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2002 26: 191Prog Hum Geogr Giles Mohan and John Mohan

Placing social capital

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Placing social capitalGiles Mohan and John MohanUniversity of Portsmouth, Department of Geography, Buckingham Building, LionTerrace, Portsmouth PO1 3HE, UK

Abstract : This paper reviews the contribution that the concept of social capital might make togeography, and the contribution geography might make to the analysis of social capital. We

begin by summarizing the conceptual origins and dimensions of social capital, in the process of which we distinguish it from several other social properties (human and cultural capital; socialnetworks). We then summarize key criticisms of the concept, especially those levelled at thework of Robert Putnam. The core of the paper is a discussion of the issue of whether there might

be a geography of social capital. We consider links between geographical debates and theconcept of social capital, and we assess the difficulties of deriving spatially disaggregatedmeasures of social capital. We illustrate this discussion with reference to literature on three setsof issues: the question of institutional tissue and its effects on regional development; the under-standing of health inequalities; and the analysis of comparative government performance. Inconclusion, we argue that the popularity of the concept reflects a combination of academic andpolitical developments, notably the search for ostensibly costless policies of redistribution onthe part of centrist governments. We therefore conclude with a discussion of the practical appli-cations of the concept in different contexts.

Key words : social capital, social policy, development, voluntarism, participation, welfare.

I Introduction

According to one reviewer in the Economist, Robert Putnams (1993a) book Makingdemocracy work , in which he established his framework of social capital, was the mostimportant book in political economy since Pareto and Weber. Social capital has come toplay an increasingly significant role in academic and policy debates. The concept has aseductive simplicity in explaining a wide variety of social, political and economicoutcomes. Its use has become commonplace in sociology (Coleman, 1988), politicalscience (Tarrow, 1996; Hall, 1999) and development studies (Fine, 1999). Furthermore,social capital is seen as an intangible, but vital, policy ingredient for ensuring the effec-tiveness of various interventions (Lomas, 1998; Szreter, 1999). For human geographers,understanding social capital is important not only because it is so pervasive and,therefore, ideologically problematic, but also because it seeks to explain different spatial

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192 Placing social capital

patterns. We therefore felt that a review of the burgeoning social capital literature wasneeded and we attempt to assess its relevance for human geographers.

We begin by reviewing the conceptual origins of social capital and by consideringsome definitional points; these are important as a ground-clearing exercise. We thenconsider the ways in which social capital has been defined, measured and applied,noting a number of criticisms levelled at Putnams work. The bulk of the paper thendiscusses the relevance of social capital to geography. We link discussions of socialcapital to other debates in the discipline, consider reasons why there might be ageography of social capital, discuss applications of the concept within geography, andanalyse the difficulties of developing spatially disaggregated measures of it.

II Conceptual origins, dimensions and criticisms

Discussion of social capital is now inextricably linked with the work of the Americanpolitical scientist Robert Putnam, but antecedents of his work can be traced through thewritings of sociologists such as Coleman at least as far back as 1920. Putnamemphasizes that social capital is a property of a collectivity; he refers to features of social life networks, norms and trust that enable participants to act together moreeffectively to pursue shared objectives (1995a: 66465).

He further contends that if these norms and networks link large proportions of thecommunity, and succeed in spanning underlying social divides, then enhancedcooperation is likely to serve broader interests. Such norms and networks are createdthrough participation in various forms of associational and civic activity which involve

face-to-face interaction, producing greater disposition towards trust. In more function-alist readings, social capital can, like other forms of capital, be treated as a stock fromwhich future benefits flow (Krishna, 2000), but, unlike most other stock resources, itdoes not wear out with use (Ostrom, 2000). Rather, as we shall see, it is enhanced byusage (though this does not mean that it cannot be depleted through disuse, misuse orexternal influence).

Defined in this way, social capital needs to be distinguished from other properties of individuals, families or communities. First, it should be distinguished from humancapital, because the latter should be conceived of as the endowments of individuals inthe form of skills and competencies in performing productive tasks. Ostrom (2000)argues that social capital may be developed as a byproduct of other activities in acommunity, while human capital tends to be generated through the more reflexive andpurposeful efforts of individuals. It does not automatically follow that human andsocial capital are correlated.

Social capital should also be distinguished from cultural capital, in the sense in whichBourdieu conceives of it, as possession of the cultural resources and skills necessary toparticipate in lite social interactions. There are likely to be connections, but culturalcapital is largely thought of as a property of individuals. Others prefer the concept of social networks: these systems offer access to resources of a material or (possibly) non-material kind. However, while both social capital and social networks may enableindividuals to gain access to other resources, the former is characterized as a publicgood, to which all residents of an area have access, in contrast to social networks, whichalmost by definition rely on exclusion.

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By way of further clarification, social capital is not synonymous with social equalityor inequality, nor with social cohesion. The former very clearly refers to disparities inthe material and cultural resources available to individuals. The latter is usually takento refer to perceptions of community solidarity, or simply to community spirit (e.g.,Burrows and Rhodes, 1998), but this is not the same as assessments of the degree of interaction with and trust in ones fellow citizens which are implicit in the idea of socialcapital.

