evolution and changing expectations of risk management in ... · evolution of financial service...
TRANSCRIPT
-
Evolution and Changing Expectations of Risk Management in Financial Institutions
Dr John Lee
Group Chief Risk Officer
Maybank Group
27 August 2014
-
2
The views expressed in the following material are the
author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of
the Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP),
its Membership or its Management.
-
3 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Agenda
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and Global Financial Crisis
Regulatory Development Resulting from GFC
Risk Management Trends
Moving Forward
-
4 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
-
5 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Financial Services Sector
Financial Services sector is made up of companies and firms which act as intermediaries that
facilitate the flow of capital and liquidity to industries and players within the economy:
Financial Services
Companies
Banks
Credit Unions
Credit Card Companies
Insurance Companies
Consumer Finance
Stock Broking
Investment Funds
Government Linked
Enterprises
Loans
Deposit Taking
Checking Accounts
Capital Raising
Revolving Credit
Risk Management
Traditional Products & Services
-
6 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
However, Interest Spreads have been Thinning for Traditional Lending
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
World
East Asia and Pacific (Developing Only)
High Income OECD
Malaysia
Interest spreads of more
mature banking markets
have been on a
downward trend over the
past decade…
Source: Worldbank (latest available data as of 2011) (Interest rate spread = lending rate minus deposit rate, %)
-
7 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Resulting in Banks’ Evolving their Business Models
…10 YEARS AGO…
In recent years, financial institutions and private equity/opportunity investors
have demonstrated a willingness to allocate more capital to principal investing
activities
Credit and
Capital Market
ActivitiesSpecialised Lending
Mezzanine Investments
Principal Investing
Private Equity
Hedge Funds
Infrastructure Funds
Corporate Acquisitions
…TODAY…
-
8 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Era of Financial Innovation and Proliferation Started
As traditional savings & loans business became less profitable, banks needed to find a more
profitable way of using their capital and funds.
Traditional
Savings & Loans
activities
Banks
traditionally
made profit
from the
spread
between its
loans &
deposits
Increasing
profitability would
mean increasing
risk
Banks began a
period of
financial
innovation to
‘churn’ its
capital
Complex
Financial
Derivatives were
invented
Derivatives
sought to
securitize the
assets of
banks, and
‘unlock’ capital
to create more
loans
Financial
Services
ushered in an
era of
unprecedented
profitability
Bankers and
Financiers
made huge
profits, which
saw the sector
more than
double its size,
which
overtook the
real economy Source: Maybank Analysis
-
9 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Complex Financial Derivatives Swelled to Unprecedented Levels
Source: OTC Derivatives and Post Trading Infrastructure, Sept 2009, European Central Bank; Maybank Analysis
Interest Rate Swaps (‘IRS’)
Equity Derivatives
Credit Default Swaps (‘CDS’)
FX Derivatives
Repo’s
Financial
Derivatives were
largely being
traded Over-The-
Counter (‘OTC’)
between a few
large players
Large notional
amounts were
being traded
OTC and
virtually
unregulated
The total OTC
‘notional’
exposures being
traded were
estimated at
US$592 trillion in
2008, at the height
of the housing
bubble
Derivative Products Traded Volumes were
‘Systemic’Risks it Created
Systemic Risks due to Sheer
Volume and Size
Opacity of OTC market caused
significant complexity
Trading Processes did not keep
pace with growth of OTC Market
Increased Counterparty Credit
Risk
Increased liquidity risks due to
sudden shocks to the system
-
10 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Hence Banking is NOT What it Used To Be
Banking is
NOT the
Same as
Before
Banks have been
required to take
more risk to
generate the
returns required
by the
shareholders and
financial markets
- Traditional banking will not generate the returns
required, more capital leverage is necessary
- The move of financial assets from traditional
banking services to asset management services due
to the demographics will also have a major impact
- It is all about moving from “stocks” to “flows” of
capital.
Velocity of Capital
- Asset based lending
- Simple products
- Unsophisticated customers
- High net interest margin
-
11 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Credit Growth has been Evident Worldwide
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
East Asia & Pacific (Developing Only)
European Union
Source: Domestic Credit provided by banking sector (%) of GDP, Worldbank Data, Maybank Analysis
Cre
dit
% o
f G
DP
Growth in economies were more and more
reliant on financial markets growing
-
12 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Financial Services Became a Key Driver of Growth Itself Globally
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Banking Assets
GDP
in b
illi
on
s o
f U
S$
Growth of the economy was driven in large part by the financial sector, which wasn’t creating
‘real assets’ , but financial assets which were being churned for profits.
