in the name of terrorism; presidents on political violence in the post-world war ii (2006)

In the Name of Terrorism

SUNY series on the Presidency: Contemporary IssuesJohn Kenneth White, editor

SUNY series in the Trajectory of TerrorLouise Richardson and Leonard Weinberg, editors

In the Name of Terrorism

Presidents on Political Violence in thePost-World War II Era

Carol K. Winkler

State University of New York Press

Published byState University of New York Press, Albany

© 2006 State University of New York

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Winkler, Carol.In the name of terrorism : presidents on political violence in thepost-World War II era / Carol K. Winkler.

p. cm. — (SUNY series on the presidency) (SUNY series in the trajectoryof terror)

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0–7914–6617–5 (hardcover : alk. paper)—ISBN 0–7914–6618–3 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Terrorism—Government policy—United States. 2. Political oratory—UnitedStates. 3. Rhetoric—Political aspects—United States. 4. Presidents—UnitedStates—Language. 5. Ideology—United States. I. Title. II. Series. III. Series:SUNY series on the Presidency. SUNY series in the trajectory of terror.

HV6432.W56 2005303.6�25�0973—dc22

2005000072

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

ToBill, Cori, and Jordan

Contents

Acknowledgments ix

1. What’s in a Name? 1Presidential Discourse and Terrorism 4Terrorism and Ideology 7

2. The Vietnam War and the Communist Terrorists 17Labeling the Threat 17The Terrorist Narrative in the Vietnam War 22Terrorism and Ideology 28

3. The Iranian Hostage Crisis: An American Tragedy 37Labeling the Captors 38The Narrative of the Iranian Hostage Crisis 42Ideology and the Iranian Hostage Crisis 55

4. Origins of Terrorism as an American Ideograph: The Reagan Era 65Labeling the Threat 70The Terrorist Narrative in the Reagan Era 78Terrorism and Ideology 90

5. The Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991: The Cold War Narrativein the Post-Cold War Era 97

Labeling the Crisis 98The Narrative of the 1991 Persian Gulf Crisis 105Ideology and Persian Gulf Terrorism 118

6. Terrorism and the Clinton Era: A Prophetic Moment 127Labeling the Threat 130Clinton’s Terrorist Narrative 136Terrorism and Ideology 151

vii

7. America under Attack: George W. Bush and Noncitizen Actors 155Labeling the Crisis 159The Terrorist Narrative 166Terrorism and Ideology 182

8. Terrorism and American Culture 189

Notes 213

Works Cited 217

Index 251

viii Contents

Acknowledgments

No book like this could have been written without the generous assistanceof the staffs of Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, the Jimmy

Carter Presidential Library, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, and theGeorge Bush Presidential Library. Going far beyond providing normalaccess to internal documents, the staffs of these libraries helped me puzzlethrough various issues that crossed the administrations covered in this book.

My ability to complete the manuscript was possible due to the professionalleave, the travel support to the various libraries, and the graduate research sup-port that I received from Ahmed Abdelal, Dean of the College of Arts andSciences at Georgia State University. I am particularly grateful to Mary AnnRomski and Carolyn Codamo, who assumed the Georgia State Department ofCommunication chair duties in my absence. The patient administrative handof Dean Lauren Adamson allowed me complete final revisions.

Many colleagues have contributed thoughtful comments in an effort toimprove this book. My initial interest in terrorism was spawned when I wasconducting research for Dr. Chuck Kaufman at the University of Maryland.More recently, Mary Stuckey offered not only expert editorial commentary, butknowledge of resources from allied professional disciplines that spoke to themesof the manuscript. Other important commentaries were provided by MarilynYoung, Celeste Condit, Karlyn Campbell, James Darsey, Thomas Goodnight,David Cheshier, Robert Newman, Cori Dauber, and Gordon Mitchell. I amalso grateful for the comments from the anonymous reviewers of SUNY Presswho provided detailed commentary throughout the manuscript, the watchfuleyes of my copyeditor, Wyatt Benner, production editor Diane Ganeles, pro-duction assistant Ryan Hacker, and the assistance of Michael Rinella, whoshepherded me through the first part of the publication process at SUNY Press.

Graduate research assistants were invaluable in the collection and cata-loging of source materials as well as in editorial assistance. My special thanks

ix

to Joseph Valenzano, James Roland, Adrienne Proeller, Leslie Wade, JudyButler, Francesca Bianchi, Nayed Tantawy, and Henrietta Aswad. MarkCarnet and Jarvis Darrisaw helped prepare the manuscript according to theSUNY’s specifications.

Earlier drafts of portions of various chapters in this manuscript have pre-viously been published. I am grateful for the generosity of Controversia andSouth Bound Press in permitting the use of my earlier work: “GlobalizedManifest Destiny; The Rhetoric of the Bush Administration in Response tothe Attacks of September 11th,” Controversia: An International Journal ofDebate and Democratic Renewal (2002) 85–108; and “Terrorism and Freedomas Oppositional Forces: Origins and Evolution in Presidential Discourse,”Studies in Terrorism: Media Scholarship and the Enigma of Terror in the 21stCentury (Penang: South Bound, 2002) 1–17.

Finally, I want to express my heartfelt thanks to my family. Cori andJordan were patient and understanding when Mom had to go work on thebook (again!). Bill was a daily sounding board for ideas, a constant source ofnew Internet revelations, and my rock-solid system of love and support.

x Acknowledgments

1

What’s in a Name?

Terrorism is perhaps the most emotive, pejorative term in the Englishlanguage. The nation’s leadership has used it to justify policies and

actions that the American public would abhor in virtually any other context.US presidents have authorized the use of sabotage, skyjacking, militarycoups, mass deportations, and assassination when responding to terrorism.They have used secret courts to prosecute suspected terrorists based onhearsay testimony and guilt by association. They have reserved the right toimprison American citizens and deport aliens who financially support terror-ist groups, even in cases when those implicated have been unaware of theillegal activities. They have held Americans accused of terrorist activity insolitary confinement for more than two years without the benefit of a trial.They have granted military tribunals jurisdiction over terrorism cases involv-ing immigrants, abandoned the evidentiary standard of proof beyond a rea-sonable doubt, and exempted tribunal decisions from appellate review.Indefinite confinement of alleged terrorists and public contemplation of gov-ernment-endorsed torture demonstrate the extremes US leadership will con-sider in the fight against terrorism.

The public will never know the full extent of terrorism’s influence onAmerican culture. Classified presidential papers, the reluctance of govern-ment officials to discuss matters of national security openly, and the secrecyof related judicial proceedings ensure that much of the nation’s battle againstterrorism will remain beyond the scrutiny of the average citizen.Nevertheless, what can be known about actions undertaken in the name ofterrorism can be revealing. One former senior administration official admit-ted he ignored a direct order from his commander in chief because of hisconfidence in his own plan for responding to terrorism (Turner 67). Anotheradvocated a military attack on a foreign country allegedly involved in terror-ism, believing the action would have a positive influence on the outcome ofan upcoming presidential election.1 Still others have leaked false informationto members of the media, including the rumor that a foreign leader believedto be involved in terrorism was a cross-dresser!2

1

The events of September 11 have fundamentally transformed long-standing debates about what constitutes a governmental overreaction to thethreat of international terrorism. On an empirical level, it is still true thatmore Americans have died from crossing the street than from being victimsof terrorist attacks, that only six Americans have died as a result of chemicalor biological terrorism since 1900, and that no American has ever died froman act of nuclear terrorism (Simon 107–08; Lluma 15). Still, memories of theWorld Trade Center and Pentagon attacks have removed many doubts aboutthe destructive potential of America’s worst nightmare. Anthrax scares andabandoned al Qaeda laboratories have compounded American’s feelings offear and insecurity, rendering worst-case scenarios about weapons of massdestruction realistic probabilities in the public’s imagination. Relatively fewAmericans would now agree with one scholar’s earlier conclusion that thegovernment’s response to terrorism is nothing more than a “an old and well-tried trick to divert attention from economic and social problems to focusattention on an ill-defined and frightening enemy” (Wardlaw 78).3 Securityfrom terrorism has become a primary concern, whether in conversations ofthe mainstream public or in the deliberations of the political elite.

Those who focus on the comparatively small number of civilian casual-ties to argue that the government’s response to terrorism is disproportionatemisunderstand the role that terrorism plays within American society. Theleadership does not calculate the magnitude of its response exclusively on thenation’s actual or projected loss of life at the hands of terrorists. The threatfrom terrorism appeals at a much more fundamental level. Terrorism func-tions as a signifier of American identity, defining what the nation stands forand against. The term divides those who are civilized from those who areuncivilized, those who defend economic freedom from those who wouldattack America’s way of life, and those who support democracy from thosewho would disrupt it. Supporting the fight against terrorism enacts politicalallegiance; resisting it opens one to charges of disloyalty.

Reconsider the nation’s response in the immediate aftermath of theevents of September 11. Calling for national unity in a televised speech theday after the attacks, George W. Bush proclaimed: “Freedom and democracyare under attack” (FDCH Transcripts 9/12/01). The nation rallied to supportthe president. The members of a previously divided, partisan Congressunited, singing “God Bless America” on the steps of the Capitol Buildingand passing a forty-billion dollar supplemental appropriations bill to aid inthe relief and response effort. Members of the public gave more than a bil-lion dollars to the families of those killed in the tragic event. National pollingrevealed an unprecedented ninety percent approval rating for Bush’s handlingof the crisis (qtd. in “Bush Best Pop in Poll” 21). American flag sales soared.

2 In the Name of Terrorism

The patriotic surge, made all the more palpable in the face of a danger-ous, external threat to the nation, reflected the public’s heightened sense ofidentification. Had the country been less unified, members of the public andthe media might reasonably have expected Bush to announce that he knewwho the perpetrators were before insisting that he knew why they acted.Interviews conducted by the 9/11 Commission now reveal that while Bushsuspected al Qaeda as the perpetrators of the attack, he also considered Iraqand Iran as potentially culpable parties (National Commission, Final Report334).4 Instead of waiting until he knew who was responsible, Bush publiclygrouped all terrorists, including the perpetrators of 9/11, into a homogenouscollective characterized by opposition to fundamental American values. Bushproclaimed that terrorists “have a common ideology . . . they hate freedomand they hate freedom-loving people” (FDCH Transcripts 9/19/01). Hisapproach defined the clash as one between those who supported America’sfoundational principles and those who opposed them. Bush reaffirmedAmerica’s sense of self by defining the nation’s mission as the defender offreedom around the globe.

The notion that depictions of the nation’s threats are integral to concep-tions of American identity is not new. Noted language theorist KennethBurke reminds us that within any social interaction, “identification is com-pensatory with division” (On Symbols and Society 182). In the context ofinternational relations, David Campbell argues that representations ofdanger are integral to the ever-evolving boundaries of a state’s identity (3).Political scientist Murray Edelman explains why leaders define their enemiesnot according to the harm that they do, but by the identifying function theyserve within the political process. He reasons,

In constructing such enemies and the narrative plots that definetheir place in history, people are manifestly defining themselvesand their place in history as well; the self-definition lends passionto the whole transaction. To support a war against a foreignaggressor who threatens national sovereignty and moral decenciesis to construct oneself as a member of a nation of innocent heroes.To define the people one hurts as evil is to define oneself as virtu-ous. The narrative establishes the identities of enemy and victim-savior by defining the latter as emerging from an innocent past andas destined to bring about a brighter future world cleansed of thecontamination the enemy embodies. (76)

Such insights help explain the public’s reaction to Bush’s early remarksabout the terrorists of September 11. Bush’s claims about the terrorists’motivations helped elevate a newly elected president into the natural leader

What’s in a Name? 3

for those who identified with the cause of supporting freedom and democ-racy around the globe.

PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE AND TERRORISM

This book explores the ways in which terrorism functions as a term of iden-tity formulation within American society. It examines the public communi-cation strategies of the executive branch of the US government since the endof World War II. The choice to focus on the words of the presidents andtheir executive branch surrogates is deliberate. The citizenry turns to thepresident during times of national crisis. The public seeks understandingregarding who is responsible for the attacks, why the nation has beenattacked, and what will be the most effective response. In the short run, thepublic looks to the president for reassurance that the nation will again besafe. Over the longer term, presidential discourse focuses attention on spe-cific aspects of terrorism that warrant ongoing governmental concern.

The chief executive’s role as a key spokesperson on the internationalstage magnifies the influence of presidential discourse about terrorism. Bothin public forums and in private correspondence with foreign leaders, thepresident and his executive branch appointees select the aspects of the terror-ism problem and the range of appropriate response options that will receive aheightened focus. Such choices have international ramifications. Americanpresidential discourse has, at times, set the international standard forresponding to terrorism. Consider the prime minister of Israel’s public justi-fication for air attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Stripin December 2001. Echoing the Bush administration’s post–9/11 rhetoric,Ariel Sharon proclaimed, “Just as the United States is conducting its waragainst international terror, using all its might against terror, so will we, too”(“Excerpts from Talk by Sharon” A8). Sharon followed Bush’s lead both inhis choice of a military response and in his strategy for justifying the decisionto the public.

To a large degree, the executive branch’s public terrorism strategy isinfluential due to the institutional powers of the presidency. The constitu-tional powers of the commander in chief, clarified and interpreted in theWar Powers Act, give presidents the right to engage military forces todefend the nation against external attack (Keynes 1). Accordingly, the officesprimarily responsible for responding to terrorism all fall within the purviewof the chief executive. Examples include the Central Intelligence Agency, theFederal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Homeland Security, theNational Security Council, the State Department’s Office of Counter-terror-ism, the Office of Public Diplomacy, and the Office of Diplomatic Security.


Besides these and other standing agencies, presidents have historically con-structed small, ad hoc groups of trusted advisors to develop and implementtheir responses to specific terrorist events (e.g., Jimmy Carter’s SpecialCoordinating Committee during the Iranian hostage crisis and GeorgeBush’s Persian Gulf Working Group in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion ofKuwait). Taken together, groups constructed within the executive branch arethe principle source of policy initiatives and implementation in the terrorismarena (Greenstein 3–4).

Not only do the executive agencies have institutional decision-makingauthority over terrorism, they routinely have informational control over intel-ligence related to the nature of the threat and the effectiveness of the nation’sresponse. While the State Department does release an annual list of abbrevi-ated descriptions of international terrorist acts, the bulk of information aboutthe attacks, the alleged perpetrators, and the government’s response remainsoutside the public arena for extended periods. Even information related toterrorist events that occurred more than two decades ago remains classified.

The power of the executive branch to control the bulk of the nation’sterrorism information is unlikely to change. Historically, presidents haveargued to the public and to the courts alike that failure to grant themexclusive access to certain information compromises the intelligence-gath-ering capabilities of the government. Bill Clinton publicly refused to revealthe evidence justifying his bombing of the Sudanese pharmaceutical plantin August 1998 in the interest of protecting US intelligence methods;George W. Bush offered a similar rationale for not initially releasing theevidence regarding bin Laden’s involvement in the attacks of September11, 2001. Bush further expanded presidential prerogatives over classifiedmaterials by signing Section 3(d)2 of Executive Order 13233 on November1, 2001 (“Executive Order”). The order permitted a sitting president towithhold national security information, even in cases where former presi-dents have authorized access to their own records. Senator Orrin Hatch’sindiscreet mention of U.S. intercepts of Osama bin Laden’s satellite phoneconversations in the early days after September 11 may serve as a prototyp-ical cautionary tale for future presidents willing to expand public informa-tion about terrorism, given bin Laden’s immediate and highly publicizedshift to other modes of communication.4 The executive branch will unlikelyrelinquish its hold on terrorism data, given the potential costs of having itmore widely disseminated.

With access to information about terrorism strictly limited, the executivebranch becomes the primary source of information for the media’s coverageof terrorist events. Members of the American media have tended to reiterateadministration’s statements about terrorism, rather than present a balancedpresentation of competing perspectives. In a study of follow-up terrorism


stories in the New York Times written in the early 1990s, for example, StevenLivingston concludes that government officials encouraged a selective inter-pretation of terrorism that replicated and reinforced the State Department’sofficial reports on terrorism. Competing viewpoints received far less pressattention. Livingston notes “officials and offices of ideological and/or foreignpolicy adversaries of the United States” accounted for only five percent of thereferences in the stories on terrorism (75). Embedded reporters in the recentUS war with Iraq have further reinforced the media’s reiteration of theadministration’s message. Positioned within military units outside of Iraqistrongholds and subjected to American commanders’ prerogatives for selec-tive news blackouts, field reporters presented news accounts generally consis-tent with the administration’s public framework during the major combatoperations in Iraq.

The events of September 11 altered the relationship between the mediaand official administration sources to some degree. Brigitte Nacos revealsthat US television networks mentioned bin Laden more frequently than theydid President Bush after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks (41).Nevertheless, she concludes that the executive branch still remained a power-ful influence in media coverage. She points to Condoleezza Rice’s successfulplea to the networks to limit coverage of bin Laden’s threats against theAmerican people to avoid the incitement of more violence (48–49). She alsocites the media’s likening of George W. Bush’s address to the joint sessionCongress to that of Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War and that ofWinston Churchill during World War II (50). Assessing media coveragerelated to both bin Laden and the anthrax attacks, Nacos concludes, “In theface of an ongoing terrorism crisis at home and a counterterrorism campaignabroad, the mainstream watchdog press refrained from barking in the direc-tion of public officials” (51).

Jarol B. Manheim studied why the media relies so heavily on officialsources. He concludes that a lack of direct access to foreign events, limits onthe media’s inclination to devote resources to foreign news reporting, and thenew era of instantaneous communications has made “the manipulation of thenews and public images of actors and events in foreign affairs actually morelikely to have an effect than it [would] in the domestic sphere (127). Withthe media contributing to the issue agenda for the public at large, journalists’continued reliance on governmental sources magnifies the importance of theexecutive branch’s public terrorism strategy.

Compounding the influence of executive branch statements is the heavyreliance on such sources by academic researchers. Joseba Zuliaka andWilliam A. Douglass dramatically critique the entire field of terrorismresearch when they observe, “One characteristic of the work of terrorismexperts is the very prohibition upon personal discourse with their subjects.


Authors writing about terrorism must abide by this taboo. It is telling thatone can claim expertise regarding ‘terrorists’ without ever having seen ortalked to one” (179). Academics, shunning interviews with the terroristthemselves, routinely turn to sources within the executive branch and admin-istration databases as the foundation for their eventual findings. Prominentscholars engaged in terrorism research have extensive connections with thefederal government and its attendant funding apparatuses (Collins 155–74).Taken as a whole, the presidents’ institutional authority over terrorism,access to classified information, and agenda-setting function for much ofacademe and the media ensure that the discourse of the executive branch isthe single most vital source for understanding how terrorism functionswithin American culture.

TERRORISM AND IDEOLOGY

Contemporary presidents evoke terrorism as a key component in their ideo-logical formulations of the American culture, but the precise nature of thatrole remains a subject of open debate. Some argue that terrorism is an ideol-ogy in and of itself, masquerading as objective reality while “actually express-ing the narrow interests of a dominant group” (Collins 157). Others denythat terrorism qualifies, because the term “does not itself explain and evaluateconditions or provide people with an orientation” (Ball and Dagger 8).Evaluating the merit of these competing perspectives depends on one’s defi-nition of ideology, itself a contested concept (Cormack 9–10; Williams55–71; and McLellan 1–9).

I myself would argue that terrorism functions as a symbolic marker ofthe culture that does not represent an ideology, in and of itself, because itfails to evoke a coherent, positive orientation for members of the collective.However, the term does perform ideological work within the culture. Byfunctioning as a recognized point of contrast, terrorism encompasses behav-iors considered unacceptable for those belonging to American society. Theterm’s adaptability of meaning and usage renders it a powerful tool for thosewishing to advance various ideological perspectives.

John Lucaites and Celeste Condit, both scholars in the field of commu-nication, theorize the evolutionary process of language development associ-ated with ideological orientations. For them, terms serving as culturalmarkers must function as three distinct types of discourse units: namely,labels, narratives, and ideographs (7–8). Given the centrality of these threeunits to the transformation of terrorism’s cultural meaning, the remainder ofthis section will elaborate the role each plays within a general communication


context and within the specific application to modern presidential discourseabout terrorism.

Labeling

Labels are linguistic terms used to describe agents, agencies, acts, scenes, orpurposes within the public vocabulary (Burke, A Grammar of Motives xv).The process of labeling is not neutral. Each use of a term is a choice(whether conscious or unconscious) that emphasizes certain aspects of whatis being described, while de-emphasizing others. “Wars of aggression” ratherthan “wars of liberation,” “collateral damage” rather than “civilian casualties,”and “prisoners of war” rather than “battlefield detainees” (to name but a few)simultaneously highlight and obscure aspects of the referenced material cir-cumstances. By happenstance or by design, labeling necessarily entails per-spective taking.

This book examines the evolving perspectives of the terrorism labelwithin the public discourse of the executive branch since the end of WorldWar II. The study encompasses all material circumstances where the execu-tive branch made more than one hundred public references to an event orseries of events as terrorism. The decision to focus on clustered referencesrather than on more unique, isolated examples of the use of the terrorismlabel stems from Burke’s insight that mundane repetition of key terms invitesan audience to associate with a particular ideological orientation (On Symbolsand Society 229).

A review of executive branch rhetoric since World War II reveals dra-matic distinctions between clustered and isolated usages of the terrorismlabel. On a few occasions, the nation’s leadership has used the word “terror-ism” to describe agents as diverse as American college students, US WorldWar I veterans, a US senator, and members of the antiabortion movement.Such cases, however, have been anomalies in the totality of presidential dis-course. The clustered references emergent from the speeches of the executivebranch have highlighted extremist groups that influence foreign states(Carter), state sponsors of terrorism (Reagan and George W. Bush), terroriststates (both Bush administrations), nonstate terrorist actors (Clinton andGeorge W. Bush), and terrorist-sponsored states (George W. Bush).

When applying the terrorism label to actions, a full range of activitieshas qualified for inclusion in the term’s meaning. The presidents have madeoccasional mention of antiwar protests, computer hacking, domestic vio-lence, protests against US governmental policies, and political disagreementsbetween presidential candidates at election time as terrorism. In their clus-tered references, however, the nation’s leadership has tended to focus onmore extreme forms of violence. Examples have included acts of assassina-


tion, kidnapping, torture, hostage taking, bombing, foreign military aggres-sion, and the use (or potential use) of weapons of mass destruction.

In public discussions of terrorist scenes, the presidents have historicallynarrowed the range of possible locations worldwide. They make infrequentmention of acts perpetrated within the borders of Europe, Africa, Centraland South America, or Australia. In their clustered references, the MiddleEast has emerged as the dominant backdrop for terrorism since World WarII. Spectacular terrorist assaults in North America have also receivedfocused presidential attention (e.g., the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the1996 Olympic bombing, the first World Trade Center bombing, and theevents of 9/11).

When members of the executive branch have used terrorism to depictpurpose in their public statements, they have generally erased the terrorists’stated rationales (whether secular or religious) for their own behavior. Onlyrarely do the presidents discuss jihad, revolution, retaliation, or other terroristcauses. More regularly, the presidents have insisted that such enemies act outof goals of regional/world domination or out of an ingrained hatred fordemocratic ideals.

At times, the clustered events chosen for inclusion in this book may befrustrating for the reader. Sensible observers could easily categorize theevents that contemporary presidents have labeled terrorism to be acts of war,instances of nonterrorist political violence, or something else altogether.Nevertheless, the choice to allow the presidents’ words to define what consti-tutes terrorism is essential to understanding the ideological ramifications ofthe cultural marker. As this book will illustrate, knowing the terrorist threatas defined by the nation’s leaders helps illuminate the cultural boundaries ofAmerican society.

Narratives

Serving as a label alone is insufficient to elevate terrorism into a languagemarker of American culture. The term must also function within recurrentsocietal narratives that provide meaning to the lives of the community’smembers. Narratives are public stories that provide coherence and consis-tency to the scenes, characters, and themes that guide the moral conduct of asociety (Fisher 64–65). They structure the relationships between and amongvarious labels (Lucaites and Condit 8). Their meanings come, in part, fromthe interrelationships that a given story has within the context of other narra-tive accounts (Katriel and Shenhar 376). Narratives can provide justificationsto perpetuate the status quo or be compelling reasons for social change.

Narratives are critical to the formulation and reformulation of the multi-ple levels of identity. Jürgen Habermas theorizes a complex interaction


between narratives and an individual’s identity. He argues that individuals“can develop personal identities only if they recognize that the sequence oftheir own actions form narratively presentable life histories; they can developsocial identities only if they recognize that they maintain their membershipin social groups by way of participating in interactions, and thus that they arecaught up in the narratively presentable history of collectivities. Collectivitiesmaintain their identities only to the extent that the ideas members have oftheir lifeworld overlap sufficiently and condense into unproblematic back-ground convictions” (136). At the personal, social and cultural level, narra-tives function to integrate discrete aspects of an individual’s existence into acoherent sense of identity.

Narratives also function to warrant and guide the behavior of individu-als hoping to qualify as members of the collective. Maurice Charland offersthree ways that narratives help constitute collective publics (133–50). First,narratives render collective subjects by demonstrating how, through thestory’s characters, members of the polity are supposed to believe andbehave to demonstrate community allegiance. Narratives define the atti-tudes and actions characteristic both of the members and of the outcasts ofthe collective.

Second, narratives transform individuals into transhistorical subjects.Narratives identify what interpretations of historical events are relevant forunderstanding the current opportunities and challenges of the community.Not only do narratives select and emphasize certain salient events of the past;they also reframe interpretations of past events in a manner consistent withthe moral force of the story.

Finally, narratives create an illusion of freedom for individuals function-ing within the collective. Individuals believe that they are selecting the storiesthat they will accept, the beliefs that they will cherish, and the behaviors thatthey will practice as members of the culture. Once identification with thenarratives ensues, however, free choice becomes an illusion. The narrativeplotline defines what concerns are important and what public beliefs and actsare appropriate. The scene of the narrative identifies the relevant elements ofthe situation that should influence thought and action of the culture. Takentogether, Charland’s three insights into the functioning of narratives revealhow the stories embodied within societal discourse help form the boundariesof the culture.

Narratives are not static; they change over time. The process of narrativeevolution is complex and multifaceted. The public tends to cling to acceptednarrative accounts when other stories confront them directly (M. H. Ross).Nonetheless, accepted societal narratives do change. Sometimes narrativescombine, as in the case of two or more stories being compatible and comple-mentary with each other (Mink 142). At other times, the acceptance of one


narrative involves the rejection of the other (Bennett and Edelman 158).Narratives must evolve or risk losing their definitional currency for the mem-bers of the collective.

The use of narratives has been a recurrent quality of modern presidentialdiscourse about terrorism. The nation’s leadership has presented terrorism tothe public as a moral drama, pitting good against evil in an ongoing battle forthe survival of civilization itself. George W. Bush’s recent announcement ofAmerica’s new war on terrorism has enhanced the likelihood that narrativeswill play a central role within future presidential discourse on terrorism.Narratives function at the level of a generic expectation for presidential wardiscourse. They emerge as an anticipated element of war discourse becausethey dramatically exhort a generally reluctant American public to favor theuse of military force (Campbell and Jamieson 107–11). With the UnitedStates now involved in a long-term war against terrorists, narratives willlikely play a central role in the future terrorism discourse of the presidency.

Presidents since the end of World War II have used the terrorism labelwithin a diverse set of societal narratives already familiar to American audi-ences from other contexts. Notably, the presidents have borrowed narrativesfrom literature, religion, military affairs, and American history to developtheir public communication strategies about terrorism. These seeminglydiverse narratives have relied on similar themes and characterizations thathave contributed a consistency and cogency to US discourse about terrorismthroughout the contemporary period.

Modern US terrorist narratives have displayed one key difference trace-able to the unique approaches of the two political parties. The point of clashmirrors a long-standing debate in scholarly terrorism circles: whether crimeor war constitutes the most appropriate metaphor to apply to the unconven-tional violence of terrorism. Democratic administrations have focused onnarratives that feature crime as the predominant theme since the end of theVietnam War; Republican administrations have relied on stories thatborrow heavily from US war narratives. Despite the dominance of onemetaphor within each of the two parties’ narratives, both groups haveresisted an exclusive focus on either crime or war. Neither party has beenwilling to cede to their opponents complete linguistic control over the twodominant terrorism metaphors. Nonetheless, the decision to focus on crimeor war as the featured element of the narrative does have ideological implica-tions for American society, as the next section will preview.

Ideographs

Terrorism, like all labels recurrent in society’s dominant narratives, mustfunction as an ideograph to constitute a defining cultural term. Ideographs


are collective terms of political allegiance that embody a society’s ideals.Michael McGee, the originator of the concept, defines an ideograph as a“one-term sum of an orientation, the species of ‘God’ or ‘Ultimate’ term thatwill be used to symbolize the line of argument the meanest sort of individualwould pursue if that individual had the dialectical skills of philosophers, as adefense of a personal stake in and commitment to the society” (7).Ideographs “typically serve as the primary purpose term” (Lucaites andCondit 8) for the central narratives of a culture. They define the foundationalvalues that serve as the basis of a culture’s identity. Equality, justice, and lib-erty are examples operating within the American culture.5

Ideographs are not limited to ideal cultural values; they also includeterms that define the society through negation. To know what a culture isrequires an understanding of what it is not. Negative ideographs contributeto our collective identity by branding behavior that is unacceptable (McGee15). American society defines itself as much by its opposition to tyranny andslavery as it does by a commitment to liberty and equality. Nevertheless, thefew studies that do mention negative ideographs limit their discussion to theantithetical relationship such terms have with a culture’s foundational values.Most prevalent is the observation that terrorism frequently functions inopposition to freedom and democracy (Parry-Giles 191; and Railsback 412).

A brief synopsis of the four defining characteristics of ideographs revealsthat terrorism currently functions to define American culture through nega-tion. The first definitional element of an ideograph is that it must be “anordinary language term found in political discourse” (McGee 15). If a partic-ular term gains usage only in conversations of the political elite, it lacks thepersuasive impact needed for the broader audience that identifies itself withthe culture. To perform ideological work for the culture, the term must“come to be part of the real lives of the people whose motives they articulate”(7). It must be readily available for use by members of the collective.

Certainly, terrorism has qualified as a common term of political dis-course. It has been the subject of thousands of presidential addresses andscholarly books. It has been the topic of blockbuster movies (e.g., Die Hard,Air Force One, and The Negotiator) and, since September 11, the repeatedsubject of both print and television advertisements. Political cartoonists havecapitalized on the term’s currency with the public, as have those who are inthe business of selling patriotic memorabilia. Terrorism’s recent impact onthe stock market, unemployment, and airport security increase the likelihoodthat rank-and-file citizens will be using the term in their political discourseinto the foreseeable future.

The second characteristic of the ideograph is that the term must be “ahigh order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular butequivocal and ill-defined normative goal” (McGee 15). To function as a


marker for the culture, a label must be capable of an expansive range of pos-sible applications. If a term’s meaning is constrained to a particular set of cir-cumstances, it lacks the transcendent character necessary to encompass andappeal to a broad cultural audience that includes diverse subgroups. Culturalmarkers must be flexible, permitting shifts over time in the perspectives ofthose who define themselves to be members of the in-group. Elasticity of theterm’s meaning allows for renewed and reaffirmed interpretations for agroup’s identity.

By virtually all accounts, terrorism has been such a flexible term. It hasdefied concrete definition. Rarely has a book on the subject failed to bemoanthe plethora of definitions used by government officials, scholars, and themedia. A sampling of scholarly opinion about terrorism exposes the futilityof striving for a consensus definition of the term:

• “Encapsulating terrorism in all its varieties could require upwards offifty distinct attributes, potentially yielding an unworkable milliondifferent combinations.” (Weimann and Winn 25)

• “Terrorism can mean just what those who use the term (not the ter-rorists) want it to mean.” (Jenkins 1–2)

• Terrorism “resembles pornography, difficult to describe and define,but easy to recognize when one sees it.” (Laqueur, “Reflections onTerrorism” 381)

• Terrorism is “a catch-all pejorative, applied mainly to mattersinvolving force or political authority in some way but sometimesapplied even more broadly to just about any disliked action associ-ated with someone else’s policy agenda.” (Pillar 12)

• In the context of terrorism, there are “especially strong reasons foravoiding the excessive preoccupations with definitions.” (Roberts 9)

The flexible application of the terrorism label has been precisely what hasallowed it to remain a resonant indicator of identity for an ever-evolvingAmerican society. Its elasticity of meaning has permitted the term to adaptto changes in the international context. Early on, terrorism referred to violencecommitted by the state (i.e., during the Reign of Terror in the FrenchRevolution). Modern-day interpretations of the term have not abandoned itshistorical meaning, as presidential references to state-sponsored terrorismattest. At the same time, however, the nation’s leadership has applied the termto the very antithesis of its earlier meaning. Now terrorism involves not onlypolitically motivated violence by the state, but also that carried out by individu-als or groups against the state. Any act of violence carried out for any reason byany group or individual can conceivably qualify as an act of terrorism.


As with other ideographs, the lack of clear goals related to terrorism hasnot prevented the term from prompting the collective commitment of theAmerican public. The US citizenry has proven time and again its willingnessto unite behind military actions targeting terrorist activity. US retaliatorybombings in Libya, Afghanistan, the Sudan, and Iraq have garnered theoverwhelming support of the public.6 Even the failed rescue mission inTehran in 1980 attracted public support, because it demonstrated the Carteradministration’s willingness to do something to end the hostages’ confine-ment.7 The widespread presence of yellow (or now red, white, and blue) rib-bons, candles, American flags, and chants of “USA” at sporting events havebeen signs of the unity of the US commitment in the fight against terrorism.

The third characteristic of the ideograph is that it “warrants the use ofpower, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived aseccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easilyrecognized by a community as acceptable and laudable” (McGee 15). Thepublic accepts extreme measures due to a belief that a threat exists to thecontinued existence of the culture. Ideographs evoke an “end justifies themeans” approach, initially compromising the very foundational values thatAmerica is ultimately fighting to protect.

Even a cursory review of presidential actions in response to terrorismreveals that the term has justified response measures that the Americanpublic would not ordinarily accept from its leadership. The opening of thisbook details several of the actions that presidents have employed in order todefend the nation against terrorism. Others include asset forfeiture, govern-mental monitoring of library records and computer usage, temporary suspen-sion of the freedom to associate, revocation of a suspect’s ability to speak toan attorney in private, and the calculated risk of losing critical foreignalliances. Increasingly, civil liberties have lost their sacred status withinAmerican society as the public has felt increasingly at risk from terrorism.

The final characteristic of the ideograph is that the term’s meaning isculture-bound. Members within the society are socialized or conditioned tothe vocabulary of ideographs “as a prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the society”(McGee 15). A willingness to accept a given interpretation of the termbecomes a virtual litmus test for membership within the collective.

Perhaps no phrase better illustrates the cultural nature of the terrorismdefinition more than the oft-repeated statement that “one man’s terrorist isanother man’s freedom fighter.” In the 1970s the Ayatollah Khomeini was apowerful religious leader to one culture, while qualifying to another as adespicable zealot who enabled kidnappers of diplomatic personnel. In the1980s the Contras were alternatively depicted as a critical insurgency groupbent on bringing freedom to an oppressed nation or as a lawless group of ter-rorists who raped, kidnapped, and tortured the civilian population of


Nicaragua. By the 1990s Osama bin Laden was either the mastermind of abrutal international terrorist network or a leader of a righteous jihad,depending on one’s cultural perspective.

In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, public rejection of themaxim that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” hasbecome increasingly commonplace. A number of government officials havedenounced the view that the definition of terrorism depends on one’s culturalorientation. Given the rise in patriotism associated with the tragedies at theWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon, such opinions should not be surpris-ing. The inclination to see one’s own cultural perspective as the only inter-pretation reflects how embedded the term has become within America’sdefinition of itself. Attacked and vulnerable, the nation has less tolerance fordissension and competing views. Just as antiwar sentiments prompted accu-sations of anti-Americanism during the Vietnam War, acknowledgment ofcultural differences about terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 has constitutedan act of collective betrayal for some.

Having met the four definitional requirements, terrorism constitutes anideograph for American culture. It is a cultural-bound, abstract term of ordi-nary political discourse that warrants the use of power in ways the public hasnormally considered unacceptable. Like all conceptions of collective identity,ideographs do change. Over time, the meaning of any specific ideographboth expands and contracts in response to changing circumstances. Tounderstand the progressions of terrorism as a contemporary ideograph, thisbook will explore the shifts of the term’s meaning since the end of WorldWar II. The meaning of ideographs also changes due to interactions withother slogans characteristic of collective life (McGee 10-14). As this bookwill demonstrate, terrorism’s recurrent pairing with terms such as “piracy,”“barbarism,” “tyranny,” “slavery,” “Nazism,” and “Communism” has all con-tributed to the term’s meaning.

Administrative choices related to terrorism have ideological implicationsfor American culture. The flexible application of the terrorist label gives thenation’s leadership substantial freedom in defining the acts, agents, agencies,purposes, and scenes that will fall outside the boundaries of the culture. Theterrorist label encompasses a plethora of potential outcasts, making it a pow-erful linguistic option for those who would employ it.

For administrations that focus on crime as the featured element of theirterrorism narratives, the ideological force of the term is comparatively small.The primary reason is that conventional responses to crime concentrate onthe individual. Is the person guilty or innocent? Has the individual receivedproper due process? If punishment is warranted, is it consistent with the mit-igating circumstances of the individual’s life history? The crime metaphor’sfocus on the individual undercuts the totalizing impulse of ideology. Were an


administration to assign guilt to an entire group or class of individuals, theywould expose themselves to charges of racial profiling or judicial unfairness.

The war narrative, by contrast, invites the public to embrace an ideolog-ical perspective related to the conflict. The culture is under attack, not froman individual as the crime narrative would portend, but from a menacinggroup that threatens the continued existence of America’s cherished values.The evocation of ideological discourse, which in turn prompts the nation’srank-and-file to accept new powers and prerogatives for their leadership,leads to a spiral of events that gives impulse to cultural warfare.


2

The Vietnam War and theCommunist Terrorists

Terrorism was commonplace in South Vietnam beginning as early as the1950s. Targets included local political figures, province chiefs, teachers,

nurses, doctors, military personnel, and others who supported the nation’sinfrastructure. From 1965 through 1972, terrorists killed more than thirty-three thousand South Vietnamese and abducted another fifty-seven thousandof them. By 1971, one of every one thousand South Vietnamese had becomea reported victim of terrorism (Thayer 50–51). The assassination rate inSouth Vietnam (a figure included in official US terrorism counts) wasapproximately “50 percent higher than the murder rates of the three worstU.S. cities” (“Terrorism in South Vietnam” 15).

The Vietnam War was the first incident in the post–World War II era toprompt more than one hundred presidential speeches addressing the topic ofterrorism. While the labeling strategy of the United States evolved over time,each of the related administrations linked terrorism and Communism as pairedthreats to American interests in the region. To reinforce the association, eachrelied on the conventional Cold War narrative to publicly frame acts of terror-ism during the war. The approach recalled the nation’s war history by mappingthe terrorist tactics of the Nazis during World War II onto the Communists inVietnam. As this chapter will discuss, the strategy functioned differently forthe US audience than it did for the South Vietnamese populace. Despite thedistinctive reactions, the leadership of the United States came to understandthat, within certain contexts, terrorism could function as a powerful culturalterm capable of uniting the rank-and-file citizenry of a nation.

LABELING THE THREAT

The Kennedy administration was the first to employ terrorism as apublic justification for American involvement in the Vietnam War.

17

Spokespersons depicted the Viet Cong as “Communists” and “terrorists”interchangeably. Early in 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk demonstratedthe approach by grouping the two as members of a homogeneous collective:“During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terrorists assassinated orkidnapped over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, and civilians” (757).Kennedy comingled the two labels further by creating a linguistic mergerreminiscent of the “Nazi terrorists” of World War II. In an open letter toPresident Diem of South Vietnam, Kennedy applauded the people of SouthVietnam for their refusal to submit to “Communist terror” (Kennedy 680). Bycoupling terrorism and Communism into a companion phrase, the Kennedyadministration merged the tactics of terrorism with the ideological objectivesof Communist powers. Kennedy’s call for an international “truce to terror”(619) before the 1961 General Assembly of the United Nations therebybecame a warrant for nourishing democratic nations around the globe.

Despite having originated the phrase, the Kennedy administration’sactual use of “Communist terror” to describe events in Vietnam was infre-quent. Kennedy referenced the merger only three times, and US StateDepartment officials limited their public usage of the terms to about a dozeninstances. The Kennedy administration, having committed military advisorsto a conflict considered by many Americans to be a foreign matter, was cir-cumspect in its public discussions of Viet Cong terrorism.

When Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency, he abandoned his pre-decessor’s reticence about discussing terrorism in official public statementsabout the war. He did so on the advice of his foreign policy advisors.Johnson’s aides were concerned about terrorism’s potential to have a disas-trous impact on the outcome of the Vietnam conflict. The American ambas-sador to Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, told Johnson in June 1966 that theNorth Vietnamese believed they could win in South Vietnam “as long as they[could] do so well with local terrorism” (Memo to President 160), and amonth later noted that they considered proficiency at terrorism to be “theirace in the hole” (Telegram [27 July] 193). By August 1966, Lodge called ter-rorism a “time tested traditional Viet Cong weapon” (Telegram [10 August]208), and followed up in November the same year by noting that terrorismwas “the heart of the matter in the war in Viet-Nam” (Letter 294). For keymembers of the administration, terrorism was not a peripheral issue; it func-tioned as a primary matter that could determine the war’s outcome.

Johnson’s aides gave many reasons for their concern about terrorism inSouth Vietnam. A primary one was that their belief that terrorism correlatedwith the expanding size of the enemy. US Embassy officials in SouthVietnam argued that the Viet Cong’s ability to recruit was a direct result ofcoercion and terrorism (Nolting 152). They also worried that terrorism wassapping the strength of the South Vietnamese and their willingness to fight.


Director of Central Intelligence John McCone maintained the campaign ofViet Cong terrorism was having a demoralizing impact on the SouthVietnamese government (368). Internal concerns mounted to such a pointthat aides even resisted the option of an early bombing campaign in NorthVietnam, fearing it would spawn increased terrorist assaults by the Viet Congagainst the South Vietnamese (M. Taylor 425). In a variety of ways, theenemy’s successful campaign of terrorism appeared to be undermining theUS military effort in Vietnam.

The Johnson administration translated its private concerns about terror-ism into a public campaign of linking the terrorist label to the Communistthreat. By early 1964, the Johnson team had adopted the Kennedy strategy.A White House statement announced, “It will remain the policy of theUnited States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for aslong as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism undercontrol” (L. B. Johnson, Public Papers, 1963–1964 388). The repeated use ofthe association throughout Johnson’s tenure underscored the central theme:terrorism and Communism were to be indistinguishable concepts in theAmerican popular psyche.

For the Johnson administration, the terrorism label functioned more todelineate the agents who conducted violent acts than it did to parse the spe-cific nature of their activities. The resulting double standard allowedAmerican soldiers to commit essentially the same acts that qualified as VietCong terrorism in official US counts. When the Viet Cong attacked popula-tion centers in South Vietnam, for example, administration officials referredto the actions as an intentional, systematic campaign of terrorism; when theUnited States targeted Haiphong power plants in North Vietnam and killedlarge numbers of civilians, administration officials portrayed the action as anunfortunate case of unintended collateral damage.

Another example of the selective application of the terrorism labelinvolved US Op 39, also named Sacred Sword of the Patriots League(SSPL). The Studies and Operations Group (SOG) of the MilitaryAssistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) conducted the covert psychologi-cal operation beginning in the mid-1960s. The operation’s purpose was tocreate “in the minds of the North Vietnamese a fabricated resistance organi-zation” (Schultz 139). The administration wanted the North Vietnamese tobelieve that the Vietnamese citizenry had established an effective resistanceorganization, but did not want to assume the risks of an actual oppositionalmovement. It achieved both purposes by approving an act of covert decep-tion, while prohibiting SOG from actually liberating any North Vietnameseterritory (138).

Operating within the leadership’s constraints, SOG created a mockNorth Vietnamese fishing village on the island of Cu Lao Cham (also known

The Vietnam War and the Communist Terrorists 19

as Paradise Island), located south of the 17th parallel. Beginning in May1964, SOG used unmarked gunboats manned with Vietnamese speakers toabduct more than one thousand North Vietnamese fishermen and bringthem to the island. En route, SOG operatives bound, blindfolded, andplaced the fisherman below deck in an effort to confuse them into believingthey were still in North Vietnam. Many detainees faced trial, conviction, anddeath sentences from SSPL “courts” after arriving on Cu Lao Cham. Thedetainees, subsequently offered clemency for their allegiance to SSPL,“chose” to participate in a three-week indoctrination program about the goalsof the resistance organization. They received high-calorie food and neededmedical care so that upon their return, other North Vietnamese would wit-ness the benefits of “joining” the resistance movement (Schultz 146–47).Had the kidnappings of Op 39 been carried out by the Viet Cong, theywould have fallen within the official count of terrorist atrocities; when con-ducted by US forces, they qualified as covert military tactics necessary toachieve success in the overall war effort.

