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Deliberative Mini-Publics and Perceived Legitimacy: The Effect of Size and Participant Type

Daan Jacobs

[email protected]

Tilburg Institute of Governance

Tilburg University

ECPR General Conference 2019, Wroclaw

mailto:[email protected]

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Deliberative Mini-Publics and Perceived Legitimacy: The Effect of Size and Participant Type

ABSTRACT

The growing use of deliberative mini-publics has created a wide array of different designs. Yet, it is

largely unknown whether specific design characteristics affect the extent to which mini-publics

increase the perceived legitimacy of a public decision-making process. In this study, the relationship

between two such design characteristics, size and participant type, and the legitimating power of

mini-publics is investigated by means of a survey experiment. It finds that the legitimating effect of a

mini-public is greatest if it involves more citizens, and if those citizens have direct interest in the

outcome of a decision-making process.

Keywords: deliberative mini-public; survey experiment; perceived legitimacy; design

Word count (excluding references and appendices): 6120

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INTRODUCTION

Deliberative mini-publics, which can be defined as institutions that foster “deliberation concerning

general political issues among small groups of randomly selected citizens” (Lafont 2015, 40), have

become an increasingly popular way to organize public participation. Although the exact number of

mini-publics is unknown, more and more governments are using this particular means to involve

citizens more directly in the public decision-making process (Smith 2009). As a result, many different

types of mini-publics now exist. Even within established formats such as the citizen's jury, the

consensus conference, and the deliberative poll, differences in design characteristics like size, scope

and mission are becoming increasingly pronounced (see Goodin & Dryzek 2006; Setälä & Smith

2018).

The growing use of deliberative mini-publics can be attributed at least in part to the idea that

they are able to significantly improve the perceived legitimacy of public decision-making –

particularly among those who are either unwilling or unable to participate themselves (Goodin &

Dryzek 2006; Fung 2015). Due to their unique participatory qualities, it is thought that mini-publics

are particularly well-suited to repair the loss of legitimacy that many democratic institutions are

believed to suffer (see Grönlund et al. 2014; Caluwaerts & Reuchamps 2015). For example, Dryzek &

Tucker (2008, 868) note that a mini-public in France took place in a context where “faith in the ability

of elites to manage risks had been shaken”. In this case, the role of the mini-public was explicitly to

"to assure […] social acceptance of technological change".

Given this importance of legitimacy in the rationale for using deliberative mini-publics, it is

not surprising that the relationship between these two concepts has been a subject of considerable

attention in the literature (c.f. Dryzek et al. 2009; Caluwaerts & Reuchamps 2016). Yet, existing work

on this issue has focused predominantly on the effect of deliberative mini-publics in general (c.f. Ron

2010; Smith 2013). On the one hand, there are studies that investigate the effect of a ‘typical’ mini-

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public. These studies often focus on stylized versions of popular formats such as the citizens’

assembly, or the citizen initiative review (see Boulianne 2018). On the other hand, there are studies

that do focus on particular cases, but limit themselves to studying the effect of that specific mini-

public (Gastil et al. 2016; Longstaff & Secko 2016).

A consequence is that an important aspect of the relationship between mini-publics and

perceived legitimacy has generally been overlooked. While it has been decisively shown that mini-

publics can positively affect the perceived legitimacy of a public decision-making process (Font &

Blanco 2007), it is largely unknown if and to what extent the strength of this effect varies with how a

mini-public is designed. In spite of the fact that mini-publics can involve anywhere between 30 and

1000 citizens for example (see Goodin & Dryzek 2006), few studies have so far investigated whether

the legitimating power of a deliberative mini-public is affected by the number of participating

citizens. Similarly, despite significant variation in the type of citizens that mini-publics involve (see

Felt & Fochler 2010), it is largely unclear whether the effect of a mini-public is stronger if involved

citizens are directly affected by the subject at hand. This prompts the following research question:

To what extent does the design of a mini-public affect its capacity to increase the perceived

legitimacy public decision-making processes?