Social capital is simultaneously an economic, sociological and political concept(Szreter, 1999). It is also a geographical concept. If social capital is created through inter-actions between individuals, it would seem reasonable to argue that the quality of rela-tionships between individuals is shaped by, and itself shapes the character of, thecontexts in which they live. This is the core of Putnams (1993a) work. He suggests thatnetworks of civic engagement are said to: foster norms of generalized reciprocity, bycreating the expectation that spontaneously given favours will be reciprocated; foster

coordination and communication, by producing channels through which informationabout the trustworthiness of individuals and groups can flow; embody past success atcollaboration, thus serving as a template for future cooperation on other issues; and,finally, increase potential risks to those who act opportunistically that they will notshare in benefits of current or future transactions (Sirianni and Friedland, 1999).

Social capital is alleged to have beneficial effects on both individuals (promoting betterhealth, social interaction; increasing the probability of successful job search; providinga favourable climate for entrepreneurship) and communities (generally, stimulatingeconomic development by making certain resources available that otherwise would belacking (e.g., microcredit schemes or sharing of capital equipment)). It cannot simply be

appropriated by individuals or particular groups.There are many examples of the use of the concept. Coleman (1988) showed that, in

the wholesale diamond market, merchants will hand over for examination bags of diamonds worth many thousands of pounds. This is done without formal regulation

because years of face-to-face interactions between merchants have established sets of norms which individuals would transgress at their peril. In less formal circumstances,Coleman shows marked differences between countries in certain expectations of generalized reciprocity. For example, in Israel children were allowed to travelunescorted on public transport at a much younger age than in the USA because of theexpectation that adults would look out for them.

Putnams work on democratic institutions in Italy emphasized these points. The mostsuccessful regional governments and regional economies were those possessing highlevels of participation in associational life and those in which citizens displayed highlevels of trust in social and political institutions. The enthusiastic reception of his work,

by both policy-makers and academics, is something to which we return below; sufficeit for now to say that it is not unconnected with a search for ostensibly progressivepolicies which are in a sense costless. This is despite Putnams warning that high levelsof participation and trust in Italy had evolved over centuries, and could not, therefore,easily be replicated.

Putnam has subsequently investigated trends in participation and social capital in thecontemporary USA (1995a; 1995b; 2000). His suggestion that both are declining speaksto a wider national unease that the forms of voluntary participation famously identified

by the nineteenth-century commentator, Alexis de Tocqueville, are no longer evident,

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robbing American democracy of its vitality. This is why his work has attractedsubstantial attention. It is encapsulated in his famous image of the lonely bowler: ratherthan participating in bowling leagues as members of teams, the trend now appears to

be towards participation as individuals or in family groups. More specifically, Putnam believes that because of the close link between civic connections and social trust [his,and others, preferred index of social capital] (Putnam, 1995a; 666) there are grounds forconcern that social capital is in decline, since measures of participation indicate a steadydownward trend. These measures include memberships of a diverse range of organi-zations which have traditionally mobilized voluntary effort in the USA, surveys of time

budgets, and measures of collective participation and group membership. Putnam laysthe blame for this apparent decline squarely on one culprit television but this viewhas been disputed (Norris, 1996).

Hall (1999) argues that the British evidence both confirms and undermines some of Putnams central contentions. He believes that levels of social capital in Britain have not

declined significantly; that television need not, therefore, corrode social capital; andthat two dimensions of social capital (patterns of sociability; attitudes of trust) may not be as closely correlated as is often held to be the case. Moreover, he contends thatgovernment can and does play a significant role in fostering social capital, and claimsthat the distribution of social capital across the population appears to be neglected.

III Criticisms of Putnam

There are a number of criticisms of Putnams general thesis, and of its application in

particular contexts. First, there is scepticism about whether social capital is producedthrough the kinds of activities in which Putnam is interested. The problem here lies both in connecting patterns of associational activity, or community involvement, tosocial capital, and in demonstrating that social capital has beneficial outcomes.Putnams argument is that social capital is produced through participation in a range of voluntary associational activities through which individuals encounter their fellows onequal terms and learn to interact with and trust them. Precisely how social capital iscreated through participation in what are, after all, somewhat mundane associationalactivities, is not made clear. Levi expresses concern about the mechanisms by whichmembership in such groups as bird-watching societies and soccer clubs leads to a highlevel of civic engagement, democratic politics, and high-quality governmentperformance (1996: 4748; Tarrow, 1996: 393).

Critics also challenge Putnams choice of measures of participation, pointing to newforms of participation (e.g., coaching/administering sports clubs hence Lemanns(1996) ironic article Kicking in groups rather than solitary bowling) and to thegrowth in chequebook participation (Jordan and Maloney, 1997). There are alsosuggestions that participation involving face-to-face interaction becomes lesssignificant (Paxton, 1998; Rich, 1999; Rotolo, 1999). For example, debates abound on thenew imagined communities created through the disembodied internet and the possi-

bilities this holds out for cyber-democracy (Chin and Mittelman, 1997). Not all associ-ations are alike, not all associations are open to all, and people may join them for avariety of reasons. The terms on which people join or participate must, therefore,condition the nature of the ensuing interactions (Stolle and Rochon, 1998). Furthermore,



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motivations for participation vary greatly: volunteering is often used by individuals asa way of accumulating human capital by gaining relevant experience and skills (Brown,1997). Thus, not all associational activity may have the outcomes predicted by Putnam.