Perhaps the most infamous example of the Johnson administration’sselective use of the terrorism label involved the Phoenix Project. The CIAofficially began the program in July 1968 and continued it in various config-urations until 1972. The main objective of the project was to undermine anddestroy the political infrastructure of the Viet Cong through acts of intimi-dation, torture, kidnapping, and killing (Dunnigan and Nofi 195). In form,it was not unlike the North Vietnamese strategy of sending guerilla forcesinto South Vietnam to assassinate critical personnel, an approach US officialsinsisted was terrorism (Bernstein 335). Phoenix operatives dramaticallyaffected 65,000 Viet Cong throughout the war, including 20,000 killed,28,000 captured, and 17,000 turned (Dunnigan and Nofi 196). As oneJohnson biographer surmised, “Sometimes the Viet Cong would have to killa few villagers to make their point, and after a time, profiting from theirlesson, the generous Americans had to do that, too” (M. Miller 466).

The Nixon administration was more circumspect than the Johnsonadministration in its usage of the Communist terrorist label. It adopted adual approach for public discussions of terrorism during the war: one forNixon himself and another for his aides. In his own public statements, Nixongenerally refrained from labeling the actions of the Viet Cong or the NorthVietnamese as terrorism. He depicted Communist acts as aggression, ratherthan as terrorism. At home, Nixon announced his 1972 decision to adopt aless inflammatory, more conciliatory approach, claiming he was exercising “adegree of restraint unprecedented in the annals of war” (Public Papers, 1972585). By adopting such a posture, he portrayed himself as the best hope forpeace in Southeast Asia.


Somewhat ironic within such a rhetorical context was Nixon’s use of themost inflammatory terrorism analogy of all US leaders during the VietnamWar era. Speaking to the nation in 1969, he compared the actions of theCommunists in South Vietnam to those of the French revolutionaries duringthe 1793–94 Reign of Terror (Public Papers, 1969 902). By recalling one ofthe most heinous periods of state terror in history, one in which 40,000French citizens received death sentences for alleged disloyalty to the state(Fromkin 684), Nixon suggested the North Vietnamese had placed theVietnamese people themselves at risk for attempting to exercise their ownrights of self-determination.

Nixon’s executive branch surrogates publicly countered his own postureof conciliation. The State Department’s diplomats, seeking concessions thatwould leave the United States a dignified exit from the conflict, adopted amore assertive, confrontational approach. The officials made explicit andrepeated reference to Viet Cong terrorism at the Paris peace talks. In anopening statement at the 15th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam, for example,Ambassador Lodge reminded the world community, the Viet Cong “assassi-nate village and hamlet officials who are duly elected by the people. Each dayinnocent civilians die because of [the Viet Cong’s] tactics of terror and vio-lence” (419). The pointed reference to Viet Cong involvement with terrorismbecame a mainstay of each Paris session held to resolve the conflict.

Besides adopting a bifurcated public strategy within his administration,Nixon strayed from the public communication strategies of his predecessorsby expanding the definition of who qualified as a terrorist. Unwilling torestrict the label’s application to the nation’s enemies abroad, Nixon used theterm “terrorism” to depict the actions of American students protesting hisadministration’s war policies. He was particularly inclined to do so whenspeaking on the record, but without the benefit of a prepared statement. Inone 1970 incident, a reporter asked him whether he wished to rethink hisearlier reference to Americans opposing the Vietnam War as “bums.” Nixondeclined, offering the explanation, “[. . .] when students on university cam-puses burn buildings, when they engage in violence, when they break up fur-niture, when they terrorize their fellow students and terrorize the faculty,then I think ‘bums’ is perhaps too kind a word to apply to that kind ofperson” (Public Papers, 1970 417). Nixon became more strident after protest-ers struck his presidential motorcade with rocks following his speech in SanJose, California, during the 1970 congressional campaigns. Noticeably irri-tated, he urged the nation to seek solutions to the “violence and terrorism bythe radical antidemocratic elements in our society” (1027). For Nixon, ter-rorists encompassed a broad range of individuals who opposed his adminis-tration’s policies, both at home and abroad.


The three administrations involved in the US labeling strategy duringthe Vietnam War forecast much of what was to come. They demonstratedthat who qualified as terrorists was a matter of interpretation—indeed, onethat could benefit both the United States as a whole and the political partyin power. Further, the term’s flexible meaning allowed for an easy mergerwith other terms of enmity already carrying persuasive force with theAmerican public. The merger with Communism heightened the ideologicalfunction of the terrorist label. In an effort that reinforced the connection,the US leadership relied on the Cold War narrative to frame the events ofthe Vietnam War.

THE TERRORIST NARRATIVE IN THE VIETNAM WAR

For more than four decades, the Cold War dominated American foreignpolicy. The Cold War was unique within the history of US warfare, given itsprimary reliance on rhetorically constituted, imagined threats all fallingwithin the framework of what the Soviet Union might do next (Medhurst,“Rhetoric and Cold War” 19-21). Not tied to a single, provocative act of vio-lence, the Cold War provided a framework whereby successive administra-tions renegotiated the global power relationships in the post–World War IIera. Communication scholars analyzing the Cold War campaign argue thatsuch rhetoric had two primary purposes: to foster the strategic interests ofthe two military superpowers and to avoid nuclear war in the process(Medhurst, “Rhetoric and Cold War” 19–27; Scott 1–16; Hinds and Windt;Newman 55–94; Cragan 47–66).

The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations borrowed heavilyfrom Cold War discourse to depict the scene, characters, and themes of theVietnam War. Coming off the Korean conflict, the presidents could applythe Cold War narrative as a well-rehearsed public framework for under-standing the events in Vietnam. The approach transformed a conflict ofremote interest to most Americans into a resonant battleground in the ongo-ing, worldwide struggle between democracy and Communism.

Rhetorical theorists maintain that the essence of the Cold War narra-tive, including its scene, characters, and themes, recurs predictably in thepublic discourse of the presidency (Medhurst, “Rhetoric and Cold War” 26;Scott 11–13). Conventional cold warriors locate the scene of their narrativein the newly free nations around the globe. They argue that the defeat of fas-cism coming at the end of World War II left many nations on the precipiceof enhanced freedom and liberty. More uncertain was whether those samenations could nurture their newly acquired freedoms into full-fledge democ-ratic regimes, with the attendant rights and privileges of self-determination.


Robert Ivie’s analysis of Vietnam War metaphors illuminates the conven-tional setting found in the Cold War narrative: “Cold War rhetors talk vari-ously of the beacon of liberty as a flickering flame, freedom as a frail bodythreatened by the cancer of Communism, as a defenseless quarry set upon byrelentless predators, and so on” (75). In the Cold War narrative, the depictedscene is precarious, requiring a strong commitment by both the UnitedStates and the emerging democratic nation to bring the promise of self-determination to fruition.

In presidential discourse focusing on terrorism in Vietnam, SouthVietnam functioned as the emerging democracy that required assistance toensure its own freedom. The administration depicted South Vietnam,attacked by forces outside its own border, as having no realistic hope ofdefending itself without US military assistance. As Johnson reasoned in1965, “Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselvesand alone, resist the growing might and the grasping ambition of Asiancommunism” (Public Papers, 1965 794). Even when Nixon touted Vietna-mization (his policy requiring South Vietnam to become increasingly respon-sible for its own defense), he portrayed South Vietnam as incapable ofmounting an effective indigenous defense. In 1969, he placed the blame forthat situation on the Johnson administration: “The policy of the previousadministration [. . .] did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening theSouth Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left”(Public Papers, 1969 906). Throughout the years of American involvement inthe conflict, administration rhetoric portrayed South Vietnam as a fragiledemocracy requiring external assistance to protect its commitment to emerg-ing freedom and liberty.

As the Vietnam War entered its second decade, the Nixon administra-tion’s narrative expanded the scope of fragile freedom beyond SouthVietnam. Advocating what became to be known as the domino theory,Nixon maintained that other fledgling democracies also would be at riskshould South Vietnam fall to the Communists. He reasoned an immediateAmerican pullout of forces would be a mistake, for it would set the stage forincreased aggression worldwide. In 1972, he warned, “[A]bandoning ourcommitment in Vietnam here and now would mean turning 17 millionSouth Vietnamese over to Communist tyranny and terror. [. . .] An Ameri-can defeat in Vietnam would encourage this kind of aggression all over theworld, aggression in which smaller nations armed by their major allies couldbe tempted to attack neighboring nations at will in the Mideast, in Europe,and other areas. World peace would be in grave jeopardy” (Public Papers,1972 584). Expanding the scope of vulnerable democracies beyond SoutheastAsia, the administration’s narrative heightened the need to attend urgently tothe scene.


Conventional cold warriors depict Communists as the characters whothreaten the fragile scene of emerging peace and freedom around the globe.Within such portrayals Communist motivations are always destructive.Likened to Hitler’s fascists, Communists seek to impose totalitarian rule onthe objects of their triumphs as a necessary first step toward the ultimategoal of worldwide conquest (Cragan 52). Within this perspectiveCommunists are willing to rely on ruthless and barbaric means to achievetheir expansive, destructive objectives (D. Campbell 15–33). The acts ofsavagery of Communists lie in sharp contrast with the behavior of the restof the civilized world.

In the Vietnam narrative, it was the Viet Cong, supported by the NorthVietnamese and the Communist Chinese, who sought to destroy the non-Communist government of South Vietnam. The Kennedy administrationinsisted that North Vietnam, fearful of unfavorable comparisons between thegrowing economy of South Vietnam and its own languishing economy undera Communist dictatorship, used terror to reverse the economic and educa-tional advances of South Vietnam. In his open letter to the president ofSouth Vietnam, Kennedy applauded South Vietnam’s rice exports, new hos-pitals, improved roads, and new schools, while chiding the perversity of theNorth Vietnamese government for wanting to undermine those very achieve-ments. He told the people of South Vietnam, “The Communist response tothe growing strength and prosperity of your people was to send terror intoyour villages, to burn your new schools and to make ambushes of your newroads” (680). From Kennedy’s public perspective, the Communists hoped todupe fragile democracies into changing their political allegiance by under-mining the advances of democratic societies.

The presidents in the Vietnam era insisted the Communist alliancesought to enslave the South Vietnamese citizenry. Administration accountsemphasized the Communist’s intention to deny the South Vietnamese theirrights of self-determination. Their public statements paired “Communism”with terms of domination such as “aggression,” “Communist slavery,”“Communist masters,” “dictatorial control,” “tyranny,” “totalitarianism,” and“dictatorship.” Within the administrations’ frame, the citizenry of SouthVietnam had no hope of determining their destiny under Communist rule.

The Communists’ thirst for domination was not limited to SouthVietnam. Roger Hilsman, the assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs,introduced the theme of world conquest to the 1963 Conference on ColdWar Education, when he stated, “ [T]he aim of the Chinese Communist isto gain predominant control in Asia and eventually to secure the establish-ment of Communist regimes throughout the world” (44). The Johnsonadministration warned that South Vietnam was critical to the Communistbelief they could actually achieve world domination. Public officials argued


that the Chinese would use a Communist success in Vietnam to demonstrateto the Soviet Union that wars of liberation could be fought and won aroundthe globe (see McNamara, “United States Policy in Viet-Nam” 562–70). Thepotential threat posed by a joint Sino-Soviet enemy elevated the importanceof defeating the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

Having rendered all Communists both in and outside North Vietnam asunited in wanting to achieve world conquest, the Vietnam narrative depictedthe enemy’s means in a similarly homogenous fashion. The nation’s leader-ship maintained that North Vietnam and all of its surrogate forces plannedto engage in a “war of unparalleled brutality” (L. B. Johnson, Public Papers,1966 394), because they could not defeat the combined forces fighting forSouth Vietnam in a traditional military confrontation. The presidents andtheir State Department officials cataloged assassinations, kidnappings, stran-gulations, harassment, and destruction of civilian property as the common-place and unconventional tactics of the Viet Cong. The enemy’s barbarityserved not only to vilify the Communist Party, but became the public ratio-nale for why US troops had to resort to unconventional methods themselves.

The targets of Viet Cong terrorism contributed to the image ofCommunist barbarity. Victims included schoolteachers, local chiefs, andmedical personnel. The Viet Cong also attacked roads and communicationsystems. Such targets were critical components of the societal infrastructurethat, when disrupted, raised doubts about the effectiveness of the SouthVietnamese government. In 1967, Lyndon Johnson warned of the conse-quences if the terrorist’s strategy succeeded: “The terrorist knows that if hecan break down this fabric of community life, then he is well on his way toconquest” (Public Papers, 1967 1235). The narrative portrayed terrorists asthreatening civilization both through their targets and their violent methods.

Finally, the discourse of the US government maintained theCommunist alliance of the Viet Cong, the Communist Chinese, and theNorth Vietnamese was not to be trusted. Administration spokespersons cat-aloged historical instances of the Communists’ false promises to reinforcethe dishonesty theme: the Communists conducted campaigns of terrorismagainst the citizenry in secret; they attempted to hide those who weredirecting, supplying, and supporting their efforts; they violated their com-mitments codified into the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962; they repeat-edly changed their requirements for negotiating a peaceful settlement to theconflict; and they set up phony organizations, such as the NationalLiberation Front (NLF), to make the conflict in Vietnam appear to be civilwar. The US State Department’s own white paper, “Aggression from theNorth,” emphasized the sharp divisions between appearance and realityassociated with the Communist threat. The report was unequivocal in itsconclusions regarding Communist duplicity: “The National Front for the


Liberation of South Viet-Nam is the screen behind which the Communistscarry out their program of conquest” (422). If the Communists could be suc-cessfully cast as untrustworthy, any claims the opposition might makeregarding their limited objectives, justified means, or constructive outcomesfor South Vietnam became presumptively false.

For conventional cold warriors, a strong national character is essentialfor an effective response to the Communist threat. Rhetorical analysts main-tain that America, as the narrative’s hero, adopts the persona of a missionaryfor freedom within the narrative (Wander 153–83). Cold War discourse issteeped in religious references, presenting America as righteous and commit-ted to the sacred cause of freedom (Cragan 58). Communication scholarPhillip Wander dubs the approach “prophetic dualism,” (157) and explains itthis way: “One side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at onewith God’s will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between themis resolved only through the total victory of one side over the other” (ibid.).As missionary for the divine, the United States acts not only to assist thosecountries too weak to defend themselves, but also to liberate itself. Americabecomes the hero who can “barely tolerate and no long endure a world thatwas half free and half slave” (Cragan 62). For good to triumph over evil inaccordance with God’s will, the US government cannot act alone; the publicmust also have faith in the American cause (58).

Consistent with Cold War expectations, then, the United Statesassumed the role of missionary for freedom in the Vietnam War narrative.Politically, the United States sought elections free from terror that wouldpermit the South Vietnamese people to exercise their rights of self-determi-nation. Terms such as “freedom,” “justice,” “fairness,” “independence,” and“self-determination” pervaded the discourse. In 1965, Johnson made thepolitical goals of the United States explicit when he announced, “[W]e insistand we will always insist that the people of South Viet-Nam shall have theright of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in theSouth and throughout all Viet-Nam under international supervision, andthey shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terroras long as we can prevent it” (Public Papers, 1965 796–97). Committed tofreedom and the right of self-determination, the United States stood rhetor-ically as a strong counterbalance to the communist menace.

In the economic arena, the narrative presented the United States ascommitted to increasing the prosperity of the people of Vietnam. Goals ofprogress, human welfare, economic growth, rural development, and educa-tion were recurrent themes throughout administration discourse. The UnitedStates was both willing and able to expend significant resources to ensure theeconomic growth necessary to stabilize Vietnam. Following a 1966 meetingof the highest-level officials of both South Vietnam and the United States in


Honolulu, Johnson called for a revolutionary transformation in the Vietnameconomy that could not “wait until the guns grow silent and until the terror-ism stops” (Public Papers, 1966 156). Within the rhetorical vision, the UnitedStates was committed to rebuilding the South Vietnamese economy, even asopposing forces tried to dismantle it.

The narrative depicted the final goal of the United States to be therestoration of peace in South Vietnam. By coming to the aid of small coun-tries unable to defend their own freedom, the United States ensured thesecurity of all (including itself). Evoking the words of his predecessor, HarryTruman, Johnson declared in 1967, “We shall not realize our objectivesunless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutionsand their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to imposeupon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognitionthat totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirectaggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence thesecurity of the United States” (Public Papers, 1967 317–18). By emphasizingthe mutual interests of protecting South Vietnamese security, the UnitedStates underscored the depth of its commitment to its ally’s defense.

Administration officials posited that the United States, with its commit-ment to constructive rather than destructive methods, offered the best hopefor the future of Vietnam. The narrative held that the United States relied onmeans consistent with its divine mission and distinguishable from its evilcounterpart. In the diplomatic arena, officials maintained South Vietnamcould trust the United States to uphold its commitments. Administrationspeakers stressed that America had previously upheld its responsibilities inrelation to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. In the economic arena,South Vietnam could trust the United States to rebuild Vietnam. In April1965 Johnson demonstrated his commitment to Vietnam’s economic futureby announcing a one billion dollar development effort of the Mekong RiverDelta, a project designed to provide food, water, and power “on a scale todwarf even our own TVA” (Public Papers, 1965 397). In the military arena,the narrative portrayed US tactics as honorable. Governmental spokespersonsinsisted the United States exercised careful restraint in selecting bombingsites to minimize civilian casualties, rather than intentionally targeting civil-ians to wreck havoc among the citizenry. As Johnson surmised in a newsconference in 1966, “We were very careful not to get out of the target area, inorder not to affect civilian populations” (Public Papers, 1966 751). Drawingsharp contrasts between democracy and Communism, the approach posi-tioned the United States to be a trustworthy ally whether in the political,economic, or security arenas.

In sum, the Vietnam War narrative was consistent with the conventionalexpectations of Cold War discourse. With barbaric Communists poised to


dismantle fragile democracies in their drive to achieve global conquest, theUnited States had a missionary obligation to further the political, economic,and security interests of foreign nations at risk. The Cold War narrativeframed the Vietnam War as an ideological conflict with important culturalvalues at stake. As the remainder of the chapter will argue, the receptivity tothat message depended on who was listening.


The frequent use of the “Communist terrorist” phrase within the Cold Warnarrative implies that terrorism served an ideological purpose for theKennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. Closer examination, how-ever, reveals that the actual function of the phrase was not so straightforward.Merger of the two terms within a single overarching label allowed differentaudiences to interpret the meaning of the phrase in different ways. Morespecifically, American and South Vietnamese audiences harbored distinctivevisions of the enemy subsumed under the rubric of the “Communist terror-ist.” The encompassing nature of the phrase permitted the two audiences tocoalesce around mutual, yet distinctive, interpretations of the opposing forcesin the war.

The American public focused on fighting Communism as its impetusfor supporting the war effort. In a briefing of twenty columnists and politicalpollsters in early January 1968, Lou Harris reported that forty-five percent ofthe public identified the one main objective in Vietnam to be “to stopCommunist aggression once and for all in Southeast Asia” (as qtd. inPanzer). Johnson’s press secretary, Bill Moyers, echoed Harris’s finding inwritten correspondence to the president: “The American people believe thatwe are in South Vietnam to draw the line. If we don’t stop the Communistshere, they will take over all of Asia.” Johnson’s internal pollster, Fred Panzer,pressed the point, concluding that the American public was “definitely sup-porting the Adm. position that the war [was] preventing further Communistaggression in Southeast Asia.” Those with primary responsibility for craftingJohnson’s public message all agreed: the public’s chief concern in the wareffort was Communism.

Even for US citizens who supported an American withdrawal fromVietnam, interjection of the term “Communism” into the polling questionsenhanced support for Johnson’s handling of the war effort. Forty-nine per-cent of those who reported they believed the United States should get out ofVietnam changed their minds when asked the follow-up question: “Wouldyou still want to get out of Vietnam if that meant losing it to theCommunists?” Fifty-three percent of the same antiwar group changed their


minds when asked the follow-up: “Would you still want to get out ofVietnam if that meant that Americans would be fighting future wars againstthe Communists?” (Watson). The potency of the Communist label withdomestic audiences resided in the term’s apparent ability to unite both pro-and antiwar elements.

By contrast, the role served by terrorism in the popular psyche of theAmerican public was more illusory. No internal polls within the Johnsonadministration asked open-ended questions regarding why America was inVietnam. Of those tailoring a list of possible answers for the nation’s involve-ment, terrorism was not a response option (Memo to Bundy et al.; [US]Dept. of State, “American Opinion Summary”). The internal poll that cameclosest to asking if Americans considered terrorism a sufficient reason for USinvolvement in Vietnam was a Harris Poll conducted in January 1975. In aconfidential poll conducted for the leadership’s eyes only, respondents wereoffered five possible explanations for US involvement and asked their degreeof agreement with each option. The five options included: to win victoryover aggression, to defend the security of the United States, to help a non-Communist nation resist Communism, to stop Communist infiltration, andto try to keep the Communists from taking over all of Southeast Asia. Afterdiscovering that seventy-one percent of the population indicated that stop-ping Communist infiltration was very important and another sixteen percentfound it somewhat important, Bill Moyers wrote in the margins of thereport’s findings for Johnson’s review, “This indicates a fair understanding onthe part of the American people of the guerilla warfare.” Whether the result,“Communist infiltration,” actually constituted guerrilla warfare or could bestretched to mean terrorism remains uncertain. Like other internal trackingpolls, no specific question about terrorism appeared on the survey.

If Communism, rather than terrorism, guided American thinking aboutthe war, the reverse was true for the people of South Vietnam. Early afterassuming office, members of the Johnson administration considered terror-ism the dominant concern of the South Vietnamese populace. Fearful that aworried South Vietnam might vote for a Communist leader if given theopportunity in free elections, Johnson hired the independent polling firm ofOliver Quayle and Company to determine how the United States might pre-vent such an outcome.

The firm undertook two tasks to assess the mind-set of the SouthVietnamese people. Initially, they reviewed all previous administrationpolling of South Vietnam conducted from fall 1964 through fall 1966.Then, they carried out an internal poll using Vietnamese interviewerstrained by Dr. Robert Sullivan of the United States Information Agency(USIA). Sullivan’s group conduced 974 personal interviews with the citizensof South Vietnam from October 17, 1965 through December 23, 1965.


Sampled from ninety-seven percent of the South Vietnamese population, theQuayle poll only excluded areas heavily controlled by the Viet Cong or those socontested that they would risk the safety of the interviewers (“Quayle Study”).

It could be argued that any Johnson-backed assessment of SouthVietnamese attitudes was biased, but the Quayle study did constitute themost extensive public opinion analysis conducted during the war. Besidesbeing stronger methodologically than prior polling, the study’s findingswere also consistent with field reports from South Vietnamese comman-ders. Provincial representatives in South Vietnam for some time hadwarned the American Embassy that “support exists for the GVN in directproportion to the degree of security established by government forces”([American] Embassy in Vietnam 306). Finally, as the following willdemonstrate, the Johnson administration quickly acted upon the recom-mendations in the Quayle report.

Quayle & Co. showed that stopping terrorism, not Communism, wasthe overriding concern of the South Vietnamese. The Quayle report of previ-ous internal administration polling revealed the Vietnamese “just didn’t careabout the war, the ideological struggle between the forces of Communismand freedom and the need for a better government for the nation” (“Survey”).The results of the new Quayle poll echoed the point. The interviewers foundthat the most apt adjective to describe the people of South Vietnam in 1965was apathetic. They attributed the sources of apathy to be the fear of terroristattacks by the Viet Cong, the repeated unwillingness of the SouthVietnamese government to stand up to these attacks, and the looting andcruelty carried out by the ARVN forces themselves. While the poll’s resultsshowed that sixty-four percent of the South Vietnamese expressing supportfor the present government with only twenty-nine percent supporting theLiberation Front, the Quayle report warned that a “campaign of terror couldchange that” (“Quayle Study”). The report concluded that above all else,eradicating terrorism was the chief concern of the people of South Vietnam.For them, it was the equivalent of personal and cultural survival.

The Quayle report recommended that the Johnson administration insti-tute a public campaign of reinforcing the linkage between the Viet Cong andterrorism. In the words of the report, “[T]he political struggle must beplanned to tag the VC and the NLF as terrorists who have caused violenceand strife here. If we can be forgiven, it should be made clear that the choiceis between ‘the good guys’ and ‘the bad guys’” (“Quayle Study”). The reportmaintained that such a strategy would be effective because of the perceptualleanings of the South Vietnamese. At the time of the survey in late 1965, theinterviewers found, “People definitely think of VC as enemy,” and “theessence of the VC image is terrorism.” Reinforcing those perceptions andmapping the chief concern of the South Vietnamese onto the enemy offered


the most hopeful prospect that the South Vietnamese elections would resultin a democratic administration.

Within three months of having received the Quayle report, the Johnsonadministration began implementing its recommendations. On April 5, 1965,the administration established the Joint United States Public Affairs Offices(JUSPAO) under the auspices of USIA. JUSPAO became the organizationcharged with carrying out all psychological operations in Vietnam. The orga-nization adopted multiple strategies for reinforcing the linkage betweenCommunism and terrorism. Among them, it distributed select Johnson quo-tations about Viet Cong terror, repression, and murder to the people ofSouth Vietnam (“Trial Leaflets”).

JUSPAO spread Johnson’s message by dropping leaflets that recalledspecific instances of terrorism committed against the South Vietnamesepeople. The messages, written in Vietnamese, reminded the citizenry thatthe Viet Cong and its backers were the primary source of terrorism. Oneleaflet described the National Liberation Front’s execution of US Sgt.Harold Bennett, as well as the terrorist bombing of the My Canh restaurantin Saigon, an incident that killed forty-four people from Vietnam, America,France, Switzerland, and the Philippines. A translation of the leaflet read,“Among the victims were women and little children. The so-calledLiberation Front knew that more civilians stroll along the riverfront near thisrestaurant after the day’s heat and that large numbers of workers and childrengather there” (“Trial Leaflets”). By emphasizing that Communists used ter-rorism intentionally to target civilian populations, the leaflets worked to vilifythe enemy and keep terrorism a central public concern.

In a February 1966 memo written to USIA headquarters in Washing-ton, JUSPAO touted the effectiveness of its efforts to reinforce the image ofthe Viet Cong as terrorists. After describing to senior USIA officials threeexamples of successful leaflet missions, the memo explained why JUSPAObelieved its communication campaign had been effective:

Rather than accenting the horror of the bombings that would haveaided the VC in accomplishing their goal of striking fear in thehearts of the local populace, emphasis was placed on the fact thatthe VC was cutting off individuals in the area from their source ofincome as well as from their friends. A special point was made ineach of the leaflets circulated that it was ordinary people who werebeing killed, not GNV officials or soldiers. The question wasrepeatedly brought up on all propaganda materials produced: “[I]sthis the action of a group desiring national liberation?” Photographsof victims were utilized only in cases where resentment to the atroc-ity would be aroused rather than fear; for example, photographs


showing mothers and small children killed by the bombings.(Memo to USIA)

The memo revealed the administration’s public strategy on a number oflevels. First, it demonstrated that the United States was striving to disassoci-ate itself from terrorism, even to the point that the nation’s propagandaavoided the use of vivid examples that might further frighten the SouthVietnamese. Second, it showed JUSPAO’s intention to reinforce, if not ele-vate, the nation’s fear about terrorism by heightening public identificationwith the victims of Communist terrorism. The primary theme reiteratedacross JUSPAO operations was that the National Liberation Front did notengage military forces for the cause of liberation; instead, it sought only toterrorize innocent civilian populations into succumbing to its will.

The JUSPAO campaign to tag the Viet Cong terrorists was an enor-mous effort. In its article “US Drops Passes to Spur Red Defections,” theMilwaukee Journal reported that by the end of March 1966, the UnitedStates had dropped more than 133 million leaflets on South Vietnam andbroadcasted similar themes six and a half hours per day on Voice of America.The magnitude of the campaign was so large that it severely impacted bud-getary allocations within the USIA. In FY 1967, Deputy Director HewsonRyan complained to his superiors at USIA that the effort required $12 mil-lion and approximately one-eighth of its manpower worldwide for the infor-mation campaign in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. The size and expense ofthe campaign underscored the importance the Johnson administration placedon strengthening the association between terrorism and the Viet Cong in theminds of the South Vietnamese.

Having moved on one front to associate the Viet Cong with terrorism,the Johnson administration simultaneously sought to disassociate the violentactions of the United States and its allies from similar interpretations. Theapproach had ideological implications with ramifications for enhanced powerby the US and allied forces. The government wanted a highly visible pro-gram of counterterrorism that would convince the South Vietnamese that ademocratic regime offered their best hope for security. The administrationsettled on a program, initially named the “strategic hamlet program” andlater called the “pacification program.” The approach called for the relocationof many South Vietnamese into strategic enclaves, the establishment of alocal security force, the identification and elimination of hidden VC cells, theestablishment of institutions of local government, and the commencement ofprograms for economic and social development (Bell).

The Johnson administration’s commitment to this high-profile coun-terterrorism program continued even in the face of mounting evidence theprogram was a resounding failure. Strategic enclaves became controversial


within the Johnson administration because of their lack of fortification, theirlack of effective leadership, their Viet Cong infiltration of up to eighty per-cent, and their negative impact on the effort to improve the self-sufficiencyof the South Vietnamese (Helms). By early 1965, the administration’s intel-ligence advised, “Enclaves can probably prevent the VC from completelyoverrunning the nation, but they will also prevent the rehabilitation of thenation—and they will deny the people what this survey tells us they clearlywant [. . .] security from the VC, better government and above all else, agreater measure of economic dignity” (Quayle, “Survey”). Needing a visibleprogram of counterterrorism in South Vietnam, the US government never-theless continued its support for a program it knew had questionable value.More shocking, however, was the fact that the leadership remained dedicatedto the approach even when the South Vietnamese government pronounced itwould need to burn some local villages to accomplish the relocation effort(Memo for the Record).

The rubric of counterterrorism also became the public strategy for thosein the administration who favored expanding the bombing campaign intoNorth Vietnam. The role combating terrorism played in justifying militaryattacks against North Vietnam became obvious in the planning documents ofJohnson’s National Security Council. In preparation for a meeting of theJoint Chiefs of Staff in early April 1964, NSC staff member MichaelForrestal submitted a draft plan for justifying South Vietnamese and US mil-itary action in North Vietnam. After outlining a series of proposed domesticand foreign diplomatic initiatives that should precede military action,Forrestal recommended the next step: “On the assumption that no changeoccurs in NVN attitude and behavior, Khanh makes speech immediatelyafter appropriate VC incident, i.e., cutting of rail line, killing of U.S. person-nel or destruction of POL dump; announces need to inflict appropriate typeof damage on NVN. Khanh deplores necessity of taking such action and sit-uation that makes it necessary for SVN to send military force to North,instead of food and medicine. First targeted attack occurs as promptly aspossible.” In Forrestal’s plan, the particulars of a given terrorist act were notrelevant to the decision to use force; any act of Viet Cong terrorism served asa sufficient public rationale for military action in the region.

By early in 1965, the administration implemented the plan for using ter-rorism to justify bombing North Vietnam. Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara wrote a memo to Johnson to remind him of the decision to pub-licly blame terrorism for US military escalation in the public arena. He notedthat official spokespersons would describe the bombing program as havingbegun “in an atmosphere of reprisal” (100) for the attacks on Bien HoaAirfield and the bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. Later in the corre-spondence, however, McNamara cited the administration’s actual rationales


for instigating the bombing program. He listed five benefits the administra-tion hoped to achieve by escalating the campaign: promoting a settlement,interdicting infiltration, demonstrating US long-term commitment toVietnam, raising morale in South Vietnam, and reducing criticism of theadministration from advocates of a bombing program (ibid.). Terrorism, inshort, became the public excuse for expanded military action.

The Johnson administration also used counterterrorism to justify its sys-tematic defoliation program. Administration officials defended the program,Operation RANCH HAND, as a necessary step to remove the vegetationgrown to feed the Viet Cong forces and provide cover for the enemy terroriz-ing the people of South Vietnam. During the 1967 campaign alone, theTwelfth Air Commando Squadron used 4,879,000 gallons of herbicides,defoliating 1,226,823 acres in South Vietnam and destroying 148,418 acresof crops (Cecil 109). The military historian and former RANCH HANDpilot Paul Cecil notes that Washington authorized approximately half thearea of South Vietnam to undergo defoliation (ibid.). Before the end of theVietnam War, the United States defoliated almost 4 million acres of SouthVietnam at least once, a factor that contributed to the forty-five percentcasualty rate among civilians during the war (Bornet 276).

The negative consequences of the defoliation program became evidentearly in the war. By 1967, scholars denounced the crop destruction programfor its disproportionate impact on the elderly, small children, and childbearingwomen. By 1969, concerns mounted regarding the impact of herbicides, suchas Agent Orange, on the health and welfare of US troops participating inVietnam. Even State Department officials voiced opposition to the program,arguing the program’s adverse impacts on the civilians provided the VietCong with strong propaganda to use against the United States (Cecil 52).

A final example of how the administration used counterterrorism as ajustification for increased powers during the Vietnam War involved assassi-nation and murder. In the aftermath of the Tet offensive, shocked Americanaudiences saw an AP photograph showing General Nguyen Ngoc Loan,head of South Vietnam’s national police, aiming a pistol point-blank into thehead of a bound Viet Cong prisoner in the streets of Saigon. Loan summar-ily executed the man without the benefit of a trial. The South Vietnamesegovernment later claimed the man was a Viet Cong captain involved in theterrorist killing of a policemen and his family. In preparation for an upcom-ing NBC-TV program taking up the incident, Special Assistant for NationalSecurity Affairs Bill Bundy provided a series of general talking points forIllinois senator Paul Douglas and Wyoming senator Gale McGee to use.Bundy wrote that one of several general points the senators could use forrebuttal argument should be: “Nobody will excuse this act, but it must belooked at in the light of a situation where Loan undoubtedly knew, as every-


body did, that the VC had just been murdering civilians, including the wivesand families of officials all over Saigon. He acted in hot blood, and this is notthe first time that there have been such summary executions in wars in Asiaor elsewhere.” As the Loan example dramatically illustrated, the Johnsonadministration justified a wide variety of US and allied actions by consideringthem in the context of terrorism and counterterrorism.

Taken together, the available evidence supports the contention that theJohnson administration took the advice of the Quayle report to present theVietnam contest as a conflict between good and evil. All violent acts of theViet Cong, the NLF, or the North Vietnamese were terrorism. All actionsby the United States and its allies were counterterrorism. Administrationofficials used counterterrorism to justify the displacement of its ally’s citizens,the bombing of a nation that had not declared war on the United States, thedestruction of a nation’s food supply, and the execution of alleged suspectswithout the benefit of a trial. Because these actions were cast as responses toterrorist acts of the enemy, they functioned within the public campaign asnecessary steps for ensuring the security of the Vietnamese populace.

The Johnson administration capitalized on the power of the terrorismlabel to prevail in the Vietnamese elections of September 11, 1966. On theday of and the day before the elections, the Viet Cong did their part to but-tress the US strategy. They increased the number of terrorist attacks to 166,a fivefold increase from the daily average of the previous month (Joint USPublic Affairs Office, General Briefing Book). For perhaps the first time inthe post–World War II era, America’s leadership both understood andexploited the potential cultural significance of the terrorism label. The SouthVietnamese, fearful for their own personal safety, were susceptible to appealsto unite behind anyone who could counter the terrorist threat. The specificsof how the leaders would proceed became secondary concerns to the princi-pal outcome of national security.

Despite the short-term political gains associated with use of the ter-rorism label, the rhetorical approach was not without consequence. Whenthe United States pulled its troops out of the region and left the SouthVietnamese people to defend themselves (unsuccessfully), the “Commu-nist terrorist” became the victor. The end of the Cold War two decadeslater allowed the United States to publicly reclaim its victor status indemocracy’s ideological contest with Communism. However, the power ofterrorism to succeed in conflicts with the United States remained anongoing legacy of the Vietnam conflict. America’s vulnerability to terror-ism would become evident only too soon. This time, the nation’s leaderwould be unwilling to unleash the full ideological potential of the terror-ism label, with the result that both the nation and the president himselfwould suffer consequences.


3

The Iranian Hostage Crisis:An American Tragedy

On November 4, 1979, several thousand demonstrators gathered outsidethe United States Embassy in Tehran and began shouting anti-

American slogans. At approximately 10:30 a.m., some of the demonstratorsscaled the compound walls and forced their way into the basement and firstfloor of the chancery building. Within a few hours, the demonstrators tookcontrol of the embassy and held sixty-three Americans hostage. Three otherAmericans—Chargé d’Affaires Bruce Laingen, Political Counselor VictorTomseth, and Security Officer Mike Howland—took refuge in the ForeignMinistry, unable to leave without risking their own safety. Iranian officialsassured the US government the takeover was nothing more than a universitysit-in and predicted it would end shortly. Meanwhile, the Ayatollah’s son,Ahmed Khomeini, came to the embassy, scaled the wall, and congratulatedthe students on their victory. Emboldened by Khomeini’s support, the grouprefused to release their hostages on the grounds that the embassy personnelwere spies. At the urging of a delegation from the Palestinian LiberationOrganization, the Iranians released thirteen female and black hostages notsuspected of espionage on November 18–19, 1979.

For months, the Carter administration attempted diplomatic overturesand gradually escalated economic sanctions to obtain the release of theremainder of the hostages. The United States severed diplomatic ties withIran on April 7, 1980, when the administration concluded that chances forconcrete progress were unlikely. On April 11, Carter told his NationalSecurity Council that he planned to proceed with a military rescue missionto extract the hostages from Tehran. On April 24, 1980, eight helicoptersand six C-130 transport planes traveled to a location called Desert One,265 miles southeast of Tehran. Due to mechanical problems, only five ofthe eight helicopters arrived at the target location. Carter ordered the mis-sion aborted, having previously determined that six helicopters would be

37

minimally necessary for a successful rescue. As the planes were leaving theDesert One site, one of the helicopters and one of the C-130 transportplanes collided, burst into flames, and killed eight American servicemen. Themilitary evacuated the rest of the officers on the remaining transport planesand left behind helicopters, weapons, equipment, and classified documents(P. B. Ryan 91). Eventually, the captors permitted the remaining fifty-twoAmerican hostages to leave Iran 444 days after the embassy takeover. Therelease coincided with the transfer of power between the Carter and Reaganadministrations.

Carter and his aides were initially inconsistent in how they labeled theperpetrators of the crisis. Ultimately, the administration denounced thoseresponsible as terrorists and portrayed the events in Tehran as an Americantragedy. The approach had the advantage of minimizing the potential ideo-logical conflict between the United States and Iran. Unfortunately for Carter,the strategy also produced political costs for the president himself.

LABELING THE CAPTORS

Memories of the Vietnam War were highly influential in the development ofthe Carter administration’s labeling strategy during the Iranian hostage crisis.From the early days of the crisis, those who held the embassy compared theirquest to the student antiwar protests of the 1960s. They identified them-selves with Vietnam-era protesters by stressing their standing as universitystudents. They referred to themselves as “the Muslim Students Followingthe Imam’s Line” and issued more than fifty communiqués to the worldmedia highlighting their student status. The captors made explicit referenceto America’s recent history with Vietnam when, in a statement distributedworldwide, they proclaimed, “[T]he American people have the power toforce Carter to return the Shah and the wealth he has ‘plundered,’ in thesame way you forced your previous President to end the Vietnam War”(“Iran-Cravath, Swaine and Moore I”). By recalling the American public’sopposition to the Vietnam War, the captors implied that they were law-abiding student protesters on a righteous mission to expose the immoralactions of the American government.

Within two days of the embassy takeover, Carter was emphatic that thecaptors not control the public labeling of the crisis. On his way to breakfastwith members of his senior aides, he said, “I’m tired of seeing those bastardsholding our people referred to as ‘students.’ Jody [Jody Powell, PressSecretary], you and Hodding [Hodding Carter, the State Departmentspokesman] get together and figure out what to call them. But they shouldbe referred to as ‘terrorists’ or ‘captors’ or something that accurately describes


what they are” (as qtd. in Jordan 34). Reminiscent of Nixon’s labeling ofantiwar student protestors, Carter’s approach invited attention to the unac-ceptable means of those holding Americans hostage, while downplaying thecaptors’ student status.

Carter’s directive to his aides notwithstanding, his spokespersons continuedto call the captors “students” throughout the first week of the crisis. HoddingCarter repeatedly employed the phrase, “so-called students,” or used quotationmarks around “students” or “student groups” (Press Briefing 11/11/79) whenbriefing members of the press. On two separate occasions, members of the presscorps asked him why he was using quotation marks when referring to the stu-dents. He responded, “I am saying clearly that our reports are no better thanwhat you read as to who they may be and that I am in no position to evaluate orto describe in any way except in quotation marks. I simply don’t know” (PressBriefing 11/7/79). Without an alternative labeling strategy from the administra-tion, members of the Washington press corps adopted the captors’ labelingstrategy, calling those who held the embassy “students.”

Officials did speculate on the identity of the captors when speaking tothe media on background. Carter aides acknowledged their ambivalenceabout the accuracy of their intelligence, but still presented educated guessesabout the identity of those holding the hostages. Assistant Secretary for NearEast and South Asia Harold Saunders expressed the administration’s lack ofcertainty when he stated, “[A]s nearly as we can tell, the group that occupiesthe compound may be a composite of several groups, or people related toseveral groups, with a coordinating committee on top” (Press Backgrounder).Saunders speculated that the captors might range from conservative religiouselements, such as the Mujahedeen group, to leftist-oriented groups, like theCheroks. Not knowing the true identity of the captors and unwilling toinvite comparisons to the Vietnam War by erroneously misleading the press,the administration remained equivocal about the public label for the captors(Kifner 175; Taheri 123).

Carter’s own public statements did not clarify the situation. Duringthe first two months of the crisis, his speeches were inconsistent in the waythey referred to those who held the hostages in Iran. Most of Carter’spublic statements avoided depictions of the captors as terrorists; instead,they described events in Iran using the passive voice (i.e., American citi-zens are being held hostage). Linguistically, passive voice functions toremove active agency, leaving the subject of responsibility unclear. WhenCarter did mention the topic of terrorism, he mostly spoke of the generalfight against terrorism, stopping short of labeling the US Embassy takeoverin Iran a terrorist act. In only three of the dozens of statements Carteroffered during the first two months of the crisis did he label the embassytakeover an act of terrorism.

The Iranian Hostage Crisis: An American Tragedy 39

The lack of a consistent public strategy that labeled the seizure “terror-ism” was also evident from the internal drafts of the president’s public state-ments. A good illustration is the speech Carter delivered before theAmerican Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations(AFL-CIO) less than two weeks after the capture of the hostages. In draftC2, an early version of the speech, no mention was made of terrorism; thedraft portrayed those holding Americans hostage as “extremists” anddepicted US policy as “we refuse to bow to blackmail.” By the final manu-script, the wording shifted to a public frame of the crisis in Iran as a terroristevent: “This is the 12th day that more than a hundred innocent humanbeings, some 60 of whom are members of the United States diplomatic mis-sion, have been held hostage in our Embassy in Iran. [. . .] This is an act ofterrorism—totally outside the bound of international law and diplomatic tra-dition” (Carter, Public Papers, 1979 2:2123). Both internally circulatedspeech drafts and final manuscripts demonstrate that the administration’slabeling strategy was uncertain during the early months of the crisis.

Once the administration had taken the public step of labeling theembassy takeover a terrorist act, it provoked an irate and lengthy responsefrom the Ayatollah Khomeini. In an interview with a CBS-TV correspon-dent in Qom just three days after the AFL-CIO speech, Khomeini chargedthat Carter’s word choice had not been judicious. He argued that the stu-dents could not possibly be terrorists, because the entire Iranian nation ofthirty-five million people supported them. He insisted the Iranians were notterrorists, because they had treated the hostages well. Finally, Khomeinistressed that the United States was hypocritical to even use the term, givenits own decisions to refuse demonstration permits and to freeze the financialassets of Iranian students in America to force them to return to Iran. As heexplained, “[Y]ou must be assured that our nation is Muslim, and Muslim isnot terrorist, and [the Iranian students] treat them with complete clemency,better than your treatment of our students abroad. [. . .] The acts which youcommit are the ones that resemble terrorist acts” (as qtd. in “Iran-Cravath,Swaine and Moore I”). Khomeini’s statement drew an historical parallelbetween the Carter and Nixon administrations. Both administrations hadopposed student demonstrations questioning the government’s actions.Khomeini recalled America’s past in Vietnam by maintaining any divisive-ness was between the US government and its people, not between the worldcommunity and Iran.

Publicly ignoring Khomeini’s protests about the labeling strategy, theCarter administration relied on a consistent public affairs strategy of referringto the captors as “terrorists” by January 1980. The strategy arguably mini-mized the Iranian government’s responsibility for controlling the captors’conduct, essentially erasing what might have been an embarrassing challenge


to that government’s ability to rule its own people. Instead, the administra-tion’s approach depicted the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran as a crimi-nal act of terrorism requiring the intervention of the international community.In a familiar refrain offered throughout the remainder of the crisis, Cartertold John Chancellor of NBC News, “Iran is at this moment involved in acriminal act, a terrorist act. And it’s not a matter of negotiating on a diplo-matic basis between two nations. This is a matter of condemning Iran forinternational terrorism and kidnapping” (Public Papers 1980-1981 1:36).Moving past the initial period of confusion, the administration consistentlyadopted the crime metaphor to frame its public rhetoric about the crisis.

Not everyone in the administration agreed that crime should be the over-riding theme of Carter’s rhetoric. Some of Carter’s aides argued that the warmetaphor was more appropriate, reasoning that the Iranian hostage crisis andthe Vietnam War were inextricably linked in the public’s mind. These aidesmaintained that the administration could not ignore the connections betweenthe two historical events and that Carter should address broader public confi-dence concerns stemming from the Vietnam War as he handled the hostagecrisis. Carter received advice from his congressional liaisons, Anne Wexlerand Al From, to adopt a security theme in his State of the Union address thatresponded to both the public’s concern about Iranian terrorism and its anxietyabout the Vietnam War. Wexter and From reminded Carter,

Americans have traditionally felt secure, part of the greatest andstrongest nation on earth. But the past two decades have shakenthat feeling. The Vietnam War and recent incidents like theIranian and Afghan crises have pierced the aura of our militaryinvincibility. The energy shortages and persistent inflation havemade Americans aware that their energy and economic security isno longer in their hands. [. . .] Security is a word that people canboth easily understand and identify with. [. . . Security] is some-thing that Americans want in their gut, particularly in unsettlingtimes like we have today. For that reason, your political adversarieswill find it very difficult to attack the security framework.

