as multiple starts, were to be avoided, and simplicity of design was desiredavoided, and simplicity of design was desired

Development PhaseDevelopment Phase

Development PhaseDevelopment Phase

Concept for 1 5 (kW) FC came from the GeminiConcept for 1 5 (kW) FC came from the GeminiConcept for 1 5 (kW) FC came from the GeminiConcept for 1 5 (kW) FC came from the GeminiConcept for 1.5 (kW) FC came from the Gemini Concept for 1.5 (kW) FC came from the Gemini programprogram

Gemini program utilized Ion Exchange Membrane (IEM) FCGemini program utilized Ion Exchange Membrane (IEM) FC

Concept for 1.5 (kW) FC came from the Gemini Concept for 1.5 (kW) FC came from the Gemini programprogram

Gemini program utilized Ion Exchange Membrane (IEM) FCGemini program utilized Ion Exchange Membrane (IEM) FCg g ( )g g ( )g g ( )g g ( )

Electrolyte Seal Electrolyte Seal

Leakage of electrolyte at the periphery of theLeakage of electrolyte at the periphery of theLeakage of electrolyte at the periphery of theLeakage of electrolyte at the periphery of theLeakage of electrolyte at the periphery of the Leakage of electrolyte at the periphery of the unit cellunit cellLeakage of electrolyte at the periphery of the Leakage of electrolyte at the periphery of the unit cellunit cell

Cell Flooding Cell Flooding

If either hydrogen or oxygen gas pressure isIf either hydrogen or oxygen gas pressure isIf either hydrogen or oxygen gas pressure isIf either hydrogen or oxygen gas pressure isIf either hydrogen or oxygen gas pressure is If either hydrogen or oxygen gas pressure is more than 2.5 (psi) below or 10.5 (psi) above the more than 2.5 (psi) below or 10.5 (psi) above the electrolyte pressure, a breakdown of theelectrolyte pressure, a breakdown of the

If either hydrogen or oxygen gas pressure is If either hydrogen or oxygen gas pressure is more than 2.5 (psi) below or 10.5 (psi) above the more than 2.5 (psi) below or 10.5 (psi) above the electrolyte pressure, a breakdown of theelectrolyte pressure, a breakdown of theelectrolyte pressure, a breakdown of the electrolyte pressure, a breakdown of the liquid/gas interface was possibleliquid/gas interface was possibleelectrolyte pressure, a breakdown of the electrolyte pressure, a breakdown of the liquid/gas interface was possibleliquid/gas interface was possible

Nickel back-platediaphragm section

Nickel plus nickel oxideelectrode

Weld

Nitrogen blanket pressure

KOH

Oxygen reactant cavity Hydrogen reactantNickel electrode Oxygen reactant cavity

Dendrite FormationDendrite Formation

FC shorted out internally during shutdownFC shorted out internally during shutdownFC shorted out internally during shutdownFC shorted out internally during shutdownFC shorted out internally during shutdownFC shorted out internally during shutdownFC shorted out internally during shutdownFC shorted out internally during shutdown

il d d i i f dd d li hil d d i i f dd d li hSilver dendrite experiment from Goddard Space Flight CenterSilver dendrite experiment from Goddard Space Flight Center

AccumulatorAccumulator

Size was insufficient to function as a pressureSize was insufficient to function as a pressureSize was insufficient to function as a pressureSize was insufficient to function as a pressureSize was insufficient to function as a pressure Size was insufficient to function as a pressure control device for total temp range of FCcontrol device for total temp range of FCSize was insufficient to function as a pressure Size was insufficient to function as a pressure control device for total temp range of FCcontrol device for total temp range of FC

Cell SeparationCell Separation

Occurrence of cold poppingOccurrence of cold poppingOccurrence of cold poppingOccurrence of cold poppingOccurrence of cold poppingOccurrence of cold poppingOccurrence of cold poppingOccurrence of cold popping

