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NATO RAPID DEPLOYABLE CORPS – ITALY
- Public Affairs Office -
DAILY MEDIA
FRIDAY 10 APRIL 2015
NRDC-ITA HQ, Solbiate Olona, Varese
Tel. +39 0331 345110- 5117-5129 / Fax +39 0331 345124 / Web www.paonrdc.it / Email [email protected]
1. With Russia in Mind, NATO Tries to Get Faster at Responses http://www.newsweek.com/russia-‐mind-‐nato-‐tries-‐get-‐faster-‐responses-‐321078 2. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Returns to Kabul http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abdullah-‐sharif/afghan-‐president-‐ashraf-‐ghani-‐returns-‐to-‐kabul_b_7032592.html 3. Afghanistan still needs U.S. troops http://aztecpressonline.com/2015/04/afghanistan-‐still-‐needs-‐u-‐s-‐troops/ 4. Ukraine Wants to Join NATO http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-‐wants-‐join-‐nato-‐321070 5. LIBYA’S CIVIL WAR https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote25_Engel4.pdf 6. Incredible: the International Criminal Court said “No probe of ISIS crimes” http://www.islamedianalysis.info/incredible-‐the-‐international-‐criminal-‐court-‐said-‐no-‐probe-‐of-‐isis-‐crimes/ 7. Tensions Between Iran and Saudi Arabia Deepen Over Conflict in Yemen http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/world/middleeast/yemen-‐fighting.html?&hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-‐column-‐region®ion=top-‐news&WT.nav=top-‐news005 8. The Limits of Iranian Expansion https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-‐diary/limits-‐iranian-‐expansion 9. If ‘Game of Thrones’ were in the Middle East http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/04/09/if-‐game-‐of-‐thrones-‐was-‐in-‐the-‐middle-‐east/?wpisrc=nl_evening&wpmm=1
10/4/2015 With Russia in Mind, NATO Tries to Get Faster at Responses
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With Russia in Mind, NATO Tries to Get Fasterat Responses
EINDHOVEN, The Netherlands (Reuters) - Dutch troops gathered at an air base onThursday as part of an 11-nation exercise to test NATO's new rapid response targets thathave been tightened following concern over new Russian assertiveness.
Given just 48 hours to deploy, around 200 soldiers arrived at the air base near Eindhovenwith the vehicles, weapons, equipment, food and water they would need if they had to flyabroad at short notice to confront an emergency.
Previously, NATO's rapid reaction force was expected to respond within five to seven days,but leaders of the Western military alliance decided last September that faster times wereneeded to meet new geo-political threats.
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"We are able to get everybody processed and supplied to be on the airplane within 48hours," said Captain Rob Morsink, from the Dutch 11th Air Manoeuvre Brigade. "Webasically confirmed that that's not an issue at all."
The rehearsal was part of a Europe-wide exercise involving more than 1,500 soldiers. Arapid reaction unit in the Czech Republic was also told to prepare to move, while nine otherNATO allies tested their headquarters' responses to alert procedures.
"We have 900 German troops being recalled to four garrisons right now and checking theirability to deploy," said Polish Colonel Mariusz Lewicki, a top NATO military planner.
After being given notice to deploy on Tuesday, the Dutch and Czech units recalled theirsoldiers to base and had the lead troops ready to move in as little as eight hours, Lewickisaid.
BY REUTERS 4/9/15 AT 5:14 PM
10/4/2015 With Russia in Mind, NATO Tries to Get Faster at Responses
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JOIN THE DISCUSSION
Surprised by the speed of Russia's military intervention in Crimea last year, NATO leadershave approved wide-ranging plans to boost the alliance's defenses in eastern Europe andcreate a new "spearhead" rapid reaction force with 5,000 soldiers.
While that force is not expected to be fully operational until 2016 or 2017, NATO is tryingto hasten the response time of its existing reaction force, whose troops are supplied this yearby Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.
NATO disappointed some eastern European allies who wanted the U.S.-dominatedorganization to station large numbers of troops on their territory following Russia's actionsin Ukraine.
NATO hopes the rapid reaction force will nonetheless prove a deterrent by demonstrating itsresolve to defend swiftly any ally that should came under attack.
Although they undoubtedly had east Europe in mind when they agreed to the new plan, theforce could also respond to "risks emanating from the Middle East and North Africa,"NATO has said.
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10/4/2015 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Returns to Kabul | Abdullah Sharif
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Posted: 04/09/2015 3:06 pmEDT Updated: 04/09/20153:59 pm EDT
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Returnsto Kabul
After a successful trip to Washington and New York where the Afghan PresidentAshraf Ghani reset the tone vis a vis the Afghan/U.S. relationship, he returned toKabul to get on with the business of governing and tackle the myriad problems facinghis country.
One of the most pressing issues for the Afghan government is to complete the staffingof the ministries in the hope of strengthening the country's institutions. Although Mr.Ghani presented the lower house of the Afghan parliament, the Wolosy Jirga, with alist containing the nominees for 16 posts that are still vacant before his trip toWashington last month , the Wolosy Jirga has just begun the confirmation process.
The Wolosy Jirga members are directly elected by the people they represent in allcorners of the country. They are mostly powerful warlords who have forced their wayin by very questionable means. Elections in Afghanistan are fraught with blatantfraud. Therefore, this branch of the Afghan government is as dysfunctional andcorrupt as the others, the executive and judiciary.
Some parliamentarians have asked for outright bribes from the cabinet nominees inexchange for their confirmation vote. According to reports from Kabul, somemembers of Wolosy Jirga are asking for sums upward of $500,000, hefty by anymeasure. The payment of any such sums will have to be made up from illegal sourcesonce the nominee is confirmed and has assumed responsibility for his or her ministry.Thus the culture of corruption and impunity continues unabated in a vicious cycle.
The first wave of nominees introduced four months after Mr. Ghani's inaugurationsailed through the Wolosy Jirga partly because most nominees were politically wellconnected to the various parties with militias including the Northern Alliance,Afghanistan's Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah's party. This is a good opportunityfor the Government of National Unity (GNU) to put a stop to this brazen predatorypractice. Mr. Ghani and his partner Mr. Abdullah need to show the Afghans and theworld that they are serious about tackling corruption as promised.
On his return to Kabul, Mr. Ghani issued a decree establishing the Electoral ReformCommission in an attempt to begin the arduous journey of reforming the Afghaninstitution. He appointed a woman, Shukria Barakzai, to head the commission. Theoffice of Chief Executive Abdullah has denounced this move as unilateral by thePresident and contrary to the previous agreements which led to the formation of the
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10/4/2015 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Returns to Kabul | Abdullah Sharif
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Abdullah's spokesman has stated that during the last presidential elections Barakzaiwas one of Ghani's supporters and as such not acceptable. Abdullah claims that hewas not consulted, fearing that President Ghani is trying to marginalize him. As aresult of this tug of war the commission has not yet begun its work to reform theelections process needed for the next round of parliamentary elections and beyond.
Even more troubling is the withdrawal of Afzal Ludin as the nominee to head theministry of defense due to disagreements between the President and the ChiefExecutive. As the fighting season begins with the arrival of spring and the melting ofsnow, it is crucial that the Afghan National Army has solid leadership. According toreports Mr. Abdullah has objected to Ludin's nomination by Mr. Ghani which forcedMr. Ludin to step aside. If these are indications of more disagreements to come, notonly governing Afghanistan would be difficult, but the very survival of the NationalUnity Government will be in question.
Another organizational task for Mr. Ghani is to appoint governors and police chiefs inmany provinces that he had summarily dismissed last year. People say that PresidentGhani is good at firing people, some on the spot, but not so apt at hiring. Finding theright person for a job is a huge problem in a country that has a very shallow pool ofcompetent technocrats and other civil servants, especially people untainted by pastand present illicit activities. Many expatriates from Europe and the US returned toAfghanistan after the US intervention in 2001 to participate in the rebuilding of thecountry. But many became a part of the corrupt machine (the Afghan government).
Some good and honest ones like the late Mayor Haidar Hamidi of Kandahar werekilled, and yet others were not given a chance and disillusioned, they returned toEurope or the U.S. The agency responsible for the provincial government is theIndependent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). It has been paralyzed withouta leader. My contacts tell me that a number of governors including that of theimportant province of Kandahar are waiting to be replaced and, demoralized, arebuying time without accomplishing much. If the Afghan government wishes tocombat the Taliban and get support from rank and file Afghans, it is imperative thatthey provide basic services to the people. This would be almost impossible to achievein the absence of bureaucrats.
In the past 14 years, the Afghan government preoccupied itself with immediateregional issues rather than world affairs. These issues include matters crucial for thefuture of Afghanistan including Pakistan, which is a strong link to the Taliban. Afterhis return to Kabul, President Ghani changed that posture by formally supporting theintervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemen. He has been criticized for abandoningAfghanistan's traditional neutrality in favor of a Saudi led coalition against the Iraniansupported Houthi insurgency in Yemen. Mr. Ghani desperately wants to engage theTaliban in the hope of stopping the fighting. Pakistan, which is a party to the coalitionwith the Saudis and Egypt, holds the master key. The Saudis have supported theTaliban with funding and political recognition and as such have sway over them. Mr.Ghani's motivation here is to curry favor with both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to bringthe Taliban to the negotiation table. Mr. Ghani went ahead with this endorsement atthe expense of Afghanistan's other neighbor, Iran, which is not a player in this
10/4/2015 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Returns to Kabul | Abdullah Sharif
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10/4/2015 Afghanistan still needs U.S. troops : AztecPressOnline
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Afghanistan still needs U.S. troopsAlex Fruechtenicht | Apr 09, 2015 | Comments 0
BY PABLO ESPINOSA
There must be a permanent U.S. force in Afghanistan of at least 15,000 troops.
After 13 years of combat, the public is tired of war and politicians are unlikely to get elected if they support keeping troops inAfghanistan. However, withdrawing completely might force the U.S. to come back later.
The idea of keeping troops in Afghanistan indefinitely might seems silly to most but the idea that Afghanistan will be apeaceful democratic country without foreign military support is nothing short of comical.
In 1988, the Soviet Union left Afghanistan after an eightyear struggle to support the communist, proSoviet government —and an estimated 15,000 Russian deaths. Four years later, Muslim rebels took control of the country.
Fast forward to 2015. President Barack Obama had a meeting on March 24 with the newly elected president ofAfghanistan, Ashraf Ghani.
Ghani requested a slower drawdown of U.S. troops. Obama agreed to leave 9,800 troops in the country for the rest of theyear. He had planned to leave 5,600 troops.
With the current campaign in Iraq against the Sunni militants who call themselves the Islamic State, Obama isunderstandably ready to leave troops for longer than expected to prevent a similar situation in Afghanistan.
The U.S. spent approximately $1 trillion on the Iraq war, with $25 billion of that money going to building the new Iraqi army.But the U.S. failed to understand that you can’t just throw money at a situation, then run away.
The former president of Iraq, Nouri alMaliki, stepped down as one of the conditions for the U.S. to intervene against theIslamic State.
Maliki is a Shiite. When he took office, he started killing and oppressing minority Sunnis who had ruled the country underSaddam Hussein and were promised an active role in government by the Americans.
He fired top military commanders and gave their jobs to Shiite friends who had no military experience and wanted none.
When the Sunnis rose up, the $25 billion army the U.S. spent thousands of American lives trying to build simply collapsed.Today, the Islamic State is using captured U.S. military weapons in Iraq and Syria.
Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product was $2.4 billion before the U.S. invaded. By 2013, it had grown to 20.5 billion. Thecountry has become financially dependent on the United States.
The U.S. may continue to financially support Afghanistan but without our troops to train and support the Afghan nationalarmy and police, history will repeat itself.
Afghanistan will again be controlled by Islamic extremists and become a base for terrorism.
10/4/2015 Ukraine Wants to Join NATO
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Ukraine Wants to Join NATO
Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko (C) and Ukrainian secretary to the NationalSecurity and Defence Council Oleksandr Turchynov (R) inspect weapons and militaryequipment as they visit the training center of the Ukrainian National Guard outside KievApril 4, 2015. /MYKOLA LAZARENKO/UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESSSERVICE/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS
FILED UNDER: World, Ukraine, NATO, Russia
KIEV (Reuters) - Ukraine, locked in conflict with Russian-backedseparatists in its east, on Thursday drew up a new security doctrinedenouncing Russia's "aggression" and setting its sights on joiningthe U.S.-led NATO military alliance.
Oleksander Turchynov, head of the national security council, tolda session of the body that Ukraine saw Russian aggression as a"long-standing factor" and viewed NATO membership as "theonly reliable external guarantee" of its sovereignty and territorialintegrity.
Turchynov's comments and the move to draft a new security
BY REUTERS 4/9/15 AT 5:10 PM
WORLD
10/4/2015 Ukraine Wants to Join NATO
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strategy were certain to raise hackles in Russia, which annexed theCrimean peninsula in March 2014 after a pro-Western leadershiptook power in Kiev in the wake of an uprising that ousted aMoscow-backed president.
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Russian officials have said the radical change of leadership in Kievraises the strategic threat of U.S. and NATO warships one daybeing based in the Black Sea waters off Crimea.
Moscow has backed separatists fighting Kiev government forces ineastern Ukraine, in a conflict in which more than 6,000 peoplehave been killed.
Turchynov said the five-year strategy was based on the reality ofmilitary aggression unleashed by Russia.
"For the first time in history a permanent member of the U.N.Security Council which possesses the nuclear weapon uses thisfactor to intimidate the international community and uses itsmilitary potential for annexation and seizing the territory of aEuropean country," he said.
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10/4/2015 Ukraine Wants to Join NATO
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He said European and Euro-Atlantic integration was now a priorityfor Ukraine's policies and the country would aim to coordinate itsarmed forces and intelligence services with those of the Westernalliance.
Ukraine, at the center of a geo-political tug-of-war between Russiaand the West, has grown close to the NATO alliance during theyears since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.
The pro-Western leadership has prepared the way for a swerve instrategic direction by scrapping the "non-bloc" status introducedunder ousted former president Viktor Yanukovich.
NATO has said membership is one day possible for Ukraine, buthas declined to arm the Kiev government on the grounds that, as anon-member, it does not qualify for military help under NATO'scollective defense rules.
The new military doctrine drawn up by the national securitycouncil will become policy once it has been endorsed by a decreefrom President Petro Poroshenko.
10/4/2015 Libya’s civil war: An oily mess | The Economist
http://www.economist.com/node/21648054/print 1/3
Libya’s civil warAn oily messAs negotiations fail to progress, one side tries to grab the oil revenue
Apr 11th 2015 | CAIRO | From the print edition
MORE blood was spilled in Libya’s civil war on April 5th, when a suicide-bomber from
Islamic State (IS) killed at least six people in the coastal city of Misrata and when the
internationally recognised government in Beida in the east struck its opponents near Tripoli
in the west. But the boldest move of the weekend caused no bloodshed. On April 4th the
10/4/2015 Libya’s civil war: An oily mess | The Economist
http://www.economist.com/node/21648054/print 2/3
An interactive guide to the Middle East's tangled politics(http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/04/daily-chart-0)
Beida government made a grab for the country’s cash by directing the state-run oil company,
the National Oil Corporation (NOC), to send its income not to the central bank in Tripoli but
to the government’s own offshore account.
Libya’s oil output is down to some 500,000 barrels a day, from as much as 1.7m at its peak
(see chart). Even so, its sales are the only thing keeping the country afloat. The revenue is
being fought over by both sides in the conflict, which has split the country between two rival
governments—the one in Beida, the other in Tripoli—and their allied militias. The NOC and
the central bank, both in Tripoli, have somehow preserved their independence, but at a cost.
The bank has used the oil money to pay consumer subsidies and the salaries of government
workers across Libya, thereby funding each side’s war.
Few expect the NOC’s revenue to end up in the coffers of the Beida government, which has
tried to get hold of the cash before by setting up a parallel outfit at Ras Lanuf, an oil hub it
controls, and installing a rival chairman of the bank. Both efforts failed. Western companies
buy the bulk of the country’s oil and have little interest in changing contracts that are paid
into central-bank accounts. Moreover, the Beida government has little ability to pay salaries,
as the database of government workers is in Tripoli. “Even if they do get the money, there’s
no way to deliver it,” says Mattia Toaldo of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a
think-tank in London.
More than anything, many think, the move is a sign of the Beida government’s increasing
intransigence, which has soured efforts by the UN to negotiate an end to the conflict and
focus the fight on IS. During peace talks last month Khalifa Haftar, a general allied to the
Beida administration, ordered an air attack on Tripoli. General Haftar has received support
from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which see Libya as a front in a war against
Islamists (they are part of the alliance supporting the Tripoli government). But Western
powers fear his war on “terrorists” is really an attempt to seize personal power. So although
they recognise the Beida government, they have refused to enable its control of the country’s
finances.
The two sides appear to be fragmenting. General Haftar has fallen out with former allies. Mr
Toaldo says the militias’ chains of command are loosening. With IS added to the mix it is no
10/4/2015 Libya’s civil war: An oily mess | The Economist
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longer clear who is fighting whom. A peace settlement seems ever harder to reach.
Government workers, at least, are still being paid. But for how much longer? The deficit this
year is expected to be about two-thirds of GDP, and the country’s reserves are running low.
Winning control of Libya’s finances may not be worth the trouble.
From the print edition: Middle East and Africa
10/4/2015 Incredible: the International Criminal Court said “No probe of ISIS crimes”
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Incredible: the International Criminal Courtsaid “No probe of ISIS crimes”9 APRILE 2015 BY ANDREA SPADA
The International Criminal Court said that it would not yet open a probe into alleged crimes committed by the
Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, including genocide, as it lacks jurisdiction.
Iraq and Syria have not signed the ICC’s founding Rome Statute that would give the court jurisdiction, but
the ICC could prosecute some of the thousands of foreign ISIS fighters who are nationals of countries that
have signed up.
Crimes of “unspeakable cruelty” including mass executions, sexual slavery, rape, torture and mutilation have
been reported and genocide alleged, chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said in a statement.
As a result, her office has been assessing the prospect of exercising “personal jurisdiction” over foreign ISIS
fighters, including from Tunisia, Jordan, Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Australia,
she said.
However, the ISIS group is “primarily led by nationals of Iraq and Syria… thus, at this stage, the prospects of
my office investigating and prosecuting those most responsible… appear limited.”
“I have come to the conclusion that the jurisdictional basis for opening a preliminary examination into this
situation is too narrow at this stage,” Bensouda said.
The United Nations Security Council could refer the situation in Iraq and Syria to the ICC, as happened with
Libya in 2011, Bensouda said, and countries with nationals who are ISIS militants could also launch their own
prosecutions.
The prosecutor said in an interview in November that she was weighing bringing war crimes charges against
Islamic State jihadist fighters, saying she had received files from several countries.
10/4/2015 Incredible: the International Criminal Court said “No probe of ISIS crimes”
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Islamic State militants have carried out a wave of abuses in areas they control in Iraq and Syria, including
public beheadings, mass executions, enslavement and rape.
The ICC is the world’s only independent permanent tribunal to try cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. It was established in 2002 and opened its doors a year later.
10/4/2015 The Arab NATO | Foreign Policy
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/09/the-arab-nato-saudi-arabia-iraq-yemen-iran/ 1/4
The Arab NATOThe new 40,000-strong Arab League “response force” is all about countering Iran.
Get ready for tense times and strange bedfellows in the Middle East.
APRIL 9, 2015BY JAMES STAVRIDIS
Syria is in flames, Iraq is at war, Libya is unraveling, and Yemen has basically disintegrated. While it
might not be novel to say that the Middle East is once again beset by crises, the collective response of
Middle Eastern nations to this unique set of overlapping and interwoven conflicts certainly is. The
Arab League is creating a new “response force” of some 40,000 military professionals from a variety of
nations, and will reportedly be formally adopted in a couple of weeks at the next summit. While not
remotely at NATO levels of professional capability, this is a fascinating and important development in
the world’s most troubled region.