The aides envisioned the use of the security theme both as a means of unit-ing the country behind the administration’s effort to resolve the crisis and asan avenue for putting the nation’s recent foreign policy failure behind them.Wexler’s and From’s advice prevailed in the final drafting of the State of theUnion address.

Seven months after the seizure of the embassy, National SecurityAdvisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advised Carter once again to rely on morelabels reminiscent of the Vietnam War. Brzezinski praised Carter for hisearlier choices and told him, “You have rightly been very sensitive to the


symbolic choice of words—e.g., calling the kidnappers in Tehran not ‘stu-dents’ but ‘terrorists.’ Let me suggest that in case of Afghanistan you make ita point to refer always to ‘freedom fighter’ and more generally to the ‘nationalliberation struggle’ of the Afghan people. The latter phrase will have specialresonance in the Third World and it will be particularly awkward for theSoviets” (Memo to the President 6/13/80). Brzezinski’s suggestion was risky,and not simply because these same “freedom fighters” would eventuallyorchestrate the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings. By recallingthe Vietnam War, the linkage associated the Iranian hostage crisis with theworst foreign policy debacle in American history.

Had the administration been successful in obtaining the hostages’release, the strategy of linking the crisis in Iran to the Vietnam War mayhave fostered a profound healing of the American psyche. In failure, how-ever, the choice risked a deeper public malaise. Ultimately, the administra-tion further compounded public disenchantment by depicting its hostagecrisis in tragic terms.

THE NARRATIVE OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS

Tragic drama is a dramatic form that emphasizes the metaphor of crime.Burke explains that criminality always applies to the device of tragedy, giventhat its subject matter focuses on conflicts with established values (OnSymbols and Society 300). Vogel argues that American tragedies involve afocus on crime and punishment due to a Christian heritage that rejectsGreek notions of fatalism (115). By choosing a dramatic vehicle that featuredcrime as a central theme, the Carter administration provided a public alter-native to a declaration of war on terrorism.

Scholars in literary circles do not agree on the generic requirements oftragic drama. Nevertheless, a look at the characteristics of tragedy that recurthroughout the work of multiple literary theorists reveals that the Carter nar-rative echoed the great historical works of tragic literature. While membersof the Carter administration may not have knowingly adopted the tragicframe in response to the hostage crisis, the key elements of the literary genrewere present in their public response strategy to the hostage crisis.

For most genre theorists, tragedies depend on the presence of a tragichero. Reviewing the breadth of literature related to tragedy, Richard Palmerexplains why the tragic hero is central to the dramatic form: “Those who seethe essence of tragedy as a humanistic affirmation believe that the heroembodies those values; theorists who approach tragedy in terms of responseusually assume that the hero stimulates that response, and metaphysically ori-ented theorists see the tragic hero as the prime vehicle of metaphysical aware-


ness” (138). To qualify as an appropriate subject for the role of tragic hero, anindividual must be able both to identify with the audience and to represent anideal sense of humanity for the group (Heilman 7; Steiner 15; Raphael 31;and Leech 33, 46). Both roles have importance for the drama itself. As repre-sentative of the people, the tragic hero’s suffering elicits a sympathetic, emo-tional response from the audience. As an emblem of humanity’s potential, thehero amplifies the consequences resulting from the tragic flaw.

Carter’s public persona established him as an ideal candidate for thetragic hero of the Iranian hostage crisis narrative. In his initial bid for thepresidency, Carter campaigned as both a common man and an individualdestined for greatness. In his announcement speech, Carter identified him-self as “a farmer, an engineer, a businessman, a planner, a scientist, aGovernor, and a Christian” (as qtd. in Glad 309). The approach permittedample opportunity for Carter to identify with the multiple and varied audi-ences on the campaign trail. His presidential campaign stressed themes ofhard work and honesty, qualities his ads claimed Carter shared with theAmerican people. Carter’s ads and speeches promised a “president who is notisolated from our people, but who feels your pain and shares your dreams,and takes his strength and wisdom and courage from you” (as qtd. inJamieson 343). Carter’s introduction to a national audience in his 1976 pres-idential campaign presented an image of him as a man among the people.

At the same time, his campaign projected Carter as having the potentialfor extraordinary leadership. One campaign ad featured Rosalynn Carterexplaining, “Jimmy is honest, unselfish, and truly concerned about the coun-try. I think he’ll be a great president” (as qtd. in Jamieson 350). Another usedan actor to represent a potential voter in the 1976 presidential election. Thead stated:

I’ve always felt that when Franklin Roosevelt died that was the endof the good and great presidents. And then after Harry Truman Ithought, well that’s the last of them. And then we had JackKennedy. For such a short time, too. I learned something fromthem. I learned that in the proper time the man and the momentcan meet, so to speak, with a vision. Take up a country and lead itto a more secure future. Where the goal truly is justice for all. Ilook forward to voting for Jimmy Carter. That’s the truth of it. Ifeel it’s in the air and we are going to have a new DemocraticPresident. In the tradition of the best Democratic presidents. (Qtd.in Glad 353)

The ads maintained that Carter had the potential to move beyond theconstraints of the common man, both due to his party affiliation and hispersonal character.


After assessing the totality of Carter 1976 presidential campaign materi-als, presidential scholar Betty Glad agrees that Carter’s projected imageblended the tragic hero qualities of the real and the ideal. She concluded,“Jimmy Carter’s campaign persona was that of a ‘great man’ destined to be agreat president. This man in jeans with red Georgia dust on his work bootsoffered a set of virtues that were complementary and reassuring. He was self-confident but humble, tough but compassionate, intelligent but still one ofthe boys, religious but accepting of differences, always working toward whathe wanted by not wanting anything for himself. He was, in essence, extraor-dinary but ordinary” (355). The complicated mix allowed for the public toboth identify with Carter’s fate during the Iranian hostage crisis and distanceitself from eventual responsibility for the ensuing tragedy.

The existence of a tragic hero is, by itself, an insufficient condition forachieving the conventions of dramatic tragedy. A second element of tragedyis that such plots must engage narrative themes that transcend transitorypolitical and social conditions. Literary theorists posit that a key factor dis-tinguishing tragedy from melodramas, epics, or tragic irony is subject matter.Tragedies address topics that are timeless and universal. They take up ques-tions such as the relationship of humanity to its environment, humanity’sposition within the universe, and the ultimate meaning of life (Muller 14).Problems that are time-bound are not appropriate for tragedy, because theirresolution is imminent; those inextricably linked to particular social struc-tures are equally ill suited, given their potential to undergo refinement by theindividuals who created them (Vogel 105).

At first glance the Iranian hostage crisis might not appear to be appro-priate subject matter for a tragic drama. The seizure of fifty-three Americansfor a little more than a year was arguably a time-bound conflict that yieldedlittle insight into humanity’s position in the universe or the ultimate meaningof life. The capture of the US Embassy in Tehran might seem more suited tomelodrama, a dramatic form that stresses a victor-victim polarity where “vic-tory is not tempered with the rigors of cost accounting, nor defeat with thereckoning of spiritual growth” (Heilman 87).

Despite the apparent difficulties, Carter’s public statements invited theconclusion that the act of holding the embassy personnel was a subjectmatter befitting tragic drama. From the first days of the crisis, Carter por-trayed the actions of the militants and the Iranian government as transcend-ing the moment. He insisted the situation was “unprecedented in humanhistory” (Public Papers 1979 2:2167), “a departure from accepted custom andtradition down through the centuries” (2162) and “the first time that such anactivity has been encouraged by and supported by the government itself(2170). Within the administration’s narrative, the uniqueness of Iran’sbreach of diplomatic security did not render the incident an isolated, transi-


tory moment in the history of international relations. Instead, the public dis-course presented the unprecedented nature of the event as a warrant forimmediate international condemnation and a historical precedent againstsuch behavior in the future.

The seizure of the US Embassy was not only a timeless concern in theCarter narrative; it was also a universal problem. Carter posited that theembassy seizure transcended provincial interpretations relegating the matterto the status of a bilateral conflict. He insisted, “It’s vital to the United Statesand to every other nation that the lives of diplomatic personnel and other cit-izens abroad be protected and that we refuse to permit the use of terrorismand the seizure and the holding of hostages to impose political demands”(Public Papers, 1979 2:2109). Carter argued from principle that other nationsshould stand with the United States and oppose Iran. He emphasized thatIran’s violation transcended any one social structure, because the embassyseizure opposed essential principles of international law, diplomatic tradi-tions, human rights, the Islamic faith, common ethical and religious founda-tions, and human decency. Carter elevated the matter to an issue ofinternational survival, pronouncing, “Iran today stands in arrogant defianceof the world community. It has shown contempt not only for internationallaw but for the entire international structure for securing the peaceful resolu-tion of difference among nations” (2277). For Carter, the seizure of theAmerican hostages was not a parochial concern. The event in his depictionwas steeped in timeless relevance for the entire international community; inshort, it was appropriate content for tragic drama.

The presence of universal subject matter, while important, is also insuf-ficient to create a dramatic tragedy. A certain progression of the plot mustalso be present to designate something suitable for dramatic tragedy. The lit-erary theorist Dorothea Krook identifies four fundamental elements thatmust be present for a tragedy to exist. These include the act of shame orhorror, the resulting suffering from that act, the knowledge of the funda-mental human condition generated from that suffering, and the affirmationor reaffirmation of the dignity of the human spirit resulting from the knowl-edge gained (8–9). She maintains that the four elements are interrelated,“separable in analysis but not in experience” (9). Hence, the following analy-sis examines each of the four elements discretely, first expanding on theirgeneric qualities and then applying them to the Carter’s administration’s nar-rative of the Iranian hostage crisis.

Early in a tragic drama, the hero undertakes an act of shame or horrorinvolving a betrayal or rejection of the fundamental nature of humanity(Krook 10–11). The act is possible because of the tragic hero has free willeven within the universe of constrained options. The hero discovers quicklythat his available choices are limited and that his own powers are finite. The


resulting act, as Aristotle reminds us, is brought on “not by vice and deprav-ity but by some great error of judgment” (238). Once put into motion, theact becomes the catalyst for all future actions of the tragic drama, a set ofevents that lead to disaster and a downward spiral beyond the capacity of thetragic hero to control.

The act of shame in the Iranian hostage crisis was Carter’s decision ofOctober 22, 1979 to allow the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, toenter the United States to receive medical treatment for cancer. Carter’ssenior aides have confirmed that while the president made the choice topermit the shah to come to the United States, he did so reluctantly, givenfew feasible alternatives available. Hamilton Jordan reported that Carterstrongly preferred that the shah live abroad to improve the chances Americacould rebuild its relationship with Iran. He only changed his mind onceadministration officials had verified the shah’s dangerous medical conditionand the group had received Iranian assurances that they would protect theUS Embassy in Tehran (Jordan 31-32).

The decision to allow the shah to enter the United States functioned asthe act of betrayal, given Carter’s commitment to international human rights.The shah’s historical record of human rights abuses in Iran, coupled with hisrefusal to transfer his powers to the Iranian government, made him a difficultally for a US president publicly proclaiming to be a defender of internationalhuman rights. Since 1953, when the Eisenhower administration ordered theCIA overthrow of Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh, the shah hadruled Iran with brutality and torture designed to quell political dissent(Roosevelt 90). The US government subsequently defended the shah, despitehis barbarity with the Iranian people. Carter’s infamous 1978 New Year’sEve toast praised Iran as “an island of stability in a turbulent part of thecorner of the world,” a line anonymously added to the original draft of thespeech prepared by the State Department and the National Security Councilon board Air Force One during the trip from Warsaw to Tehran. To date, noofficial on the flight has publicly accepted responsibility for the wordingchange (Sick, All Fall Down 344). Having established human rights as a cor-nerstone of his foreign policy, Carter’s close association with the shah of Iranqualified as a tragic act of shame.

As expected in the tragic genre, Carter’s act of shame became the cata-lyst for all future acts in the Iranian hostage drama. Initially, Carter’spublic statements were consistent with the tragic hero who has yet to cometo knowledge and understanding that his own actions contributed to hisfate. Carter resisted any insinuation that he had backed away from hiscommitment to human rights. He insisted that the shah’s past humanrights abuses of the Iranian people were “ancient history” (Public Papers,1980–1981 1:307) and he was not interested in “trying to resolve whether


or not the Shah was a good or bad leader” (Public Papers, 1979 2:2205).Carter tried to recast his decision in positive terms, maintaining that hisdecision to permit the entry of the shah was a direct result of his commit-ment to human rights. Having linguistically transformed the shah from apublic to a private figure, Carter announced he had “no regrets about it norapologies to make because it did help to save a man’s life, and it was com-patible with the principles of our country” (2169). In the early months ofthe crisis, Carter maintained his complete lack of responsibility for havinginstigated the hostage crisis.

Members of the Carter administration strived to prevent public discus-sion of the shah’s governance as the precipitating act of the crisis. In a mem-orandum written in January 1980, Assistant to the President Al McDonaldreminded Carter, “The Iranian issue is one of hostage release, not the reignof the Shah” (Memo to President). In accordance with McDonald’s advice,the administration demanded publicly that the release of all the hostages wasa necessary precondition for consideration of any other issues. References byadministration officials to the previous reign of the shah did not appear inprepared statements. The former Iranian regime was mentioned infrequentlyand only in response to pointed questions from White House reporters.

When those outside the administration attempted to raise the topic ofthe shah’s reign, the administration was vigorous in its defense of the deci-sion to admit the shah into the United States. Carter publicly and stronglydenounced Ted Kennedy, his Democratic primary opponent in the 1980elections, for making the statement reported over the Tehran InternationalService that “The American people are now blaming those who agreed toaccommodate the deposed Shah” (“Iran-Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, III”).Categorically, he insisted that Kennedy’s denouncements “have not beentrue, they’ve not been accurate, and they’ve not been responsible, and they’venot helped our country” (Carter, Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:308). Theadministration wanted no insinuation that Carter’s decision was responsiblefor the hostage crisis; aides crafted their rhetoric to foreclose all public dis-cussion of US culpability.

While Carter refused publicly to admit that his decision regarding theshah had contributed to the onset of the hostage crisis, he was willing toconfess he had erred when he decided to trust the Iranian government.Carter recalled, “We had received repeated assurances of protection fromthe highest officials in the Iranian Government, even a day or two beforethe mob was incited to attack and before the protection was withdrawn atthe last minute” (Public Papers, 1979 2:2124). By focusing on his own will-ingness to take the Iranians at their word, Carter publicly bolstered hiscommitment to the principles of respect and dignity that undergirded hishuman rights policy.


Carter’s public statements aside, previously classified memoranda fromhis administration confirm that the decision to admit the shah resulted inthe subsequent spiral of disastrous events. The shah’s presence in the UnitedStates was the critical factor preventing the early release of the embassy per-sonnel. By early January 1980, a report entitled Diplomatic Strategy forIran—The Period Ahead circulated through the offices of Carter’s topaides. It offered insights into the subsequent negotiating postures assumedby the various players in the hostage crisis. The report reasoned, “Ourassessment of the basic situation in Tehran is unchanged. The militantshave the hostages and will not let them go unless either the Shah is returnedor Khomeini tells them to. Khomeini will not tell them to unless he gets theShah. The Revolutionary Council wants to release the hostages in return fora face-saving gesture—an international tribunal, but cannot persuadeKhomeini. The U.S. is willing to meet the Council’s terms if the hostagesare released first, but not to meet those of Khomeini and the militants. Theimpasse continues.” According to Carter’s own intelligence, his refusal toreturn the shah was the key factor in the continued confinement of theAmerican hostages.

Heroes in tragic drama, having committed the shameful act that sets off achain of unfortunate events, must endure agonizing suffering. The necessarysuffering can take the form of actual disaster or anticipated catastrophe. Thetragic hero can experience the suffering directly or the spectators, who havealready perceived the hero’s fall, can experience it indirectly (Palmer 148).Throughout the ordeal, the tragic hero is simultaneously innocent and guilty:innocent by the arbitrary, random nature of his or her lot and the dispropor-tionate level of suffering that he or she must endure; guilty by membershipwithin a guilty society or one where injustices are inescapable (Frye 209;Sewall 72). Sharing in the guilt of the tragic circumstance, the tragic heroserves as a scapegoat who is gradually isolated from society (Sewall 5; Frye217). The hero endures the devastating fate due to a moral nature that willnot permit the use of expediency to escape life’s consequences (Heilman 9).

Predictably, the theme of crime and punishment was prevalent in theCarter administration’s depictions of the Iranian hostage crisis. Labeling theseizure an act of kidnapping, blackmail, and extortion, Carter maintained theembassy takeover constituted “a criminal act” (Public Papers, 1980–19811:36), “an illegal incarceration” (Public Papers, 1979 2:2242), and an “illegaland outrageous holding of the innocent hostages” (Public Papers, 1980–19812:611). Carter placed the full blame for the criminal act on Iran, insisting,“The Government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation, whichit has itself created” (Public Papers, 1979 2:2168).

Because Iran had committed a heinous criminal act, the administration’snarrative called for the foreign nation’s punishment. As a matter of US


policy, Carter maintained, “failure to release the hostages will involveincreasingly heavy costs to Iran” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:2141). By July1980, Carter publicly evaluated the strategy of punishment as successful:“We are punishing Iran severely for holding the hostages. It’s costing themliterally millions of dollars every day in lost revenue, lost trade, a poorer qual-ity of life for their people. Their Government is divided, they’re in chaospolitically, because they’re holding these hostages” (2:1312). According tothe administration’s narrative, Iran’s economic suffering was warranted dueto the fact that the guilt for the crisis was Iran’s, and Iran’s alone.

By contrast, the administration’s narrative portrayed the United States asan innocent victim in the conflict. Statements from the White House wereadamant that the detention of the hostages was “without justification”(Public Papers, 1979 2:2141). Carter defended the United States as the“aggrieved party” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:36), maintaining the UnitedStates had “done nothing and will do nothing that could be used to justifyviolent or imprudent action by anyone” (Public Papers, 1979 2:2123). Afterthe militant Iranians produced a purported State Department cable provingthe hostages were CIA officers operating under diplomatic cover, adminis-tration officials declined to even dignify the charge with a statement (“Iran-Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, I”). Instead, the administration argued thatevery international forum (e.g., the United Nations Security Council and theInternational Court of Justice) had upheld the guilt of Iran and the inno-cence of the United States. By depicting the United States as the innocentparty, the administration strived to avert its own public condemnation for thedownward spiral of events in Iran.

While deflecting personal responsibility for the hostage crisis, Carter didacknowledge that certain actions at home had made the nation vulnerable toIran’s illegal actions. Carter focused on how the nation’s overreliance on for-eign oil had left it exposed to the transgressions of militant actors in theMiddle East. Carter reasoned, “It is our entire Nation which is vulnerable,because of our overwhelming and excessive dependence on oil from foreigncountries” (Public Papers, 1979 2:2168). America was the victim, but one thathad the power to change the course of its fate. Carter called for sacrifice bythe rank-and-file, encouraging adoption of his conservation plan of gasrationing to avoid future incidents similar to the embassy seizure in Tehran.

As the months of the crisis continued, it was Carter himself whoaccepted suffering to account for the events in Iran. The administration’snarrative portrayed Carter’s sacrifice as occurring on many levels. Personally,he had to endure the agony of his own inability to protect Americans abroad.Carter admitted that the hostage crisis was “a problem that [was] always on[his] mind” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 2:1907). He depicted the depth of hisconcern by emphasizing, “It’s as though those hostages were members of my


own family, my own sons and daughters” (1641). By personalizing thetragedy, Carter displayed the suffering expected in a tragic drama.

On a political level, Carter suffered a reduced level of public confidencein his ability to lead the nation. Much of the criticism focused on the han-dling of the Iranian hostage crisis itself. Five days after the seizure of theembassy, Carter received written notification from Representative GeorgeHanson that he planned to introduce a congressional resolution of impeach-ment if stronger and more effective action was not forthcoming. As the crisislingered, members of the press and his political opponents criticized him forhaving “been too patient” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:670). By the firstweek of January 1980, Lou Harris offered an internal administration assess-ment of a ABC-News Harris Survey that Carter’s political fate would onlyget worse: “[T]he American people are beginning to run out of patience withPresident Carter’s handling of the hostage crisis in Iran. A 53-27 percentmajority now feels that if ‘in three weeks, the hostages are still held by Iranand it does not appear that any real progress has been made in getting theirrelease,’ then President Carter’s policy on the Iran crisis has been a failure. Ifthe stalemate continues on for another three months, then an even higher78-12 percent majority would then view the President’s efforts as a failure.”A top secret review of foreign policy presented at the March 25, 1980 meet-ing of Carter’s Special Coordinating Committee for the crisis confirmed thepollster’s prediction: “On a number of specific issues, notably Iran and theMiddle East, we are in fact losing momentum, with potentially very destruc-tive consequences for our interests” (Foreign Policy: Coherence and Sense ofDirection). By July 1980, Carter’s approval rating had fallen to an all-timelow of twenty-one percent (Greenstein 139). The public’s perception ofCarter as an indecisive leader unable to effectuate the release of the hostageswas a key component of the suffering he endured.

The administration highlighted the arbitrary nature of Carter’s fatewhen the rescue mission failed to obtain the release of the Americanhostages. Carter described the reason the mission failed as “we were justplagued by bad luck” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:883). He noted that thesource of the problem was equipment failure, not a lack of commitment,courage, or ability on the part of the president or the involved members ofthe armed services. The rescue mission had presented Carter with the oppor-tunity to display his effectiveness as a leader, but he again fell victim to thearbitrary fate of the drama’s tragic hero.

In accordance with the expectation of tragic form, the administration’snarrative presented Carter’s sacrifice not only as arbitrary, but unjust and dis-proportionate as well. Carter publicly admitted that the Iranian hostage crisishad made him vulnerable in his 1980 reelection bid. He reinforced that mes-sage when he adopted the Rose Garden strategy of remaining at the White


House to respond to the hostage crisis rather than campaigning in primariesacross the nation. He stressed his willingness to endure the consequences ofthe isolation when he stated, “I think at this time it’s better for me to takethat political sacrifice, accept fewer votes and fewer delegates, in order tocarry out my duties as President” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:733).Appropriate to the role of the tragic hero, Carter publicly accepted the unjustnature of his isolation and sacrifice.

Behind the scenes, some in the administration were unwilling to acceptCarter’s political sacrifice. Consider the administration’s response to chargesthat Carter planned to manipulate events in the hostage crisis to assure hisreelection bid. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta were the first journaliststo document the charges in a series of newspaper articles written for UnitedFeature Syndicate (scheduled for release on August 19–23, 1980). Theirarticles announced “a startling Carter plan to invade Iran and create a mili-tary crisis on the eve of the presidential election” (“Anderson, Jack. PlannedOct. Invasion”).

The White House responded by categorically denying the allegation. Itissued the following statement: “Erroneous and totally irresponsible reportssuch as the Anderson column increase the danger to the American hostagesin Iran, impede efforts to obtain their release peacefully, and jeopardizeAmerican interests in the area generally” (Carter, Public Papers, 1980–19812:1545). The deputy press secretary, Rex Granum, sent a telegram to SidneyGoldberg, the vice president and managing editor of United FeatureSyndicate, requesting that the organization withdraw the column altogetheror that it send a telegram to each recipient of the article with copies of theWhite House’s response (“Anderson, Jack. Planned Oct. Invasion”). Manynewspapers and magazines, including the Washington Post, refused to printthe series of columns. The administration’s emphatic response was consistentwith the expectation that a tragic hero would not compromise moral princi-ple to engage in actions of political expediency.

After conducting subsequent interviews with both the journalistsresponsible for the story and the relevant members of the Carter administra-tion, the former National Security Council staff member Gary Sick con-cluded, “Anderson’s charges were indeed false. No invasion of Iran wasplanned, for October or any other time. His description of the operation,however, did bear at least some resemblance to the plan for the second rescuemission” (October Surprise 25). Sick’s conclusion underscored Carter’s unjustsuffering by documenting the unfair nature of the attacks the president hadto endure.

Ironically, the categorical denial of the White House was also false. Theadministration insisted in its denial that “neither the President nor any otherresponsible official has expressed any intention to take such an action either in


October or any other time” (Carter, Public Papers, 1980–1981 2:1545;emphasis mine). In a memorandum written August 7, 1980, less than twoweeks before the White House denial, Brzezinski had reminded Carter,“Foreign policy should offer you the greatest opportunity for the exercise ofPresidential leadership, in a manner that could significantly influence theoutcome of the elections” (Memo to the President, 8/7/80). In the memo hewent on to describe six dangers that might occur in the international arena,“the handling of which could decisively affect the outcome of the elections.”One of the six dangers included developments related to the hostage crisis.Trigger events included that a hostage would be placed on trial, would die, orwould disappear. After itemizing the six dangers, Brzezinski followed imme-diately by saying, “All of the above could also offer opportunities for decisiveleadership. Such a reaction could galvanize national support and cause apatriotic upsurge. Thus, on the hostage issue we should at least have theoption to take prompt military action, either through a blockade or (perhaps)the seizure of Kharg Island. I believe that you should ask Harold Brown totake some quiet steps to make sure that prompt military action could be initi-ated in the event of such a crisis.” Kharg Island was notably one of thepotential locations of the planned attack that Anderson and Van Atta hadspecified (“Anderson, Jack. Planned Oct. Invasion”) and the one named inBrzezinski’s memo to Carter (8/11/80). Brzezinski’s statements leave littledoubt that a Carter administration official had indeed expressed the inten-tion to plan for an invasion of Iran for political effect, the “responsible offi-cial” qualifier of the administration’s denial notwithstanding.

Within the conventions of tragic drama, the value of the tragic hero’ssuffering is that it produces knowledge. The hero and/or the spectators ofthe drama develop an understanding for both the nature of the world andhumanity’s place within it (Palmer 147). Tragic heroes ordinarily come tounderstand the finiteness of their powers (Vogel 115; Leech 40; Heilman153). Spectators of the drama see evil and good in unprecedented ways(Sewall 23–24; Krook 13). Aristotle advises that discovery is not a simpleprocess when he writes, “[O]f all recognitions, the best is that which arisesfrom the incidents themselves, where the startling discovery is made by nat-ural means” (86). Knowledge thus gained through the events of the drama isparticularly resonant, because it appears less contrived.

Carter’s failed rescue mission functioned as the event that led to hispublic acknowledgment of America’s limited power. Prior to the mission,Carter hailed the wide range of options the United States had for assertingleverage on Iran to release the hostages. Publicly, he detailed his systematicprocess of exhausting diplomatic and economic alternatives before exercisingmilitary options sufficient to obtain the hostages’ release. Once the missionfailed, however, the internal public affairs strategy designed to explain the


timing of the military endeavor unveiled the administration’s own acknowl-edgment of its impotence to impact the hostage situation:

What are the reasons for the decision: 1) the failure of all diplo-matic efforts; 2) the absence of any reason to believe that thehostages would be released at any time in the foreseeable future; 3)the danger posed to the hostages by the deteriorating situation inIran; 4) the obvious complications associated with the militaryinterdiction of commerce; 5) the need to resolve a crisis that washeightening tensions in an already volatile and vital region; 6) theneed to remove a situation that complicated relationships amongfriends and allies; 7) the judgment of the president and senior mil-itary and defense advisors that the rescue operation was a soundand feasible plan; and 8) concern for the physical and psychologicaleffect on the hostages of prolonged captivity. (McDonald, Memoto Senior Staff and Deputies)

Having previously argued that the administration had exhausted all diplo-matic and economic means prior to the rescue attempt, Carter offered littlehope through his public assurance the nation would continue to pursuepeaceful and diplomatic means in the mission’s aftermath. Carter’s recogni-tion that America’s powers were insufficient to resolve the crisis was evidentin his national address reporting the decision to abort the rescue mission. Inwhat would become a prophetic statement, Carter explained the rescue team“knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried withthem” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:772). Like America’s influence over thehostage crisis, Carter’s political hopes crashed with the helicopters into theIranian desert.

Through the remainder of the crisis, Carter discussed the limits on thegovernment’s ability to obtain the hostages’ release. Publicly, he acceptedthat the matter was “not in [his] hands” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 2:1827).He recognized “We must expect prolonged management of seeminglyintractable situations and often contradictory realities” (1:873). He indicatedthat he was praying that the nation’s diplomatic overtures and economicsanctions, as well as other world events, would convince the Iranians toreturn the hostages.

While the public enactment of Carter’s discovery coincided with therescue mission, the administration’s internal documents suggested the actualmoment of revelation came several months beforehand. A telegram sent tothe Swiss ambassador outlining the US negotiating position in February1980 revealed that the administration was willing to accept partial responsi-bility for the US conflict with Iran. In a straightforward repudiation of the1953 CIA operation to influence the Iranian elections, the transmission


noted, “The US administration is prepared to make a statement at an appro-priate moment that it understands the grievances felt by the people of Iran,and that it respects the integrity of Iran, and the right of the people of Iranto choose their own form of Government” (Telegram to Swiss Amb. Lang).Accepting the legitimacy of Iranian claims, the telegram inferentiallyacknowledged the precipitating role of the United States in the resultinghostage crisis in Iran.

The final generic convention of tragic drama involves affirmation orreaffirmation of human dignity. After the tragic hero suffers and comes to anunderstanding of personal responsibility for his or her own condition, theaudience might reasonably expect to feel depression or sadness. Instead,tragedies end with what Aristotle called catharsis (230), a paradoxical finalityalternatively described by literary theorists as a balance between pleasure andpain, imperative and impulse, spiritual victory and natural defeat, attractionand repulsion, or affirmation of self and suicide (Heilman 9; Raphael 15;Palmer 112). By accepting suffering as both necessary and a result of thehero’s actions, societal purification occurs. No resurrection of the hero is pos-sible, as no solution exists to the catastrophic consequences that he or shemust endure. But the society, now estranged from the hero, transcends theexisting moral order. It develops a stronger sense of human dignity, havingobserved the hero’s courageous confrontation with disaster (Steiner 129).

The administration’s narrative employed the theme of reaffirmation inthe immediate aftermath of the attempted rescue mission. After visiting thefive men who were injured in the rescue attempt, Carter elevated the partici-pating members of the armed forces into models for all Americans in difficulttimes. He affirmed, “[W]e are reinspired and rededicated to freedom and theresponsibilities of a free nation in a democracy by the self-sacrificial andheroic attitude of these men” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:786). At the eulogyfor the American servicemen killed in Iran, Carter stressed the role that dutymust play in the nation’s consciousness. He emphasized, “[W]e know that itis not the length of a life that determines its impact or its meaning or its qual-ity, but the depth of its commitment and the height of its purpose” (864).Carter defined the pursuit of duty and responsibility to be laudable endsworth pursuing. He reasoned in his first news conference after the rescue mis-sion, “There is a deeper failure than that of incomplete success, and that is thefailure to attempt a worthy effort, a failure to try” (793). Carter implied thatboth the members of the rescue team and he himself had sacrificed to purgeAmerican society of its collective guilt for the events in Iran.

Carter argued that reaffirmation required a steadfast commitment to theinternational goals of freedom, dignity, and human rights. Carter explicitlydefined the future duty of the nation when he said, “We do not maintain ourpower in order to seize power from others. Our goal was to strengthen our


own freedom and the freedom of others, to advance the dignity of the indi-vidual and the right of all people to justice, to a good life, and to a futuresecure from tyranny. In choosing our course in the world, America’s strengthmust be used to serve America’s values” (Public Papers, 1980–1981 2:1556).In his farewell address to the nation, he cautioned against temptations toabandon such principles during difficult times. Instead, he steadfastly main-tained, “We should never be surprised nor discouraged, because the impactof our efforts has had and will always have varied results. Rather, we shouldtake pride that the ideals that gave birth to our Nation still inspire the hopesof oppressed people around the world. We have no cause for self-righteous-ness or complacency, but we have every reason to persevere, both in our owncountry and beyond our borders” (3:2892). Through a reaffirmation of cher-ished American values, Carter provided a means of spiritual rebirth even asAmerican society was in the midst of its second stunning foreign policydefeat in a decade.

Like tragic dramas more generally, the Carter administration narrativefor the Iranian hostage crisis included an act of shame, inevitable suffering,acquisition of knowledge, and value reaffirmation. The rhetorical approachreinforced that the ongoing battle against terrorism would involve catharsis,i.e., the pain of periodic setbacks coupled with the pleasure of defending thenation’s foundational ideals.

IDEOLOGY AND THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS

Action in tragic dramas rarely focuses on ideological conflicts. The responsi-bility for society’s ills falls on an individual (the tragic hero), rather than onan opposing culture. Tragic heroes, as representative of humanity’s potential,avoid politically expedient clashes of culture and, instead, emphasize tran-scendent moral themes. As T. R. Henn, a fellow at Cambridge University,posits, “[W]hile it might be reasonable to expect that tragedies will be writ-ten concerning conflict which will necessarily accumulate on the periphery ofsuch ideological situations, we shall not expect the central conflicts to be sus-ceptible of tragic statement” (248). Consistent with the traditions of tragicdrama, the Carter public communication strategy generally avoided ideologi-cal depictions of the Iranian hostage crisis.

Remaining on the outskirts of an ideological conflict, however, wouldnot be easy for the Carter team. The administration faced a hostage crisisstaged as ideological warfare by opposing forces within just a few days of theembassy takeover. On November 22, 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini labeledthe crisis a de facto “war between Islam and the pagans” (“Iran-Cravath,Swaine, and Moore I”). The following day, the Tehran International Service


quoted Khomeini identifying a series of steps all Muslims should follow:“(1) All Muslim officers must attack with their weapons against U.S.imperialism and its agents in Muslim countries and must support theIranian people in battle. (2) All Muslims must demonstrate against theU.S. and its agents in Muslim countries in order to make the U.S. under-stand that Iran is not alone. (3) All U.S. interests, embassies and estab-lishments in Muslim countries must be destroyed” (as qtd. in“Iran-Cravath, Swaine, and Moore III”).

By the next day, Khomeini charged that the United States and Israelhad attempted to seize Moslem mosques in Mecca and Medina. Some mul-lahs throughout Iran began equating a visit to the US Embassy in Iran witha pilgrimage to Mecca (Taheri 124). Gary Sick has described the difficultiesthe administration faced when he wrote: “Khomeini was a total ideologue.He saw the world through the exclusive prism of his own beliefs, separatingevents into opposites: right or wrong, good or bad, black or white. Andsince he considered his ideology divinely ordained, he was the most danger-ous of all ideologues” (All Fall Down 219). Given Khomeini’s status as pri-mary religious leader for many Iranian fundamentalists, his ideologicaldepiction of the contest became a notable factor in the world’s perception ofthe hostage crisis.

The captors who held the embassy publicly reflected Khomeini’s fram-ing of the crisis. They called for mourning possessions carrying flags of mar-tyrdom and revolution as a show of Muslim unity against the United States.They announced that anyone insulting or using obscene language about thepolicies of the Imam should be considered an agent of the CIA or SAVAK,the brutal military police organization of the shah. Even when theyannounced the humane treatment of the hostages, the captors were careful toclarify that such action was not a capitulation to the United States; it was anact consistent with Muslim ideology (“Iran-Cravath, Swaine, and Moore I”).Khomeini and the captors elevated the international stakes of the conflict byraising the act of hostage taking to a clash of cultures.

The calls from Khomeini and the embassy captors resonated throughoutmuch of the Middle East. A telegram from the Chargé d’affaires BruceLaingen to Cyrus Vance assessed the sentiment in Iran less than a monthafter the embassy takeover. He warned, “Khomeini and his entourage of cler-ics have skillfully used the seizure of our embassy, charges that our diplomatsare spies, and our refusal to hand over the shah to develop a mass psychologyof hate that may have few parallels in history [. . .]. In Pakistan, hundredsstormed the US Embassy, killing one American and trapping dozens ofembassy personnel in a vault for five hours. Pakistanis also attacked the USConsulate in Karachi, the American Library in Lahore, and the AmericanCultural Center in Rawalpindi. In Beirut, fifty Iranian students marched on


the US Embassy, tore the US seal off the building, and burned an Americanflag. In Libya, approximately two thousand demonstrators marched on theUS Embassy in Tripoli, chanting support for the Iranians and setting fire tothe embassy’s furniture. Amid the chants of “Death to America” and “theGreat Satan” in various quarters around the Middle East, the Carter admin-istration faced a ready-made ideological battle with the Muslim world.

Both Carter and his key advisors recognized the importance of fore-stalling a clash of Islam with the United States. Strategically, they believedthe United States could ill afford to make an enemy of the entire Muslimworld, given the dependence on Middle Eastern oil both at home and by keyallies abroad. A top-secret internal report entitled Foreign Policy: Coherenceand Sense of Direction offered the following assessment: “The stakes are sogreat (even greater to Western Europe and Japan which are far more depen-dent on Middle East oil) that it is strategically imperative the U.S. orches-trate a credible response with our Allies and (to the extent feasible) thenations of the region—and that we then together can carry out thatresponse.” The administration’s cost-benefit analysis strongly argued againstbroadening the conflict from Iran to the broader Muslim community.

Accordingly, the administration attempted to deflect attention awayfrom ideological interpretations of the struggle. Charged with providingCarter daily policy advice regarding the Iranian hostage crisis, the SpecialCoordinating Committee (SCC) reported its consensus that the presidentshould “reaffirm that the U.S. has no quarrel with the people of Islam, haslong-standing ties with Islam, and great respect for the principles of thefaith” (Donovan). Noting that Carter was in full agreement with the SCC,Harold Saunders recalled, “The President wanted at a minimum to be surethat, in dealing with the Iranian revolutionaries, we did not do or say thingsthat would make us seem at odds with the whole Islamic world” (“Diplomacyand Pressure” 124). Consistent with the character of the tragic hero, Carterheld to a pragmatic, rather than an ideological, approach to the public policygovernance of the Iranian situation (Morris 260).

Multiple public statements by administration officials during the hostagecrisis stressed the mutual interests of the United States, Iran, and theremainder of the Muslim world. The State Department, for example, orga-nized a reception for all the faculties of Islamic Studies in the Washington,DC area. Held in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, the event fea-tured Carter addressing the group in celebration of the close and valued tiesbetween America and the Muslim world. He told his audience, “We share,first and foremost, a deep faith in the one Supreme Being. We are all com-manded by Him to faith, compassion and justice. We have a commonrespect and reverence for the law. Despite the strains of the modern age, wecontinue to place special importance on the family and the home. And we


share a belief that hospitality is a virtue and that the host, whether a nationor an individual, should behave with generosity and honor toward guests”(Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:284). Carter closed his remarks with anexpression of his continued interest in developing closer political, eco-nomic, and cultural ties with Islamic nations. His message was straightfor-ward: the United States wished to continue its relationship with Muslimnations around the globe despite the tensions resulting from the Iranianhostage crisis.

Administration officials felt so strongly about the consequences ofalienating Muslim countries that they attempted to influence the Americanmedia’s reporting of the hostage crisis. Aides asked reporters to avoid depic-tions of the events in Iran as a clash between the United States and theMuslim world. Harold Saunders was ardent in a press background briefingof December 6, 1979: “The issue has little to do with religion, although theIranian authorities have cast the issue on religious terms. [. . .] It seems tome that in the interest of sound reporting, whether it be our official com-mentary or your reporting of the situation, we all might together reflect onour own practice in using words like ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ to generalizeabout what has been called the crescent of the crisis. This is not principally,I think, an issue between Islamic nations and the U.S.” (Saunders, PressBackgrounder). He then reminded the press that the United States stillenjoyed strong relations with other Muslim states and that many Arab gov-ernments had denounced the holding of hostages as a violation of interna-tional law and diplomatic practice.

The Carter administration used expanded Voice of America broadcaststo send a conciliatory message to the people of Iran directly. Having elimi-nated Persian programming due to lack of funding prior to the crisis, theadministration resumed running half-hour, indigenous language programs toIranian audiences. In November 1979, the Voice of America programs inter-viewed leading Muslims discussing U.S.-Iranian relations and their unfavor-able reaction to the taking of the hostages (Reinhardt, Memo to Brzezinski).On a more long-term basis, James M. Rentschler, the director of theInternational Communication Agency, recommended to Brzezinski onDecember 3, 1979, that the United States needed to develop programmingstressing American identification with Islam. As he stated, “It should not betoo difficult for ICA people to devise a series of programs, valid over the nextone to five years, which point up the commonality of values, spiritual andsecular, that link our societies.” By stressing identification, rather than divi-sion, the administration hoped to strengthen ties between the United Statesand Iran and further America’s long-range interests in the Middle East.

The orchestrated effort to diffuse the contest between the United Statesand the Muslim world was not the only potential ideological conflict facing


the Carter administration. The potential clash with a joint Muslim/Com-munist enemy was perhaps even more ominous. From Carter’s first days inoffice, the administration identified Iran as the most likely spot for conflictbetween the United States and the Soviet Union. As Colonel William E.Odom, member of the National Security Advisor’s staff, recalled, “In theregional areas of East-West competition, the largest strategic stakes and themost fragile situation was in Iran and the Persian Gulf area.” As early asNovember 1978, Carter’s diary recorded his concern the Soviet leadershipwould intervene in Iran (Keeping Faith 440).

The Soviet move was not only one of high probability; it was one withhigh stakes as well. Internal administration analyses detailing the dangerousconsequences of a Soviet takeover of Iran reasoned, “In geo-political terms,the Soviets would be in a position from Iran to dominate the Middle Eastand South Asia, and ultimately to deny Gulf oil to the West. [. . .] A suc-cessful Soviet operation in Iran, even if it did not lead to a cut-off of otherGulf oil, would affect the power balance almost as decisively as a long-termdisruption of that supply” (“Iran-11/79”). A top-secret report of the SCCadded a projection of the economic impact of a Soviet movement into theIran: “The effect of Soviet control of [Persian Gulf oil], either through overtmilitary action or by internal subversion or political intimidation, woulddestroy the free market economies and dissolve our alliances in Europe andin East Asia” (Building Up Our Deterrent Capabilities). Administrationofficials saw Iran as pivotal for the very survival of American influencearound the world.

US intelligence reports confirmed the Soviet Union was attempting tocapitalize on the Iranian hostage crisis to improve its standing in the Muslimworld. Even before the seizure of the embassy, the Soviet Union had orderedits leftist, pro-Soviet elements in Iran to participate in revolutionary demon-strations against the shah and had promised Soviet assistance and materialsupport for a left-wing coup expected sometime in 1979 (Middle EastBureau). In the early days after the embassy seizure, Carter’s chief of theCovert Action Staff reported that FBI summaries of National Voice of Iranclandestine broadcasting from the Soviet Union came “close to saying Iranhas support and will be protected by the USSR.” After assessing all FBIsummary reports of Soviet clandestine broadcasting to Iran from November1979 through March 1980, a National Security Council staff member PaulHenze concluded, “[T]he Soviets have not only done nothing to help us inthe Iranian hostage situation—they have persistently and insidiously donetheir damnedest to stir up Iranian opinion against us” (Memo to Brzezinski4/7/80). Using available intelligence at the time, officials in the Carteradministration believed the Soviet Union was a palpable threat to Iran andthe rest of the Middle East.


The Iranians who worked with the Carter administration attempted toexploit the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union byinvoking the use of ideological terminology. The shah himself blamed therise of the revolution on enforcement of laws designed to undermineCommunist influence in Iran (Carter, Keeping Faith). Both the shah andintermediaries of the Iranian government subsequently told Carter aides thatthe militants who held the embassy were Communists or had Marxist lean-ings (Washburn, Memo to Precht). The Iranian foreign minister SadeghGhotbzadeh relayed an account of being kicked out of the embassy com-pound by “those idiot communists” after demanding that the captors allowan international commission to visit the hostages (Sick, Memo toBrzezinski). Ghotbzadeh argued the United States should work through himto release the hostages, because he remained the “main obstacle to commu-nist influence in the new revolutionary regime” (qtd. in Precht). By April1980, US assessments did not accept the ideological conclusions of the for-eign minister. Instead, they concluded his argument was simply designed toinduce the United States to be more flexible in its negotiations with Iranianintermediaries (ibid.). While members of the administration did accept thatthe Soviet Union was a threat to Iran, they were reluctant to conclude that aCommunist nation was coordinating the events of the hostage crisis.

Carter was initially reluctant to publicly fuel the ideological conflictbetween the United States and the Soviet Union. Having invested much ofhis own political capital in the SALT II arms control treaty, Carter initiallypreferred alternative explanations for the Soviets’ behavior. After the Sovietsfirst entered Afghanistan, Carter used labels such as “Soviet military inter-vention,” “Soviet invasion,” and “Soviet action” (See Public Papers, 1980–1981 1:194–200, 21–24) to depict the move. The approach steered awayfrom an ideological frame that would have depicted the conflict as a contestbetween Communism and democracy. Publicly, Carter did not recall theSoviet Union’s history of aggression or its current adventurism as an integralpart of the Communist ideology, opting instead for the pragmatic explana-tion that the Soviet Union sought direct access to oil reserves of the PersianGulf (38–42). Early on, Carter acted to avoid a clash of cultures, leavingopen the possibility for improved relations in the future.