More generally, there are questions about the novelty of his argument: thatinvolvement and participation in groups can have positive consequences for theindividual and community is a staple notion . . . [which] simply recaptures an insightpresent since the beginning of the discipline (sociology) (Portes, 1998: 2). Putnamwould probably contend that the emphasis on social capital as both an emergentproperty and a public good is novel. However, a further weakness of his argument is theimplicit assertion that causal connections between associational activity, social capitaland beneficial socioeconomic outcomes can be found consistently from an era of medieval city states through to the present day (Tarrow, 1996).

Furthermore, it is said that Putnam emphasizes the beneficial features of socialcapital while ignoring its down side. Rubio (1997) refers to perverse social capital:

criminal gangs or organized crime, such as the Mafia, involve the salient characteristicsof the Putnam conceptual triad (networks, norms and sanctions) but these are bothinternal to the group in question and have undeniably negative effects. There can also

be circumstances in which rival groups in society may exhibit high levels of socialcapital within groups but low social capital between them (e.g., strongly sectariansocieties). It could be argued that the stronger the social capital within the group, thegreater the hostility to outsiders (Halpern, 1999). However, against this there areexamples of regions which have overcome such divisions (some of Putnams mostsuccessful regions in Italy), and there is no necessary link between social capital andintolerance.

Putnams account is also society-centred and therefore neglects the ways in whichsocial capital can be created (and destroyed) by structural forces and institutions. It thusprovides a warrant for a deficit model of the causes of decline of the American innercity, of the comparative failure of the peripheral regions of western Europe, or thecontinued underdevelopment of the third world. Indicators of malaise may be civicwhile causes of decline are structural. One corollary of this is that the state is relativelyunder-theorized. Putnam is criticized for his neglect of the states role in suppressingassociational life in the Italian South (Bagnasco, 1996; Tarrow, 1996; Putzel, 1997).Similarly, Putzel (1997) adds that in areas identified by Putnam as having high socialcapital other organizations were involved in producing it, but he ignores them. This

lack of attention to the states role and other forms of political organization promptedEvans (1997) and Ostrom (1996) to talk of state-society synergy as a more usefulapproach to theorizing the formation of social capital. Skocpol (1996; 1997) emphasizesthat American associational life has been carefully nurtured, not least by governmentaction, and argues that if there is a decline in social capital it results not from individualchoice but from changes in the character of American politics, including the decline of local campaigning and the proliferation of lobbyists and special interest groupsorganized nationally. Among lites, she suggests, new kinds of connections are aliveand well (Skocpol, 1997) but these lites are now arguing that the nations social con-nectedness must be repaired from below, with little help from government.




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IV Geography and social capital

Here we deal with four issues. First, we consider why human geographers might wantto draw on a concept like social capital, and for this reference is made to broad intel-

lectual and political trends in geography (and in the external environment). Second, wereview evidence which implies that accepting the causal account of social capitaldeveloped by Putnam there might be spatial variations in patterns of associationalactivity, which have consequences for social capital formation. Third, we raise questionsconcerning the definition and measurement of social capital, and the spatial scale atwhich it operates. Fourth, we conclude by assessing some applications of concepts of social capital within geography.

1 Social capital and contextual explanations in geography

It is a truism of contemporary geographical thought that place makes a difference tothe outcome of social processes. Social capital might thus have much to contributeto contextual explanations of geographical phenomena. There are connections herewith previous and current geographical work, such as the localities debates of the 1980s, and to attempts at contextual explanations informed by structuration theoryand, more recently, actor-network theory. Here we simply highlight convergences

between such accounts and the ways in which social capital might be relevant tothem.

The localities programme of research on uneven development in Britain might best

be understood as an attempt to move away from a deterministic reading-off of socialand political events from the productive base. Instead, the intention was to show howthe social complexion of places affected forms of economic restructuring. Now, socialcapital per se was not referenced in the localities debates, but the implication of thestudies that the character of social relationships in a locality could, in some circum-stances, be more than the sum of its parts has obvious resonance with discussions of social capital. The clearest statement of this is probably Savage et al.s (1987) contention(see also Urry, 1987) that the locality may be a site of emergent causal powers(Lovering, 1989: 213).

The second connection is with structuration theory, which suggests that the actionsof individual agents may or may not serve to reproduce social structure according tocontext. Furthermore, actions not only have unintended consequences but may alsohave unexpected consequences. Thus, the dense interpersonal networks of voluntaryassociations studied by Putnam could produce (and/or reproduce) a degree of socialcapital which was qualitatively different from that available in other places. Equally, itis possible that the stock of social capital in a place is not reproduced or replenished, butis instead depleted. These arguments suggest, in line with much contemporary theory,that what goes on in a place is not fixed but is a contingent outcome of the interactions

between agency and structure.Giddens attempts to link structure and action by arguing that the former is not only

an external constraint on action, but is also the continually reproduced mediumthrough which action is enabled (Murdoch, 1997: 324). Social capital might be seen aspart of these continually reproduced media in so far as it is generated by an unending



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sequence of human actions; for Putnam, social capital is to be found in any form of social relation that provides a resource for action (Foley and Edwards, 1997: 552).