8% Banking
Assets 10 yr CAGR
4% Total GDP 10
yr CAGR
Banking Assets vs. Nominal GDP of G7 Countries
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Maybank Analysis
-
13 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Events Leading Up to the Crisis
Prior to Summer of 2007
August 2007
April 2008
September 2008
Post- September 2008
Crash of the U.S.
Subprime Mortgage
Market shakes confidence
in the global financial
markets
Unprecedented growth in
the global economy over
the past 4 years –
averaging 5% yearly
growth from 2003 to mid
of 2007
“Fire Sale” of the major
U.S. investment bank
Bear Stearns
Market confidence in
counterparties vanish as the
global economy entered a
negative feedback loop with
the financial system.
2009 onwards
Eurozone Debt
Crisis looming,
potential
sovereign bail
outs
Source/Notes: [1] Meeting of the Governors & Central Bankers G20, March 13-14 2009, [2] Negative feedback loops between the real economy and the financial system, IMF , March 2009, [3]
Asian Development Outlook 2009, Asian Development Bank
The non-financial corporate
sectors are hit by the financial
crisis as borrowing spreads widen
and equity markets crash – DJIA
was down by 54% and S&P down
by 57%[3] by March 2009.
The unthinkable happened, credit markets crashed, players locked up, and market
confidence dwindled, which created a financial tsunami that wiped out Wall Street and
Main Street.
U.S. and European credit
markets lock-up due to
waning confidence after
the folding of Lehman
Brothers and the merger
of Merrill Lynch & Co.
with BOA.
The US Economy is
downgraded by S&P
and global equities
tumble
-
14 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Key Risk Lessons from the GFC
OVER RELIANCE ON RATING AGENCIES
Government and investors were over reliant on rating agencies’
assessment of mortgage securities
RELIABILITY OF DATA INPUT
Quality of external ratings and inaccurate valuation of mortgage securities reduced the credibility
of data input for VaRcalculations.
MARKET LIQUIDITYASSUMPTION
Market liquidity was assumed be available at all levels, in all time periods, for all maturities, at an
appropriate price
COMPLEXITY OF PRODUCTS
Investors did not fully understand the underlying assumptions and collaterals attached to mortgage
securities led to inaccurate valuation of products
INEFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
Financial Institutions did not have a comprehensive capital
management programme and did not adequately link their capital management to stress testing
NON COMPREHENSIVE STRESS TESTING
Lack of spill over and second round effects and inadequate magnitude of shocks on risk
parameters for stressed scenarios
MODEL RISK
Identification of wrong risk factors (e.g. ignoring basis risk) and incorrect distribution of risk
parameters, i.e. volatility and correlations led to MTM losses
and non-reflective VaRcalculations.
LACK OF OVERSIGHT BY CENTRAL BANKS
Central banks lacked oversight over the dealings of the
investment banks, basing information only on internally
generated VaR calculations of the banks.
CORRELATION OF RISKS
Lack of analysis and consideration on the impact of credit default and counterparty
credit risk to market and liquidity risk
-
15 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Outcomes from the GFC
Increased demand on
risk IT and
Infrastructure due to
evolving regulations
Risk management
needs greater
integration to
strategic decision
processes
Risk
interdependencies
need to be
considered across
risk types, entities
and jurisdictions
Macroeconomic and
systemic risk
monitoring and
assessments will gain
greater importance
Market liquidity
assumptions of banks
need to be revisited
Greater granularity
required of risk data
and aggregation for
large banking groups
The GFC and the ensuing regulatory scrutiny has increased the demands on banks to rethink
their current operating models to gain competitive advantages and drive value for the
organization:
-
16 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Financial Services Landscape Today - The New Normal
Regulation, Regulation,
Regulation
Increased regulation and
intrusiveness by regulators and
governments on the FS sectors
Increased Market Volatility
Stock markets around the globe
experiencing increased volatility
and loss of wealth are still being
observed
Shaken Consumer
Confidence
Consumer confidence in FS has
fallen and a general backlash at
financial services companies is
causing a PR debacle for Wall
Street
Challenging Cost
Environment
Firms need to be able to manage
the increasing cost of doing
business, without sacrificing the
customer experience
Crisis of Confidence
Much of the cause of the
financial crisis has been due to
an unwillingness of banks to lend
to each other, which froze
liquidity in the market
Deleveraging Continuing
Many banks and financial
companies are still reeling from
the fallout of the financial crisis,
and will continue to do so in the
short to medium term
The impact of the financial crisis is still being felt across the globe, and banks and financial
services companies are adjusting to the ‘new normal’…
Source: Maybank Analysis
-
17 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Back to Basics
Moving forward, it is important for greater linkages between the Real and Financial Economies
The challenge for governments and regulators is bring the two closer…
Borrower Balance
Sheet Channel
Bank Balance Sheet
Channel
Liquidity Channel
Financial Sector
Transmission of
shocks to the real
sector determined
through health of loan
book, balance sheet of
banks,
macroeconomic
situation and access to
liquidity
Real Sectors
Transmission of
shocks to the financial
sector determined
through access to
financing, health of the
economy and asset
price stability (e.g. real
estate sectors)
Regulation and
Supervision
Macroeconomic Policy
and Strategy
-
18 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Humanising Financial Services Maybank’s Guiding Principles (1/2)
Humanizing Financial Services means that the customer’s welfare comes first. At
Maybank, our commitment to humanising financial services is based on four key principles:
Providing
People with
access to
funding
Offering Fair
Terms &
Pricing
Advising
Customers
Based on
their needs
1 2 3
Being at the
Heart of the
Community
4
-
19 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Evolution of Financial Service Industry and GFC
Humanising Financial Services Maybank’s Guiding Principles (2/2)
Providing People with
access to funding
1 By putting people first, we are committed to providing access to
customers and businesses around the world to funding to grow and
prosper.