In this study, we seek to answer this question by studying how two design characteristics –

size and participant type – influence the effect of a deliberative mini-public on the perceived

legitimacy of public decision-making. We do so by means of a survey experiment (N = 383). In this

experiment, a representative group of Dutch residents was asked to read a brief description of a

public decision-making process that featured a deliberative mini-public. Depending on the

experimental group to which participants were randomly assigned, the mini-public involved either

30 or 1000 citizens, and involved either citizens in general or only citizens who would be directly

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affected by the decision at hand. Having read the brief description, participants were asked to answer

a series of questions to establish if and to what extent they considered the decision-making process

legitimate.

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we provide an overview of the diversity of

deliberative mini-publics. Next, we briefly review the literature on this issue, and introduce our main

hypotheses regarding the effects of size and type of participants of a deliberative mini-public on

perceived legitimacy. Following a description of the experimental design and proceedings, we report

the main results. We conclude with a discussion of our main findings and contribution, and an outline

for future research.

DELIBERATIVE MINI-PUBLICS

As a means to organize public participation, deliberative mini-publics stand out for having two

defining characteristics. The first is a commitment to facilitating deliberation. Defined as a process of

decision-making in which participants “weigh carefully both the consequences of various options for

action and the views of others” (Mathews 1994, 110), deliberation is often seen as an alternative to

the partisan debate that typifies traditional decision-making processes (see Elster 1998; Leydet

2015). To achieve this, mini-publics usually provide participants with access to experts or

supplementary information, and attempt to create an environment in which a wide range of different

views is considered in an open and respectful way (see Burkhalter et al, 2002). A second

characteristic is the use of sortition. Contrary to most other ways to involve citizens more directly in

public decision-making, mini-public use random selection to determine who is eligible to participate.

While such selection will often be quasi-random in practice (Dryzek and Tucker 2008, 864), it is

believed that this results in a more representative sample of citizens taking part (see Ianiello 2018).

While all mini-publics share these characteristics, different designs can be distinguished. One

is the deliberative poll. A brainchild of James Fishkin (1997; 2009), deliberative polls engage a

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randomly selected sample of citizens in a deliberative process that aims to retrieve a public opinion

“if everyone had the chance to research and reflect carefully on the issues at hand” (King 2003, 27).

To determine if this was successful, participants fill out a survey before and after the deliberation. A

slightly different design is the citizens’ jury. While citizens’ juries also selected participants randomly,

they are modelled on the criminal justice jury system and typically ask participants to deliver a

‘verdict’ on a topic of public interest (Smith & Wales 1999; Crosby & Nethercut 2005). Yet another

design is the consensus conference. In this format, a randomly selected group of citizens is also

invited to participate in a deliberative process. However, consensus conferences typically provide

participants with a large degree of freedom to decide what it is they want to discuss (Smith 2009;

Einsiedel & Eastlick 2000).

Yet, even these more or less established designs come in different shapes and sizes. In terms

of size for example, there is significant variation in the number of participants that different mini-

publics involve. At one end of the scale, there are mini-publics that involve no more than a few dozen

citizens at a time (c.f. O’Doherty et al. 2012; Bentley et al. 2018). For example, a 2013 Community

Jury on cancer screening for men in the United Kingdom involved only 12 randomly selected citizens

(Rychetnik et al. 2014). At the other end, there are mini-publics that involve anywhere between a few

hundred and several thousand citizens simultaneously (c.f. Setälä et al. 2010; Christensen et al. 2017).

A 2003 event of AmericaSpeaks in the United States had a staggering 2800 participants, for example

(see D’Agostino et al. 2006).

Similar differences exist with regard to the type of participant that mini-publics involve. On

the one hand, there are mini-publics that aim to involve as general a group of citizens as possible (c.f.

Himmelroos & Christensen 2013; Mao & Adria 2013). This is usually achieved by randomly selecting

citizens who live in a predefined geographical area. For example, a mini-public on biobanking in

Canada selected its participants by randomly calling registered residents of British Columbia (Secko

et al. 2009). On the other hand, there are mini-publics that try to involve a more specific group of

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citizens (c.f. Meijer et al. 2016; Ritter et al. 2018). In many cases, this is because the organizers feel

that a particular decision affects certain member of the public more than others. Consequently, these

mini-publics randomly recruit citizens with a direct interest in the decision, be it because they are

local residents (c.f. Rocle & Salles 2018), or because they have a particular profession (c.f. von Essen

& Allen 2017).