The initial force will be composed of troops mostly from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and
Sudan (and a smattering of others from Gulf nations), and will be based in Egypt. It will be
commanded by a Saudi general, and will boast a structured and permanent command structure. The
idea is to pull together a multinational force that could be ready to react to future crises, in the same
way that several Arab nations are currently conducting operations today in Yemen. Reports indicate
that 500 to 1,000 men will be members in the air command; up to 5,000 service members will
constitute the naval command; and roughly 35,000 will be part of the land forces. Like the NATO
command structure, this Arab force will have specified warfighting components: air, sea, land, and
special forces. The troops will be paid for by their respective countries, and the command structure
will be financed by the Gulf Cooperation Council.
There is a fair amount of precedent for this type of operation, including, of course, the various Arab
coalition attacks against Israel in the 20th century and the 1962 Arab coalition operation in Yemen.
Why is this happening and what should we in the West do about it?
10/4/2015 The Arab NATO | Foreign Policy
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It is clearly not simply because of events in Yemen, although that is the proximate trigger. In simple
terms, the Arab League — essentially a Sunni club at this point given the political meltdowns in Iraq,
Lebanon, and Syria — is creating this army to face Iran.
This is particularly important for the Sunni Arab world given the distinct possibility of Tehran’s return
to the world stage, if sanctions are indeed lifted. If that occurs, billions of dollars will flow into Iran’s
coffers as its ability to trade freely internationally comes back online. While Iran may or may not be
prevented from ultimately building a nuclear weapon, it most certainly will have a windfall of
resources shortly, assuming the nuclear deal is finalized.
Iran will use those resources as it has for a couple of decades: to push the Shiite religious agenda,
sponsor terrorism directed against Sunnis, Israelis, and the West (in roughly that order), and
strengthen its already capable armed forces. Iran already effectively controls five capitals in the
Middle East — Tehran, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and most recently Sanaa. The mullahs’ goal is to
push their version of Islam and to diminish the stature and status of their Sunni opponents: notably
Saudi Arabia (which they see as vulnerable), Bahrain (which has an oppressed Shiite majority), and the
Gulf States (which are small and close enough to be dominated).
As I have written before, we are looking at an event in Islam not unlike the reformation in the Christian
faith — which ended up killing huge numbers of Europeans in the wars between Catholics and
Protestants. Such is the likely future of this part of the Islamic world, unless cooler heads prevail.
This emerging coalition operation in Yemen will include Saudis, Egyptians, soldiers from the Gulf
States, and, very, possibly Pakistan. So far, the United States is supplying information, intelligence,
and air refueling capacity. The announcement of the Arab response force — which builds on this
relationship — is a startling new development, but a logical extension of the massive defensive buying
program Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have been engaged in for two decades. They have significant
technological military muscle, especially in the air and on the sea. And with Egyptian troops, they can
mount a formidable campaign ashore.
What should we be doing about it?
10/4/2015 The Arab NATO | Foreign Policy
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The United States should support this emerging Sunni coalition, to include not only intelligence and
logistics, but cyber, special forces training, unmanned vehicles, and other “new triad” systems that can
be brought to bear without huge manpower commitments. Obviously, our well-developed military
assistance programs — in the form of grants to Egypt and sales to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States —
should continue. And our training and exchange programs should be strengthened as well.
Is there a role for NATO?
It’s too early to tell. But NATO does have warm relations with many of the Sunni states as part of the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. At a recent conference in the region, NATO Deputy Secretary General
Alexander Vershbow said, “NATO has a solid record of cooperation with countries here in the Gulf. The
launch of our Istanbul Cooperation Initiative ten years ago was a strong demonstration that the
security and stability of this region is of strategic interest to NATO — just as the security and stability
of the Euro-Atlantic area matter to the Gulf region.” Building on existing ties (to include ongoing good
work together in Afghanistan) makes sense. Granted, it is quite unlikely that these nations will be
clamoring for NATO help, but the Western alliance should make itself available — no pressure, just an
offer — for advice, joint exercises, shared intelligence, material support, and general assistance.
Finally, the delicate question of Israel should be considered. Is it possible that, over time, Arab
concerns over Persian power grabs may actually supersede their antipathy for Israel? That seems
unlikely, yet worth thinking about as this Sunni-Shiite divide unfolds. Egypt and Jordan have peaceful
relations with Israel — and clearly the Gulf nations share Israel’s fear of a nuclear armed Iran. It is
possible that, despite the nasty precedents of 1967 and 1973, a Sunni military coalition poised to
counter Tehran might provide the basis for cooperation with Israel over threats from the Shiite world.
Sadly, it seems likely that we are headed toward a significant Sunni-Shiite war in the region, one in
which much blood may be shed. And it is worth considering how the United States and NATO could
interact with our friends in the region as they face a significantly strengthened Iran coming out of the
nuclear negotiations.
Photo Credit: FAYEZ NURELDINE / AFP
RESEARCH NOTEST H E WA S H I N G T O N I N S T I T U T E F O R N E A R E A S T P O L I C Y
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Number 25 — April 2015
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LIBYA’S CIVIL WARRebuilding the Country from the Ground Up
Andrew Engel
Andrew Engel, a former research assistant at The Washington Institute, received his master’s degree in security studies at Georgetown University and currently works as an Africa analyst. He traveled across Libya after its official liberation. He is the author of the Washington Institute Research Note Libya as a Failed State: Causes, Consequences, Options.
Libya’s postrevolutionary transition to democracy has been completely upended by civil war and
the extension of the so-called Islamic State to Libyan lands.1 The country’s disintegration has been referred to as “the Middle East’s second war zone”2 and “a war to watch in 2015.”3 An estimated 2 million Libyans out of a population of 6.2 million have been affected by the escalation in fighting—with at least 454,000 Libyans displaced since November 2014,4 some for the fourth or fifth time5—exacerbating an already untenable humanitarian crisis.
Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), including the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which now claims the Islamic State in Libya (ISL) as part of its caliphate, continue to expand throughout the country’s three provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. Jonathan Powell, the British special envoy to Libya, described the country on January 14 as “a honey pot” for VEOs such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and even Boko Haram,6 which on March 7 pledged allegiance to ISIS.7 The deadly March 18 attack against the Bardo National Museum in Tunis by ISIS gunmen trained in ISL territory underscores the VEO threat to the region emanating from the country.8 It is therefore no surprise that Bernardino
León, the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), has warned that Libya is “very close to total chaos”9 and that the country is increas-ingly being compared to “a Somalia”10 or “Mosul”11 on the Mediterranean.
The central argument of this paper is that UNSMIL’s current top-down approach in pursuit of a unity government—backed by the European Union and the United States—will prove unable to deliver stability. Worse, it could further fan the conflagration, given that the UN Security Council could loosen its arms embargo in the event a unity government is formed,12 allowing more weapons to enter a coun-try already oversaturated with them. The situation could also be aggravated by the arrival of EU member country troops to Libya to back a unity government.13 Weapons delivered to a central government lacking official armed forces could be diverted to the various armed groups that have, since 2011, undermined the emergence of a strong unity government in the first place. An influx of weapons to Libya could also exac-erbate terrorism-related security challenges facing Libya’s neighbors.14 The presence of foreign soldiers in Libya to protect government buildings and infra-structure would directly support VEO recruitment
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last General National Congress (GNC) that was reinstated in August 2014 and is still led by Nuri Abu Sahmain and, until recently, the “National Salvation Government” of Prime Minister Omar al-Hassi in Tripoli. Hassi was dismissed by the GNC and his ministers for poor leadership on the economy, and was replaced by his deputy, Khalifa Ghwell, also an Islamist.15 Broadly speaking, Operation Dignity con-sists of traditional Arab nationalists, federalists, anti-Islamists, and former regime elements, while Opera-tion Dawn comprises a loose coalition of hardline revolutionaries, Islamists, and Amazigh in the north-west. Each alliance outwardly exhibits the impression of unified command and control, but there is tension and diffusion among their many parts.
Libya’s crisis reflects broader regional tensions and conflicts16 and, as such, has been subject to varying types of foreign intervention. States advocating polit-ical Islam, such as Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan, support factions within Operation Dawn, and their regional and ideological competitors, the United Arab Emir-ates, Saudi Arabia, and in particular Egypt, support factions of Operation Dignity, which also receives backing from Russia.17 VEOs such as ISL receive outside support in the form of foreign fighters, the likely smuggling of weapons and goods, and propa-ganda that drives recruitment and hijra (immigra-tion) to caliphate territory in Libya. The growth of ISL increases the likelihood of additional direct for-eign interventions, as requested by neighbors such as Mali18 and Chad,19 or along the lines of Egypt’s February 16 bombing of Darnah in response to ISL’s killing of twenty Egyptian Coptic Christians and one other Christian, a video of which was released Febru-ary 15.20 Indeed, Thini reportedly called for the Arab League’s newly created joint force, now intervening in Yemen, to intervene on his side in Libya.21
Operations Dawn and Dignity have both contrib-uted to escalating violence. Indiscriminate shelling and human rights abuses have reportedly occurred on all fronts,22 including through the use of cluster munitions,23 most probably from Operation Dignity forces.24 Dignity has capitalized on its relative aerial superiority over Dawn to conduct airstrikes along Libya’s coastline, with some dozen MiG-23s, L-39s,
efforts, and could very well end in a “Black Hawk Down” scenario. Furthermore, the fragility and fac-tionalism within Libya’s warring coalitions puts into question whether these groups could ever be brought under a “big tent,” with hardline spoilers threatening to undermine any unity government agreement.
A bottom-up approach to Libya’s civil war that engages power brokers at the local level—local armed forces, tribes, shura councils, and municipal coun-cils—best accords with the reality of power dynam-ics in Libya. Such a piecemeal approach is certainly difficult, complicated, and time intensive, not unlike assembling a puzzle. But a patchwork of successes holds greater promise than any politically expedient top-down approach.
The study proceeds in four parts. The first addresses the various actors driving instability in Libya—that is, the components that constitute Operation Dignity and Operation Libya Dawn—and fissures within the respective military-political alliances. The second part provides an overview of Libya’s VEO landscape, and how ISL is both driving and benefiting from polar-ization of the country’s jihadist milieu. The third part provides a battlefield update for each of Libya’s four active fronts, including risks to Libya’s hydrocarbon wealth. Fourth and finally, the study turns to existing efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement, and recommendations for a course of action.
Greater Violence and Fragmentation
Two competing military-political alliances are at the heart of Libya’s cleavage. Based primarily in the east is Operation Dignity, led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar and consisting of remnants of the armed forces within the Libyan National Army (LNA), along with irregular and tribal forces. Zintani brigades in the western Nafusa Mountains also operate under the banner of Operation Dignity. The political elements consist of the elected and internationally recognized House of Representatives (HOR) in Tobruk, which is led by its speaker, Aguila Saleh Essa, and the government of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thini in Bayda. In opposition is Operation Dawn, primarily in the west, consisting of a rump parliament from the country’s
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numerous helicopters,25 and three new MiG-21s deliv-ered to the Libyan Air Force (LAF) from Egypt.26 In contrast, Dawn forces have just two27 or three28 air-craft that have been used in attacks against Zintani forces, and one was recently shot down near Zintan with a man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD) on March 23.29 Dawn jets have also bombed the Dig-nity-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) at the oil export terminals of Ras Lanuf and al-Sidra in the Gulf of Sirte.30 As Libyan national identity contin-ues to devolve to the level of region, tribe, and town,31 violence has also become more intimate,32 especially in Benghazi, Darnah, the Nafusa Mountains, and the country’s southwest. In Benghazi, for example, residents with ties to Tripolitania—particularly those from Misratah—are being targeted and forced out of the city. The Laithi district in particular has seen an exodus of families to Misratah. Hardline federalists seeking greater autonomy or even independence for Cyrenaica may have an interest in seeing the conflict continue in order drive out of Cyrenaica those with roots in Tripolitania, deepening east and west divi-sions.33 Finally, ISL, like its namesake in Syria and Iraq, is pursuing tactics deemed too extreme by its Libyan rivals within the orbit of the al-Qaeda trend, and conflict between the two sides is escalating.
Operation Dignity
Haftar launched Operation Dignity on May 16, 2014, and was joined by most of the LAF, remnants of the navy, and al-Saiqa Special Forces. The operation was initiated in response to a widespread and increasingly deadly unconventional warfare campaign blamed on Islamist extremists that began shortly after the start of Libya’s transitional period, one in which some fifty people were assassinated per month in early 2014—or, by some accounts, up to five hundred people were killed by May 2014.34 Violence has been heav-ily concentrated in Cyrenaica, and includes among its victims those associated with civil society, the judi-cial system, and security services.35 But Haftar and later the HOR expanded their “war on terrorism” to include all Islamists in Libya, including the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Misratah, thereby
ensuring unity among their enemies who might not otherwise have found common ground. By August 25, 2014, Haftar had nominally integrated his forces under the command of Army chief of staff Abdul Razzaq Nazuri,36 who was appointed by the HOR,37 achieving the appearance of unity of effort.
Speaking to a pro-Operation Dignity news outlet on November 3, 2014, Operation Dignity commander Faraj al-Barassi estimated that some 80 percent of Dignity fighters are regular armed service members.38 However, a video made public on March 1 shows Barassi telling an audience that “the percentage of sol-diers actually fighting in the battlefield does not exceed fifteen to twenty percent. The rest are policemen, civil-ians, and volunteers.”39 A UN Security Council panel of experts wrote on February 23 that the LNA, from May to August 2014, “could not be considered to represent an ‘official army’ any more than could their opponents.”40 Command and control is also unclear. The al-Saiqa Special Forces in Benghazi are reportedly more loyal to Thini than to Haftar,41 while forces in the west, such as the powerful Zintani brigades and their allies in the Warshefana tribe,42 and federalists in the Gulf of Sirte, such as Ibrahim al-Jathran’s PFG, have resisted taking direct orders from Operation Dignity leadership.43 The Zintanis seem wary of Haf-tar’s ambitions, while the federalists oppose the cen-tralized state sought by Haftar and Thini; al-Saiqa44 and PFG45 forces have reportedly complained that Haftar has marginalized their forces by not provid-ing adequate arms and ammunition. Nonetheless, the Thini government’s Ministry of Interior has reportedly tried to bring the PFG within its chain of command46 in a possible bid to further legitimize its control of hydrocarbon resources.
While Haftar is the personality driving much of Operation Dignity, his official position has long been ambiguous and left to HOR debate.47 Elements within the HOR are reportedly wary of Haftar and his back-ers, a situation that compelled the HOR speaker to unilaterally reinstate 127 former Muammar Qadhafi–era officers on January 19 and make Haftar’s role in the army official.48 The move did not, however, clarify Haftar’s ultimate standing within the armed forces,49
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which remained uncertain until March 9, when he was sworn in to the rank of lieutenant general and for-mal leadership of the LNA at a ceremony in Bayda.50
There is considerable tension between Haftar and the Bayda-based Thini government. On January 5, Nazuri ordered the arrest of Col. Masoud Rahouma, Thini’s minister of defense, over weapons shipments being carried out without his or Haftar’s knowledge.51 On February 1, soldiers loyal to Haftar blocked Thini’s arrival to Benghazi, and while Haftar denied the inci-dent, his spokesman, Muhammad al-Hejazi, accused Thini of not asking for permission to visit. Hejazi, by claiming that Thini’s “meeting with the commanders of the frontline was not his business,”52 demonstrated the gross absence of civilian oversight. Even greater tension emerged in this alliance when Interior Min-ister Omar al-Sinki, from Misratah, called Haftar a dictator and claimed he had told him he seeks the presidency; Thini fired Sinki on February 10, but he refused to step down.53
This lack of clarity over Haftar’s role in Opera-tion Dignity, and ultimately his personal ambitions, has not only been a source of discord in the military-political alliance but is also a principal grievance nar-rative cited by Operation Dawn and extremists alike. This general unease extends beyond Haftar to Egypt. The decision to label Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization reflects the hardline stance of Operation Dignity’s Egyptian backer, President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Indeed, after his HOR-sanc-tioned return to the armed forces, Haftar reaffirmed that “my basic task is to cleanse Libya of the Mus-lim Brotherhood,”54 just as Sisi has pledged that the Brotherhood would not exist under his presidency.55 Regarding the continuing UNSMIL negotiations, Haftar more recently pledged that “there will be no dialogue with terrorism.”56 It is therefore no surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood has accused Haftar of walking “in the footsteps of Sisi.”57 Just as Sisi expressed disinterest in running for president as a general,58 Haftar had claimed he had no interest in power;59 Sisi has since become president, and Haftar claims he would run for president if the people desire it.60 (Some Operation Dignity elements in the west are also skeptical toward negotiations: on March 8,
Zintan’s Abdullah Ahmed Naker, former head of the Tripoli Revolutionists Council and head of the Sum-mit Party, decried the talks as the product of “Ameri-can and British agendas.”61)
Cooperation between Egypt and Operation Dig-nity is close. The HOR deputy prime minister has stated that “Egypt is a natural extension of Libya, and vice-versa.”62 In acting on this mentality, Egypt is even reportedly connecting parts of eastern Libya to its electrical grid.63 Egypt has a vested economic interest in Libya, particularly in providing opportu-nities to its own cheap labor force.64 The growth of ISL is furthering Egypt-Dignity cooperation: after the announcement of ISL’s abduction of Egyptian Coptic Christians, Egypt’s Central Intelligence Divi-sion agreed to train two thousand Libyans to confront terrorism.65 While strong outside support from Egypt will assist Haftar in his battle against the likes of ISL, it could also lead to Haftar overshadowing the HOR and Thini government. Strong Egyptian backing could likewise discourage Haftar from entering into negotiations with Islamists in Tripoli. Indeed, none of Haftar’s representatives were present at the second round of UNSMIL talks held in Ghadames in early February66; UNSMIL condemned the March 19 LAF airstrikes against Mitiga Air Base in east Tripoli as
“a threat to dialogue”67; and, more critically, the LNA launched a new ground offensive with air support to retake Tripoli on March 20,68 which León said would put into “question the possibilities to continue work-ing in the coming days.”69
Operation Dawn
Operation Dawn formed in July 2014 in response to Operation Dignity. Its first operation resulted in the destruction of Tripoli International Airport (TIP), leading to the eviction of pro–Operation Dignity forces from and the capture of Tripoli by the end of August. Operation Dawn subsequently boycotted the HOR and resurrected the GNC, a move that the same UN Security Council panel of experts said had no “precedent in post-revolution Libya with a similar scale and impact,” adding that Dawn leadership was
“ultimately responsible for the implosion of the politi-cal process.”70
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Dawn elements claim a rival Libyan Army (LA),71 which includes some former army elements and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in western Libya,72 is led by Gen. Abdullah Obeidi,73 and osten-sibly reports to a Supreme Defense Council.74 There is considerably less command and control among Dawn forces than among Dignity forces. The bulk of Opera-tion Dawn consists of an unwieldy alliance of Islamist and revolutionary militias over which Hassi admitted on February 5 he has no control: “I did not give the order to start the war and I do not now have the abil-ity to ask them to stop the war.”75 In general, Islamist militias such as the Libyan Revolutionaries Opera-tions Room (LROR), among others, are responsible for providing security in the capital, while hardline revolutionary militias have their base in the business-minded city of Misratah and nearby towns, and con-stitute the bulk of Dawn’s fighting power. Misratans are also leading Operation Sunrise, a front in the Gulf of Sirte that sought to wrest oil export terminals from the PFG, and the more recently formed Opera-tion Quicksand against ISL in the Gulf of Sirte.76
Hassi, in a mirror image of Haftar’s absolutism, has described Dawn’s struggle as a “war against tyranny,”77 while Salah Badi, the Misratan commander who led the attack on the TIP,78 characterized his military operation as a correction79 to “protect the February 17 Revolution” from a “counter-revolutionary opera-tion in Benghazi...the [Haftar-led] military coup.”80 But while there are hardliners from Misratah opposed to negotiations, such as Badi81 and GNC representa-tive Abdul Rahman al-Swehli,82 many of Misratah’s revolutionary brigades have signaled their support for dialogue and rejection of terrorism.83 Islamists within Dawn have been most vocally opposed to peace talks. In addition to Misratah, according to León, Gharyan and Zawiyah support the talks84 and attended pre-liminary discussions in Geneva on January 14, while Islamist factions were noticeably absent.85 Operation Dawn’s fiery official Facebook page alleged that the talks had “failed miserably,” claiming that “the masks have fallen” from those looking after their own mate-rial interests at the expense of the revolution and warn-ing that “the conspiracy led by León is not the first and will not be the last.”86 The same page sarcastically
welcomed the second round of talks in Ghadames so that power may be returned to Muammar Qadhafi’s cousin in exile in Egypt, “Ahmed Qadhaf al-Dam and those around him,” with the result of “all revolutionary military and civilians being thrown in jail.”87
Some former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a jihadist insurgency that once fought the Qadhafi regime, staunchly oppose negotiations. Former LIFG leaders Abdul Wahab al-Qayed88 of the al-Wafa (Loyalty to the Mar-tyrs) bloc and Sheikh Sami al-Saadi of the Umma al-Wasat Party89 have reportedly have taken a firm stance against negotiations; former LIFG emir Abdul Hakim Belhaj of the Watan Party is, however, in favor of talks.90 A few members of the Muslim Brother-hood’s Justice and Construction Party and Libya’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Sadiq al-Gharyani,91 are on record opposing talks. The remaining thirty-some members of the al-Wafa Bloc92 in the rump GNC, who were also principal drivers of the political stale-mate when Libya only had one parliament,93 also oppose negotiations.94 The general sentiment among those opposed to compromise is aptly summed up by an LROR-sponsored video of January 28, titled “Do Not Reconcile” and calling for “blood for blood, a head for a head”—in other words, an eye for an eye.95
The most problematic aspect of the Dawn coalition is its relationship with extremists and penchant for conspiracy theories.96 Again, the Islamist trend is the most culpable: Hassi has recklessly glorified Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), a U.S.- and UN-desig-nated terrorist organization, by calling it “beautiful”97 and remarking that despite its extreme antipathy to democracy, its members could be “won over.”98 Has-si’s replacement, Ghwell, has reportedly claimed that ASL members are “not extremists,” but “revolutionar-ies.”99 The head of Dawn’s foreign media department, Jamal Zubia, described ASL as “closer to a mutual-aid society than a terrorist organization” and accused Algerian intelligence services of framing Islamists.100 On February 16, the LROR even praised the Muja-hedin Shura Council of Darnah and Its Suburbs (MSCDS),101 an amalgamation of jihadist groups within the al-Qaeda trend that formed in response to ISL’s rise in Darnah.