We are able to do this through our extensive network of 47,000
Maybankers across the globe and our commitment to service quality.
Offering Fair Terms &
Pricing
2 We are committed to providing fair terms and pricings to our
customers, because we want to see them grow with us.
Our Islamic First policy also provides an appropriate and effective
driver of this principle.
Advising Customers
Based on Needs
3 We intend to serve the needs of the community, small and medium
enterprises (‘SME’) and commercial customers.
We are committed to the values of the One Stop Shop, Needs Based
Selling and World Class Savings.
Being at the Heart of the
Community
We are committed to working at the very heart of our communities,
understanding that no one single decision applies to every situation.
We are committed to Serve From Your HEART – which means serving
our customers with Humility, Efficiency, Appreciation, Respect, and
Trust.
4
-
20 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Regulatory Development Resulting from GFC
-
21 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Regulatory Development Resulting from GFC
Basel III Reforms
The Basel III requirements intend to strengthen the resilience and soundness of the banking
system against systemic risks, which have implications on banks and risk management…
Cost of Capital & Liquidity will
Increase
Addressed
systematic risk
and inter-
connectedness
Increased
capital
requirements
(quality and
quantity)
Introduced
capital buffers
Included
Leverage Ratio
(backstop to
risk-based
measure)
Improved
liquidity
management
principles and
globalized
liquidity
standards
Basel III (Capital & Liquidity)
1 2 3 4 5
-
22 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Regulatory Development Resulting from GFC
Basel III Requirements
Increased capital
requirements
(quality and quantity)
Introduced capital buffers
Included Leverage Ratio
(backstop to risk-based
measure)
Improved liquidity
management principles and
globalised liquidity standards
Addressed systematic risk
and inter-connectedness
Basel III introduces more stringent requirements to improve the
quality of capital banks are required to hold. It attempts to improve
transparency of regulatory capital and improve market discipline.
Basel III attempts to ensure that banks build up capital buffers outside
periods of stress which can be drawn down as losses are incurred.
A Leverage Ratio will function as a constrain to the build up of
excessive leverage in the banking sector and act as a backstop
measure.
Two key liquidity risk measures (LCR & NSFR) aimed at ensuring
banks maintain sufficient buffers of liquidity during times of stress.
Basel III specifically addresses the concept of ‘Systemically Important
Financial Institutions’.
1
2
3
4
5
-
23 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Risk Management Trends
-
24 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Risk Management Trends
Risk Management Essentials
Moving forward, banks’ Risk Management needs to focus on the following key areas:
Establishing the
appropriate risk appetite
Balancing more effectively
the risk reward dynamics
Enhancing the risk
governance through more
effective risk managers and
risk management function
Inculcating a stronger risk
culture within the
organization
Understanding and
measuring better the
correlation of risks
1 2 3
4 5
-
25 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Risk Management Trends
Establish Appropriate Risk Appetite
Risk
Appetite
Risk Taking Capacity
Target Risk Profile
Actual Risk Profile
Risk Appetite defines the quantum of risk a bank is
willing to accept based on its business model, target
rating, target share price, etc.
Risk Taking Capacity (‘RTC’) is the maximum
amount of risk a bank’s capital base is able to
withstand, which are in turn linked to its limit
setting, etc.
The desired Risk Profile of the
bank will managed by the limits set
The desired Risk Profile of the
bank will managed by the limits
set
The bank’s actual Risk
Profile utilization of limits
Establishing an appropriate Risk Appetite is essential to link the Risk Strategy of the firm to its
business and strategic objectives…
-
26 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Risk Management Trends
Balancing Risk-Reward Dynamics
Banks’ Risk Management needs to strike a balance between its Capital Protection objectives
with its profit driven Capital Development objectives..