SIZE, PARTICIPANT TYPE AND PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY

Although the literature on the relationship between public participation and perceived legitimacy is

well-developed (see Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Fung 2006), relatively little attention has so far been

paid to the extent that this relationship is influenced by design characteristics like size and the type

of participant. The studies that do, suggest that both characteristics may well affect the degree to

which public participation increases the perceived legitimacy of a public decision-making process.

For size, there appear to be a tentative consensus that a greater number of participants

results in more legitimacy (Michels 2011; Hysing 2015). In his evaluation of various public

participation methods for example, Fung and Wright (2003) note that a large-scale participation

effort in Brazil has “increased the legitimacy of the municipal state and increased tax compliance”.

On the effect of involving different participant types, the literature is less clear. On the one hand, there

are studies that stress involving citizens with a direct interest as the best way to increase perceived

legitimacy (Mascarenhas & Scarce 2004; Cliquet et al. 2010) On the other, there are studies that

suggest that involving as broad a selection of citizens as possible is key to generating strong

legitimacy beliefs (Koontz & Moore Johnson 2004; Bryson et al. 2012).

Given the limited attention for design characteristics and the legitimating power of public

participation more generally, it is not surprising that few studies have investigated this issue with a

specific focus on deliberative mini-publics. Nevertheless, the literature does provide a number of

valuable insights. With regard to size, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, there are signs that

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mini-publics with more participants are able to command a greater degree of legitimacy (Goodin &

Dryzek 2006). This intersects with recurring concerns about recurring concerns about the small size

of many mini-publics, and how this limits the extent to which they are perceived as legitimate

(Dryzek & Tucker 2008). Yet, it is also clear that bigger is not always better. In their discussion of the

Belgian G1000 for example, Caluwaerts & Reuchamps (2015, 164) note that in spite of involving well

over 700 citizens, the mini-public “did not succeed in finding strong legitimation of its decisions from

the wider public.”

The same is true for insights regarding the effect of involving different participants. On the

one hand, studies find that mini-publics can command a greater degree of legitimacy if they involve

a sample of citizens that is as descriptively representative of a wider population as possible (see

Kahane et al. 2013; von Essen & Allen 2017). In their study of a mini-public on biobanking policy for

example, Molster et al. (2011, 221) stress the need to include a diverse group of participants because

“a lack of broad inclusiveness of public perspectives can limit claims of procedural legitimacy”. Yet,

descriptive representativeness does not guarantee legitimacy (see Olsen & Trenz 2014). By striving

for perfect representativeness, mini-publics may well exclude relevant stakeholders and “risk being

too detached from the real world to gain sufficient legitimacy” (Bobbio 2019, 50).

However, these insights suffer from two shortcomings. The first is that their subject has

rarely been an actual object of study. Observations about the effect of design characteristics like size

and participant type, to the extent that they have been made, tend to occur in the margin of studies

that focus on the relationship between mini-publics and perceived legitimacy more generally (c.f.

Böker 2017; Pogrebinschi & Ryan 2018). As a result, many of these observations lack depth and

provide only a limited view of what this relationship might look like. The second shortcoming

concerns the fact that these insights can hardly be described as a systematic exploration of the way

that size and participant type affect the legitimating power of deliberative mini-publics. This is

particularly problematic because it prevents the literature from establishing the extent to which this

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relationship is causal; that is, whether the size of a mini-public or the type of participant that it

involves is in fact responsible for observed changes in the perceived legitimacy of decision-making

processes (see Druckman et al. 2011). This is where the study seeks to make its contribution.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

In general, it is thought that people consider a public decision-making process to be legitimate if it is

fair (Tyler 2003; Levi et al. 2009) Whether this is the case, depends on a range of factors that includes

the extent to which they, or people like them, have been able to participate in that process (see Tyler

1994; Moynihan 2001). If participation is found to be genuine (Abelson et al. 20003), and if people

feel that their interests have been sufficiently taken into account (Michels & De Graaf 2010), they will

generally consider a decision-making process to be legitimate.

There are two ways in which such feelings can be evoked. The most straightforward way is

directly. By being actively involved in a public decision-making process, people gain a sense of

ownership and trust (Burton 2009; Gellers 2016), which in turn affects the perceived legitimacy of

that process. However, most people will rarely participate in public decision-making themselves.

