Government of Western AustraliaDepartment of Environment and Conservation

Confidential and UrgentSpecial InquiryOffice of the CommissionerLevel 18197 St Georges TcePERTH WA 6000

Your ref:

Our ref:

Enquiries:

Phone:

Fax:

Email:

Keiran McNamara

6467 5500

6467 5525

keiran.mcnamara@dec.wa.gov.au

Dear Mal

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL CABINET IN CONFIDENCE

Thank you for your letter of 16 June 2011 providing me with a confidential copy of the reportA Shared Responsibility The Report of the Perth Hills Bushfire February 2011 Review.

I have made a preliminary examination of the report and compiled notes for my reference,which are attached for your information. I will give further consideration to the report andprovide any additional comment by the requested date of 22 June.

In broad summary, I do not have concerns with the report, other than with recommendation45, as discussed in the attached notes.

However, I do have an overarching concern. The report is, in its text if not necessarily in itsrecommendations, quite critical of the Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA) and,by contrast in some respects, relatively complimentary of the Department of Environment andConservation (DEC).

Notwithstanding this, a number of the recommendations are directed to FESA. Thefundamental issues of FESA's culture and behaviour, as commented on in the review, shouldbe addressed by Government before the response to various recommendations is entrustedto FESA.

I note from your letter that the report has been provided only to the Minister for EmergencyServices and the Chief Executive Officer of FESA, as well as myself. I believe I should beable to provide a copy of the report and my comments to my Minister as well.

I have some difficulty in commenting on the Keelty review in isolation from the (final) report ofFESA's major incident review (MIR) by Stuart Ellis. The draft of the MIR that I have seencontrasts with the Keelty review, and at this point in the process I remain concerned that thetwo reports present inconsistencies and difficulties for Government.

DIRECTOR GENERAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES DIVISIONS: The Atrium, 168 St Georges Terrace, Perth, Western Australia 6000

Phone: (08) 6467 5000 Fax: (08) 6467 5562 TTY: 1880 555 630PARKS AND CONSERVATION SERVICES DIVISIONS: Executive: Corner of Australia II Drive and Hackett Drive, Crawley, Western Australia 6009

Phone: (08) 9442 0300 Fax: (08) 9386 1578 Operations: 17 Dick Perry Avenue, Technology Park, Kensington, Western Australia 6151

Phone: (08) 9219 8000 Fax: (08) 9334 0498 TTY: 9334 0546

POSTAL ADDRESS FOR ALL DIVISIONS: Locked Bag 104, Bentley Delivery Centre, Western Australia 6983

www.dec.wa.gov.au

wa.gov.au

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The Keelty review has not explicitly addressed a fundamental issue. The fact of the matter isthat the response to the Roleystone fire on 6 February 2011 should have harnessed the fullcapabilities of DEC as well as FESA. That did not happen on the day. DEC's advice toMr Keelty was that the best outcome for the community and the Government would havebeen for FESA to fight the fire in the suburbs and save the houses, and for DEC to focus onthe bushfire. The urban/bush interface will always be a challenge, but it will not besatisfactorily addressed if an urban response attitude excludes bushfire competence.

With your agreement, I would also like to copy this correspondence to the Director General ofthe Department of the Premier and Cabinet.

Yours sincerely

Keiran McNamaraDIRECTOR GENERAL

17 June 2011

Att.

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Cover letter

p. 2 para 2: "for the most part"

p. 2 para 3: FESA "appeared to struggle"

p. 3 para 3: lives vs houses lost as measure

Report

p. 3 para 3: lives vs homes lost as measure

p. 6 para 5: comment re liability re fuel load

p. 7 para 2: note re FESA MIR

p. 7 para 4: comment re credibility of FESA witnesses (and also see para 5)

p. 9 para 1: FESA submissions >1000 pages (incl. criticism of FESA submission paras1 and 2, e.g. "self promotion and gratuitous advice rather than a constructive address ofthe terms of reference"; "parts... inaccurate or untrue")

p. 9 para 3 "culture of fear and intimidation felt by volunteer firefighters but also byresidents"

p. 10 para 1: draft MIR "not consistent with the information presented to, or findings of,[this] Special Inquiry" (and paras 2 and 3)

p. 10 para 7: "not familiar with the district" re Buckingham Bridge on Brookton Highway(and paras 1 and 2, p. 11)

p. 14 para 4: "It will take courage to implement the recommendations of this reportbut change needs to occur if another disaster is to be averted."

p. 26-27 last para: reference to FESA taking control of fire from "CALM" CALM/DECdid not support this, but Government/Parliament decided otherwise (see also p. 30para 3)

p. 28 paras 3-5 and p. 29 para 1 and Recommendation 1 reference to/summary ofFerguson review of DEC's capability to manage fire (positive summary)

Recommendation 1 (p. 29): Agreed (subject to FESA acting collaboratively; reportclearly states that FESA does not take collaborative approach)

p. 29 final para: concern re FESA's "in house" work on legislative change (seeRecommendation 2)

p. 31 para 4: brief summary of DEC role

p. 37 final para/p. 38 1st para: criticism of FESA re. its relationship with local government(e.g. "may represent abuse of power by FESA" on p. 38)

p. 39 final para: "Incident Action Plan requirement was not followed in the Roleystone-Kelmscott fires"

p. 43-45: note re comments on incident management levels and structures/responses(including implicit criticism of Police Commissioner at p. 45 para 1)

p. 48 3rd dot-point: note community attitude that "aerial fire fighting could quickly containa fire", leading to "a sense of complacency and a lack of preparation" reflects mediaand "political" promotion of "toys" and "heroic response" over good preparedness andland management

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p. 57 and p. 58 (para 1 and 2): fundamental endorsement of prescribed burning for fuelload management

p. 58: implicit criticism of FESA's capacity and competency re prescribed burning,contrasted with DEC's record and competency, but noting p. 60 para 2 that "the qualityof the prescribed burning is more important than the quality"; see also further comment(including positive comment) on DEC's prescribed burning program on pages 59-63(and note also that neither FESA nor local government have any such program forother/non-DEC lands) (note also reference on p. 62 to DEC research scientistDr Lachlan McCaw as "acclaimed")

p. 63 Recommendation 13: supported, noting resourcing implications for DEC

p. 64 Recommendation 14: supported, noting (1) DEC undertakes prescribed burningwhen suitable conditions permit, as decided on a daily basis, and involvement ofvolunteers/local governments may not always be achievable under thosecircumstances, and (2) FESA does not have any substantive prescribed burningprogram in the south-west of the State (see also para following Recommendation 14)

p. 65 para 2 and following: note comment re local government capacity to assess andmanage fuel load

p. 70 Recommendation 17: potential implications re DEC's waste managementfunctions including support for local governments

p. 70 Recommendation 18 (and following para): having local governments use aerialand satellite imagery to monitor firebreaks and fuel loads on private property appearspotentially inefficient and fragmented vis-à-vis whole of tenure/landscape approach

p. 71-72 and Recommendation 19 re prescribed burning: note comments "DEC shouldbe allowed the greatest possible flexibility in undertaking its burn program whilecomplying with the relevant air quality standards" and "DEC's record in this regard iscommendable". Recommendation 19 is supported.

p. 73 and Recommendation 20: monitoring the research and development of"alternatives" to prescribed burning is noted/supported, while also noting that methodsdiscussed are (potentially) complementary not "alternative"

p. 74-80 including Recommendations 21-23: re "tenure-blind" approaches to fuel: DEChas no role/jurisdiction/legal authority outside land it manages under the CALM Act;FESA has lead role (as recognised on p. 75), but does not have the requisitecompetency. Fuel management is a responsibility that land managers have toproactively pursue. A "policy" (p. 75) would be meaningless unless landowners/managers actively implement it (and only DEC does so systematically).