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Dawn has also issued worrisome statements vis-à-vis ISL. Three Misratan soldiers with Operation Sun-rise were reportedly abducted and killed by ISL fight-ers in early February while returning home from the front line, but Dawn’s information office refused to name ISL as the culprit, and instead blamed “gang-sters.”102 Dawn’s official Facebook page alleged that ISL consists primarily of remnants from the Qadhafi regime, claiming that “those who are raising the black flags supporting Daesh [ISIS] today were the ones that were raising the green flags yesterday, and they are following the orders of Qadhaf al-Dam and the money of Eastern and Western intelligence agencies.” (The same post also praises ASL for securing Sirte, but ironically, much of ASL in Sirte later switched allegiances to ISL).103 While remnants of the former regime (which was strongest in Sirte) have joined ISL, overstating their presence is simply propaganda.104 Hassi has denied the very existence of the Islamic State in Libya – and even went as far as to blame Haftar for ISL attacks in Tripoli.105
Misratah has also supported the ASL-domi-nated Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries (SCBR),106 a coalition battling Operation Dignity that included at its inception Islamist militias of varying ideological rigidity,107 but which moved to embrace ASL’s hardline jihadist position.108 The rea-son for this support is largely pragmatic: as long as Haftar is fighting the SCBR in the east, he will have a harder time threatening Misratah. This beneficial relationship for Operation Dawn has led some within the coalition, or influencers such as the Islamist al-Nabaa television station, to praise jihadist attacks against Operation Dignity forces as legitimately over-seen by revolutionaries, while condemning jihadist attacks against their own forces as done by Qadhafi regime remnants.109
This dishonest stance toward extremism is unten-able, and Dawn’s political cover for and material sup-port to extremist groups risk blowback: as one Mis-ratan Dawn commander noted, “Our next fight will be with Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamic State.”110 While a fight pitting Dawn forces against ASL is not likely in the near future, a battle against ISL was inevitable. By promising to take the fight beyond Dignity forces
to include Operation Dawn, ISL has not displayed the same level of pragmatism as ASL, which has entered into tactical alliances. As friction increased with ISL’s expansion westward toward Misratah, an agreement to avoid escalating conflict 111 and attempts to engage in dialogue broke down, leading to open fighting on March 14, when Misratah’s 166th Battalion, originally part of Operation Sunrise, clashed with ISL forces forty miles east of Sirte.112 Yet even as Misratan fight-ers engage ISL in combat and advance toward down-town Sirte,113 Operation Dawn’s chief of staff and the GNC have continued to label ISL as Qadhafi loyal-ists114—propaganda that demonstrates Operation Dig-nity remains Dawn’s primary concern.
The Islamic State and Libya’s Changing VEO Landscape
The presence of VEOs in Libya is not a new phenom-enon. The LIFG had pursued jihad within the con-fines of the Libyan state by refraining from pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his more trans-national project. Even though the LIFG dismantled itself before the war and had renounced violence as an organization,115 some of its members joined the 2011 armed uprising against Qadhafi, participating along-side Libyans who fought in Iraq against U.S. and coali-tion forces.116 It was clear from the beginning that an extremist presence existed among opposition fighters. The information minister for the National Transitional Council (NTC), Mahmoud Shaman, in response to a question about al-Qaeda working its way into the rev-olution, responded that “radicals...only represent 15% of the rebels” but opined that they “do not constitute a threat.”117 A more pessimistic message came from former NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Ras-mussen when he warned that extremists would “try to exploit” the post-Qadhafi transition.118
Post-Qadhafi Transition
Some Libyan Islamist and jihadist groups, many of which did in fact possess revolutionary credentials (unlike ASL and ISL, which entered the scene post-revolution), opted to work with the state despite its democratic practices and aspirations, a move anath-ema to ISIS’s ideological rigidity. The Abu Salim
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Martyrs Brigade (ASMB) in Darnah, which espoused a brand of jihad closer to the LIFG and al-Qaeda than to the Islamic State, and the more Islamist Feb-ruary 17 Brigade in Benghazi from which the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade and members of ASL would later emerge, cooperated with the transitional authorities. The AMSB, which prioritized local goals and refused to pledge allegiance to anyone outside Libya, much as the LIFG had done, had granted a covenant of pro-tection to former NTC head Mustafa Abdul Jalil and had signed contracts with the Ministry of Interior.119 To defame the ASMB, ISL propagandists have char-acterized this act as “joining the state of apostates,”120 putting the ASMB on the defensive and leading it to warn its critics against practicing takfir [excommu-nication] against the group.121 The Libya Shield bri-gades, created by the Ministry of Defense in summer 2012, quickly became populated by Islamist fighters on the government payroll,122 such as Libya Shield 1 in Benghazi. Even ASL had members who received government salaries,123 and the group did not inter-fere with the country’s first democratic parliamentary elections on July 7, 2012. (Federalists, ironically, had attempted to disrupt the voting process with vio-lence.124) ASL now leads the SCBR, which includes the February 17 Brigade, the Rafallah al-Sahati Bri-gade, Libya Shield 1 and 2, and ASL’s Farouq Brigade, which was Misratan in origin and was based in Sirte before joining the SCBR.
One individual apparently affiliated with the Islamic Youth Shura Council (IYSC), the first VEO present in Libya to pledge allegiance to ISIS, on October 3, 2014, described how jihadist groups close to al-Qaeda cooperated with the transitional govern-ments, at least from his perspective in Darnah. This individual, who goes by Shebl al-Adnani al-Libi on Twitter, indicated that jihadists had traveled to Libya and would have remained unorganized if not for the efforts of al-Qaeda: “Those with experience in Afghanistan and Algeria came to the Libyan scene, and their savior from fragmentation was al-Qaeda.”125 Al-Qaeda could very well be shorthand for ASL. The IYSC member alleged the group had recruited in Darnah by calling on jihadists to “join al-Qaeda under the cover of ASL,”126 while other ISL
propagandists have asserted that ASL is simply “al-Qaeda in Libya.”127 (ASL is indeed close to al-Qaeda, and is even on the UN’s al-Qaeda sanctions list by association, but the group as a whole does not appear to have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda.128) But the minhaj (methodology) of “entering the tyrannical ministries and not practicing takfir against those in them”129 was inappropriate, and “al-Qaeda did noth-ing and did not take a clear stance with respect to the [Libya] Shields, ASMB, and Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade; they did not takfir them and it is clear that their minhaj was distorted.”130
The trend of Islamists and jihadists cooperating with the transitional authorities would come to an end with the steady collapse of the transitional process. The chaos that ensued left an opening for the most extreme jihadists to establish ISL, which like its peers in Syria and Iraq rejects any cooperation with “un-Islamic” democratic governments and elections as a whole. Such systems are deemed shirk (idolatry or polytheism), governance for kuffar (unbelievers) in opposition to the tawhid (unification) of the umma (Islamic community). Cooperation with the transitional authorities is like-wise being used by ISL in a propaganda war against jihadists affiliated with the al-Qaeda trend.
Polarization and Competition
The IYSC’s pledge to Caliph Ibrahim, as ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is referred to affectionately by his supporters, and ISL’s subsequent and aggres-sive terrorism and propaganda, have polarized the VEO landscape in Libya. ISL has expanded beyond Darnah to Benghazi, Sirte, Nawfalia, and Tripoli, is rumored to have a presence in Ajdabiya, Khoms, Sabratha, and in the south, and has com-mitted attacks against hydrocarbon infrastructure in the resource-rich Gulf of Sirte. ISL’s propaganda includes “hard” security and violent actions, as well as
“soft” activities such as those focused on hisba (reli-gious accountability) and dawa (proselytizing).131 The main goals of ISL propaganda are to deter and win recruits from competing jihadist groups, opposing tribes, and Operation Dawn and even Dignity forces, as well as draw foreign fighters and supporters to the
“land of the caliphate” in Libya.
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Haftar claims ISL has somewhere between 7,000 and 7,500 fighters,132 while the U.S. Department of State estimates the group’s numbers around 1,000–3,000, with 800 in Darnah, some 300 of whom had previously fought in Syria and Iraq.133 Foreign fight-ers feature prominently within ISL’s ranks, including fighters from neighboring Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. While Operation Dignity forces have always had an interest in inflating ISL’s numbers and the general threat posed by foreign fighters, it is tell-ing that Misratah’s 166th Battalion, allied with Oper-ation Dawn, has also published134 evidence of foreign fighters in ISL’s ranks after engaging in clashes out-side Sirte,135 and its members have spoken openly about this phenomenon.136
Part of ISL’s successful expansion across Libya owes to its poaching of members from other jihadist groups, such as ASL.137 ISL is taking root in areas that have had an ASL presence, with ASL’s Sirte and Nawfalia branches appearing to have joined ISL wholesale, while in Darnah and Benghazi ASL members have joined individually;138 reports of ASL’s chief sharia jurist, Abu Abdullah al-Libi, joining ISL would be a huge blow to the group if confirmed.139 Some formerly pro-ASL social media accounts have begun spreading ISL and ISIS propaganda.140 The IYSC’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State led to a split in the ASMB,141 with its head, for-mer LIFG leader Salim Derby, later announcing the newly created MSCDS on December 12, 2014. Included in this new council are reported remnants of the LIFG, al-Nour Brigade, Libyan Islamic Army, and possibly ASL142 in Darnah.143 Adnani reported with invective that the “MSCDS is now meeting with the ASMB, the LIFG, and those who have been stained with blasphemy, the call for elections, and the tyrannical ministries.”144
Relations have been better in Benghazi between ISL and al-Qaeda-affiliated VEOs, likely due to the need for a united front against Operation Dignity and supporting forces. As one jihadist commented,
“In Benghazi you can find unity...[Islamic] State sol-diers are in the same trenches as Ansar,”145 while a pro-ASL account downplayed interjihadist tensions by claiming that “[Islamic] State soldiers and ASL
soldiers and all the mujahedin, there is no disagree-ment among them, just brotherhood and love.”146 Despite greater comity in Benghazi than in Darnah, ISL’s successes have put ASL on the defensive. Some ASL supporters now deny claims the organization as a whole has ever cooperated with the transitional authorities, while others have argued that “the broth-ers [in Libya] saw that this type of fighting was for the needs of that time.”147 Around the beginning of February, ASL established an Islamic court and Islamic police units in areas of Benghazi they still control.148 Some saw the move as an attempt to dem-onstrate they still control parts of the city,149 but it was more likely meant to counter ISL’s imposition of Islamic rule, which is undercutting ASL’s standing.150 By the end of March, ASL opened a general services office in areas under its control.151
Just as ISL has condemned Islamists and jihad-ists alike for working with the transitional state, ASL’s sharia committee had called on leaders of the Islamist and formerly Ministry of Defense–affili-ated Libya Shield to repent.152 In response, militias from the SCBR repudiated the state and asked for repentance.153 Praise by pro-ISL propagandists154 and ASL155 for the head of Libya Shield 2, Boka Oreibi, who was killed fighting in Benghazi on March 23, underscores the shift of previously nonjihadist fight-ers toward the jihadist trend.
Tension in Libya between ISL and the broader al-Qaeda trend mirrors the competition in Syria between al-Qaeda’s JN and ISIS. For example, Adnani has alleged “conspiracies from the Lata-kia mountains” on behalf of JN members who have entered Libya,156 and al-Qaeda in general, against ISL.157 One JN sympathizer, in response to the exe-cution of twenty-one Christians—which was first announced three days before the execution video was released158—quipped that “sometimes it seems that they took [al-Qaeda head] Sheikh [Ayman al-]Zawahiri’s ‘advice for jihad’ and are doing the opposite.”159 Indeed, the MSCDS was clear to dis-avow any connection with the February 22 suicide car bombings in the eastern town of al-Qubbah,160 controlled by Dignity forces, which left more than forty people dead.161
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Rebuilding Libya from the Ground Up
The broader contours of this competition between the Islamic State and the al-Qaeda trend are form-ing around ISL on the one hand, and the mujahe-din and revolutionary councils on the other. The MSCDS is allied with the Shura Council of Bayda Revolutionaries—whose January 2015 founding was announced on the February 17 Brigade’s official Facebook page162—and the SCBR.163 The last coun-cil to be formed is the Revolutionaries’ Shura Coun-cil of Ajdabiya and Its Suburbs (RSCAS), which is either led by or close to ASL.164 (Interestingly, one account maintains that fighters from the Benghazi council want to change the “Revolutionaries” in their name to “Mujahedin”165 to more clearly signal their true intent—pursuing jihad over the Febru-ary 17 revolution; indeed, the MSCDS’s use of the
“Mujahedin Shura Council” echoes the Mujahedin Shura Council that fought coalition forces in Iraq and to which al-Qaeda in Iraq belonged.) Competi-tion for jihad in Libya can take two forms. First, just as ISIS and JN clashed in Syria, the competition in Libya between ISL- and al-Qaeda-aligned fighters similarly risks developing into greater interjihadist violence.166 Second, with the death of ASL leader Muhammad al-Zahawi, announced January 24,167 the remainder of ASL may join ISL. One pro-ISL account claimed, no doubt with some exaggeration if true, that Zahawi had said 70 percent of his group supported the Caliphate “but that they wanted to join collectively.”168 With Zahawi gone, pressure will likely increase on the rest of ASL to come within the ISL fold.169
ISL has expanded its focus beyond other jihad-ist groups and Operation Dignity forces to include a showdown with Libya Dawn. Pro-ISL propagan-dists are calling for a “Dawn of Islam,”170 or “Dawn of Truth,”171 and “not Libya Dawn.” The pro-ISL writer Abu Moaz al-Barqawi, who has previously called on ASL members to join ISL,172 explained the reasoning behind this war on Dawn in a February 10 article titled “Libya Dawn: Fighting for Democ-racy.”173 According to Barqawi, “Dawn is trusted with protecting the GNC and the apostates within it, and they have only fought for democracy; yes, they have fought the criminals in the Qaaqaa and
Sawaiq Brigade in Tripoli [belonging to the Dignity camp], but they are no less criminal than them.”174 Further proof of Dawn’s apostasy is its protection of “crusaders” in Tripoli’s Corinthia Hotel, such as an American and Frenchman who were killed in ISL’s siege of the hotel. In contrast, “The Islamic State fights for...God’s word to be the supreme word over the unbelievers...and your fighting, O Libya Dawn, has not been for this intention, and your dead are not martyrs.”175
While Barqawi’s piece largely addresses the Islamist contingent of Dawn in Tripoli, others tar-get Dawn’s revolutionary contingent: Misratah. The Battar Media Foundation, affiliated with the Libyan Battar Brigade, which fought in Syria,176 attempted a softer approach in a publication titled “Issues You Should Know, People of Misratah.”177 The document matter-of-factly explains ISL’s position against Qad-hafi, Haftar, the Tobruk and Tripoli governments, and the Libyan armed forces and security apparatuses, and calls upon “those who support them to leave them.”178
As part of a strategy to win over sympathetic ele-ments in Misratah, the document attempts to engage with the city’s revolutionary credentials by claiming that “the Islamic State soldiers who are fighting Haf-tar and the Libyan governments...they themselves contributed to fighting Qadhafi and [bringing about] his fall.”179 Others, such as the prolific pro-ISL propa-gandist Abu Irhim al-Libi, have similarly reached out to Misratah, extolling the city’s revolutionary virtues:
“O land of heroes, your strength lies with the Islamic State.”180 Although most of the effort is focused on winning over Islamists in Dawn, some pro-ISL writ-ers have offered Dignity forces the opportunity to repent. Abu Osama al-Barqawi, in “a letter to the people of Barqa,” wrote, “We call upon the so-called Dignity soldiers and the awakening of apostasy to disown the tyrannical and pagan parliament...”181 However, even while making these overtures ISL was already engaged in low-level activities against forces tasked with securing Tripoli,182 thereby embarrass-ing the Hassi government, and taking on Misratan fighters183 in the Gulf of Sirte.184
ISL is committed to fighting Dignity and Dawn forces alike, and polarizing other VEOs like ASL as
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part of a strategy to win over whomever they may, so as to fight the rest. The emergence of ISL is vindicat-ing for Libya’s pro-Dignity quarter, which has long ascribed to all Islamists the specter of terrorism and warned of the worst in Libya, and a game changer for VEOs and Dawn forces alike. Toward the end of the Battar Media Foundation’s letter to the people of Misratah, readers are reminded that “the hands of the Islamic State reach to Tobruk and Bayda, as well as Tripoli and Misratah.”185 There is no reason to believe ISL will not try to make good on its threats.
Theater Updates
Cyrenaica
The LNA in eastern Libya consists of al-Saiqa Special Forces units, infantry, a tank brigade, remnants of the navy and LAF, and tribal and irregular forces, known as the sahwa (awakening), named after the Sunni tribal sahwa against al-Qaeda in Anbar, Iraq, where ISIS has its roots. But the LNA has command-and-control issues and is not an entirely a regular force. In opposition to Operation Dignity in Benghazi are ISL and the SCBR, and in Darnah, ISL and the MSCDS. ISL and Operation Dignity are also opposed by the RSCAS in Ajdabiya and the SCBR in Bayda.
