gadfly fall2010

8/2/2019 Gadfly Fall2010

1/32

the undergraduate philosophy magazine of Columbia UniversityGADFLYTHE

Existential

Stage-Fright:

Dostoevsky and

Identity [p. 6]

Debate: How ar can

we criticize the

Western Canon? [p. 17]

Interview:

Making Small

Talk with Bruce

Robbins [p. 14]

Systematic Criticism:Marx, Nietzsche and

the Financial Crisis [p. 20]


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GADFLYTHE

Fall 2010

Shorts

Philosophy TalksUpcoming Conferences, Talks, Lectures

Branching OutPhilosophy-Related Courses

A Treatise to Spirit Dragons

The Paradox of Reductionism

FeaturesExistential Stage-Fright

Toward A Functional Denition of Religion

Systematic Criticism

Marx, Nietzsche and the Financial Crisis

On Public Art

Criticism

Making Small Talk with Bruce Robbins

An Interview

How Far Can we Criticize the Western Canon?

A Debate

A Review ofA Clockwork Orange

Joshua Maslin

Shai Chester

Thomas Sun

Peter Licursi

Arton Gjonbalaj

Rebecca Spalding

Bart Piela

Puya Gerami

Evan Burger

2

3

6

10

20

24

4

14

17

28


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From the Editor

The Gady is sponsored in part by the Arts Initiativeat Columbia University. This funding is made possiblethrough a generous gift from The Gatsby CharitableFoundation.

STAFF

Editor-in-Chief

Bart Piela

Managing Editor

Puya Gerami

Shorts EditorSumedha Chablani

Features Editors

Stephany GarciaAlan Daboin

Criticism Editors

Victoria Jackson-HanenRebecca Spalding

Copy EditorAmber Tunnell

Arts Editor

Hong Kong Nguyen

Layout Editor

Christina Johnston

Technology Director

Cindy Zhang

Business andFinance Manager

Michelle Vallejo

Thanks to the Columbia and Barnard PhilosophyDepartments for their support and assistance.

ILLUSTRATORS

Amalia RinehartLouise McCuneKeenan KorthDaniel Nyari

Ashley LeeArais Abbruzzi

Christina JohnstonRachel Shannon-Solomon

[A plain, empty common room. Four chairs arranged around a central table. In themiddle of the table lie three copies of a magazine. A y buzzes around the room.

EnterVlada philosophical sort of chap, DescartesMeditations in towand

Estronot.]

Vlad [excitedly]: A table! Existent or not? [Pauses.] I. The same question.

Estro: You cogitate. I sit. [He sits.]

Vlad [under his breath]: Heavybody. [More loudly.] Whats that? [He sits acrossfromEstro and peers at a magazine.]

Estro: What?

Vlad: That! With the queer fellow on it. What a beard on him. He doesntlook so good.

Estro [looks down]: Looks ne to me.

Vlad [noticing another copy, ipped]: Ha! A kind of mask. Exhibit A: cool,composed, calculating. Exhibit B: rotting. Two sides of the same shekel,though you wouldnt know it. Or would I? [He opens a copy and begins read-ingFrom the Editor. The hand holding the magazine begins to fade.]

Vlad [shouting]: Reductio ad absurdum!

Estro: Who!? [Aside.] But enjoy. [The lights go out. With a nervous shout.]Vlad!

Vlad [calmly]: Yes?

Estro: What are we waiting for? [Silence. He crosses himself, slowly.]

[The lights turn on. The same room, empty. In the middle of the table lie two copiesof a magazine and a tome of Descartes.Enter a janitor. Tidying , he throws themagazines in the trash. Later. Enter a student. He places three copies of a magazine

on the tableand, with a smile, he picks up theMeditations. He exits.]

Bart Piela


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THE GADFLY Fall 20102

Philosophy Talks

Out and About

Friday, February 11, 2011Rachael Briggs (Sydney/NYU visiting)

Friday, February 25, 2011Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers)

Friday, March 4, 2011Sally Haslanger (MIT)

Friday, March 25, 2011

Anthony Gillies (Rutgers)

Friday, April 29, 2011Shelly Kagan (Yale)

Thursday, February 24, 2011Tamar Gendler (Yale University)4:10 PM- 6:00 PMRoom 716 Philosophy Hall

Thursday, March 10, 2011Kathrin Koslicki (U. of Colorado)4:10 PM- 6:00 PMRoom 716 Philosophy Hall

Thursday, April 7, 2011Brad Skow(MIT)4:10 PM- 6:00 PMRoom 716 Philosophy Hall

The Center for Public Scholarship at the New SchoolThe 22nd Social Research Conference

CPS: The Body and the StateFebruary 11, 2011 - February 12, 201110:30 AM - 7:00 PM

Join us as speakers discuss the body as a human rights arena in which many forces, suchas religion, science, media, and market struggle for control over policies that control ourbodies. We hope to illuminate how the often tacit assumptions about the normal, healthy,and acceptable body lead to policies which are, at their core, unjust.

New York University

Spring 2011 Colloquium SeriesColumbia University

Spring 2011 Colloquium Series


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shorts 3

Branching Out:Philosophy-Related Courses Outside the Department

Aesthetics & Philosophy of HistoryDorothea von MueckeGermanic Languages

W 4:10-6:00 PM

Montaigne, Descartes, PascalPierre ForceFrench Romance & PhilologyTR 2:40-3:55 PM

German Thinkers & Heidegger

Matthias BormuthHistoryM 11:00-12:50 PM

Plato the RhetoricianKathy H. EdenEnglish and Comparative Literature

W 11:00-12:50 PM

Philosophy and Historyof Evolutionary BiologyWalter BockBiologyMW 1:10 - 2:25 PM

Buddhist EthicsThomas F. YarnallReligionTR 2:40-3:55 PM


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A Treatise to Spirit Dragons:

Joshua MaslinIllustrated by Amalia Rinehart

The Paradox o Reductionism

The reductionist has done it! Shehas found the most basic constitu-ents of the universe: we are all

nothing more than spatiotemporal pointsbeing blown around by the stellar windsof cause and effect. Humanity has philo-sophically ascended (descended?) enoughto gure out what the universe is made of:

reallyREALLYsmall things. Dontbelieve it? Doesnt matter. Youre stillcomposed of these spatiotemporal points.Better start coming to terms with it.

And you know who else has tostart coming to terms with this idea? Corn.Someone should really tell corn that it toois made of spatiotemporal points. Cornhas spent so much time festering in itsunintentional ignorance (ironic for a plant

with so many ears). Sure, corn is not ascomplex as we are; really, its so simplethat it couldnt tell a man from a woman,a woman from a pernicious tree fungus!I guess we need to try a bit harder to getthrough to corn. Find a loud SigEp andget him to yell. Not working? Have

him yell louder.