Note concern in last para of p. 78 (and p. 79) re "entirely in-house" rather thancollaborative approach by FESA. There is no demonstrated FESA competency to "lead"on this issue (cf. reference in 2nd para on p. 79 "this lack of co-operation is reflective of abroader mindset among FESA management that is focussed on controlling and "owning"work programs that would be more effectively and efficiently addressed by acollaborative approach" and "that FESA has been working... without any consultationwith DEC or local government is indicative of a lack of commitment to cooperation")

p. 82-86: note acknowledgement of Dr McCaw's (DEC) report as source of expertadvice on fire and its spread

p. 86 para 2: note comment re Buckingham Bridge (see earlier comment re p. 10)

p. 88 para 4: note comment re incident levels

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CABINET IN CONFIDENCE

p. 89-93: residents' criticism of FESA fire fighting priorities/tactics

p. 94: expresses concern that FESA did not follow WESTPLAN BUSHFIRE

p. 95-100: discusses ambiguous nature of FESA declaration of fire as Level 3 incident.Lack of declaration as L3 (see p. 97) has direct relevance to FESA criticisms of DEC inEllis Major Incident Review re DEC input/response. Second para on p. 97 representsvery strong criticism of FESA for not following established plans/protocols. Much ofcriticism of DEC in FESA submission to Keelty review and in (draft) Ellis MIR emanatesfrom this however DEC cannot be criticised for not following properprocesses/procedures if FESA never initiated/enacted the L3 declaration. DEC'ssubmission to Keelty, in contrast, clearly showed our own protocols for elevation to L3.There is direct criticism of FESA (Mr Hynes) in this respect on p. 98. Page 99 states (2'dpara) "FESA management's application of the WESTPLAN BUSHFIRE involved verypoor communication with other agencies". Note in particular the strongly contrastingstatement on p. 100 "In contrast to the events outlined in this section, DEC appears tohave a much more accountable system in applying WESTPLAN BUSHFIRE."

"DEC has an 'Incident Escalation Report' that has to be completed by the Regional DutyOfficer in consultation with the District Duty Officer and the Incident Controller. The formcomplies with the requirements of WESTPLAN BUSHFIRE and, in addition to detailingthe time of the assessment of the incident level, the form provides a goodcontemporaneous record of incident assessment." (p. 100)

Recommendation 25 (p. 101) is supported

pages 101 - 103: critical of FESA's organisation (and Mr Hynes' evidence), partly byreference to standard DEC procedures, e.g. (p. 103):

"There is no mention in the Incident Action Plan about evacuation of residents,threats to critical infrastructure such as the Buckingham Bridge or other relevantdetails. The Special Inquiry found this lack of detail unacceptable especiallyconsidering the decisions made on the day of the fires.

Details about the weather conditions were inserted onto the Incident Action Plan butno tactics or alternative strategies or risks were identified.

This lack of documented planning by the Incident Controllers is reflected inevidence from a number of witnesses who stated that there was disorder in the 1MTwithout any proper planning place for at least the first two hours of the fire."

p. 104-105: confusion within FESA re IMT structure; final para states "The SpecialInquiry finds that this is yet another example of FESA management not complyingwith the State's emergency management plans as discussed in earlier sections.As the agency responsible for developing Emergency Planning for WA, FESAmust comply with the State's plans to maintain their credibility andaccountability."

p. 107 para 1: implicit criticism of FESA re favouritism to career fire fighters overvolunteers

p. 114-116 and Recommendation 116: see earlier references in these notes toBuckingham Bridge. In its evidence to the Keelty review, DEC suggested that a 'normal'function of an IMT would have been, through its planning officer/team, to have identifiedthe bridge as a critical asset to be protected. The review has not commented on theFESA IMT in terms of its size and capacity/skills vis-a-vis a "normal" DEC IMT.Recommendation 29 (p. 116) states that "The Fire and Emergency Services Authorityand the Department of Environment and Conservation ensure that their IncidentControllers identify critical infrastructure as part of their initial assessment and

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CABINET IN CONFIDENCE

preparation of Incident Action Plans when attending major incidents and that trainingand exercises be used as an opportunity to identify and document critical infrastructure."This is a normal expectation of a DEC Incident Controller, and in this case of a FESAIncident Controller and IMT at the Roleystone fire, it was a failure on FESA's part.

Recommendation 30 (p. 117): DEC owns/manages 396 bridges

p. 117 ff: criticism of FESA and Policy re evacuations (incl. criticism of FESA'sMr Hynes' evidence vis-à-vis that of Police see p. 118 2'd last para; also last parareinforces earlier commentary re lack of clear declaration of level of incident seeearlier comment re p. 97-100)

p. 131-134: DEC Resources Vs Interstate Resources:

see the DEC response dated 13 June 2011 to Mr Ellis re the FESA draft MIR (copyattached). FESA's handling of this issue is a major flaw in the response to this fireand in terms of collaboration/cooperation, as recognised in this review. Thecommentary on p. 133 is a significant indictment on FESA in terms of their (lack of)respect for DEC's bushfire suppression capabilities

FESA called in IMT resources from Victoria without any consultation beforehandwith DEC. The fact is DEC could have supplied IMT resources in greater numberand more quickly than Victoria, but FESA did not even ask DEC before going toVictoria.

the following two paragraphs in the report are illustrative (p. 133):

"The Special Inquiry finds that optimum coordination of available resourcesto fight the Perth Hills fires of 5 and 6 February 2011 was not providedbecause of a series of shortcomings on the part of senior FESA managementto properly consult and coordinate.

The Special Inquiry further finds that the FESA submission and the evidenceit provided to the Special Inquiry attempted to cover up these shortcomings."

the comment re "serious questions about governance within FESA that need to beaddressed" (p. 133) is noted

p. 134: this goes to the heart of the issue that the (draft) MIR is FESA controlled. DECcommented on the draft MIR on 10 and 13/6/11. It remains to be seen how the final MIRcompares to the (independent) Keelty review

p. 134 final para: FESA has long sought to diminish and undermine DEC's firemanagement and response roles. DEC believes that this has gone too far, a viewapparently shared by the Keelty review.

p. 135: see earlier notes re homes vs lives as measure

p. 157 and Recommendation 42 re "changing climate": DEC does recognise this in itsfire planning

p. 160-1 and Recommendation 43: supported by DEC, however DEC would argue that italready "elevates" bushfires to the appropriate incident level, and notes that therecommendation follows on from FESA having failed to do so

p. 162, para 2: DEC would support Emergency Management WA moving to DPC

p. 163 Recommendation 45 (and preceding text p. 162): this needs furtherdiscussion/debate. The location of State Emergency Management Group meetingsshould be on a "horses for courses" basis, e.g. DEC has previously hosted them at itsKensington offices when DEC has been charge of major fires. They should be held at

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CABINET IN CONFIDENCE

the office of the lead agency for the incident and should not be disruptiveto/disconnected from operational needs. In an emergency situation, lead agency staff donot have time to travel across Perth.

p. 163-165: this is the section that goes to the heart of DEC/FESA issues. The reportmoves quickly (p. 163) to the strong inference (see p. 163-4) that the "conflict issignificantly of FESA's making. On p. 165 (para 3) it states "even in the absence of anexplicit requirement to do so, FESA's reluctance to engage constructively andproactively with DEC in response to bushfire is of serious concern to the SpecialInquiry".

p. 165-166: note (final para) comment re FESA's call upon resources from Victoria. DEChas not seen the evidence from Mr Hynes that is referred to, and notes the review'squestioning of Mr Hynes' motivation in not calling upon (available) DEC resources.Mr Hynes' stated reference to the Boorabbin bushfire is regarded by DEC as totallyirrelevant.

p. 166: equally goes to the heart of DEC/FESA relationship, but shows that it was FESAthat exhibited lack of relationship/engagement

p. 166 paras 4-7 state:

"It became apparent during the conduct of the Special Inquiry that the poorrelationships between agencies is being propagated in the main from the executivelevels of FESA. The above citations are just an example of what the Special Inquiryreceived either as evidence, in submission or by way of individual meetings.

The Special Inquiry is firmly of the view that a major cultural shift needs to occurwithin FESA. That cultural shift needs to drive change towards a more collaborativeand genuine partnership approach in particular with other WA agencies involved inthe response to bushfires, including volunteers.

The veracity of some answers given by FESA witnesses to this Special Inquirygives rise to serious concerns about the values of FESA as an organisation.

Less attention needs to be given to expressing how good FESA might be and moreattention given to establishing long term positive relationships so that the virtues ofthe organisation will be automatically recognised by others. The Special Inquiry isnot convinced that Terms of Reference 5 can be achieved without significantchange to FESA and its management team."