Instead, they rely on elected representatives or recognized proxies (see Barnes et al. 2003; Roberts

2004) to do this for them. Yet, this second, more indirect way to organize public participation can

also inspire legitimacy beliefs. If people are confident that participating citizens are sufficiently

representative (Fung 2006), and any input made by these citizens is taken seriously (Rydin &

Pennington 2000), they are more likely to accept the outcome of a decision-making process.

For a means to organize public participation, this means that its source of legitimating power

resides squarely with the capacity to facilitate high-quality participation (see King et al. 1998;

Halvorsen 2003). In this respect, deliberative mini-publics have a lot to offer. Due to the fact that they

select participants (quasi-)randomly, mini-publics should be able to involve a group of citizens that

is more or less representative of the population from which they are selected (Fishkin 2013; Lafont

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2015). This should in turn make it easier to generate legitimacy beliefs, especially among people who

are either unwilling or unable to participate themselves (Curato & Böker 2016; Setälä 2017). While

the impact of mini-publics has often been limited (see Felicetti et al. 2015), this is still believed to

give them a major advantage over other ways to involve citizens more closely in the public decision-

making process (Brown 2006).

Within this framework, it is possible to see how the size of a mini-public, and the type of

participant it involves, could affect the degree to which it increases the perceived legitimacy of a

public decision-making process. For size, this relationship is relatively straightforward. If the extent

to which a mini-public generates legitimacy beliefs depends on whether it enables a representative

group of citizens to participate, a greater number of participants would increase representativeness

and therefore perceived legitimacy. This is because random selection works particularly well in large

quantities. By using chance to determine who can participate, each eligible citizen has an equal

probability of being selected. If repeated often enough, this creates a representative sample of the

target population (Dowlen 2009; Stone 2009). As long as its selection is sufficiently random, a mini-

public with more participants should therefore have a greater degree of representativeness. This

prompts the first hypothesis:

H1: a public decision-making process that includes a mini-public with a large number of

participants is perceived to be more legitimate than a public decision-making process that

includes a mini-public with a small number of participants.

A slightly different relationship suggests itself for the type of participant that a mini-public

involves. If this design characteristic is conceived as the difference between involving a general

subsection of a population, or only those who have a direct interest in the outcome of a decision-

making process, it follows that involving a general subsection would increase representativeness,

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and therefore perceived legitimacy. This is because limiting participation to citizens with a direct

interest will inevitably reduce the extent to which selected citizens resemble the wider population

(see Fung 2015). However, it is important to note that this only holds if a decision-making process

concerns a community that consists of both directly and indirectly affected citizens, and that this

problem is only likely to be salient for citizens who are not directly affected (see Tuler & Webler

1999; Webler et al. 2001). If these conditions are met however, a mini-public that involves a general

sample of citizens should be able to command a greater degree of legitimacy. This prompts the second

hypothesis:

H2: a decision-making process that includes a mini-public involving a general sample of citizens,

is perceived to be more legitimate than a public decision-making process that includes a mini-

public involving only citizens with a direct interest in the outcome of that process.

METHODS AND DATA

These hypotheses were tested by means of a survey experiment. As a research method, survey

experiments share characteristics of both surveys and experiments. Like experiments, they

manipulate one or more independent variables and divide participants randomly over different

experimental groups. Like most surveys, the experiment itself usually consists of a questionnaire in

which a brief description of a scenario (a vignette) is embedded (c.f. Naumann et al. 2018; Strebel et

al. 2019). By manipulating the text of this description and measuring if this results in a different score

on one or more dependent variables, survey experiments can help to determine if certain

manipulations are likely to trigger a particular response (see Sniderman 2011). Although the method

is subject to a number of limitations (see Barabas & Jerit 2010), it has the advantage of being

relatively accessible whilst allowing for a degree of causal inference (Gaines et al. 2006).

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Pilot study

A pilot study was conducted to test the experimental design. This pilot study was conducted in a

classroom setting at a research university in the Netherlands, as part of two undergraduate courses

on social scientific research methods for students of public administration and law. As these courses

did not take place simultaneously, the data was collected in two waves. In each of these, the

experiment was conducted in the same way. Upon entering the classroom, students were presented

with a unique access code. With this code, they could log on to the online survey platform Qualtrics.

Having done so, participants were automatically assigned to one of four experimental groups. This

was done randomly, using software that is embedded in the platform.