Eventually, Carter did adopt the rhetorical strategy of ideological war-fare to portray the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The timing of his shiftcoincided with the International Olympic Coordinating Committee’s refusalof his request to move the 1980 Moscow games to Athens, Greece.Cognizant of Hitler’s celebration of Nazism at the 1936 Berlin games,Carter called on all democratic nations to refuse to send their flags to theSoviet Union in protest of the Afghanistan invasion (Public Papers,1980–1981 1:675). Some of the allies rebuffed Carter’s request, not wanting


to disrupt their trade with the Soviet Union (Drachman and Schank226–27). Carter’s call for the boycott ultimately resulted in sixty out of a pos-sible one hundred and fourteen countries complying with his request andanother sixteen refusing to participate in the opening ceremonies.

Unable to rally the entire world community around his boycott of theOlympic games, Carter subsequently became increasingly strident in his por-trayal of the conflict. Facing stiff competition in his 1980 presidential cam-paign, Carter’s campaign trail appeals became increasingly ideological. At atown hall meeting in South Carolina, Carter proclaimed, “When the Sovietswent into their neighboring nation, Afghanistan, this was not a triumph ofcommunism, it was an indication of the failure of communism” (PublicPapers, 1980–1981 3:2565). Having failed to rally the public behind nonide-ological frameworks for portraying America’s foreign policy challenges,Carter adopted a more aggressive cultural clash strategy with the approach ofhis final election.

Throughout the final year of his presidency, Carter publicly associatedthe seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran with the Soviet invasion inAfghanistan. He frequently made public statements that described the twointernational incidents in tandem. When discussing Afghanistan, he stressedmany of the themes of tragic drama that he had already rehearsed with theAmerican public in regard to the Iranian hostage crisis. Examples included:(1) the invasion constituted an illegal act that violated international law, (2)the Soviet Union would suffer increasing costs for remaining in Afghanistan,(3) punitive actions by the United States were unlikely to persuade theSoviets to withdraw, and (4) public sacrifice would be necessary during thecrisis. Merging the two foreign crises into a single phenomenon of disrespectfor international law had the advantage of providing focus to the problem.However, failure to achieve positive results in one crisis reinforced the tragicoutcome of the other.

By linking the crises, Carter invited his audience to conclude that theAmerican and Islamic cultures were not at war. When speaking to Iranianaudiences, Carter administration officials actively engaged in a campaign topresent the Soviet Union, not America, as the real threat facing Iran. Thestrategy, dominant by May 1980, sought to capitalize on the fear Iranianclerics had of the Soviet-dominated Left overtaking Iran (Dodson). In JodyPowell’s statement to David Hartman on Good Morning America, he arguedthat the Soviet Union, not the United States, was anti-Muslim: “When youhave 50,000 troops right across your border who are actively engaged inkilling your co-religionists because they wish to practice the same religionthat you wish, it seems to me that might be a matter of greater concern thanany imagined threat from the United States.” Repeatedly, administrationstatements referenced the vote of thirty-four Muslim nations in Islamabad


condemning the Soviet Union and calling for a withdrawal of its troops inAfghanistan. By refocusing the conflict as one between Communism andIslam, the Carter administration attempted to de-emphasize the antipathythat existed between Iran and the United States.

To broaden the Iranian audience for the anti-Soviet message, Carterapproved broadcasts by the Board of International Broadcasting, a unit of theInternational Communication Agency, in areas adjacent to Iran andAfghanistan. As Harold Saunders revealed, Carter “wanted to take whateveradvantage could be taken of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a nonalignedIslamic nation” (“Diplomacy and Pressure” 124). Carter approved a SCCplan of December 12, 1979 that called for increases in US broadcasts toMuslim audiences, additional transmitters, and additional personnel. Theintent of the broadcasts was to underscore the unfavorable treatment ofMuslims by the Soviet Union. The plan for the broadcasts was to reiteratethat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated the willingness of thecurrent Soviet Union to intervene in the internal affairs of Muslim countries.

Recognizing that funding for the Board of International Broadcastingplan was insufficient to accomplish the intended task, Carter requested andreceived authorization for a substantial increase in funding. On May 8, theHouse Foreign Affairs Committee authorized additional appropriations of$3 million for FY 1980 and $9.7 million for FY 1981 to the Board forInternational Broadcasting to provide four new transmitters and additionalmanagement and support personnel to enhance broadcasting by RadioLiberty to the Central Asian areas of the Soviet Union, including areas adja-cent to Afghanistan and Iran (“Meetings-SCC 266”). Despite congressionalapproval, the Office of Management and Budget did not allocate the fundingfor the project. Perhaps in a final bit of tragic irony, Paul Henze complainedin June 1980, “It is exactly six months since President’s approval of expand-ing broadcast to Muslims. Not much has happened as a result. [. . .] Not apenny has been allocated to expanding Muslim broadcasting staffs and nonew transmitters have been leased or otherwise secured” (Memo toBrzezinski, 6/7/80).

The choice of a tragic narrative to depict the Iranian hostage crisisappeared in concert with Carter’s reluctance to elevate terrorism into an ide-ological marker of American culture. Terrorism now fell into the same cate-gory as other great tragic themes, such as the relationship of humanity to theenvironment, the place of humanity within the universe, and the meaning oflife. It had become an ongoing crisis of the ages with universal implications.Facing such an important matter, the public began to question why Carterdid not take stronger action.

Carter’s more pragmatic approach was productive on a policy level. Byvirtually any objective measure of success in hostage-taking affairs, Carter’s


methods achieved better results than those of his contemporaries whoembraced an ideological framing of terrorism. During Carter’s tenure, forexample, fewer Americans became hostages, fewer Americans died in foreigncaptivity, and those who were held spent fewer years in captivity than duringReagan’s presidency. (US Dept. State, “International Terrorism Incidents,”US Dept. State “Casualties”). Nonetheless, it was Carter, the tragic hero,who had to symbolically experience “death” for American society to under-stand its own limits. His own administration’s narrative presented Carter aswilling to endure such unjust suffering so that society’s commitment tohuman dignity could be reaffirmed.

The tragic framing of the Iranian hostage crisis positioned Carter for hislegacy as a strong ex-president. Because tragic heroes are willing to enduresuffering to absolve society’s responsibility for a crisis, they become ennobledeven as they are defeated. Their commitment to transcendent moral values,such as human rights, freedom, and dignity for all people, appears all themore substantial given their own willingness to sacrifice on behalf of theirprinciples. Their responsibility to the moral order becomes a defining ele-ment of their character, as does their awareness of and resistance to theshort-term temptations of political expediency and ideological confrontation.Recent opinion polls rank Carter as having the highest moral character ofany president, a somewhat unsurprising finding for the hero of America’smodern tragic drama (Schulman M1).

Carter’s approach to the Iranian hostage crisis limited America’sresponse options to those that responded directly to the proven perpetratorsof a criminal act of terrorism. Not wanting to risk more clashes with Muslimnations around the globe, he refused to fully employ the ideological power ofthe terrorism label. His successor would not be so restrained.


4

Origins of Terrorism as an AmericanIdeograph: The Reagan Era

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan promised theAmerican public that, unlike Carter, he knew the answers to the

nation’s terrorism problem. Once elected, however, Reagan experienced asharp increase in global terrorism. Attacks against Americans and their prop-erty rose from eight and a half percent of the world total in the five yearsimmediately preceding Reagan’s tenure to between twenty and thirty-fivepercent from 1983 to 1988 (Terrorist Incidents). More than five thousandterrorist attacks occurred worldwide. The Middle East became a focal pointof terrorism, serving as the site of thirty-five percent of all international inci-dents and the source of about one fourth of all attacks in Europe (MiddleEast and Terrorism). Over 550 Americans lost their lives in terrorist attacksduring the Reagan era (Turner 24).

Iran’s celebrated release of American hostages on Reagan’s inaugurationday foreshadowed the public prominence the topic would have throughoutthe remainder of his presidency. Reagan gave literally hundreds of publicstatements addressing the topic. A dozen specific acts of terrorism domi-nated Reagan’s discourse, all involving the deaths of Americans outside theUnited States. In the substantial majority of Reagan’s speeches, he discussedincidents that occurred in two regions of the world: Central America and theMiddle East.

One particular Central American incident captured congressional andpublic attention. It involved the murder of four American churchwomen bythe El Salvadoran National Guard in December 1980. The nuns’ previouswork with the poor had raised local suspicions that they were rebel sympa-thizers, a position reinforced by initial administration statements on the sub-ject (Arnson 62–63). While the executive branch assured Congress that thegovernment of El Salvador was conducting a full investigation, theSalvadorans were actually engaged in a cover-up that included job transfers

65

for confessed killers and a weapons exchange designed to avoid ballisticsdetection. The perpetrators were eventually brought to justice, but not untilthe US government obtained the names of the murderers, turned them overto the El Salvadoran military, and insisted upon arrests (Leogrande 93–94).The Reagan administration, with its well-known support of the ElSalvadoran government, faced embarrassment as a result of the incident.

In the Middle East, the frequency and deadliness of terrorist attacksspiked after Israel responded to terrorist raids across its border by invadingLebanon in June 1982 (Hougan). The resulting violence prompted theUnited States to send the Marines into Lebanon as part of a multinationalpeacekeeping force. On April 18, 1983, a suicide bomber, allegedly moti-vated by the desire to drive the United States out of Lebanon and to punishAmerica for supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, rammed a van loaded withTNT explosives into the front of the US Embassy in West Beirut (Oakley).The attack killed sixty-seven people, including seventeen Americans. In anOctober 11, 1985 press briefing, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinbergerclaimed to have circumstantial evidence linking the bombing to the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, but no US retaliatory response was forthcoming.

In a predawn attack on October 23, 1983, another suicide bombercrashed into the US Marine barracks in Lebanon. Two hundred and forty-one Americans stationed to protect the Beirut airport died in the bombing.The US government implicated the Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah as havingcaused the attack (Buhite 222–23). Reagan initially proclaimed a staunch,continuing commitment to the initial size and mission of the peacekeepingforce (Press Briefing). Four months later he became convinced of the inabilityto ensure the safety of American military forces in Lebanon and ordered theredeployment of the Marines to ships offshore (Public Papers, 1984 1:186).

Not all of the specific terrorist acts Reagan publicly discussed victimizedAmerican military forces; he also mentioned acts of Middle Eastern terror-ism that targeted civilians. On June 14, 1985, two twenty-year-old Lebanesemen, armed with two grenades and a pistol, hijacked TWA Flight 847,which was en route from Athens to Rome. One hundred and fifty-threepeople on the plane, including 135 Americans, became hostages. When thecaptors’ initial demand for an intermediary went unheeded, they shot NavyPetty Officer Second Class Robert Stethem. Afterward, the captors threwthe serviceman’s dead body down onto the airport’s tarmac. Over the nextsixteen days, approximately a dozen heavily armed men took control of theplane. They flew back and forth from Beirut to Algiers, releasing hostagesintermittently. Their demands included: the release of seven hundredLebanese Shia Muslims held by Israel, the release of two Shia Muslims heldby Spanish authorities for shooting a Libyan diplomat, the release of seven-teen Shia Muslims imprisoned in Kuwait for a series of six bombing attacks


in December 1983, an end to Arab world oil and arms transactions with theUnited States, a removal of US navy ships from the Lebanese coast prior tothe hostages’ release, and a pledge that the United States and Israel wouldnot retaliate once the situation was resolved (Summary of Events). One addi-tional demand, never officially released to the American public, was for theUnited States to admit CIA involvement in a previous covert Beirut carbombing (Turner 191). The captors released the remainder of the hostageson June 30, 1985, following Israel’s release of thirty-one Shia Muslimdetainees from Atlit Prison and after the US State Department’s publicstatement reaffirming “its long-standing support for the preservation ofLebanon, its government, its stability, and security and for the mitigation ofthe suffering of its people” (Summary of Events). Despite the appearancethat the Israeli and US actions constituted concessions to the hostage-takers,the leadership of both nations insisted that their actions were in no way con-nected to the release of the TWA 847 hostages.

Less than four months later, four members of the Palestine LiberationFront hijacked the Achille Lauro on the high seas between Alexandria andPort Said, Egypt. The hijackers, purportedly on their way to Ashdod, Israelto avenge an earlier Israeli bombing raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis,took four hundred individuals hostage on October 7, 1985 (Sec. of St.,Telegram to Amman, et al.). The hijackers threatened to blow up the shipand to execute an American hostage every five minutes if their demand torelease fifty Palestinians imprisoned in Israel was not met (Sec. of St.,Telegram to Am. Emb. Belgrade). Egypt mediated a resolution of the crisisat the written request of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. Thesubsequent agreement, previewed and approved by Reagan, required thehijackers to release the captives in exchange for safe passage and delivery tothe PLO for prosecution (Am. Consul in Alexandria). Reagan’s consent wascontingent on the hijackers not killing any of the passengers. CaptainGerardo De Rosa of the Achille Lauro satisfied the agreement’s conditionswhen, threatened with his own life and the murder of another passenger, heconfirmed in writing that all passengers were safe. The kidnappers releasedthe passengers and crew fifty-two hours after the ship’s initial takeover.

A few days later, the Syrians recovered Leon Klinghoffer’s body, shot inthe forehead, on the seacoast near Tartous (US Dept. of St., OperationsCenter). Recognizing the death of an American passenger, the United Statesimmediately asked Egypt to hold the kidnappers for Italian extradition.Instead, an Egyptian 737 carrying the four terrorists, two Palestinians(including the alleged mastermind Abu Abbas), and four Egyptians took offfor Tunis. When Tunis and Athens denied landing privileges to the aircraft,it turned back to Egypt. On route, four US F14s from the USS Saratogaintercepted the plane and escorted it to Sigonella, Italy (Weinberger). The

Origins of Terrorism as an American Ideograph 67

Italians agreed to a request for extradition of the four kidnappers. Both theItalian and Yugoslavian governments refused to extradite Abu Abbas to theUnited States, given that the case for his guilt was based exclusively on Israelisources (Egyptian Handling).

The Reagan administration did not limit discussion of Middle Easternterrorism to attacks on Middle Eastern soil. Less than six months after theAchille Lauro incident, agents of the Libyan People’s Bureau of East Berlinexploded a bomb in a West Berlin discotheque, killing two people and injur-ing two hundred and thirty others (a figure that included fifty American ser-vicemen). The US government claimed to have convincing evidence thatLibyan leader Moammar Qadhafi directed the April 5, 1996 attack, evidencethat included intercepts of contact between the bombers and the Libyan gov-ernment both the day before and the day after the attack (Burnett). Theadministration released a State Department White Paper cataloging morethan fifty instances of Libyan terrorism from 1979 to 1985 and intelligencelinking the government of Libya to the highly dangerous Abu Nidal terroristgroup. Claiming to have evidence of plans for future attacks against high-ranking US officials and intercepts from the Libyan embassy in EastGermany verifying their prior knowledge of the attack on the discotheque,the Reagan administration decided to respond (Libya under Qadhafi). OnApril 14, 1986, administration officials asked a group of European foreignministers to join the United States in imposing economic sanctions againstTripoli. When the ministers refused, the administration initiated controver-sial air and naval strikes. Officially, the targets were Libyan command posts,training bases, and transport capabilities, but when a US bomb hit a militarybarrack that housed one of Qadhafi’s residences, speculation arose that theactual objective was the assassination of the Libyan leader (Targets;Drachman and Shank 245).

A second event where Reagan referred to a Middle Eastern source tar-geting American civilians in Europe occurred on December 21, 1988. PanAm Flight 103, en route from Frankfort to London to New York, explodedover Lockerbie, Scotland. The attack killed 259 individuals aboard the planeand 11 bystanders on the ground. The day after the bombing, a group callingitself “the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution” took responsibility for theincident, claiming revenge for the US decision to give refuge to the shah andfor the July 1988 downing of an Iranian civilian airbus by the USS Vincennesthat had previously killed 227 adults and 63 children (Am. Emb. inLondon). Years after the explosion, Reagan administration officials positedthe theory that the Pan Am 103 attack had been Qadafi’s retaliation for theUS air raid that had killed the Libyan leader’s daughter (Cannistraro).

On January 31, 2001, more than a decade after the onset of the initialinvestigation by US, Scottish, and German authorities, a special three-judge


Scottish court found Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi, an alleged Libyan securityagent, guilty of murder related to the Pan Am 103 incident. Based on cir-cumstantial evidence, the prosecution’s case linked a coat that Al-Megrahipurchased in Malta to the inside of the suitcase bomb. He received a sen-tence of life imprisonment with a possibility of parole after twenty years,while his codefendant Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima was found not guilty. Morethan two decades after Pam Am 103 crashed, the Libyan government agreedto pay $2.7 billion to victim’s families in the airliner crash, with each familyreceiving $10 million. Their announced timeline for payment was forty per-cent of the amount when the UN lifted its sanctions against Libya, forty per-cent when the United States lifted its sanctions against Libya, and twentypercent when the United States removed Libya from its list of state sponsorsof terrorism.

While the vast majority of Reagan’s public examples of Middle Easternterrorism focused on bombings, he also commented publicly on hostage inci-dents. Throughout the entirety of Reagan’s second presidential term, Islamicfundamentalists held more than a dozen Americans hostage in Lebanon.Targets included CIA agents, members of the clergy, journalists, and fac-ulty/administrators of both American University in Beirut and theInternational School in South Beirut. The Islamic Jihad organization exe-cuted two hostages—William Buckley and Peter Killburn—claiming retalia-tion for Israel’s bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis and for the USbombing raid on Libya. The murder of Buckley was particularly salientbecause of his standing as the most senior US intelligence officer knowledge-able about the Middle East. Other groups holding hostages demanded armssales and the release of seventeen Shia Muslims imprisoned for their role insix December 1983 bombings targeting American and French embassies inKuwait (Buhite 223). While publicly maintaining a stance of no concessionsto terrorists, Reagan privately authorized the sale of more than fifteen hun-dred TOW and Hawk missile parts to Iranian emissaries from August 1985through November 1986 (“Iran/Arms Transaction”). He also approved aplan to release the seventeen Da’wa prisoners (Lytton). After the initialexchange of arms for three hostages, the captors kidnapped three moreAmericans and increased the price of obtaining future hostage releases(Wroe 87). When a Middle Eastern newspaper made the arms-for-hostagedeal public, Reagan experienced a loss of US credibility abroad (Platt, Memoto Poindexter 11/14/86), the largest drop in domestic presidential approvalratings ever recorded over a several-week period (D’Souza 247) and the onsetof a joint congressional investigation that uncovered the diversion of pro-ceeds from the Iranian arms sales to the Nicaraguan Contras.

While the bulk of Reagan’s discourse emphasized terrorist incidentsspawned in the Middle East, he made an exception when a Soviet aircraft


fired on a commercial US airliner. In the predawn hours of September 1,1983, a Soviet SU-15 fighter shot down KAL Flight 007 as the plane leftRussian airspace over Sakhalin Island. All 269 passengers and crew died inthe subsequent crash, constituting the fifth worst air disaster in history (R.W. Johnson 1). The US government condemned the attack as a wanton actof murder against a civilian airliner; the Soviet government maintained itwas an unfortunate, but necessary, response to a provocative violation ofRussian airspace. Ultimately, both governments retracted their initial state-ments on the crisis, with the Soviets admitting the incident had actuallyhappened and the United States divulging that one of its RC-135 recon-naissance aircraft had been in the vicinity of the Korean airliner when it wasoriginally detected by Soviet radar (Sec. of St., Telegram to All Dipl. Posts).Official US sources insisted the airliner’s deviation into Soviet airspace wasaccidental. Interviews and an independent assessment of the flight tapes ledanalyst David Pearson to conclude, “The evidence suggests that Flight 007’sdeviation was known to its crew. It suggests that U.S. civilian and militarypersonnel knew the plane to be headed toward the Soviet Union hoursbefore the shoot down and did nothing to direct it back to course. And it isclear that the Administration has tried from the beginning to limit inquiryinto the downing” (Pearson 360–61).

The Reagan administration’s selection of these twelve examples of ter-rorist acts was, in and of itself, a revealing act. Reagan primarily focused onterrorist attacks (usually bombings) that involved government-backed perpe-trators in the Middle East. As the next section of the chapter will argue,Reagan’s focus was not random; it had important implications for the imple-mentation of his administration’s foreign policy agenda.

LABELING THE THREAT

Faced with more than five thousands acts of international terrorism, theReagan administration focused on a subgroup it labeled “state-sponsors ofterrorism.” The new label carried institutional currency, given Congress’srecent passage of the Export Administration Act of 1979. That law empow-ered the secretary of state to place on an annual list nations found to besponsors of multiple acts of international terrorism. Once on the list, foreignnations became subject to export restrictions. As would become apparentduring Reagan’s tenure, states on the list could also expect to be the recipientof a host of other measures ranging up to and including military retaliation.

State sponsorship of terrorism was a phrase expansive enough to encom-pass a wide range of activity perceived to be threatening to the United States.The phrase allowed the government to differentiate state aid to terrorist


groups from self-supported terrorism or tactical terrorism (Public Report ofVP Task Force). Operationally, the administration defined the phrase as“logistical aid, provision of weapons and/or training, granting of safe-havens,use of diplomatic pouches and/or documentation, and—in some cases—actual targetting [sic] and/or provision of information about the selectedtarget” (McFarlane). By grouping foreign states refusing to extradite accusedterrorists with others that actively conspired to commit acts of violence, thelabel offered expansive possibilities for those the administration considereddeserving of public condemnation, economic reprisal, or military retaliation.

Members of the Reagan administration both recognized and exercisedbroad latitude in assigning state-sponsor status. Deputy Assistant ofNational Security Affairs Nancy Bearg Dyke wrote to Vice President GeorgeBush in March 1982 to inform him that the secretary of state had removedIraq from the list, despite internal intelligence demonstrating that theMiddle Eastern nation continued to sponsor terrorism. The rationale for thedecision, she explained, was that the administration wanted to encourageIraq to become more like other more moderate Arab nations. Dyke went onto indicate that even for countries that did make the list, the United Statescould apply different strategies of reprisal. She offered the cases of Syria andSouth Yemen, which could buy civil aircraft, while Libya and Cuba couldnot. Multiple factors besides a nation’s history with terrorism fed into thedecision for inclusion on the list.

The administration used the notion of state sponsorship to justify areengineering of the nation’s response options to terrorism. Publicly,Reagan maintained, “The new phenomenon we have seen of the use of ter-rorism as an instrument of state policy demands new approaches from us”(Public Papers, 1985 1:517). Behind the scenes, much of the focus was onthe past: namely, the early republic’s approach to the Barbary pirates.National Security Assistants Don Gregg and Doug Menarchik argued in amemo to Bush that the Barbary pirate analogy was appropriate for develop-ing response options to current terrorist acts. They reasoned, “Just as theBarbary powers were held responsible for their piratical actions as well as foractions of independent pirates who exploited the permissive environment,the US could bring pressure to bear on state actors to ‘police’ their spheresof influence.” Apparently impressed, Bush praised the aides’ work. In themargins of the memo, he wrote “very good” and encouraged that it be dis-tributed to counterterrorism spokesperson Admiral Holloway and to mem-bers of the State Department.

Internal administration correspondence was specific about the directionof the administration’s new approaches. One memo identified eight strategicconsiderations implied by the concept of state sponsorship: “(1) more atten-tion to physical protection, (2) may effect US ability to deploy ground forces


in high risk area (air power may be used more as a substitute for power pro-jection), (3) may have to accept higher level of risk, (4) more retaliatory oper-ations/preemptive strikes, (5) greater investment in Special Operations, (6)rescue operations in a hostile environment, (7) military operations limited;(8) utility will be debated, and military measures alone won’t solve problem”(“Terrorism-II”). As the list detailed, the “state sponsor” label was notinnocuous; it shifted priorities within the administration for the funding andimplementation of the nation’s security initiatives.

One particular agency bolstered by the administration’s new labelingstrategy was the Central Intelligence Agency. Donald Gregg, a former CIAagent and assistant to the vice president in the National Security Agency,advocated both the use of increased US covert activities and use of USunconventional forces in response to state-sponsored terrorism. Encomp-assing both options under the rubric of “an international response,” Greggwrote, “Until I’m shot down in flames, I’m going to try to push ‘an interna-tional response to international terrorism.’ Makes it easier (in some ways) tomove into a situation, and makes it harder for terrorists to retaliate.”Involving the international community became a strategic calculation for jus-tifying US responses to terrorism that were difficult to explain both at homeand abroad.

Despite the latitude the new label offered, the Reagan administration’semphasis on state-sponsored terrorism did have its drawbacks. The phrase’sambiguity soon became a point of controversy. Several members of Congressinsisted that El Salvador, which enjoyed the support of the Reagan adminis-tration, belonged on the list due to its involvement in the murder of the fournuns and the subsequent cover-up. Similarly, the Democratic Party codifiedinto its 1988 party platform that South Africa should be named a terroriststate after it engaged in three simultaneous raids against alleged AfricanNational Congress bases in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. In the polit-ical arena, the phrase’s flexible adaptation opened the administration tocharges of bias in the selection of who qualified as state sponsors.

The greater problem was the perception that the United States itselfbelonged on the list. The American public began to question whether theUnited States was sponsoring terrorism because of the government’s supportof the Nicaraguan Contras. Reports by Americas Watch and the former NewYork assistant attorney general Reed Brody corroborated that the Contraswere guilty of terrorist acts such as torture, mutilation, kidnapping, and rapeof Nicaraguan civilians (Americas Watch 4–6; “Attacks” iv–xi). TheAssociated Press fueled public concern when it broke a story on the CIA’s“murder manual” for the Contras (“CIA’s Murder Manual”). The manual,designed by John Kirkpatrick to train the Contras on how to use violencemore selectively, contained the following word choice that appeared to advo-


cate the limited use of assassination: “It is possible to neutralize carefullyselected and planned targets such as court judges, justices of the peace, policeand State Security officials, CDS [Sandinista Defense Committee] chiefs,etc.” (as qtd. in Leogrande 364). Armed with such revelations, members ofCongress began arguing that by supporting the Contras, the United Stateswas sponsoring terrorism.

Media reports of administration activities in the Middle East furtherunderscored the concern that the United States was supporting terrorism.On May 12, 1985, Bob Woodward wrote in the Washington Post that theCIA had provided training for counterterrorist groups in Lebanon that hadsubsequently hired others to bomb the front of Sheik Fadlallah’s house(Woodward and Babcock A1). The CIA had targeted the sheik, due to theadministration’s belief that his chief of security was responsible for thebombing of the Marine barracks, the first American embassy bombing inBeirut, and the kidnapping of then CIA station chief, William Buckley(Hougan). The attack, which took place in a public square just outside amosque, resulted in eighty civilian deaths and more than two hundred civil-ian injuries. The Saudi leadership, which had allegedly provided funding andoperatives for the attack in collusion with the CIA, gave millions of dollars ofhumanitarian assistance to West Beirut as compensation once the attackfailed to kill the sheik (Ibid.).

Woodward later recanted the story, and a follow-up U.S. Congressionalcommittee investigation found no evidence of US complicity. Carter’s formerdirector of the CIA Stansfield Turner questioned the inquiry’s findings,however, based on his assumption that the committee itself would have hadprior knowledge of the event and would have shared in the responsibility forthe tragic outcome (183–85). Woodward recently changed his story for asecond time. In 2001 interview with Frontline, he claimed Casey did meetwith the Saudi ambassador to the United States and, during a garden stroll,the two agreed the Saudis would pay two million dollars to build a car bomband hire operatives to kill the sheik (Woodward).

By 1985, the majority of the American public agreed that the UnitedStates was a state sponsor of terrorism. Internal administration polls recordedthat sixty-six percent of the public responded positively to the statement,“There is little point to our condemning a state of terrorism againstAmerican interests in the Middle East if we support our own terrorists inCentral America” (“Libya, July 1985 [2 of 3]”). With a skeptical Americanpublic, the administration began facing increased constraints on its ability tocarry out its foreign policy objectives.

Now on the defensive, the administration distributed an official state-ment to White House spokespersons that specifically addressed the differ-ence between terrorism and insurgency. The statement compared US support


for the Contras with the role that third countries played in the successfuloutcome of the American Revolution. It continued by reminding thespokespersons, “[I]t is important to differentiate between terrorism’s rampantindiscriminate brutality against innocent third parties and the organizedarmed opposition to communist tyranny that is taking place in Nicaragua”(Kimmitt). By evoking the American Revolution, the administration soughtto align US efforts with the cause of freedom fighting, while retaining thelatitude to denounce terrorists abroad.

To bolster its case, the administration produced an expanded definitionof terrorism that highlighted the differences between the actions of theNicaraguan Contras and those of terrorists. In a memo to Attorney GeneralEdward Meese, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane provided theadministration’s definition of terrorism:

Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence for a politicalpurpose to create a state of fear, which will aid in extorting, coerc-ing, intimidating or causing individuals and groups to alter theirbehavior. A terrorist group does not need a defined territorial baseor specific organizational structure. Its goals need not relate to anyone country. It does not require nor necessarily seek a popular baseof support. Its operations, organization and movements are secret.Its activities do not conform to rules of law or warfare. Its targetsare civilians, non-combatants, bystanders or symbolic persons andplaces. Its victims generally have no role in either causing or cor-recting the grievance of the terrorists. Its methods are hostage-taking, aircraft piracy or sabotage, assassination, threats, hoaxes,and indiscriminate bombings or shootings.

By providing an expanded definition of terrorism, the administrationattempted to distinguish the actions of the Contras from those engaged interrorist acts of political violence.

Despite administration officials’ repetition of the new list of characteris-tics, the public remained unconvinced the Contras were not engaging in ter-rorist activities. In response, members of the administration publiclyhighlighted the characteristic features of freedom fighters. In his memo toMeese, McFarlane provided a contrasting definition of insurgency, empha-sizing that the two terms diverged with regard to intentions, organizationalmakeup, operational methods, targeted populations, international law com-pliance, and level of secrecy:

Insurgency is a state of revolt against an established government.An insurgent group has a defined organization, leadership andlocation. Its members wear a uniform. Its objectives are acquisition


of political power, achievement of participation in economic orpolitical opportunity and national leadership or, ultimately, takingpower from existing leadership. Its primary interests relate to onecountry. Its methods are military and paramilitary. Its targets aremilitary, both tactical and strategic, and its legitimate operationsare governed by the international rules of armed conflict. It oper-ates in the open, and it actively seeks a basis of popular support.

Administration officials, armed with the contrasting definitions of ter-rorism and insurgency, received instructions to use them “only on an ifasked basis” (McFarlane). Publicly, Reagan’s spokespeople balked at thecliché that one man’s terrorist was another man’s freedom fighter (see, forexample Reagan, Public Papers, 1986 1:563). Privately, Reagan’s nationalsecurity advisors warned that, despite the coordinated rhetorical strategy,the “distinction [was] not clear” (Menarchik). The failure to persuade thepublic had its costs; the administration lacked the ability to mobilize thenecessary pressure on Congress to have it reverse the decision to prohibitsupport for the Contras.

As the administration was defending itself against charges the UnitedStates was a state sponsor of terrorism, it was simultaneously shifting to apublic communication strategy of merging drug trafficking and terrorisminto a joint threat. In 1984, US Ambassador Lewis Tambs used the encom-passing phrase “narco-terrorism” to describe guerilla activity in Colombia(Qtd. in Executive Intelligence Review). Beginning in 1985 and more fre-quently in 1986 and 1987, Reagan himself argued the nation would increas-ingly have to face terrorism and narcotic drug trafficking as “twin menaces”(Public Papers, 1986 1:45) and “twin killers” (162). Drug traffickers, notrenegade foreign states, were now depicted as being in collusion with terror-ists and had become the nation’s dangerous new threat.

The shift in labeling strategy invited the public to rehabilitate theadministration’s image in response to the terrorism problem. By highlightingnonstate actors, the new framing refocused the administration’s publicagenda away from potentially embarrassing questions about who qualified asa state sponsor of terrorism. In its place was a new approach designed todelegitimate the terrorists. Terrorists, now associating with the drug traffick-ers, were not misunderstood freedom fighters; they were dangerous enemieswho plagued American society. The strategy encompassed hope of renewedinnocence for the United States and reinforced guilt for those who attackedAmerican values and principles.

At the time Reagan was publicly espousing terrorism and drug traf-ficking as associated threats, his administration began a concerted cam-paign to reveal the extent of the linkage. Reagan signed National Security


Directive 221 on April 8, 1986 (as rpt. in Simpson 640). While the specificwording of the directive remains classified, a draft of the agency’s publicresponses revealed that the directive empowered the intelligence commu-nity to “continue its efforts to target specific drug source and transit regionsfor in-depth analysis of the links between drug trafficking organizations,insurgent groups, and terrorists” (Agency Responses). Bush announcedthat implementation of the directive would initially target Nicaragua,Cuba, and Colombia to discover evidence of a narco-terrorist threat (asrptd. in Simpson 640). Over the next seven years, the Reagan and Bushadministrations spent more than three billion dollars to implement NSDD221 (ibid.).

By June 1988, the administration was still in the process of building itscase that an actual link existed between drug trafficking, terrorism, andguerilla activity in Central America. Responding to a request for informationfrom Washington, the American Embassy in Bogota wrote a telegram to thesecretary of state describing ten incidents of hostage-taking that occurred inColombia between February 1980 and June 1988. Also included in theembassy’s response was the admission that its conclusions were drawn fromthe incomplete consular files and the faulty memories of its personnel.Included within the report’s ten incidents were ones that the embassy freelyadmitted lacked detailed information or the identity of the groups involved.At no point did the response claim to have solid intelligence linking acts ofkidnapping with drug trafficking in the region.

Privately, administration officials warned that even if actual events didsupport a linkage between terrorism and drug trafficking, emphasizing theassociation would undermine Reagan’s case that he had an effective strategyfor responding to terrorism. Terry Mattke, another national security assistantto the vice president, warned of the consequences of conflating the twothreats in the public’s mind. Mattke wrote,

There is a fundamental difference in character between the war ondrugs and the war on terrorism. The war on drugs involves effortsto confront both the supply and demand sides of the equation.The supply is interdicted and harassed, and we are steadily edu-cating the population in an effort to reduce the market, thedemand. But until the market, the demand dries up, we face anenormous task. In the war on terrorism we face a very different sit-uation. The world’s demand or market for terrorism is limited to afew unprincipled causes and regimes. Civilized nations uniformlyreject the concept and the use of terror. So what we intend to dois confront the issue at the source, the supply [. . .] and the terror-ist resources. [T]he human supply although too great at present,


will be easier to dam than the flow of chemicals and substancesthat poison our societies.

In short, some advisors feared that the public merger of terrorism and drugtrafficking was risky. They believed it opened Reagan to charges he wasoverstating the extent of the problem, and it risked the public’s judgmentthat Reagan was ineffective in handling terrorism when he would not be ableto stop the flow of drugs into the United States.

Why take such risks? One possibility was the administration may havewanted to reduce its vulnerability to charges the United States was sponsor-ing narco-terrorism in Central America. With a highly touted public cam-paign of “Just Say No” to drugs, the Reagan administration found itself inthe awkward situation of supporting allies in Central America linked to drugrunning. As early as 1984, the CIA had received information the Contraswere involved in drug trafficking into the United States (Castillo). The story,made public in an Associated Press article in December 1985 (Barger andParry A22), resulted in an administration admission that, “Individual mem-bers of the resistance [. . .] may have engaged in such activity [drug traffick-ing] but it was, insofar as we can determine, without the authorization ofresistance leaders” (as rptd. in Leogrande 464). William Leogrande, formerstaff member of the Democratic leadership working on Central Americanpolicy, suggested that the administration’s denial of resistance leader involve-ment was suspect, given linkages between the firms hired to ship nonlethalaid to the Contras and involvement by those same firms in trafficking anddrug laundering (464). With evidence supporting that the Contras wereassociating with drug traffickers, the administration’s new strategy of focus-ing on the linkages of the nonstate actors was again carrying political risks.

To make matters worse, the administration could not corroborate itsclaims that the group it opposed in Central America was involved in drugtrafficking. In August 1984, a supposed Nicaraguan government defectoraccused high-level Sandinista officials (including Minister of the InteriorDaniel Ortega) of smuggling drugs into the United States. After conductingan investigation, members of Reagan’s Drug Enforcement Administrationadmitted, “no evidence was developed to implicate the Minister of theInterior or other Nicaraguan officials” (as qtd. in Arnson 336). In short, theadministration aligned itself against narco-terrorism in the public arena at atime when it needed to divert attention from its private sponsorship of allieslinked to drug trafficking.

With both state sponsorship of terrorism and narco-terrorism raisingquestions about the actions of the US government, Reagan faced mountingpolitical difficulties. Having promised the public he held the answers to theterrorism problem, Reagan needed a convincing strategy. As the next section


will reveal, the administration responded by crafting a deceitful application ofthe Cold War narrative. In the process of that strategy’s implementation, thecriminality of terrorism became subordinated to the war metaphor. Whenpublic confidence in Reagan’s approach waned by the start of his second term,the stage was set for elevation of terrorism into an American ideograph.

THE TERRORIST NARRATIVE IN THE REAGAN ERA

Having lost more Americans to terrorism in 1983 alone than in the previousfifteen years of US history combined (McFarlane, Memo to Meese), Reaganaides were stinging from the humiliation of having to withdraw US troopsfrom Lebanon. Current retrospectives by the administration’s central playersreveal the depth of the reaction to the forced retreat. On Frontline, VincentCannistraro summed up the reigning sentiment at the time: “Hezbollah wona victory. That war was over. We lost that war. I don’t know if it was recog-nized at the time, but the withdrawal of the U.S. represented a victory forHezbollah.” Also appearing on Frontline, US State Department coordinatorfor counterterrorism, Robert Oakley, likewise remembered, “It was a hugeshock [. . .] it caused us to reevaluate a lot of things.” Convinced they had losta war against terrorists, the Reagan administration committed itself tomaking a change.

Just a few days after the terrorist attack on the marine barracks inLebanon, the Republican House minority whip Newt Gingrich wrote to KenDuberstein, Reagan’s chief of staff, expressing his concerns for Reagan’spolitical future. In that memo to Duberstein, he worried the Americanpublic and media were shocked by all the violence around the world, includ-ing outbreaks in Lebanon, Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, as well asthe nuclear missile demonstrations in Europe. He warned,

In fact, if Reagan gets bogged down in the technical detail of eachfight in each theatre he begins to look like a man who has walkedinto a room and started to randomly pick fights with people. Sincethere is no time in American memory that we have been involvedin this much violence in this many places, it will begin to sink in tomany Americans that if they are separate incidents, then maybe weought to get a less violence-prone President. After all, if he hasfound four different areas of tension simultaneously, maybe hereally is a troublemaker.

Having won a recent presidential election in which his Democratic opponenthad characterized him as irresponsible in the foreign policy arena, Reagancould ill afford to compound the problem.


Gingrich stressed the need for the administration to adopt a singleexplanation for why so much global violence was occurring. Later in thememo, he predicted, “If we allow our vision to be fragmented, then we willlose piecemeal on each front as the American people come to conclude thatours is a randomly violent, short-tempered and overbearing administration.”The solution, according to Gingrich, was to blame the Soviet Union forinternational violence whenever and wherever it occurred. He predicted sucha rhetorical framing would have considerable political advantages for Reagan.As he explained, “If in fact we are faced with Soviet trained, financed andguided terrorists, guerilla and military coups, then it is Andropov rather thanReagan who is the real cause of all the problems. Then the American peoplecan focus their anger on Andropov, the KGB, and the Soviet Union.” Theapproach, Gingrich noted, would result in a lasting political alliance betweenthe friends of Israel, those who cared about access to oil fields, and thosewho wanted freedom in the Caribbean. Gingrich, in short, recommendedReagan scapegoat the Soviet Union for all acts of worldwide terrorism.

Members of Reagan’s own executive branch echoed Gingrich’s conclu-sion that blaming the Soviets would have political advantages for the admin-istration. Their expressed motivation for urging the strategy was less aboutReagan’s political future and more about garnering public support for theadministration’s policy in Nicaragua. An analysis of two years of polls onNicaragua led analysts in the State Department to conclude, “[T]he conflictsin Central America have aroused less concern among the public than suchother foreign policy issues as relations with the Soviet Union, arms controlnegotiations, trying to deal with terrorism, and reducing the US trade imbal-ance” (Smalley, Memo to Sec. of St. 5/16/85). Lacking strong public supportand facing a Congress steadily withdrawing its financial support from theContras, Reagan’s presidential assistant Robert Smalley recommended areframing of the threat posed by the Sandinistas. He told the secretary ofstate, “Perception of threat to the US would be enhanced to the extent theSandinista regime could be credibly pictured as a surrogate of Cuba or theUSSR, as repressive at home, or as subversive among its neighbors.” Inagreement, Gingrich and Smalley both worked to persuade Reagan that hehad political and policy reasons to blame all international terrorism on theSoviet Union.

One difficulty with the plan was that Reagan’s CIA analysts did notbelieve the Soviets were involved in organizing the bulk of internationalterrorism. A December 1981 report, “Growing Terrorist Danger inAmerica,” by the National Foreign Assessment Center of the CIA con-cluded, “The actions of some terrorist groups may influence future behaviorof other groups, but we see no evidence of a central coordinating authority.[. . .] The US is facing terrorist threats from several quarters which,


although unconnected, will challenge the US ability to react to widely dis-persed and potentially serious international terrorist attacks.” Reagan’s intel-ligence at the time was unequivocal: the Soviet Union was simply notresponsible for all acts of terrorism around the globe.

In a recent interview on Frontline, Vincent Cannistraro, Reagan’s direc-tor of National Security Council Intelligence, remembered how the adminis-tration resolved the discrepancy between the recommended public strategyand the extant realities of terrorism. He recalled, “[CIA Director] Bill Caseyhad already been trying to cook the analytical books on terrorism, particularlyby the pressure he had placed on the analysts to come up with an analysisthat said the Soviet Union was behind these acts of terrorism.” Despite itsapparent basis in fiction, Gingrich’s proposed strategy gathered momentumas the preferred administration approach. Within a matter of weeks, theReagan administration adopted a Cold War narrative to frame its public dis-cussions of terrorism.

Reagan’s terrorism narrative reflected the scene, characters, and themesof Cold War discourse. Echoing the terrorist narrative of the Vietnam Warera, the scene was the fragile state of freedom and democracy around theglobe. Reagan identified two areas of the world particularly vulnerable tooutside forces. The first was Central America. Reagan maintained, “InHonduras, democratic institutions are taking root. In El Salvador, democ-racy is beginning to work even in the face of externally supported terrorismand guerrilla warfare” (Public Papers, 1983 2:1192). Relying on natural,organic metaphors that suggested the possibility of renewal and regenera-tion, Reagan referred to “the fragile flower of democracy” (Public Papers,1985 1:370) that was blossoming in Central America. The administration’snarrative insisted democracy would flourish in Central America if it weresimply permitted to grow.

The other vulnerable region was Lebanon. Reagan described Lebanon’shistory by recalling, “In the early 1970’s many thousands of Palestiniansentered Lebanon. Lebanon’s fragile political consensus collapsed, and asavage civil war broke out” (Public Papers, 1983 2:1679). Reagan depictedLebanon in the present day as “a small country” and a “troubled land,” (1517)but insisted it had “made important steps toward stability and order” (1518).Praising Lebanon’s progress, Reagan said, “Lebanon has formed a govern-ment under the leadership of President Gemayal, and that government, withour assistance and training, has set up its own army. In only a year’s time,that army has been rebuilt” (ibid.). Like its companion state in CentralAmerica, Lebanon held potential for the spread of democracy in Reagan’sarticulated public view.

The administration’s narrative presented the Soviet Union and its clientstates as enemy forces attempting to take advantage of the fragility of the


emerging democracies. Following Gingrich’s advice, Reagan argued that thegeneral rise of state-sponsored terrorism could be traced back to “increasedSoviet support for terrorism, insurgency, and aggression coupled with theperception of weakening U.S. power and resolve” (Public Papers, 19841:480) in the 1970s. He insisted that in Central America, there was a“Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan plan to destroy the fragile flower of democracy[. . .]—a plan that could, for the first time, bring tyranny to our own bor-ders, carrying the same specter of economic chaos, the same threat of politi-cal terrorism, the same floodtides of refugees we’ve seen follow everyCommunist takeover from Eastern Europe to Afghanistan, Laos, Vietnam,Cambodia, Ethiopia, and, now, Central America” (Public Papers, 19851:370). Shifting regions, he maintained that Syria, backed by the SovietUnion, used terrorism in hopes of acquiring portions of Lebanon to creategreater Syria (Public Papers, 1983 2:1713). The goal in each region aroundthe globe was the same: “to bring about a one-world Communist state”(1714). Reagan publicly maintained all acts of international terrorism werethe direct results of an aggressive Soviet influence.

The means terrorists used to accomplish their objectives further paral-leled the conventional claims of Cold War discourse. Within the narrativeframework, terrorists relied on savage acts of barbarism to instill fear in civil-ian populations. Reagan told Congress that terrorists relied on “indiscrimi-nate threatening, intimidation, detention, or murder of innocent people”(Public Papers, 1984 1:576). He labeled their methods “uncivilized” (PublicPapers, 1983 2:1556), “crude” (Public Papers, 1984 2:806), “cowardly” (ibid.),and “evil to its core and contemptible in all its forms” (ibid.). Committed touncivilized methods of attack, terrorists posed a dangerous threat toAmerican society.