There are also connections here with actor-network theory (ANT). In relation tohuman geography, its advocates have concentrated on its utility for overcomingdivisions between the natural and the social. However, we would see the value of ANTin this context as part of what Murdoch (1997) terms a trend towards associationalistthinking, evident in an empirical and theoretical focus on networks or associations ineconomic and political geography. Afurther advantage claimed for ANT is its relationaltreatment of geographical scale simply as an outcome of the heterogeneous linksestablished between actors (Murdoch, 1997: 322); this is in opposition to a static viewof space for example, of administrative units as spatial containers which we arguestill besets studies of social capital (see below).

2 Is there a geography of social capital?If participation in various forms of associational activities contributes to the formationof social capital, then there are good reasons to expect geographical variations in socialcapital. The main literature drawn on here is that relating to political cultures, civic par-ticipation and patterns of membership of voluntary associations, as well as work on thegeography of the voluntary sector.

First, political participation and volunteerism vary (by age, class, ethnicity andgender) and so, at a minimum, one would expect compositional effects to producespatial variations. However, as shown by national surveys in the UK, variations in vol-

unteering are too great to be explained by compositional factors alone (Davis-Smith,1998; Lynn, 1997).Second, there is evidence from intensive studies of particular localities that the extent

and character of participation varies from place to place. There is ample historicalevidence of memberships of friendly societies or contributory welfare arrangements, orof the formation of charitable or voluntary associations. Contemporary studies of political participation indicate substantial place-to-place variations (e.g., Miller et al.,1996; Parry et al., 1992; Verba et al., 1996).

Third, the voluntary sector exhibits uneven development, as is well illustrated by themany extensive statistical analyses that have been carried out in the USA (e.g., Wolpert,1990; Wolch, 1989; Wolch and Geiger, 1983). Other national and internationalcomparisons confirm these variations (Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Salamon, 1995). Suchvariations are often related statistically to the fortunes of local economies and/or tocompositional effects. Expressed in this way, such studies apparently contradictPutnams causal mechanisms, since according to Putnam high levels of voluntaryactivity precede (rather than follow) economic development.

Fourth, several commentators argue that institutional structures can make adifference to levels of participation and, thereby, influence the formation of socialcapital. Examples might include the former Greater London Councils populistprogrammes aimed at enlisting a rainbow coalition (MacKintosh and Wainwright,1987) and the many other efforts by central and local government to stimulatevoluntary activity (Hall, 1999; Maloney et al., 2000). In Mexico, Fox (1999) details therelationship between the governments decentralization programme and local




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community organizations. He argues that structures of local governance in turninfluence the capacity of grassroots communities to influence social investments (1999:48). In many other developing countries, NGO activity, and the voluntarism whichsurrounds it, has largely been in response to the actions of foreign NGOs and donorswho have placed faith in civil society over the state (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Whilegeneralizations are dangerous, the externally funded NGO activity follows patterns of uneven development whereby poorer regions attract greater attention and local NGOsdevelop in response to the inflows of money. Hence, the spatiality of voluntarism isfurther complicated by non-local interventions.

Fifth, contemporary processes of uneven development are likely to have an impacton the quality of social relationships and, therefore, on levels of social capital. The flightof capital from certain locations has certainly been associated with a decline in civilityand increasing levels of crime (e.g., Campbell, 1993). However, this does not applyeverywhere and the result may be an increase in the dispersion of levels of social

capital, rather than a generalized decline. In so far as the affected neighbourhoods may be relatively small areas, this raises the question of the spatial scale at which socialcapital operates. Putnam does not commit himself on this point, and as we shall see,different writers adopt a pragmatic approach to this problem. Finally, there areexamples of deliberate localized efforts to stimulate community development in neigh-

bourhoods evacuated by capital, as a strategy of economic and social renewal. InNigeria, for example, the Naira boom followed by the stringent IMF-sponsoredAdjustment Programmes caused great economic hardship and the breakdown of trust.One response was the re-creation of social capital within the confines of Born Againchurches where trust relations were formed and, crucially, the state was unable tosuppress political debate (Laakso and Olukoshi, 1996; Marshall, 1991).

In short, then, there are good reasons to suppose that there is a geography of socialcapital; the evidence implies substantial variation in the presence of, or participation in,organizations credited with producing social capital. However, this in turn raises thequestion of how one devises spatially disaggregated measures of social capital.

3 Developing spatially disaggregated indicators of social capital

There are obvious difficulties in operationalizing a fluid, relational concept such associal capital, especially given the extensive conceptual disputes about the term. Theseproblems become still more acute when one attempts to devise geographically disag-gregated measures. Data on the dimensions of social capital are not captured throughsources such as the census and one has to rely on other direct or indirect measurementsof the concept. Putnams causal model suggests a sequence in which, broadly speaking,participation in associational activity produced greater levels of trust and civicengagement. We will follow that sequence here.

Several authors have followed Putnams lead in using data on levels of associationalactivity as proxies for social capital. An example would be Narayan and Pritchetts(1997) use of group or association membership at the village level in Tanzania: increasesof one standard deviation led to household incomes increasing by 2030% per person.Similarly Veenstra and Lomas (1999) utilize a range of measures of participation in civicand associational life in their study of Canadian provinces. The problems of relying on



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such data are well rehearsed by Paxton (1998) and Rich (1999). Membership statisticsare available for a long time-series for some key organizations, but simply countingaggregate numbers and presenting trends on one indicator does not tell us very much.For example, what are the ramifications of associational membership for oneindividual, or for the area in which he/she lives? To explore this one would needindividual-level data about other aspects of participation by individuals and how suchparticipation was related to the formation of social capital. For temporal comparisons,as indicated above, associational membership may not always be a helpful indicator,

because of changes in the character of associational life, as old organizations aresupplanted by new ones.