This clearly illustrates that the independent review has found that the fault in respect ofthe lack of a good working relationship lies overwhelmingly at the feet of FESA ratherthan DEC.

p. 167: repeats above observations, summarised as "consistent and wide-rangingcriticisms of FESA's management"

p. 169-170: DEC does not necessarily have a particular view regarding FESAgovernance issues, but is generally of the view that the business of government shouldbe carried out by a "department of State", rather than by a statutory board or authorityunless there is an overwhelming public interest for that alternative.

p. 171-2 and Recommendation 46: DEC believes there is merit in considering the moveof Emergency Management WA to the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (asnoted above)

p. 180, Recommendation 49: Noted; exercising requires resourcing, as noted in DEC'sresponse to the Ferguson (2010) review of DEC's fire management capability)

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CABINET IN CONFIDENCE

p. 188, Recommendation 54: supported

p. 188: DEC notes and agrees with concerns regarding the independence of the MIR in

this case.

p. 189: reiterates concerns about "FESA's management and culture in executing its fireresponsibilities".

Keiran McNamaraDIRECTOR GENERALDEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION

Dyson, Kylie

From: Rayner, Jan on behalf of McNamara, KeiranSent: Monday, 13 June 2011 9:13 AMTo: leading@myoffice.net.auCc: graham.wilks@fesa.wa.gov.au; perthfirereview@dpc.wa.gov.au;

jo.harrison-ward@fesa.wa.gov.au; Dans, Peter; Carter, Murray; Low, KeithSubject: FW: MIR FeedbackAttachments: stuart ellis.pdf

Sensitivity: Confidential

Dear Mr Ellis

On the afternoon of Friday 10 June, the Department of Environment andConservation's (DEC) Director of Regional Services, Mr Peter Dans, wrote to youwith comments on the draft FESA Major Incident Review (MIR).

I authorised Mr Dans responding directly to you given the timeline associated with theMIR and my unavailability during that day.

I have since read the draft MIR and the comments provided by Mr Dans. I fullyendorse those comments and reiterate the department's strong concern that aspectsof the draft MIR are unbalanced and misleading, and that they need to be corrected.

I will elaborate on just two matters.

The claim on page 39 that DEC did not respond properly to initial reports of theRoleystone fire is wrong and appears intended to damage the standing of DEC. Ifpublished, it will be refuted in the strongest terms.

The discussion regarding interstate support on page 51 is a distortion. I note that Iam named personally, yet I was never contacted by you or FESA in relation to theMIR. The facts are as follows:

In the latter part of the afternoon of Sunday 6 February, DEC's State Duty Officer(SDO) informed me that a Victorian deployment had been requested by FESA.The DEC SDO was advised of this from Victoria, not FESA.

At the State Emergency Coordinating Group (SECG) meeting held at 6.30pm,which I attended, FESA informed the SECG that support from Victoria hadalready been requested.

This was presented as a matter of fact, not a proposition for discussion.

I did not consider it appropriate at SECG to debate or challenge a decision thathad already been made and given effect.

I note in particular the following statements in the draft MIR:

"Why DEC was not formally asked to contribute IMT resources is unclear;perhaps it was because the DEC liaison officer at the SOC did not offer the

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resources, or that FESA assumed the DEC IMT staff were committed, as DECwas responding to a number of smaller incidents across the state at the time."(p.51)

and

"In this situation, misunderstandings appeared to develop as a result of poorcommunication: DEC not clarifying that IMT resources were available thatweekend and FESA not specifically asking." (p.51)

To somehow ascribe "blame" to DEC for a unilateral FESA decision is grosslymisleading. The fact is that FESA requested incident management team (IMT) stafffrom Victoria without first asking DEC. We could have readily supplied IMT staff, withlocal experience, and they could have been deployed far more quickly than resourcesfrom Victoria. A phone call to DEC's SDO would have been the logical course ofaction prior to a phone call to Victoria.

It seems incomprehensible to me that the Victorian request could be justified by ahypothetical need five days hence (cf. "FESA indicated the interstate support wasintended for the following weekend, rather than to manage the existing incidents";p.51). This appears to be a retrospective justification.

I trust that the draft MIR will be amended to correct the misrepresentations andconcerns identified in DEC's response.

Yours sincerely

Keiran McNamaraDIRECTOR GENERAL

Department of Environment and ConservationLevel 4, The Atrium168 St Georges Tce

PerthPh: 6467 5500Fax: 6467 5525

From: Carmichael, KerrySent: Friday, 10 June 2011 2:30 PMTo: leading@myoffice.net.auCc: graham.wilks@fesa.wa.gov.au; perthfirereview@dpc.wa.gov.au; McNamara, Keiran; Carter,Murray; Low, KeithSubject: FW: MIR FeedbackSensitivity: Confidential

Dear Stuart

Further to the email exchange below, please find attached a letter setting out DEC's principalconcernswith the current draft of the MIR and the MIR document with similar and additional comments andconcerns inserted.

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Regards

Peter

Peter DansDirector Regional ServicesDepartment of Environment and Conservation, Crawley WAPhone: (08) 9442 0328; Fax: (08) 9386 6399Email: kerrv.carmichaeledec.wa.00v.au

From: Low, KeithSent: Wednesday, 8 June 2011 9:59 AMTo: WILKS GrahamCc: leading@myoffice.net.au; Dyson, Kylie; Maher, Terry; Carter, Murray; Carmichael, KerrySubject: RE: MIR FeedbackSensitivity: Confidential

Graham

Thanks for this latest version. We will provide our comment on this version, but will not be able tomeet the 48 hour deadline we spent much of yesterday going through this to check for changesfrom the 9 May version one that was unfortunately used for the initial consultation on 27 May. I

expect that it will be Friday before it can get through our DG and on to Stuart, but we will work as

quickly as possible.

Regards

Keith LowSenior Policy OfficerFire Management ServicesDepartment of Environment and ConservationPhone: 08 9334 0104 Fax:08 9367 9913Mobile: 0407 477 446Email: Keith.Low@dec.wa.gov.au

From: WILKS Graham [mailto:Graham.Wilks@fesa.wa.gov.au]Sent: Tuesday, 7 June 2011 8:49 AMTo: Carmichael, KerryCc: Carter, Murray; Low, Keith; McNamara, Keiran; Maher, Terry; PLATT Mark; HYNES Craig; StuartEllisSubject: RE: MIR FeedbackImportance: HighSensitivity: Confidential

Morning Peter

In line with Mark Platt's advice of 3 June, your comments were provided direct to Mr Stuart Ellis forexamination.

Based upon your email advice Stuart has been in contact with me and suggested that he would beconcerned if there are any additional issues that DEC has about the draft document that it has notbrought to his attention. In particular Stuart is concerned about the statement that "There are asignificant number of statements within the body of the draft report which DEC believes do notaccurately reflect DEC's position or understanding of specific events."

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After discussion with Stuart I am attaching a copy of the Final Draft (Version 8) for your examination.This latest version of the MIR includes changes as endorsed by Stuart and reflects his response toDEC's comments as received on 3 June. Please note that this continues to be a working draft and assuch until formally released is to remain confidential.

In providing this draft to you Stuart has proposed that DEC be invited to "track" any concerns orcorrections that it wishes him now to consider. FESA accepts that in order for there to be a timelyresponse to the completion of the MIR that it is appropriate for DEC to communicate direct withStuart. (Email: leading @myoffice.net.au Mob: ). I would ask however that as a matterof courtesy that I be copied in.

In order to effect timely completion I would suggest that Stuart would be hoping to achieve a 24-48hour turnaround.

Please feel free to contact me if required.

Regards

Graham Wilks I Executive Manager I Office of the CEOFire & Emergency Services Authority of WA IFESA House I 6th Floor, 480 Hay St Perth WA 6000P +61 8 9323 9451 I F +61 8 9323 9470 I Mgraham.wilks@fesa.wa.gov.au

GOVE11/441ElfT Ofwrsyru A1,11.711Al IA

This email is intended for the named recipient only. The information contained within this email may beconfidential or commercially sensitive. If you are not the intended recipient you must not reproduce ordistribute any part of this email, disclose its contents to any other party, or take any action in reliance onit. If you have received this email in error, please contact the sender immediately and delete themessage from your computer.

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Government of Western AustraliaDepartment of Environment and Conservation

Mr Stuart EllisPrincipalLeading Emergency ServicesPO Box 217STEPNEY SA 5069

Dear Mr Ellis

Your ref:

Our ref:

Enquiries: Murray Carter

Phone: 08 9334 0375

Fax: 08 367 9913

Email: murray.carterdec.wa.00v.au

DRAFT FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES AUTHORITY MAJOR INCIDENT REVIEW

I refer to the email request by Mr Graham Wilks of the Fire and Emergency ServicesAuthority (FESA) for the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) to providecomments on the draft of the Major Incident Review (MIR) for the Lake Clifton, Red Hill andRoleystone fires to be provided to you directly, as the reviewer.