Next, participants were asked to read a brief description of a public decision-making process.

According to the quasi-fictional scenario, the local government had received news that that its stock

of student housing would not be sufficient to cope with a predicted rise in student numbers. To deal

with this impending problem, it was described to have created a panel of citizens that were randomly

selected. The panel was reported to have met with various experts over the course of several

meetings, and to have discussed several potential solutions in an open and respectful way. Ultimately

the panel was described to have reached consensus on a proposal that would see the government

build half the required amount of additional housing units. This proposal was subsequently reported

to have been presented to the municipal council, which adopted it unanimously.

The manipulations concerned the characteristics of the citizen panel that the local

government had allegedly created. The first manipulation centered on its size. In one version of the

scenario, the panel was reported to have consisted of 30 citizens. In another, of 1000 citizens. These

numbers were chosen to correspond roughly with the size of the smallest and largest mini-publics.

The second manipulation centered on the type of participant. In one version of the scenario,

participating citizens were described simply as ‘residents’. In the other, as ‘residents that would be

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directly affected (e.g. students, business owners, etc.)’. These categories were chosen to reflect the

difference between a general sample of citizens, and citizens with a direct stake in the outcome of the

decision-making process. The manipulations were combined in a factorial design that provided each

experimental group with a different combination (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Factorial design for the effect of size and participant type

Participant type

General Direct interest

Size Small Group 1 Group 2

Large Group 3 Group 4

Having read this scenario, participants were asked to answer a series of questions about the

process. To measure our dependent variable, we used an operationalization that is often used as an

indicator of perceived legitimacy (c.f. Linde 2012; Doherty and Wolak 2012). Participants were asked

to indicate how much they agree with the following statement: “The decision-making process was

fair”. Answers were recorded on a five-point Likert-type scale that ranged from “Strongly disagree”

to “Strongly agree”. Our choice for this particular measure was motivated by the fact that procedural

fairness has been established as a reliable way to measure perceived legitimacy (see Grimes 2006),

that it focuses specifically on the legitimacy of processes and procedures (c.f. Carroll and Carroll

1999; Carman 2010), that it does not require participants to have participated in a decision-making

process themselves (Esaiasson et al. 2012), and that it has precedent in comparable studies of

legitimacy and procedural fairness (c.f. Schminke et al. 1997; Bøggild 2016). To ensure the reliability

of the study, the survey also included attention and manipulation checks, and collected a limited

amount of demographic information to check if randomization was successful.

In total 154 valid responses were collected. Randomization was successful; an analysis of

variance (ANOVA) suggests that there are no statistically significant differences between the

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experimental group on any of the demographic variables. The results of the attention check suggest

that a large majority of all respondents paid sufficient attention to the experiment; 89.6% answered

the corresponding question correctly. The manipulation check yields similar results. When asked to

indicate of how many citizens the panel consisted and what type of citizens they were, 77.9% of all

participants chose the characteristics that correspond with the treatment they were given. This

suggests that the manipulation was successful. The fact that the data was collected in two successive

waves does not appear to have had an effect; the experimental effect is stable across both waves. For

data quality assurance, the responses of all individuals failing the attention or manipulation checks

were removed. This leaves a total of 106 participants.

The results are surprising (see Appendix 1). For size, a two-way factorial ANOVA suggests

that there is no statistically significant difference between the groups in which the vignette featured

a large mini-public, and the groups in which the vignette featured a small mini-public (F(1, 102) =

.04, p = .85). Participants who were presented with a description of a decision-making process in

which a mini-public involved 30 citizens, award that process the same average legitimacy score (M =

3.71, SD = .79) as participants who were presented with a description in which the mini-public

involved 1000 citizens (M = 3.71, SD = .64).

For participant type, that same factorial ANOVA does report a statistically significant

difference (F(1, 102) = 6.01, p < .05). However, this difference runs counter our second hypothesis,

with participants who were presented with a vignette in which the mini-public involved a general

sample of citizens awarding the decision-making process a lower average legitimacy score (M =3.51,

SD = 3.85) than participants who were presented with a vignette in which the mini-public involved

only citizens with a direct interest in the outcome of the decision-making process (M = 3.85, SD =

.65). The effect size is small (𝜂𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙2 = .06).