Water-Glycol PumpWater-Glycol Pump

Leakage and failure to startLeakage and failure to startLeakage and failure to startLeakage and failure to startLeakage and failure to startLeakage and failure to startLeakage and failure to startLeakage and failure to start

Water-Glycol Pump, cont’dWater-Glycol Pump, cont’d

Hydrogen Vent PortHydrogen Vent Port

Under extreme thermal conditions the waterUnder extreme thermal conditions the waterUnder extreme thermal conditions the waterUnder extreme thermal conditions the waterUnder extreme thermal conditions the water Under extreme thermal conditions the water vapor condensed and froze at purgevapor condensed and froze at purge--port port openingopening

Under extreme thermal conditions the water Under extreme thermal conditions the water vapor condensed and froze at purgevapor condensed and froze at purge--port port openingopeningopeningopening

This prevented further hydrogen purgingThis prevented further hydrogen purging

openingopening

This prevented further hydrogen purgingThis prevented further hydrogen purgingp y g p g gp y g p g g

Two heaters were added to subsequent flight Two heaters were added to subsequent flight

p y g p g gp y g p g g

Two heaters were added to subsequent flight Two heaters were added to subsequent flight vehiclesvehiclesvehiclesvehicles

Hydrogen Pump/SeparatorHydrogen Pump/Separator

Because the hydrogen was saturated with waterBecause the hydrogen was saturated with waterBecause the hydrogen was saturated with waterBecause the hydrogen was saturated with waterBecause the hydrogen was saturated with water Because the hydrogen was saturated with water vapor, several electrical problems were vapor, several electrical problems were encountered until a satisfactory waterproofing encountered until a satisfactory waterproofing

Because the hydrogen was saturated with water Because the hydrogen was saturated with water vapor, several electrical problems were vapor, several electrical problems were encountered until a satisfactory waterproofing encountered until a satisfactory waterproofing epoxy insulation was foundepoxy insulation was foundepoxy insulation was foundepoxy insulation was found

W W

TOP

VIEW

BACK

VIE

W

Block I AnomalyBlock I Anomaly

Secondary Coolant LoopSecondary Coolant Loop

Cooling capacity of the secondary coolant loopCooling capacity of the secondary coolant loopCooling capacity of the secondary coolant loopCooling capacity of the secondary coolant loopCooling capacity of the secondary coolant loop Cooling capacity of the secondary coolant loop was reducedwas reducedCooling capacity of the secondary coolant loop Cooling capacity of the secondary coolant loop was reducedwas reduced

TOP VIEWBACK VIEW

Block II AnomaliesBlock II Anomalies

Condenser Exit Temperature 1Condenser Exit Temperature 1

Condenser Exit Temperature 2Condenser Exit Temperature 2

Water slugging out of condenserWater slugging out of condenserWater slugging out of condenserWater slugging out of condenserWater slugging out of condenserWater slugging out of condenserWater slugging out of condenserWater slugging out of condenser

Condenser Exit Temperature 2Condenser Exit Temperature 2

Ingestion of Hydrogen Gas Ingestion of Hydrogen Gas

Ingestion of hydrogen gas into drinking waterIngestion of hydrogen gas into drinking waterIngestion of hydrogen gas into drinking waterIngestion of hydrogen gas into drinking waterIngestion of hydrogen gas into drinking water Ingestion of hydrogen gas into drinking water caused discomfort to crewmancaused discomfort to crewman

Solution was the development of hydrogen gasSolution was the development of hydrogen gas

Ingestion of hydrogen gas into drinking water Ingestion of hydrogen gas into drinking water caused discomfort to crewmancaused discomfort to crewman

Solution was the development of hydrogen gasSolution was the development of hydrogen gasSolution was the development of hydrogen gas Solution was the development of hydrogen gas separator which was added to the drinking water separator which was added to the drinking water system system

Solution was the development of hydrogen gas Solution was the development of hydrogen gas separator which was added to the drinking water separator which was added to the drinking water system system