Fine, ne, the yelling is useless.

Get that bro out of the corneld. At the

end of the day, weknow what constitutescorn. If corn doesnt want to listenifcorn doesnt even know we existwemight as well exploit the hell out of it.Plant it in rows, harvest it, turn it into syr-up, maybe even a pseudo-efcient gasoline

substitute, and distribute it to the masses!Corn will never know the difference.

Wait a minutelets pump thebrakes for a second. If livingcorn is completely removed

from the complex reality we experience,does that mean that human beings...No.It couldnt be. Could it? Could webe thecorn? Of course we arentactuallythe corn.

But are we likethe corncould the universebe farmingus?Are spirit dragons farming us?!

Corn experiences the universe in its owncorny way, for it lives and reproduces. Butcorn is missing out on so much! Is it pos-sible that we are, too? Is it possible that weare equally bound by our humanity, just

as corn is by its corniness?


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shorts 5

Humor a thought experiment and

take actor Haley Joel Osment. Asa child, he played a superhuman

introvert in M. Night Shyamalans familyclassic, The Sixth Sense. Before we allbecame disillusioned with M. Nights complexcinematic writing formula (arbitrarily selectingplot twists from a hat during drug-inducedstates of consciousness), we were shockedto nd out that (spoiler alert)

our young protagonist could

see dead people. This was his sixthsense. Like everyone else, hecould, ostensibly, tastecake, hear Ke$ha songs,see double rainbows,touch furry rabbitsand smell gas leaksfrom the stove. But hecould also perceive deadBruce Willises. While Ioften dream about deadBruce Willises, I have yetto perceive his mopeyghost in a waking state.

Those spiritdragons! Whoknows what theycan perceive?Dead Abe Lincolns?

Intelligent Republicans? Ibet theyre laughing at our spatiotem-poral points right now. Jerks! Theyll neverunderstandoh. If we cant understand cornsplace in the universe, how could spirit dragons(coughgodcough) understand humanitys?If they could, theyd be just as simple as us.So why even speculate about these spirit drag-ons? We dont have the hardware to deal withtheir issues, nor do they have the means to un-

derstand ours.

Oh, Reductionists: As long as were ac-knowledging the possibility of theseunknown unknowns, you guys should

probably send someone over to apologize tothe corn. After all, were all re-

ally in the same boat. A littleempathy could do everyone

some good.So, just to summa-

rize: there are spirit drag-ons farming us, and corndeserves our respect.Stated another way:we exist in an incom-

prehensible universelled with incom-

prehensible things.Our vision of thisuniverse will al-ways be strainedthrough a humansieve. Reductionistlogic, born of hu-manity, is subject

to innite regression

(and progression). To

conceptualize the fabricof the universe in terms of

parts could be an entirely false paradigm, ifnot physically, at least philosophically.

Disagree, oh mighty Reductionists?Then I am at your mercy, omnipotent Gods ofCorn. And if you like manipulating the fates ofthe ignorant and disconnected, consider capi-talizing off of the wildly popular Farmville.You could catapult Universal Farming Religion

to the forefront of human consciousness!

Our vision of this universe will alwaysbe strained through a human sieve.


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Existential Stage-FrightShai Chester

Illustrated by Daniel Nyari

Universal truth is an outdated con-cept. Traditional philosophersexplained reality through a single

system of precepts which, though oftenabstracted to the point of meaningless-ness, provided the singular satisfaction ofcomplete and absolute truth. Contempo-rary thinkers are skeptical of such grand

unifying theories. To them there is no oneobjective vision of reality, only variousperspectives, all equally valid and limited.

This pluralism subverts the lay-mans conception of the soul. While onemight at rst assume that each person

has a single, unchanging soul and that thewildly contradictory emotional states thatpossess us are merely supercial masks, a

pluralistic interpretation would assert thatthere is no single, unchanging soul, ratherthat each of these emotional states is itsown distinct soul. All of these emotionalstates are bound by their common physicallocation: you. The absence of an absoluteidentity would not seem to be so troublingthough, as it validates a plurality of masks.(Here and throughout I have in mindWendy Donigers essay, Many Masks,Many Selves.) This relativism is liberatingin a world that demands many identities,allowing a career woman to change from

doting mother, to cutthroat capitalist, tosultry temptress without undermining any

of her masks. Freed from the obsolete no-tion of the soul, Pluralistic Man denes

himself more or less as he wills.

The Underground Man, the anti-hero of Dostoyevskys novelNotesfrom the Underground, is the epitome

of the pluralistic personality masquerader.

Throughout the novel, the UndergroundMan deliberately assumes identities rangingfrom debauched aristocrat to radical socialcritic, culminating in his stirring sermonon vice and redemption to an enrapturedprostitute, which is ultimately revealed as acynical intellectual self-indulgence with notrue pathos. The Underground Man doesnot feel liberated by his radically differentpersonalities; rather his acute realization

of his masks undermines his masquerade.The jarring contradictions between hisdifferent personae make them feel phonyand reveal his terrible disconnection fromhis true self, which Dostoevsky, unlikemodern pluralists, fervently believes in.Dostoevsky employs the UndergroundMan to prove that the individual whoknows thyself cannot comfortably wearpluralistic masks.

The vestment of the sanctimo-nious is the most uncomfortable mask forthe self-perceptive man because the hon-est preacher, constantly aware of his ownsins, hesitates to cast the rst stone. Dos-toevsky demonstrates this with the Un-derground Mans failed speech during thegoodbye dinner of Zerkov, a successfularmy ofce and former school mate. The

protagonist prefaces this episode by de-scribing his childhood jealousy and hatred

A version of this article previously appeared in the

Journal of the Undergraduate Writing Program.

The vestment of thesanctimonious is the mostuncomfortable mask forthe self-perceptive man.


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features 7

of Zerkov, a typical aristocratic philistineblessed with beauty, moral indifference,and social graces. This last attribute par-ticularly vexes the Underground Man, asit is what he lacks and longs for most. Toprove his moral superiority and disdain,he decides to don the smirking mask of

satire and interrupt the dinner with a dia-tribe that he thinks will shatter Zerkovs

conceit. In the middle of his philippic,though, he is struck by the hypocrisy ofhis cynicism. After all, he invited himselfto the dinner originally out of a vain at-tempt to ingratiate himself with the verymen whose vanity he is attacking. Crippledby this revelation, his tirade trickles into

confused and sentimental rambling, whichonly fuels his opponents contempt.