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Main study

The main study was conducted using the LISS Panel. This is an online panel that consists of

approximately 5000 probability-sampled Dutch households. Each of these households fills out a

survey every month, and receives a small financial incentive in return. If households do not have an

internet connection or a compatible computer, they are provided with one. Although the panel is not

a perfect reflection of Dutch society, it is generally considered to be more representative than other

web-based survey platforms. The LISS Panel is regularly used for survey-based research1.

For the purposes of this study, twelve questions were added to one of the LISS Panel’s

monthly surveys. These included a vignette, several questions to measure perceived legitimacy, and

a manipulation check. Questions about demographics, and general evaluative questions about the

survey were included in the survey by default. The survey, including these twelve additional

questions, was sent to a random sample of 968 households from the panel. Upon opening the survey,

each household was randomly assigned to one of the four experimental groups. Households were

given four weeks to complete the questionnaire. If a household had not completed the questionnaire

after two weeks, a reminder was sent.

Although the design of the main study is similar to that of the pilot study, some changes were

made. To ensure that the vignettes would be relevant to the households in the LISS Panel, the scenario

was adapted. Instead of on a potential lack of student housing, the scenario focused on the

development of a brownfield site. According to the vignette, the site had been derelict for several

years and had been subject to several complaints. Two options suggested themselves; to turn the site

into a commercial zone, or to turn it into a park. Like in the pilot, the local government decided to

create a citizen panel to determine which option would best serve the community. The panel was

reported to have met with various experts over the course of several meetings, and to have discussed

1 Source: https://www.website.lisspanel.nl/ (last retrieved on 25 August 2019).

https://www.website.lisspanel.nl/

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several potential solutions in an open and respectful way. Ultimately the panel was described to have

reached consensus on a proposal that would see half the site turned into a commercial zone, and the

other half into a park. This proposal was subsequently reported to have been presented to the

municipal council, which adopted it unanimously (see Appendix 2).

As a result of this change, the manipulation for participant type was also adapted. Instead of

students, local residents were named as an example of citizens who have a direct interest in the

outcome of this decision-making process. Finally, since the LISS Panel survey is exclusively

distributed in Dutch, the vignettes and questions were all translated to appropriate equivalents.

Data

Of the 968 households that were approached, 673 returned a questionnaire in time. This amounts to

a response rate of 69.5%. On average, these participants are 52.56 years old (SD = 18.89), and more

often female (51.7%) than male (48.3%). A comparison with data from the Dutch Central Bureau for

Statistics suggests that this makes our sample older and slightly more female than the overall Dutch

population2. Randomization was again successful; a one-way ANOVA suggests that there are no

significant differences between the experimental groups on both demographic variables (see Table

1). The results of the attention check do provide a cause for concern. When asked how many citizens

the mini-public in the scenario involved, and what type of citizen, only 56.9% of all participants

selected the answers that correspond to the scenario that they were presented with. However, it is

not clear if this means that the manipulations were not successful; when asked if the questions were

difficult to answer, only 26% of all participants answered either ‘Yes’ or ‘Definitely’. For quality

assurance, participants who failed the manipulation check were excluded from the analysis. This

leaves a sample of 383 participants.

2 According to the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), the average age of Dutch citizens in 2018 was 41.8

years. 50.3% was male. Source: https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/ (last retrieved on 25 August 2019).

https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/

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Table 1. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for age, sex and political orientation

Mean

(SD)

N F p df

Age Small/General 53.82

(18.89)

162 .62 .60 3, 669

Small/Direct interest 52.29

(19.29)

175

Large/General 51.19

(19.52)

182

Large/Direct interest 53.15

(17.72)

154

Sex

(1 = Male,

2 = Female)

Small/General 1.53

(.50)

162 .12 .95 3, 669

Small/Direct interest 1.52

(.50)

175

Large/General 1.50

(.50)

182

Large/Direct interest 1.52

(.50)

154

RESULTS

To determine how the size of a mini-public and the type of participant it involves affect the perceived

legitimacy of a public decision-making process, it is instructive to first inspect the average legitimacy

scores for each design characteristic (see Table 2). For size, these paint a somewhat different picture

than in the pilot study. Rather than having comparable scores, participants who presented with a

vignette in which the mini-public involved 30 citizens now award the decision-making process less

legitimacy (M = 3.67, SD = .82) than participants that were presented with a vignette in which the

mini-public involved 1000 citizens (M = 3.85, SD = .77). This is in line with out first hypothesis.