I would like to thank you, and FESA, for the opportunity to consider the draft document andprovide comment before it is finalised. I apologise that it has taken a little longer than youwould have considered ideal, although, in part, this has resulted from the initial consultationbetween FESA and DEC being conducted on an earlier draft.

The request was for comments to be provided in the form of a 'tracked' version of the latestdraft, dated 16 May 2011. Where possible, particularly in relation to points of fact, thisapproach has been taken. In the majority of cases, however, DEC's comments are inrelation to matters which are most appropriately considered, synthesised and dealt with bythe reviewer. DEC has therefore added comments for your consideration where it believesthe draft may be based on inaccurate or limited information, particularly where this reflectsadversely on DEC, and to add additional information in some cases.

I would like to raise several specific and important issues in more detail.

A State-level coordination

The draft MIR discusses a number of issues related to State-level coordination duringthe fires, extending to implied criticism of DEC for not having its State Duty Officer(SDO) form part of the State Operations Command on 6 February.

DEC's observation is that the respective roles of the State Operations Centre (SOC) andthe Metropolitan Regional Operations Centre (MROC) in FESA are often unclear. Thisissue is recognised in Section 6 and Recommendation 7 of the draft MIR. One of DEC'sresponses to this has been to clearly articulate to FESA that its Liaison Officer in theMROC is operating purely at a regional level and that State-level co-ordination andcommand functions are the role of the SDO. Despite this being clarified quitespecifically on 6 February, FESA did not contact the SDO to advise him that theincidents had been elevated to State level and/or to request his presence at the SOC.

Office of the Director Regional ServicesCorner Australia II Drive and Hackett Drive, Crawley WA 6009

Phone: 9442 0328; Fax: 9386 6399Locked Bag 104, Bentley Delivery Centre WA 6983

www.dec.wa.gov.au

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This is despite regular contact between the SDO and his FESA counterpart (State DutyDirector) in the days leading up to, and on, 6 February, in relation to fire incidents andresourcing matters. In fact, at around 1400 hours on 6 February, the SDO pro-activelyrang the FESA State Duty Director on the basis of information conveyed through DEC atdistrict and regional levels, to enquire on progress and to offer assistance in sourcingheavy machinery for the suppression effort. Whilst the offer was accepted, the FESAState Duty Director did not either enquire as to whether DEC had other suppressionresources available to assist, or advise the SDO that the incidents had been raised toState level and that he should join the State Operations Command.

Despite some deficiencies in WESTPLAN Bushfire in defining processes for elevation,DEC is at a loss as to why FESA did not provide formal advice that the Red Hill andKelmscott-Roleystone incidents had been elevated to State level and that DECinvolvement in State Operations Command was required. DEC expressly repudiatesany suggestion that it was at fault in this matter, or that it was in anyway unwilling toparticipate.

2. Joint FESA/DEC State Operations Centre

The potential for a joint or co-located FESA and DEC operations centre is discussed atseveral points in the draft MIR, which correctly indicates that there is a level ofagreement that there are some advantages to the concept. However, the draft is notclear about the model that is proposed and I am concerned about the expectations thatmay be raised.

DEC supports a joint/co-location model in which it and FESA can operate from the samefacility in response to specific incidents at a State level. This support is contingent onthere being satisfactory facilities and information connectivity to allow the DEC StateDuty Officer (or Co-ordinator) and any support staff to efficiently carry out their duties forthe duration of the incident. FESA has only recently consulted with DEC on the specificsof its plans for the new Cockburn facility but it is hoped that this level of co-location maybe provided for.

A model that involves permanent co-location of the SDO and/or other senior DEC fireoperations staff in the FESA SOC, possibly including co-ordination of prescribed burningoperations, is highly problematic for DEC. Apart from the requirement this would raisefor a significantly higher level of facility, which DEC doubts is within the scope of plansfor the Cockburn facility, this model does not account for DEC's role as a land managerforemost, and a fire manager as a result. The implications of such a model have notbeen adequately considered and would have to be worked through at length before DECcould indicate any level of support for the concept.

I trust that the MIR can be quite clear about what has been or is being proposed andreceiving in-principle support, so that resultant expectations are not unreasonable.

3. Public information

DEC is particularly disappointed at the representation in the draft MIR of its role in publicinformation dissemination at the Lake Clifton fire, which is not an accuraterepresentation of the facts.

3

FESA tightly controls public information and media management in relation to majorfires, as outlined in Section 4.2.1 of WESTPLAN Bushfire, and DEC has cooperated withthis approach. At the Lake Clifton fire all DEC staff operated under the principle thatthey were working on a FESA fire for a FESA Incident Controller. This extended to theInformation Services Unit (ISU) staff of DEC's pre-formed incident management team,who worked with the FESA officer appointed as the Public Information Officer (PIO),under the overall direction of the Incident Controller. The PIO also handled all medialiaison (at the fire) exclusively, so the DEC ISU staff concentrated on providingpublic/community information, including the information sheets which were used atcommunity meetings and road checkpoints after being approved by the IC.

As is normal practice at DEC-managed fires, the ISU staff sought to have theseinformation sheets available on-line to maximise the availability of fire information, andliaised with FESA Media and Public Affairs (MPA) through the PIO to have them loadedon the FESA website. Only when this was refused did the ISU suggest that theinformation could alternatively be made available on the DEC website. This too wasrefused.

The suggestion that DEC did not coordinate with FESA MPA, or that these refusalsarose because of concerns about potential disparities or inconsistencies in information,is totally erroneous, as the DEC staff were working within a FESA organisation, and allthe information they produced was reviewed and approved by the FESA IC beforerelease.

Given DEC's immediate response to FESA's request for assistance, by providing a fullincident management team and its mobile incident control centre, and theacknowledgement of all concerned (at the incident) that it was a model for inter-agencycooperation, it would be highly regrettable, and misleading, for DEC's role in publicinformation dissemination to be misrepresented in the final MIR.

4. Zones 2 and 2A Operational Protocols

The operation of the Zones 2 & 2A arrangements, and DEC's response to the Kelmscott-Roleystone fires under these arrangements, are also misrepresented in the draft MIR,with the implication that DEC acted inappropriately in not responding automatically.DEC did not respond on the basis of the initial advice from FESA COMCEN specificallybecause it was advised that a response was not required. This is entirely consistent withthe Zones 2 & 2A Operational Protocols, which state:

AutomaticDEC Duty Officer Perth Hill advice (turnout if required) (emphasis added)

DEC acknowledges, and has submitted to the Perth Hills Bushfires Review, that theprotocols could be considered ambiguous and may lead to confusion. However, thisconfusion arises principally in COMCEN where there is an inconsistent approach tonotification to DEC. It manifests most often as a delay in notification, which was nearly40 minutes in the case of the Red Hill fire, but extends to DEC regularly being told thatassistance is not required at the same time as it is initially advised of a fire. Thisoccurred in the case of the Kelmscott-Roleystone fire, where DEC's response wasmounted unilaterally on the basis of its own intelligence that the initial fire had escapedand was escalating rapidly.

4

In terms of lessons learned and improvements which can be achieved, DEC believes thefocus of the MIR should be on clarifying the Zones 2 & 2A Operational Protocols andimproving the operation of COMCEN, rather than implying that DEC was confused oracted in contradiction to the protocol.

5. Interstate support

The draft MIR has reached appropriate conclusions in relation to this matter but I amconcerned that the underlying issues have been glossed over, to the detriment ofimprovement and, again, misrepresenting DEC's position.

DEC's view is that the decision by FESA to arrange the interstate support withoutreference to DEC was inept, given:

DEC is the biggest single source of senior bushfire management capability in WA;and

DEC is the only agency in Western Australia with an existing support agreement withVictoria, and had to enact this after the event to validate FESA's unilateral action.

For FESA to justify this to the review by reference to the Director General of DEC'sattendance at the SECG meeting on the evening of 6 February is misleading. Therequest for interstate support was not raised at SECG as a discussion point, but as a faitaccompli.

I am aware and appreciate that, as reviewer, you met with DEC staff on several occasionsto examine the Department's input to the three fire events. However, the above issues andothers detailed in the current draft MIR reflect a reliance on FESA information that hasresulted in an imbalance of input to your considerations and a number of misrepresentationsof DEC's performance and intent. This is not in the best interests of the WA Government inrealising maximum benefit from the "lessons learnt" during these three major incidents.