Operation Dignity forces have made incremental progress in Benghazi since nearly losing the city in late July 2014 to Islamist extremists.186 On October 15, 2014, Haftar’s forces broke out of Benina Interna-tional Airport, where they had been hemmed in by the SCBR, and moved on to seize several eastern neigh-borhoods. The LNA and sahwa forces have attempted to consolidate territorial gains and return Benghazi to a semblance of normalcy,187 such as by relying on rem-nants of the National Security Directorate (police) to ensure security.188 In a symbolic move, Thini’s gov-ernment held its first meeting in Benghazi on Feb-ruary 1, 2015.189 Haftar has claimed—and not for the first time190—that the end of operations in Benghazi is near,191 pledging he would take control of the city by mid-April.192 Nevertheless, ASL’s extension of services to areas under its control indicates progress remains to be made.193 Should Dignity forces liberate Benghazi, they purportedly would seek to then liber-ate Darnah from extremists.194
The Central Front
Dawn militias opened a third front of fighting, Oper-ation Sunrise, in the Gulf of Sirte on December 13, 2014, with a surprise attack195 against the PFG in Bin Jawad,196 thirty-seven kilometers west of Ras Lanuf. General Obeidi claimed that “it’s our duty to retake the fields from these bandits,”197 while Sunrise’s offi-cial Facebook page claimed the LA sought to “liber-ate the oil terminals from terrorist gangs.”198 As an attack against a Libyan state institution, the move
BENGHAZI
DARNAH MSCDS
ASMB
Former LIFG
ASL
ASL
Shura Council of Beghazi
Revolutionaries
Shura Council of Bayda
Revolutionaries
Libya Shield 1 and 2
Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade
February 17Brigade
BAYDA
AJDABIYA
Revolutionaries’ Shura Council of Ajdabiya and its
Suburbs
al-NourBrigade
ASL
Farouq Brigade
Fig. 1: Non-ISL “al-Qaeda Trend” Jihadists in Libya
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was in direct violation of UN Security Council Reso-lution 2174199 and resulted in immediate environmen-tal and economic repercussions for Libya, with the loss of some 1.48 million barrels of oil.200 Misratah’s Libya Shield–Central Region led the operation, with Sunrise fighters launching rockets at the Ras Lanuf and Sidra oil export terminals,201 destroying crude oil tanks and requiring 310 firefighters to extinguish the blaze.202 The LAF provided air support to the PFG, and has bombed Dawn and Sunrise elements in Mis-ratah, Sirte, and Bin Jawad.203 Fighting between the two sides abated due to ISL’s advances in the Gulf of Sirte, with Misratah and the PFG toward the end of March reportedly agreeing to jointly fight ISL.204
Attacks against Libya’s oil infrastructure are not limited to the Sunrise-PFG battle around coastal export terminals. ISL, likely from bases in Sirte and Nawfalia, has attacked the Mabruk,205 Bahi,206 and Dahra207 oil fields (further east, a bomb targeted the pipeline transporting oil from the El Sarir oil field to the Hariga export terminal, but responsibility is unclear208), resulting in PFG casualties. While news outlets and pro-ISL accounts209 claimed the attacks were the work of the Islamic State in Fezzan, no offi-cial acknowledgment has been issued to date.210 The likely logic behind this drive against Libya’s source of wealth is to deny the glue holding the respective Dawn and Dignity coalitions together: hydrocarbons. While ideological, tribal, and geographic motivations also drive both alliances, denying the ability to pay salaries and prospects of controlling Libya’s purse strings would help fracture the alliances.
As a result of fighting in the Gulf of Sirte, Lib-ya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) warned toward the end of December that the country could not meet domestic consumption, let alone fulfill its international export obligations. An NOC statement, employing extremely dark rhetoric, warned: “The truth requires us to be very clear and candid with the Libyan people. The ongoing crisis in Libya points to the possibility of a slide into a dark tunnel of the unknown.”211 Libya needed to export 800,000 barrels per day at $100 per barrel to meet its 2014 budget-ary needs,212 but oil production dropped to 490,000 bpd as of March 16213—less than a third of its prewar
1.6 million bpd—with the cost of crude oil at $42.85 per barrel.214 Foreign reserves, estimated to be some $100 billion around August 2014, could potentially be depleted within four years,215 and on March 10 one Central Bank of Libya official remarked that Libya is less than two years away from a currency collapse.216 The expansion of ISL in the Gulf of Sirte and attacks on Libya’s hydrocarbons industry risk turning Libya’s conflict from a civil war to, as one Libyan wrote, “a revolution of the hungry.”217
The Western Front
Dawn forces have had the most success in Trip-olitania due to their August 2014 capture of Tripoli, effectively denying Dignity forces a swath of terri-tory some six hundred kilometers long from the Libya-Tunisia Ras al-Jadir border crossing toward Sirte. The capital is home to Dawn’s political estab-lishment—the GNC and Hassi government—as well as a number of Islamist brigades of varying pre-dispositions. Misratah is the seat of Libya’s hardline-revolutionary trend, with a sizable business commu-nity; it fields more than forty brigades,218 including the Libya Shield–Central Region. Amazigh com-munities also constitute part of this political-mili-tary alliance, extending from the Nafusa Mountains to Gharyan and coastal towns west of Tripoli, such as Zuwarah.
After the capital’s capture, Dawn forces had tem-porarily improved security and services there,219 with the LROR even claiming to have installed secu-rity cameras for policing.220 While Tripoli’s overall humanitarian situation has improved,221 the cost of quiet has been the repression of activists, the media, and political figures.222 But the relative calm has not lasted: extremists soon resumed targeting manifesta-tions of “un-Islamic” activity, such as by burning an art center in the Zawiyat al-Dahmani neighborhood223 and bulldozing a historic tomb there the very next day.224 These attacks picked up, with ISL claiming the December 27, 2014, car bombing of Diplomatic Police, and then the attacks on January 17 on the Algerian embassy and ten days later on the Corinthia Hotel, among others, in a clear pattern of escalation against symbolic foreign- and Dawn-affiliated targets.
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While Dawn controls the coast, it is opposed by forces allied with Operation Dignity southwest of the capital. Zintan and tribal allies such as the Warshefana, with occasional backing from the LAF, have skirmished with pro-Dawn forces.225 Until the March 20 Zintani-led offensive, fighting largely took place along a line stretching from al-Assa to Riqda-lin, Jmail, Sabratha, al-Ajailat, and southeast toward Kikla, and southwest to the heavily contested al-Wati-yah Air Base. This renewed offensive has pushed the line north and northeast toward Gharyan, Azizia, and Zawiyah, with Zintani and Warshefana forces operat-ing under the LNA capturing most of Azizia, forty-five kilometers southwest of the capital, on April 3.226
Tribal Warfare in the Southwest
By January 11, fighting in the southwestern desert town of Ubari between Tebu and Tuareg tribesmen, including Tebu from Chad and Tuareg from Mali,227 had lasted more than a hundred days, leaving upward of 150 people dead and 260 wounded.228 After several failed ceasefires, fighting erupted again on March 20, led by a Tebu counteroffensive.229 Some 85 percent of the town’s population has been reportedly displaced.230 The conflict between Tuareg (some pro-Dawn but generally not unified) and Tebu (overwhelmingly pro-Dignity) minorities in Ubari is expressed along Dignity-Dawn lines,231 with the Tebu steadfastly sid-ing with Dignity and Haftar’s expansive war against Islamists, while the Tuareg are fragmented,232 with some openly supported by and backing Misratah and its Amazigh allies in the northwest. Tebu forces, from Murzuq to Ubari, claim to be part of the LNA, whereas the Tuareg 316th Brigade in Ubari has claimed to be with the LA. The Tuareg al-Haq Bri-gade is widely rumored to have al-Qaeda or Islamic State connections—certainly a convenient narrative for Tebu forces to propagate—and while the brigade is widely thought to be involved in extremism, it has made no formal and public pledges of allegiance or other outward signs of affiliation. There are reports of significant numbers of Malian Tuareg and Chad-ian Tebu also participating in the fighting,233 with this foreign presence circumventing Libyan chains of com-mand and thereby complicating deescalation efforts.
Rather than ideology, this deadly tribal fighting has more to do with control of territory and local economies, matched with tribal grievances. The fighting, which has lasted over half a year, has roots in Tebu gains in post-Qadhafi Libya, namely their expansion westward from their Murzuq stronghold. A deeper reading of the conflict shows that the south is also an arena for tribal competition over the rights to sell contraband, smuggling routes, oil fields, and gold prospecting.234 This current round of fighting that began in September likely was sparked when a Tuareg militia attempted to seize a gas station pro-tected by Tebu fighters.235As for tribal grievance narratives, one Tuareg leader, in a propaganda video posted before a firefight, presented “a modest mes-sage to all Libyans: we say to you that we have raised our weapons because we are oppressed...Do not waste your ammunition and efforts. Nobody knows when this war will end, nor does it matter to us if it is long or short. The important thing is that we are defending our lands and ancestors, who have lived here for thousands of years.”236 For both sides, the ultimate aim of this battle in Ubari is expulsion.237 Nonetheless, the Islamist versus non-Islamist narra-tive has played an important organizational role in politicizing local conflicts and interests among both the Tuareg and Tebu.238
Fighting in the southwest spread to Brak al-Shati, north of Sebha, on March 4 or 5, centering on the town’s air base. Local interests are likely also at play, but the conflict nonetheless carries with it Dignity-Dawn overtones. This is particularly salient since Mis-ratah’s Third Force, supported by the Awlad Suleiman tribe, is stationed at the Temenhent Air Base, outside Sebha.239 Fighting has since spread beyond Brak al-Shati to checkpoints north of Sebha,240 where Tebu and the Magarha tribe could fight the Third Force, presenting the possibility of a broader tribal war in Libya’s southwest. Worse, ISL propaganda tailored to Libya’s southern tribes—such as one video in which two Tuareg are calling on Malian Tuareg to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi,241 and another by a Tebu calling for Tebu to join ISL242—indicates the group has aspirations for Libya’s south and beyond into the broader Sahara/Sahel region.
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The Way Forward
Flaws in the Top-Down Approach
Chaos in Libya threatens North Africa and the Mid-dle East.243 ISL is only 217 miles from Italy’s coast, and the group’s own “Jihadi John” promised that “we will conquer Rome.”244 But the NATO coalition that first intervened in Libya in 2011, and then promptly assumed a hands-off posture, has lately been more preoccupied with wars in Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine. Even in light of ISL’s grisly appearance on the Lib-yan VEO scene, and as the subsequent calls for intervention grow more urgent,245 the focus remains on UNSMIL-led negotiations. The governments of France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Britain, and the United States warned on the fourth anniversary of Libya’s February 17 revolution that “the United Nations–led process to establish a national unity government pro-vides the best hope for Libyans to address the terror-ist threat and to confront the violence and instability that impedes Libya’s political transition and develop-ment.”246 The respective British and U.S. ambassadors to Libya, Michael Aron and Deborah K. Jones, writ-ing on the same anniversary, reaffirmed the need for
“the UN political dialogue process”247 and argued that “a national unity government...[c]onfronting Libya’s enemies—foreign and domestic—will remain impos-sible without such a government.”248 The parameters of such an agreement, as indicated in the first round of negotiations in January in Geneva, emphasized an agreement on democratic principles, the support of state institutions, and the rejection of terrorism.249 The hope is that a lasting ceasefire would lead to withdrawals, weapons control and monitoring, and finalizing of the constitutional process.250
A top-down political bargain to bring about a ceasefire between key players should be pursued, if only for the remote chance it will succeed, or at the very least, to bring about some measure of deconflic-tion or to simply exhaust the option. But the goal of buttressing democratic principles and state insti-tutions ignores the reality that both the GNC and HOR invoke democratic principles as their raison d’être, although of the two, the HOR has far greater claims to legitimacy due to its elected and interna-
tionally recognized status. Moreover, state institutions have never truly existed in Libya since Qadhafi first took power; one U.S. administration official described the ministries under the transitional governments as
“Potemkin.”251 And then there is the scourge of terror-ism by ISL, ASL, and other jihadist groups, the threat of which during the transitional period was not as elevated as it is now. Dawn’s problematic relationship with jihadists such as ASL, and general denial of the nature of the ISL threat, calls into question the extent to which elements in Dawn, particularly the Islamist trend, can fully reject terrorism.
UNSMIL’s loose framework for implementing a unity government is fraught with impracticalities. The proposed “presidential council of independent personalities” that would nominally lead the country would do so only in name, for such a council’s very independence would mean it is not connected to the powerful fighting forces on the ground. And while the framework endorses the HOR as Libya’s legiti-mate parliament, it remains to be seen which ele-ments within the GNC would accept dissolving their legislative body. On the Tobruk side, acts of “sabotage,” as one diplomat put it, of the ongoing negotiations from the pro-Haftar camp underscore his unwill-ingness to compromise with his rivals.252 The provi-sion of security to protect a unity government and state institutions when all fighting forces are heavily politicized is another matter entirely. Post-Qadhafi, each transitional government was both unified and a failure at a time of even greater political will and better security than what exists today. As one promi-nent Libyan analyst remarked, “There is not a con-flict because there are two governments; there are two governments because of a conflict.”253 Similarly, Thini commented on April 1 that the conflict “is a crisis of security...and not a political crisis as is promoted by León.”254 In other words, the fighting is a result of deeper fissures that a unity government cannot fully address. A return to such a government would result in a powerless and divided political body, just as with the preceding transitional governments, with all the hallmarks of a failed state: an inability to monopolize the use of force within state borders, an inability to control people and borders, and an inability to provide
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public goods.255 The notion of a unity government as a necessary precondition to lift the UN arms embargo, in place since 2011, is fraught with risk.256 Delivering more weapons to armed factions in a country suffer-ing from weapons proliferation could further under-mine attempts at establishing the very unity govern-ment sought by UNSMIL, further destabilizing the region. A weak unity government with shaky capacity would likely prove unable to work with any new secu-rity agreement initiatives—just as past transitional governments have failed to leverage external support for the country’s weak security services.257
Lastly, the idea that more “institution building” could bring about stability,258 or that the elected Con-stitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) could “play a role in returning peace to Libya,”259 is similarly unrealis-tic. (The CDA released a draft document for public review on Libya’s Independence Day, December 24, 2014.260) CDA head Ali Tarhouni mused that “even if we come up with a constitution, what can you do with a constitution in a situation like this?”261 And as León noted, a public referendum on the constitution cannot be held amidst total chaos,262 and certainly not amidst massive displacement and rising extremism. A top-down political grand bargain may succeed in papering over Libya’s massive fault lines and security challenges, but it will not likely achieve the stability sought by UNSMIL and supporting countries.
The Case for a Bottom-Up Approach
The emphasis on a top-down settlement ignores the extent of polarization on the ground. One Libyan blogger acknowledged this discrepancy when he wrote that “while senior political analysts talk about the court decisions, and about the legitimacy of this or that, peo-ple have a simple and sharp way of explaining events without any analysis; just simple words: either with or against.”263 Such an approach also ignores the reality of power dynamics in Libya. CDA member Abdel Kader Kadoura wrote that “local power is the base of con-structing a state in Libya. We cannot compare Libya with any other country...because our country is consti-tuted around tribal or regional characteristics, and this is something that we cannot neglect, whether from a political Islam or secular perspective.”264
UNSMIL’s negotiation efforts now include munic-ipal councils,265 political parties, and tribes,266 reflect-ing an important recognition that power in Libya is established from the ground up.267 The tribal track is particularly central since Libya’s tribes are inherently social and political. Predating the state, they are, in essence, readily available structures with which to negotiate.268 (Political parties, in contrast, have very little history in Libya and their true representation is overstated.) Ground-up mediation efforts can engage those who actually hold power in each of Libya’s three provinces, whether they are municipal councils, shura (consultation) councils, or armed formations. Local efforts at negotiation, which can be done based on traditional mediation practices, are also best suited to address the very intimate nature of the violence ripping apart Libya’s social fabric. This process would ultimately be like putting together a puzzle, whereby the many pieces of the state are slowly reassembled; the more pieces there are in place, the greater the potential for progress. Without a doubt, some pieces will remain missing.
Tripolitania has a greater chance of ground-up progress than Cyrenaica, where extremist groups like ISL and ASL are more deeply entrenched. Moreover, Zintan and Misratah have considerable command and control over their forces, making them comparably well equipped to adhere to a deal, along with having economic interests to preserve. Misratans, inhabiting their coastal city, are concerned about imports and exports that depend on the country’s overall economic health, while Zintanis—occupying a powerful moun-tain city near the Tunisian and Algerian borders—are concerned about their cross-border activities and interests in southwestern Libya, where their militias expanded greatly during the 2011 revolution. Already in 2015, the two sides have twice exchanged prison-ers.269 The Warfallah tribe, which is Libya’s largest and has succeeded in remaining somewhat neutral, might also sit at a negotiating table with Misratah if oth-ers, such as the Zintanis, were present. Engaging the Zintanis and Warfallah would increase the chances of expanding a consensus among other formerly pro-Qadhafi tribes, such as the Warshefana, Abu Seif, Magarha, and Qadhadhfa. Any rapprochement
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between Zintan and Misratah should include the requirement that the latter publicly denounce ASL and the SCBR. Hardline Islamists in Dawn, primarily in Tripoli, will simply have to be sidelined and mar-ginalized for their rejectionism, and dealt with later.
A rapprochement is also possible between Zintan and the Amazigh, who are not natural allies with Dawn’s Islamist elements. Just as the Amazigh are wary of Zintani hegemony over the Nafusa Moun-tains, they are also suspicious of the pro-Dawn town of Gharyan and the Mashasha tribe projecting influ-ence into their territories. Guaranteeing protection for Amazigh cultural and linguistic rights could split them from the Dawn alliance and bring about a ceasefire in the Nafusa Mountains. Some Libyan observers with intimate knowledge of northwestern tribal dynamics believe the Amazigh towns of Jadu or Yafran could facilitate such a process.270 Recent Zintani and Warshefana advances southwest of Trip-oli could put pressure on the Amazigh and on Misra-tah to negotiate local truces, particularly the latter in order to secure its western flank.
A rapprochement between Zintan and the Amazigh could serve as a springboard to include tribes in the southwest. The Zintanis are close to, and have influence over, the pro-Dignity Tebu, while the Amazigh in the north come from the same tribal fam-ily as the Tuareg in the south. Once the Tuareg and Tebu cease hostilities, they could conceivably redirect their efforts toward patrolling Libya’s vast southern border—to not only reap the benefits their commu-nities have traditionally enjoyed from cross-border smuggling but, more important, to counter the free movement of jihadists.
How to Fight ISL and Other VEOs
The solutions to combat ISL, ASL, and other jihad-ist VEOs can be found within Libya. Bottom-up negotiations that involve key stakeholders hold the best chances of success in Tripolitania and Fezzan, as ceasefires or more-lasting truces among warring parties in both regions would also represent the first steps toward reorienting wartime efforts against the spread of VEOs. Cyrenaica remains the most chal-lenging theater due to its entrenched VEOs.
Former NATO secretary-general Rasmussen claimed on February 16 that “we will need boots on the ground” to fight ISL,271 while Egypt272 and Thini273 have called for foreign intervention. ISL and its sup-porters not only anticipate an intervention274 but may actually be trying to provoke one, as part of a strategy of recruitment and even possibly alleviating broader pressure on ISIS by splitting U.S. and Western Euro-pean countries’ resources.275 ISL has proven that it can escalate violence in Libya in response to international intervention, as demonstrated by the al-Qubbah sui-cide car bombings in answer to Egypt’s airstrikes.276 Intervention in North Africa led by former colonial powers Italy and France, as well as Egypt due to Sisi’s war on the Muslim Brotherhood, would feed into ISL narratives used for recruitment and to enhance domestic legitimacy.