Social capital perhaps ought to be regarded as the outcome of associational activityand so researchers have been much exercised by measuring a range of indicators of trust. Halpern (1999) believes that the level of trust people have, in institutions or theirfellow citizens, is the best way to measure social capital. He therefore recommends

inclusion of a measure of trust as part of routine government social surveys. Theproblems to which this might give rise are well illustrated by Knack and Keefers (1997)use of a measure of trust (from the World Values Survey, which covers 29 countries)derived from responses to the phrase most people can be trusted. This highlyambiguous phrase (does it include family, friends and strangers?) produces a veryelastic measure of social capital (p. 1283). As Schuller (2000: 32) points out, the dangerhere is that overmuscular measurement applications will result in a still-nascentconcept becoming so waterlogged that it sinks.

Whether one measures participation or trust, there are difficulties in obtaining disag-gregated data on dimensions of social capital. Most indicators are derived from national

studies, which permit little disaggregation. There are few international studies whichattempt to ask comparable questions across a number of states. For those that attemptthis (such as the World Values Survey) it is at least plausible that responses are context-dependent. This issue is exemplified by influential ecological studies of the impact of social capital on health (e.g., Kawachi and Kennedy, 1999; Kawachi et al., 1997) whichclaim to discern statistically significant relationships between levels of trust and healthstandards at the state level in the USA. It is clear that there are interstate differences inlevels of trust, but it is debatable how meaningful these are as explanations of healthinequalities. There are important arguments on health inequalities concerning the scaleat which social capital might operate. The suspicion is that operational opportunismhas led scholars to use whatever data happen to be available (state-level surveys, in thiscase) and correlate them with mortality data. Instead, we suggest, indicators should bederived which allow us to examine the effects of social capital at and across severaldifferent scales. Unfortunately, direct measures of trust involve costly surveys if theyare to be replicated. Alternative possibilities are thus direct measurement of associa-tional activity at a small-area level, and indirect measures using synthetic estimationtechniques. On the former, we can regard Richard Titmuss famous (1970) dictum thatarrangements for blood donation represented one of the best measures available of thequality of social relationships in a society as a strong argument for using blooddonorship rates as a small-area surrogate for social capital. On the latter, it is possible,using multilevel modelling techniques, to produce synthetic estimates of proportions of the population engaged in voluntary activity (Barnard et al., 2001). These techniquesoffer scope for developing and testing measures of social capital at various spatial




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scales, rather than simply accepting data that happens to be available for fixed spatialcontainers.

These questions of scale, process and measurement have fostered other studies whichtake a more qualitative route, or which focus on a limited set of small areas. Onyx andBullen (2000) surveyed five areas in contrasting urban and rural environments inAustralia, in rather more depth than would be possible in a national sample survey, andfound statistically significant differences. Rural environments were characterized byhigher levels of participation and mutual support, and, though levels of social capitalwere higher in rural than urban areas, it appeared that on some dimensions (e.g.,tolerance of diversity) rural areas scored lower than urban areas. It may be that such

broad generalizations are all that is possible in terms of disaggregation. Maskell (2002)argues that if social capital as a general endowment is, by definition, locally contingent,it may not be possible to develop uniform measurements that allow comparison

between localities. Krishna and Shrader (1999) pursued a similar line in developing a

Social Capital Assessment Tool (SCAT). They argue that while the scale of social capitalmay have to be constructed separately for each different context, instruments can bedevised that will assist in the construction of such a scale among different contexts(Krishna and Shrader, 1999: 7; emphasis in original). The SCAT consists of a communityprofile, a household survey and an organizational profile which allow policy-makers tomore effectively deliver participatory projects, because the levels and types of socialcapital will not be known a priori. In this regard, Moser and Holland (1998) used aParticipatory Urban Appraisal, an adaptation of PRA, in Jamaica to assess the effects of urban violence on levels of social capital. They showed that investment in localcommunity projects might well deliver the greatest social and economic benefits,

because it would reconstitute trust relationships and thereby stimulate economic inter-dependencies.

Finally, we suggest that one profitable line of inquiry might be the extent of dispersion in levels of social capital. Much urban policy is concerned with small areaswhich, it appears, have gone past a threshold at which traditional behavioural codes donot apply. This is a theme of Campbells (1993) work on the collapse of a sense of community. However, anecdotal observation from our own work reveals traditionalforms of voluntarism are alive and well in other places (e.g., through largely middle-class, church and womens organizations). If so, we may be dealing with not a

generalized but a localized decline in social capital, the contours of which need to becharted.

4 Applications of social capital

Given these significant conceptual problems, one wonders why social capital has become so popular over the past decade. The answer necessarily entails examiningwider questions of political-economy and ideology. At the most general level, scholarsare interested in it because it apparently offers the power to explain residual variancein models of several kinds of activity. More specifically, there are three principal areasin which concepts of social capital have been applied: explaining uneven developmentat various scales; understanding the comparative performance of governments; andaccounting for spatial variations in health experience.