I trust the comments above and in the accompanying draft MIR document go some way toaddressing the imbalance and provide additional insight into relevant matters. Should youwish to clarify or follow up on any of the matters raised herein, please contact Mr MurrayCarter on 9334 0375 in the first instance.

Yours sincerely

Peter DansDIRECTOR REGIONAL SERVICES

10 June 2011

Att.

cc Ms Jo Harrison-Ward, FESA (Attention: Mr Graham Wilks)Mr Mick Keelty, Perth Hills Bushfire Review

Government of Western Australia, Fire & Emergency Services Authority FESA

Fire 1O. Emergency SenicesAuthority or Western Australia

480 Hay StreetPerth Western Australia 6000

PO Box 1174 Perth WA 6844

Telephone (08) 9323 9300Facsimile (08) 9323 9384Email tesa@fesa.wa.goy.au

Our Ref: 13801-02 www.fesa.wa.gov.au

Confidential and UrgentSpecial InquiryOffice of the CommissionerLevel 18197 St Georges TerracePERTH WA 6000

Dear Mr Wauchope

FESA COMMENTSPERTH HILLS BUSHFIRE FEBRUARY 2011 REVIEW REPORT

"SHARED RESPONSIBILITY"

I refer to your correspondence dated 16 June 2011 providing FESA with an opportunity tocomment on this report prior to it being submitted to Cabinet. Thank you for the opportunity tomeet with you on 15 June 2011 to outline FESA's concerns prior to seeing the report and thefollow up opportunity to comment on such an important document after receiving the report.

Having regard to the limited time FESA has had to consider this issue, FESA acknowledges therecommendations, and although there are a minor number which it does not support, it iscommitted to further considering the recommendations under the leadership of Government andin partnership with our emergency management partners. Save for those recommendationswhich require a machinery of government change, this detailed consideration should occur froman all agencies perspective and consider the applicability, priority, policy, legislation andresourcing implications of each recommendation in order to adequately inform Government anddevelop a whole-of-government implementation plan.

However, of primary and more significance to FESA is its concern with the following issueswhich contribute to serious misgivings about the content and conduct of the Special Inquiry:

Lack of procedural fairnessPerceived and actual biasPre-determined outcomes prior to hearing evidenceLanguage and content of the reportFactual inaccuracies

FESA is concerned with the combination of the above, the lack of thoroughness by the SpecialInquiry in the examination of important issues, and the commentary throughout, rather than therecommendations, including the treatment and manipulation of evidence which will have adetrimental impact on Government, the FESA organisation, volunteers and staff withconsequential adverse impacts on the fire and emergency services sector.

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Our Vision: A Safer Community

Moreover, the report totally underestimates the value and importance of volunteers to theState's emergency management arrangements and the continuing reliance on them into thefuture, with little recognition of this generally or specifically to the efforts at the Roleystone Fire.This coupled with the suggested abolition of existing consultative committee structures and forvolunteers to be engaged along with other stakeholders through "the establishment of anemergency services advisory group" totally disregards the importance placed upon engagingvolunteers and working with them on matters that affect them, in accordance with the VolunteerCharter committed to by Government, as outlined in FESA's Submission2.

The inferences and innuendo contained in the language and content of the report unfairlytargets the integrity, credibility and commitment of FESA as an organisation, the FESABoard/Executive and specific individuals which will have a long term detrimental impact. Theflow-on of this unwarranted attack will inevitably adversely affect the willingness of individuals(both staff and volunteers) to take on key leadership roles/positions in the future. It will alsohave a flow-on impact on FESA as an organisation of choice for prospective employees in whatis already an extremely competitive and specialist environment.

FESA's primary concerns in this regard include the following. These overarching concerns havepreviously been raised with the Commissioner and are reiterated and include further detail forthe purposes of completeness.

1. Lack of Procedural Fairness

The process adopted by the Special Inquiry did not provide FESA and its witnesses withthe general principles of procedural fairness.

FESA submits the principal tenets of procedural fairness have not been followed by theSpecial Inquiry and this creates significant issues with its report. Examples of thisinclude:

o FESA and/or key individuals were not provided with an opportunity to test and/orrefute allegations placed before and relied upon by the Special Inquiry in its report.

o Testimony and credibility of witnesses whose 'individual account' has been reliedupon by the Special Inquiry was not tested and FESA has numerous exampleswhere this account is factually incorrect but is almost universally accepted and insome cases praised by the Special Inquiry.

o Issues of significant concern, with potentially very serious consequences for theorganisation and/or individuals, were not advised to FESA nor was it given theopportunity of reply.

o Witnesses were denied the opportunity to be represented or have anyone apart fromthemselves in the room when giving evidence. This is clearly in breach of s.24J ofthe Public Sector Management Act 1994.3

1 Special Inquiry Report p.1702 FESA Submission pp.213, 223

3 S. 24J of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 Procedure and evidence at special inquiries states 201) "Anindividual, public sector body or other body may be represented at a special inquiry by a legal practitioner or otheragent".

Page 2 of 14

2. Perceived Bias

O It became apparent throughout the proceedings, and supported by the contents of itsfinal report that the Special Inquiry was not impartial and there was a clear bias againstFESA as an organisation and towards its Chief Operations Officer and other senioroperational officers. This is blatantly clear from the transcripts of evidence of witnessesthat were clearly speculative and sensational in nature.

O FESA made a significant and detailed submission to the Special Inquiry which in itself,given FESA's recognised lead role in fire and emergency management within the State,was considered both appropriate and necessary. This submission followed thefundamental principle of public service providing frank and fearless advice and asoutlined in the submission was not intended nor designed as specific criticism of anyindividual agency, but focused on the overall best outcome for the community of WA.This was specifically mentioned in the Executive Summary which quoted:

"Whilst this submission contains a critical review of a range of holistic issues, it shouldnot be construed as direct criticism of any particular individual or agency's performance.FESA strongly believes that without taking a holistic and forward looking view of theseissues and removing existing norms from consideration, the ultimate best outcome forthe community of WA will not be achieved. It is on this basis and FESA's strive for bestpractice, this submission has been drafted in the overall public interest". 4

FESA believes it was entitled, as was any other party, to make such a submission andthe repetition of adverse references to it within the report are not warranted. No othersubmission is quoted in such a fashion. Suggestions that the "majority of this materialhad to be specifically sought by the Special Inquiry because the original FESAsubmission did not follow the template provided by the Special Inquiry despite anundertaking to do so given by the FESA CEO at a hearing on 29 March 2011"5 is notaccurate. Denigration of the submission and the perceived lack of credibility given to itthroughout the report is not warranted and reflect the bias demonstrated by the SpecialInquiry against FESA. Specifically, FESA objects to:

o Suggestions it did not follow the template as provided. FESA made contact withthe Special Inquiry secretariat and outlined its proposed approach to setting outthe alignment of its submission with the Terms of Reference, which was agreedand included within the submission6.

o The majority of the material having to be specifically sought by the Special Inquiry.As evidenced by the detail and breadth of FESA's submission, and supportingappendices, in comparison to the additional material provided to the SpecialInquiry, this is simply not an accurate statement.

o References to the submission being "more in the style of self-promotion andgratuitous advice rather than a constructive address of the terms of reference"!

4 Executive Summary FESA Submission p.45 Special Inquiry Report p.96 Executive Summary FESA Submission pp.5-67 Special Inquiry Report p.9

Page 3 of 14

Whilst it is open for the Inquirer to form a view as to the tone of the submission, it isstill incumbent on him to fully consider and weigh the contents of the document.

o Statements by the Special Inquiry that "The Special Inquiry further finds that theFESA submission and the evidence it provided to the Special Inquiry attempted tocover up [emphasis added] these shortcomings"8 where there is no evidence tosupport such an assertion.

o During the taking of evidence from the FESA witnesses the Special Inquiry madeseveral adverse references regarding FESA's submission. This includedstatements such as "It's very hard to reconcile the facts with the fiction of the FESASubmission'° and "that's a bit of gratuitous advice from me, especially with theerrors that are contained in it that have done nothing but anger people, both thecommunity and the fire-fighting occupations"." These statements are notsupported by any specific references to any factual errors nor were FESA providedwith an outline of these allegations and an opportunity to correct them.

o Throughout its submission FESA emphasises the need for it and other partneragencies to operate in a more collaborative manner into the future and in doing sorecognised the past and present issues between the agencies that needsaddressing. This included genuine statements to the effect of:

"FESA remains totally committed to evolving a more inclusive, open andintegrated operating environment with all parties involved in bushfiremanagement from what has been achieved in the past"11

This genuine commitment and recognition underlies FESA's approach and theunderlying content of its submission which appears to have been totally lost anddiscounted by the Special Inquiry which suggests the complete oppositethroughout the report.