In Cyrenaica, despite Haftar’s polarizing revan-chism, his forces were the first to take on VEOs and have shouldered the brunt of the counterter-rorism effort. As encouraging as Misratah’s recent engagements against ISL are, they do not compare to the sacrifices made by Operation Dignity forces, both throughout the civil war and as targets of an assassination campaign preceding it. But still, Mis-ratah, with its heavy firepower, growing daylight with Islamists in Tripoli, and demonstrated will-ingness to fight ISL in the Gulf of Sirte, can play a significant role in combating ISL. Therefore, rel-evant outside powers must continue to lean on Haf-tar, as commander of the armed forces, to deescalate aggressive rhetoric against Misratah; Haftar and the HOR’s labeling of Dawn forces, including Mis-ratah, as terrorists is particularly problematic. An April 5 statement by the HOR condemning an ISL attack against Misratan forces is one such encourag-ing step.277 Similarly, outside powers must maintain pressure on Misratah to split from unreasonable ele-ments in Dawn that are wholly rejectionist and have whitewashed the extremist threat in Libya. A formal truce between the two sides is not needed to jointly combat ISL, although it would help. Between the anvil of Misratah from Tripolitania and the hammer of Dignity from Cyrenaica, ISL’s advances can be rolled back and contained.
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The Role of Foreign Powers
The United States, its European allies, and UNSMIL should complement existing UNSMIL efforts by engaging with Libya’s neighbors to develop a ground-up strategy. This could include, for example, work-ing with Tunisia and Algeria to address the tribes straddling the two countries’ respective borders with Libya, or cooperating with France to use its Saharan and Sahelian networks to reduce the likelihood of a broader southwestern tribal war. (Algeria is currently attempting to broker a Tuareg-Tebu truce.278)
Beyond supporting UNSMIL negotiation efforts that include municipal councils and tribes, or devel-oping their own coordinated tracks, foreign pow-ers should aim first and foremost to contain Libya’s crisis from spilling over across North Africa and the Mediterranean. This requires refining existing arms embargos and acting to prevent the smuggling of oil and to protect hydrocarbon infrastructure. UN Secu-rity Council Resolution 2174, which calls for an arms embargo and relies on enforcement by neighboring states, has not proven effective; one diplomat called it
“a joke.”279 The Security Council panel of experts dis-cussed before noted that the resolution has been used as a deterrent and an incentive for negotiations—a failure on both counts. Implementation of the arms embargo is weak because enforcement is piecemeal and demand for arms and ammunition high.280 EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini has sug-gested EU ships could play a role,281 and Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, indicated Russia could become involved, a move wel-comed by Egypt.282
Without coordinating efforts and addressing Lib-ya’s vast and porous southern borders, which France is currently attempting to police,283 the arms embargo will continue to fail. One way to improve UNSC Res-olution 2147 would be to coordinate a multinational effort to support an aerial and naval observation and interdiction regime. This international framework would leverage U.S., European, and perhaps even Russian capabilities in the Mediterranean, Sahara, and Sahel to improve intelligence gathering for mon-itoring, to the extent possible, violations of the arms
embargo and the movement of VEOs both within Libya and across Libya’s porous borders. Action-able intelligence could be passed on to friendly local actors. This regime would also help address the flow of refugees and migrants out of Libya toward Europe, a high-casualty journey and one jihadists may exploit to reach southern Europe. Continual monitoring of Libyan borders and airspace could incorporate other countries that might have wished to unilaterally inter-vene, thereby providing a sanctioned means of help-ing stabilize Libya, while simultaneously deterring the impulse toward unilateral action. This observation and interdiction regime could be scalable, to include more aggressive aerial interdictions targeting VEOs. Such an interdiction regime could already have pre-vented the movement of large armed ISL convoys toward towns like Nawfalia and Sirte, or against oil fields in the Sirte Basin.
Second, establishing an escrow account for Lib-ya’s assets and hydrocarbon wealth could provide the international community with greater lever-age within Libya. Such an account, managed by a respected third party such as Malta, where the Cen-tral Bank of Libya has run operations throughout the civil war, could help depoliticize and protect Libya’s hydrocarbon sector from damaging initiatives like Operation Sunrise.284 The United States has already signaled that it will not tolerate unilateral federal-ist moves to sell Libya’s oil,285 and further assurances could help reach a more lasting entente in the Gulf of Sirte. If Misratans and federalists are not fighting each other, both will have greater resources to target ISL’s steady advance in their backyard as well as pro-tect vulnerable infrastructure. Oil revenues could also be used to reward local actors that agree to ceasefires or more comprehensive agreements, especially if their resources are instead directed against VEOs.
Conclusion
The military-political alliances of Operations Dignity and Dawn are limited by hardliners opposed to a unity government within their respective ranks and, particu-larly in the case of Dawn, their own limitations as alli-ances. A top-down agreement that returns Libya to the post-Qadhafi transitional process may prove unable to
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deliver security, at the least, and worse, it could exacer-bate the conflict. This is especially true if a unity gov-ernment is used as a precondition for lifting the Secu-rity Council weapons embargo. A return to a bitter and divided government is not the solution for righting the country, nor combating ISL. Rather, the United States and its European allies should throw their weight behind UNSMIL efforts to engage Libya’s municipal councils and tribes, or even develop their own paral-lel tracks. Achieving local truces and more permanent agreements, however patchwork they may be, is the first step toward providing stability and reorienting
Libya’s many armed factions toward fighting VEOs such as ISL and ASL. Establishing an escrow account for Libya’s assets and vital hydrocarbon wealth can both depoliticize the country’s hydrocarbon infrastructure and be used to reward good behavior. Further, an inter-national aerial- and sea-based regime could contain spillover and prevent extremists from being smuggled into Europe. It would also constrain regional actors pursuing unilateral objectives in Libya, and could eas-ily be upgraded from an intelligence-gathering regime in support of interdictions to an armed regime, should the need arise.
NOTES1. Andrew Engel, Libya as a Failed State, Research Note 24 (Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2014), http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/libya-as-a-failed-state-causes-consequences-options. 2. Editorial, “Libya Spirals Downward as the West Looks the Other Way,” Washington Post, January 12, 2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/libya-spirals-downward-as-the-west-looks-the-other-way/2015 /01/12/49869b98-9a8f-11e4-96cc-e858eba91ced_story.html.
3. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “10 Wars to Watch in 2015,” Foreign Policy, January 2, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/02/10-wars-to-watch-in-2015/.
4. “Libya IDP Figures Analysis,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, March 19, 2015, http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/figures-analysis.
5. UNHCRNews, Twitter post, “Across Libya, approx 400k people are displaced. In addition, there are nearly 37k refugees and asylum seekers of different nationalities,” January 16, 2015, 3:07 a.m., https://twitter.com/Refugees-Media/status/556045078033338368.
6. Alex Whiting, “Libya May Become Another Somalia if UN Talks Push Fails—British Envoy,” Reuters, January 15, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/uk-libya-talks-powell-idUKKBN0KO2EE20150115.
7. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Pledges Allegiance to Islamic State,” BBC News, March 7, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31784538.
8. “Tunisia Museum Attackers ‘Trained in Libya,’” France 24, March 20, 2015, http://www.france24.com/en /20150320-tunisia-museum-attackers-libya-training-islamic-state/.
9. Associated Press, “UN Envoy, at Geneva Talks Calls for Libya Unity Government,” New York Times, January 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/14/world/europe/ap-eu-united-nations-libya.html.
10. Alex Whiting, “Libya May Becomes Another Somalia if UN Talks, Push Fails – British Envoy,” Reuters, January 15, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/uk-libya-talks-powell-idUKKBN0KO2EE20150115
11. Frederic Wehrey, “Mosul on the Mediterranean? The Islamic State in Libya and U.S. Counterterrorism Dilem-mas,” Lawfare, December 17, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/12/17/islamic-state-in-libya-and-u.s.-counterterrorism-dilemmas.
12. Michelle Nichols, “Britain Says Libya Needs Unity Gov’t before Arms Embargo Change,” Reuters, February 20, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/20/mideast-crisis-libya-un-idINL1N0VU04O20150220.
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13. Adrian Croft, “EU Proposal to Send Soldiers to Libya Met with Skepticism,” Reuters, March 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/15/us-libya-security-eu-idUSKBN0MB0PX20150315.
14. United Nations, “Letter Dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” February 23, 2015, p. 4, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/128.
15. Saber Ayyub, “Hassi Changes His Mind, Hands over to Ghwell,” Libya Herald, April 2, 2015, http://www.libya-herald.com/2015/04/02/hassi-change-his-mind-hands-over-to-ghwell/ - axzz3WCfhS8ze.
16. Wolfgang Pusztai, “What Is Plan B for Libya?” Atlantic Council, January 30, 2015, http://www.atlanticcoun-cil.org/blogs/menasource/what-is-plan-b-for-libya?utm_content=buffer06244&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.
17. James Politi, “Renzi Appeals to Putin for Russian Help to Stabilize Libya,” Financial Times, March 5, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1ef0ec4-c35e-11e4-9c27-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3Ux4hwebW.
18. Edith Lederer, “Mali Appeals for International Intervention in Libya,” Associated Press, January 7, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/mali-appeals-international-intervention-libya-061017313.html.
19. Faisal Jalloul, “Libya Conflict Threatens Entire Maghreb,” Al-Monitor (originally published in al-Khaleej), January 7, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2015/01/libya-south-extremists-intervention-unlikely.html.
20. Ahmed Tolba and Yara Bayoumy, “Egypt Bombs Islamic State Targets in Libya after 21 Egyptians Beheaded,” Reuters, February 16, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/16/us-mideast-crisis-libya-egypt-idUSK-BN0LJ10D20150216.
21. “Arab States Must Intervene in Libya Exactly as Yemen: Thini,” Libya Herald, March 30, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/30/arab-states-must-intervene-in-exact-libya-situation-as-in-yemen-thinni/ - axzz-3WN1nDDzY.
22. United Nations, “Update on Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law during the Ongo-ing Violence in Libya (Revised),” December 23, 2014, p. 1 http://unsmil.unmissions.org/portals/unsmil/Libya%20Human%20Rights%20update%20Report%20-%202014-12-23%20-%20revised%202014-26-12%20EN.pdf.
23. Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Evidence of New Cluster Bomb Use,” March 15, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/n’ews/2015/03/14/libya-evidence-new-cluster-bomb-use.
24. David D. Kirkpatrick, “ISIS Finds New Frontier in Chaotic Libya,” New York Times, March 10, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/world/africa/isis-seizes-opportunity-in-libyas-turmoil.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
25. “The Libyan Air Force, Refurbishing Its Old SU-22s Fighter-Bombers?” Oryx Blog, February 9, 2015, http://spioenkop.blogspot.com/2015/02/the-libyan-air-force-refurbishing-its.html.
26. “Further Egyptian MiG-21 Deliveries to the Libyan Air Force,” Defence Blog, March 12, 2015, http://defence-blog.com/?p=3949.
27. Ajnadin Mustapha, “Dawn Launches Airstrikes on Zintan,” Libya Herald, February 17, 2015, http://www.libya-herald.com/2015/02/17/74528/#axzz3RvCJZyIS.
28. “Hejazi: Libya Dawn Has Only Three Aircraft,” Libya al-Mostakbal, February 28, 2015, http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/news/clicked/64355.
29. James Wheeler, Twitter post, “A man in Zintan shot down this #Libya Dawn MiG fighter jet (landing in Rujban) today with a SAM7 missile,” March 23, 2015, 2:45 p.m.,https://twitter.com/wheelertweets/sta-tus/580077861299740673.
30. Ayman al-Warfalli, “Rival Libyan Forces Carry Out Air Strikes, Militants Storm Oilfield,” Reuters, March 4, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/libya-security-idINKBN0LZ15R20150303.
31. Andrew Engel, Libya as a Failed State, Research Note 24 (Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2014), p. 9, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/libya-as-a-failed-state-causes-consequences-options.
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32. Patrick Haimzadeh, “Pour Résoudre la Crise Libyenne, Encore Faut-Il la Comprendre,” Orient XXI, January 30, 2015, http://orientxxi.info/magazine/pour-resoudre-la-crise-libyenne,0802.
33. Nizar Sarieldin, “The Battle for Benghazi: The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means,” SWP Comments (Stif-tung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015), p. 4, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C08_srd.pdf.
34. Mohamed Eljarh, Twitter post, “More than 500 assassinations of army/police officers and activists, judges and police happened before may 2015,” February 4, 2015, 2:40 p.m., https://twitter.com/eljarh/status/563104778008674304.
35. Nizar Sarieldin, “The Battle for Benghazi: The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means,” SWP Comments (Stif-tung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015), p. 2, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C08_srd.pdf.
36. United Nations, “Letter Dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” February 23, 2015, p. 15, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/128.
37. Ajnadin Mustafa, “New Chief of Staff Appointed by Parliament but General Staff Refuses to Accept Offer,” Libya Herald, August 24, 2014, http://www.libyaherald.com/2014/08/24/new-chief-of-staff-appointed-by-par-liament-but-obeidi-refuses-to-go/#axzz3SUpsLev2.
38. Osama al-Jared, “Colonel Faraj al-Barassi: We Will Face Darnah Next after Liberating Benghazi,” al-Wasat, November 3, 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/discussion/45431/.
39. “Faraj Barassi says only 20% of the so-called ‘army’ of dignity operaion [sic] are soldiers,” YouTube video, 1:30, posted by “Khaled Butou,” March 1, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddArjcw71y4&feature=youtu.be.
40. United Nations, “Letter Dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” February 23, 2015, p. 2, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/128.
41. Nizar Sarieldin, “The Battle for Benghazi: The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means,” SWP Comments (Stif-tung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015), p. 6, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C08_srd.pdf.
42. Wolfgang Pusztai, “What Is Plan B for Libya?” Atlantic Council, January 30, 2015, http://www.atlanticcoun-cil.org/blogs/menasource/what-is-plan-b-for-libya?utm_content=buffer06244&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.
43. Sami M. Berriwen, Twitter post, “This came after weeks of tribal mediation between the govt & al-Jathran (Head of OFG), who doesn’t want to serve under Haftar’s command,” March 18, 2015, 2:16 a.m., https://twitter.com/SamiBerriwen/status/578122905524908032.
44. Nizar Sarieldin, “The Battle for Benghazi: The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means,” SWP Comments (Stif-tung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015), p. 7, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C08_srd.pdf.
45. Sami M. Berriwen, Twitter post, “A war for dominance between al-Jathran & Haftar erupted few months back. OFG accuses Haftar of deliberate marginalization re arms supplies,” March 18, 2015, 2:17 a.m., https://twitter.com/SamiBerriwen/status/578123062337363968.
46. Sami M. Berriwen, Twitter post, “Last week, Ministry of Interior (Internationally-recognized govt) made Oil Facilities Guards under its command,” #Libya, March 18, 2015, 2:16 a.m., https://twitter.com/SamiBerriwen/status/578122803246854145.
47. “HoR Moves to Tobruk Naval Base: Hafter’s Position to Be Debated There Tomorrow,” Libya Herald, January 3, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/01/03/hor-moves-to-tobruk-naval-base-hafters-position-to-be-debat-ed-there-tomorrow/#axzz3NspngLYR.
48. United Nations, “Letter Dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution
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20 RESEARCH NOTE 25
1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” February 23, 2015, p. 15, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/128.
49. Reuters, “Libya Recalls Former General Haftar for Army Duty,” January 19, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/19/us-libya-security-idUSKBN0KS1SH20150119.
50. Ayman al-Warfalli, “Libya’s Haftar Appointed Army Chief for Recognised Government,” Reuters, March 2, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/02/uk-libya-security-army-idUKKBN0LY19N20150302.
51. Nizar Sarieldin, “The Battle for Benghazi: The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means,” SWP Comments (Stif-tung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015), p. 7, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C08_srd.pdf.
52. Ayman al-Warfalli et al., “Libyan Troops Try to Block PM Visit, May Signal Rift with Government,” Reuters, Feb-ruary 2, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/02/us-libya-security-visit-idUSKBN0L62B920150202.
53. “Thinni Sacks Interior Minister Sinki: Report,” Libya Herald, February 10, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/02/10/thinni-sacks-interior-minister-sunki-report/#axzz3RdLN4gqg.
54. Khalid Mahmoud, “Libya: Tobruk Government Reaffirms Support for Gen. Haftar,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 20, 2015, http://www.aawsat.net/2015/01/article55340600.
55. Michael Georgy and Tom Perry, “Egypt’s Sisi Says Muslim Brotherhood Is Finished,” Reuters, May 5, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/06/us-egypt-sisi-idUSBREA440QD20140506.
56. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Unraveling,” The New Yorker, February 23, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-zine/2015/02/23/unravelling.
57. “The Brotherhood Attacks Haftar: Sisi of Libya Is Trying to Repeat the Coup with Arab Countries’ Support,” CNN Arabic, May 20, 2014, http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/05/20/haftar-sisi-libya?hpt=continous.
58. Lally Weymouth, “Rare Interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi,” Washington Post, August 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rare-interview-with-egyptian-gen-abdel-fatah-al-sis-si/2013/08/03/a77eb37c-fbc4-11e2-a369-d1954abcb7e3_story.html.
59. Agence France-Presse, “Libya’s General Haftar Vows to Crush Jihadists,” Al-Arabiya, May 25, 2014, http://eng-lish.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/05/24/Libya-ex-general-says-people-mandated-him-to-crush-jihadists.html.
60. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Unraveling,” The New Yorker, February 23, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-zine/2015/02/23/unravelling.
61. “Abdullah Naker from Tobruk Shows Support for Haftar’s Team and Operation Dignity,” Libya News 24, March 8, 2015, http://washin.st/1Plcb3Z.
62. Khalid Mahmoud, “Libyan Deputy PM: We Are in Control of 80 Percent of the Country’s Oil,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 11, 2015, http://www.aawsat.net/2015/01/article55340321.
63. “Egypt Provides Eastern Libya with 30 Megawatts of Electricity a Day,” Moheet, January 27, 2015, http://washin.st/1IL3mLJ.
64. “Egypt Proposes Egyptian-Libyan Economic Conference,” Libya Herald, April 3, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/04/03/egypt-proposes-egyptian-libyan-economic-conference/.
65. “Egyptian Intelligence to Train 2,000 Libyan Operatives,” Libya Herald, February 6, 2015, https://www.libyaher-ald.com/2015/02/06/egyptian-intelligence-to-train-2000-libyan-operatives/.
66. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Unraveling,” The New Yorker, February 23, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-zine/2015/02/23/unravelling.
67. UN Support Mission in Libya, “UNSMIL Condemns Attack on Mitiga Airport as a Threat to Dialogue, Says Should Strengthen Resolve of Dialogue Participants to Reach Agreement,” March 19, 2015, http://unsmil.un-missions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=2012994&language=en-US.
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68. “UNSMIL’s Leon Slams Government Attack on Tripoli,” Libya Herald, March 21, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/21/unsmils-Leon-slams-government-attack-on-tripoli/#axzz3VAuqkw5u.
69. “Leon on Military Operations in Libya...,” YouTube video, 4:16, posted by “UNSMIL,” March 20, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h4bQ9lL1mf4&feature=youtu.be.
70. United Nations, “Letter Dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” February 23, 2015, p. 3, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/128.
71. “National Salvation Government Mourns Libyan Army Members Who Were Martyred during Their Coura-geous Opposition to Armed Terrorist Gangs,” Libyan News Agency, March 18, 2015, http://washin.st/1ItSnK0.
72. “Conference of the Libyan Army to Support Libya Dawn,” Aljazeera, October 29, 2014, http://washin.st/1FD7zAR.
73. Ajnadin Mustafa, “I’m Still Chief of Staff, Declares Obeidi,” Libya Herald, September 16, 2014, http://www.libyaherald.com/2014/09/16/im-still-chief-of-staff-declares-obeidi/#axzz3RvCJZyIS.