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First, social capital is used in explaining economic growth and uneven development.There is evidence at the level of nation states that nations with high social capital tendstrongly to be wealthier (as measured by GDP per head), or enjoy more rapid economicgrowth. Some models suggest that social capital is more important to economic growththan human capital (despite the importance attached to the latter in theories of endogenous growth) (Halpern, 1999, quoting Whiteley). This might be because socialcapital increases trust and this lowers transaction costs (by reducing the need forexpensive contractual arrangements and facilitating transmission of information), or

because it has positive effects on the operation of government (greater legitimacy leadsto stability and the pursuit of greater investment in public goods). However, the preciseform social capital takes may be important; for example, public trust (i.e., betweenrelative strangers) may be more beneficial to economic growth than trust withinfamilies.

Social capital may also be relevant to the explanation of intrastate patterns of uneven

development. Given the declining significance of physical resource endowments and(some) convergence in human capital (as measured in terms of levels of qualifications),the different economic fortunes of regions within advanced capitalist societies requireexplanation. One response has been to synthesize research in the economic and culturalspheres, in an attempt to discover the reasons why certain regions perform better thanothers. Here, the focus is usually on institutional tissue which permits networking andfacilitates a disposition towards trust, promoting the exchange of ideas and contacts,and thereby enhancing a regions collective capacity for innovation. The work of Cookeand Morgan (1998) on Wales exemplifies this. The idea of networks of untraded inter-dependencies is also relevant. In the literature on new industrial spaces, the case is

made that tacit knowledge is exchanged between firms on the basis of unwritteninformal rules (Pinch and Henry, 1999a; 1999b), relying on conventions establishedthrough face-to-face interaction. Whether the concept of social capital la Putnamapplies to these processes is somewhat debatable. The institutional tissue in some of Europes old industrial regions has not always been an inclusive one (Hudson, 1994);rather, it has almost designedly excluded certain interests and promoted a narrowdevelopment agenda. Nor is it clear that knowledge-intensive industries necessarilycluster in places with high levels of social capital, at least in the sense in which Putnamunderstands it. If social capital is engendered through participation in face-to-face asso-ciational activity, the gated communities of California would not appear to be likelysources of social capital. In fact, it may be that the issue here is a distinction betweentwo aspects of social capital: the dense interfirm relationships in which economicgeographers have explored, and the interpersonal networks of associational life whichhave attracted Putnams attention.

Second, and closely related to these institutionalist formulations are those concerningthe effectiveness of government institutions. Subsequent studies have apparentlyprovided more support for Putnams argument showing that, after controlling forGDP per head, higher social capital was associated with lower levels of corruptionand higher levels of performance on the part of government institutions (a pointwhich Putnam is apt to argue rather deterministically; Putnam, 2001: 153). Exampleshere might be Bayart et al.s (1999) study of corruption, or the World Banksanalysis of the failure of privatization schemes (www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/scwhyrel1.htm). Critics question the direction of causality and contend that



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interdependencies between state and voluntary organizations make it impossible todetermine which should have causal priority. On this view good government could beeither, or both, of a cause or consequence of high social capital. Recent theorists(Ostrom, 1996; Evans, 1997) hedge their bets on this issue and talk of the co-productionof beneficial social schemes such that the relationships between government and asso-ciations are mutually reinforcing which provides the normative underpinnings forpartnerships.

Third, social capital is used in understanding health inequalities, because of theevidence that, despite rising living standards, substantial disparities exist. Narrowlymaterialist accounts cannot deal with this satisfactorily. The focus has shifted to levelsof inequality between and within nation states, the suggestion being that in moreegalitarian societies disparities in health are less great and overall levels of health arehigher. The most widely cited author in this context is Wilkinson (1996), who hasargued two basic propositions: within the developed world, highest health standards

are found in the most egalitarian societies (and not the richest ones); and the mostimportant links between disease and income inequality are psychosocial ones, whichoperate through the pathway of social cohesion. Thus, the explanatory emphasis is onrelative, not absolute, income effects, which operate through psychosocial (not material)causal processes. Wilkinsons work has inspired many ecological analyses which relateaggregate statistics on health outcomes to a range of measures of inequality, socialcohesion or social capital. In these, social capital is viewed as a mediating link,connecting relative incomes to mortality experience in two ways. First, there are associ-ations between income inequality and indicators of crime levels or education standards,viewed by some as symptoms of underinvestment in social capital (Kaplan et al., 1996)

though human capital might be more accurate. Second, there is the argument thatincome inequality disrupts social cohesion; thus declining levels of social trust and civicparticipation would symbolize this breakdown, and we might therefore expect healthstandards to be associated with income inequality and social capital. Kawachi et al.(1997) have quite bluntly asserted, on the basis of ecological analyses, that incomeinequality leads to increased mortality via disinvestment in social capital. Otherscounsel caution. Although it does appear remarkable that indicators of trust at the statelevel should apparently explain much of the variance in mortality levels, there isscepticism about the underlying causal processes, with Muntaner and Lynch (1999)advocating the linkage of social capital to class.