The description of the final primary character in the administration’snarrative, the United States, borrowed heavily from conventional Cold Wardiscourse. As in the case of the Vietnam War narrative, the United Statesemerged as a missionary for peace and freedom in the global arena. Reagandescribed the moral nature of his quest in a toast to Queen Elizabeth II: “[T]he greatest glory of a free-born people is to transmit that freedom to theirchildren. That is a responsibility our people share. Together, and eager forpeace, we must face an unstable world where violence and terrorism, aggres-sion and tyranny constantly encroach on human rights. Together, committedto preservation of freedom and our way of life, we must strengthen a weak-ening international order and restore the world’s faith in peace and the ruleof law” (Public Papers, 1982 2:752). For Reagan, the United States wasuniquely qualified and responsible for preserving the values of peace, free-dom, and justice. Speaking to Christian evangelists in Florida, he describedthe confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union as a


struggle between good and evil. He labeled the Soviet Union the “evilempire” (Public Papers, 1984 1:364), thus elevating the mission of theUnited States into a religious calling. He declared, “There is sin and evil inthe world, and we’re enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose itwith all our might” (362). Placing his argument within the context of thedivine, Reagan argued the public should accept on faith their responsibilityfor spreading peace and freedom.

In sharp contrast to the destructive, evil nature of the Communistnemesis in the narrative, the administration portrayed the United States ashaving a commitment to a constructive approach toward emerging democra-cies. The United States, with its goal of rooting out the fragile conditionsthat spawned terrorism, adopted a multifaceted model of political, economic,and security assistance reminiscent of America’s policy toward Vietnam.Nowhere was the strategy more apparent than in Central America. A brief-ing paper for Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s visit to Central and South Americademonstrated the three-pronged strategy of promoting democratization, eco-nomic revitalization, and security support (US Dept. of St. Briefing Paper).In 1982, the United States committed $400 million of economic assistanceand $120 million of security assistance to Central America in an effort to“break the region out of its cycle of right wing dictatorships vs. left winginsurgencies” (ibid.). As the Cold War narrative portended, the constructiveapproach of the United States promised to effectively guard against the evilforces operating around the globe.

Reagan’s application of the Cold War narrative transformed the nationaldebate about the crime of terrorism. The metaphor of crime was still present,but reconstituted within the context of war. Terrorism became less aboutindividuals committing crimes and more about the Soviet Union and itsclient states permitting and encouraging terrorism as the means of furtheringtheir ideological perspective. The shift placed the primary burden forresponding to terrorism on the heads of state, not on federal prosecutors orjudges. States that permitted terrorists to flourish in their spheres of influ-ence had to face the possibility of answering to the full range of responseoptions available to the American commander in chief.

The public generally accepted Reagan’s application of the Cold Warnarrative to the situation in Central America, but not in a beneficial way forthe administration. With the most recent public memory of Cold War dis-course being the Vietnam War, the public mapped their perceptions aboutAmerica’s first losing war effort onto the Nicaraguan conflict. After review-ing national polls conducted in late 1984 and early 1985, Smalley noted thatthe majority of the public believed “U.S. involvement in Nicaragua couldlead to ‘another Vietnam’ with US forces becoming entangled in a drawn-out,internal conflict in which both sides are viewed negatively” (Memo to Sec. of


State 5/16/85). Various administration officials reached the conclusion thateven Reagan, the great communicator himself, could not change the negativeperceptions of the public (ibid.). Compounding the problem of public opin-ion was the difficulty the administration had of making a credible case thatits counterterrorism strategy was actually bolstering democratic governments,economic recovery, or national security (Dallek 163-194). By the mid-1980s,the Reagan camp determined that rather than build public support for theadministration’s policy of engagement in Central America, its narrative washardening attitudes against reinstating aid for the Nicaraguan Contras.

Reactions to the administration’s use of the Cold War narrative in rela-tionship to the events in the Middle East were no better. The Americanpublic no longer accepted the claim that the Soviet Union was behind all actsof international terrorism. Internal administration polling revealed that thepublic blamed Iran for the TWA 847 hijacking, not the Soviet Union or Syria(Smalley, Memo to Sec. of State 6/20/85). Smalley surmised from his reviewof the administration’s internal polls that “Principle blame ‘for the currenthostage situation’ is placed on security conditions at Athens airport and NabihBerri, ‘the leader of the Shiite Moslems” (ibid.). By the mid-1980s, the publicappeared ready to assign responsibility for terrorist acts on a case-by-casebasis, and the executive branch complied with the new sentiment. In a 1985interview with Time, CIA Director William Casey admitted, “There is no oneperson, there is no one capital in the world that controls terrorism. [. . .] Thisis a war without clear borders, without clear enemies.”

On a more general level, the public was losing patience with Reagan’sinability to win the fight against terrorism. The administration’s internalpolls showed almost half of the public reporting they disapproved “of the wayRonald Reagan is handling terrorism” (Decision Making Information).Terrorism against Americans was on the rise, and the administration antici-pated further escalations of terrorist activity in response to the administra-tion’s covert foreign policies (McFarlane, Memo to Meese).

Reagan’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism took up the charge ofassessing why the public was losing faith in administration’s response to ter-rorism. Young and Rubicam, the firm hired by the task force to more fullyunderstand the viewpoint of the American public, conducted focus groups ofregular readers and viewers of the news in Des Moines Iowa, Trumbull,Connecticut, and New York City. The groups ranged from eighteen to sixty-four years of age and were balanced for political ideology. In November of1985, the firm presented its conclusions to the task force. While the studyrevealed no direct effects of terrorism on the citizens who participated, itfound that terrorism reduced “America’s status to being seen as a pawn: pow-erless, easily manipulated, and at the mercy of those who attack us becausewe cannot fight back” (Young and Rubicam). Focus group members reported


feeling fearful, vulnerable, helpless, victimized, [and] angry” (ibid.). Reagan’sanalysts concluded that the public was frustrated with the ability of terroriststo expose the limits of America’s power.

Internal assessment of public sentiment coalesced around the call to havea stronger response to terrorism. Young & Rubicam reported that“Americans want to fight back against terrorism because it (1) Emasculatesthe American nation; (2) Is wrong and must be stopped; (3) ThreatensAmerican lives; and (4) Makes Americans mad.” A Newsweek poll, appearingin a widely circulated internal memorandum at the time of the TWA hijack-ing in June 1985, underscored the need for more forceful responses. It noted,“54% believe that Reagan’s actions have not been tough enough [. . .]”(McDaniel, Memo to McFarlane). Reagan’s polling information was consis-tent; both the administration’s public communication strategy and its terror-ism policy needed to change.

In a May 1985 speech delivered before the American Bar Association,Reagan introduced the new approach. The Soviet Union was no longer thesole source of terrorism around the globe; instead, five foreign states thatsponsored terrorism emerged as the primary enemies of the United States.Reagan identified the offending nations to be Iran, Libya, North Korea,Cuba, and Nicaragua. His public list of state sponsors of terrorism differedfrom those identified by the State Department under the ExportAdministration Act of 1979. Syria and the People’s Republic of SouthYemen were labeled state sponsors on the official list but omitted in Reagan’saccount; Nicaragua and North Korea were named by Reagan as state spon-sors but did not qualify for the secretary of state’s list (McFarlane, Memo toMeese). Despite these discrepancies, the new narrative shifted the identity ofthe enemy to new state sponsors of terrorism, but retained the depiction ofthe scene, character traits, and themes of the previous Cold War narrative.

At times, transitioning between the two approaches posed rhetorical dif-ficulties for the administration. Recasting the scene consistent with theadministration’s prior rehearsals of the narrative, for example, was problem-atic. Now the targets of terrorism (i.e., Americans traveling abroad,European nations, etc.) were no longer fragile democracies or new nations insearch of their right for self-determination. They had established govern-ments, they had stable economies, and they belonged to the world’s preemi-nent security alliance. To argue that such democracies were fragile risked aloss of credibility, if not ridicule, at home and abroad.

To resolve the problem, the new narrative shifted the emphasis awayfrom the fragility of a particular nation to the vulnerability of democracy as awhole to terrorism. Reagan reasoned, “Terrorism is the antithesis of democ-racy . [. . .] Where democracy seeks to consult the common man on the gov-ernance of his nation, terrorism makes war on the common man, repudiating


in bloody terms the concept of government by the people” (Public Papers,1985 2:1019). The United States, as the exemplar of an effective democracy,became the natural target of choice for terrorists in the administration’s nar-rative. As Reagan explained, “[T]he very reason for [terrorists’] cruelty andviciousness of their tactics is to disorient the American people, to cause dis-unity, to disrupt or alter our foreign policy, to keep us from the steady pur-suit of our strategic interests, to distract us from our very real hope thatsomeday the nightmare of totalitarian rule will end and self-government andpersonal freedom will become the birthright of every people on Earth” (899).The terrorists’ focus, coupled with their growing collusion with foreignstates, had ominous implications for free nations around the globe. AsReagan asserted, “Government-sponsored terrorism, in particular, cannotcontinue without gravely threatening the social fabric of all free societies”(Public Papers, 1986 1:512). Reagan’s new narrative preserved the vulnerablenature of the scene called forth by conventional Cold War discourse, but itreconstituted terrorism as an inevitable outcome of a healthy democracy, nota sign of national fragility or governmental weakness.

As Reagan publicly expanded the scene of his narrative from a singleemerging democracy to democracy as a whole, the leaders of his executivebranch disagreed. The task force report, touted by the administration as itsmost comprehensive examination of international and domestic terrorism,concluded that attacks on democracies were not the sole or even the primarycause of terrorism. The Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force,approved by the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, theCentral Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, and the White House, among others, noted that MiddleEastern nations (i.e., those without democratic forms of government) werefrequently the intended targets of terrorism.

Charles Hill, the executive secretary for the State Department provideda more detailed explanation for why the United States had come underincreasing attacks from terrorism in a memo to the National SecurityAdvisor, Robert McFarlane. In the text of that June 1984 memo, he wrote,“We are a prime target because we have an extensive official and commercialpresence overseas which is high in numbers of people and profile; and citi-zens and facilities are accessible and open to the public; our policies areopposed to the interests of many terrorist groups; and we often support gov-ernments which terrorists are attempting to bring down.” While terroristshad chosen to attack the citizens of a democracy as Reagan had suggested,the Hill memo suggests that the reasons for doing so were not clearly relatedto America’s political ideology.

Official spokespersons even undercut Reagan’s contention that terroristsplaced the US culture in jeopardy. James Holloway, the executive director of


the task force, told reporters on March 6, 1986, “While terrorism poses noserious challenge to the national will or national survival, it remains a com-plex, dangerous threat for which there is no quick or easy solution”(Holloway, Draft Statement). The administration appeared far from publiclyunited on the stance that terrorism was a dangerous juxtaposed enemy ofdemocracy and freedom.

Portraying the state sponsors of terrorism as having similar traits to theirCommunist predecessors posed a second rhetorical challenge for the Reaganadministration’s effort to reconstitute its Cold War narrative. To a certainextent, the former characterization of the Soviet Union and the new statesponsors of terrorism offered a good match. The use of savage, barbaricmeans to achieve political objectives was a trait the administration couldreadily apply to either enemy. Reagan aides could also argue that the inabilityto trust the adversary equally pertained to both threats.

More difficult was making a credible case that the five individual statesidentified as sponsors of terrorism qualified as a homogenous collective. KentOots’ 1986 study of transnational terrorism argued that coalitions amongsuch groups were infrequent, ad hoc, and short in duration (116–17). MarthaCrenshaw’s three-year study of international terrorism between 1985 and1987 reached a similar conclusion: “[I]n reality there is no monolithic terror-ist entity. Instead, terrorism appears highly eclectic and pluralistic” (10–11).At the time the administration shifted to its new narrative, a globally net-worked group of state-sponsored terrorists did not exist.

Despite the empirical evidence to the contrary, the administration’srevised narrative held to the notion that state sponsors of terrorism functionedas an internationally orchestrated syndicate of criminals. Reagan insisted,“Most of the terrorists who are kidnapping and murdering American citizensand attacking American installations are being trained, financed and directlyor indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian govern-ments—a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated” (Public Papers,1985 2:897). By focusing on the parallel to organized crime, the new nar-rative helped prepare the audience for stronger measures in response tothe threat.

Another difficulty for the administration was establishing that the statesponsors in its revised narrative were not only colluding, but were harboringa shared goal of global domination consistent with the conventional charac-terization of the Cold War enemy. For Reagan, all state sponsors were benton the destruction of the United States. He proclaimed, “[A]ll of these statesare united by one simple criminal phenomenon—their fanatical hatred of theUnited States, our people, our way of life, our international stature” (PublicPapers, 1985 2:897). For Reagan, the threat posed by state sponsors of terror-ism simply could not be tolerated.


Once again, statements from other administration officials weakened thecredibility of Reagan’s public shift. Reagan’s task force report belied the con-clusion that terrorists harbored a goal of world conquest. It pronounced,“The motivations of those who engage in terrorism are many and varied”(Public Report of VP Task Force). It acknowledged that the actual motiva-tions behind terrorism included serving as a strong-arm, low-budget meansof conducting foreign policy or as the means to pursue national insurgencymovements (ibid.). The totality of public positions taken by executive branchspeakers made it more difficult to conclude that terrorists were at the samelevel of global threat as their communist counterparts.

A undated memo entitled, The Middle East and Terrorism, identified thecauses of terrorism in that region of the world to be as follows: Frustrations oftraditional societies confronting rapid modernization, including maldistribu-tion of income, oil wealth, and unfilled expectations; Intractable politicalproblems such as Arab-Israeli question, East-West competition, strategic oilresources and strategic location; Deep-seated political animosities: Arab-Israeli, intra-Arab (e.g. Syria and Iraq, Persian-Arab, Islamic fundamental-ist-secularist, and anti- and pro-communist divisions; A sense of hopelessnessand a profound lack of faith in the peaceful means of attaining one’s politicaland personal goals, peaceful or otherwise; Exploitation of disaffected bycharismatic leaders with no respect for human life or dignity, (e. g. Qadhafiand Khomeini). In short, the causes for terrorism spawned in the MiddleEast were multi-faceted.

The new narrative deflected attention away from alternative publicexplanations of why various state sponsors of terrorism were colluding to per-petrate such violent acts. Reagan insisted in his 1986 address to the UnitedNations General Assembly: “No cause, no grievance, can justify [terrorism]”(Public Papers, 1986 2:1231). In press background briefings, administrationofficials reiterated, “Nothing can justify terrorism. No political causes or endscan explain or rationalize the brutal murder of civilians” (Platt, Memo toPoindexter 1/6/86).

Foreclosing discussion of the terrorists’ specific motives not only reducedthe possibility that the administration’s stance would become muddled, but itpositioned the Reagan camp to depict themselves as an innocent party sub-jected to unwarranted attacks. Accordingly, the narrative invited the publicnot to consider the Palestine Liberation Front’s contention that the hijackingof the Achille Lauro was a justified response to the Israeli air raid on thePalestinian headquarters in Tunis. Likewise, the public was not to concernthemselves about the Guardian of the Islamic Revolution’s claim that thebombing of Pan American Flight 103 was justified retaliation for the USSVincennes downing of an Iranian airliner in July 1988 (Situation RoomNote). Finally, citizens were to ignore Lebanese accusations that CIA


involvement in a Beirut car bombing warranted the continued confinementof American hostages in Lebanon and the hijacking of TWA 847.

The administration’s revised narrative continued the conventional char-acterization of the hero’s role in response to the threat in the Cold War nar-rative. The United States was critical for an effective response to the globalthreat of terrorism. The characterization of the US motivations remained thesame: restoring peace, freedom, and civilized values around the globe. Thestated mission preserved its religious quality. Reagan told the InternationalForum of the Chamber of Commerce, “I’ll remind our allies of the truth ofwhat Edmund Burke said long ago: ‘When bad men combine, the good mustassociate; else they will fall, one by one.’ Well, together the free people ofthis world will ensure that liberty not only survives but triumphs and that oursons and daughters, too, will know the blessings of the winds of freedom”(Public Papers, 1986 1:512). By again placing his appeal to unity within thecontext of the divine, Reagan underscored the Cold War theme of needingall members of the community to have faith for the mission to succeed.

While the goals remained the same, the means for accomplishing themission did change. Reagan announced a series of strategies that his admin-istration would need to increase intelligence cooperation with friendlynations regarding terrorists and their state supporters, improve readiness tostrike back against states that offered refuge to terrorists, implement preven-tive security measures around the globe, make murder of US citizens abroada federal crime, and expand the number of extradition treaties available tobring terrorists to justice. Concurrently, the administration publicly toutedthat its improved intelligence had already helped abort 126 terrorist incidentsduring 1985 alone (Public Papers, 1986 1:20).

In the ABA speech announcing his new narrative, Reagan evoked a his-torical analogy to cast the future direction of his approach to terrorism.Recalling the nation’s experience with the Barbary pirates, he insisted, “Wecan act together as free peoples who wish not to see our citizens kidnappedor shot or blown out of the skies – just as we acted together to rid the seas ofpiracy at the turn of the last century” (Public Papers, 1985 2:899). During theprevious week, the Reagan administration had received internal pollingresults designed to assess public sentiment regarding twelve potential coursesof action that the United States could take against terrorism. Ninety-onepercent had responded favorably to an option that reflected virtually word forword Reagan’s reference to the Barbary pirates in his ABA speech: “Just ascivilized nations united against piracy a century ago, today the democraticworld must act in concert if we are to eliminate terrorism” (“Libya, July 1985[ 2 of 3]”). While the parallel wording of the two statements suggests thatpublic support was a desire of the administration, it did not explain how thehistorical analogy would drive U.S. terrorism policy.


More revealing was a memorandum by Don Gregg and DougMenarchik congratulating Bush on the administration’s decision to likenmodern international terrorism to nineteenth-century piracy. The memorecalled the history of the Barbary pirates as follows: “The Founding Fatherswere torn between paying tribute as a pragmatic ‘economical’ way of dealingwith the pirates versus a more noble military response. Young America hadneither the resources (an American Navy was virtually non-existent), experi-ence nor political will to take a bold unilateral approach against the scourgeof piracy. Humiliation and a war declared by the pirates finally forced the USinto action.” Gregg and Menarchik extracted five lessons from the Barbarypirates that received written praise in the memo’s margins by the vice presi-dent. They included:

• Bold unilateral leadership and military action were necessary bythe US to end pirate attacks against US interests.

• The United States needs to find the “address” for the power domi-nating the region used by the terrorists and use a variety of meansto get that power to exercise its authority to police terrorist actions.

• Piracy and terrorism are “profitable” and will continue so long asthese forms of violence have no consequences. Bilateral, govern-ment-to-government pressure proved the most efficacious diplo-matic way to achieve results. Private initiatives tended toundermine official policy and should be discouraged.

• Bilateral approaches which emphasized common concerns andmaximized mutual interests proved more effective than multilat-eral approaches such as forming a league against piracy.

• Americans were enslaved up to ten years by pirates. Modern ter-rorists hold US citizens captive for years. The US should considerestablishing a trauma center for victims and their families.

The lessons addressed the public call for more forceful measures against ter-rorism. Their implementation would, in part, be quick, as the bombing ofLibya was only months away.

Reagan’s move to dub five foreign states as the core responsible for ter-rorism around the globe did not go unnoticed. The leadership could nowlabel any foreign nation a state sponsor of terrorism, with the consequencethat all nations could potentially be held accountable for terrorist acts occur-ring anywhere around the globe. Diplomatic, economic, and military pres-sure could all be brought to bear should the U.S. consider a foreign nationinsufficiently motivated to stamp out the terrorist threat.


Perhaps unsurprisingly, the shift in the narrative received a skepticalresponse within the international arena. The United States InformationAgency tracked the foreign media’s reaction to the public presentation of thenew approach. The agency concluded, “Media reaction was critical of thePresident’s American Bar Association speech Monday. Commentators sawhis ‘furious’ remarks as a ‘hollow threat,’ saying Mr. Reagan had taken the‘most extreme rhetorical position’” (as qtd. in USIA, Morning DigestForeign Media Reaction). The conservative press in Britain argued, “Mr.Reagan’s hollow threats are destroying his most valuable foreign policy asset:his credibility” (ibid.). The most influential newspaper in France, Le Monde,argued, “Reagan’s imprecations against terrorists and those who help them[. . .] reveal his powerlessness” (ibid.). Some media outlets even questionedReagan’s veracity. Mexico’s Unomasuno argued the address was “a laughabledistortion of reality aimed mainly at destroying the Nicaraguan revolution”(ibid.). In large measure the international community considered Reagan’snew public stance not to be credible. As the final section of this chapter willargue, however, terrorism’s emergence as a term that carried ideological forcerendered the factual accuracy of administration’s claims far less of a concernfor the American public.


Reagan’s recharacterization of terrorism as a continuing, ever-present threatagainst democracies around the globe received a positive reaction from hisdomestic audience. The term garnered such persuasive force that it functionedas an ideological marker of American culture. Unlike during the VietnamWar, where Communism dominated terrorism as a justification for US mili-tary involvement for the American public, terrorism now served as an ideo-graph on its own. Terrorism had become a shorthand term of politicalallegiance that defined the in-groups and out-groups of American culture.

Consistent with the defining characteristics of the ideograph, terrorismserved as an ordinary term of political discourse. The term became the focusof hundreds of presidential speeches, hundreds of scholarly books, thousandsof media articles, and several popular movies during the Reagan presidency.After analyzing presidential rhetoric and broadcast media coverage duringthe Reagan years, Bethami Dobkin concluded that terrorism functioned asan umbrella term used to portray a wide range of political violence and torepresent an archetypal enemy in opposition to American identity (40). TheMiddle East scholar Edward Said agreed, arguing terrorism had acquired “anextraordinary status in American public discourse,” replacing Communism as“public enemy number one” (149). During the Reagan era, terrorism became


a term of political discourse used repeatedly by the nation’s leaders and citi-zens alike.

Terrorism also functioned as a higher-order abstraction that repre-sented collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-definedgoal. Administration officials concluded the public wanted Reagan to dosomething about terrorism; they just were not sure what it should be.Reagan’s national security advisors argued in 1985, “[T]he public’s prefer-ence for a ‘major effort’ by the Government to counter terrorism has risen tothe level of top public concerns during the past year” (Holloway, Memo toFuller, Gregg and Menerchik). They cited a June 1985 Roper poll thatfound seventy percent of Americans favored a major effort to take steps tocombat terrorism, up from fifty-four percent in 1984. They concluded,“Concern about controlling terrorism now matches the level of concernreached by only a few domestic issues during the last decade: nuclearweapons, crime, inflation and unemployment.” While the poll underscoreda united commitment by the public to fight against terrorism, its vague ref-erence to “a major effort” to counter the threat was revealing about theabstract nature of the public’s commitment.

The administration confirmed through internal polling that the publicdid not have firm expectations about the specifics of the nation’s terrorismpolicy. Executive Secretary Rodney B. McDaniel of the National SecurityCouncil’s Executive Secretariat underscored the potential flexibility theadministration had when responding to terrorism. Based on his assessmentof the totality of the administration’s internal national security polling, hetold John M. Poindexter, the deputy assistant of the National SecurityAgency, that “Americans will give the President a limited, but not insignifi-cant time frame to resolve a terrorist incident. The President will have policylatitude, with the public only likely to disapprove of ‘extreme’ actions such asmilitary operations that jeopardize or harm hostages or innocent people, oron the other hand, capitulating to terrorist demands. As time passes withouta resolution, however, the President will receive greater criticism no matterwhat he does” (Memo to Poindexter). With terrorism now an assault on theAmerican way of life, the public would allow the president to do what hedetermined was necessary, as long as he did it quickly.

Besides functioning as an ordinary term of political discourse that unitedthe public, terrorism also warranted the use of power in ways the communitywould not ordinarily accept or consider laudatory. A good example was theadministration’s decision to intercept the Egyptian 737 during the AchilleLauro crisis, an act viewed by many in South Asia and the Middle East as acase of American-sponsored skyjacking. The consequences of the act abroadwere substantial. Demonstrations of three thousand to four thousand stu-dents broke out at the University of Cairo. US diplomatic assessments of the


reaction of the Egyptian populace concluded, “[T]he sense of outrage andgrievance is widespread” (Am. Emb. Cairo), and “[T]he aftermath of theAchille Lauro hijacking is not only reinforcing anti-U.S./Israel feeling oncampus, but also appears to be turning student activists against theGovernment of Egypt” (ibid.). Headlines in the Middle East read,“American Ambush Hijacks the Hijackers” and “America Crowns HerselfLeader of Terrorism.” Members of the foreign press interpreted the intercep-tion as evidence that the United States had “lost its mind completely,” that“America is determined to wreck all peace efforts,” that the United States“presides over the mafia of terrorism,” and that the United States was begin-ning “the real American war against the Arabs” (as qtd. in USIA, SpecialReport). Taken as a whole, Reagan’s decision to intercept the aircraft riskedthe long-term relationship the United States had with its closest and mostpivotal ally in the Middle East. It simultaneously undermined Americancredibility in many quarters of the international community.

Despite the consequences to US foreign relations, the American publicsupported Reagan’s handling of the crisis. An ABC News/Washington Post pollconducted late in October 1985 showed eighty percent approved of Reagan’shandling of the Achille Lauro hijacking and the events that followed, whileonly seventeen percent disapproved (Public Opinion Online, #0005872). Alate October 1985 Harris poll added that ninety-one percent of the publicbelieved Reagan was right “not to apologize for the takeover of the Egyptianplane, since it was about time that the U.S. did something to tell hijackersthat we weren’t going to let them get away with it in the future, whereAmerican lives were involved” (Public Opinion Online, #0062595). The vir-tual unanimity of the public response may, at first glance, appear surprising.Taken out of its ideological context, the act of seizing a foreign aircraftmight reasonably be predicted to engender some outrage. Instead, the bulk ofthe American public appeared to view the action as a necessary step to pre-serve the safety of citizens traveling abroad.

Besides warranting the use of international skyjacking, terrorism becamea justification for encroaching on the sovereignty rights of foreign nations.The administration knew that despite a long-standing public commitment tosee the perpetrators of terrorist acts “brought to justice” (Public Papers, 19861:575), the United States actually had a dismal record of prosecuting andpunishing international terrorists. A study conducted in the late 1980s, forexample, revealed that since 1968, international terrorists involved in kidnap-ping had an eighty percent chance of escaping capture or death and an evenchance of having some or all of their demands met. Of the individualsinvolved in all forms of terrorist activity, few got caught and tried, and ofthose who did, the average sentence was less than eighteen months (C.Johnson 281).


By the mid-1980s, the administration vowed to remedy the problem. Itsponsored the Terrorist Protection Act of 1985, which made the murder orassault of American citizens abroad a federal crime under US law. The effectof the law was to create joint jurisdiction over crimes previously seen as sov-ereign matters of foreign states. In 1986, the Congress authorized the FBI toabduct terrorists located outside of US borders (Kash 141). The new law,when implemented, produced havoc abroad. During the Achille Lauro affair,the Italian media reported that Italy’s failure to meet the Reagan administra-tion’s demand to arrest Abu Abbas had fractured the relationship betweenthe United States and Italy (USIS Rome). When several members of theItalian cabinet threatened to resign over Italy’s handling of the incident, theUS Department of State’s Operation Center warned, “The dissatisfaction ofthree of the five Italian coalition partners with the government’s actions mayprovoke a cabinet crisis.” By insisting on extradition, the United States jeop-ardized the internal affairs of its allies abroad.

Perhaps even more devastating was the result in Colombia. In responseto a US demand for extradition of Colombian drug lords, the guerilla groupM-19 seized Colombia’s Judicial Palace on November 6, 1985, and tookhundreds of hostages. The final death toll from the resulting shootout wasmore than one hundred, including several members of the Supreme Courtwho had been in the process of hearing arguments on the extradition ques-tion (Executive Intelligence Review).

As a final example, the need to respond to terrorism became the admin-istration’s rationale for preemptive uses of military force around the globe.On April 3, 1984, Reagan signed NSDD 138, which authorized the use ofactive defense measures in response to state-sponsored terrorism. While thedirective and much of its implementation remains classified, publicly avail-able documents revealed administration officials interpreted active defensemeasures to include preemptive military strikes against groups or individualsplanning strikes against US interests “when the host country is unable orunwilling to take effective action” (Hill). The directive authorized sabotage,killing of suspected guerillas and lower-level state officials, preemptory andretaliatory raids, deception, and expanded intelligence against suspected radi-cals and people regarded as their sympathizers, particularly in Iran, Libya,Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, and the USSR (Simpson 365–66).

At the time of the directive’s implementation, administration officialswere aware it would have adverse consequences for individual American citi-zens. Previously classified documents reveal that as early as 1984, administra-tion officials at the highest levels of government said that “Active defensemeasures by the United States are expected to prompt retaliation and at least inthe short run to increase [the] level of terrorist activity against us, includingwithin the United States” (McFarlane). Given that the Reagan era experienced


the highest level of terrorist activity and the most deadly terrorist acts of anymodern president, the pessimistic projections appear to have been prophetic.

The public, which was never briefed on the potential consequences ofthe directive, supported the administration’s strategy of using preemptiveattacks. By November 1985, John Poindexter, Reagan’s national securityadvisor, had received internal polling results that concluded: (1) the publicfavored taking military action against known terrorist facilities to discouragefuture acts of terrorism; (2) the public recognized the president must some-times carry out an antiterrorist policy without prior consultation with theCongress or American allies; (3) the public would more likely support mili-tary action against known terrorist bases in Iran or Lebanon than againstsimilar bases in Syria, Nicaragua, or Cuba; and (4) the best time to carry outa military response was after an embassy or military bombing, when fears forthe hostages’ lives might complicate the issue (McDaniel, Memo toPoindexter). The public was willing to grant wide latitude to the Reaganadministration in its handling of the terrorism threat.

When Reagan decided to use military force against Libya, his adminis-tration justified the bombing according to the preemptive standards estab-lished in NSDD 138. In addition to a more traditional claim of self-defenserelated to the intercepts, he insisted that the United States had evidence theLibyans had been involved with dangerous terrorists groups in the past andthat they were planning future incidents against American citizens. TheWhite House’s talking points recalled Qadhafi’s declaration that Libyawould train, arm, and protect Arab guerillas for “suicide and terrorist mis-sions,” his vow that Libyan forces would not give up their “brave confronta-tion” against the United States, and his urging for “all Arab peoples” toattack anything American, “be it an interest, goods, a ship, a plane or aperson” (White House Talking Points). Official spokespersons expressedconcerns about Qadhafi’s “money, training, and technical support to revolu-tionary and terrorist groups as disparate as the Sandinistas, Colombian M-19guerillas, Caribbean leftist movements, the Irish Revolutionary Army, rebelmovements throughout Africa and muslim [sic] insurgents in Thailand andthe Philippines” (ibid.). The public overwhelmingly supported the approach,with seventy-one percent supporting the air raid, even though thirty-ninepercent believed the act would increase the amount of terrorism (Falk 873).

While supported at home, Reagan’s preemptive approach was highlycontroversial on the international scene. Many foreign countries interpretedthe air strikes on Libya to be an act of war. In varying degrees, Iran, Jordan,Syria, China, India, Pakistan, North Yemen, South Yemen, Kuwait, SaudiArabia, the UAE, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the USSR,Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Nicaragua all condemnedthe attack (International Reaction).


Debates over terrorism versus freedom-fighting, warranted interceptionversus international skyjacking, extradition versus international kidnapping,and preemptive measures versus acts of war all demonstrated the culturalvariability of the term’s meaning throughout the Reagan era. Who qualifiedas terrorist, what acts constituted terrorism, and who deserved condemnationwere all open questions that prompted culturally specific answers.

Following on the heels of two American tragedies (the Vietnam Warand the Iranian hostage crisis), Reagan was the first contemporary USleader to both elevate and capitalize on terrorism as a negative ideographwithin American society. He did so conscious of the costs of failing toachieve the status of a strong leader against terrorism. In 1987 his own vicepresident articulated the possible political consequences associated with theterrorist enemy:

Except in the case of a catastrophe resulting from biological, chem-ical or nuclear terrorism, the gravest threat [from terrorism] is thepotential political impact: a short term crisis, reduced Americancredibility in the eyes of others, and an upsurge in activity by ter-rorists who believe they have succeeded. We can minimize thepolitical effects of a successful act of terrorism against the UnitedStates so that it will not upset or cast doubt on our process of gov-ernment or our leadership. To do this we must emphasize at alllevels of government that adherence to our policy, our program,and our procedure is most important. Only in this way, by demon-strating resolve and consistency in dealing with the threat, can thepolitical impact be blunted.

By the time Reagan exited his office, the ideological stature of the terroristlabel had become firmly established and was a linguistic resource available forall who would follow. The implications were far-reaching. Individual actorscommitting terrorist atrocities were no longer just the responsibility of lawenforcement; heads of all states now had an obligation to respond and pre-vent such acts within their spheres of influence. American presidents coulduse the full range of state powers, including preemptive military strikes andviolations of historically recognized boundaries of state sovereignty, in theirpursuit of terrorists. While Reagan limited his application of the ideographto a small group of state sponsors, his successor would go further and applythe powerful term to a foreign head of state that took aggressive actionsagainst a neighbor.


5

The Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991: The Cold War Narrative in the Post–Cold War Era

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded Kuwait, a small PersianGulf nation that controlled ten percent of the world’s oil supply. Two

hours and twenty minutes later, George Bush publicly condemned the attackas a naked act of aggression. Working with foreign nations around the globe,the United States assumed a leadership role in securing twelve related UnitedNations Security Council resolutions. One resolution called for Iraqi forcesto immediately withdraw from Kuwait. Others condemned Iraqi actions,including its invasion and annexation of Kuwait, its holding of foreignnationals, its attempts to change Kuwait’s demographic composition, and itsviolence against foreign embassies and diplomatic personnel in Kuwait. Theremaining resolutions specified how the international community wouldrespond to the act of Iraqi aggression: imposing economic and trade sanc-tions, governing restrictions on humanitarian aid, assigning financial respon-sibility for losses resulting from the invasion, and authorizing the use of allnecessary means to enforce the UN resolutions.1

By the beginning of 1991, the Bush administration maintained it hadexhausted diplomatic channels for resolving the crisis. On January 16, theUnited States, along with its coalition partners, initiated Operation DesertStorm, a military action that began with a massive air bombardment of Iraqdesigned to gain air supremacy and disrupt Iraqi communications and powersystems. Before the end of the five-week air campaign, the US Air Forceexpended more than half of its total arsenal of non-nuclear missiles (Yetiv32). The air campaign neutralized Iraqi air defenses, destroyed artillery, dis-rupted transportation routes, and limited Iraqi maneuverability on the battle-field. Spokespersons for the US Air Force originally hailed the move ashaving crippled the Iraqi war-fighting capability, but later assessments dra-matically deflated earlier estimates of success (Gordon and Trainor 465).During the air campaign, allied forces lost thirty-seven combat aircraft, afigure that included twenty-eight American planes.

97

On February 24, 1991, allied ground forces entered the conflict. Themaneuvers included a decoy amphibious assault off the coast of Kuwait, aflanking initiative three hundred miles west of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, and araid across the Kuwaiti-Saudi border designed to recapture Kuwait City. Theground war lasted approximately one hundred hours. By February 27, Iraqconceded and announced its decision to comply with the UN resolutions.

The casualities on the two sides of the conflict were widely disparate.From the day Iraqi forces moved into Kuwait until the day they withdrew,the allied forces lost 698 soldiers. Included in that figure were 207 Americanswho died in noncombat related accidents. Early calculations made at thetime of the conflict estimated Iraqi deaths, during the same period, to bebetween 30,000 and 115,000, with an additional 111,000 Iraqis dying after-ward from the health effects of the war (Yetiv 118; Warner and Winkler180; Dapointe 186). Such casualty figures for Iraqi deaths have been difficultto verify, given access issues. More recent estimates place the number of Iraqicasualties suffered during the military operations at 10,000 (Yetiv 118).

As this chapter will demonstrate, the Bush administration struggled ini-tially with whether to call Iraq’s move on Kuwait an act of terrorism. At thetime of the incursion, the US government considered Iraq a potential ally inthe Middle East that might further American interests in the region. Notwanting to irreparably harm bilateral relations between the United States andIraq, the Bush administration gradually escalated its rhetoric against the Iraqileader. Eventually, the administration decided to depict the events in theGulf as terrorist acts and borrowed the Reagan strategy of reconstituting theCold War narrative. Unlike the previous administration, however, the Bushcamp remained cautious about invoking the full ideological potential of theterrorist label.

LABELING THE CRISIS

Initially, the Bush administration did not label the Iraqi move on Kuwait asan act of terrorism. The first administration statements on the crisis referredto the action as “aggression,” “an unwarranted attack,” “a reckless action,” “anirrational action,” “naked aggression,” “intolerable behavior,” “unprovokedaggression,” “ a miscalculation,” “an invasion,” and “a contravention of inter-national law” (Public Papers, 1990 2:1107–09; 1130–37). The administrationexercised restraint, even after receiving intelligence that the Iraqi governmentwas refusing exit privileges to more than six hundred foreign nationals inKuwait and that Iraqi troops were moving US citizens from Kuwait to Iraq.Bush told reporters he was concerned about the foreign nationals, but main-tained he was “not going to invite further harassment by elevating the value


of any citizen” (1120). Faced with an opportunity to arouse public concern byevoking terrorism, Bush initially demurred, choosing instead to work behindthe scenes to resolve the conflict.

The administration publicly offered reasoning for why it avoided the useof the terrorist frame. Secretary of State James Baker gave the followingexplanation early in the crisis: “[N]othing has been demanded or asked inconnection with permitting them to leave the country [. . .] we think it wouldbe a mistake to characterize it as a hostage situation and to use a word likethat since we are in discussion with respect to the matter. And as far as weknow, no American citizens have as yet been mistreated” (Public Papers,1990 2:1126). In his memoirs, Bush made clear the actual motivation behindhis restraint had more to do with public reactions both at home and abroadthan it did with a failure of Iraqi behavior to qualify as terrorism. He revealedhe “had been reluctant to use the word ‘hostage’ in public statements because[he] did not want to invite comparison to Tehran and lose the internationalfocus on Kuwait, the real issue” (Bush and Scowcroft 350). Unwilling to riskframing the Iraq-Kuwaiti conflict as another American tragedy, Bush wascircumspect about his word choice.

By late August 1990, the administration changed its mind and beganarguing Iraq had left it no choice but to use the hostage label. Bush describedthe rationale for his rhetorical shift to the annual conference of the Veteransof Foreign Wars: “We’ve been reluctant to use the term ‘hostage.’ But whenSaddam Hussein specifically offers to trade the freedom of those citizens ofmany nations he holds against their will in return for concessions, there canbe little doubt that whatever these innocent people are called, they are, infact, hostages” (Public Papers, 1990 2:1148). By late September, publicthreats of terrorism from Iraqi officials and Palestinian terrorist groups, aswell as evidence of Iraqi operatives planning a major worldwide terroristcampaign, prompted Bush to declare, “We hold Saddam Hussein responsibleif there is any terrorist act against us” (1265). Bush’s personal use of the ter-rorist label left little doubt that he now considered the conflict to be one ofhigh stakes.

Despite intermittent use of the hostage label to describe those held inKuwait and Iraq in the early months of the crisis, the administration initiallyrejected the use of terrorism as an overarching theme for Saddam Hussein’sbehavior during the Gulf conflict. Drafts of Bush’s speeches throughoutAugust and September 1990 reveal the administration considered, but even-tually discarded, terrorism as an encompassing rational for American involve-ment. Bush’s September 11, 1990 address to a joint session of Congressdemonstrated that the administration was still cautious about branding Iraqiactions as terrorist atrocities. A draft of the speech’s introduction, cast asideprior to final delivery, spun the entire situation as terrorist aggression: “We

The Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991 99

gather as an Iraqi aggressor suppresses peaceful Arab neighbors whose coun-try he has ruthlessly invaded—an Iraqi President who, in violation of law anddecency, holds innocent people from many nations hostage; an Iraqi dictatorwho, if left unchecked, would hold the global economy hostage to hisexpanding control of oil; and who, if not restrained, might extend his reignof terror with chemical weapons, as he has done before” (Speech with DraftNotes, “Iraq and the Economy.”). A proposed applause line for the speechreinforced the theme: “But we cannot allow ourselves—or the world—to beterrorized.” Abandoning terrorism as an organizing principle for the speech,the final manuscript relegated “freedom from terror” to one of several goalsBush grouped under his fifth objective for the contest (i.e., creating a NewWorld Order). The term “hostages” similarly received a mention, but as onlyone of five UN resolutions related to the Iraqi situation. The applause linewas omitted altogether. A comparison of the two drafts reveals that the Bushadministration decided not to embrace, but still chose to preserve, the optionof casting the crisis as terrorism.

The decision not to inflame the public with the discourse of terrorismwas also evident in how the administration chose to describe SaddamHussein prior to and during the crisis. Immediately following Iraq’s move onKuwait, the Bush administration adopted a public strategy of downplayingterrorist portrayals of the leader that would evoke negative stereotypes. Earlydrafts of Bush’s remarks at the Pentagon courtyard on August 15, for exam-ple, included the following, subsequently omitted, linkage of the Iraqi leaderto infamous terrorists: “Today, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq stands as an interna-tional outlaw, a haven for mercenaries and terrorists like the notorious AbuAbbas, whose jackals gunned down an American retiree on the Achille Lauro,tossing him and his wheelchair into the sea” (Haass, Speech with DraftNotes to Winston). Only once throughout August and September 1990 didBush refer to Hussein’s previous use of chemical weapons on the battlefield,and then, only in response to a reporter’s direct question about the Iraqi’spotential for using chemical weapons (Public Papers, 1990 2:1110). By down-playing Hussein’s past acts of terrorism, the Bush administration reserved thefuture ability of the United States to restore its alliance with the Iraqi leaderin the event that he withdrew from Kuwait.

Having discarded the overarching theme of terrorism early in the crisis,the Bush administration relied instead on a lengthy list of justifications forAmerican involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict. In the three months afterthe Iraqi attack, administration spokespersons offered the following publicrationales for engagement of US military forces: (1) stemming Iraqi aggres-sion, (2) maintaining stability and security in the Middle East, (3) preventinga dictator from strangling the global economic order through control of theoil supplies, (4) restoring Kuwait’s legitimate government, (5) protecting the


lives of American citizens held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait, (6) protecting thelives of foreign nationals held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait, (7) creating a NewWorld Order, (8) defending Saudi Arabia, (9) getting Iraq out of Kuwait,(10) deterring future proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile,and nuclear technologies, (11) protecting jobs, and (12) destroying Iraq’smilitary capability. Public diplomacy themes distributed to White Housespokespersons added even more justifications for military involvement: theprotection of US embassies, the enhancement of America’s image as a reli-able ally, and the protection of interests considered vital by every presidentsince Harry Truman (Public Diplomacy Themes, n.d.). By listing so manyrationales for US involvement, the administration risked the perception itwanted to intervene militarily regardless of the reason.

Despite the myriad of public rationales for a military presence, privatememoranda from the American Embassy in Riyadh demonstrated that theBush administration had even more goals that it never shared with either theAmerican public or with the full complement of its coalition partners.Examples of such objectives included the elimination of Iraqi nuclear, bio-logical, and chemical capabilities, the military downsizing of Iraq’s offensivewar-fighting capability, a restored balance of power in the region betweenIran, Syria, and a rehabilitated Iraq, and stronger US. economic, political,and military cooperation with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.Embassy personnel lobbied the White House not to abandon these USobjectives because they lacked the full support of the international coalition;they argued, instead, that the administration should consider these additionalaims as falling within the coalition’s broad consensus goal of “restoring secu-rity and stability to the region” (US and Coalition War Aims). The internalcorrespondence revealed that a primary justification for US involvement wasa reduction of Iraqi influence in the Middle East, a cause not palpable to thebroader international audience.

In his memoir, coauthored with George Bush, Brent Scowcroft disclosesthat during the first months after the Iraqi invasion, the administration expe-rienced widespread frustration at its apparent inability to communicate thewar aims of the Gulf crisis to the American public. When faced with criti-cism, Scowcroft maintained the administration “tended to react to com-plaints by expanding the list of U.S. interests, leading to charges that each ofthe principals had his own reasons and we really didn’t have our act together”(Bush and Scowcroft 399). Assuming Scowcroft was correct in his analysis,the administration compounded its lack of focus even as it tried to communi-cate more persuasively with the American public.

By late October 1990, the national polls reaching the administration’sPersian Gulf Working Group demonstrated waning support for Bush’s leader-ship during the Gulf crisis. A USA Today survey showed a thirty-one percent


drop in the number of respondents who approved of Bush’s handling of thecrisis from August 20 to November 13 (Press Clips). An ABCNews–Washington Post poll showed a similar twenty-six percent drop fromAugust through October 1990 (Press Clips, Natl. Journal 12/15/90).Accompanying the general drop in support for the Bush’s handling of theGulf crisis was growing uncertainty about why US military forces were nec-essary. A National Journal poll conducted in August and again in Novembershowed a nineteen percent drop in the number of Americans who believed“Bush has explained the Middle East situation well enough so that you feelyou understand why the United States is sending troops to Saudi Arabia”(ibid.). The public appeared to be reacting to the growing list of justificationsfor US involvement by becoming more confused.

In an effort to understand why public support was dwindling, severalpolling organizations probed further. The results indicated that some of theadministration’s rationales for engaging US forces simply did not resonatewith the American public. Again in a poll reviewed by the administration’sPersian Gulf Working Group, the Los Angeles Times reported on November14, 1990, nationwide “Just 1 in 6 of those polled said the United Statesshould go to war to protect oil supplies, and only about 1 in 8 said restoringthe Kuwaiti government—another of the President’s core objectives—wouldbe worth bloodshed” (Press Clips). The administration’s primary justifica-tions for the use of military force were simply not persuasive with the bulk ofthe American populace.