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Seen through the lens of pluralisticselves, the Underground Mans mor-

alizing is defensible. His supposedlysinful true self is no more fundamentalthan the righteous persona he adopts, so

the latter is not hypocritical, but merelydifferent. A pluralistic self that wears con-icting masks is no more duplicitous than

a single actor who plays separate conict-ing parts in the same eternal play.

Such a carefree possessor of anti-thetical ethics is acknowledged by Dosto-evsky. He longingly describes the rogue[who] can be absolutely and loftily honestat heart without in the least ceasing to be

a rogue. Yet such innocence is limited tothose who have a faculty for the mostcontradictory sensations, i.e. unreec-tive laymen. The perceptive mans visceralaversion to conscious hypocrisy cannot beassuaged by an intellectual recognition ofthe plurality of self.

The self-aware individuals com-prehension of the articial source of his

mask inhibits his ability to naturally mas-querade, as Dostoevsky exhibits againwith his hapless protagonist. In a surge ofanger, after being humiliated at the dinnerparty, the Underground Man imagines anelaborate revenge involving an honorableduel, years of stoic suffering in Siberia,and nally a climactic confrontation with

the grand perpetrator, Zerkov, whom theChrist-like hero magnanimously forgives,

attaining absolute moral revenge. The in-tegrity of this mask of righteous anger

is quickly undermined, however, by theUnderground Mans realization that theentire revenge fantasy is merely a trite re-

hashing of plots lifted from Pushkinand Lermontov.

Appropriating personae fromart is not unique to raried

literati such as the Under-ground Man. How often do you nd

yourself repeating jokes you have heardon television? And how many of the al-most meaningless cutsie phrases that un-necessarily replace simple words in oursentences are lifted from trite TV charac-ters and ads? We all imitate art, and usuallynot even the sort of meaningful art thatthe Underground Man apes. The external-ity of our masks is not an issue to the plu-ralistic interpretation though, as it denies

the existence of a wholly internal mask tobegin with. We are never ourselves to our-selves, but always in relation to others, sothe difference between the UndergroundMan quoting Pushkin versus Pushkinsoriginal exhortations is just a matter ofdegree.

To Dostoevsky though, this mat-ter of degree is crucial because the wearer

of the mask is conscious of it. All ideasmay be necessarily external because theyare ultimately an amalgamation of reac-tions to others ideas, but they do not im-mediately appear so to their conceivers,even those who are perceptive. Converse-ly, when the Underground Man copies di-rectly from Pushkin, since art is articial

by default, he is unavoidably aware that heis uttering artice. Again, the condence

The self-aware individualscomprehension of the articialsource of his mask inhibits hisability to naturally masquerade.


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features 9

of the masquerader is determined by hisawareness of the masquerade, not the the-

oretical validity of the mask.

Amask worn in its proper scenecan appear authentic; during thetransition between scenes, how-

ever, the absurdity is naked. Dostoevskyillustrates this with the UndergroundMans nal interaction with the prostitute

Eliza. The penitent harlot comes tohis house seeking the holy man who

had lectured her on sin. Althoughher savior begins his address appro-priately, sanctimoniously extollinghis humble abode, he is soon dis-tracted by his hated manservant and startssquabbling with him over some petty mis-deed. Pathos turns to bathos, and the Un-derground Man is reminded once more ofthe silliness of his masks. Note that moralhypocrisy is not the issue here. The man-

servant may have deserved a tongue lash-ing as much as Eliza merited more owery

words. It is the awkward juxtaposition thatundermines each persona.This damning disparity is not just

apparent during abrupt switches. No mat-ter how brief and uid the transition, the

perceptive individual will always note themomentary non sequitur. Even WendyDonigers model career woman, cominghome from a day of merciless layoffs tobake cookies for her children, would be

disquieted by the contrast of her masks.

Both the contemporary concep-tion of self and Dostoevskysolder conception have their con-

solations. The former does not posit asingle fundamental identity, but effec-tively replaces it with the pluralistic self.Dostoevsky denies the feasibility of thispluralistic self, but believes in an ultimate

authentic identity: a soul. Although theUnderground Man may have lost his soulthrough lack of tting environment,

through divorce from real life, and ranklingspite, hisNotesserve as corrective pun-ishment for himself, for the reader, and

perhaps even for the author, urg-ing them to avoid his mistakes andreturn to their true selves. Whenviewed through each others lensesthough, these consolations cancelout. The Pluralistic UndergroundMan can neither blithely exchange

masks, nor piously pursue the sacred aspi-ration of the non-existent true self. He is

the tragic archetype of modernity: masteryof reasoning has allowed him to penetratethe minds substrata of comforting delu-sions and fantasies, only to nd nothing

beneath. Doniger optimistically assureshim that as we strip away masks, or faces,each time we see more in the hall of look-ing glasses. The Pluralistic UndergroundMan only sees innite reections of his

plastic face, endlessly mocking him.

Even the model career woman,coming home from a day of mercilesslayoffs to bake cookies, would bedisquieted by the contrast of hermasks.

During the transition between

masks, the absurdity is always

naked.


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features 11

Scientists undergo euphoric states just asmuch when they admire the beauty ofthe galaxy or the complexity of the brain.Richard Dawkins, in an article entitled IsScience a Religion?, describes this well:The merest glance through a microscopeat the brain of an ant or through a tele-scope at a long-ago galaxy of a billionworlds is enough to render poky and pa-rochial the very psalms of praise. If deepeuphoria isnt the distinguishing character-istic of religion either, then what is?

James, I think, mentions it inpassing:In the religious life, on the con-trary, surrender and sacrice are positively

espoused: even unnecessary givings-upare added in order that the happiness mayincrease. Religion thus makes easy andfelicitous what in any case is necessary.Unlike religion, science cannot make oneembrace pain, suffering or death with en-thusiasm. At best, it can teach one to be

patient and accepting of the ways of theuniverse. Science can ease pain, sufferingand death by reducing them into sums ofchemical reactions or parts of biologicalcycles, but it would be extremely difcult

for science to transform them into some-thing worth embracing. Here we nally

have the distinguishing characteristic ofreligionthe ability to make easy and fe-licitous what is necessary.

Instead of dening religion to be the

personal, solemn worship of the pri-mary truth, as James approaches it,

and therefore running the risk of char-acterizing science as a religion, I proposethat we take a backwards approach. In-stead of looking at the different emo-tive or doctrinal components that build areligion, why not look at what religion isuniquely able to accomplish? This unique

ability is to make what isnecessary, such as suffer-ing and death, easy andfelicitous. A religion hasto prepare one in sucha way that one startsto positively embracesuffering. It doesnot have to makedemands on itsbelievers, norestablish rituals,

nor create socialgatherings, norworship the divine,so long as it accom-plishes this func-tional task.