74. Operation Sunrise Libya’s Facebook page (in Arabic), posted December 24, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/ALSHOROOQ.OPERATION.LY/posts/1588064441428182.
75. “‘I Have No Control over Libya Dawn Militias’: Omar Hassi, Libya Dawn PM,” Libya Herald, February 5, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/02/05/i-have-no-control-over-libya-dawn-militias-omar-hassi-libya-dawn-pm/#ixzz3Qz4GGYDo.
76. Operation Quicksand’s Facebook page (in Arabic), created February 16, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/Op-eration.Quicksand/timeline.
77. Borzou Daragahi, “Tripoli Islamist Regime Declares ‘War’ on Libyan Rivals,” Financial Times, November 24, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d004fcaa-7424-11e4-b444-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3PQNH7aGS.
78. “In Video, Salah Badi Leads Misratan Militias in Storming Tripoli Airport,” al-Rseefa, July 13, 2014, http://www.alrseefa.net/archives/14701.
79. “Libya Dawn: A Map of Enemies and Allies, and Paths of Confrontation,” Al Arabiya Institute for Studies, Au-gust 25, 2014, http://washin.st/1FD8Rf3.
80. Nancy Porsia, “Q&A: ‘Libya Will Become a Haven for Radicals,’” Aljazeera, December 24, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/qa-libya-will-become-haven-radicals-201412235130190233.html.
81. Mohamed Eljarh, Twitter post, “Majority of #Misrata’s armed units are in support of ceasefire. Those under Badi are NOT. Islamist faction of #Libya dawn refused ceasefire,” January 18, 2015, 1:12 p.m., https://twitter.com/Eljarh/status/556922080021975040.
82. Mohamed Eljarh, “Libya’s Geneva Talks and the Search for Peace,” Atlantic Council, February 6, 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/libya-s-geneva-talks-and-the-search-for-peace.
83. Sami M. Berriwen, Twitter post, “Misrata’s revolutionary brigades: ‘We emphasize our commitment to dia-logue..we reject all kinds of Terrorism,’” #Libya, March 7, 2015, 6:21 a.m., https://twitter.com/SamiBerriwen/status/574213316442198016.
84. “León: All Who Want to Strangle Dialogue Want War, and We Will Not Tolerate Them,” al-Wasat, January 14, 2015, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/56505/.
85. UN Support Mission in Libya, “Transcript of SRSG Leon Press Conference before the Opening of the Libyan Dialogue Session in Geneva,” January 14, 2015, http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=1992895&language=en-US.
86. Operation Libya Dawn’s Facebook page (in Arabic), posted January 18, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/676867649049180/photos/a.676872015715410.1073741828.676867649049180/774630495939561/?type=1.
87. Operation Libya Dawn’s Facebook page (in Arabic), posted February 10, 2015, https://www.facebook.
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com/676867649049180/photos/a.676872015715410.1073741828.676867649049180/785108761558401/?type=1&theater.
88. Qayed’s older brother, Abu Yahya al-Libi, was an al-Qaeda deputy leader before being killed in a June 2012 U.S. drone strike in Pakistan. See Paul Cruickshank,, “Al-Libi Death a Major Blow for al-Qaeda,” Security Clearance (blog), CNN, June 5, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/05/al-libi-loss-would-be-major-blow-for-al-qaeda/.
89. Jihan al-Jazwi, “Qayed, al-Saadi, and al-Manaai are Leading the Rejection of the Geneva Dialogue,” al-Wasat, January 12, 2015, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/56173/.
90. Ahmed Elumami, “Libyan Islamist Leader Backs UN Talks, but Tensions High,” Reuters, March 7, 2015, http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL5N0W74ZM20150307?sp=true.
91. Mohamed Eljarh, “Libya’s Geneva Talks and the Search for Peace,” Atlantic Council, February 6, 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/libya-s-geneva-talks-and-the-search-for-peace.
92. Mohamed Eljarh, Twitter post, “Not correct to say #GN refusing the Geneva talks. JCP& the 94 group have all welcomed the dialogue. Only Martyrs bloc boycotting,” #Libya, January 18, 2015, 1:11 p.m., https://twitter.com/Eljarh/status/556921845690429441.
93. Andrew Engel and Ayman Grada, “Libya’s Other Battle,” PolicyWatch 2295 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 28, 2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/libyas-other-battle.
94. Mohamed Eljarh, “Libya’s Geneva Talks and the Search for Peace,” Atlantic Council, February 6, 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/libya-s-geneva-talks-and-the-search-for-peace.
95. Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room’s Facebook page (in Arabic), video, minute 1:44, posted January 28, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=762203233875900.
96. Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room’s Facebook page (in Arabic), posted January 28, 2015, https://www.face-book.com/GTLOfficial/photos/a.433642643398629.1073741828.427077124055181/762641667165390/?type=1.
97. Hadi Fornaji, “Omar al-Hassi in ‘Beautiful’ Ansar Row while ‘100’ GNC Members Meet,” Libya Herald, Novem-ber 18, 2014, http://www.libyaherald.com/2014/11/18/omar-al-hassi-in-beautiful-ansar-row-while-100-gnc-members-meet/.
98. “UN Declare Ansar al-Sharia Terrorists as Fighting Rages across Syria,” Middle East Eye, November 20, 2014, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-declare-ansar-al-sharia-terrorists-fighting-rages-across-libya-565330611.
99. “Hassi Sacked as ‘Prime Minister’ by Congress,” Libya Herald, March 31, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/31/hassi-sacked-as-prime-minister-by-congress/.
100. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Unraveling,” The New Yorker, February 23, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-zine/2015/02/23/unravelling.
101. Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room’s Facebook page (in Arabic), posted February 16, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/GTLOfficial/photos/a.433642643398629.1073741828.427077124055181/775196935909863/?type=1.
102. @Fajer_Libya_ M, Twitter post, “To Allah we belong, and to Him we do return,” #Fajer_Libya, February 10, 2015, 4:41 a.m., https://twitter.com/Fajer_Libya_M/status/565128349669134336.
103. Operation Libya Dawn’s Facebook page (in Arabic), posted February 14, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/676867649049180/photos/a.676872015715410.1073741828.676867649049180/787201198015824 /?type=1.
104. Yasmine Ryan, “ISIS in Libya: Muammar Gaddafi’s Soldiers Are Back in the Country and Fighting under the Black Flag of the ‘Islamic State,’” Independent, March 16, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-in-libya-muammar-gaddafis-soldiers-are-back-in-the-country-and-fighting-under-the-black-flag-of-the-islamic-state-10111964.html.
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105. Mohammed Eljarh, “What Today’s Bloody Attack in Tripoli Means for Libya,” Foreign Policy, January 27, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/27/what-todays-bloody-attack-in-tripoli-means-for-libya/.
106. Nizar Sarieldin, “The Battle for Benghazi: The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means,” SWP Comments (Stif-tung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015), p. 3, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C08_srd.pdf.
107. Frederic Wehry, “The Battle for Libya’s Oil,” Atlantic, February 9, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/internation-al/archive/2015/02/the-battle-for-libyas-oil/385285/. And see two Twitter posts from Mohamed Eljarh: “Label-ling Misratan armed groups as terrorist was wrong. What led to such wrong labeling is support from Misrata for terrorists grps,” #Libya, February 10, 2015, 1:11 a.m., https://twitter.com/Eljarh/status/565075583932305408; and “Haftar/HoR’s labelling of Misratan factions as terrorists was wrong. But Misratan factions played as an enabler for AS/IS by funding,” #Libya, February 10, 2015, 12:58 a.m., https://twitter.com/Eljarh/sta-tus/565072322483478528.
108. Abu Hamam al-Derni, Twitter post, “Remember: Cut Off the Road for Anyone Who Wants to Walk on the Blood of Martyrs,” March 25, 2015, 7:18 a.m., https://twitter.com/abh_aldrny/status/580690287992946688.
109. “IS/Ansar al-Sharia—‘Qaddafi Terrorists’ in Sirte, ‘Revolutionary Heroes’ in Benghazi,” Libya Herald, March 21, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/21/isansar-al-sharia-qaddafi-terrorists-in-sirte-revolutionary-heroes-in-benghazi/#axzz3VAuqkw5u.
110. Frederic Wehry, “The Battle for Libya’s Oil,” Atlantic, February 9, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/interna-tional/archive/2015/02/the-battle-for-libyas-oil/385285/.
111. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “#ISIS/#IS fighter in #Libya responds to IS clashes with Brigade 166 (Dawn Militia) in #Sirte, ‘vows revenge,’” March 15, 2015, 4:31 a.m., https://twitter.com/MaghrebiNote/sta-tus/577069701907509248/photo/1.
112. Rebecca Murray, “Islamic State Fighting in Libya’s Sirte Claims at Least 19 Lives,” McClatchey DC, March 14, 2015, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/03/14/259788/islamic-state-fighting-in-libyas.html.
113. “Final Battle against IS Expected in Sirte Soon: Report,” Libya Herald, March 23, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/23/final-battle-against-is-expected-in-sirte-soon/#axzz3VAoi3QAb.
114. Reuters, “Islamic State Fighters and Force Allied with Tripoli Clash in Central Libya,” March 14, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/14/us-libya-security-idUSKBN0MA0U020150314.
115. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Jihadism’s Foothold in Libya,” PolicyWatch 1980 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 12, 2012,) http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jihadisms-foothold-in-libya.
116. Alison Pargeter, “Are Islamist Extremists Fighting among Libya’s Rebels?” CTC Sentinel, April 1, 2011, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/are-islamist-extremists-fighting-among-libya%E2%80%99s-rebels.
117. “‘Il y a des Contacts entre Benghazi et Tripoli,’” interview, Le Figaro, June 23, 2011, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/06/23/01003-20110623ARTFIG00622-il-y-a-des-contacts-entre-benghazi-et-tripoli.phpEvenm.
118. Thomas Harding, Ruth Sherlock, and Richard Spencer, “Libya ‘Cannot Exclude’ Extremist Exploitation, NATO Chief Says,” Telegraph, September 12, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8758553/Libya-cannot-exclude-extremist-exploitation-Nato-chief-says.html.
119. “TheMaghrebiNote,” “ISIS in Libya,” March 8, 2015, pp. 10–11, https://themaghrebinote.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/isis-and-its-origins-in-libya-themaghrebinote.pdf.
120. Ibid. 121. Ra’id al-Libi, “Opening the Truth about the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade”; and the response by the Abu Salim
Martyrs Brigade, “Uncovering the Suspicions about the Martyrs of Abu Salim,” Muslm, both posted April 3, 2014, http://washin.st/1E7yAgR.
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122. Nizar Sarieldin, “The Battle for Benghazi: The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means,” SWP Comments (Stif-tung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015), p. 2, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C08_srd.pdf.
123. Jamie Dettmer, “Libyan Government Turns to Ansar al-Sharia Militia for Crime-Fighting Help,” Daily Beast, February 26, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/02/25/libyan-government-turns-to-ansar-al-sharia-militia-for-crime-fighting-help.html.
124. Jamie Dettmer, “Federalist Support Grows in Eastern Libya,” Voice of America, February 25, 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/libya-federalism-cyrenaica/1610348.html.
125. Abdul Ila, Twitter posts: https://twitter.com/mahamed8640/status/544861020821651457 and https://twitter.com/mahamed8640/status/544861954649886722.
126. Abdul Ila, Twitter post, https://twitter.com/mahamed8640/status/544866434141396992. 127. Andrew Engel, “The Islamic State’s Expansion in Libya,” PolicyWatch 2371 (Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, February 11, 2015), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-expan-sion-in-libya.
128. Abu Abdul Aziz, Shebl al-Adnani, and al-Muwahid al-Majhul, Twitter exchange, December 16, 2014, https://twitter.com/a_m_a_m82/status/544134402788589568. See also al-Rajahi Rahmat Rabbo, “Response to the Fabrications of al-Safouq: A Statement on the State of Ansar al-Sharia and Response to Abdul Majid al-Safouq,” January 18, 2015, http://justpaste.it/iyt2.
129. Abdul Ila, Twitter post, https://twitter.com/mahamed8640/status/544862978810855425. 130. Abdul Ila, Twitter posts: https://twitter.com/mahamed8640/status/544864915874672640 and https://twitter.
com/mahamed8640/status/544865524807921664. 131. Andrew Engel, “The Islamic State’s Expansion in Libya,” PolicyWatch 2371 (Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, February 11, 2015), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-expan-sion-in-libya.
132. “Libya Army Chief Warns of ISIL Threat against Europe,” Aljazeera, March 20, 2015, http://washin.st/1ChKEHU. 133. Mark Hosenball, “U.S. Fears Islamic State Is Making Serious Inroads in Libya,” Reuters, March 20, 2015, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/20/us-libya-security-idUSKBN0MG2G520150320. 134. Sami W. Berriwen, Twitter post, “ISIS fighter killed during clashes near #Sirte has been identified as Bashir
Mirsaani, Tunisian national,” March 19, 2015, 1:47 p.m., http://washin.st/1JsOr9W. 135. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “Brigade 166 releases pictures of captured vehicles and list of captured for-
eign fighters,” #ISIS/IS #Libya #Sirte, March 15, 2015, 3:43 a.m., https://twitter.com/MaghrebiNote/sta-tus/577057439524208640/photo/1.
136. “Chief of Staff Brigades Prepare to Attack the State Organization in Sirte,” YouTube video, 2:28, posted by “Al-mashaya Channel,” March 17, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjU6Ytt5IIE.
137. “Libye: Ansar al-Sharia Crée un Micro-Etat Islamique,” Observations Confidentielles (blog), posted by “Baki @ 7our Mansour,” January 30, 2015, https://7our.wordpress.com/2015/01/30/libye-ansar-al-sharia-cree-un-micro-etat-islamique/.
138. “‘Islamic State’ in Libya Repeats Same Media-Manoeuvre from Syria & Iraq,” TheMaghrebiNote (blog), Janu-ary 24, 2015, https://themaghrebinote.wordpress.com/2015/01/24/islamic-state-in-libya-repeats-same-media-manoeuvre-from-syria-iraq/. See also “Clashes of Two Jihadi Fronts in Eastern Libya, Derna,” TheMaghrebiNote (blog), December 16, 2014, http://themaghrebinote.com/2014/12/16/clash-of-two-jihadi-fronts-in-eastern-libya-derna-article-by-maliwitness/comment-page-1/.
139. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “#IS accepted the pledge of allegiance of Abu Abdullah AlLibi in #Libya (likely to get a top ranking in the group),”April 3, 2015, 9:17 a.m., https://twitter.com/MaghrebiNote/sta-tus/583981723119136768.
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140. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “Several Online previous Ansar al-Sharia (Libya) accounts that I used to monitor have changed into #IS accounts now,” January 27, 2015, 12:13 p.m., https://twitter.com/MaghrebiNote/status/560168822175723520.
141. “Libya, the New Hub for Jihadism,” TheMaghrebiNote (blog) October 11, 2014, http://themaghrebinote.com/2014/10/11/libya-the-new-hub-for-jihadism/.
142. Abu Abdul Aziz, Shebl al-Adnani, and al-Muwahid al-Majhul, Twitter exchange, December 16, 2014, https://twitter.com/a_m_a_m82/status/544134402788589568.
143. Osama al-Husseini, “Libyan Sources Uncover to al-Ahram the Leadership of Positions of Terrorist Organiza-tions in Darnah,” al-Ahram, February 17, 2015, http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/51460/26/NewsPrint/360680.aspx.
144. See Abdul Ila, Twitter posts: https://twitter.com/mahamed8640/status/544876389598375936 and https://twit-ter.com/mahamed8640/status/544876814238502914.
145. Abu Abdul Aziz, Shebl al-Adnani, and al-Muwahid al-Majhul, Twitter exchange, December 16, 2014, https://twitter.com/a_m_a_m82/status/544134402788589568.
146. Salman al-Libi, Twitter post, “Soldiers of the Caliphate and Soldiers of Ansar al-Sharia and all the Mujahedin, there are no differences, just brotherly love #2,” January 18, 2015, 3:11 p.m., https://twitter.com/sac155/sta-tus/556951932506755072.
147. Al-Rajahi Rahmat Rabbo, “Response to the Fabrications of al-Safouq: A Statement on the State of Ansar al-Sharia and Response to Abdul Majid al-Safouq,” January 18, 2015, http://justpaste.it/iyt2.
148. “Ansar al-Sharia in Libya / Islamic Police in Benghazi,” YouTube video, 4:19, posted by “Abu tunisi,” February 5, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNMloXZvqW4#t=151.
149. Moatez al-Majbari, “Ansar al-Sharia Forms Police and a Court ‘to Judge by God’s Laws Alone’ in Some Beng-hazi Suburbs,” al-Quds al-Arabi, February 2, 2015, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=289438.
150. “Jihadistes unis de Benghazi?” Observations Confidentielles (blog), posted by “Baki @ 7our Mansour,” February 6, 2015, http://7our.wordpress.com/2015/02/06/jihadistes-unis-de-benghazi/.
151. Ansar al-Sharia Media Department, “Photo Report,” April 1, 2015, https://justpaste.it/k9cd. 152. Abu Abdul Aziz, Shebl al-Adnani, and al-Muwahid al-Majhul, Twitter exchange, December 16, 2014, https://
twitter.com/a_m_a_m82/status/544134402788589568. 153. Al-Rajahi Rahmat Rabbo, “Response to the Fabrications of al-Safouq: A Statement on the State of Ansar al-
Sharia and Response to Abdul Majid al-Safouq,” January 18, 2015, http://justpaste.it/iyt2. 154. Abu Irhim al-Libi, “Boka al-Oreibi: On God’s Path, Not Democracy,” March 27, 2015, https://justpaste.it/boka. 155. Ansar al-Sharia in Libya Media Department, “Obituary of Field Commander Muhammad al-Oreibi,” March 23,
2015, https://justpaste.it/m3rabi.156. Shebl al-Anani al-Libi, Twitter post, “Conspiracies from the Latakia Mountains have been directed at the Lib-
yan scene but praise be to God that we are aware of what is happening, and that some of Jawlani’s hyenas have entered Libya,” December 17, https://twitter.com/a_m_a_m82/status/545349599926685696.
157. Abu Abdul Aziz, Shebl al-Adnani, and al-Muwahid al-Majhul, Twitter exchange, December 16, 2014, https://twitter.com/a_m_a_m82/status/544134402788589568.
158. Abu Moaz al-Barqawi, Twitter post (suspended account), “The Islamic State in the Province of Tripolitania has Executed the Crusader Prisoners; Revenge for Muslims in the Land of Egypt,” #Cairo, February 12, 2015, 8:11 a.m., https://twitter.com/asd_zxc__/status/565906159216103425.
159. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “#ISIS/#IS claimed in #Dabiq7 magazine that they executed 12 coptic chris-tians abducted in #Sirte #Libya in January,” February 12, 2015, 7:11 a.m., https://twitter.com/MaghrebiNote/status/565891050670415872.
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160. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “Shura Council releases a statement that enraged #ISIS in #Derna—called for ISIS to repent from #alQubbah bombings,” February 21, 2015, 1:41 p.m., https://twitter.com/MaghrebiNote/status/569205194132758529.
161. Johnlee Varghese, “ISIS-Libya Claims Responsibility for Attacks on Iranian Ambassador’s Residence,” Inter-national Business Times, February 23, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.in/isis-libya-claims-responsibility-attacks-iranian-ambassadors-residence-624291.
162. February 17 Martyrs Brigade’s official Facebook page, January 2015, https://www.facebook.com/17febmartyr/photos/pb.190022144367187.-2207520000.1424728072./806905999345462/?type=3&theater.
163. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “The Shura Council formations are growing every month, 3 Shura Coun-cils in 3 major cities in #Libya, next city?” January 22, 2015, 4:00 a.m., https://twitter.com/MaghrebiNote/sta-tus/558232666328551425.