By October, members of the administration began lobbying the presi-dent to regain focus in his public justification for going to war. RobertTeeter, Bush’s chief pollster, implored him to recognize that the administra-tion simply had too many public rationales for military involvement in thePersian Gulf Crisis. He encouraged Bush to limit the administration’s publicstatements to two main justifications: Iraqi aggression and protecting thelives of Americans held in Kuwait and Iraq (Woodward, Commanders 315).James Baker argued similarly that the administration should emphasize theplight of the hostages in Iraq and Kuwait, given that the public was notaccepting the value of oil supplies or the dismantling of Kuwait as sufficientrationales for war (Hybel 72).

Making the hostages the focus of the public justification for war had anumber of advantages for the Bush administration. Perhaps foremost amongthem was that the hostages provided a legal justification for Bush’s assump-tion of commander-in-chief powers. As Steven Rademaker, the deputy legaladviser to the National Security Council, opined, “The President’s authorityto commit U.S. forces to combat in self-defense exists not only with respect toattacks on U.S. territory and U.S. forces, but also with respect to attacks onU.S. citizens and property abroad. Therefore, so long as Iraq continues to


hold U.S. citizens hostage, and U.S. military actions against Iraq are in anyway calculated to obtain their release, those actions can be defended as legit-imate exercises of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.” Byfocusing on the hostages, rather than on acquiring oil access or the protec-tion of the Kuwaiti government, the administration could justify US involve-ment on defensive grounds more acceptable to the public.

Emphasizing the hostages also positioned the administration to advo-cate the primary concern of the American public. A USA Today poll, con-ducted nationwide in mid-November 1990 and then reviewed by centraladministration officials, found, “50% still say saving the 1,000 U.S. hostagesin Iraq and Kuwait is the top priority” (Press Clips). A tracking poll con-ducted by NBC News–The Wall Street Journal in August, September, andDecember 1990 revealed that a majority of the public considered terrorism ahair trigger issue justifying US military action. Asked whether the UnitedStates should take military action in response to a hypothetical scenariowhere “Iraq imprisons or mistreats Americans left in Kuwait,” fifty-five toseventy percent of the respondents indicated that it should (Press Clips, Natl.Journal 1/12/91). The terrorism label, having already achieved the status ofan ideograph during the Reagan administration, again demonstrated its abil-ity to mobilize the public.

A third way that focus on the hostages benefited the administrationinvolved avoiding controversy with his domestic audience. Bush himself wasvulnerable to charges that his desire to maintain Kuwaiti sovereigntystemmed from self-interest, given that his was the first US oil company todrill wells in Kuwait (Wayne 47). During the administration’s campaign togarner support for the war effort, Bush’s general connections to oil interestshad been a topic of public discussion, but his specific association to Kuwaithad yet to attract concerted media attention.

The strategy of highlighting the plight of the hostages, however, was notwithout risk. Bush’s immediate two predecessors—Jimmy Carter and RonaldReagan—each suffered sharp twenty point drops in their presidentialapproval ratings in the face of lingering hostage crises (“PresidentialPopularity” 7). For many observers both at home and abroad, the Iranianhostage crisis and the Iran-Contra scandal demonstrated the weakness,rather than the strength, of American power in the international arena. Bushwas particularly vulnerable to such criticism, given his role as Reagan’s chiefcounterterrorism official during the Iran-Contra affair and his decision aspresident to pardon members of the Reagan administration found guilty ofinvolvement in the scandal.

Focusing on the hostages to justify US military intervention also carriedthe risk of elevating Saddam Hussein’s leverage within the conflict. Bushadvisors warned Hussein might decide to release the hostages and continue


to occupy Kuwait, an eventuality the Iraqi leader exercised by December1990 (US and Coalition War Aims). As Stephen Rademaker forecast, “If thehostages are freed, the individual self-defense rationale for U.S. militaryoperations against Iraq will become more attenuated. The argument thenbecomes that we are acting in collective self-defense of Kuwait and relatedU.S. interests rather than U.S. lives and property.” While perhaps sufficientto sustain a legal justification for going to war, the stance, if accepted,realigned the administration with rationales for war that had failed to garnerpublic support.

Despite the risks involved, the administration began emphasizing thehostages held in Iraq and Kuwait as a primary justification for going to war.By late October 1990, the government’s public statements began detailingthe plight of the hostages, including their shortages of food, their inadequatehousing, and the terrorizing impact of being forced to act as human shields(see Baker, “Why America Is in the Gulf” 237). The Bush administrationproceeded to employ an overarching frame of terrorism to characterize theconflict. In Bush’s rhetoric, Saddam Hussein became an “international ter-rorist” (Public Papers, 1991 1:26). Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait became “a sys-tematic campaign of terror on the people of Kuwait—unspeakable atrocitiesagainst men and women and among the maimed and murdered, even inno-cent children” (12). Iraq’s capture of Kuwaiti oil reserves became a means to“finance further aggression, terror and blackmail” (11). Iraq’s Scud missileattack on Israel was “purely an act of terror” (48). Iraq’s torching of Kuwaitioil wells was an act of “tragic and despicable environmental terrorism” (79).By November 1990, the administration depicted every action by the Iraqileader as an act of terrorism.

In brief, the administration was initially reluctant to frame the PersianGulf crisis as terrorism. When other justifications for US involvement in thecrisis failed to garner public support, the administrations shifted to a coordi-nated public campaign of denouncing the Iraqi leader as a terrorist. By doingso the Bush administration transformed the crisis in the Persian Gulf from aconventional war scenario between two foreign nation-states into an interna-tional battle against the scourge of terrorism. The framing encouraged thepublic to evaluate the administration’s handling of the crisis, not from theposition of a distant ally of an attacked nation, but in accordance with itsstatus as the leader of the free world in a fight to protect the civilized world.

The Bush administration’s framing of Saddam Hussein as a terroristbuilt upon the Reagan administration’s conception of states providing logis-tical and financial support for terrorism. The key difference between the twoapproaches was that terrorism in Bush administration discourse not onlyencompassed foreign states connected in some way with the terrorist acts ofothers; it also included nations with leaders who committed bad acts in the


conduct of their own foreign policy. The Bush administration used the shiftin strategy to reconstitute the Cold War narrative into a fitting story for thepost-Cold War era.

THE NARRATIVE OF THE 1991 PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

The Bush administration faced a significant rhetorical challenge in itsattempt to tell the story of the Persian Gulf situation. The typical publicterrorism strategy of modern Republican presidents, the Cold War narra-tive, appeared outmoded in the post-Cold War period. Bush’s Persian GulfWorking Group reviewed an analysis comparing two previous Cold Warconflicts with the situation in Kuwait. The report concluded, “The presentsituation in the Persian Gulf does not feature the same compelling cold warmotivations as earlier conflicts. The need to destroy Iraq’s nuclear andchemical capabilities, the need to protect U.S. hostages, and the removal ofSaddam Hussein from power are all factors that may be able to fill the gapleft by the absence of cold war labels, but not one of these justifications isas deeply rooted in American culture as the cold war psychology was inearly conflicts” (Historical Overview). With the collapse of the SovietUnion, conventional modes of public persuasion in foreign policy becamemore attenuated.

In the end, Bush chose to follow the lead of his predecessor. He adoptedReagan’s approach of reasserting central themes and character traits of theCold War narrative, while reconstituting certain plot elements consistentwith his new vision of the post-Cold War era. Such a strategy providedrhetorical continuity to appeal to his political base; simultaneously, it pre-sented a new foreign policy approach that administration officials hopedwould attract the popular support of the general electorate.

The Bush narrative borrowed the theme of a fragile scene from the his-toric Cold War narrative. The Kuwaiti monarchy, however, neither func-tioned as an emerging democracy (the conventional backdrop of traditionalCold War discourse) nor as a preexisting democracy vulnerable due to itsopen form of government (Reagan’s reconstituted scene). The Bush adminis-tration resolved the problem by ascribing the characteristic of fragility to theNew World Order. Bush explained, “Today that new world is struggling tobe born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world wherethe rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations rec-ognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where thestrong respect the rights of the weak” (Public Papers, 1990 2:1219). From theperspective articulated by Bush, order was an option for all nations: thestrong and the weak, the large and the small, the democratic and the not-so-


democratic. The New World Order constituted a frail international contextthat held the promise to yield a more peaceful, a more just, and a more liber-ated world.

The Bush administration recalled the traditional Cold War scene byclaiming that emerging democracies around the globe were vulnerable toHussein’s actions. The fact that Iraq had not yet invaded a democratic nationdid not prevent the administration from arguing that such countries weresuffering. In Bush’s public statements, the emerging democracies shoulderedthe bulk of the economic consequences of the conflict between Iraq andKuwait. He explained, “The fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe arebeing severely damaged by the economic effects of Saddam’s actions. Thedeveloping countries in Africa and in our hemisphere are being victimized bythis dictator’s rape of his neighbor Kuwait” (Public Papers, 1990 2:1719).Behind the scenes, the Bush administration was concerned about the eco-nomic impact of the Iraqi move on the United States. Aides articulated fearsof a recession, a potential $300 billion deficit, and even worse long-term eco-nomic problems (For Discussion). While the New World Order became thelabel for the new scene in the reconstituted Cold War narrative, it was broadenough to include both established and new democracies worldwide.

The Bush administration’s depiction of the scene functioned to rebut acharge embedded in the competing Iraqi narrative about the conflict. In themonths leading up to the takeover, Iraq had blamed Kuwait for the eco-nomic distress that prompted its move on Kuwait. Saddam Hussein chargedthat Kuwait had moved its border northward seventy kilometers and wasengaging in slant drilling to pump oil from Iraqi oil fields during the Iran-Iraq War. As compensation, he demanded $2.4 billion from the Kuwaitis.At the Arab Summit in Baghdad at the end of May, Hussein accused Kuwaitof acting again to hurt Iraqi interests by flooding the world oil market anddriving prices down to a low of $7 per barrel. On July 16, 1990, Husseinargued that Kuwait’s oil policy had cost Iraq $14 billion (Am. Emb.Baghdad). Privately after the summit, Saddam Hussein told the Saudi oilminister, “I will never agree to let Iraqis starve, and Iraqi women go nakedbecause of need” (Aziz, as qtd. in Baram 16). Kuwait, not Iraq, became theaggressor in the public stance of the Iraqi leader.

In response, the Bush narrative presented Kuwait not as an actor self-ishly out for its own self-interest, but as one of many nations that made upthe frail scene of the New World Order. Bush insisted Kuwait was “a peace-ful neighbor” (Public Papers, 1991 1:74), “a much smaller neighbor” (PublicPapers, 1990 2:1107), and “a small and defenseless neighbor” (Public Papers,1991 1:78). It was not the aggressor. Bush reinforced the innocence and rel-ative powerlessness of Kuwait by feminizing its victim status in light of theIraqi crimes committed against it. Bush portrayed the Iraq’s invasion as “a


ruthless systematic rape of a peaceful neighbor” (74). The metaphor of rapehighlighted the action’s indiscriminate nature (Griffin 35), the intimidationinvolved in the act (Brownmuller 15), and the perpetrator’s use of force(Muehlenhard, Danoff-Burg, and Powch 129). It also chastised those whowould blame the victim as callous and unsympathetic. As a small, defenselessstate in the New World Order, Kuwait qualified for the support of largernations striving for peace and stability around the globe.

As the guilty party in the Bush administration’s public strategy, Iraqassumed many of the negative characteristics ascribed to the Communists inthe Cold War narrative. Iraq, like the Communist menace before it, har-bored the goals of worldwide conquest. Only, this time, the purpose of theexpansion was control over the world’s economic resources, rather than thespread of an ideological perspective. Bush held that Saddam Hussein was“bent on regional domination” (Public Papers, 1990 2:1580), and wanted toestablish “a chokehold on the world’s economic lifeline” (ibid.). Bush insistedthe reason Hussein sought dominance over Kuwaiti oil supplies involved his“desires to control one of the world’s key resources” (1719). In the Bush nar-rative, greed and economic power replaced ideological dominance as the pri-mary motivations behind Hussein’s conduct.

Credibly presenting Saddam Hussein as a worldwide economic threat,however, posed a rhetorical challenge for the administration. Bush himselfhad been involved in a number of executive branch decisions that presumedIraq to be a potential ally of the United States. Most dramatic was the case ofIraq shooting on the USS Stark, an incident that occurred during Bush’sterm as Reagan’s vice president. When the US government asked the Iraqiregime to explain the incident, the foreign government argued it had mistak-enly fired two missiles on a warship escorting American-flagged Kuwaiti oiltankers out of the Persian Gulf. The Reagan team, denied an interview withthe pilot, publicly accepted Iraq’s explanation that the killing of the thirty-seven American sailors and the wounding of twenty-one others had been anaccident. Efforts to improve relations between the two countries ensued.

Formally, the Reagan administration had taken steps to strengthen theties between the two nations. Working to block an Iranian move to assumecontrol of Iraq, the United States removed Iraq from the State Department’slist of official state sponsors of terrorism in 1982. Even more embarrassingfor Bush, the administration had provided critical battle planning assistanceto Iraq “at a time when American intelligence agencies knew that Iraqi com-manders would employ chemical weapons in waging the decisive battles inthe Iran-Iraq war, according to senior military officials with direct knowl-edge of the program” (“Officers Say” 1). In a variety of contexts, Bush wasconnected with US moves to establish closer relations with Hussein and theIraqi government.


Once Bush assumed the presidency, he continued the pattern of work-ing to strengthen the alliance. His secretary of state refused to place Iraq onthe official list of state sponsors of terrorism, even after Hussein used chemi-cal weapons against his own people. In October 1989, Bush signed NationalSecurity Directive 26, the official policy of cooperative engagement withIraq. The government’s rationale for its new conciliatory policy with Iraqread, “Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve ourlonger-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the MiddleEast” (G. [H. W.] Bush, Memo of NSD 26). The directive authorized thegovernment to pursue opportunities for US firms to participate in the recon-struction of the Iraqi economy in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and toconsider the sale of nonlethal forms of military assistance to Iraq.Subsequently, the administration supported the extension of $3 billion in USagricultural credits to Iraq between February 1988 and July 1989. A congres-sional delegation visiting Baghdad on April 12, 1990, reassured SaddamHussein privately of continued US support, a message that Glaspie reiteratedto the Iraqi leader two weeks later.2 In light of the administration’s policy ofcooperative engagement, transforming Saddam Hussein into an evil menacebent on control over a key world resource would not come easily.

To counter the claim that the government had misjudged Iraq’s poten-tial as an ally, the Bush administration recalled a theme from conventionalCold War discourse. In short, the narrative held that like the Communistsbefore, the Iraqi dictator was a liar. Bush told reporters that Iraq had liedabout its plans to invade Kuwait and its promise to withdraw a few days intothe conflict. Bush publicly declared that Saddam Hussein’s “promises meannothing” (Public Papers, 1990 2:1108). The United States was no longer indenial about Saddam Hussein’s true intentions. When a reporter asked “whyit is that not all that long ago it was Saddam Hussein that the U.S. wasdealing with in the Middle East,” Bush responded, “[H]e hadn’t invadedKuwait. He hadn’t raped, pillaged, and plundered the people in Kuwait andthe city of Kuwait itself. He hadn’t violated this fundamental norm of inter-national behavior” (1679). Within the Bush narrative, Iraq’s assault onKuwait removed all doubt about the nation’s trustworthiness on the interna-tional stage.

The charge of misjudging Iraqi intentions gained strength from theBush administration’s failure to prevent the Iraq’s military buildup on theKuwaiti border in late July 1990. Internal intelligence briefings at the timeconfirmed that US military analysts had suspected that an Iraqi invasionmight be imminent. A briefing memo sent from Sandra Charles throughRichard N. Haass to Scowcroft on July 27, 1990 summarized the day’s intel-ligence: “Saddam apparently has increased his military force strength by onedivision along the border. [. . .] Analysts believe that a shallow incursion into


the northern oilfield, Rumaylah, cannot be ruled out, while drastic militaryaction is also possible if less likely.” Convinced by counterarguments thatIraq would not risk the invasion, Bush and his top aides sent a message toSaddam Hussein later the same day reiterating the conciliatory posture of theUnited States. The communication assured the Iraqi leader that the UnitedStates was trying to find a way to work with him and insisted Iraq recipro-cate (Woodward, Commanders 215). On the morning of the Iraqi move intoKuwait, Bush further contributed to the controversy by telling reporters heconsidered the Iraqi takeover a fait accompli (Greenstein 166). Whether tooconciliatory or too fatalistic, the Bush administration’s failure to prevent theevents in the Gulf raised lingering questions about the evil characterizationof a foreign leader recently courted by the US government.

The Bush administration narrative, however, supplied an explanation ofwhy the government had failed to prevent Iraqi forces from invading Kuwait.When the six-month buildup of Iraqi forces had begun, the United Stateshad considered Hussein the leader of a nation with the potential to become avalued member of the international community; now, he was a terrorist whono longer employed a rational decision-making calculus. The Bush adminis-tration relied on the stereotype of the irrational terrorist to transform thecharacter of Saddam Hussein. Bush insisted Saddam’s actions were “sense-less,” “irrational,” and “reckless,” and offered “no military advantage to himwhatsoever” (Public Papers, 1991 1:69). Bush admitted he “[couldn’t] figureout what he’s thinking” (107). James Baker added that Saddam Hussein had“an inflated sense of Iraq’s leverage and a very high pain threshold”(“Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Comm.” 308). Facing an irra-tional opponent, the Bush administration could not reasonably have beenexpected to anticipate the ill-conceived Iraqi attack.

The administration returned to the Cold War narrative to frame themeans the Iraqi leader used in the Persian Gulf conflict. Bush argued thatHussein relied on barbaric acts to accomplish his objectives. The most horri-fying and vivid story of the war involved Iraqi soldiers throwing prematurebabies out of incubators before stealing the machines to take home to Iraq.On October 10, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus heard what theythought was firsthand testimony from a fifteen-year-old girl known only asNayirah. Nayirah told the committee that she only wished to use her firstname in order to protect her friends and relatives in Kuwait. Not under oath,the girl testified that Iraqi soldiers had come into the al-Addan Hospital inKuwait where she was volunteering, removed fifteen premature babies fromtheir incubators, and left them to die on the floor.

Once told, the story received substantial attention both at home andabroad. In late October 1990, Bush repeated the essence of Nayirah’s story,this time attributing it to the emir of Kuwait. He stated, “[D]ay after day,


shocking new horrors reveal the true nature of the reign of terror in Kuwait.In one hospital, dialysis patients were ripped from their machines and themachines shipped from Kuwait to Baghdad. Iraq soldiers pulled the plug onincubators supporting 22 premature babies. All 22 died. The hospitalemployees were shot and the plundered machines were shipped off toBaghdad” (Public Papers, 1990 1:1482). Bush repeated the story in variousvenues and the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton presented it beforethe United Nations Security Council. In December 1990, AmnestyInternational confirmed in a press release the looting of the incubators, butraised the number of deaths of premature babies to 300. The story, toldrepeatedly in multiple forums, became the representative anecdote of Iraqibarbarity. Six pro-war senators mentioned the incubator account in speechesexplaining their votes to support the Senate resolution to authorize the war.In the end their number was significant. The resolution passed by only afive-vote majority.3

The incubator incident was false. By April 1991, Amnesty Internationalretracted the story after its fact-finding team found “no reliable evidence thatIraqi forces have caused the deaths of babies by removing them or orderingtheir removal from incubators” (Koch). Some earlier witnesses recanted par-ticular details of the story, while others discounted it altogether. Revelationsthat Nayirah was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the UnitedStates, that she had never been in the hospital, and that she had beencoached for her testimony by the public relations firm of Hill and Knowltonfurther undermined the story’s credibility (K. Phillips 309).

To further dramatize the barbaric nature of the Iraqi enemy, theadministration emphasized the plight of Americans held hostage in Kuwaitand Iraq. By late October 1990, James Baker expounded on the unaccept-able conditions the hostages faced in captivity. He announced, “Americansare being forced to sleep on vermin-ridden concrete floors. They are keptin the dark during the day and moved only at night. They have had theirmeals cut to two a day. And many are becoming sick as they endure a terri-ble ordeal. The very idea of Americans being used as human shields issimply unconscionable” (“Why America is in the Gulf” 237). OnNovember 1, 1990, the administration highlighted the conditions of thehostage’s confinement in its briefing to fifteen congressional leaders on thestatus of the Persian Gulf conflict. Bush began the meeting by explainingthat the United States was receiving more reports of maltreatment ofAmerican and British hostages. The members of the delegation were skep-tical. They questioned whether any escalation of maltreatment hadoccurred. They suggested the administration might simply be using theplight of the hostages to justify going to war. Senator William Cohen, thevice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, offered that officials


of the CIA and DIA, when testifying before his committee the precedingweek, had indicated there was no new evidence of mistreatment(Woodward, Commanders 17). Throughout November and December, theadministration nevertheless reminded the public that Iraq was starving theembassy personnel in Kuwait. By January 1991, administration officials hadrecounted repeated instances of Iraqi disrespect for fundamental tenets ofinternational law and order.

The Bush administration reinforced the idea of Iraqi barbarity byrenouncing the initial reluctance by US officials to discuss the Iraqi leader-ship’s prior bad acts. After Hussein had used chemical weapons to kill morethan eight thousand Kurdish civilians in Iraq in 1988, the Bush administra-tion had worked initially to downplay the incident and weaken a bill inCongress to impose economic sanctions in response to the atrocity.4Members of the Bush administration did so knowing that the United Stateshad supplied Iraq with six strains of botulinum toxin, three strains ofanthrax, and three strains of gas gangrene bacteria, West Nile fever virus,and dengue fever virus since 1983 (Niman 20–22). During the buildup of USforces in the Gulf, the administration abandoned its earlier public restraint.Bush denounced Hussein’s callous use of weapons of mass destructionagainst “innocent villagers, his own people” (Public Papers, 1991 1:11). Basedon lessons learned from past experience with Iraq, Bush insisted that SaddamHussein’s current pursuit of a chemical and biological weapons arsenal wouldbecome a precursor to future acts of barbarism.

In Bush’s reconstituted Cold War narrative, Iraq shared the characteris-tic barbarity of the Communist threat, but shifted the object of its conquestambitions to the economic arena and its chosen method of achieving domi-nation to weapons of mass destruction. To successfully respond to the revisedthreat, the hero character in the Bush narrative also needed to be recast. Thenew hero became the broader international community, with the UnitedStates assuming a leadership role.

Even while shifting the hero’s identity, the administration’s new narra-tive did not abandon the prior persona of the United States in conventionalCold War discourse. Bush grounded the nation’s motivations in thoserehearsed many times for his domestic audience. He laid out his administra-tion’s goals as, “You know how America remains the hope of ‘liberty-lovingpeople everywhere’” (Public Papers, 1990 2:1150). On a mission to defend thefreedom and self-determination of all members of the international commu-nity, the United States retained its earlier objectives.

The administration justified the means necessary for responding to theIraqi threat by drawing from the lessons of the nation’s war history. As arecent and resonant public memory of US success against terrorism, WorldWar II became the resurrected standard for how America should respond.


The Vietnam War, as a compelling recent episode of a US failure against ter-rorism, became a cautionary tale for how not to engage the enemy.

The Bush administration capitalized on the collective public memory ofWorld War II to draw a number of public lessons about how the UnitedStates should react to the takeover of Kuwait. The first of these was that theUnited States should shed its unilateral posture in times of internationalcrisis and, instead, assume a leadership role within the broader global com-munity. Accordingly, Bush framed the crisis as one facing the entire civilizedinternational community: “[W]e’re not in this alone. [. . .] It is the UnitedNations against Saddam Hussein. It is not Iraq against the United States”(Public Papers, 1990 2:1169). He touted the rewards of global cooperation forultimate success in the conflict when he stated, “[T]ogether, we can success-fully oppose tyranny and help those nations who look to us for leadershipand vision” (ibid.). While the United States still played a vital role in the nar-rative’s battle against terrorism, it no longer assumed sole responsibility forovercoming the threat.

The folly of appeasement was a second lesson the Bush administrationborrowed from World War II. Bush warned the public of the consequencesof appeasement by historical references to Adolf Hitler. In one warning, heremembered that “Half a century ago, the world had the chance to stop aruthless aggressor and missed it” (Public Papers, 1990 2:1150). When Bushsent James Baker to meet with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz in earlyJanuary, he assured the public he would not repeat the mistakes of WorldWar II. In his January 9 news conference, Bush declared that he “sent JimBaker to Geneva not to negotiate, but to communicate” (Public Papers, 19912:18). In accordance with the new framework, the government did not fail ifit was incapable of securing a negotiated settlement; instead, it failed if itmade even a minor concession to a recognized terrorist.

The Soviet Union experienced the transposed standard firsthand when itoffered concessions to Iraq in exchange for an agreement to withdraw fromKuwait immediately prior to the ground war. The proposal was along thelines of domestic US opinion polls conducted from November 9 toNovember 13, 2000, which showed that sixty-nine percent of the respon-dents favored “Agreeing to a negotiated settlement, under which in returnfor getting out of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein is allowed to have access to thePersian Gulf through the northern part of Kuwait, as a face-saving device forhim to get out” (L. Harris, “Public Wants” 2). Nevertheless, Bush remainedconsistent with the no-negotiation pledge of the revised narrative andrejected the proposal immediately. He announced that the Soviet proposalfell “well short of what would be required” (as qtd. in Rosenthal A1). TheWorld War II standard of unconditional surrender became the Bush admin-istration’s only standard for an acceptable outcome in the conflict.


Despite the public stance, officials in the Bush administration perceivedthat a substantial portion of the public actually favored making concessionsto avoid war in the Gulf. After the United States moved offensive forcestrength into Saudi Arabia in November 1990, for example, advisors warnedthe Persian Gulf Working Group, “Americans are not convinced that thePresident has taken all the relevant diplomatic steps” (Troops in the Gulf).The Opinion Analysis Staff of the Bureau of Public Affairs in the StateDepartment identified particular concessions that had the potential to under-mine public support for US military involvement in the region. Their reportto the Working Group in early January 1991 stated, “Partial Iraqi withdrawalproduced a 5–10 point decline in support for using military force to freeKuwait completely. A total withdrawal produced about a 25-point decline insupport for using force (‘to destroy Iraqi’s military threat’), plus increasedsupport for removing US troops” (US Dept. St., PA/Opinion Analysis1/14/90). Members of the administration concluded that specific diplomaticoutcomes had majority public support.

Nonetheless, the Bush administration chose not to work toward theconcessions the public appeared to favor. Instead, they used certain linguisticcodes that recalled the Hitler analogy, thereby softening the public’s call fordiplomatic concessions to Iraq. The strategic replacement of the term“appeasement” for “diplomacy” was particularly powerful, given the memo-ries it evoked regarding Great Britain’s unsuccessful concessions to Germanyduring World War II. Bush’s chief of staff, John Sununu, received a confi-dential memorandum in late December 1990 that specifically addressed thepower of the appeasement label. The memo, originally sent from TonyFabrizio of the polling firm Fabrizio, McLaughlin and Associates to SamZakhem, chairman of the Freedom Task Force, reported the results of acommissioned national survey of voter attitudes regarding US policy towardthe Middle East.

The poll assessed the impact of the appeasement label with the public bydrawing a simple comparison. First, the survey employed the term “diplo-macy,” by asking the question, “As you may have heard, the U.N. recentlypassed a resolution demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by January15th. At that time, President Bush has three options. Which option wouldyou personally favor?” Of the respondents, 45% chose “continue diplomaticrelations,” 37.8% chose “act militarily,” and 11% chose “withdraw from theregion completely” (Fabrizio). With diplomacy as a survey option, far lessthan half the public favored a military engagement in the Gulf.

A second polling question asked the public what actions they wouldsupport if, instead of diplomacy, the term “appeasement” appeared in thewording of the survey. Fabrizio highlighted the swing such phrasing wouldprompt in public support for the war effort in the report’s conclusion. It read,


“[W]hen asked whether we should ‘appease’ Saddam Hussein or Force himout of Kuwait even in the face of war, a commanding majority (65.0%) favorforcing Hussein from Kuwait even if it leads to war” (Fabrizio.). By recastingdiplomacy as appeasement, the Bush administration recognized that it couldpush public support for military engagement by as much as twenty percent-age points.

A third theme that the Bush administration borrowed from World WarII was the need for an urgent response. Bush echoed the words of FranklinD. Roosevelt when he argued that the consequences of waiting were simplytoo high. Repeating the phrase “while the world waited” (Public Papers, 19911:42–45), Bush argued Iraq had raped, pillaged, and plundered Kuwait,added to its chemical weapons arsenal, fortified its military forces, andundermined the economies of nations throughout the world. As a terroriststate, Iraq could only be expected to take maximum advantage of any delay.

The decision to stress the urgency of an early military engagement was astrategic one. The Bush administration believed the costs of waiting forsanctions to work far outweighed its benefits. An October 29, 1990 telegramfrom the American Embassy in Riyadh to the secretary of state identified anumber of potential consequences that worried administration officials aboutwaiting to use military force. These included: “incidents between Israelis andPalestinians which divide Arabs and Muslims from [the] US and ourEuropean Allies; incidents between religious activists in Saudi Arabia andthe non-Muslim forces deployed here which could make our presence unten-able for the Saudi monarchy; the crumbling of the coalition at the UN as aconsequence of one or more major actors going their own way, e.g. theFrench or the Soviets’ erosion of sanctions’ enforcement before sanctions canwork their will in Iraq; and a collapse of American public support for theU.S. force presence in the gulf or—more likely—a rise in domestic U.S.opposition to offensive action to liberate Kuwait and punish Iraq” (Amer.Emb. in Riyadh). The same telegram also warned that weather conditionsfor exercising an offensive military operation would be unfavorable betweenFebruary and September. For a multitude of reasons, the administration con-cluded that waiting to engage military forces posed substantial risks for thecoalition forces.

By contrast, the administration concluded that Saddam Hussein’s costsof waiting for sanctions to work were inconsequential. On January 10, 1991,William Webster, the director of the CIA, reported in a letter to Les Aspin,the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “We have seenlittle hard evidence to suggest that Saddam is politically threatened by cur-rent hardships endured by the populace. Moreover, Saddam has taken fewactions that would indicate he is concerned about the stability of his regime.Assessing the populace’s flash point is difficult, but we believe it is high


because Iraqis have borne considerable hardship in the past. During its eight-year war with Iran, for example, Iraq endured a combination of economicdifficulties, very high casualties, and repeated missile and air attacks on majorcities without any serious public disturbances.” Comparatively, the adminis-tration’s internal analyses concluded that waiting for sanctions to work woulddisadvantage the United States more than Saddam Hussein.

Despite the strategic benefits of attacking Iraq sooner, many in theadministration believed the majority of the public did not support early inter-vention. In December 1990, State Department analysts reported that publicattitudes about going to war in the Gulf were not favorable. They arguedthat public reaction broke down into four groups: the hawks, the hawkish,the dovish, and the doves (US Dept. of St., PA/Opinion Analysis 12/11/90).The analysts’ summary assessment of attitudes of the four groups revealed“The hawks and hawkish together comprise about 40% of the public. Theyare prepared to go to war in order to liberate Kuwait, either now or afterJanuary 15. The doves and dovish comprise about 55% of the public. Dovesoppose the deployment of U.S. forces. The dovish, who support the originaldeployment, sub-divide into those prepared to fight if sanctions don’t workafter an extended period (about a half-year or more) and those who wouldeventually settle for a compromise.” In short, Bush’s conservative base wasclearly in favor of moving forward, but the majority of the public remainedopposed to early intervention.

Bush’s problem of uniting the electorate behind a military engagementwas compounded in November and December 1990 when members ofCongress went public with their concerns regarding whether the governmenthad given economic sanctions on Iraq sufficient time to work. The SenateArmed Forces Committee opened hearings on the Persian Gulf conflict inlate November. Sam Nunn, chairman of the Armed Services Committee,introduced the hearings by criticizing the administration for changing theoriginally stated goals in the Persian Gulf conflict and for failing to givesanctions enough time to work (Lampley). Given the State Department’sassessment of dove and dovish attitudes, the administration knew theapproach had the potential to resonate with the majority of the public.

Members of the Bush administration worried about the impact thatstatements by Nunn and other Democratic leaders would have upon theAmerican public. The Working Group received an internal analysis thatargued, “In the current situation, Democratic party leaders as of late October1990 had not outlined an alternative Persian Gulf strategy, and Republicanand Democratic partisans at that time differed very little in their attitudestoward attack vs. defense vs. withdrawal. The predominant Democratictheme today, restraint/give the sanctions more time, will bear watching,however. Since the time of the last RNC study, Senator Nunn, Senator


Mitchell, and others have become more vocal in their opposition to theattack option. [. . .] Now that Democratic leaders have enunciated an alter-native position, it is possible that partisanship will prompt Democrats toshift some of their support away from that option” (Historical Overview).With an alternative strategy competing with the administration’s view,public attitudes in support of the Bush team’s perspective had furtherpotential to erode.

Evoking the public memory of World War II highlighted the costs ofwaiting for sanctions to impact Iraq. Just as Adolf Hitler continued to usurpterritories while the allies debated whether to enter into the conflict, SaddamHussein could be aggressive before the United States responded. Further, theWorld War II analogy invited the conclusion that giving the enemy time tostrengthen its own position carried the consequence of raising the costs offuture engagement. The narrative theme was unequivocal: neither theAmerican public nor the international community could afford to wait andsee if Saddam Hussein changed his mind; Iraq’s intention to developweapons of mass destruction made inaction simply too risky.

Even if the administration could have garnered public concurrence withits need to act, members of the executive branch worried that the nation’shistory in Vietnam raised doubts about the citizenry’s support for a long-term military engagement involving American casualties. Bush’s WorkingGroup considered John Mueller’s historical assessment of the Vietnam andthe Korean conflicts to help gauge the impact of likely American casualtieson public opinion: “[P]ublic support in both conflicts fell in direct relation tocasualties suffered (killed, hospitalized, wounded, missing)—‘every timeAmerican casualties increased by a factor of 10, support for the war droppedby about 15 percentage points.’[. . .] Both conflicts lost clear majority supportat about the 60,000 casualties level (60,000 casualties today would probablyinclude 15,000 troops killed in action)” (Historical Overview). Translatedinto the realities of the Persian Gulf context, Mueller’s conclusions offeredthe administration a sobering perspective on its ability to retain public sup-port for a military engagement.

Internal polling conducted in the months following Iraq’s move intoKuwait offered the administration little hope of sustained public support. AWirthlin Group poll conducted for the administration in Novemberreported that seven in ten Americans agreed with the statement, “[T]hedeath of American soldiers in a fight with Iraq is too high a price to pay inthis Middle East conflict.” In the same month, poll numbers from LouHarris confirmed a lack of support for the use of ground forces when casu-alty figures were included in survey questions. Harris reported, “[B]y 61–35percent, a majority now would oppose ‘sending U.S. troops and those of ourallies in Saudi Arabia across the border into Kuwait against the 425,000


Iraqi troops to liberate that country from Iraqi control, even if that wouldmean as many as 30,000 American casualties from the fighting’” (PublicWants to Give Sanctions) Harris’s ominous conclusion for the administra-tion was: “Clearly, the public does not want a massive assault of U.S.ground force to liberate Kuwait today.” By December, Harris saw littlechange, noting, “The underlying attitude about the Gulf is distinctly againstthe expenditure of many American lives” (Bush Rating 59% Positive).Fearful of committing to another Vietnam, the majority of the public wasreticent to send troops into Kuwait.

The public’s intolerance for high casualty figures was particularly trou-bling for the administration, given its own internal, worst-case scenario pro-jections. A private briefing of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney andGeneral Colin Powell in December estimated up to twenty thousandAmerican casualties during a military confrontation in the Gulf (Woodward,Commanders 349). That number, only several thousand below the figureincluded in the Harris poll, was dangerously close to the trigger point forpublic opposition to the war effort.

The Bush narrative responded to the public’s concern about high casual-ties by contending the best hope for preserving American life was a strongcommitment to confronting terrorism before it spread throughout the civi-lized world. Bush recalled the concessions logic employed in the globalresponse to Palestinian terrorists holding Israeli athletes hostage during the1972 Olympic Games. By not giving into a terrorist’s demands, he reasoned,“We will succeed in the Gulf and when we do, the world community willhave sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future,who contemplates outlaw aggression” (Public Papers, 1991 1:79). By provid-ing an alternative cost-benefit analysis for determining the acceptablenumber of casualties during wartime, the Bush narrative invited the public tochange its standard of evaluating US success in a military conflict.

Besides encouraging the public to reconsider how it weighed the costs ofa war effort, the Bush administration promised to minimize the costs of war.The Bush camp, claiming to have learned the lessons of the Vietnam War,reiterated that it would not repeat those mistakes. By late November 1990,the public diplomacy themes of the administration stressed five key differ-ences that all official spokespersons should emphasize between the two con-flicts: “US interests/stakes critical and clear in Gulf; US has support ofalmost entire international community; US position has strong UN backing;unlike North Vietnam, Iraq is not receiving massive outside assistance; and ifwe must use force, it will be decisive from the outset. We are here to suc-ceed” (Haass, Memo to Sununu et al.). In the Bush administration’s narra-tive, the Persian Gulf conflict and the Vietnam War were not the same; thistime, the United States would prevail.


State Department polling analysts concluded that the majority of thepublic did draw distinctions between the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulfconflict. On February 1, 1991, they reported, “At present, most Americansbelieve the war against Iraq will be won in a matter of ‘months’ (62%) andthe cost of lives of fewer than 5,000 U.S. troops (55%). Of those holdingthese views, about two-thirds support the war” (U.S. Dept. of St.,PA/Opinion Analysis 2/1/91). Only a minority (26%) believed the warwould cost more than five thousand lives, the key benchmark where supportfor the war drops to less than half of the public (ibid.). Optimism that theUnited States would prevail in the conflict was high as the nation prepared tobegin its ground offensive.

Taken as a whole, the Bush narrative placed the terrorism label withinthe conventional framework of presidential war rhetoric. Saddam Hussein’sterrorist acts were not crimes; they were acts of war on Kuwait and on allnations committed to stability and order around the globe. Bush, as com-mander in chief of the only remaining military superpower, was obligated torespond. The administration’s ability to capitalize on the full ideologicalpotential of the terrorist label, however, was circumscribed by the nondemo-cratic government under attack and the ideological diversity of US allies inthe conflict. Constrained from presenting the conflict as a threat againstdemocracy, the Bush camp depicted the military action as a pragmatic neces-sity in the goal of sustaining the New World Order.

IDEOLOGY AND PERSIAN GULF TERRORISM

The leadership of Iraq and of the United States disagreed on the role of ide-ology within the public discourse of the Persian Gulf conflict. While bothsought to form alliances with Muslim nations to strengthen their position inthe war effort, they split on how to accomplish that objective. The Iraqismagnified the ideological divisions between the West and Muslim commu-nities, enough so that the US National Security Council concluded, “[Iraq’scommunications] support Saddam’s efforts to define and describe the conflictin terms most likely to gain Arab/Muslim support” (Arab Public Opinion#14). The United States, by contrast, preferred to downplay distinctionsbetween the two cultures in hopes of encouraging other Muslim nations inthe region to join the coalition effort to repel the Iraqi move on Kuwait.

The Iraqis portrayed the confrontation in Kuwait to be yet anotherbattle in the ongoing war between Muslims and the Western colonialistforces with their Zionist allies. Saddam Hussein, along with the IraqiRevolution Command Council, argued the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was anecessary step to reverse artificial, nationalistic divisions imposed on the


Arab world by Western imperialist forces in the aftermath of the Arab statesgaining their independence.5 The blame for the region’s economic woesrested with the West, as Hussein explained: “The malicious Westerners,while partitioning the Arab homeland, intentionally multiplied the numberof countries with the result that the Arab nation could not achieve the inte-gration needed to realize its full capability. In this way, they also fragmentedcapabilities. While fragmenting the Arab homeland, they intentionally dis-tanced the majority of the population density and areas of cultural depthfrom riches and their sources[. . .]” (as qtd. in Bengio 113). For Hussein, theannexation of Kuwait became a restorative act that strengthened and inspiredthe Arab population to meet to its full, united potential.

To bolster his case, Saddam Hussein argued that the West was exploit-ing the Persian Gulf conflict in an effort to eliminate the Arab culture. Heaccused the United States and its coalition partners of attacking the sacredplaces of the Muslim faith. Hussein insisted the Iraqis were fighting to pro-tect from defilement by American military forces Muslim holy places,namely, Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed, and Medina, his burial site.Recalling the ongoing conflict between Muslims and Christians since theseventh century,6 Hussein summoned all Muslims to meet their obligations:“[W]e are duty-bound to engage in holy jihad so that we can liberate the twoholy mosques from captivity and occupation. [. . .] Your brothers in Iraq willknow no peace of mind until the last soldier of occupation departs by choiceor is expelled from the land of Arabism in Najd and Hejaz (Saudi Arabia)”(as qtd. in Bengio 140). The Iraqi leader also accused allied forces of bomb-ing holy shrines in Karbala and Najaf (P. M. Taylor 120). By catalogingmultiple examples of where coalition forces were defiling sacred grounds,Hussein built the case that the underlying purpose of the allied campaignwas to dominate all those who worshipped within the Muslim faith.

The Bush administration took seriously Hussein’s allegations of alliedattacks on Muslim sacred places. It understood that Hussein’s messagewould resonate with some in the Middle East. A contemporaneous NationalSecurity Council assessment stated, “Shia Muslims in Bahrain and EasternSaudi Arabia are potentially susceptible to disinformation on the bombing ofshrines in Karbala and Najaf, as are their counterparts in Iran and SouthAsia” (Arab Public Opinion #14). While not persuasive with the broaderglobal community, the Iraqi charge carried the possibility of uniting keyMuslim populations within the region.

To reinforce the claim that the US military campaign constituted anattack on the Muslim faith, the Iraqi leadership raised the specter of Israeliinvolvement in the Persian Gulf conflict. The Middle East scholar BernardLewis has argued that Hussein’s mention of Israel was particularly persuasivewith audiences in the region because it recalled the humiliation of five Arab


states fighting and failing to prevent a half of million Jews from establishinga state in 1948 (Lewis 154). Evoking the Jewish stereotype of cunning anddeceit, Hussein blamed the allied air campaign on “the hostile policy that isbeing made in the corridors influenced by criminal Zionism” (as qtd. inBengio 188). Radio Baghdad fueled the controversy by broadcasting a storyclaiming that scores of Israeli planes had joined the coalition air forces in theaftermath of Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel. The report concluded thatthe Israeli move had only heightened “the determination of the strugglingmen of the armed forces and Iraq’s people to continue Jihad” (P. M. Taylor98). Hussein, bolstered by the Iraqi media, attempted to incite the entireMuslim community to rise up and defeat the Zionist threat.

The Bush administration tracked Middle Eastern media sources toascertain the extent and nature of the claims related to Israeli involvement.Among the stories it recorded were: Israel was receiving funds from SaudiArabia via the United States; the CIA was asking the Israeli intelligenceagency to launch an assassination operation against Saddam Hussein thatused Iraqi Jews posing as foreign journalists; Israel was moving 65 (laterraised to 142) attack planes to bases in Saudi Arabia and another 44 attackplanes to a base in Turkey; Israeli pilots, disguised as Americans, were flyingbombing raids as part of the multinational force; and Israeli planes disguisedwith Iraqi markings were planning to attack Turkey, Syria, and Egypt (IraqiDisinformation). The director of the USIA, William Rugh, evaluated theprobable impact of such stories as devastating for US interests in the conflict.He concluded, “Israeli military involvement looms as potentially the mostinflammatory and destructive of these stories. Both Syria and Yemen haveindicated that Israeli attacks against Iraq may cause a shift in their position.Public opinion in other Muslim countries would probably react violently toIsrael’s entry into the war” (Rugh, Memo to Seaquist and Hullender). Thepoignancy of Israeli involvement potentially threatened the continued exis-tence of Bush’s international coalition.

The Iraqis fueled anti-Western sentiment by charging that Americanattacks on the Muslim religion extended to the moral teachings of the faith.One circulated story accused the Pentagon of sending thousands of Egyptianwomen to the Gulf to serve as prostitutes for US forces. Another maintainedthat AIDS was rampant among US forces in the region. Another chargedSaudi leaders with drinking alcohol at US military bases. The stress on theimmoral conduct of the coalition forces underscored a common preconcep-tion amongst certain Islamic factions, namely, that acquiescence and adop-tion of Western morals would lead to societal decay (Rush, Memo toSeaquist and Hollonder).

Finally, the Iraqis accused the United States and its coalition partners ofdirectly attacking the Arab people. The Iraqis reiterated that allied forces


were intentionally targeting the civilian population of Iraq. When speakingto the UN Secretary General, for example, Tariq Aziz complained of the“horrendous and deliberate crimes against Iraqi citizens” (as qtd. in P. M.Taylor 184). Baghdad Radio reinforced the point, calling for Iraq to dealwith its captured coalition pilots “on the basis of their being killers ofdefenseless women, children and old people, not as soldiers waging a waragainst other soldiers” (ibid., 111). Allied bombings of the Amiriya suburb ofBaghdad and a purported baby milk factory dramatized Iraqi claims of civil-ian damage. The Iraqis, initially reluctant to admit the existence of civiliancasualties for fear of showing weakness to the global community, eventuallyencouraged and exploited public discussions of the collateral damage of theconflict (85–86).