This func-tional approach todening religion is

helpful in eliminat-

ing the vaguenessinherent in otherapproaches, partic-ularly James. WhenJames tried to dene

religion in terms ofbelief in the divine,he found himselfin muddled wa-ter. The chief

trouble was in


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hinging the deni-tion of religion onthe nebulous concept of the divine,itself a term laden with connotations of areligious nature, when James was attempt-ing to puzzle out what religious nature wasin the rst place. To explain the divine,

James asserts that it is any object that isgodlike. When pushed further, he ex-plains that what is godlike is the primaltruth. The overall strategy seems to bedening one ambiguous term in terms of

another. If, on the other hand, we denereligion in terms of its function to us, asubject we probably know more aboutthan nebulous concepts, then we can

avoid dependence on illusory termsand ideas.

Apreliminary testwill show that the ma-jor religions of the

world will t the funct iona ldenition. Chris- tian and Is-lamic followers believe in thep r e s e n c e of Heaven and Hell

and an impending Last Judg-ment. The doctrine that suffer-ing in the currentlife will be recip-

rocally compen-sated by rewards in

an afterlife is one ofthe most effective tools

religions use to ascribepositive attributes to suf-

fering. Critics of Chris-tianity such as Nietzschecriticize just this ability ofChristianity to make suf-

fering contagious. Indeed,Christianity is so effective at

this that occasionally we hearof followers who not only em-brace sufferingtheyask for

more. Julian of Norwich, in her

Sixteen Revelations of Divine Love,begs to be sent a bodily crisis sothat she can gain intimate knowl-

edge of the suffering of Christ. In similarveins, suffering and sacrice are positively

espoused in Buddhism and Hinduism. Inthe former, suffering is cast as a necessarystep towards achieving nirvana. In the lat-ter, sacrice in the current life is said to ac-cumulate and be proportionally rewardedin the next world.

If we dene religion in terms of itsfunctions to us, then we can avoiddependence on illusory terms and ideas.


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features 13

An immediate objection to thefunctional denition of religion

may be that, according to ourcommon experience, religions are not theonly entities that can render suffering andsacrice in a positive

light. The most strik-ing counterexample

is nationalism. Manywar heroes have cho-sen to sacrice their

lives not for their reli-gion but for their nation. This line of criti-cism insightfully points out that the func-tional denition of religion offered thus

far is not a sufcient condition, just as I

have pointed out that James denition of

religion in terms of the solemn treatmentof the primary truth does not sufciently

qualify religion. Perhaps a sufcient deni-tion of religion should combine these twonecessary conditions: a religion must (1)revere the primary truth of the world in asolemn manner and (2) positively espousesacrice and suffering. This denition will

rule out science as a religion, for sciencedoes not render sacrice and suffering in

a positive light. It will also distinguish reli-gion from nationalism, for nationalism isabout the pursuit of things like freedomand independence, not of the primary

truth of the universe.In order for this two-part

denition of religion to stand, a more

detailed analysis will have to show thatother recognized religions of the world,

besides the ones discussed above, willcontinue to be qualied as religions un-der the denition. The search for a pre-cise denition of what it is to be a religion

does not only have theoretical value, but

also practical value. It can help the Inter-nal Revenue Service in drawing the linebetween religious and non-religious insti-tutions and the Supreme Court in judgingcases related to the separation of churchand state. And, considering a case we areperhaps more familiar with, it will give

answers to the premed student who nds

himself behaving more and more like a re-ligious follower during his weekly MCATBible study, his communion in weekendstudy groups and his relentless sacrice of

social fun. He may be a zealot, but he isnot a religious zealot.

Instead of looking at the different

emotive or doctrinal components thatbuild a religion, why not look at whatreligion is uniquely able to accomplish?


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Making Small Talk with Bruce RobbinsRebecca SpaldingIllustrated by Ashley Lee

Bruce Robbins is the Old

Dominion Foundation Professor in the

Humanities in Columbias English and

Comparative Literature Department. His

primary interests include nineteenth and

twentieth century ction, literary and

cultural theory and postcolonial studies.

A prolic author, Professor Robbins

has published such works as Feeling Global:Internationalism in Distress, The Servants

Hand: English Fiction from Belowand Secular

Vocations: Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture.

From 1991 to 2000 he was co-editor

of the journal Social Text. He regularly

teaches courses on contemporary literary

theory, modern comparative ction, and

intellectual history.

Recently, I sat down with Professor

Robbins to discuss his undergraduateyears, the important relationship between

literary theory and philosophy, and the

Core Curriculum.

How did you rst get into your

eld?

I was a history and literature

major at Harvard, which was a combined

program for those students who hadnt

quite gured out which eld they were

more interested in. I had gone into college

thinking I would become a philosophymajor. I had read Plato, Nietzsche, and

Sartre during my adolescence, in the hey-

day of existentialism. I remember I once

told my high school friends that I was

interested in existentionalism. I was, of

course, mocked and put down in the way

that people are severely put down in high

school for being pretentious. Anyway, I

was familiar with those thinkers before I

got to Harvard but I never ended up tak-ing a philosophy course during college. In-

stead, I was turned on to literary criticism

through a close reading course that I took

freshman year. The best way the history

department and literature department had

found to combine the two subjects was, in

effect, a sort of compromise. We did read

social historians who were big in that peri-

od, but intellectual history was at the cen-

ter. Thats what gave me the condence to

take a shot at so-called theory when it

took off in the U.S. in the 70s.

At some point in senior year, I

went morein the literary direction. I guess

it seemed to me that literary criticism was

more open than other elds. The philoso-

pher Richard Rorty said it well when he

said that philosophy had abandoned the

goal of asking the big questions, and lit-erary criticism had picked up the ball af-

(i)


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15criticism

ter philosophy dropped it. For in-stance, around 1972 there was a

certain excitement around Claude

Levi-Strauss, and a friend of

mine, an undergraduate at the

time who actually went on to

become a professor at the Uni-

versity of Chicago, suggested we

form a reading group with an as-

sistant philosophy professor in or-

der to read Levi-Strauss.We did, but it didn't work.

The guy in the philosophy depart-

ment was not interested in answer-

ing the larger questions, such as,

What is this thinker trying to do? Why

is it worth doing?This particular phi-

losopher, not the discipline as a whole,

was not prepared to answer these larger

questions and I believe I was because

there was more room to do so in literarycriticism, at least at that moment.

Have things changed for literary

criticism?