164. “@Areenalasood22,” Twitter post, “Announcing the Formation of the Revolutionaries’ Shura Council of Ajd-abiya...” March 25, 2015, 4:05 pm, https://twitter.com/areenalasood22/status/580822721350754305.
165. Al-Rajahi Rahmat Rabbo, “Response to the Fabrications of al-Safouq: A Statement on the State of Ansar al-Sharia and Response to Abdul Majid al-Safouq,” January 18, 2015, http://justpaste.it/iyt2.
166. “Jihadistes unis de Benghazi?” Observations Confidentielles (blog), posted by “Baki @ 7our Mansour,” February 6, 2015, https://7our.wordpress.com/2015/02/06/jihadistes-unis-de-benghazi/.
167. Associated Press, “Libyan Militant Group Says Its Leader, Mohammed al-Zahawi, Was Killed,” New York Times, January 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/africa/libyan-militant-group-says-its-leader-mo-hammed-al-zahawi-was-killed.html.
168. Abdul Ila, Twitter post, https://twitter.com/mahamed8640/status/544875282218639360. 169. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “Ansar Al-Sharia #Sirte #Nawfaliyah branches defected to #IS & elements
in both #Benghazi & #Derna also joined #IS,” March 21, 2015, 2:38 p.m., https://twitter.com/MaghrebiNote/status/579396707982712832.
170. Um Habiba, Twitter post, https://twitter.com/um_habiba83/status/566044477803212800. 171. Gharib al-Ikhwan, “Dawn of Truth and Not Libya Dawn,” Blogspot.com, January 6, 2015, http://gareeb-alikh-
wan.blogspot.com/2015/01/blog-post.html.172. Abu Moaz al-Barqawi, “No Organization in the Shadow of the State,” January 31, 2015, http://justpaste.it/j6g5. 173. Abu Moaz al-Barqawi, “Dawn: Fighting for the Path of Democracy,” Nasher.me, February 10, 2015, http://
nasher.me/fajrlibya/ (post currently down). 174. Ibid. 175. Ibid. 176. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Syria: The Epicenter of Future Jihad,” PolicyWatch 2278 (Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syria-the-epicenter-of-future-jihad.
177. Battar Media Foundation, “Issues That You Must Know, People of Misratah,” Nasher.me, February 15, 2015, http://nasher.me/misrata/ (post currently down).
178. Ibid. 179. Ibid. 180. Abu Irhim al-Libi, “Misratah of Men,” February 16, 2015, http://justpaste.it/liby4. 181. Abu Osama al-Barqawi, “A Letter to Our People in the Province of Barqa and Monotheistic Youth in It,” Febru-
ary 16, 2015, http://nasher.me/bber/ (post currently down). 182. Ali Salem, “Car Bomb Attack at Tripoli Diplomatic Police HQ, Daesh Claims Responsibility,” Libya Herald,
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December 27, 2014, http://www.libyaherald.com/2014/12/27/car-bomb-attack-at-tripoli-diplomatic-police-hq-daesh-claims-responsibility/.
183. Abu Moaz al-Barqawi, Twitter post (account suspended), “Charge of the soldiers of the #Caliphate in #TheProv-ince_Tripolitania, God is Great, Killing of 3 apostates from #Libya_Dawn and wounding a number of them in clashes in #Nawfalia in #TheProvince_Tripolitania yesterday,” February 10, 2015, https://twitter.com/asd_zxc__/status/565231159509258241.
184. Frederic Wehry, “The Battle for Libya’s Oil,” Atlantic, February 9, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/interna-tional/archive/2015/02/the-battle-for-libyas-oil/385285/.
185. Battar Media Foundation, “Issues That You Must Know, People of Misratah,” February 15, 2015, http://nasher.me/misrata/ (post currently down).
186. “Libya: Rebel Factions Claim Control of Benghazi,” Aljazeera, July 31, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/ar-ticles/2014/7/31/benghazi-islamistlibya.html.
187. Fateh Minaa, “Pictures of Inspection Campaigns by the Army in Benghazi,” al-Wasat, January 15, 2015, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/56734/.
188. “Police Are Preparing to Spread throughout the Streets of Benghazi,” Libya al-Mostakbal, March 23, 2015, http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/news/clicked/65801.
189. Mary Fitzgerald, Twitter post, “Libya’s PM Thinni & his ministers hold meeting in Benghazi military base sur-rounded by fighters (pic v @motasemdhawi),” February 1, 2015, 5:48 a.m., https://twitter.com/MaryFitzger/status/561883746434301952.
190. “Libya Observer,” Facebook page, posted January 4, 2015, http://washin.st/1yehPQj. 191. “Haftar: The Final Stage to Liberate Benghazi Has Begun,” al-Wasat, January 4, 2015, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/
news/libya/54879/. 192. Agence France-Presse, “Khalifa Haftar Pledges to Completely Control Benghazi within the Month,” al-Youm
al-Sabiya, March 17, 2015, http://washin.st/1aLwTKS. 193. “Ansar al-Sharia in Libya / Islamic Police in Benghazi,” YouTube video, 4:19, posted by “Abu tunisi,” February 5,
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNMloXZvqW4#t=151.194. Osama al-Jared, “Colonel Faraj al-Barassi: We Will Face Darnah Next after Liberating Benghazi,” al-Wasat,
November 3, 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/discussion/45431/.195. Osama al-Jared, “Al-Badin to al-Wasat: Libya Dawn Is Dragging the Country into Division,” al-Wasat, Decem-
ber 13, 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/51764/#.VIysprF-mGE.facebook. 196. “Violent Clashes between Libya Dawn and the Petroleum Facilities Guard,” Libya al-Mostakbal, December 13,
2014, http://libya-al-mostakbal.org/news/clicked/59897. 197. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Unraveling,” The New Yorker, February 23, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2015/02/23/unravelling. 198. Operation Sunrise Libya’s official Facebook page, “About,” account created December 13, 2014, https://www.
facebook.com/ALSHOROOQ.OPERATION.LY/info?tab=page_info. 199. UNSMIL, Twitter post, “#UNSMIL: attacks on oil installations are in clear violation of UN Security Council
resolutions. Libyan oil belongs to all the Libyan people,” December 27, 2014, 7:59 a.m., https://twitter.com/UNSMILibya/status/548870883687669760.
200. “Sidra Fire Official Report Reveals Great Damage,” Libya Herald, February 1, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/02/01/sidra-fire-official-report-reveals-great-damage/.
201. Agence France-Presse, “Islamists Kill Libyan Soldiers in Attack on Oil Ports,” France 24, December 26, 2014, http://www.france24.com/en/20141226-islamists-kill-libyan-soldiers-attack-oil-ports-benghazi/.
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202. “Alwasat,” Twitter post, “Ras Lanuf celebrates the 310 firefighters who extinguished the fires at the Sidra oil facil-ity,” January 18, 2015, 10:20 a.m., https://twitter.com/alwasatengnews/status/556878876790779904.
203. Muhammad Ali, “Commander of al-Qardabiyah Air Base Confirms to al-Wasat It Has Been Bombed,” al-Wasat, December 13, 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/51747/#.VIytcEWlt_A.facebook.
204. “Operation Sunrise Pulls Back from Ben Jawad after Joint Offensive with PFG against IS Agreed: Report,” Libya Herald, March 26, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/26/operation-sunrise-pulls-back-from-ben-jawad-after-joint-offensive-with-pfg-against-is-agreed-report/ - axzz3UwUMiuAq.
205. Esam Mohamed, “Libyan Official: 10 Died in Oil Attack; 7 Foreigners Taken,” Associated Press, February 5, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/libyan-official-9-died-oil-attack-7-foreigners-162157285--finance.html.
206. Waha Oil Company–Dahra Field, Facebook page (in Arabic), February 14, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/WAHADAHRA/posts/747846078645848.
207. “Dahra Oilfield Reported Taken by IS,” Libya Herald, March 3, 2015, https://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/03/dahra-oilfield-reported-taken-by-is/.
208. Reuters, “Bomb Hits Pipeline from Libya’s El Sarir Oilfield,” February 14, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/ar-ticle/2015/02/14/us-libya-security-idUSKBN0LI0E120150214.
209. Abu Moaz al-Barqawi, Twitter post (account suspended), https://twitter.com/CC4_TNT_/status/56626525 8730201088.
210. See Twitter post (account suspended), https://twitter.com/mshmr_alwaily_2/status/562769569899884544. 211. “‘National Oil’ Calls for Neutralizing ‘Sustenance for Libyans,’” al-Wasat, December 26, 2014, http://www.al-
wasat.ly/ar/news/libya/53699/#.VJz-P0o43VY.facebook. 212. “Infographic: Libyan 2014 Economy...Oil Crisis, Budget, and the Dilemma of the Central Bank,” al-Wasat, De-
cember 28, 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/economy/54088/#.VKCPq6UZRvU.facebook. 213. Reuters, “Libya Oil Output Is Close to 490,000 Bpd—Industry Source,” March 16, 2015, http://af.reuters.com/
article/libyaNews/idAFL6N0WI2OE20150316. 214. Matt Egan, “Oil Plunges to a 6-Year Low: Is $30 a Barrel Next?” CNN, March 16, 2015, http://money.cnn.
com/2015/03/16/investing/oil-prices-gas-6-year-low/. 215. World Bank, Plunging Oil Prices, MENA Quarterly Economic Brief (Washington DC: World Bank, 2015), p.
22, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/01/26/000350881_20150126110740/Rendered/PDF/938470Box385410c0Biref0January02015.pdf.
216. David D. Kirkpatrick, “ISIS Finds New Frontier in Chaotic Libya,” New York Times, March 10, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/world/africa/isis-seizes-opportunity-in-libyas-turmoil.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
217. Fadil al-Ameen, “Libya on the Brink of Economic Collapse and Human Tragedy,” al-Wasat, January 12, 2015, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/170/56098/.
218. “Good Morning Libya,” Twitter post, “#FYI: There are 44 militias in Misrata, all are under the so-called operation #Libya Dawn:...,” March 20, 2015, 8:44 a.m., https://twitter.com/Morning_LY/status/578945088660852736.
219. “Libya Observer,” Facebook page, “Night Police Checkpoint photo album,” posted November 27, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/lyobserver/timeline/story?ut=43&wstart=1388563200&wend=1420099199&hash=1116523589751280878&pagefilter=3.
220. Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room, official Facebook page, January 11, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/GTLOfficial/posts/751825484913675.
221. United Nations, “Update on Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law during the Ongo-ing Violence in Libya (Revised),” December 23, 2014, p. 2, http://unsmil.unmissions.org/portals/unsmil/Libya%20Human%20Rights%20update%20Report%20-%202014-12-23%20-%20revised%202014-26-12%20EN.pdf.
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222. Ibid. 223. James Wheeler, Twitter post, “Tripoli #Libya: The theater at Zawiyat Dahmani Cultural Center was burned
today. Arts Institute had received threats,” February 5, 2015, 12:27 p.m., https://twitter.com/wheelertweets/sta-tus/563433649446854656.
224. James Wheeler, Twitter post, “Zawiat Dahmani neighborhood of Tripoli, #Libya: Historic tombs bulldozed. Follows up yesterday’s burning of the cultural center’s theater,” February 6, 2015, 3:03 a.m., https://twitter.com/wheelertweets/status/563654255312396288.
225. United Nations, “Update on Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law during the Ongo-ing Violence in Libya (Revised),” December 23, 2014, pp. 3, 4. http://washin.st/1IvZdyy.
226. Ajnadin Mustafa and Saber Ayyub, “LNA Claims to Take Aziziya; Zintan Says Its Forces Will Not Enter Trip-oli,” Libya Herald, April 4, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/04/04/lna-claims-to-take-aziziya-zintan-says-its-forces-will-not-enter-tripoli/ - axzz3WN1nDDzY.
227. “FezzanLibya,” Twitter post, “People need to understand the situation in #Ubari is tribal issue including Chadian Tebu and Malian Tuareg however both Dignity and Dawn camps,” March 20, 2015, 2:23 p.m., https://twitter.com/Fezzan213/status/579030557964812288.
228. “Ajwa LiBalad,” Facebook page, January 11, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/ajwanews/posts/800442523362584:0. 229. “FezzanLibya,” Twitter post, “Heavy clashes in #Ubari since this early morning between Tebu & Tuareg militias,”
#Fezzan #Libya, March 20, 2015, 4:27 a.m., https://twitter.com/Fezzan213/status/578880652222795776. 230. Mustafa Khalifa, “Displacement in Obari Reaches 85 Percent; Situation in the Town ‘Catastrophic,’” Libya Her-
ald, March 26, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/26/displacement-in-obari-reaches-85-percent-situ-ation-in-the-town-catastrophic/ - axzz3WN1nDDzY.
231. Andrew White, Twitter post, “@Fezzan213 Thanks, that’s all very interesting. Clear that Tebu are coordinated and very pro-Dignity, Tuareg are disperse and less pro-Dawn,” March 18, 2015, 11:22 a.m., https://twitter.com/andrewwhiteMENA/status/578260183962554368.
232. “The Truth of What Is Happening in the City of Ubari between the Tuareg and Tebu Tribes,” YouTube video, 27:00, posted by “ToumastTV,” December 5, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XSmVNn5eJY&feature=youtu.be; Tuareg fighter calls for unity at 6:00.
233. FezzanLibya, Twitter post, “People need to understand the situation in #Ubari is tribal issue including Chadian Tebu & Malian Tuareg however both Dignity & Dawn camps,” March 20, 2015, 2:23 p.m., https://twitter.com/Fezzan213/status/579030557964812288.
234. Mustafa Khalifa, “Displacement in Obari Reaches 85 Percent; Situation in the Town ‘Catastrophic,’” Libya Herald, March 26, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/26/displacement-in-obari-reaches-85-percent-situation-in-the-town-catastrophic/#axzz3WN1nDDzY.
235. “Ajwa LiBalad,” Facebook page, January 11, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/ajwanews/posts/800442523362584:0. 236. “The Truth of What Is Happening in the City of Ubari between the Tuareg and Tebu Tribes,” YouTube video,
27:00, posted by “ToumastTV,” December 5, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XSmVNn5eJY&feature=youtu.be; Tuareg fighter calls for unity at 6:00.
237. Ibid. See 14:30 for the quotation. 238. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,” Perspectives
on Politics 1, no. 3 (September 2003): p. 480, http://stathis.research.yale.edu/files/The%20Ontology%20of%20Political%20Violence.pdf.
239. Andrew White, “The South’s Latest Unrest: Ongoing Clashes in Brak al-Shati,” Africa Conflict Blog, March 18, 2015, http://africaconflictblog.com/2015/03/18/the-souths-latest-unrest-ongoing-clashes-in-brak-al-shati/.
240. “FezzanLibya,” Twitter post, “BREAKING: Dignity Forces from #Brak claim they have taken northern check-
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point of #Sebha from #Misrata militias,” March 18, 2015, 1:05 p.m., https://twitter.com/Fezzan213/status /578286172016885760.
241. “TheMaghrebiNote,” Twitter post, “#ISIS release video featuring two Tuareg fighters, calls on groups in #Aza-wad to give allegiance to Abu Bakr & #IS...,” January 20, 2015, 8:25 a.m., https://twitter.com/maghrebinote/status/557574549743865856.
242. Michael Horowitz, Twitter post, “New IS video depicting a Tebu (African tribe) militant calling for other Tebu tribesmen to join the Caliphate,” #ISIS, March 12, 2015, 8:57 a.m., https://twitter.com/michaelh992/sta-tus/576049439174963200.
243. Please see Fadil al-Amin’s analysis at http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/170/56098/. 244. Jared Malsin, “Beheading of Coptic Christians in Libya Shows ISIS Branching Out,” Time, February 15, 2015,
http://time.com/3710610/libya-coptic-christians-isis-egypt/. 245. Reuters, “Egypt’s Sisi Calls for Libya Coalition under UN Mandate,” February 17, 2015, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2015/02/17/us-mideast-crisis-libya-egypt-idUSKBN0LL0GA20150217. 246. U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on Libya by the Governments of France, Italy, Germany, Spain,
the United Kingdom and the United States,” media note, February 17, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237550.htm.
247. “‘The UN Political Dialogue Process Is Essential’”: UK Ambassador Michael Aron,” Libya Herald, February 17, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/02/17/the-un-political-dialogue-process-is-essential-uk-ambassador-michael-aron/.
248. “Only Libyans Can Save Libya: U.S. Ambassador to Libya Deborah K. Jones,” Libya Herald, February 17, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/02/17/only-libyans-can-save-libya-us-ambassador-to-libya-deborah-k-jones/#ax.
249. “UN Envoy Says Libya Talks Will ‘Take Time’ to End Fighting, Agree Political Settlement,” UN News Centre, January 14, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49799#.VLm7FWTF-YS.
250. UN Support Mission in Libya, “Transcript of SRSG Leon Press Conference before the Opening of the Libyan Dialogue Session in Geneva,” January 14, 2015, http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=1992895&language=en-US.
251. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Unraveling,” The New Yorker, February 23, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-zine/2015/02/23/unravelling.
252. Mark Micallef, “Despite Sabotage, Libya Is Close to Unity Government,” Times of Malta, April 5, 2015, http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20150405/local/despite-sabotage-libya-is-close-to-unity-govern-ment.562594.
253. See Abdul Rahman AlAgeli, “The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath,” panel discussion, March 12, 2015, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=4760.
254. “Libya Crisis Is a Security and Legitimacy Crisis—Not a Political Crisis: Thinni,” Libya Herald, April 1, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/04/01/libya-crises-is-a-security-and-legitimacy-crises-not-a-political-cri-ses-thinni/-axzz3WN1nDDzY.
255. Andrew Engel, Libya as a Failed State, Research Note 24 (Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2014), pp. 5–6, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/libya-as-a-failed-state-causes-consequences-options.
256. Michelle Nichols, “Britain Says Libya Needs Unity Government before Arms Embargo Change,” Reuters, Febru-ary 20, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/20/uk-mideast-crisis-libya-un-idUKKBN0LN2BO20150220.
257. For example, David M. Rodriguez, commander of U.S. Africa Command, remarked that “the Libyan government’s weak capacity has prevented the execution of many initiatives.” See “United States Africa Command 2015 Posture Statement,” p. 4, http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/document/25285/usafricom-posture-statement-2015.
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258. Omar Ould Dedde O. Hammady and Michael Meyer-Resende, “Saving Libya’s Constitution-Making Body,” Sada (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 18, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/12/18/saving-libya-s-constitution-making-body/hxm9.
259. Ibid. 260. To be directed to the correct site, see this soon-to-be-reactivated Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/
LibyanYouthMovement/posts/834338233298661?fref=nf. 261. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Unraveling,” The New Yorker, February 23, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2015/02/23/unravelling. 262. UN Office at Geneva, “Transcript of Press Conference by Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG) for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Mr. Bernadino Leon,” near verbatim transcript, January 14, 2015, http://washin.st/1Eby0i7.
263. The source, http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/blog/2015/01/08/feature-03, is from a website that is currently down.
264. Patrick Haimzadeh, “Pour Résoudre la Crise Libyenne, Encore Faut-Il la Comprendre,” Orient XXI, January 30, 2015, http://orientxxi.info/magazine/pour-resoudre-la-crise-libyenne,0802.
265. U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on Libya,” media note, March 21, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/239659.htm.
266. “Tribal Leaders Refuse Dialogue outside Libya,” Libya Herald, March 22, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/22/tribal-leaders-refuse-dialogue-outside-libya/#axzz3VAuqkw5u.
267. Patrick Haimzadeh, “Pour Résoudre la Crise Libyenne, Encore Faut-Il la Comprendre,” Orient XXI, January 30, 2015, http://orientxxi.info/magazine/pour-resoudre-la-crise-libyenne,0802.