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Table 2. Average legitimacy scores for size and participant type

N Mean SD

Size Small 202 3.67 .82

Large 180 3.85 .77

Participant type General 177 3.62 .87

Direct interest 205 3.87 .71

For the type of participant, the results resemble those of the pilot study. Participants who

were presented with a vignette in which the mini-public involved a general sample of citizens,

consider the decision-making process to be decidedly less legitimate (M = 3.62, SD = .87) than

participants who were presented with a vignette in which the mini-public involved only citizens with

a direct interest in the outcome of that process (M = 3.87, SD = .71). As before, this goes against our

second hypothesis.

A factorial ANOVA confirms these differences (see Table 3). Controlling for the influence of

participant type, the size of a mini-public has a significant effect on the extent to which a public

decision-making process is considered legitimate (F(1, 382) = 7.01, p < .01), with a larger mini-public

generating stringer legitimacy beliefs. The effect size is small (𝜂𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙2 = .02) The type of participant

that a mini-public involves, also has a significant effect on the extent to which a public decision-

making process is considered legitimate (F(1, 382) = 10.96, p < .01). Controlling for the influence of

size, a mini-public that involves only citizens that have a direct interest in the outcome will generate

a greater degree of perceived legitimacy. The effect size is again small (𝜂𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙2 = .03). An interaction

effect between size and participant type is not statistically significant (F(1, 382) = .35, p = .55), which

suggests that the effect of size and participant type do not reinforce each other.

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Table 3. Factorial ANOVA for the effect of size and participant type on perceived legitimacy

SS df F 𝜼𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍𝟐

Corrected model 10.22 3 5.53** .04

Intercept 5260.14 1 8546.45*** .96

Size 4.32 1 7.02** .02

Participant type 6.75 1 10.96** .03

Size*Participant type .22 1 .35 < .01

Error 232.65 378

Total 5626.00 382

Corrected total 242.87 381

Note: *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01

CONCLUSION

In this study, an attempt was made to answer the question if and to what extent the design of a

deliberative mini-public affects its capacity to increase the legitimacy of a public decision-making

process. To do so, we conducted a survey experiment in which participants were asked to reflect on

the legitimacy of a fictional decision-making process that included a deliberative mini-public.

Depending on the experimental group to which a participant was assigned, that mini-public involved

either few or many citizens, and either citizens in general or only citizens who had a direct interest

in the outcome of the decision-making process. The results confirm only one of the hypotheses. For

size, the results suggest that a large mini-public will increase the legitimacy of that process more than

a small mini-public. This is in line with the first hypothesis. For the type of participant, the results

suggest that a mini-public involving only citizens with a direct interest in the outcome of a decision-

making process will increase the legitimacy of that process more than a mini-public that involves

citizens in general. This is exact opposite from what the second hypothesis predicted.

20

How can this be explained? Firstly, it is possible that these results are a product of the way in

which this study is designed. Survey experiments have for example been criticized for being too

artificial (see Barabas & Jerit 2010), causing participants to respond in in different ways from how

they would in real life. Similarly, it is possible that the results are caused by the fact that participants

were provided with relatively little information about the decision-making process that was

described in the scenario. Although this was done deliberately, to mimic the amount of information

that an average citizen would usually receive about such decision-making processes, providing

participants with more information may well produce a different result. This is also true for the fact

that participants were not provided with information about the presumed advantages of using a

mini-public Although this was again deliberate, instructing participants about the reasons for using

a mini-public may well change the extent to which they consider different designs to be legitimate.

Yet, it seems unlikely that the results flow completely from the design of this particular study.

This is especially true for the results that concern the effect of participant type. The consistency of

these results across the pilot study and the main study, in spite of the fact that these studies used

different scenarios and were conducted using a set of different participants, increases the likelihood

that they are in fact genuine. If this is the case, the fact that they are not in line with the second

hypothesis may simply be an indication that the theory underlying this hypothesis requires closer

inspection. For example, it may well be that representativeness is not the only criterion by which

participants judge the extent to which public participation increases legitimacy of a public decision-

making process. Perhaps they consider the perfect representation of their interests to be less

important than allowing an appropriate set of citizens to participate (see Jacobs & Kaufmann 2019).