It is not a good moment for

literary theory. All across the

country, partly due to nancial pressure,

scholars have pulled back into a narrowly

historical understanding of their eld;

many only work within that particular peri-

od. Not many people are asking questions

that transcend their period. Theory exists

to impose these larger questions on the

discipline.Are we really talking about the same

object as in earlier periods? Or are we relying on

the lazy assumption that these texts are the same

simply because they are all called literature?To

a certain extent, literary criticism is a placewhere that still happens, just less so. As a

historical fact, theimpulse of French theory in the 60s and

70s does not seem as strong now. To-

day, people are looking elsewhere for that

philosophical excitement that we got from

French theorists.

Is there anyone working in

theory now who gives you that

philosophical excitement?

Etienne Balibar, for one, who is actually

teaching a seminar at Columbia this fall.

He is asking very interesting questions

about violence and civility. He and Judith

Butler are working on the same problems,

particularly the problem of universality.

Is there such a thing as the

Western Canon as taught in

Literature Humanities and

(ii)(iii)

(iv)


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Contemporary Civilization and is the Core an

adequate way to teach that Canon?

I have never had the good fortune of

taking Lit Hum or CC or teaching eithercourse. It is something I would like to do

while Im still walking. The Core is great

when I want to refer to a certain philo-

sophical tradition in my other classes be-

cause students have read Herodotus, Kant,

etc. There are not many other universities

where you can do that. However, I think it

would be a good thing if the Core were re-

vised in some way by integrating other tra-

ditions into Lit Hum and CC. Not as other

options on the side but at the centerI

would like to see the Core tell the story,

the true story, of the communication be-

tween these traditions and the Western

tradition. This could happen in the Core.

This currently happens through institutes

around campus that bring together people

from different intellectual backgrounds to

explore the same problems.

Which philosopher or philosophi-

cal tradition has most inuencedyour approach to literary theory?

The Kantian tradition. It is Kants inter-

pretation of the aesthetic that makes lit-

erary criticism a viable discipline whether

critics acknowledge that debt or not. That

being said, traditions that are hostile to

Kant are also inuential for me and for

the discipline; Hegel, for example. A great

deal of contemporary theory is based, at

least in part, on readings of Chapter 4 of

the Phenomenology of Spirit. And in turn, the

anti-Hegelian traditions of French post-

structuralism have also become important

to me and to the discipline.

Whats your favorite novel?

Dickens' Bleak House. But I will put in a

good word for Franzens new novel, Free-

dom.

(vi)

(v)


19/32

17criticism

The more we know about some-

thing, the better we can place

new information about that thing:the better we can make connections, ad-

vance our understanding, go beyond our

immediate knowledge set. Even when new

information complicates old information,

we have the hope of working through the

complication towards a better understand-

ing. This is the value of dialectic (and,

hopefully, this debate).

To be able to place any informa-

tion, we need to start somewhere. We cannot

remain intellectual blank slates for long. So

where should we start? Thats a complicat-

ed question. Should we begin by gathering

scientic knowledge and go from there?

Or religious knowledge? Philosophical?

Political? Should we start with the East

and move West, or the other way around?

In an important sense, it does not

really matter. We can start anywherewith any canonand move outwards, as

long as we are careful, discerning, curi-

ous intellectual agents. Where we start is

a matter of convenience. In our case, it is

roughly a function of geography.

I

t is useful to take the evolution of

thought, bind it by relatively arbitrary

geography and study that evolution.

This offers us a way to explore how criti-cal thought originates, evolves, overlaps,

diverges and converges in a fairly well de-

ned historical set of works. It gives us

somewhere to begin investigation into ourvery humanity.

So, does the Western Canon exist?

Yes it doesand weve invented it. We, as

an intellectual community, have attached

more or less permanent labels to works,

one of these being Western, and we ex-

ploit these labels for our own ends, one of

these being learning. And these labels truly

are useful. As our ends (gradually) change,

so can the labels. This explains why the

syllabi of Literature Humanities and Con-

temporary Civilization have evolved over

the years. This is not to say the labels are

perfect, even when most everyone agrees

upon them. We make mistakes, and we

have to acknowledge our larger intellectual

community does as well. We resist change

and so does the community.

But, overall, learning happens and it

happens within a specic frame-

work. Without this framework, we

would be much worse off. We would have

nowhere to start. We could start some-

where else, but this would take immense

energy and efforta complete reorienta-

tion of Western academia. If the current

method isnt broken, we shouldnt try so

hard to x it. Its not perfect, certainly. Itignores some questions too permanently,

A Useul ConventionBart Piela

Debate:How ar can we criticize the Western Canon?

Illustrated by Rachel Shannon-Solomon


20/32


when these questions shouldcome up. But

it gives us our all-important starting point.

And by virtue of its obvious imperfec-

tions it brings up the obvious questions.

In this sense, it is more valuable becauseit isimperfect, because it is something we must

revaluate, question and probe. Our revalu-

ation, though, should not be too vicious;

in a way, we should be just as cautious in

criticising the Canon as we are in accept-

ing it.

We cannot deny existence or use-

fulness to something because it is, at bot-

tom, arbitrary. This would undermine the

very notion of a convention. Few endeav-

ors would ever get off the ground. As longas we can move from the point we have

decided upon towards new horizons, as

long as we do not become trapped within

the Western Canon, its value is immediate

and important.

T

he selection of a Western Canon

involves a exible manipulation,

conscious or not, of the past

what to remember, and what to forget. Itis not a xed collection of unquestioned

masterworks, celebrating the inexorable

progress of human civilization. Nor is

it a monolithic body of aesthetic and

philosophical texts that will remain

eternally relevant. It is a battleground for

constant cultural self-denition. Because

of this, the formulation of the Canon is

implicitly informed by various interests

which probably afrm and reenforce theprevailing values of the current order

rather than substantially challenge them.

And just as we must always be suspicious

of who is writing our historysince, as

Orwell reminds us, those who control the

present control the past, and those who

control the past control the futurewe

must be equally wary of those who claim

the intellectual capability to determine a

Western Canon. More often than not, the

reading of a canon uncritically reects the

patchwork of principles and hypotheses

which bolster the intellectual foundation

of the reigning political-economicsystem.

Furthermore, it is important, I think,

to dispel the dangerous notion

that the authors of the Canon

are undeniably ingenious thinkers who,

through intellectual meditation and open

dialogue, built the extraordinary foundation

of contemporary society. This triumphalist

account denies the competitive nature ofphilosophical discourse. If the place of

the Canon is to be justied, then readers

must recognize the divisive upheavals in

intellectual history that have gloried

some authors while condemning others to

oblivion.