Refugee accounts from those fleeing across the border from Iraq sup-ported the leadership’s claims that civilian casualties were widespread. Someof the refugees claimed to have seen coffins on car roofs and city buses hit bybombs. Despite the fact that Arab correspondents admitted refugees lackedreliable details of civilian casualties (P. M. Taylor 174), the Bush administra-tion remained fearful of the public relations value of the personal statements.The director of the USIA warned, “[E]ye witness accounts of casualties havea strong emotional appeal” (Rugh, Memo to Hullender). The powerful testi-monials reinforced the perception that allied forces were attacking innocentMuslim civilians in communities sympathetic with the Iraqi perspective.

Taken as a whole, Iraq’s ideological framing of the crisis was a majorconcern of the Bush administration. Assessing the potential impact of theentire Iraqi public campaign, the administration concluded, “Iraqi propa-ganda finds a ready reception in pro-Saddam publics in North Africa,Jordan, Yemen, and—to a controlled degree—in Syria. [. . .] Iraqi propa-ganda has so far failed to make much impression on pro-coalition publics.But it hammers away at themes close to Arab preconceptions. Their contin-ued repetition and replay in Arab and Western media could begin to impacton opinion which has so far been resistant” (Arab Public Opinion #14).Given rank-and-file opposition to America’s aims in a number of alliedMiddle Eastern countries, the administration feared Hussein’s ideologicalframing would result in the breakup of the coalition, a reality far more likelyif the war went on beyond several days (see Arab Public Opinion #12, #13,and #14).

In response, the Bush administration engaged in a public diplomacycampaign designed to downplay the ideological nature of the conflict. Thecampaign involved twenty-nine million leaflets, extensive psychologicaloperations broadcast on the Voice of the Gulf from Saudi Arabia and Turkey,and thirteen hours a day of Arabic programming over Voice of AmericaRadio. The campaign’s officially stated goal was “to reach Iraqis, other


Arabs, and other Muslims with facts and themes in the U.S. interest” (Dykeand Charles).

A substantial portion of US public diplomacy involved timely andunequivocal denials of Iraqi charges of cultural attacks. Within one day ofIraq’s annexation of Kuwait, the United States led a UN Security Councileffort to pass Resolution 662, declaring the annexation null and void. Theadministration’s public rebuttal highlighted the fallacious reasoning of theIraqi claim to Kuwaiti land. It insisted, “Kuwait as an ‘eternal’ part of Iraqsurfaced after August 8 and Iraq’s initial claims that it had invaded at therequest of a new government in Kuwait. No countries accepted this canardon August 2 any more than they do now. Before its invasion Iraq recognizedKuwait as a sovereign, independent state, and a full member of the ArabLeague and the UN. In addition, the two countries maintained full diplo-matic relations” (Iraqi Public Affairs). The US message rejected the historicalclaim made by the Iraqi government; instead, it held that Kuwait hadmodern status as a sovereign nation.

The administration was equally emphatic in its denial of Iraqi accusa-tions that US troops were defiling Muslim holy places. The administration’spublic affairs rebuttal read, “The multinational forces are not in Mecca orMedina. These forces are primarily in northern and eastern Saudi Arabia”(Iraqi Public Affairs). To lend credibility to the denial, the Saudi govern-ment invited Moslem journalists to the holy sites in late October 1990.Ambassador Glaspie argued that the United Sates could reinforce the credi-bility of its denial if the conflict continued until the Moslem religious obser-vances of Raj and Ramadan. As she reasoned, Islamic pilgrims could then seefor themselves that US troops were not present.7

The administration adopted a similar strategy of denial in response toIraqi charges that Israel was participating in coalition military activities. BothSaudi Arabian officials and the Israeli ambassador to the United Statesissued announcements stating that Israel had not bombed Iraq. US spokes-persons reinforced the message, publicly applauding the restraint and respon-sibility that the Israeli government had exercised in its decision to allowcoalition forces to respond to Iraqi attacks on its homeland (see Baker,“Opportunities” 82).

Denial was also a critical element of the public strategy to respond tocharges of coalition-inflicted civilian casualties. The administration orderedthe Judge Advocate General Corp. to review all targets to ensure that civil-ians and antiquities were not on the lists. On January 17, Powell offered thattwenty percent of the aircraft attacking Iraq returned without dropping theirordinance. A primary reason for the return rate, according to Powell, was“the very tight control we had over the aircraft. They did not make the kindof positive identification of the target that we required before going in and


launching under the rules of engagement to minimize collateral damage”(Iraqi Disinformation). The next day Lt. Gen. Charles Horner,Commander of the US Central Command Air Forces, added, “[O]ne of thestrongest guidances [sic] we had from the very start was to avoid any damageto civilian targets and to the holy shrines located in Iraq” (ibid.). By drawingon the authority of the nation’s military commanders, the administrationhoped to position more credibly its claims that the allied forces did nottarget Iraqi civilians.

Besides denying Iraqi accusations, the administration emphasized therole of its Arab partners in the coalition to dispel the ideological frame of theconflict. The Bush administration spent months prior to the onset of themilitary campaign ensuring that the coalition included active participation bythe Arab states. When discussing the story about the US defiling shrines inMedina and Mecca, administration public affairs guidelines stressed that onehundred thousand Muslim troops were participating in the coalition forcethat occupied Saudi Arabia (Iraqi Public Affairs). In response to claims ofintentional civilian casualties, the guidelines described the air force involvedin the initial air campaign to be a joint force of pilots from Kuwait, SaudiArabia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (ibid.).

Framing the conflict as Iraq against the rest of the world, the Bushadministration argued that the true enemy of the Muslim faith was SaddamHussein. As early as September 10, 1990, the former Iranian ambassador tothe United Nations, Fereydoun Hoveida, had informed US officials thatSaddam Hussein’s use of foreigners as human shields violated the norms ofboth the Arab world and Islam (Memo of Conversation). The US govern-ment picked up the theme, stressing again and again that Iraqi actions werein opposition to the Islamic faith. The message received extensive mediaattention when it became one of three main focal points in a UN programentitled “the Rape of Kuwait” presented before the Security Council onNovember 26–27, 1990 (Haass, Memo of Conversation to Gates).

The official rebuttals developed in response to Iraqi accusations rou-tinely highlighted the threat Saddam Hussein posed to the Muslim faith. Inresponse to the accusation that imperialist forces were attacking Muslims andArabs, the administration’s official statement read, “On August 2nd Iraqbegan this war when it attacked Kuwait, an Arab, Muslim nation. [. . .] It isIraq that has launched two massive wars against Muslim nations—Iran andKuwait—that have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Arabsand Muslims, and the displacement of many more” (Iraqi Public Affairs). Inresponse to the alleged attacks on Muslim holy places by the United States,administration guidelines placed the blame for the risk to the shrines on Iraq.One US rebuttal proclaimed, “Once Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait, a for-eign force presence will no longer be required to defend Saudi Arabia from


further Iraqi aggression” (ibid.). As for the claim that the coalition forceswere intentionally targeting civilians, the US rebuttal reiterated that it hadbeen Iraq that had intentionally ordered missiles into civilian areas of SaudiArabia. Regardless of the accusation lodged against coalition forces, the Bushadministration attempted to shift the responsibility for the problems of theMuslim people to the Iraqi leader.

In public diplomacy themes developed specifically for consumption bythe Iraqi population, the administration underscored that Saddam Hussein,not the United States, was the true enemy of the Arab people. USIA mediaoutlets distributed two themes directly to Iraqi citizens that stressedHussein’s transgressions against Muslims. The first was “Saddam Hussein iswrong in his invasion and plunder of Kuwait and its people. He is notdefending Arabs, he is attacking them” (Public Diplomacy Themes to Targeton Iraqis). The second was “Iraq’s policies are a scandal (fadhiha), bringinghumiliation and disgrace to Iraqis: Invasion of a brother Arab state, the set-tlement with Iran, the taking of innocent hostages, the thievery in Kuwait”(ibid.). Coupled with persistent denials of Iraqi charges, the administrationhoped that repetition of these themes would counter the strategic framing ofthe Persian Gulf conflict as an ideological battle between the United Statesand Muslims.

In short, the Bush administration’s faced a public relations battle in thePersian Gulf conflict potentially more serious than the one it faced on thebattlefield. Iraq’s depictions of the allied forces as being anti-Arab and anti-Muslim embodied the potential to ideologically divide the United Statesfrom its coalition partners. Through denial of Iraqi claims and public associ-ation with Arab partners, the Bush administration attempted to countergrowing negative sentiment within the Middle East regarding US involve-ment in the Gulf. Vilifying Hussein as the true enemy of the Arab peopleoffered a competing explanation for who was to blame for the suffering ofIraqi people. A quick victory, coupled with an extensive public relationseffort in the Middle East, worked to hold the coalition together throughoutthe air and ground campaigns.

The Bush camp rhetorically presented the Persian Gulf conflict as abattle between the old and the new. Saddam Hussein’s ideological call for allMuslims to join his cause remembered centuries of historical injustice againstthose who practiced Islam and promised a return to the days of a unitedArab empire. Bush’s urgings for those same members of the Muslim faith tojoin his coalition offered a vision of a new international community, tolerantof difference and ripe with advantages for all who participated. The Bushappeal was not as ideological as his predecessor’s; it depended on members ofthe international community seeing far-reaching, pragmatic benefits fororder and security in the post–Cold War environment. The next president


would also promise global benefits and resist the ideological potential of theterrorism label. In the process, however, he would return to publicly empha-sizing terrorism as crime, not war.


6

Terrorism and the Clinton Era: A Prophetic Moment

The number of international terrorism incidents dropped precipitouslyduring the Clinton presidency. The yearly average of terrorist attacks

targeting Americans was 351, as compared with 435 during the Bush admin-istration and 569 during the Reagan years (US Dept. of State, Patterns: 1989100). Despite the overall decline in terrorist episodes, the amount of presi-dential discourse devoted to the topic of terrorism expanded significantly.Clinton gave more than a thousand speeches that discussed acts of terrorismhappening both at home and abroad.

Three of the attacks that Clinton referenced most frequently occurredwithin the borders of the United States. The first happened on February 26,1993, when a yellow Ford Econoline van, rigged with a timing device,exploded in the parking garage under the World Trade Center. The bomb-ing killed six people and injured more than a thousand others. One of thedefendants, a possible Iraqi operative named Ramzi Yousef, reported that theterrorists had planned to topple one of the World Trade Center towers intothe other, with the goal of causing as many as 250,000 casualties. JudgeKevin Duffy, speaking at the first World Trade Center trial, claimed thebombing caused more injuries and hospital casualties than any other event indomestic American history apart from the Civil War (as rptd. in Reeve 15).Three New York juries found the defendants Yousef, Mohammad Salameh,Mahmud Abouhalima, Nidal Ayyad, Ahmad Ajaj, and Eyad Ismoil guiltyfor their roles in the bombings. Each received 240 years in prison, but Yousef(the supposed mastermind of the operation) was sentenced to carry out histerm in solitary confinement.

Clinton’s next featured terrorist attack on US soil occurred April 19,1995. A Ryder rental truck exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah FederalBuilding in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. One hundred and sixty-eight peopledied in the bombing, including nineteen children under the age of six. Initialaccounts by witnesses and media organizations mistakenly claimed that the

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bombing was the work of Middle Eastern terrorists (Hamm 54–55). Afterinvestigating the crime, the government charged two Americans, TimothyMcVeigh and Terry Nichols, with both the planning and implementationof the attack. At the trial the prosecution argued that McVeigh andNichols had acted alone in retaliation for the government’s intervention atRuby Ridge and Waco. Defense attorney Stephen Jones adamantlydefended the position that McVeigh and Nichols were not sole actors,offering an unidentified left leg as proof that someone else had to havebeen present at the bombing. Jones argued that McVeigh had been caughtup in an international conspiracy, involving Afghan Arabs, Osama binLaden, Iraqi operatives, and/or white supremacist groups. He accusedJudge Richard Matsch of unfairly excluding the evidence of conspiracyprior to trial (Jones and Israel 284). After Colorado juries found the twoguilty of murder of federal employees, Nichols received a life sentence. Thejury gave McVeigh the death penalty, a sentence the government carriedout on June 11, 2001. Later, another judge sentenced Nichols to anotherlife sentence after an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of 161 counts ofmurder, arson, and conspiracy.

The third domestic terrorist incident prominent in Clinton’s discourseoccurred July 27, 1996. This time, a bomb exploded during an open-air rockconcert at Centennial Olympic Park during the 1996 Olympic Games inAtlanta, Georgia. Two people died and another 111 were injured. The sub-sequent FBI investigation initially focused on Richard Jewell, a park securityguard, who sued and settled a case against the Atlanta Journal and Consti-tution for libelous claims about his involvement in the park bombing. TheFBI censured two agents and suspended another without pay for askingJewell to waive his right to an attorney during initial questioning. More thanfive years after the park bombing, and more than a $25 million FBI man-hunt, police eventually captured and arrested Eric Robert Rudolph while hewas searching for food in a trash bin in Murphy, North Carolina. Rudolph, aChristian fundamentalist, later explained that he had planned a sequence ofbombings during the 1996 Olympic Games in protest over the federal gov-ernment’s support of legalized abortion. In exchange for information aboutthe location of about 250 lbs. of hidden explosives, Rudolph received a lifesentence without parole for his role in the Centennial Park bombing.

While attacks on American soil dominated much of the public discourseof the Clinton era, three terrorist events abroad were also featured in presi-dential discourse. On the morning of March 20, 1995, five members of theAum Shinrikyo religious cult punctured eleven plastic bags of sarin they hadpreviously placed under the seats or on the baggage racks of five trainsheaded toward the Kasumigaseki Station of the Tokyo subway system. Theattack resulted in twelve deaths and more than five thousand injuries.


According to 1997 courtroom testimony in Tokyo, Aum Shinrikyo had alsoplanned to release sarin in the United States (Kristoff A1). Nine Aum mem-bers received sentences of between twenty-two months and seventeen yearsin prison; one was acquitted.

A second international incident highlighted in Clinton’s discourse hap-pened the morning of August 7, 1998. Two bombs exploded almost simulta-neously outside the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,Tanzania. Combined, the two attacks killed twelve Americans and nearlythree hundred Africans. The bombings were part of a broader campaignagainst US embassies and military installations designed to drive the UnitedStates out of the Middle East (“Ex-U.S. Sergeant”). With evidence thatOsama bin Laden had orchestrated the attack, the United States respondedwith retaliatory bombing raids on terrorist training camps in Afghanistanand on a pharmaceutical plant allegedly involved in chemical weapons pro-duction in the Sudan. The US government tried codefendants and alleged alQaeda members Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, Mohamed SadeekOdeh, Wadih El-Hage, and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim for their role in thebombing conspiracy. Ali Mohamed, another defendant in the case, pleadedguilty to conspiracy charges and agreed to testify for the prosecution regard-ing the inner workings of the bin Laden organization. Al-Owhali was foundguilty and received a life sentence. Tanzania and Great Britain subsequentlyarrested nine other alleged al Qaeda members in relation to the bombings.More than four months after the embassy attacks, bin Laden was asked in aninterview whether he had masterminded the bombings. He responded,“[T]he World Islamic Front for jihad against ‘Jews and Crusaders’ had issueda ‘crystal clear’ fatwa. If the instigation for jihad against the Jews and theAmericans to liberate the holy places ‘is considered a crime,’ he said, ‘let his-tory be a witness that I am a criminal’” (as qtd. in National Commission,Final Report 70).

The final international incident to receive Clinton’s sustained publicattention occurred October 12, 2000. A small boat loaded with two suicidebombers, TNT, and C-4 exploded next to the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen.The explosion blew a 40� by 60� hole in the naval destroyer, killing seventeenUS sailors and injuring thirty-nine others. CIA analysts initially suspectedOsama bin Laden in the bombing, a charge he publicly denied. Yemeni offi-cials claimed to lack evidence against bin Laden, but FBI investigators werenot convinced of his innocence (“Bin Laden Denies Link;” “No Proof;” andPage “Why Clinton Failed to Stop Bin Laden.”). After detaining more thaneighty potential suspects, the government of Yemen planned to try six peoplewho had allegedly participated in the bombing (“Cole Attack”). In April2003, ten men accused of being key planners in the attack escaped from jailwhile in Aden, Yemen. Over the next month, Saudi Arabia extradited four

Terrorism and the Clinton Era 129

other Yemeni members of al Qaeda as suspects in the attack. The 9/11Commission Report argued that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had orchestratedthe attack from Afghanistan, Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso had been thelocal al Qaeda coordinators, and Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawarhad been the two suicide bombers in the attack (National Commission, FinalReport 190–91). The Clinton administration did not initiate a militaryresponse against al Qaeda, because the United States could not confirm binLaden’s personal involvement in the attacks until captured operatives revealedthe information in 2002 and 2003 (ibid., 193). Armed with evidence of binLaden’s connection to the Cole attack, the Bush administration also chose notto act, because too much time had passed, the event was stale, and they didnot want a counterproductive tit-for-tat interchange with al Qaeda (202).

Taken together, these six incidents received the most frequent mentionin Clinton’s corpus of presidential discourse related to terrorism. By hisselection of examples, Clinton invited public discussion about terrorism toshift from state to nonstate actors. Individuals or the groups operating acrossstate boundaries became the focus of whom the US should hold accountablefor acts of international terrorism. At first glance, the approach might seemreminiscent of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when small bands of extrem-ists served as stereotypical terrorists. As the next section will reveal, however,Clinton presented a different sort of threat.

LABELING THE THREAT

Within Clinton’s public rhetoric, the terrorists that threatened America didnot conform to old stereotypes. Clinton insisted that the United States wasexperiencing a “modern terrorist threat” (Public Papers 1995 1:722), one thathad “assumed new and quite dangerous dimensions” (Public Papers 19952:1547). He maintained that the terrorist challenge was something “thestatesmen of 50 years ago simply did not imagine” (Public Papers 19951:255). Having stressed the need for new thinking, Clinton proceeded todefine the nature of the emerging threat.

Clinton insisted that one key change in modern terrorists was their tac-tics. A reader of his statements on terrorism, denied other historical informa-tion, might conclude that terrorists operating in the Clinton era no longerused hostage-taking as a method of pressuring governmental actors to meettheir political objectives. In Clinton’s first term, he offered one hundred andfourteen examples that specified the terrorists’ methods. Fifty-nine of theexamples referred to bombings, forty-eight to attacks (including gas), andseven to assassinations, killings, or murders. Publicly, he did not offer asingle example of hostage-taking, despite the chronicle by his own State


Department of fifty-three international incidents of kidnapping, hijacking,or other forms of hostage-taking during the same time period (US Dept. ofState, Patterns: 1993–1997). Clinton did not raise the subject of hostage-taking even when he made public mention of Colombia, the worldwideleader in daily kidnappings (Schweitzer and Dorsch 177). His focus onbombings, attacks, and assassinations invited the public to disassociate thethreat he faced from the politically difficult ones of his predecessors, namely,the Iranian hostage crisis and the Iran-Contra scandal.

When Clinton explicitly defined terrorism in public, he reinforced theexclusion of hostage-taking from his conceptualization of the threat. Hedefined terrorism as an act of killing, not an ongoing act of extortion toachieve political gain. He told members of the Arab news media, “There areclear definitions of terrorism, and one of them is the willful killing of inno-cent civilians who themselves are not in any way involved in military combat”(Public Papers 1993 2:1480). When speaking after the Oklahoma bombings,he reinforced the more narrow interpretation: “Terror is when someone,allegedly for some philosophical or political reason, believes they have theright to take innocent lives [. . .]” (Public Papers 1996 1:550). In Clinton’spublic frame, terrorism was not a drawn-out saga; it was series of quick,unpredictable attacks. He told members of the US Air Force Academy,“Terrorists do not go slow, my fellow Americans. Their agenda is death anddestruction on their own timetable” (Public Papers 1995 1:768). Clintondirected public attention to acts of violence that had apparent closure.

Having de-emphasized the taking of hostages, Clinton argued thatterrorists were now planning to use weapons of mass destruction as theirmethod of choice. Repeatedly, he warned audiences that the use of chemi-cal weapons by terrorists was no longer just a theoretical possibility. Herecalled the dramatic empirical example of the sarin gas attack on theTokyo subway in more than fifty of his public remarks in the three yearsimmediately following that attack. Clinton also maintained that biologicalweapons were the emerging tools of international terrorists. Speaking tothe members of the United Nations, he cautioned, “Recent discoveries inlaboratories working to produce biological weapons for terrorists demon-strate the dangerous link between terrorism and the weapons of massdestruction” (Public Papers 1995 2:950). Finally, Clinton displayed concernregarding terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons. He stressed, “One of my high-est national security priorities has been to ensure that the breakup of theformer Soviet Union did not lead to the creation of new nuclear states.Such a development would increase the risks of nuclear accidents, diver-sion, and terrorism” (Public Papers 1994 1:248–49). Clinton insisted thataccess to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons made the new terroristsa more dangerous threat to the nation.


Mounting empirical evidence substantiated Clinton’s claim that terror-ists were becoming increasingly involved with weapons of mass destruction.Particularly worrisome was the widespread availability of such weapons inthe international arena. During the 1990s alone, governmental sourcesrevealed that more than seventy countries had built approximately ten thou-sand underground military facilities; of those, more than fourteen hundredhoused weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or military commands(Tyson 1). The diffusion of weapons of mass destruction around the worldheightened the likelihood terrorists would acquire the means to inflict mas-sive fatalities.

During the Clinton era, more than twenty nations produced or usedchemical weapons. Iraq, North Korea, and Libya did so under the guise ofgrowing pesticide industries. Insecure storage sites for chemical agents inRussia compounded the problem. In 1996, the administration threatenedLibya with nuclear retaliation if it continued to build a large chemicalweapons plant inside a mountain located south of Tripoli (Tyson 1). By1999, the Clinton team had information that bin Laden was conductingchemical weapons training and development at its Derunta camp (NationalCommission, Final Report 141). Inside the boundaries of the United States,federal agents recovered thirty-five gallon drums of cyanide from the homeof a white supremacist who purportedly was planning to dump the contentsinto either the New York City or Washington, DC water supply.1

Terrorists were also turning to biological weapons. Terrorists hadthreatened the use of such weapons against the Arab world, Germany,British Columbia, Australia, Great Britain, and the United States. UNreports revealed that Iraq had planned to use biological weapons during the1991 Persian Gulf War in the event America opted to launch a nuclearattack on Baghdad. The US government had many reasons for taking thethreats of the terrorists seriously. During the Cold War, a school in Berlinhad trained Iraqis on the use of biological weapons. Mustard gas had beenstolen from US installations in Germany. Stockpiles of biological toxins hadbeen discovered in safe houses in Paris and Germany. Even within the bor-ders of the United States, members of a religious cult had used a biologicaltoxin to poison 750 patrons of an Oregon salad bar (Laqueur, New Terrorism61–63; Schweitzer and Dorsch 109–28).

Like chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons were posing anew and heightened challenge. Terrorists had attempted to sabotage nuclearpower plants in South Africa, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and thePhilippines. CIA Director John Deutsch announced that Chechen leadershad threatened to turn Moscow into a desert by using radioactive wasteagainst the city. The Chechen rebels demonstrated the credibility of theirthreat by placing a small container of cesium 137 in a Moscow park


(Laqueur, New Terrorism 73). A defector, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, toldAmerican officials that al Qaeda had also been trying to buy a nuclear bomb(J. Miller A1). Conventional restraints on weapons of mass destruction (e.g.,not wanting to provoke a massive retaliatory US response and not wanting toundermine sympathy for one’s cause) were no longer containing certain ter-rorist groups.

Besides the focus on weapons of mass destruction, Clinton insisted thatterrorists were turning to the Internet to wreak havoc on the social order.Clinton introduced the term “cyber attack” (Public Papers 1998 1:1826) intopresidential terrorism discourse. Officials at his Justice Department added“cybercrime,” “cyberpiracy,” “cyberstalking,” “cyberterrorism” and “cybersecu-rity” to the national lexicon (Reno, “Remarks;” Reno, “Symposium;”Podesta). Clinton explained that the Internet could aid the enemy in tradi-tional terrorist functions, such as moving around quickly and finding infor-mation related to bomb making. The potential dangers involved in cyberterrorism, however, did not stop with the strengthening of conventional ter-rorist methods. Clinton warned that new modes of attack were available toterrorists who used the Internet. He reasoned, “Hackers break into govern-ment and business computers. They can raid banks, run up credit cardcharges, extort money by threats to unleash computer viruses. If we fail totake strong action, the terrorists, criminals and hostile regimes could invadeand paralyze these vital systems, disrupting commerce, threatening health,[and] weakening our capacity to function in a crisis. [. . .]” (Public Papers1998 1:826). For Clinton, the Internet enabled the terrorist to achieve wide-spread societal disruption.

Public announcements by the U.S. Justice Department established themagnitude of the cyberterrorism problem. Janet Reno referred to anFBI/Computer Security Institute survey of Fortune 500 companies thatfound financial losses stemming from cybercrime (such as hacking, viruses,and crashing networks) exceeded $360 million from 1997 through 1999(“Remarks”). Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder cited a BusinessSoftware Alliance estimate that the cost of software piracy amounted to morethan $11 billion in 1998 alone (“Remarks to High-Tech Crime Summit”).The Justice Department’s Web site cataloged media reports of cyberterror-ism. Targets from 1999 and 2000 included the US Postal Service, the Stateof Texas, the Canadian Department of Defense, the NASA Jet PropulsionLab, Stanford University, the US Department of Defense, AT&T, MCI,Sprint, the US Army, the White House, Ameritech, US Cellular, the USDistrict Court for the Eastern District of New York, USIA, NATO, and aFAA control tower. In 1995 alone the Defense Department experiencedmore than two hundred and fifty thousand attempts at intrusion, theft, alter-ation, or destruction of data from its computers (Schweitzer and Dorsch 45).


Behind the scenes, the administration had even more startling data sup-porting the threat of cyberterrorism. Richard Clarke, the administration’scounterterrorism czar, made the decision to find out just how vulnerable theUnited States was to a cyberterrorism attack. In 1998, he paid a group ofhackers to break into the Pentagon’s most secure computer systems. Not onlydid the hackers gain access to Pentagon data, they controlled the militarycommand center, the command-and-control apparatus used by the leader-ship during an attack on the nation (“Clinton’s Secret War”).

The distinctiveness of modern-day terrorists in Clinton’s public dis-course went beyond tactics; terrorists had also changed the location of theirattacks. Clinton announced that contemporary terrorists would now strikeanywhere, including within the boundaries of the United States. He labeledthe new terrorist “an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for bor-ders” (Public Papers 1996 2:1257). Publicly, Clinton focused on attacks thatoccurred primarily against the world’s economic superpowers. In thespeeches he delivered between 1993 and 1998, fifty-seven percent of theincidents he mentioned happened in either Japan or the United States. Datafrom the State Department belied the notion that terrorists targeted Japanand the United States more than they did other regions of the world. Lessthan one percent of the international terrorist attacks occurred in the UnitedStates, and less than nine percent occurred in all of the countries in Asia.2Despite the patterns of terrorists in the past, however, Clinton had intelli-gence that indicated that the United States was at risk. One NationalSecurity Council memo (undated) warned that, “Foreign terrorist sleeper cellsare present in the US and attacks in the US are likely” (as qtd. in NationalCommission, Final Report “italics in original” 179). In line with the NSCintelligence, Clinton emphasized the potential impact terrorist assaults couldhave on the world’s economic centers by reiterating a handful of dramaticpast occurrences.

The final change in Clinton’s characterization of terrorists focused onthe groups’ organizational structures. No longer isolated bands of extremists,modern terrorists were dangerous members of a threatening internationalsyndicate of criminals. Increasingly, Clinton portrayed them as colludingwith drug traffickers and organized criminals. Reminiscent of Reagan’s refer-ences to the twin threats of terrorists and drug traffickers, Clinton’s approachmerged multiple causes of public concern into a new, conglomerate threat.He reasoned, “In the world we’re living in, with computer technology, withopen borders, one of the biggest challenges is seeing the people who are ter-rorists, the people who are drug runners, the people who are organized crim-inals, and the people who smuggle weapons of mass destruction, includingchemical and biological weapons, coming together and working together”(Public Papers 1996 1:506).


Empirical evidence supported Clinton’s contention that terrorists, orga-nized criminals and drug traffickers were becoming more interconnected.Reno reported that by 1989, the expansion of domestic organized crimestemmed from its linkages with drug-trafficking groups, such as theColombian cartels, the Asian Triads, Mexican foreign nationals, andJamaican posses (as cited in Martin and Romano 83). The Southern PovertyLaw Center established that there was a domestic link between other crimi-nal groups and terrorists. Its report concluded that drugs were increasinglyfunding terrorist acts of the extreme right (as cited in Snow 106).

Abroad, the joint efforts of the terrorism, organized crime, and drugtrafficking were even more substantial. Terrorism and drug trafficking hadparticularly strong ties in Colombia, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia(Schweitzer and Dorsch 165–70). The PKK, a Kurdish terrorist organiza-tion, controlled one hundred percent of Europe’s drug trafficking (Tezcan,as rptd. in Mourad 174). In a 1997 Cairo Terrorism Seminar attended bythirty nations, the Turkish participant reasoned that terrorists and orga-nized criminals made an effective alliance, because their needs were comple-mentary. Organized crime provided organizational cover, logistical support,and necessary country contacts; terrorists bought arms, used their state con-tacts to aid transport of individuals involved in illegal activity, and launderedmoney (Mourad 178). The final declaration of the Cairo Terrorism Seminarassessed the yearly proceeds from the international alliance of terrorism,drug trafficking, and organized crime to be approximately eight hundredbillion dollars, with total profits at least two hundred times that figure(Mourad 247–48).

Before leaving office the Clinton administration institutionalized terror-ists as nonstate, criminal actors. Caught between the desire to officiallydeclare Afghanistan a terrorist state for providing safe haven to bin Ladenand an unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban government,the administration initially demurred on a decision to place Afghanistan onthe secretary of state’s list of state sponsors. Instead, Clinton signed an exec-utive order in July 1999 that designated al Qaeda as a foreign terrorist orga-nization subject to the same sanctions traditionally reserved for state sponsorsof terrorism (National Commission, Final Report 125). The new designationresulted in the freezing of the group’s assets within the United States, thedenial of visas for group members, and the elevation of supporting the groupinto a federal crime.

Overall then, Clinton argued that terrorists posed a new threat becauseof shifts in the weapons they used, the nations they targeted, and thealliances they built to improve their organizational abilities. From the presi-dent’s public viewpoint, such new and dangerous challenges demanded extra-ordinary leadership that, if unavailable, would place the entire international


community at risk. Clinton’s terrorist narrative asserted that he possessed theinspired type of leadership required for global survival.

CLINTON’S TERRORIST NARRATIVE

On multiple occasions Clinton received criticism that he lacked a coherent,publicly articulated vision of leadership. Early in his first term, TreasurySecretary Lloyd Bentson warned Clinton that his presentation of so manyissues to the American public was diverting attention away from what he wastrying to accomplish (as rptd. in Drew 166). Early scholarly assessments ofthe Clinton presidency replayed a similar theme. Phillip Henderson argues,“Often devoid of ordered argument or reasoned analysis, the [. . .] Clinton-era speeches are heavily weighted in the direction of ‘laundry lists’ rather thanconveying an underlying sense of conviction or direction” (227). FredGreenstein offers a more charitable interpretation, but nevertheless agreesthat Clinton’s public stance was problematic. He notes, “No American presi-dent has exceeded Clinton in his grasp of policy specifics, especially in thedomestic sphere, but his was a mastery that did not translate into a clearlydefined point of view” (187). For many, Clinton lacked an encompassingtheme that provided coherence to his policy agenda.

While even a cursory reading of Clinton’s speeches confirms that hepublicly advocated many different policies, the conclusion that he lacked anoverarching rhetorical perspective is incorrect. From the day Clintonaccepted the Democratic Party’s nomination for president in 1992, headopted the prophetic tradition to frame his rhetorical vision for America’sfuture. Grounded in a religious heritage familiar to many Americans, theapproach presented a moral framework for the conduct of society. Therhetorical frame presented terrorism as a crime against God, the community’srejection of it as a test of the faithful, and the government’s response as adivine calling.

Traditionally, the scene common to prophetic discourse involves periodsof societal upheaval. Prophetic figures, while emerging as historical staplesduring the last two centuries, appear more frequently during times of crisis(Witherington 404). Gerhard von Rad, having analyzed the common charac-teristics shared by prophets across the centuries, explains why: “The place atwhich [prophets] raise their voices is a place of supreme crisis, indeed almosta place of death, in so far as the men of this period of crisis were no longerreached by the saving force of the old appointments, and were promised lifeonly as they turned to what was to come. All the prophets shared a commonconviction that they stood exactly at that turning point of history which wascrucial for the existence of God’s people” (265). At such moments of crisis,


the people are numb and in a state of denial about the transition that liesahead. Much of the prophet’s task is to encourage people to acknowledge theloss of the old order and the structures that have been created to support it.In contrast to the people who are reluctant to move forward, the prophetexperiences no ambiguity about future political events and strongly advocatesacceptance of the new order (Rad 265; Brueggemann 69).

Clinton’s terrorist narrative depicted the international scene at the endof the twentieth century to be such a critical turning point in American his-tory. It portrayed the Cold War as the old order that was no longer relevantfor America’s future. Clinton warned of the risks attendant to the dissolutionof the Soviet Union, a threat that had functioned as the unifying rationale forforeign policy priorities for half a century. He insisted the nation had toresist complacency and isolationism and immediately confront the newemergent threats of the twenty-first century. Speaking to the UnitedNations, Clinton surmised, “For as we all know now so painfully, the end ofthe Cold War did not bring us to the millennium of peace. And, indeed itsimply removed the lid from many cauldrons of ethnic, religious, and territo-rial animosity” (Public Papers 1993 2:1616). Clinton portrayed inaction as amistake the US could not afford.

In his public discourse, Clinton replaced the superpower competition ofthe old order with a new era of globalization. For him, the move towardglobalization fundamentally altered the rules of international engagement.Clinton explained that previously accepted distinctions were no longerapplicable in the conduct of international affairs. He explained,“Interdependence among nations has grown so deep that literally it is nowmeaningless to speak of a sharp dividing line between foreign and domesticpolicy” (Public Papers 1995 2:1568). He reasoned that pointed divisionsbetween economic and national security were equally outmoded, with theresult that “The true measure of our security includes not only physicalsafety, but economic well-being as well” (US Dept. of State Dispatch 1996:402). Clinton portrayed globalization as a time when old divisions had togive way to new opportunities for coming together.

While committed to the acceptance of the new order, Clinton warnedthat globalization was also fraught with danger. Kenneth Burke recognizesthat implicit in any notion of order is motive, which, when recast as a scenicelement, contains the possibility of bad acts (Rhetoric of Religion 192). ForClinton, the positive attributes of the new global scene were precisely theelements that made society vulnerable. He explained, “[T]he very forces thathave unlocked so much potential for progress—new technologies, bordersmore open to ideas and services and goods and money and travelers, instantglobal communications, and instant access to unlimited amounts of impor-tant information all across the world—these very forces have also made it


easier for forces of destruction to endanger the lives in all countries” (PublicPapers 1996 1:602). Clinton warned of the dangers of failing to embrace theworld’s changes in his acceptance of the 1992 Democratic Party presidentialnomination: “Where there is no vision, the people will perish” (Vital Speeches1992: 644). For Clinton, the future of both the nation and the members ofthe international community depended on confronting the new and moredangerous threats spawned by the end of the Cold War.

Danger in the conventional prophetic tradition is not a simple concept;it emerges in two forms. The first kind of danger is a temporary fall fromgrace, as in the case of an individual who fails to faithfully obey the dictatesof the prophet’s covenant. With proper atonement those that fall out ofweakness can be re-created in God’s image. The second kind of danger is forone’s fall to involve a deliberate commitment to a countercovenant. Theseindividuals disobey God’s will by enrolling “in the ranks of a rival force”(Burke, Rhetoric of Religion 195). In Burke’s words, “It would be a differencebetween being ‘weak in virtue,’ and being ‘strong in sin’” (194).

For Clinton, the terrorists and their supportive rogue states weremembers of the countercovenant. Coupled with organized criminals anddrug traffickers, terrorists formed an “unholy axis” (Public Papers 19972:1206) that threatened the future of humanity. Clinton’s alliance ofthreats functioned in direct opposition to the Holy Trinity. Rather thanstrive for the Trinity’s perfect communion through love, terrorists and theircounterparts functioned as the “enemies of peace” (Public Papers 19942:1311) and “forces of hatred and intolerance” (Public Papers 1995 2:1596).Their violence was “rooted in people’s desire to hurt other people becausethey’re different from them” (Public Papers 1996 2:1750). Their actionswere fueled by a “curse of hatred based on race and religion and ethnicitythat is sweeping the world” (1107). Antithetical to the creative power ofthe divine, terrorists acted as “forces of destruction” (Public Papers 19961:603), “the dark underside of disintegration” (641), and “21st centurypredators” (Public Papers 1997 2:1206). Terrorists’ unyielding commitmentto the countercovenant rendered their redemptive potential negligible inClinton’s public approach.

Reminiscent of Dante’s three-headed dog, the devil figure in Clinton’snarrative was a composite of three separate, but interrelated, threats to thesacred order. The unholy trinity was not a simple composite of the evilswithin the alliance; the merger was generative of a more threatening, moreperfect devil figure. Clinton illuminated the interactive, dangerous impact ofthe alliance when he stated, “Groups that once operated in one country orregion or engaged in one kind of criminal activity have become global anddiversified: drug traffickers barter machine guns, terrorists sell counterfeitbills, organized criminals smuggle nuclear materials” (US Dept. of State


Dispatch 1997: 177). The result was an ultimate devil figure that merged theevil of various hostile forces to the nation. Clinton maintained that the asso-ciation elevated terrorism into “the most significant security challenge of the21st century to the people of the United States and to civilized people every-where” (Public Papers 1996 2:1211). The new existence of a more dangerousthreat established the need for the international community to come togetherin the interests of global survival.

Bin Laden functioned as a prototype of Clinton’s trilogy of evil, becausehe personally embodied the threat possible when terrorists, organized crimi-nals, and drug traffickers worked in tandem. Clinton labeled bin Laden “thepreeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the worldtoday” (1996 II, 1460). Administration sources notified members of the pressthat bin Laden used narcotics trafficking to pay the Taliban for sanctuary(Risen A6).3 Bin Laden’s alleged coconspirators provided the links to orga-nized crime by claiming that he had attempted to pay $1.5 million on theblack market for uranium to build a nuclear bomb (as rptd. in Weiser A1).Administration sources also maintained that bin Laden personified thedestructive and emerging potential of cyberterrorists, given his access to a $3trillion-a-year telecommunication industry that far exceeded the communica-tion technological capabilities of the United States (Hayden). In short, binLaden relied on all the new methods that Clinton outlined in his depictionof the new terrorists of the twenty-first century.

Privately, the administration suspected that bin Laden and his al Qaedaorganization were responsible for the embassy bombings in Tanzania andKenya, the bombing of the USS Cole, the World Trade Center bombing, theattack on Khobar Towers, the bombing of Aden hotels designed to killtroops headed to Somalia, the downing of Blackhawk helicopters carryingmilitary personnel to the humanitarian mission in Somalia, the bombing inRiyadh, an assassination attempt on George H. W. Bush, and bombing plotsfor Manila and the Philippines (Clarke, Memo to Rice 3). Publicly, CIADirector George J. Tenet labeled bin Laden “the most immediate and seri-ous” terrorist threat to the United States (as rptd. in Pincus and Loeb A16).Accordingly, bin Laden’s name appeared on the FBI’s Most Wanted listwith a reward of $5 million for evidence leading to his capture.

Within the conventions of the prophetic tradition, the hope of defeatingevil rests with God’s chosen servants. Such individuals function as agents ofthe divine, and are obligated to reassert the divine principles to the people(Zulick 137). The covenant functions as a treaty between God and thepeople that commits its followers to a certain set of standard behaviors (A.Phillips 219). It reasserts the virtuous path for the fallen and serves as a readyreminder of God’s presence (Darsey 18). The covenant reaffirms knowledgealready known to the audience (20).


In the administration’s narrative, Clinton complied with the obligationto rearticulate God’s principles for the public. He called for the public toembrace a “new covenant” (Vital Speeches 1992: 644), one that required citi-zens to “renew our faith in ourselves and each other, and restore our sense ofunity and community” (645). Transcending the historically recurrent use ofreligion in presidential inaugural addresses (Fairbanks 230), Clinton neverrelinquished his prophetic role throughout his presidency. During hisfarewell address, he predicted that he would “never hold a position higher ora covenant more sacred than that of President of the United States” (VitalSpeeches 2001: 229).

Clinton presented rejection of terrorism as a sacred principle that allpeoples and nations must recognize. He elevated opposition to terrorism intoa moral imperative. He pronounced, “It is also true that we believe that ter-rorism everywhere is wrong, that terrorism in the Middle East is wrong, thatpeople blowing up our Federal building in Oklahoma City is wrong, andpeople taking over a hospital [. . .] and killing innocent civilians is wrong, andhas to be resisted strongly” (Public Papers 1995 2:903). He publicly conceivedof state sponsors of terrorism in equally moralistic and unequivocal terms:“You cannot do business with countries that practice commerce with you byday while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocentcivilians by night. That is wrong. I hope and expect that before long ourallies will come around to accepting this fundamental truth” (Public Papers1996 2:1258). For Clinton, violent actions qualified both terrorists and theirsupporters as embodiments of evil.

Clinton positioned those who vowed to oppose terrorists within thesame moral framework. He maintained, “It is right for us to continue toreach out to other countries. It is right for us to support peace and freedomand to try to expand our own prosperity by expanding that of others. It isright for us to be partners with other countries, even when we’re tired and wewant to lay our burdens down, because it’s the only way to fight terrorism,the only way to fight drug dealing, the only way to fight organized crime; itis right to do that. So you get to decide about that, which road will you walkin the future” (Public Papers 1996 1:705). Clinton presented many of his nar-rative’s central themes as commandments for the faithful within the interna-tional community. His call to never bargain or negotiate with terrorists wasuncompromising. His demand that all nations have zero tolerance for terror-ists was unyielding. His plea for nations not to be intimidated by terroristtactics was essential for those who embraced the covenant. His directive thatall nations refuse sanctuary to terrorists was a return to when sanctuarieswere gathering places for prophets and pilgrims, not for the fallen (Rad 31).

A common scholarly complaint about Clinton’s presidential rhetoric hasbeen that it was uncompromising. One author criticizes Clinton’s public


strategy, for example, by claiming that it was “often carefully crafted to pre-empt dialogue, negotiation and compromise” (Henderson 235). When con-sidered through the lens of the prophetic tradition, such certitude aboutGod’s word is expected. As a manifestation of God’s will, the covenant is notdebatable; it is absolute truth (Darsey 21). Evil is condemned and permittedno exoneration (Cragg 110). James Darsey reminds us, “[T]he prophetannounces both the charges and the verdict of God or nature against thetransgressors of the law” (24). For those who fail to live by the sacred tenetsof the covenant, punishment is a necessary precursor to any hope of redemp-tion. For those who adhere steadfastly to a countercovenant, punishment isnecessary to reveal the wrath of God’s will (118).

As the prophetic persona in the narrative, Clinton assumed the role ofaccuser and judge in the battle against terrorism. Publicly, he recognized thenecessity of punishing both the terrorists and those who supported them. Heclaimed his administration had captured and convicted more terrorists thanany of his predecessors had. He imposed more economic sanctions than anyprevious president. He demonstrated his willingness to attack foreign statesthat failed to abide the covenant by employing both covert and overt militaryforce. Covertly, he spent more than $120 million in aborted CIA efforts tooverthrow Saddam Hussein (Hyland 173). Overtly, he ordered twenty cruisemissiles fired at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in response toIraq’s planned assassination of George Bush during his trip to Kuwait inApril 1993. In a joint military initiative with Britain, he ordered four hun-dred other cruise missiles dropped in Iraq to destroy its chemical, biological,and nuclear lab sites (Clinton, My Life 833). He sent sixty-six cruise missilesinto Afghanistan and the Sudan in response to the US Embassy attacks inKenya and Tanzania. Clinton insisted he would punish terrorism withoutregard to his own personal or political cost; the duty to avenge God’s will hadto take precedence.

Clinton did not engage in a public debate about his decision to punishthe transgressors of the covenant. His decision to bomb the Sudan andAfghanistan was illustrative. He insisted he had “compelling evidence”(Public Papers, 1998 2:1461) and he invited public acceptance of that assess-ment on faith. He pronounced the guilt of the two foreign nations, even inthe face of privately expressed doubts by his attorney general, members of theCIA, and members of the Justice Department (Henderson 243;Hersh,“Missiles of August” 37). He proclaimed Afghanistan “contained keyelements of the bin Laden network’s infrastructure and [had] served as atraining camp for literally thousands of terrorists from around the globe”(Public Papers, 1998 2:1461). He announced that the Sudanese factory “wasinvolved in the production of chemical weapons” (ibid.). Sudanese officialssubsequently protested that the Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries had only


been engaged in a benign commercial venture and demanded a UN investi-gation. Despite taking what a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies described as a “shellacking for the attack on al-Shifa”(Benjamin), Clinton officials refused to publicly debate the issue, to describetheir evidence in detail, or to explain how it was obtained (Myers A1, A6).While the 9/11 Commission determined in 2004 that “No independent evi-dence has emerged to corroborate the CIA’s assessment” (NationalCommission, Final Report 118), Clinton defended his decision to bombSudan in his memoirs by pointing to the testimony of a witness in a terroristtrial held in NYC who had said that “bin Laden had a chemical weaponsoperation in Khartoum” (My Life 805).