CAPITAL
(risk taking
capacity)
RISK
(economic
capital)
RETURN
(economic
performance)
Capital Adequacy
-
27 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Risk Management Trends
Enhancing Risk Governance
The financial crisis has underscored the importance of a strong risk governance structure,
which is independent and able to give challenge to the business…
1st Line of Defense
Business Operations
2nd Line of Defense
Oversight Functions
3rd Line of Defense
Independent Oversight and Assurance Functions
1st Line of defense is the business
operations which performs day-to-
day risk management and
implements an effective risk and
control environment to operate in
Bo
ard
, EX
CO
, Au
dit C
om
mitte
e
2nd Line of defense are the oversight
functions such as Group Finance,
Group Risk & Group Compliance
which set direction, define policy
and provide assurance
3rd Line of Defense are Group Internal
Audit and External Audit which
provide independent challenge to
the levels of assurance provided by
business and oversight functions
-
28 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Risk Management Trends
Inculcate Strong Risk Culture
Strong and effective risk management is driven from a strong ‘tone from the top’, and this is
evident in firms with a strong ‘Risk Culture’…
Senior Management has
to have collectively a
sound understanding of
the business and its
risks
Risk identification and
risk reporting must be
understood across all
levels of the organization
Risk culture objectives
has to be clearly defined
and communicated
across the organization
Risk understanding in
the organization has to
cover all risks both
financial and non-
financial risks (reputation
risk, business risk, etc.)
The organization’s risk
tolerance and risk
appetite must be
documented,
communicated and
updated.
Risk tolerances and risk
targets has to be aligned
with business strategy
(e.g. high target debt
rating can’t be consistent
with high ROE target)
-
29 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Risk Management Trends
Understanding Risk Correlations
The financial crisis has shown that risks can’t be looked at in isolation, and model outputs have
to be coupled with qualitative analysis and expert judgment…
Banks have to identify
and manage all relevant
risks, across business
lines and on a portfolio
basis
Avoid reliance on a
single methodology or
model, and couple risk
assessment with expert
judgment
Models which point to
high-returns on
economic capital may in
fact point to model
deficiencies
Decision making should
not only be based on
quantitative outcomes,
but also practical and
conceptual limitations of
models
Stress testing should
take into account risk
correlations and
macroeconomic trends
and analysis
Risk management must
participate in the product
approval process and
any significant changes
to products
Source: Adapted from: “High-level principles of Risk Management”, Committee of European Banking Supervisors February 2010.
-
30 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Moving Forward
-
31 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Moving Forward
Winning in The New Banking Era
1. High performers strive for a
customer centric—Universal
Banking model with a focus on
core customer groups and deep
relationships.
2. High performers demonstrate
that multichannel clients can
be twice as profitable and
exhibit greater loyalty.
3. High performers have been
early adopters of industrialized
operating models in order to
deliver best in class cost operating
performance balanced with
excellent customer service.
4. Despite the economic crisis, and the collapse of real estate prices in
some markets, high performers have applied prudent risk management
policies to ensure low bad-debt ratios, strong coverage for provisioning,
along with low reputational and operational risk.
5. Robust capital management
discipline is a key pillar for high
performers, combining high quality
capital, appropriate liquidity and
funding positions, with a proven
successful track record of
inorganic growth.
6. The success of the high-
performance Universal Banking
model has been demonstrated
by the ability to export
(replicate) the model to
global markets.
7. Technology is a crucial
building block supporting the
successful Universal Banking
customer centric model.
Source : Accenture – Winning in The New Banking Era (2011)
-
32 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.
Questions & Answers
-
C r e a t i n g a c u l t u r e o f
r i s k a w a r e n e s s ®
Global Association of
Risk Professionals
111 Town Square Place
14th Floor
Jersey City, New Jersey 07310
U.S.A.
+ 1 201.719.7210
2nd Floor
Bengal Wing
9A Devonshire Square
London, EC2M 4YN
U.K.
+ 44 (0) 20 7397 9630
www.garp.org
About GARP | The Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP) is a not-for-profit global membership organization dedicated to preparing professionals and organizations to make
better informed risk decisions. Membership represents over 150,000 risk management practitioners and researchers from banks, investment management firms, government agencies,
academic institutions, and corporations from more than 195 countries and territories. GARP administers the Financial Risk Manager (FRM®) and the Energy Risk Professional (ERP®)
Exams; certifications recognized by risk professionals worldwide. GARP also helps advance the role of risk management via comprehensive professional education and training for
professionals of all levels. www.garp.org.
33 | © 2014 Global Association of Risk Professionals. All rights reserved.