We must also be aware of the

often questionable factors that are involved

in the formulation of a Canon. For

example, it is now discreditable to insist

The Canon and the Status QuoPuya Gerami


21/32

19criticism

on some sort of Western civilization,

and if we are to defend a Canon, then

all attempts must be made to discard the

notion of the West as a separate culture

representing enlightenment and intellectualprogress. Similarly, it is no coincidence

that in a society dened by patriarchy

and the sanctity of private property, a

great deal of the Canon respects these

characteristics and provides fodder for

their defense. I am, of course, pointing to

the repeated and not unconvincing claim

that the support of a Canon reproduces

the intellectual foundation for a awed

and starkly unequal society.

Nonetheless, granted that one

acknowledges the dangerous implications

of a Canon and notes the obvious effect

that such a project will often signify an

underlying approval of the status quo, I

think that one can reasonably argue that

it is a supremely valuable educational

tool if re-directed for different purposes.It ought to be used rst to rigorously

interrogate our own fundamental political

assumptions. In the process, readers

will be able to nd relevance in certain

authors while dismissing others as no

longer theoretically valuable; in this way

the Canon will be constantly re-made.

In that case, the Canon exists,

surely; but it is not a collection to

inspire passive awe, but rather a body of

thought to be perpetually challenged, re-

interpreted, destroyed, and re-built.


22/32


Systematic Criticism

Peter Licursi

Illustrated by Keenan Korth

As the dust begins to settle in the

aftermath of the recent nan-

cial crisiswhich has caused

the deepest economic recession since the

Great Depressiontwo different posi-

tions have emerged among various intel-

lectuals, politicians and activists. The rst,

popularly touted by fundamentalist pro-

ponents of the free market, views the cri-

sis as a result of inhibiting state-imposed

regulations which compelled the private

sector to design more mystifying nancial

innovations. The second, advocated by

the more moderate defenders of liberal-

democratic capitalism, oppositely argues

that the crisis was sparked by massive de-

regulation, the growing power of nancial

managers, and in certain cases, the greedy

ethical deciency of those in positions

of economic responsibility. And yet, few

if any of these vocal analysts have ap-

proached understanding the crisis in sys-

temic terms.

None have surmised that theessential calamity debated between

moderate and fundamentalist lib-

eral capitalists can be found within

liberal capitalism itself. Contrary to

these awed patterns of mainstream

political discourse, I believe that what

is needed today is a totalizing theoreti-

cal critique of the political-economic

system. To do this, we must use the

tools rst provided by two philoso-phers whose works undermined the

prevailing, embedded religious and ethi-

cal values of their societies: Karl Marx

and Friedrich Nietzsche. I argue that their

works remains relevant and can be utilized

to call into question the seemingly ubiq-

uitous belief in the fundamental sustain-

ability of liberal capitalism.

The primary triumphs of Marx

and Nietzsche, within their respective

methodologies, are that they re-historicizemorality, subvert ethics and call into ques-

tion the very foundations of so-called

Judeo-Christian religiosity. From these

groundbreaking critiques of the funda-

mentally universal, one can derive the im-

petus to en-

vision

Marx, Nietzsche and the Financial Crisis

What is needed today is a

totalizing theoretical critique of

the political-economic system.


23/32

features 21

our societal catastrophes, and conceivably

their resolutions, on a systemic level.

Marxs historical materialism

is central to his account of human con-

sciousness in society and its manifestation

in religion and morality. In his Theses onFeuerbach, Marx posits the materialist argu-

ment that religious sentiment is a purely

social product. This leads to a basic meth-

odological innovation: in understanding

religion and morality, philosophy must

not consider the abstract individual, but

rather a particular form of society. Ideas

are the by-products of economic material

relations. Morality, religion and other ide-

ologies do not stand by themselves, inde-pendent of these relations. Nor do their

corresponding forms of consciousness.

All ideology, whether religious or secular,

relies exclusively on the material experi-

ence of human beings: Life is not de-

termined by consciousness, Marx writes,

but consciousness by life.

This underlying materialism is key

to understanding the manner bywhich Marxs conception of reli-

gion is fruitful in constructing a systemic

critique of contemporary capitalism. For

Marx, the critique of religion is the key to

the critique of all ideologies and institu-

tions. Mans reluctance to understand his

material reality, including that of his situa-

tion under capitalism, is clearly manifested

in religion. This fundamental concept also

allows us to deconstruct some of the mis-

guided criticisms of the nancial crisis.

Rather than appealing to a very vague con-

ception of business ethics to target par-

ticular managerial trends as perpetrating

this crisis, we can attempt to understand

how capitalism as a complex social system

produces these trends. Rather than under-

standing this incident as an abstract psy-

chological or ethical trend, one must insistupon analyzing it as a material reection of

capitalism. In essence, the crisis represents

a series of trends that were rst identied

by Marx. However, these patterns have ac-

celerated and developed to a degree that

Marx could not have foreseen.

Marx describes the power ofcapitalism to alienate man from

his labor and mediate all social

interactions as relations of production, re-

sulting in a commodity fetishism in which

the socially produced material goods seem

naturally produced. In this crisis, one ob-

serves a level of alienation in which the

material product has been removed. Even

the innovators of complex derivatives

admit that their nancial speculationsoccupy a ctitious realm divorced from

material production. With this level of

sustained alienation from the means of

production and productive forces, accord-

ing to Marxs logic, man loses his ability

to exert inuence over his material reality,

and thus, his human essence. This com-

plete mystication of productive relations

leads to the false consciousness that Marx

analyzes in his critique of religion.

Furthermore, as Marx suggests,

capitalism today is no longer merely an

economic system, but rather a complex so-

cial structure in which individuals devout-

ly trust. As Slovenian philosopher Slavoj

iek warns, one should never underesti-

mate the innite plasticity of capitalism.

It has adapted and regenerated through a

number of crises, and yet despite this it

has become increasingly clear that neither

the market nor the state can solve the in-

nite problems that face our world. Still,

contemporary political discourse largelydisregards the possibility of a systemic

critique of liberal capitalism. For its most

Ideology is a mere construct,

utilized to further the aims of

those in positions of dominance.


24/32


ardent supporters, the crisis occurred pre-

cisely because capitalism, they argue, was

restrained. Like religion, capitalism, both

as ideology and complex social system, is

fetishized and masked as a naturally oc-

curring phenomenon, despite its roots in

our material reality. If, as Marx insists, man

is the human world, the state and society,

then the status of capitalism is far less cer-

tain, and we have much more control over

our social, political and economic organi-

zation than presumed by those who de-

fend this system. In order to add another

level of nuance to this critique, it is gainful

to turn to Niezsches critique of morality.