These are disparate areas of study, but we might summarize the common threads between them by saying that the interest in social capital results from a critique of overdetermined theorization of links between structural forces and individualexperiences, a recognition that contexts matter to the outcomes of social processes, and,in particular, a critique of the excesses of free-market capitalism and failures of stateintervention. However, considerable disagreement exists as to the operationalizationand use of the concept. This has not prevented politicians and institutions from priori-tizing it in public policy and we conclude this article with a discussion of some practicaland policy implications.



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V Social capital in practice: political attractions and socioeconomic limitations

In conclusion, we might well ask why social capital has attracted so much attentionwhen there are substantial arguments about just what it means. Put bluntly, one

argument is that it is a form of revisionist neoliberalism, a political response to thealleged constraints imposed by globalization and the consequent reduction in scope forstate intervention. In its earliest, Thatcherite incarnation neoliberalism sought toremove the state from economic life. With the Clinton and Blair revolutions, we see aslightly more positive role for the state, albeit a more lean and focused one; reformistintentions are circumscribed by the contours of a polarized social landscape, and sothere is a search for policies which appear to be costless (Mohan, 1999: 11552; 2002).The combined effect of these changes has been a move towards multiple stakeholderapproaches involving partnerships between state, private capital and civil society. Thisis epitomized in various searches for a third way, a key element of which is a discourse

combining rights and responsibilities. The clearest illustrations of this are probably JohnGrays (1996) apostatic rejection of Thatcherism, the communitarian-inspired prescrip-tions of Etzioni (1996), Fukuyamas (1995) work on trust and the writings of Mulgan(1997) and Leadbeater (1999). These authors have all had the ear of government and, inaddition, Tony Blair claims to have been influenced by the philosopher JohnMacMurray, whose key text was entitled Persons in relation. We now draw on ourown research specialisms (the politics of third-world development, and social policy inthe core) to show how public policy might be orientated towards the production of social capital.

1 Social capital and development studies: local networks and poverty alleviation

Over the past five years, social capital has become an important analytical concept andpolicy tool within development (see, for example, Brown and Ashman, 1996;Bebbington, 1997; Bebbington et al., 1997; Wilson, 1997; Evans, 1997; Uphoff, 2000).First, analytically, researchers have tested the extent to which social capital underpinssocial development and/or poverty alleviation programmes. Brown and Ashman(1996) examined 13 cases of multiparty cooperation across Africa and Asia and foundthat The creation and strengthening of social capital in the form of local organizationsand networks is an essential task in building intersectoral cooperation that mobilizesand utilizes local resources and energies for problem solving (p. 1477). Similarly,Bebbington et al. (1997) argue the nature of relationships among plural actors, and theconsolidation of social capital in the form of local organizations and networks,constitute part of the explanation of these successes in sustainable forestry (p. 31).These researchers are, however, aware that the actual mechanisms which link thesenetworks and organizations are poorly understood. From a sociospatial perspective,these analysts see social capital as an essentially local endowment leading to localdevelopment.

The second use of social capital is rather more prescriptive. If social capital isnecessary for localized developmental success, and the lack of success points to the lackof social capital (or at least the right sort), then the inference is that policies shouldattempt to build it (Wilson, 1997). Such efforts challenge the path dependency of



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Putnam, arguing that investing in locally relevant social capital will initiate a self-generating and virtuous cycle. However, such a process is difficult, and Governmentsare unfortunately still often reluctant to make investments in social capital (Uphoff,2000: 238).

At the level of macropolicy, the World Bank argues that social capital should ideallyentail horizontal and vertical associations which promote social cohesion on the onehand and prevent divisive parochialisms on the other (www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/index.htm). The concept leads firmly into their broader agenda of favouring civil society over the state (Fine, 1999). Social capital has been used by theBank to justify the creation of Social Funds and other partnerships. Social Funds have

become an established device for poverty alleviation under Structural AdjustmentProgrammes (Stewart and van der Geest, 1995) and, more recently, have been seen asone way to promote social inclusion (Gillings, 1999). Initially such funds werechannelled through NGOs which acted simply as delivery agencies, but over time

NGOs have become more involved in programme design and monitoring.This privileging of certain forms of social capital over others serves to normalize apartial approach to political economy at the expense of alternatives. In this sense itreflects the colonization of the social sciences by neoclassical economics (Fine, 1999) asit gives an economic rationale to all non-economic behaviour. It allows the majorlenders to sidestep the state and its relation to the global economy since an absence of development is attributed not to the global economy but to the inability of local societyto insert itself into economic life in a rational manner. Like modernization theory beforeit, the problem lies with the victims of poverty and not the wider political economy.As Fine (1999) summarizes, social capital allows the World Bank to broaden its agendawhilst retaining continuity with most of its practices and prejudices which include

benign neglect of macro-relations of power, preference for favoured NGOs andgrassroots movements, and decentralized initiatives (p. 12). It remains to be seen howsocial capital can be mobilized as a counternarrative of solidarity and more radicalsocial movements as Fowler (1998) suggests it can.