To this end and without hesitation FESA voluntarily provided a copy of theExecutive Summary of its submission to DEC and other agencies. Apart from RDLthe same was not reciprocated by a number of other agencies to FESA. However,the Special Inquiry provided an opportunity to DEC employees to pass commenton FESA's submission12 which has been relied upon in the final report without anysuch reciprocal opportunity being provided to FESA to either view, comment onother submissions and/or respond to criticism and/or comments by others of itsown submission.

It is clear through the language of the report and supported by its own acceptance thatthe Special Inquiry "took the view that to properly address Terms of Reference number1, 4 and 5, an examination of FESA was not only appropriate, but very necessary"."This is a fundamental shift in the terms of reference and the direction of the SpecialInquiry which was contrary to the Premier's stated intention and not otherwisecommunicated to FESA by the Special Inquiry. FESA would suggest a properexamination (of FESA) could not have objectively occurred based on the evidence and

8 I bid p.1339 Lindsay Cuneo Transcript 20 May 2011 p.281° Ibid p.32

11 Executive Summary FESA Submission p.812 Special Inquiry Report p.16513 Ibid p.9

Page 4 of 14

material sought from FESA and/or considered by the Special Inquiry. This is also atodds with the very clear statement in Parliament by the Premier in response to aquestion as to whether FESA's performance is part of the review, "No; it is not", and thePremier clearly stating to Parliament "I was dismayed, if not offended, by calls from theopposition for inquiries into FESA".14

Reference within the report during the course of the Special Inquiry inferring the need toissue a summons to obtain a copy of the MIR15 may give an impression that FESA wasrefusing to provide a copy of this report to the Special Inquiry. This is simply not thecase and from the outset FESA had committed to provide this report, which was veryclear and referred to in the Premier's initial announcement. This arrangement wasfurther consolidated during meetings between the Special Inquiry and the MIR Reviewer.

3. Pre-determined outcomes

FESA does have significant concerns with the perceived bias and lack of impartiality adopted bythe Special Inquiry. These concerns include:

FESA can provide references to open comments made by the Special Inquiry to anumber of external parties that it met with during the conduct of the Inquiry, advisingthem of its views and determinations prior to formally commencing its proceedingsand/or receiving submissions from which it should properly deduce a conclusion and/oroutcome.FESA also received advice from the Special Inquiry on matters it considered would formpart of its decision prior to evidence on such matters being sought and/or closing ofsubmissions. On this basis and in the overall interests of informing the Special Inquiry,FESA carefully considered, researched these concepts and included them in its

submissions for which it was subsequently unfairly criticised.16

4. Factual Inaccuracies

4.1 FESA Relationship with DEC

This is a consistent thread throughout the Special Inquiry report, which amongst other thingsstated:

"It became apparent during the conduct of the Special Inquiry that the poor relationshipbetween agencies is being propagated in the main from the executive levels of FESA.The above citations are just an example of what the Special Inquiry received either asevidence, in submissions or by way of individual meetings.""

Two of the "citations" referred to in the above quote can be summarised as:

DEC only being advised of the fires a considerable time after they were first reported toFESA

14 Hansard, Question Without Notice No.63, 23 February 2011

is Special Inquiry Report p.715 Ibid pp.7,9

17 Ibid p.166

Page 5 of 14

DEC being specifically advised by FESA COMCEN" that assistance was not required

The Special Inquiry specifically suggests that "FESA's reluctance to engage constructively andproactively with DEC in response to bushfires" 19 is demonstrated by "DEC being advised offires a considerable time after they have first been reported to FESA and/or being advised byFESA COMCEN that assistance is not required".2°

FESA is able to unequivocally demonstrate that these statements are erroneous. However, theSpecial Inquiry accepted the statements without raising them directly with FESA or providingFESA with the opportunity to present evidence which it had available to rebut these statements.

These allegations are incorrect. This was also raised by DEC during the course of the MIRhowever, the reviewer put those allegations to FESA and FESA provided a copy of a number ofconversations within the COMCEN and State Operations Centre which are routinely audio taped(including automatic timestamps), and the recordings from 5 and 6 February 2011 have beenreviewed in light of these allegations. The factual positions, not considered by the SpecialInquiry, but accepted by the MIR after reviewing this material, in drawing its conclusions follow:

4.1.1 DEC only being advised of the fires a considerable time after they were firstreported to FESA

The recordings reveal that within four (4) minutes of both the initial receipt of the Red Hill andRoleystone fire reports, DEC was notified. A summary of the facts are:

Red Hill Fire

At 9.13pm (2113 hours) on 5 February 2011 COMCEN received the first 000 callreporting the Red Hill fire at the corner of Toodyay and Roland Road.

Four minutes latet; at 9.17pm (2117 hours), COMCEN advised DEC (Sam) of the fire onToodyay Road. DEC asked if assistance was required and was told "not at this stage",just wanted to advise.

Roleystone Fire

At 11.41am (1141 hours) on 6 February 2011 COMCEN received the first 000 callreporting the Roleystone fire.

Four minutes later, at 11.45am (1145 hours), COMCEN advised DEC of the fire burningout of control in a Zone 2 location Brookton Highway and Old Coach Place,Roleystone.

18 COMCEN is the FESA Communications Centre where all emergency 000 calls are received and dispatch takesplace.18 !bid p.1652° !bid p.165

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4.1.2 DEC being specifically advised by FESA COMCEN that assistance was notrequired

The COMCEN recordings also reveal that:

Red Hill Fire

Forty minutes after the first 000 call advising of the Red Hill fire, at 9.53pm (2153 hours)on 5 February 2011, COMCEN requested from DEC (Sam) machinery D6 andfrontend loader and two Bulk Water Tankers (BWT) plus DEC officer. COMCEN wasadvised this would be arranged.

At 10.11pm (2211 hours) DEC advised COMCEN that the D6 was an hour away as they

were awaiting a pilot. They were reluctant to release [emphasis added] the frontendloader in case they need it for other operations, and there was only one BWT and DECofficer.

At 10.37pm (2237 hours) COMCEN again contacted DEC with a request for additionalappliances. DEC advised a few trucks were available.

Roleystone Fire

When DEC was first advised of the Roleystone fire by COMCEN at 11.45am (1145hours) on 6 February 2011, there was no specific comment that a response was notrequired. It was an advice to the DEC duty officer of a fire in a Zone 2 location, whichnecessitates an automatic response, in accordance with agreed procedures.

Seven minutes later, at 11.52am (1152 hours), COMCEN contacted DEC to request themobilisation of Air Bombers.

The fact that DEC was advised of the Red Hill and Roleystone fires within four minutes of therespective initial 000 calls would not support the statement that DEC was "being advised of firesa considerable time after they have first been reported to FESA"21 . In addition, the COMCENrequests for DEC assistance made within 40 minutes of the initial Red Hill fire report and sevenminutes of the initial Roleystone fire report demonstrate that DEC had not been advised that

"assistance is not required"22.

The Special Inquiry accepts these statements from DEC without testing their accuracy withFESA witnesses, and then uses this untested evidence to cast doubt on FESA's values as anorganisation and support its conclusion that "a major cultural shift"23 within FESA and a"significant change to FESA and its management team"24 are required. FESA submits that theprocess followed to reach this conclusion was not thorough, lacked procedural fairness and wasbased on erroneous evidence, and therefore the conclusion is inherently flawed. Moreover, theimplication of these statements on the organisation and individuals is significant and will

21 Ibid p.165

22 Ibid p.165

23 Ibid p.16624 Ibid p.166

Page 7 of 14

inevitably lead to a lack of confidence by the community if allowed to proceed as currentlydrafted without thorough and objective analysis.

4.1.3 DEC awareness of calling of Victorian Resources

The Special Inquiry references as a further example of the perceived issues between FESA andDEC the lack of awareness and consideration when requesting interstate support from Victoria.