I

n On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche

sets out to disprove the widespread

notion in the philosophy of ethics,

from Plato to Kant, that morality is a priorito society. These doctrines search for the

metaphysical criteria for judging any ac-

tion good or evil. But for Nietzsche mo-

rality is an a posteriori phenomenon, and

religion is merely a mode of valuation

with tangible historical origins. Nietzsche

characterizes the emergence of religion,

beginning with Judaism and continuing

with Christianity, as a triumphant slave

revolt in morality. This act, on behalf ofthe weak, is prompted by the resentment

of the once powerful knightly-aristocratic

class, and produces an inversion in which

good qualities (nobility, aggression and

strength) become Evil, and bad qualities

(impotence, weakness and simplicity) be-

come Good. Nietzsches argument is em-

bedded in an understanding of human

history similar to Marxs materialism in

that it is concerned with the a posterioriori-

gins of ideology.

Unlike Marx, however, Nietzsche

assaults these values as man-made con-

structs. In fact, in an evaluative sense he

posits that everything considered Good

in Judeo-Christian ethics is merely a set

of defensive constructs, hypocritically

imposed on society, without any inherent

meaning. In doing so, Nietzsche estab-

lishes a mode of criticism that calls into

question the most foundational ideologi-

cal presumptions of society. It is in this

methodological tradition

that one can pursue the

systemic criticism ad-vocated above. As

Nietzsche decon-

structs the entire

teleology of Eu-

ropean ethics, we

too can decon-

struct the teleol-

ogy of capitalism

and its insistence

on its own per-manence via de-

mocracy, human

rights, and the free

market.

An impor-

tant de-

v i a t ion

from Marx in

Nietzsches cri-tique is the no-

tion that ideology,

even broad ideo-

logical systems

like Morality,

is a mere con-

struct, utilized to

further the aims of

those in positions of

dominance. Marx, on

As iek warns, one shouldnever underestimate the innite

plasticity of capitalism.


25/32

features 23

the other hand, sees ideology as the product

of material conditions, functioning as both an

expression of those material conditions and as

their mask. This theoretical

crossroads is key to a cri-

tique of contemporary

capitalism. Is this system,

as both an ideologi-

cal construct and a

complex social or-

ganism, buoyed

at the insistence

of its power ben-

eciaries and

their ideologicalwardens? It does

seem that the vic-

tims of this crisis

are far more willing

to attack the greed

of a few managers,

like Bernard Madoff

or the executives that

ew to congressional

hearings on private jets,than to seek those fun-

damentally problematic

structures in capitalism

that make crises inevi-

table and recurring. How-

ever, this reaction assumes

that capitalism requires a

balanced ethical outlook; in-

stead, in the tradition of Marx,

we must pursue the notion that capitalism, asa system, produces the behaviors that our so-

ciety has quite clearly deemed unacceptable. In

fact, we see that in prosecuting the individu-

als who perpetrated risky speculations without

looking at the inherent causal elements in capi-

talism that prompt these behaviors, we end up

perpetuating and strengthening the system as

a whole.

Thus, the public embarrassment and

prosecution of bank executives is merely a

masquerade, in which the public demand for

justice is supercially satiated and a select few

take the fall for the inherently problematic ele-

ments of capitalism. Thus, using the Marxist

and Nietzschean critiques, I believe that the

reactive discourse of the nancial crisis is a

mystication of class-consciousness, in which

those with a vested interest in the prolongation

of liberal-capitalism dole out what appears to

be justice in order to avoid the actuation of

real social justice. Those who desire to divert

criticism from capitalism disregard it altogeth-

er as a subject for critique. Apologists create

an assumptive discourse in which the longev-

ity of the system is incontestable, and, in sodoing, mystify the ability of the victims of the

crisis to understand the totality of capitalism

as a historical process.

In both the works of Marx and Nietz-

sche, consciousness of the historical, material

origins of grand ideological systems is key to

the intellectual liberation of man. Each thinker

posits that the maintenance of these grand ide-

ological systems depends on the unconscious-

ness of its material origins, which is why these

systems are fetishized and masked as natural,

rather than social, entities. It is the very fact

that the permanence of capitalism in politi-cal discourse is so staunchly presumed that we

must view it with a skeptical, critical lens. I am

not positing a solution to the problem of the

nancial crisis, as this is not the true purpose

of philosophy, but rather a redenition of this

problem as a systemic crisis necessitating a cri-

tique of the inherent qualities of capitalism.

Marx and Nietzsche provide us with the intel-

lectual tools to make this critique.

It is the very fact that thepermanence of capitalism inpolitical discourse is so staunchly

presumed that we must view itwith a skeptical, critical lens.


26/32


Public art faces a challenge that is

quite unlike that which is faced by

all art: each and every instance of

public art has both a time limit and a spa-

tial attachment. That is to say public art

has a temporal restriction, an expiration

date, a moment when it ceases to interest

its viewing public, as well as a site-specic

designation. The implications of site-spec-

icity for public are more obvious and

immediate than those of time-specicity.

To derive a theory that combines both

specicities, I question human nature,

with particular emphasis on the viewing

publics sensitivity to public art. The speci-cities, or parameters, of public art are re-

vealed precisely when the viewing public

becomes conditioned by, or desensitized

to, public art. We can condently declare

the end of public art when we, as human

beings qua viewing public, stop caring,

talking and thinking about public art.

It is crucial to understand rst

that both the artist and the viewing pub-

lic play an important role in the time-specicity and site-specicity of public

art. Because public art is so exposed, it is

extremely accessible to the viewing pub-

lic. The artist is thus confronted with the

challenge of creating public art that re-

tains its viewing public, namely its local

community. Due to this over-exposure,

public art fails to transcend the temporal

restrictions that are less known to works

of art in the museum. Public art is directly

restricted to the changing tides of human

interest, participation and sensitivity, to

the changing face of its viewing public, to

the changing times.

Public art is site-specic because it

must occupy a specic public space.

Complicating matters, it must be

relevant to the public space of its viewingpublic. This is, again, a burden and a chal-

lenge placed to the artist. The philosopher

Hilde Hein notes, [The] sheer presence

of art out-of-doors or in a bus terminal

or a hotel reception area does not auto-

matically make that art publicno more

than placing a tiger in a barnyard would

make it a domestic animal. For example,

Maya Lins Vietnam Veterans Memorial

in Washington, D.C. is an instance of pub-lic art, but a public rendition of Salvador

Dals The Persistence of Memory in

London is not. Some art, like The Per-

sistence of Memory, is essentially taken

out of the museum, copied, and placed in

a public spacefor the purpose of this

article, I shall not consider this public art.