268. Andrew Engel, Libya as a Failed State, Research Note 24 (Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2014), p. 19, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/libya-as-a-failed-state-causes-consequences-options.
269. Ajnadin Mustafa, “Misrata and Zintan Agree [sic] Prisoner Exchange,” Libya Herald, February 21, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/02/21/misrata-and-zintan-agree-prisoner-exchange/#axzz3SUpsLev2.
270. Anonymous Libyan political observer, online interview by author, February 9, 2015. 271. Channel 4 News Facebook page, video, 1:17, posted February 16, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v
=10152735351396939&fref=nf. 272. Margaret Besheer, “Libya: Lift Arms Embargo, Let Us Fight Extremists,” Voice of America, February 18, 2015,
http://www.voanews.com/content/un-security-council-to-hold-emergency-meeting-on-libya/2648381.html. 273. “Arab States Must Intervene in Libya Exactly as in Yemen: Thinni,” Libya Herald, March 30, 2015, http://www.
libyaherald.com/2015/03/30/arab-states-must-intervene-in-exact-libya-situation-as-in-yemen-thinni/ - axzz-3WN1nDDzY.
274. Abu Irhim al-Libi, “The French Crusader Campaign against Libya: Analysis and Expectations for the Coming War,” Blogspot.com, http://libi4.blogspot.com/2015/01/blog-post_10.html.
275. Abu Irhim al-Libi, “Libya: The Strategic Gateway for the Islamic State,” Blogspot.com, January 26, 2015, http://libi4.blogspot.com/2015/01/blog-post_26.html.
276. Ayman al-Warfalli, “Islamic State Militants Claim Suicide Attacks in Libya That Kill 42,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/20/us-libya-security-idUSKBN0LO0SS20150220.
277. Michael Aron, Twitter post, “Good to see House of Reps condemning today’s Daesh attack on Misratans. Liby-ans must unite against Daesh,” #Libya,” April 5, 2015, 10:48 a.m., https://twitter.com/HMAMichaelAron/sta-tus/584774558760226816.
278. “Algeria Seeks to Broker Peace between Obari Tuareg and Tebu,” Libya Herald, March 23, 2015, http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/03/23/algeria-seeks-to-broker-peace-between-obari-tuareg-and-tebu/#axzz3VAoi3QAb.
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279. Benny Avni, “In Libya, Rift Widens over How to Defeat ISIS,” Newsweek, March 14, 2015, http://www.news-week.com/libya-rift-over-fighting-isis-313851.
280. United Nations, “Letter Dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” February 23, 2015, p. 4, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/128.
281. Adrian Croft, “EU Proposal to Send Soldiers to Libya Met with Skepticism,” Reuters, March 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/15/us-libya-security-eu-idUSKBN0MB0PX20150315.
282. Paul J. Saunders, “Russia Indicates It Might Take Anti-IS Action in Libya,” Al-Monitor, March 11, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/russai-naval-blockade-arms-libya-militas.html## ixzz3UhTAIYss.
283. “France: The Saharan Policeman,” BBC News, March 19, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31939287. 284. Andrew Engel, Libya as a Failed State, Research Note 24 (Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2014), p. 17,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/libya-as-a-failed-state-causes-consequences-options. 285. Borzou Daragahi and Neil Hume, “U.S. Seizure of Mystery Oil Tanker Leaves Questions Unanswered,” Fi-
nancial Times, March 17, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/636ee0be-ada6-11e3-bc07-00144feab7de.html #axzz3SaLta1nR.
10/4/2015 The Limits of Iranian Expansion - Geopolitical Diary - [email protected] - Gmail
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The Limits of Iranian ExpansionApril 9, 2015 | 23:54 GMT
AnalysisIt is easy to look at the fight in Yemen as yet another sectarian proxy battle in the region. Saudi Arabia isfighting Iranbacked rebels and Iranian warships are seemingly facing off against the Saudi navy, which isblockading Yemen's ports. And with the number of security incidents picking up inside the Saudi kingdom,many are questioning whether a more assertive Saudi role in the region could end up bringing moretrouble, potentially affecting Saudi Arabia's mostly Shiite oilrich Eastern Province. A more careful look atIranian capabilities, however, may reveal a less alarming picture.
First, the framing of the conflict as a sectarian one is a bit of an exaggeration. Yemen has long beenfighting with itself. Factions such as the Houthis have taken advantage of a power struggle in Sanaa. AlQaeda, southern separatists and various tribal factions, meanwhile, are playing various sides. EvenYemen's southern separatists have admitted to receiving Iranian financial support and military training insummer 2013. By framing thewar in Yemen as a battle against an Iranian bid for regional hegemony,Riyadh can play on emotions to galvanize a Sunni coalition to fight back.
Iran has played an unclear but minor role in supplying Houthi rebels in Yemen, but with a Saudiledblockade now in effect, that becomes much more difficult. Iran is also trying to flex its muscles by makinga media splash out of the routine rotation of a naval group to the Gulf of Aden. But Iran is not about toenter a losing naval battle with Saudi and Egyptian naval forces in the Bab elMandeb strait. While Riyadhprojects power from the Arabian Peninsula, it is simply too much of a reach for the small Iranian navydeployment operating far outside the umbrella of Iranian air cover.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
Second, Iran's reach into the Saudi kingdom is also minimal. A gunbattle in the eastern Saudi city of alAwamiya on April 5 that ended with one Saudi policeman dead and three others wounded raised alarmthat Iran could be stirring the embers of unrest. Sporadic attacks, usually involving small groups ofgunmen ambushing security checkpoints, have occurred in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province over the pastcouple of years. But we have not seen any enhancement of the capabilities and organization of Shiiteactivists challenging Saudi authorities. As evidenced by the police raid and the militants' continuedreliance on light arms, Saudi Arabia has kept a close watch on Eastern Province for good reason.Moreover, Riyadh appears to have been quite successful in preventing outside material support fromreaching rebels in the interior.
At most, Iran is able to encourage Shiite militant activity, primarily through religious conduits in Beirut andBahrain who go between Iranian intelligence and Saudi Shiite community leaders. As much as Iran wouldlike to build up a fifth column in the Saudi kingdom, Saudi Arabia still appears capable of containing lowlevel unrest in the east to protect its oil wealth.
To be sure, a U.S.Iranian rapprochement will help rehabilitate Iran's economy, enabling Tehran to projectinfluence in the region. Consequently, Sunni powers are ramping up efforts to curb Iran's ambitions. ButIran's recovery should not be mistaken for a rapid expansion of power. Iran's power began peaking withthe fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and declined again when the civil war in Syria gained momentum.Tehran is now struggling to sustain its allies in Baghdad and Damascus. With Turkey and Saudi Arabiastriving to fill a void left by the United States, Iran will try to preserve its gains rather than opening new
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Tensions etween Iran and Saudi Arabia DeepenOver Conflict in Yemeny DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK APRIL 9, 2015
CAIRO — Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia deepened on Thursdayas Iranian leaders lashed out with rare vehemence against the continuingSaudi air campaign in Yemen, even hurling personal insults at the youngSaudi prince who is leading the fight.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, on Thursdaydenounced the Saudi airstrikes in Yemen as “a crime” and “a genocide,”while all but taunting Saudi Arabia that its war in Yemen was doomed tofail.
A regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia extended its bombingcampaign for a 16th night in its effort to stop the Houthi movement and itsallies from dominating Yemen. The Houthis nonetheless continued theiradvance, and aid groups warned of a compounding humanitariancatastrophe, particularly in the port city of Aden.
Secretary of State John Kerry sharply warned Iran over its backing forthe other side of the conflict in Yemen, in the first explicit Americanaccusation that Tehran has been providing military aid to the Houthis.
Washington was “not going to stand by while the region isdestabilized,” Mr. Kerry said in an interview with “PBS NewsHour” onWednesday night.
“There are obviously supplies that have been coming from Iran,” headded. “There are a number of flights every single week that have beenflying in. We trace those flights, and we know this. We are well aware of the
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support that Iran has been giving to Yemen.”The United States has recently increased the provision of logistical
support, intelligence and weapons to the Saudi campaign, just days after theannouncement of a framework for a nuclear deal with Iran. Mr. Kerry saidhe was seeking to reassure allies, including Saudi Arabia, that the UnitedStates could “do two things at the same time.” The United States could helppush back against Iranian attempts to project its influence around theregion, he argued, while at the same time negotiating a deal that wouldreward Tehran for providing guarantees that it was not building nuclearweapons.
Saudi Arabia has said it is bombing the Houthis because it sees them asan instrument of Iranian power, but Western diplomats and independentexperts have said that while Iran has supported the Houthis financially, ithas no direct control over the group.
The back-and-forth insults and threats Thursday raised fears that theYemeni conflict could further inflame the rivalry between the two regionalheavyweights, Iran and Saudi Arabia, already fighting each other throughsectarian proxies in Syria and in less overt struggles across Iraq, Lebanonand Bahrain.
Some analysts suggested that the battle for Yemen may furthercomplicate the delicate politics of a deal with the Western powers torestrain Iran’s nuclear program. But others argued that the deal had insteademboldened Iran to flex its muscles against Saudi Arabia.
“Deep down, the Iranians know that they are winning,” said MichaelStephens, the head of the Royal United Services Institute in Doha, Qatar.
Mr. Kerry appeared forced into a difficult balance, reassuring SaudiArabia and other allies of American support against Iran withoutantagonizing Iranian hard-liners severely enough to fuel opposition to thenuclear deal.
The Ayatollah’s diatribe only added to the challenge.In rare direct criticism of Iran’s rival by name, Ayatollah Khamenei
said that Saudi Arabia was departing from a history of acting with dignity inforeign affairs, saying that “inexperienced youths have taken over the affairsof the state and are replacing dignity with barbarity.”
10/4/2015 Tensions Between Iran and Saudi Arabia Deepen Over Conflict in Yemen - NYTimes.com
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His comments were a jab at the Saudi defense minister, PrinceMohamed bin Salman, who Saudi diplomats say is about 30. He is also ason of King Salman, who ascended to the throne this year and promptlynamed him to the powerful dual roles of defense minister and chief of theroyal court.
The Saudi news media has been cheering Prince Mohamed as thearchitect and overseer of the Yemeni campaign despite a light résumé,raising eyebrows among rivals in the royal family and setting him up forembarrassment if it is deemed to have failed.
In a statement on Thursday, Ayatollah Khamenei warned the Saudis“they must cease their crimes in Yemen,” and that failure there was all butinevitable.
“They will be harmed and incur losses in this issue in which they willunder no circumstances triumph. The Saudis’ face will be rubbed in theground in Yemen,” he said, comparing the Saudi actions to Israel’scampaigns against Palestinian militants in Gaza — who have also receivedsupport from Iran.
In another statement, released over Twitter along with some of hisother remarks, the ayatollah further teased Saudi Arabia about its pledge tocatch up to Iran in the development of a nuclear weapon.
“An underdeveloped country said that ‘If Iran has enrichment, we wantit too,’ ” he said. “Well, do it if you can. Nuclear technology is our domesticcapability.”
Mr. Stephens, of the Royal Unity Services Institute, said theextraordinary barbed comments appeared designed to provoke and inflame.
“It is almost like the Iranians are baiting the Saudis, trying to find everypressure point, to make the Saudis feel emasculated, and then stand backand watch as the Saudis get in deeper and deeper,” he said.
But at the same time, he argued, the Iranians were sending a messageof support to their Yemeni allies, the Houthis.
“They have decided to show that they are willing to stand behind theHouthis,” Mr. Stephens said. “The Iranians are making some sort of aguarantee to their allies that, whatever happens, they are going to makesure that the Houthis are at the table for the talks.”
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Saudi Arabia, which is leading a regional coalition against the Houthis,issued its own warning to Iran, saying that two Iranian warships thatrecently arrived in the waters off Yemen should steer clear of Yemeniwaters. “If the ships seek to aid the Houthis, the coalition has the right tochoose the proper answer,” said a spokesman, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Asseri.
In another provocation, Saudi Arabia denied permission for an Iranianplane filled with pilgrims to land in Mecca.
The Houthis, a group based in northern Yemen that follows a strain ofShiite Islam, have fought a half dozen conflicts with the Yemeni governmentsince 2004, including a fight in 2009 that drew Saudi Arabia into borderskirmishes. Only since that time, scholars say, has the movement receivedsupport from Iran, the region’s main Shiite Muslim power as well as SaudiArabia’s rival.
Since the fall, however, the Houthis have teamed with major units ofthe Yemeni security forces still loyal to the former strongman, Ali AbdullahSaleh. Those units have helped the Houthi-allied forces capture the capital,Sana, and much of Yemen.
Their advance appears to have continued despite the two-week-oldSaudi bombing campaign. On Thursday, Al Jazeera television network —owned by Qatar, part of the Saudi coalition — said the Houthi-allied forceshad also occupied Ataq, capital of Shabwa Province, taking control ofgovernment offices.
At the United Nations, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, whose effortsto restart a political dialogue in Yemen have collapsed, implored theHouthis to halt their expansion. But he also has been critical of the Saudi-led military campaign.
“The coalition air raids — and the continuing attempts by the Houthisand their allied armed groups to expand their power — have turned aninternal political crisis into a violent conflict that risks deep and long-lasting regional repercussions,” Mr. Ban said at United Nationsheadquarters.
“The last thing the region and our world need is more of the chaos andcrimes we have seen in Libya and Syria,” he said.Thomas Erdbrink contributed reporting from Tehran, Rick Gladstone from
10/4/2015 Tensions Between Iran and Saudi Arabia Deepen Over Conflict in Yemen - NYTimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/world/middleeast/yemen-fighting.html?&hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region®ion=top-… 5/5
New York, and Kareem Fahim from Cairo.
A version of this article appears in print on April 10, 2015, on page A9 of the New York edition withthe headline: Tensions Between Iran and Saudi Arabia Deepen Over Conflict in Yemen.
© 2015 The New York Times Company
WorldViews
If ‘Game of Thrones’ were in the Middle EastBy Ishaan Tharoor April 9 at 9:49 AM
When he delivered his fiery speech to Congress in March, declaiming the Iranian regime, Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu deployed a rather memorable phrase. He equated the Islamic republic with the jihadists of
the Islamic State, arguing "both want to impose a militant Islamic empire" on the world. He went on to say that
both the extremists and Tehran's leadership were waging "a deadly game of thrones."
WorldViews picked apart Netanyahu's speech that day here, but the Israeli leader planted another seed. What if
the fantasy world of "Game of Thrones," the vastly popular HBO series based on the books by George R.R.
Martin, was indeed transposed to the fractious Middle East?
[An illustrated guide to all 456 deaths in 'Game of Thrones']
Yes, it's a silly, hypothetical question. But the "Game of Thrones" universe is so rich with metaphors that it's
already been used to explain everything from American presidential candidates to English soccer teams. The
following is WorldViews's rough starter guide to the Middle East's "Game of Thrones" identifying the
feuding states and factions of the region if they existed in Westeros, the fictional continent where most of
Martin's story takes place.
A disclaimer: The analogies are far from exact (which ought to be expected when you graft imaginary medieval
fantasy things onto a real part of the world that is a lot more complicated.) If you have not watched the show or
read the books, you probably won't follow the allusions to current affairs; if you have, you may likely disagree
with them. We welcome your alternate guides in the comments section.
House Lannister = Saudi Arabia
The wealthiest and most powerful house in Westeros, the Lannisters are kingmakers. To the house's lead
patriarch, family matters before all. The Lannisters' influence can be felt in direct and subtle ways across the
realm, even in places far from their domains. They are criticized by some for having a record of abuse and
brutality, while others resent how their power has been built purely on the natural resources found beneath their
lands.
More than anything, the Lannisters care about preserving the political status quo that they helped establish in
the region. Recent events and Lannister overreactions may lead to a dangerous unraveling.
House Stark = Middle East's crushed liberals and democrats
For longer than most remember, the Starks labored in the remote north of Westeros, out in the cold. Then, they
had a brief moment in the sun only to be brought down by what's remembered as a bitter, tragic betrayal.
Now, they are hounded wherever they turn. Some, faced with little choice, were coopted by those they shouldn't
trust. Others have gone underground or abroad and are waiting for their fortunes to change. There had been talk
of spring, but for the Starks, winter truly came.
House Baratheon = Arab autocrats
Until recently, House Baratheon ruled over much of the realm, sometimes with a guiding Lannister hand. The
recent troubles have led to divisions within their camp. One faction seeks to upstage the Lannisters so
desperately that it has led to quixotic adventures far from their traditional home.
House Targaryen = United States*
The Targaryen dynasty came from afar and lorded over Westeros for decades. Their vastly superior firepower
literally, dragons was a guarantor of their hegemony; an alliance of convenience with the Lannisters didn't
hurt, either. But upheavals in the realm have cast the Targaryens out in the wilderness, and relations with the
Lannisters have frayed. There are some still in Westeros who clamor for their return. Whatever the case, their
weaponry is coveted by all of Westeros's pretenders to the throne.
House Greyjoy = Turkey
The Greyjoys remember fondly a distant age when they counted large swathes of Westeros under their
dominion, but it's ancient history to almost everyone else. Steeped in their own traditions and ways, their recent
interventions in parts of the region have smacked of political naïveté. Their leader was once a strong,
transformational figure, but now more regularly fumes in his citadel, fearful of enemies closing in around him.
House Martell = Iran**
House Martell of the southern region of Dorne has always seen itself as distinct from the other major houses of
Westeros. They come from a different ethnic background and take pride in their own myths and legends. Their
hatred of the Lannisters is matched only by the longstanding enmity for the Tyrells (see below).
House Tyrell = Israel**
The Tyrells pride themselves on the prosperous realm that they've cultivated in Westeros, removed from wider
ruin and dysfunction. They've had to hold their nose and find common cause with the Lannisters, despite
obvious differences. Their rivalry with (and mistrust for) the Martells of Dorne is on a constant simmer, and
sometimes flares into open conflict.
Wildlings = Islamists
The Wildlings they call themselves the "free folk" were always there, and in many ways are just like
everyone else in Westeros. But some of the land's noble houses conspired to subdue them, and built a vast Wall
to keep them out. Their latest attempts to come out from the cold have been met by stiff resistance, particularly
by one wing of the Baratheon clan.
White Walkers = Islamic State
The Wildlings are in truth fleeing these monstrous creatures, some of whom are zombie Wildlings. The White
Walkers are shockingly effective in their tactics, and swallow up new recruits into their mysteries at frightening
rates. There's a lot of debate over where they come from and what they want, but everyone agrees that they're
awful.
Night's Watch = Kurds
On the frontlines in the fight against both the Wildlings as well as the more terrifying White Walkers, the Night's
Watch mans the Wall that guards the other kingdoms of Westeros. Their clashes with the Wildlings and White
Walkers have intensified in recent times. Some people believe they are as lousy a pack of scoundrels and
criminals as those who they battle. Their lobbying efforts in the main capital have yielded a degree of support.
The Riverlands = Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere
Who remembers when these lands were lush and peaceful? Now, all is war and ruin as the great houses vie for
supremacy. Amid the violence, it's the smallfolk who pay the most hideous price.
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*WorldViews recognizes that this parallel exaggerates the degree to which the United States has been sidelined
from the strategic discussions in the Middle East. It is obviously still a key, perhaps preeminent actor in the
region.
**WorldViews recognizes that these parallels obscure some of the criticism of the Iranian and Israeli
governments, and do not mention the negotiations for a nuclear deal with Iran, Tehran's support for proxy
militias in other corners of the Middle East or Israel's problematic treatment of the Palestinians. But you try
finding all of that in the Westeros of "Game of Thrones."
Related on WorldViews
The shadow of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen
Why Obama doesn't need Iran to recognize Israel before signing a nuclear deal
Ahead of U.S. air strikes in Syria, Saudi Arabia beheads inmates
Ishaan Tharoor writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post. He previously was a
senior editor at TIME, based first in Hong Kong and later in New York.