In actual fact, DEC was invited by the FESA Chief Operations Officer to participate andattended a planning meeting with Victorian representatives in January 2011 in anticipation ofpotential requests given the significance of the prognosis and season. Therefore, DEC was fullyaware of the pre-plans for such support. The activation of this interstate support was premisedon providing contingent capacity for not only the current fires but the forecast fire weather for theweek ahead and fatigue management principles. Active collaboration on such coordination andstrategic resourcing decisions into the future can only be achieved with the integration of theState Operations Centre which the Special Inquiry passively discusses25, although this formed amajor component of FESA's submission'. The importance of such integration can be learntfrom the Victorian and more recently Queensland Floods/Cyclone scenarios. This type ofintegration cannot be achieved solely through the development and promulgation of aMemorandum of Understanding, a commitment to working in partnership as recommended bythe Special Inquiry27 and maintenance of two separate centres of operation. Despite the bestendeavours of any party, this lack of integration will continue to perpetuate the current void andtimely integrated decision making and planning, an area not really touched on, and FESA wouldsuggest the importance of this not being fully appreciated, by the Special Inquiry.

4.2 Location of Community Emergency Manager (CESM) Positions

In the course of its inquiry, the Special Inquiry examined the Community Emergency ServicesManager (CESM) positions. Despite significant detail being provided to the Special Inquiry onthis particular program within FESA's submission," the report fails to make any reference at allto FESA's submission, supporting detail and explanation. Unfortunately, this appears to havelead to the Special Inquiry not fully understanding the history and context of this program nor itsoperating arrangements. This in turn has lead to a recommendation with respect to the physicallocation of these positions" which is not necessary because a thorough examination of thisprogram would have determined that all of these positions, with the exception of 2 (Pastoral andCockburn) are already located at the local government offices and not FESA offices as stated inthe report" to warrant this recommendation.

5. Declaration of Incident

The Special Inquiry calls into question FESA's working relationship with WAPoI in a number ofplaces, citing this as a further example of "very poor communication with other agencies'' andthe non-declaration of the incident level adversely contributing to a number of pertinent issues.

25 Ibid p.16226 FESA Submission pp.280-29027 Special Inquiry Report p.2928 FESA Submission pp.163-167 and Executive Summary FESA Submission pp.17-21

29 Special Inquiry report p.1845° Ibid p.18431 Ibid p.99

Page 8 of 14

Firstly, it is recognised that FESA did not meet the requirement to declare the incident level asoutlined in Westplan Bushfire, but the Special Inquiry did not have evidence to support thecontention that anything turned on this issue. Furthermore, suggestions that incident levels areroutinely declared by other relevant agencies within WA was not examined properly by theSpecial Inquiry. The consequences cited by the Special Inquiry of FESA not formally declaringthe incident level are outlined below:

5.1 Convening of State Emergency Coordination Group

The Special Inquiry suggests that the time which the Commissioner of Police was notified of theincident and the lack of declaration regarding incident level contributed to a delay in convening

this meeting. It specifically states, "As Chair of the SECG he was denied this opportunitybecause FESA did not adhere to the requirements of WESTPLAN BUSHFIRE".32 The formalnon declaration of the incident level did not affect the timing and convening of the SECGmeeting. The Commissioner of Police was apprised of the escalating incident by the ExecutiveOfficer of the State Emergency Management Committee as per policy on several occasionsthroughout the afternoon, to which he advised he was aware of the fires and in any eventWAPoI was also represented at the State Operations Centre. The meeting was originallyscheduled for 5.30pm but put back to 6.30pm (1830 hours) at the request of the Commissionerof Police because he was not available until then due to another commitment, however hisrepresentatives were present within the State Operations Centre and fully apprised of thedeveloping situation.

5.2 Powers to Evacuate

This is a critical issue that is outlined within the FESA submission33. The Special Inquiry makesreference to an "impasse that had developed between FESA and WAPol about the powers to be

used when evacuating residents".34 The Special Inquiry goes on to insinuate that issuesexperienced with respect to evacuation and traffic management lay at the feet of FESA due tothe non-declaration of the incident level, and that no attempt has been made to rectify theseeither before, during or after the events subject to this Special Inquiry.

This is not correct, in fact at the State Emergency Coordination Group meeting at 6.30pm onSunday 6 February 2011, FESA queried with the Deputy Commissioner of Police whether anyissues with respect to traffic management existed. The outcomes of this discussion arerecorded in the minutes of the meeting and were also subject to follow up face to facediscussion during the course of the incident coordination, with no issues apparent at that time.Whilst this is recorded in minutes and records, the Special Inquiry chose to only rely upon theevidence of the Deputy Commissioner in this regard.35 This is a further example whereby allrelevant evidence and the testing of evidence did not occur by the Special Inquiry.

32 Ibid p.9933

FESA Submission pp.295-29634 Special Inquiry Report p.11735 Ibid p.118

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6. Major Incident Review

The Special Inquiry acknowledged the expertise and standing of the Major Incident Review(MIR) Reviewer, Mr Stuart Ellis, but did not seek to formally interview Mr Ellis to test areas ofthe MIR which did not accord with the Special Inquiry's views. For example, a lot of weight is

placed on the fact that the MIR did not consult with volunteers. However, the Special Inquiryhas failed to understand, or at the very least report, that volunteers' input into the MIR did occurvia the following processes:

Normal debriefing processes with volunteers were conducted by FESA and passeddirectly to the MIRDirect consultation by the MIR reviewer with individual volunteers who filled keypositions (e.g. Incident Management Team positions)Submissions by and consultation with the Bushfire Volunteers Association, whorepresent bush-fire volunteers.

It is incongruous to suggest on one hand that the MIR should consult with all volunteers whoattended the incident and then also suggest that the completion of the MIR must occur within 6weeks36 on the other. This is simply not practically achievable, in part due to the availability ofvolunteers, particularly during a busy operational period.

Moreover, the Special Inquiry report is inconsistent in so far as it praises the expertise andstanding of Mr Ellis37 and then subsequently criticises the MIR on the basis that "FESA'sinvolvement in this process brings into question the independence of the MIR and serves toundermine its findings".38 If the comments of the Special Inquiry in relation to the conduct of theMIR were adopted, it would not be possible for future reviews to be conducted by a respondingagency and rather it seems that an independent inquiry, at the level of this inquiry, would berequired on all occasions. Moreover, the interaction between Mr Ellis and FESA to clarify issuesis what, in our view, is missing from the approach adopted by the Special Inquiry, and informedrather than adversely effected, the independent process of Mr Ellis.

7. Serious Allegations with no evidentiary basis and outside Terms of Reference

7.1 Preparation of Witnesses

In effect the Special Inquiry infers collusion between and inappropriate leading of FESAwitnesses with the following statement in the report:

"While it is normal for witnesses to seek legal advice prior to appearing before this typeof Special Inquiry, it did become obvious during the course of the Special Inquiry thatFESA witnesses were discussing their evidence and appeared to have preparedanswers. Suffice to say that in the eyes of the Special Inquiry, this practice diminishedthe credibility of some witnesses and their evidence".39

This is an extremely serious allegation and infers misconduct at the most serious levels,including possibly the professional conduct of the State Solicitors Office in the process.

36 Ibid p.188

37 Ibid p.9

38 Ibid p.13438 Ibid p.7

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Witnesses attended a "briefing" by the State Solicitors Office (and attended by senior FESApersonnel) as to the process which did not provide any direction as to the evidence to be givenby witnesses. Rather each witness was expressly told to assist the Special Inquiry in any waypossible. This is a usual practice when preparing witnesses to appear before an Inquiry. Anysuggestions that the preparation of witnesses extended to the inferred by the Special Inquiry isstrongly refuted and is contradicted by the Special Inquiry's own comments within the reportwhere it cites inconsistencies between the evidence provided by different FESA witnesses.Therefore, it could not be reasonably said that these witnesses were comparing evidence andprovided "prepared answers".4° Furthermore, the inability for witnesses to be representedand/or supported during their evidence may have adversely contributed to this process, is inbreach of the Public Sector Management Act41 and somewhat foreign to normal processes suchas Royal Commissions and these types of Inquiry (e.g. Coronial Inquiry).

7.2 Misuse of Emergency Services Levy / Community Emergency Services Manager(CESM) Position 1 Bullying and Retribution against volunteers

The Special Inquiry draws a number of conclusions with respect to the CESM program andmakes mention that "the Special Inquiry was concerned that the program may not represent agenuine partnership between FESA and local government'42 without referencing any evidenceto support this statement. It goes on to denote some very serious accusations regarding theinterface between this program and the provision of funding derived from the EmergencyServices Levy (ESL).