2 Social capital and social policy in the core

There are concerns, too, about the ways in which social capital is used to inform publicpolicy in western nations. Neoliberals tend to argue that state intervention hasdestroyed social capital, either by assuming welfarist responsibilities and stranglingself-help initiatives (Green, 1996) or by destroying communities through catastrophicattempts at planning and urban renewal (Coleman, 1985). A more balanced perspectivewould acknowledge that the relationship between state and civil society is not a zero-sum one; popular voluntary associations and the state have historically operated inclose symbiosis (Hall, 1999; Lehning, 1998; Skocpol, 1996). In seeking to promote thecreation of social capital, one cannot simply rely on offloading responsibilities from thestate onto the voluntary sector. Three suggested policies are reviewed here.

First, there are proposals for greater state support for the voluntary sector (e.g., Lomas,1998). Possibilities include putting the voluntary sector on a firmer financial footingand/or relaxing benefit regulations which inhibit volunteering. As Hall (1999) demon-strates for the UK (see also Maloney et al., 2000), government action certainly has



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helped sustain cultures of voluntarism, and greater support for the voluntary sectorseems a prerequisite for enhancing social capital. However, sustained intervention andsupport would almost certainly be more necessary in the more impoverished areas; see,for example, the Commission on Social Justices (1994) ideas for communitydevelopment, and various American initiatives (Sirianni and Friedland, 1999) whichpropose reinvigorating volunteerism and self-help in disadvantaged localities.

A second context in which social capital is discussed is educational reform: thepotential of schools to form foci for neighbourhoods is often recognized, since neigh-

bourhood schools are institutions in the success of which almost all residents have aninterest. Schneider et al. (1997) believe that a pro-market policy, giving parents voucherswith which to choose schools, will stimulate voluntary support and therefore socialcapital, but it is hard to see why such an individualistic solution would produce theseresults (see criticisms, of similar proposals, by Henig, 1994, and Carnoy, 1993). Marketforces, promoting competition between schools, do not seem likely to support anything

other than social segregation (see Gibson and Asthana, 2000, on current tendencies inBritain).Yet it seems inconceivable that the stock of social capital can be improved in the

absence of educational reform and investment. Szreter (1999) contends that the litist,class-based British education system not only endows a small fraction with the humanand cultural capital they need for success but it also creates dense social networksamong this lite group, from which the remainder are excluded. He argues that only agood overalleducation system . . . can lay the necessary foundations for the proliferationof social capital all across the economy, by providing its basis in common communica-tive competence and mutual respect (p. 42). This conclusion holds for other social

policies such as health, housing and social security. Although Szreters arguments arefocused largely on human capital, they apply by extension to questions of social capitaland social cohesion.

Third, in the area of industrial policy, some have suggested that it is possible to createthe networks of dense interfirm relationships that are believed to characterize Europesregional success stories. Policy emphases here are on creating fora in which ideas can

be discussed and disseminated, thus stimulating a collective learning process byenhancing the networking capacities of regions (Morgan, 1997). Critics, however,

believe that this offers a hopelessly optimistic vision which neglects the structuralchallenges facing deindustrialized regions (Lovering, 1999).

Beyond these specific suggestions, authors such as Woolcock (1998) argue thatgovernment agencies should consider the implications for social capital of anydecisions they may take. The analogy might be with the treatment of externalities by theplanning system. An emphasis on social capital also reminds us that there is such athing as society and that policies to reduce inequality benefit everybody. However, if social capital is as path-dependent as implied by Putnam, creating it will be a long-termand large-scale project. In the policy areas reviewed here, it is also questionable whethersimply promoting social capital makes sense in abstraction from policies to reducesocioeconomic disparities.

For this reason, we are concerned about the ways in which social capital has come to be privileged over material inequalities (between people and places) in a way whichmay be both analytically weak and practically disabling. We have referred to numerousdifficulties in operationalizing the concept, and we are sceptical as to whether it is



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possible, for analytical convenience, to separate social capital from material circum-stances. A similar point has recently been made by Portes (2000), who regards Putnamscentral proposition that a civically involved population will produce goodgovernance as largely self-evident and circular. He therefore welcomes efforts toproduce novel indicators (newspaper readership, associational membership etc.) sincethese mean that social capital is not being measured by its consequences (pp. 45).Even these indicators need to be tested thoroughly, however, because social capital maysimply be another way of describing social inequalities. Portes therefore believes thatconsiderable research remains to be done to establish whether or not extraneous factors(e.g., material prosperity, institutional arrangements) might be responsible for bothhigh levels of social capital and effective governance. If social capital were shown con-vincingly to be independent of material circumstances, then policies to increase it mighthave some impact. If the converse were true, social capital would be little more than aflag of convenience, allowing centre-right governments to pretend they are contribut-

ing to the solution of social problems when very little was actually being done tomitigate fundamental inequalities. The dangers of uncritical application of the conceptare emphasized by Leeder (1998), who warns of the risk of a one-sided obsession withsocial capital as the god-thing in a secular power-religion, the one true measure intowhich we can empty all that is complex and puzzling, the embodiment of all our

bravest ambitions and secret desires for a society that reflects our very own values.There is a tendency to wish-fulfilment in discussions of social capital.

Acknowledgements

Both authors would like to thank their colleagues at Portsmouth who have engaged inlively and informative debates on the nature and value of social capital to geographers.They are Craig Duncan, Kelvyn Jones, Vicky Sullivan and Liz Twigg. We are alsograteful to David Halpern, Perri 6 and Simon Szreter for copies of unpublishedmaterial.

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geography social capital

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