Memorials, such as that of Maya Lin, are

often highly site-specic, as they should

be, but their time-specicity becomesrather complicated and controversial. A

memorial is thought to possess qualities

that transcend the boundaries of time, to

appeal to and communicate with count-

less generations of people through time.

Yet memorials are conned to the time of

their installation, the time when they (and

their subject matter) were considered rele-

vant. This is not to say that memorials are

On Public Art

Illustrated by Louise McCune

Arton Gjonbalaj

Public art faces a challengethat is quite unlike thatwhich is faced by all art.


27/32

features 25

unsuccessful works of art; in fact, they are

extremely successful, but only if they help

the ever-changing viewing public experi-ence or at least imagine the time when the

work was installed, when it was important

and relevant, when it was alive.

It is apparent, then, that public

art can link us to the past, taking us out of

our time and space. Public art can force us

to rethink our habits as well as our habi-

tats. At the proper level of engagement

with public art, we are placed outside of

our very recognizable selves, outside of

the environment with which we were once

so familiar. We think that we know our

space, but only a drastic modication of

the spacethrough public artcan accu-

rately test our familiarity and knowledge.

Public art compels us to question our

identity as well as our surroundings. Only

after this transformation can we truly un-

derstand our time and space and, moreimportantly, ourselves. After

we have inevitably exhausted

public art of this function, it

expires. Public art can take us

out of our time and space, but

it cannot save itself.

What transpires in arts transition

from the museum or gallery

to the park or street corner?Think of the Salvador Dal and Maya Lin

examples. On a more personal level, think

about the Thinker and Alma Mater

on Columbias campus, the rst simply

copied and placed on campus, and the

latter made specically for the site that

is Columbia University. When Columbia

students, the viewing public of Alma

Mater, tried to destroy the sculpture in

the 1970s, as philosopher Arthur Danto

recalls, the students were not vandals but

revolutionaries, symbolically attacking the

public whose values Alma Mater embod-

ies.

There is hope that public art can

be kept alive if its artist does something

innovative and original. To extend its im-

pact and push its temporal and spatial

boundaries, public art should provokecontroversy and interaction in the

There is hope that publicart can be kept alive ifits artist does somethinginnovative and orginal.


28/32


form of discourse or deep personal medi-

tation. Public art must respond to and in-

teract with the viewing public by reecting

the cultural, historical, philosophical, po-litical and social interests of the viewing

public. However, in doing so, it is tied to

a temporal and regional locality. As

it attempts to reenergize and sculpt

an often-overlooked public space,

by transforming the blank canvas of

bare public space into an artistic and

expressive fte, public art pays tribute to

the local, the ordinary and the vernacular,

deeply time-specic and site-specic ele-ments.

The role of the viewing public, as

inuenced by different times and

localities, is essential to under-

standing public art. Public art requires the

sensational investmentthe active partic-

ipationof the viewing public. As Hilde

Hein suggests, we are no longer mere

passive onlookers. Instead, we

are participants

actively implicated in the constitution

of the work of artA works realization

depends on the audiences bestowal of

meaning upon it, a contentious social andpolitical undertaking. However, the view-

ing public rarely becomes more attached

to any instance of public art over time. It

seems that at some point each instance of

public art becomes a xed entity, merelysomething we pass by on a daily routine.

The interruption of the ow of nature,

of the ow of human trafc, caused by

public art is crucial to its overcoming the

specicities. Public art must have redemp-

tive value that implicates an understanding

of the spatial and temporal arrangement

of the environmentan understanding

of that which constituted the space before

the installation and that which consti-

tutes it after the installation.

The ideal instance of

public art demonstrates relevant

meaning that transcends its in-

stallation in a specic time and

space, a meaning that is in-

fused in a new, updated instal-

lation. This subsequent in-

stallation reects the artistscareful consideration of the

criticism of the viewing

public, as well as the dy-

namics and restrictions of

time and space. This no-

tion of the continuity of

an idea or meaning con-

veyed through an instance

of public art transcends

The ideal instance of public artdemonstrates relevant meaningthat transcends its installations.


29/32

features 27

that particular instance through a series

of generational installations. In this case,

the essence of a specic instance of pub-

lic art is never lost. However, the pieceitself, the particular instance of public

art, becomes outdated, outmoded, and

ignored. Ultimately, this is not a solution

to the notions of time-specicity or site-

specicity, nor a solution that is absolute-

ly necessary. In fact, part of the very fab-

ric of public art is its ability to evaporate,

to disappear from the eyes and lives of

the viewing public, making way for a new

local installation.

P

ublic art is sculpted by the

hand of the artist

and the eye of the

viewing public, from

the moment of

its installation to

the moment of its

elimination, its re-

moval. Public art that

is neither initially nor ul-

timately given any meaning by the view-

ing public, has no meaning. It is therefore

toppled, in totalthe idea, the meaning,and in extreme cases, the artist. The time-

specicity and site-specicity of art do

not necessarily condemn it; instead they

challenge the artist to create fresh, new

public art that meets the changing de-

mands of the changing viewing public,

with hopes of creating and understand-

ing a form of art that can transcend time

and space.

Public art that is not givenany meaning by the viewingpublic has no meaning.


30/32


Evan Burger

little

philosophybooks

A Clockwork Orange

Illustrated by Arais Abbruzzi

In 1972, Stanley Kubricks masterpiece

A Clockwork Orange was released in

British theaters. The lm ratings

board of Great Britain had been especially

hard on this viciously violent movie, and

the boards harshness was soon justied:

a multitude of copycat crimes, supposedly

inspired by the movie, broke out acrossthe country. The most horric of these

involved a 17-year-old Dutch tourist

raped by a gang of young men chanting

just as in the lmthe lyrics to the

song Singing in the Rain. Kubrick

subsequently bowed to public pressure and

forbade the showing of the lm in Great

Britain, a self-imposed ban that lasted until

his death in 1999. The public reaction to

the movie was motivated by an unspoken

theory of art and ethics; namely, that the

aesthetic good is inextricably bound tothe moral good, that good art makes good

people. The great irony is that the work of

art in question is itself an attack upon this

commonly held (but rarely challenged)

assumption.

Alex, the protagonist of

A Clockwork Orange, has the most

rened aesthetic taste of all the

characters in the moviehe

loves Beethoven and appreci-ates beauty for its own sake,

even if that beauty is almost

solely restricted to the female

form. And yet, Alex has the

blackest heart in a cast of vil-

lains. This dichotomy induces in

the audience an unpleasant cog-

nitive dissonance, conicting with

our assumptions. Despite this con-

ict, Kubricks mastery of cinema-tography draws us into rapport with

flm


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