This is extremely concerning to FESA, and the language and inference within the SpecialInquiry report regarding FESA's administration of the ESL Grants Program and itsinterrelationship with the CESM program includes the following serious unfounded statements:

" that FESA used the program to advance its own cause making new equipmentavailable to local governments conditional upon accepting the CESM program. If this istrue, then it may represent an abuse of power by FESA which will undermine the intentand delivery of the CESM program'43

"FESA was 'offering deals' to get shires to sign up to the program'44

"FESA was attempting to use the program to take control of bushfire management inlocal governments and 'bully' volunteers, while being able to report that it engaged withlocal government"'

people making these comments feared retribution from FESA for raising theirconcerns with the Special Inquiry""

These are extremely serious and in effect suggest that fraud, bribery, financial mismanagementand a culture of bullying/retribution exists within FESA. These allegations are made without any

40 Ibid p.741

s.24.1

42 Ibid p.37

43 Ibid p.38

44 Ibid p.183

45 Ibid p.183

46 Ibid p.183

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specific articulation of evidence and in some respects are dealt with in a somewhat superficialmanner, not commensurate with the serious nature of these allegations. The consequences ofsuch allegations, if true, may constitute serious misconduct and/or criminal behaviour. This isstrongly refuted by FESA, but it was not given the chance to examine this issue with the SpecialInquiry in either the conduct of its business or drawing of these conclusions. In fact had FESAbeen consulted on these issues, the Special Inquiry would have advised the Special Inquirythese allegations have previously been made, followed up and found to be untrue following ameeting involving the Minister's office, the Premier's office, FESA and the Locals AgainstWildfires group. However, in the absence of availing itself of this information the Special Inquirypursued this issue, drew these serious conclusions and applied them universally across the ESLand CESM programs.

The report goes on to consider this issue on a flawed understanding of the history, context andcomplexities of the ESL program, which was developed following detailed consideration byGovernment. Despite significant detail being provided to the Special Inquiry on the ESLprogram within FESA's submission,47 the report fails to make any reference at all to FESA'ssubmission and supporting detail and explanation.

The absence of an appreciation and reference to the "grants component" (which only equates toapproximately 8.7% of the overall ESL revenue base) which is governed by a representativegrants committee, which includes Local Government and volunteer representation, is a

demonstration of the lack of understanding and follow-up evidence/information called fromFESA that sits behind and may alleviate these serious allegations.

Moreover, by its own admission, the Special Inquiry accepts that "While the Special Inquiry wasnot mandated to investigate or verify these claims, it was sufficiently convinced that a detailedreview of the way ESL funds are allocated by FESA is warranted".48

Since the introduction of the ESL FESA has ensured that a rigorous annual internal audit of boththe ESL collection and disbursement process and of expenditure by selected local governmentson ESL related activities, is undertaken by independent external auditors. This process, againstestablished audit protocols, examines FESA's level of compliance with legislative requirementsand in particular its Manual of Operating Procedures, as well as providing an assurance thatlocal government capital and operating expenditure is in accordance with protocols. Theindependent audit process has not produced any evidence that FESA has failed in any way toensure that the collection and expending of ESL funds is not in accordance with relevantlegislation and associated procedures. Therefore, suggestions by the Special Inquiry to thecontrary appear misguided and lack supportive evidence.

FESA cannot see how the Special Inquiry can possibly draw the conclusions it has, let alone theextremely serious allegations it has raised regarding the alleged abuse of this process by FESAwithout calling for and testing this in evidence with FESA itself. This is of serious concern toFESA and underscores the approach taken in a number of other areas of the Special Inquiry ashighlighted elsewhere in this correspondence.

47 FESA Submission Appendix 148 Special Inquiry Report p.177

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8. Additional Matters

Unfortunately, given the limited time and resources, the Special Inquiry appears to have taken avery one dimensional view to a number of important issues. The Special Inquiry failed to fullyrecognise and address the dynamic and challenging nature of major emergencies and theidiosyncrasies involved in managing a volunteer based organisation and multi-agency incident.Moreover, with respect to those involved in the Special Inquiry, the absence of direct fireknowledge and expertise within the Special Inquiry team may have contributed to itsinadequacies in fully appreciating and understanding some of the specific fire related details andthe consequential reliance on individual witnesses' accounts and evidence to the detriment ofthe overall Special Inquiry outcome. It may also fail to appreciate the very difficult operationalenvironment that fire fighters were facing with some of the worst climatic conditions experiencedin this state.

Notwithstanding its acceptance throughout the report of the "primacy of life'49 principle, thecriticism of the lack of a detailed incident action plan in the initial stages of the incident andrecommending this be mandated into the future" demonstrates a lack of awareness of thesituation and the criticality of decision making during these initial phases of a rapid onset, fastmoving and rapid impact emergency such as that subject to this Special Inquiry. Whilst FESAfully appreciates the need to develop and improve in this area, unlike remote forest firefightingwhereby there is little/no immediate life/property risk to contend with and potentially a moreindirect method of suppression, this is simply not always achievable in an urban/rural interfacearea. This issue and the challenges of producing an Incident Action Plan (IAP) within the initialstages of a fast moving incident was the subject of detailed consideration by the VictorianBushfires Royal Commission with the Commission finding the following in its final report:

"The Commission recognises that it is extremely difficult to produce an incident actionplan during the first shift or the early stages of a fast-running fire".

"Before 7 February fire agencies were aware of the difficulty of developing an incidentaction plan in the early stages of a fire as a result of being overrun by events or sufferingfrom 'data overload'. They had sought to implement the abridged incident shift plan inorder to limit the difficulties".51

This detailed consideration and recognition of the competing priorities and pressures associatedwith this initial phase of a fast moving incident resulted in a recommendation by the RoyalCommission that:

"The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainabiity and Environment:

amend their procedures to require that an incident action plan summary becompleted within the first four hours of an incident being reported and be providedto the State Control Centre and, where established, to the relevant Area ofOperations Control Centre"52

45 Ibid pp.3, 425° Ibid pp.103-10451 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report, vol.2, s.2.7.1

52 Ibid, Recommendation 15

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FESA is committed to working with DEC to address this issue but simply uses this example todemonstrate the criticism reflected in the Special Inquiry's report on this issue does not accordwith the more robust analysis and assessment by the Royal Commission and fails to recognisethe dynamic nature and competing priorities of managing these types of incidents in the initialstages. As outlined in the Special Inquiry's report, the rate of spread and timing associated withthe Roleystone Fire and associated spotting activity as detailed by Dr McCaw of DEC53 clearlydemonstrates that the emphasis on the post initial stages Incident Action Plans would not havehad any material impact on the loss and most damaging time of the fire. FESA is firmly of theview the community would much rather the initial attack be concentrated on the assembly anddeployment of resources to protect life and property than sitting down and documenting adetailed Incident Action Plan, which by the time it is completed the major fire impact has gone.Dynamic decision making must sit at the heart of these types of operational activities.

9. Conclusion

It is this level of lack of understanding, compounded by the other issues outlined above, whichcauses FESA concern about the report and underpinning rationale utilised by the SpecialInquiry. This should not be viewed in any way as FESA discounting the value of the SpecialInquiry and/or the practicality of the majority of its recommendations, as it clearly outlined in itssubmission "FESA welcomes the opportunity to make this submission and work ill partnershipwith the Inquiry to achieve the best possible result for the community of WA".54

However, this needs to be balanced with a fair, equitable and due process and rigorousexamination of the pertinent issues.

To this end, FESA remains extremely disappointed with the inferences and perceptionsthroughout the report and coupled with the significant concerns it has expressed aboveregarding the overall conduct of the Special Inquiry, feels a vital opportunity has been missed touse this Special Inquiry, which itself expressed such a concern55, as a catalyst for real andmeaningful change for the future.

Whilst the Chief Executive Officer is currently overseas, I confirm that she has endorsed thisresponse. I trust the above provides Cabinet with sufficient information with which to considerthis report and FESA's associated comments. However, should you have any further queriesregarding this matter FESA would welcome the opportunity to respond accordingly.

Yours sincerely

FRANK PASQUALEACTING CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER22 June 2011

53 Special Inquiry Report pp.82-8654 Executive Summary - FESA Submission p.355 Special Inquiry Report p.135

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