Lessons Learned/ReviewLessons Learned/Review

Some problems were unique to the FC and others wereSome problems were unique to the FC and others wereSome problems were unique to the FC and others wereSome problems were unique to the FC and others wereSome problems were unique to the FC and others were Some problems were unique to the FC and others were caused by integration with other spacecraft systemscaused by integration with other spacecraft systemsSome problems were unique to the FC and others were Some problems were unique to the FC and others were caused by integration with other spacecraft systemscaused by integration with other spacecraft systems

Operational errors caused the costly failure of several Operational errors caused the costly failure of several FC’s during early servicing and checkout operationsFC’s during early servicing and checkout operationsOperational errors caused the costly failure of several Operational errors caused the costly failure of several FC’s during early servicing and checkout operationsFC’s during early servicing and checkout operations

Contamination was a serious problem for spacecraft Contamination was a serious problem for spacecraft subsystemsubsystemContamination was a serious problem for spacecraft Contamination was a serious problem for spacecraft subsystemsubsystemsubsystemsubsystem

Redundancy philosophy that was instituted by FC Redundancy philosophy that was instituted by FC

subsystemsubsystem

Redundancy philosophy that was instituted by FC Redundancy philosophy that was instituted by FC system designers resulted in system and mission system designers resulted in system and mission flexibility flexibility system designers resulted in system and mission system designers resulted in system and mission flexibility flexibility

LESSONS LEARNED/REVIEWLESSONS LEARNED/REVIEW

Recommendations:Recommendations:Recommendations:Recommendations:Recommendations:Recommendations:System selection/design criteria should include System selection/design criteria should include susceptibility to damage as a result of operational susceptibility to damage as a result of operational

Recommendations:Recommendations:System selection/design criteria should include System selection/design criteria should include susceptibility to damage as a result of operational susceptibility to damage as a result of operational p y g pp y g perrorerrorSystem/spacecraft interfaces should be carefully System/spacecraft interfaces should be carefully d fi dd fi d

p y g pp y g perrorerrorSystem/spacecraft interfaces should be carefully System/spacecraft interfaces should be carefully d fi dd fi ddefineddefinedCompatibility of circulating fluids with system Compatibility of circulating fluids with system hardware verifiedhardware verified

defineddefinedCompatibility of circulating fluids with system Compatibility of circulating fluids with system hardware verifiedhardware verifiedAll fluid loops should have filters upstream of critical All fluid loops should have filters upstream of critical componentscomponentsAll fluid loops should have filters upstream of critical All fluid loops should have filters upstream of critical componentscomponentsCritical automatic control devices should be used in Critical automatic control devices should be used in manner to avoid operation in twomanner to avoid operation in two--phasephase--fluid fluid mediummedium

Critical automatic control devices should be used in Critical automatic control devices should be used in manner to avoid operation in twomanner to avoid operation in two--phasephase--fluid fluid mediummediummedium medium medium medium

ObjectivesObjectives

State Basic Design Criteria for FC’sState Basic Design Criteria for FC’sState Basic Design Criteria for FC’sState Basic Design Criteria for FC’sState Basic Design Criteria for FC sState Basic Design Criteria for FC s

Design considerations during developmentalDesign considerations during developmental

State Basic Design Criteria for FC sState Basic Design Criteria for FC s

Design considerations during developmentalDesign considerations during developmentalDesign considerations during developmental Design considerations during developmental phase that affected Block I and Block II vehiclesphase that affected Block I and Block II vehiclesDesign considerations during developmental Design considerations during developmental phase that affected Block I and Block II vehiclesphase that affected Block I and Block II vehicles

Summarize the conditions that led to the failure Summarize the conditions that led to the failure of components in FC’sof components in FC’sSummarize the conditions that led to the failure Summarize the conditions that led to the failure of components in FC’sof components in FC’sof components in FC sof components in FC s

State the solutions implemented for each failureState the solutions implemented for each failure

of components in FC sof components in FC s

State the solutions implemented for each failureState the solutions implemented for each failureState the solutions implemented for each failureState the solutions implemented for each failureState the solutions implemented for each failureState the solutions implemented for each failure

ReferencesReferences