Regardless of what caused these results, they have a number of potentially important

implications. In addition to their theoretical implications, a number of practical implications suggest

themselves. Concerning the design of mini-publics, the results suggest that using mini-publics with

more participants is likely to maximize their legitimating potential. Similarly, involving participants

21

with a direct interest in the outcome of a public decision-making process will also lead to a greater

increase in the perceived legitimacy of that process. This information could aid policy makers who

consider using a deliberative mini-public and are faced with design choices regarding size and the

type of participant that should be involved. However, these results may well extend to other ways to

organize public participation as well. As such, they would suggest that using participation methods

that involve more citizens, such as referendums, town hall meetings and public consultations will

increase the perceived legitimacy of public decision-making processes more than using participation

methods that are either more limited in size, or exclusive in nature.

To explore these implications, additional research is required. This should focus in the first

place on trying to replicate the findings of this study. In the literature, there is an increasing

awareness of the need to verify the reliability of reported results (see Walker et al. 2017). A

replication study could help to establish the robustness of the findings reported here. Next, future

studies could expand on these findings by extending the experiment to different scenarios and

contexts, or by studying the hypothesized mechanisms using different methods. In doing so, these

studies may well be able to determine whether there is such a thing as an ‘optimal’ size, or what does

and does not constitute a ‘direct interest’. Alternatively, future studies may want to focus on further

exploring the underlying mechanism. The surprising results for the effect of participant type suggest

that the source of perceived legitimacy might be multidimensional. If so, investigating which factors

are more or less important would go a long way to furthering our understanding of the relationship

between deliberative mini-publics and perceived legitimacy.

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28

APPENDIX 1: RESULTS OF THE PILOT STUDY

Table 4. Average legitimacy scores for size and participant type

N Mean SD

Size Small 55 3.71 .79

Large 51 3.71 .64

Participant type General 45 3.51 .76

Direct interest 61 3.85 .65

Table 5. Factorial ANOVA for the effect of size and participant type on perceived legitimacy

SS df F 𝜼𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍𝟐

Corrected model 3.21 3 2.15 .06

Intercept 1398.37 1 2811.68*** .97

Size .02 1 .04 < .01

Participant type 2.99 1 6.01* .06

Size*Participant type .18 1 .37 < .01

Error 50.73 102

Total 1511.00 106

Corrected total 53.93 105

Note: *** = p < .001, * = p < .05

29

APPENDIX 2: TEXT OF THE MAIN EXPERIMENT

Vignette 1: Small/General

Recently, the government of your municipality decided to develop a derelict plot of land in

your area. The plot was left unused for years, and had been subject to several complaints

from local residents. Two development options suggested themselves. On the one hand, the

plot could be turned into a park. With plenty of vegetation and a playground, the park would

give local residents a place to relax. On the other hand, the plot could be turned into a

commercial zone. With plenty of space for new businesses, this commercial zone would

stimulate the local economy.

To determine which of these two options would be most beneficial to the community, the

municipal government instructed civil servants to create a panel of 30 residents. Members

of this panel were identified using random selection.

Over the course of several meetings, the panel met with experts, policymakers and interest

groups and discussed several potential solutions in an open and respectful way. Ultimately,

the panel reached consensus about the best possible solution.

The result was a proposal that would see half the plot turned into a park, and the other half

into a commercial zone. This proposal was adopted by the municipal government, who sent

it to the municipal council. Following a debate, the proposal was put to the vote. It passed

unanimously.

Vignette 2: Small/Direct Interest









municipal government instructed civil servants to create a panel of 30 residents with a

direct interest in the decision (local residents, business owners, etc.) Members of this

panel were identified using random selection.




30




unanimously.

Vignette 3: Large/General









municipal government instructed civil servants to create a panel of 1000 residents.

Members of this panel were identified using random selection.







unanimously.

Vignette 2: Large/Direct Interest









municipal government instructed civil servants to create a panel of 1000 residents with a

direct interest in the decision (local residents, business owners, etc.) Members of this

panel were identified using random selection.

31







unanimously.

deliberative mini-publics and perceived legitimacy: the ...€¦ · perceived legitimacy has...

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