By periodically punishing those committed to the countercovenant,Clinton fulfilled his prophetic obligation, even if terrorism remained an ongo-ing problem. Elimination of the threat in prophetic discourse is not necessaryfor society to be redeemed. Kenneth Burke explains, “When we read of onebroken covenant after another, and see the sacrificial principle forever reaf-firmed anew, narratively this succession may be interpreted as movementtowards a fulfillment, though from the standpoint of the tautological cyclethey ‘go on endlessly’ implicating one another” (Rhetoric of Religion 217).Clinton did not insist that as God’s messenger, he could eliminate the threatto the sacred order. Instead, he forecasted, “This will be a long, ongoingstruggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terror-ism” (Public Papers, 1998 2:1461). For Clinton, the fight against terrorismwould be unending, but the commitment to fight against the evil wheneverand wherever it occurred was redemptive for God’s followers.

Within the conventions of the prophetic tradition, the Almighty sufferswhen the people fail to accept God’s message and, instead, embrace a coun-tercovenant. Convention holds that as God’s agent, the prophet mustdemonstrate God’s suffering to his people through self-sacrifice.Overpowered by God’s will, the prophet accepts the role reluctantly (Darsey80). The nature of the prophet’s sacrifice must be substantial in order todemonstrate the magnitude of the people’s breach of faith. Prophets fre-quently assume the roles of martyrs within their societies as they enact theirradical self-sacrifice (32). As a result, themes of duty, sacrifice, and martyr-dom pervade prophetic discourse.

As God’s vehicle within the narrative, Clinton endured self-sacrifice. Inthe first moments after he received the Democratic presidential nomination,Clinton revealed his personal history of experiencing and accepting self-sac-rifice. He remembered meeting John F. Kennedy, who taught him theimportance of responding to calls for sacrifice. Clinton maintained that thelesson had been a familiar one for him because of his childhood. He hadnever known his father. He had accepted the need for his mother to leave


him with grandparents when he was only three years old so she could findwork. Clinton’s emphasis on his personal history should not be surprising,for as Kenneth Cragg reminds us, “[W]here prophets originate bears stronglyon what they become. Their antecedents are significant for their destiny”(21). For Clinton, the call to sacrifice had been internalized from early child-hood; it prepared him for what he would later endure as God’s messenger tothe people.

Clinton’s publicly described sacrifice in relation to terrorists transcendedthe personal. It extended to his role as the head of the body politic. As theleader of the United States and the free world, Clinton embodied the world’ssuffering in the fight against terrorism. Such suffering, he argued, was thecost of standing up against the threats to the sacred order. As Clintonexplained, “America is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely becausewe are leaders; because we act to advance peace, democracy, and basic humanvalues; because we’re the most open society on Earth; and because, as wehave shown yet again, we take an uncompromising stand against terrorism”(Public Papers, 1998 2:1461). Clinton identified himself explicitly withAmerican martyrs (i.e., the family members of Americans slain by terroristsand the survivors of terrorism) at the signing of the Antiterrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act of 1996. As the bill became law, he announced,“I sign my name to this bill in your names” (Public Papers, 1996 1:630).Consistent with the expectations of prophetic discourse, he assumed theburden of the sacrifice for all Americans who had encountered the evil of ter-rorism.

Clinton encouraged the public to share in and accept the required sacri-fice. Like him, the public was to remain steadfast in their commitment tocarry out their sacred duty. Clinton acknowledged that in the fight againstterrorism, the “responsibility is great, and I know it weighs heavily on manyAmericans. But we should embrace this responsibility because at this point intime no one else can do what we can do to advance peace and freedom anddemocracy. [. . .]” (Public Papers, 1996 2:1258). He insisted the nation musthonor its martyrs by continuing the struggle against terrorism. Speaking afterthe Oklahoma City bombing, he encouraged the people to remain resolute intheir opposition to terrorism: “So let us honor those who lost their lives byresolving to hold fast against the forces of violence and division, by neverallowing them to shake our resolve or break our spirit, to frighten us into sac-rificing our sacred freedoms or surrendering a drop of precious American lib-erty. Rather we must guard against them, speak against them, and fightagainst them” (Public Papers, 1996 1:629). Sacrifice was the nation’s duty ifthe sacred order was to prevail.

Conventionally, prophets are always cognizant of the distance that existsbetween God and the people, a situation they synecdochically represent


through their own separateness. Kenneth Cragg reminds us that such dis-tance leaves the prophet vulnerable to derision: “A hostile society impales itsrighteous mentors, holds its seers up to scorn, imprisons them in its longcontempt, makes them the butt of its impenitent glee. It frustrates their lib-erties and maligns their ministry, recruiting public clamour to their tribula-tion and contriving ridicule to their discredit” (103). Prophets acceptisolation and scorn as part of the sacrifice they must endure when assumingthe responsibility of spreading God’s word.

In the terrorism arena, separateness between presidents and the people isan institutional phenomenon. From the day presidents assume the office,inevitible distance emerges between the leader and the people. One ischarged with protecting the people; the other to be the recipient of that pro-tection. The leader directs the nation; the people follow. When presidentialaction turns to terrorism specifically, the leader faces enhanced seclusion.Presidents are distant in matters of foreign policy because of what they know,paralleling in some ways the distance between an omnipotent God and hisfollowers. The nation’s leaders limit what they share with the public in hopesof responding to the terrorist threat most effectively. At times, presidentsundergo ridicule because they are unwilling to share what they know withthe public.

Willing to accept derision and mockery, Clinton reserved the right toact alone, if necessary, in the battle against terrorism. Acknowledging hisown isolation, Clinton insisted that should terrorists need to be punished, hewould act alone if necessary to meet his obligation. He stated, “Even thoughwe’re working more closely with our allies than ever and there is more agree-ment on what needs to be done than ever, we do not always agree. Where wedon’t agree, the U.S. cannot and will not refuse to do what we believe isright” (Public Papers, 1996 2:1258). Accordingly, Clinton authorized fiveseparate intelligence orders for covert operations to destroy al Qaeda(Woodward, Plan of Attack 12). One of his Presidential Decision Directives(PDD-39) authorized both offensive and defensive actions to “reduce terror-ist capabilities” and to “reduce vulnerabilities at home and abroad” (as rptd.in Clarke, Against All Enemies 92). A Clinton Memorandum of Notificationgave sanction to the CIA and members of Afghani tribes working with theUnited States to kill or capture bin Laden (National Commission, FinalReport 132).4 Those unwilling to accept the true nature of the emerging orderwould not deter Clinton even in the face of domestic or international dissent.

Clinton not only isolated himself from the American public and themembers of the international community; he also distanced himself fromthe US Congress. Clinton publicly berated Congress for failing to respondimmediately and forcefully to his call for a strong stand against terrorism.He accused them of acting too slow (Public Papers, 1995 1:1745), of listen-


ing to “a few people with extreme views” (Public Papers, 1996 2:1909), andof using “the old politics of diversion and delay” (Public Papers, 1995 1:689).After the House of Representatives failed to adopt his 1996 antiterrorismlegislation in full, Clinton went so far as to portray the chamber’s membersas the servants of terrorism. Insisting the House had abrogated its responsi-bilities, he argued,

The House also voted to let terrorists like Hamas continue to raisemoney in America by stripping the Justice Department’s authorityto designate organizations as terrorists and thereby stop them fromraising funds in the United States. The House voted against allow-ing us to deport foreigners who support terrorist activities morequickly, and it voted to cripple our ability to use high-tech surveil-lance to keep up with stealthy and fast-moving terrorists. At thesame time the bill went easy on terrorists, it got tough on lawenforcement officials. The House stripped a provision that wouldhave helped protect police officers from cop-killer bullets. And itordered a commission to study not the terrorists but the Federallaw enforcement officials who put their lives on the line to fightterrorism. (Public Papers, 1996 1:463–64)

Clinton portrayed the conflict with terrorists as a battle between good andevil. Congress could either help him acquire the tools he needed to defeatterrorists or they could become the pawns, if not the co-conspirators, ofthose who have rejected the covenant.

Through the process of sacrifice, the prophet conventionally offers hopefor salvation. Society gains the opportunity to reconsider itself and its evilactions by observing the suffering of the prophet. Those who become self-aware and recognize the error of their ways find redemption. Prophets ulti-mately maintain that God is merciful and offers hope of salvation for thosewho vindicate the covenant (Cragg 110).

The potential for hope and salvation was a recurrent theme in Clinton’spublic statements. The Clinton camp first highlighted the message in thecampaign film it presented at the 1992 Democratic National Convention.The film’s theme was Clinton as the Man from Hope, a reference to hisbirthplace in Arkansas. In his acceptance speech at the 1992 convention,Clinton reinforced the message by pledging that his new covenant offeredthe prospect of an optimistic future. Borrowing directly from the scriptures,he predicted, “[O]ur eyes have not yet seen, nor our ears heard nor our mindsimagined what we can build” (Vital Speeches 1992: 645). Drawing from thehis Southern Baptist upbringing, Clinton offered to lead the nation to abetter future. He encouraged his followers through a reference to the biblicalstory of Moses: “Guided by the ancient vision of a promised land, let us set


our sights upon a land of new promise” (Public Papers, 1997 1:43). Thefuture need not be bleak if the people sought redemption.

A common prophetic strategy for instilling hope in the people is the useof the rebirth archetype (Darsey 29). For Christians, such archetypes recallthe optimistic story of Christ’s resurrection. For all members of the publicregardless of religious affiliation, the archetype links to the natural progres-sion of the seasons. As James Hoban Jr. explains, “The hope engendered inthe coming of the new momentarily quiets fears of obliteration; thus human-ity responds to the season of birth—the spring—that gives promise ofgrowth even as it foreshadows winter” (281). As the people prepare to leavethe comfort and security of the established order, the birth of the new isfilled with promise.

Publicly remembering his own experience, Clinton evoked the archetypeof rebirth to demonstrate the redemptive possibilities available to the people.He recalled that, the “future entered my life the night our daughter Chelseawas born. As I stood in the delivery room, I was overcome with the thoughtthat God had given me a blessing my own father never knew: the chance tohold my child in my arms” (Vital Speeches 1992: 645). From the example ofhis past, Clinton demonstrated his acceptance of the sacrifices necessary toproperly raise his child, a responsibility his own father had abandoned.Clinton acknowledged his own duty, thereby redeeming the sins of his fatherand instilling a sense of hope for the future. Transforming the personal intothe public, Clinton then encouraged the American people to accept the sac-rifices that would be necessary to ensure the future of all of the nation’s chil-dren. He explicitly called on the audience to accept his new covenant in orderthat every child could achieve according to his or her God-given abilities(ibid.). Like Clinton, the American people had the opportunity for an opti-mistic future if they accepted the principles of the covenant.

In the Clinton narrative, God’s potential followers included the memberstates of the international community, the US Congress, and the Americanpublic. During the process of purification, Clinton called upon each of thesegroups to abandon their prior compromises between good and evil andbecome obedient servants of God’s will. He insisted that each had to sacrificein the name of the new covenant and each had to give itself over completelyto the prophet’s guidance.

The sacrifices required of members of the international community weremultifaceted. Clinton called on all foreign nations to condemn terrorismwherever it occurred and to deny safe havens to those who had committedacts of terrorism, even when such actions increased their own short-term vul-nerability to terrorism. He also demanded that foreign nations risk their owneconomic futures by blocking oil exports and denying computer technologyto the state sponsors of terrorism. Finally, he insisted they overcome worries


about state sovereignty and join him in bringing banks and financial systemsinto conformity with international statutes against money laundering, inreducing or outlawing chemical, biological, and nuclear arsenals, in commit-ting to the Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, and in joiningthe International Clearinghouse of Evidence on Terrorism (Public Papers,1996 2:1258; Public Papers, 1995 2:1654–57). Offering assurances of salva-tion to those nations that complied, he announced, “We will help people ofall faiths, in all parts of the world, who want to live free of fear and violence.We will persist, and we will prevail” (Public Papers, 1998 2:1462).

Clinton was equally, if not more, demanding on the members of the USCongress. He insisted Congress act to help prevent terrorist acts by prohibit-ing fund-raising for terrorist groups within the United States, by fundinghigh-tech inspection machines at airports, and by funding the implementa-tion of the national plan to protect the nation’s infrastructure. He called onCongress to enhance the investigative tools available to law enforcement bymaking terrorism a federal crime, by legalizing the use of chemical markers,by using multipoint wiretaps to investigate terrorists, and by increasing thebudgets of the FBI and CIA. He demanded they strengthen the prosecutor-ial means available in the fight against terrorism by cutting back the numberand time delay of appeals of individuals found guilty of terrorism, by passingsanctions against state sponsors of terrorism, and by allowing the deportationof foreigners suspected of engaging in terrorist activity. Finally, he insistedCongress improve the safety of those potential victims of terrorism (i.e., byupgrading the public health systems, by stockpiling medicines necessary torespond to a biological or chemical attack, by investing in the research anddevelopment of biotechnology, by banning the use of cop-killer bullets, andby permitting the limited use of the military in the civilian sector). Viewedthrough a nonprophetic lens, such a lengthy set of recommendations mightbe rightly labeled a laundry list; seen as divine guidance, however, such pro-posals were simply the burdensome sacrifices required for salvation.

For the American public, Clinton’s call to sacrifice was not calculated inmonetary or political costs; it came at the expense of certain freedoms andcherished liberties. Clinton reminded the public, “[W]e accepted a minorinfringement on our freedom, I guess, when the airport metal detectors wereput up, but they went a long way to stop airplane hijackings and the explo-sion of planes and the murdering of innocent people” (Public Papers, 19951:575). He asked the public to accept an expansion of the federal wiretapauthority, to allow the use of military forces within the domestic borders ofthe United States, and to accept restrictions on their second amendmentrights such as forgoing certain types of weapons and tracing others belongingto terrorists (Public Papers, 1996 1:630–32). He encouraged the public toaccept sacrifices of liberty in the name of ensuring the very survival of the


emerging order. As Clinton offered, “We will prevail again if, and only if,our people support the mission” (Public Papers, 1995 2:1798).

To be an effective spokesperson of God’s message and be able to con-vince the people sacrifices are necessary for salvation, a prophet must becharismatic. The prophet must be able to attract a substantial following tooffer a realistic hope for the people. Weber defines charisma in the context ofthe prophetic tradition as “a certain quality of an individual personality byvirtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowedwith supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers orqualities. These as such are not accessible to the ordinary person, but areregarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them theindividual is treated as a leader” (as qtd. in Eldridge 229). Without a charis-matic persona, the prophet cannot credibly carry out the sacred duties,whether the role of punishing those who adhere to a countercovenant or call-ing for sacrifices from the faithful.

A body of evidence suggests that members of the international commu-nity, the US Congress, and the American public did regard Clinton as aleader in the fight against terrorism at the time of his presidency. In theinternational arena, Clinton made demonstrable progress in creating struc-tures for battling terrorism during his tenure. He enlisted a record number offoreign nations to enter into mutual legal assistance treaties with the UnitedStates (twenty-one in force and another nineteen signed). During theClinton years, mutual legal assistance treaties were signed or put into forcewith Argentina, Morocco, Spain, Panama, Jamaica, the Philippines, theUnited Kingdom, Hungary, South Korea, Antigua and Barbuba, Australia,Austria, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Hong Kong, St. Lucia,Luxembourg, Poland, the Organization of American States, Trinidad,Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Nigeria, Romania, Russian Federation ofStates, South Africa, Ukraine, and Bermuda. Executive agreements servingas precursors to mutual legal assistance treaties were signed with the CaymanIslands, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Anguilla, Turks and Caicos,Haiti, and Nigeria. Extradition treaties were also signed with Belize,Paraguay, South Africa, and Sri Lanka (J. P. Rubin, “US and Greece”). Theresulting international cooperation helped identify terrorist perpetrators inthe bombings of Pan Am 103, the World Trade Center, the US embassies inTanzania and Kenya, and the USS Cole.

The US Congress also complied with many of Clinton’s moves tostrengthen the nation’s ability to fight terrorism. Members of Congresspassed Clinton’s FY 2000 request for $10 billion to combat terrorism, athreefold increase in the resources previously allocated to the problem (Mann63–64). They also passed significant legislation that made it easier for lawenforcement officials to investigate and prosecute terrorists. Prominent


among these was the passage of the Counter-terrorism and Effective DeathPenalty Act of 1996. The act restricted federal habeas reconsideration oflegal and factual issues ruled by state courts in most instances, expanded therestitution available to victims of terrorism, and regulated the fund-raisingfor organizations associated with terrorist actions. It barred alien terroristsfrom entering the United States and expedited the deportation of thosealready in the United States. Finally, it increased restrictions on the posses-sion and use of materials with the potential to cause catastrophic damage andlimited the purchase of plastic explosives to those with implanted, preexplo-sion detection devices.

A second significant congressional action against terrorism was theSenate’s ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the spring of1997. The convention banned the production, acquisition, stockpiling, trans-fer, and use of chemical weapons. A scholarly assessment of the agreementcalled it “one of the most ambitious treaties in the history of arms control”(Schweitzer and Dorsch 99). Passing over opposition of some in the chemi-cal industry, the convention identified a lengthy list of chemicals routinelyused in commerce as having military applications. It subjected the manufac-turers of these chemicals to international accounting requirements and inter-national inspections. Nonsignatories were banned from importing thechemicals on the control lists from any nations that signed the treaty.

As Clinton left office, the majority of the American public consideredhim to be a strong leader. The last public approval ratings of his handling ofthe presidency distinguished him among former presidents in modern times.As the Gallup News Service reported, “Clinton’s average approval rating forhis last quarter in office is almost 61%— the highest final quarter rating anypresident has received in the past half century” (D. W. Moore). By more thana two-to-one margin, Americans expected Clinton to go down in history asan outstanding or above average president (ibid.). In the foreign policy arena,Clinton’s approval ratings surged during the course of his presidency.Entering office with low expectations for his ability to handle foreign affairs,Clinton emerged as a distinguished leader on the international scene. In a1994 Gallup poll, “Americans rated Clinton a poor leader on foreign policy,trailing President[s] Kennedy, Nixon, Truman, Eisenhower, Reagan, GeorgeBush, and Carter. But by 1998, the quadrennial survey rank[ed] Clinton asthe best foreign policy president since World War II” (Wright A1).

Despite the public’s support for his leadership, Clinton rocked his popu-lar legacy by his involvement in the repeated scandals involving women(Jennifer Flowers, Monica Lewinsky, and Katherine Wiley) and money(Whitewater land deals, presidential library expenses, White House gifts,and the presidential pardon of Louis Rich). An early January 2001 Galluppoll, for example, found just forty-one percent of Americans approved of


Clinton “as a person,” and only thirty-nine percent considered him “honestand trustworthy” (D. W. Moore).

Clinton’s reckless personal behavior, however, did not disqualify him asa charismatic leader of the people. Within the prophetic tradition, prophetsconventionally do not calculate the means of their own self-preservation. AsDarsey explains, “Failure of the person of the prophet is, almost by defini-tion, necessary to his success as God’s servant. Personal success is self-servingand vitiates the purity of the divine motive” (32). Willing to forgo concernsfor personal well-being, prophets attend to their more important obligationof leading God’s followers in the ways of the covenant.

The prophetic tradition, with its emphasis on public obligation and per-sonal failure, helps explain the seeming paradox of the Clinton legacy. Mediaeditorials in the months following the Clinton presidency opined, “Clinton isunprecedented in the way respect for the public man has deflected disdain forthe private one” (Schulman M1), “He’s a larger than life figure [. . .] but he’salso got some very real flaws” (Miga 5), and “Clinton steps off center stage[. . .] as one of the most controversial yet most popular figures in modernU.S. history” (“Clinton Exit”). The seeming discord between Clinton’spublic success and his private failure are characteristic for one whose narra-tive calling is to the divine.

Clinton’s standing as an effective leader in the foreign policy arena hasbeen scrutinized in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks on the World TradeCenter and the Pentagon. Various media outlets reported that Clintonpassed on three opportunities to seize bin Laden. Others have criticized himfor not striking Kandahar when he had information bin Laden was locatedthere (“Clinton Defends Decision Not to Strike”; J. F. Harris A15).Denouncing such claims as “fables” and “urban legends,” Clarke concludedthat Clinton “approved every snatch that he was asked to review” (Against AllEnemies 142–49).

The 9/11 Commission’s Report details the administration’s internal deci-sion-making calculus of each of its opportunities for capturing or killing binLaden according to US intelligence. Reasons identified for failing to capital-ize included risks of operational expense, collateral damage, mission failure,possible mosque damage, deaths to tribal allies, public opposition to a per-ceived assassination attempt, a possible coup in Pakistan, and the low proba-bility of public support for a use of military ground forces in Afghanistan(National Commission, Final Report 114, 131, 136–37). The report ulti-mately concludes, “Since we believe that both President Clinton andPresident Bush were genuinely concerned about the danger posed by alQaeda, approaches involving more direct intervention against the sanctuaryin Afghanistan apparently must have seemed—it they were considered atall—to be disproportionate to the threat” (349). Given that al Qaeda had


killed fewer than fifty Americans prior to the attacks of 9/11 (340), thechances of garnering public support for a military intervention were slim.

In the end, Clinton’s pronouncements about the terrorists of the twenty-first century turned out in many ways to be prophetic. Bin Laden and hisassociates did use weapons of mass destruction as their method of choice,they did choose the United States as the location of their attack, and theyworked within an internationally connected organizational structure toorchestrate their acts of violence. While aware of the new risk posed by ter-rorism, Clinton never implemented a response strategy to bin Laden thatwould produce lasting security for the United States. By October 2001, aUSA Today/CNN/Gallup poll reported that three of four Americansresponded that Clinton had not done enough as president to capture or killbin Laden (Page, “Why Clinton Failed to Stop Bin Laden”). While theprophetic vision had been telling, the continuation of bin Laden’s activitieswould be devastating for America.


During Clinton’s tenure as president, the persuasive power of the prophetictradition was not reserved for Clinton himself. Bin Laden also employedprophetic conventions in his public communication strategy to reach Muslimaudiences. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded, “Bin Ladin saw himself ascalled ‘to follow in the footsteps of the Messenger and to communicate hismessage to all nations’” (National Commission, Final Report 48). In February1998, bin Laden, on behalf of al Qaeda, issued a joint fatwa with Ayman alZawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, under the united name ofWorld Islamic Front. The fatwa included the following statements whichoutlined the principles of bin Laden’s covenant:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilian and mil-itary—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in anycountry in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca]from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all thelands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. [. . . ]We—with God’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in Godand wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill theAmericans and plunder their money whenever and wherever theyfind it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiersto launch the raid on Satan’s US troops and the devil’s supportersallying with them, and to displace those who are behind them sothat they may learn a lesson. (Bodansky 226–27)


The fatwa not only established the religious foundation for violent actsagainst the United States, but also contributed to the clash of Muslim andWestern civilizations by confining those who would receive God’s rewards tomembers of the Muslim culture.

A recent book by a retired twenty-year veteran of the CIA, MichaelScheuer, under the author name “Anonymous,” explains that with the fatwaand other statements vilifying the United States, bin Laden had the goal ofinciting all Muslims to join in an insurgent war against America and its allies(Imperial Hubris 216). According to Scheuer, bin Laden was and continuesto be an effective leader of the movement because of attributes consistantwith the previously discussed prophetic tradition. They included the credibil-ity he had gained from his willingness to forfeit his personal wealth to thecause, his unique communication skills within the Muslim community, andhis insistence that his followers join the defensive fatwa “not because heordered them to, but because God has ordered them to do so in what Herevealed in the Koran” (7). The former CIA operative details a myriad ofways that US actions around the world positioned bin Laden to make effec-tive religious appeals to the Muslim community (11–13). Scholars in theMiddle East have supported bin Laden’s rationale for a united Muslimresponse including the use of weapons of mass destruction, given estimatesthat US actions have resulted in more than ten million Muslim deathsworldwide (156).

Clinton’s public response to bin Laden’s prophetic appeals was multifac-eted. In large measure, he chose to avoid mentioning his adversary’s name.Clinton explained his strategy to the 9/11 Commission when he stated he“intended to avoid enhancing Bin Ladin’s stature by giving him unnecessarypublicity” (National Commission, Final Report 174). Instead, Clintonfocused on the broader collective of threats to the nation. He pronounced,“We’re vulnerable to the organized forces of intolerance and destruction; ter-rorism; ethnic, religious and regional rivalries; the spread of organized crimeand weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking. Just as surely as fas-cism and communism, these forces also threaten freedom and democracy,peace and prosperity” (Public Papers, 1995 2:1784). Evoking Reagan’s ideo-logical strategy of depicting terrorism, Clinton maintained that the newenemy alliance threatened the American culture.

When he did mention bin Laden, Clinton characterized him as a falseprophet in both word and deed. Clinton dismissed bin Laden’s call for jihadagainst the United States as divinely inspired. Instead, he insisted, “[N]oreligion condones the murder of innocent men, women, and children”(Public Papers, 1998 2:1461). Clinton maintained that terrorists, like binLaden, used a “twisting of their religious teachings into justifications ofinhumane, indeed ungodly acts” (1465). The administration’s narrative


depicted the members of bin Laden’s organization as “fanatics and killerswho wrap murder in the cloak of righteousness; and in so doing, profane thegreat religion in whose name they claim to act” (1461). Bin Laden came torepresent all those who would intentionally break from the ranks of thedivine to embrace a countercovenant.

For Clinton, the path to the divine was not reserved exclusively formembers of American culture. He held out the potential for salvation to allpeoples regardless of their national, cultural, or religious origins. The test forthe faithful involved the abandonment of any linkage between terrorism andAmerican ideology per se as a relic of past, outmoded thinking. If thepromise of a global community was to emerge, old divisions simply had togive way.

Nevertheless, Clinton insisted that the historical lessons contained inpast cultural conflicts should not be forgotten. He encouraged members ofthe public and the international community to recall the past correlationsbetween particular ideological predilections and the use of terrorism to reaprewards. He argued, “History teaches us that democracies are less likely to goto war, less likely to traffic in terrorism and more likely to stand against theforces of hatred and destruction, more likely to become good partners indiplomacy and trade. So promoting democracy and defending human rightsis good for the world and good for America” (Public Papers, 1995 2:1598).For Clinton, Communists and Fascists presumptively embraced terrorism,while peoples committed to democratic principles did not. Ideological con-flict did not have to constantly repeat itself for society to know and recallthose tendencies.

Having acknowledged the lessons of the past, Clinton maintained thatmodern-day international terrorism had become a nonideological topic.Countering his earlier echoing of Reagan’s rhetorical approach to terrorists,Clinton became emphatic in his dismissal of ideological interpretations ofterrorist violence. He said that “Terrorism is not a political issue; this is not apartisan issue, this is not an ideological issue” (Public Papers, 1996 1:552).Having framed terrorism as an evil that threatens the sacred order, heattempted to transcend narrow interpretations of the term that might impli-cate a particular culture as the sole source of terrorism. In Clinton’s evolvingworldview, terrorism was not limited to a specific state, ethnic group, ortribe. It was a countercovenant that threatened all of God’s people, regardlessof their cultural affiliation.

Clinton maintained that it would be a mistake to tag a particular cul-ture as terrorist without providing the opportunity for redemption. In par-ticular, he cautioned against conflating terrorism with Islam. He predicted,“[I]f we could bring peace to the Middle East, it might revolutionize therange of options we have with the Muslims all over the world and give us


the opportunity to beat back the forces of radicalism and terrorism thatunfairly have been identified with Islam by so many people” (Public Papers,1996 2:1796). Offering a similar message domestically, Clinton attempted toforestall public condemnation of all domestic militia members after theOklahoma City bombing. Clinton admonished the public: “Just as I cau-tioned the American people earlier not to stereotype any people from othercountries of different ethnic groups as being potentially responsible for this, Idon’t want to castigate or categorize any groups here in America and accusethem of doing something that we don’t have any evidence that they havedone (Public Papers, 1995 1:577). Clinton rejected the use of the terrorismlabel as a term of denigration for particular cultures.

Clinton advocated evaluating cultures according to whether they sup-ported or condemned terrorism. Drawing on the example of the Muslimfaith, he argued, “[W]hat the United States wants to do is to stand upagainst terrorism and against destructive fundamentalism, and to stand withthe people of Islam who wish to be full members of the world community,according to the rules that all civilized people should follow” (Public Papers,1994 2:1056). Regardless of an individual’s culture of origin or livelihood,people who acted in accordance with the new covenant could look forward tothe hope promised through salvation. Actions, rather than membership inparticular cultures, became the operative principle for judging the faithful.

By adopting the prophetic tradition, Clinton elevated terrorism into acrime against God’s will. As unrepentant sinners, terrorists bore the fullresponsibility for the suffering of society. Their guilt was to be accepted onfaith and as an absolute truth. Their punishment, no matter how severe, wasnecessary to demonstrate the strength of God’s wrath. By elevating the fightagainst terrorism to the status of a divinely inspired act whether or not thenation was at war, Clinton prepared the American audience for his successorto employ an expansive set of prerogatives in response to terrorism.


7

America under Attack: George W. Bush and Noncitizen Actors

On September 11, 2001, nineteen suicide bombers wielding box cuttersand knives hijacked four transcontinental flights. The result was the

most tragic episode of terrorism in American history. Two of the planesrammed into the World Trade Center in New York City. The first hit at8:48 a.m.; the second struck twenty minutes later. The attacks caused thetwo towers to collapse and a third building to fall ten hours later. The thirdplane, en route from Washington, DC to Los Angeles, hit the Pentagon at9:40 a.m. The final plane, a flight hijacked en route from Newark to SanFrancisco, crashed outside Pittsburgh. The resulting death toll exceededthree thousand.

Within a few days of the attacks, the US government blamed Osama binLaden and his al Qaeda associates for the events of September 11. The exec-utive branch had been privy to a substantial body of intelligence during thespring and summer months of 2001 that warned al Qaeda was planning toattack US interests (National Commission, Final Report 254–77). To helpbuild the public case against al Qaeda, CIA officials leaked the existence ofyear-old intercepts that recorded bin Laden boasting about his plans tocommit Hiroshima against the United States (Risen and Engelberg A1).The Defense Department released a videotape, purportedly filmedNovember 9, 2002, showing bin Laden laughing about how the planes thatflew into the World Trade Center had done far more damage than he hadimagined they would (Bumiller A1; “Osama bin Laden Videotape”). BinLaden publicly took responsibility for the attacks in a videotape shown onAl-Jazeera four days prior to the 2004 US elections. The Justice Departmentindicted the nineteen hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui for conspiring withOsama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to carry out the September 11 attacks.Moussaoui eventually pled guilty to conspiring with the 9/11 hijackers. Hepublicly declared that bin Laden had chosen him to fly an airliner into theWhite House in a planned second wave of attacks.

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In response, the Bush administration adopted a multipronged strategy.The first phase sought to eliminate the threat from al Qaeda and its support-ers. The United States led a worldwide effort to freeze the financial assets ofmore than sixty organizations with alleged links to al Qaeda. It pressuredSaudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the UAE (the only three countries to have rec-ognized the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan) into breakingoff diplomatic relations. It supported members of the Northern Alliance withUS ground and air forces in a military operation designed to capture or killbin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership. When the Taliban refused to uncon-ditionally surrender bin Laden and his terrorist collaborators operating onAfghan soil, the Bush administration added the removal of the Taliban gov-ernment to its objectives for the first phase. US and British forces began amilitary campaign designed to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate alQaeda’s sanctuary on October 8, 2001. Two months later the remainingmembers of the Taliban surrendered their last stronghold, Kandahar, andfled into the desert. More than three years after the fall of the Taliban, manymembers of al Qaeda have been captured or killed; bin Laden and key mem-bers of al Qaeda, however, do remain at large.

Phase two of the administration’s approach involved the prevention ofterrorists and their supporters from threatening the United States and theglobal community with weapons of mass destruction. Bush identified Iran,Iraq, and North Korea as states poised to use weapons of mass destruction tothreaten peace and security around the globe. US diplomatic initiatives tar-geted Iran and North Korea in an effort to contain their nuclear weaponsdevelopment. The administration placed its primary focus on Iraq, citing thefailure of Saddam Hussein to account for all of his chemical and biologicalagents in accordance with UN resolution 1441. Internally, Deputy Secretaryof Defense Paul Wolfowitz built the case against Iraq by focusing onSaddam’s praise for the 9/11 attacks, his historical record of supporting ter-rorists, and the possibility that Iraq had been involved in the first WorldTrade Center bombing (National Commission, Final Report 336). Havingbegun the planning for the military operation in Iraq on September 13, 2001(Fallows 3), Bush initiated the military campaign to remove Saddam Husseinand his regime on March 20, 2003. Six weeks later Bush publicly declaredvictory with the phrase, “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended”(White House 1 May 2003: 1).1

At the time of Bush’s announcement, US forces had suffered 138 casual-ties. Since that time, more than 1600 servicemen and women have lost theirlives as the US occupation of Iraq continues. Accurate assessments of Iraqicasualties are more difficult to determine. On the one year anniversary ofBush’s victory announcement, estimates of Iraqi casualties based on mediastories placed the figure at between nine and eleven thousand (Ewens 2).


Preliminary reports from hospitals, morgues, mosques, and homes duringthe same time period approximated the figure to be between five and tenthousand (Ford, “Surveys Pointing to High Civilian Death Toll” 1). Ahousehold survey estimate designed and conducted by researchers at JohnsHopkins University, Columbia University, and the Al-MustansiriyaUniversity in Baghdad reported that in the eighteen months after the startof combat operations in Iraq, one hundred thousand Iraqis (mainly womenand children) had died (E. Ross 1). More certain is the fact that US forceshave captured Saddam Hussein, as well as many other prominent figures inthe Baathist regime.

Whether the Bush team’s strategy for countering international terrorismhas been effective remains an open question. For the most part, early assess-ments have indicated that both the quantity and the deadliness of terroristattacks have increased since the attacks of September 11. The CongressionalResearch Service, responding to a request by a member of the HouseCommittee for Governmental Reform, concluded that al Qaeda had com-mitted only one attack in the thirty months prior to September 11, 2001, buthad promulgated ten acts in the subsequent thirty months (Cronin 4). InMay 2004, the International Institute of Strategic Studies announced thatwhile the coalition efforts had resulted in the killing or capture of two thou-sand al Qaeda members and half of its leadership, the war on terror hadaided al Qaeda recruitment efforts to the point that eighteen thousand mili-tants were prepared to attack the United States and its closest Europeanallies (Majendie 1). An article written for the Spectator concluded, “The trou-ble is that every time a seemingly ‘essential’ al Qaeda leader has beenarrested, he has been replaced with no effect at all on the organization”(Anand 16). After tallying the effectiveness of the Bush administration’sglobal war on terror, Michael Scherer has written, “At a minimum, it is truethat the U.S.-led coalition has failed to eliminate al Qaeda’s presence fromeven one country where it was established on 11 September 2001” (ImperialHubris 71).

The most positive account of the administration’s success emerged inthe State Department’s annual study of international terrorism. The firstrelease of the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 report touted a drop in inter-national terrorism attacks to “the lowest annual total [. . .] since 1969” (USDept. of State 2004, as cited in Waxman 1). The ranking minority memberof the Committee on Government Reform, Henry Waxman, did not acceptthe authenticity of the figures. In a May 17, 2004 letter to Secretary of StateColin Powell, he argued that manipulating the data “may serve theAdministration’s political interests, but [. . .] calls into serious doubt theintegrity of the report.” He emphasized the thirty-five percent increase insignificant terrorist attacks in 2003, a figure bringing incidents that resulted

America under Attack 157

(or potentially resulted) in the loss of life or serious injury to persons or prop-erty to a twenty-year high. Members of the State Department subsequentlyadmitted that their first tally of the 2003 incidents had omitted terrorist inci-dents occurring after November 11. They also explained that other datamanagement problems encountered by the newly formed Terrorist ThreatIntegration Center had compounded the mistaken figures (Perl 7). Therevised Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 acknowledged that acts of interna-tional terrorism had shown an increase from 198 in 2002 to 208 in 2003.The number of people killed from acts of terrorism dropped by 100 from2002, while the total wounded worldwide grew by 1,633 from the previousyear (as rptd. in Schweid 1).

One week after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United Statesunderwent a second wave of terrorist violence. Letters, postmarkedSeptember 18 and mailed from Trenton, New Jersey, carried deadly anthraxspores to New York, Florida, and Washington, DC. The sender addressedthe letters to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Senator Patrick Leahyof Vermont, Tom Brokaw of the National Broadcasting Corporation, and areporter from a Florida tabloid. While none of the targets developed anthraxpoisoning, the letters did infect fourteen other people. Five of those infecteddied by the end of 2001.

The party or parties responsible for sending the letters remain elusive.Despite the government’s assignment of as many as one-quarter of its FBIagents to the case, official spokespersons have insisted they cannot determinewhether the anthrax spores were of domestic or foreign origin (Verrengia).Administration officials have acknowledged that the anthrax in the letterswas derived from a domestically produced Ames strain “used in Americanbiological weapons research and in vaccine testing” (ibid.). However, the dis-tribution of similar strains of anthrax around the globe heightened the diffi-culty of discovering the identity of those responsible. Government officialshave publicly speculated that terrorists in Afghanistan, as well as the formerSoviet Union and Iraq, may have been to blame. Japanese war veterans havetestified in courts overseas that they produced large quantities of anthrax at aunit base in Hubin in the early 1940s, a claim officially denied by theJapanese government. More recently, US officials have publicly named Dr.Steven Hatfill a suspect because of his work on a secret project involving thedetection and disarmament of biological weapons by Special Operationsunits. Hatfill maintains his innocence and has sued several of those who haveaccused him of wrongdoing. The investigation continues (Broad, Johnston,and Miller A1).

Since September 11, the leadership’s public campaign against terrorismhas focused primarily on those associated with the World Trade Center andPentagon attacks, with less emphasis on the cases of bioterrorism. As the


next section will argue, executive branch officials have characterized theattacks of 9/11 as a matter of public sphere deliberation, while designatingthe anthrax attacks as more appropriately the concern of technical experts.2

LABELING THE CRISIS

Within hours of the attacks of September 11, George W. Bush repeatedlyemployed the terrorist label to depict the events in New York andWashington, DC. Even before his aides briefed him on the attack on thePentagon, Bush called the two airplanes crashing into the World TradeCenter “an apparent terrorist attack on our country” (FDCH Transcripts 11Sept. 2001: 2). Later that same day, he dropped the hedge. In a nationallytelevised address, he labeled the attacks “a series of deliberate and deadly ter-rorist acts” (1). Dismissing any notion that the incidents were airline acci-dents, Bush held that the events of 9/11 were an unprecedented, catastrophicact of terrorism that constituted an act of war against the United States.

Borrowing a terrorism labeling strategy prominent in the Clinton years,the Bush administration maintained that the terrorism threat it faced posed aunique challenge in the nation’s history. On the face of it, such an approachresonated. Since the birth of the nation, terrorists had never achieved a mag-nitude of success comparable to that of the 9/11 hijackers. They had neverhit the headquarters of the world’s military superpower. They had neveraccomplished the murder of thousands of US civilians on America’s homesoil. They had never been so threatening that they prevented the commanderin chief from returning to the White House over a sustained period.

The Bush administration offered four rationales to support the threat’sdistinctive nature in its public campaign. First, it stressed the tendency ofthe current terrorists to hide. Powell explained, “This is different. [. . .] Thisenemy is not looking to be found. The enemy is hidden” (FDCH Transcripts14 Sept. 2001: 4). Bush agreed, arguing, “The American people are used toa conflict where there was a beachhead or a desert to cross or known mili-tary targets. That may occur. But right now, we’re facing people who hitand run. They hide in caves” (FDCH Transcripts 16 Sept. 2001: 4). On theinternational scene, Bush presented the same perspective, urging worldleaders to understand that “unlike previous wars, this enemy likes to hide”(FDCH Transcripts 13 Sept 2001: 4). The difficulty in locating the enemyprompted the expectation that a US victory in the war on terrorism wouldnot come quickly.

The choice of hiding as a strategic calculation of US enemies, however,was far from new. American Indians were the first to hide and ambushunsuspecting US soldiers (Drinnon 53). John Underhill, the only surviving


eyewitness to the Pequot War, remembered that the settlers burned manyhouses and much corn, but failed to kill most of the Indians because of theirobscurity (ibid., 36). A more recent example involves the Viet Cong duringthe Vietnam War. The Viet Cong conducted campaigns of terrorism againstthe citizenry in secret. They participated in campaigns of kidnapping andmurder by night. They hid those who were directing, supplying, and sup-porting their efforts. Two decades later during Reagan’s tenure, Islamic fun-damentalists hid throughout Lebanon and other countries in the MiddleEast as they held American hostages captive for years. In sum, the decisionto hide from superior US military forces has been a recurrent posture of thenation’s enemies, and one (given the examples presented here) that has pro-duced a chilling record of success.

The second reason offered by administration officials for why the enemywas new involved their use of unconventional weapons. Director ofHomeland Security Tom Ridge claimed, “We’re under attack from a differ-ent kind of enemy who is using different kinds of weapons. Any weaponsdesigned to fear, and weapons designed to panic and disrupt” (FDCHTranscripts 26 Oct. 2001: 5). He elaborated on the types of new weaponswhen he stated, “We never thought a 747 could be turned into a missile, butsomeone who took an instrument that’s part of who we are and what we doeveryday—an airplane—turned it into a weapon. Somebody took an enve-lope and turned it into a weapon” (FDCH Transcripts 25 Oct. 2001: 9). TheBush camp’s rhetoric featured the perverted use of conveniences in the globaleconomy to distinguish its new threat.

The administration’s claim notwithstanding, weapons designed to instillfear have been a mainstay in the history of terrorism. French revolutionariesduring the Reign of Terror used the guillotine; Hitler used the gas chamber.The Aum Schrinko cult used sarin gas, and US white supremacists plannedto introduce cyanide into the New York and District of Columbia water sup-plies. The exploitation of modes of transportation has also been a commontactic of terrorists. The hijacking of airplanes was so common during theNixon administration that the federal government enacted the Sky Marshallprogram. Suicide truck bombers attacked the Marine barracks in Lebanon,and terrorists in small boats blew a hole in the side of the USS Cole. Finally,mail bombs were certainly not new, as abortion clinics throughout the nationcan readily attest.

The 9/11 Commission explored the question of whether the nation’sleadership should have known that airliners could have been transformedinto lethal missiles. Citing numerous incidents occurring during the Clintonyears, they were critical of the possibility that members of the administrationdid not imagine the 9/11 scenario. The report recalled the numerousinstances of related intelligence available to the nation’s leadership,


Threat reports also mentioned the possibility of using an aircraftfilled with explosives. The most prominent of these mentioned apossible plot to fly the explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. city.This report, circulated in September 1998, originated from asource who had walked into an American consulate in East Asia.In August of that same year, the intelligence community hadreceived information that a group of Libyans hoped to crash aplane into the World Trade Center. In neither case could theinformation be corroborated. In addition, an Algerian grouphijacked an airliner in 1994, most likely intended to blow it up overParis, but possibly to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. In 1994, a pri-vate airplane had crashed onto the south lawn of the White House.In early 1995, Abdul Hakim Murad—Ramzi Youself’s accomplicein the Manila airlines bombing plot—told Philippine authoritiesthat he and Yousef had discussed flying a plane into CIA head-quarters. (National Commission, Final Report 345)

Given that the Bush administration retained key terrorism personnel fromthe Clinton years who were aware of these warnings, the failure to conceiveof a suicide hijacking operation is suspect.

Further undermining the administration’s claim that it could not haveanticipated the use of an airliner as a missile were 52 intelligence reportsreceived by the Federal Aviation Administration. These reports containedwarnings about Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the potential use of domes-tic airliners for suicide bombings. On February 10, 2005, RepresentativesHenry A. Waxman and Carolyn B. Maloney wrote to the Chair of theHouse Committee on Government Reform, Tom Davis, to request congres-sional hearings into “whether the administration had misused the classifica-tion process to withhold, for political reasons, official 9/11 staff findingsdetailing how federal aviation officials received multiple intelligence reportswarning of airline hijackings and suicide attacks before September 11” (1).The use of commercial airlines by terrorists to attack highly valued, symbolictargets was a known risk for key figures in the nation’s leadership.

The third reason posited for the new threat was that the enemy was nowa group of nonstate actors. Bush announced the shift in the terrorists’ iden-tity when he explained, “ [W]e’re adjusting our thinking to the new type ofenemy. These are terrorists that have no borders” (FDCH Transcripts 17Sept. 2001: 3). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld maintained that thenew role of nonstate actors required a rethinking of war strategy. Henoted, “The United States is, as the president said, in a war. It is, however, avery different type of war; it is not a war of cruise missiles. It’s not a warwhere the enemy has armies, navies, air forces, capitals,—high value targets”


(Federal News Service 16 Nov. 2001: 1). The Bush camp insisted that a non-state nature of the enemy necessitated a shift from the nation’s conventionalstrategies of deterrence and containment.

Like the other rationales, the administration’s claim that nonstate actorswere something new was also suspect. Frequently, terrorists have been indi-viduals acting on their own (i.e., Eric Rudolph and Theodore Kosczynski),groups functioning outside state apparatuses (i.e., Black September Organi-zation, Red Brigades, Islamic Jihad), or foreign entities lacking official recog-nition of their state status (i.e., Communist China when it kidnapped AngusWard prior to recognition as the People’s Republic of China). With Clintonhaving claimed nonstate actor status as a new characteristic of the terroristthreat in the early 1990s, Bush’s repetition of the same point during hisadministration lacked authenticity.

The Bush team’s final explanation of why terrorists constituted a newthreat related to the level of barbarity the enemy would use in carrying out itsattacks. Bush encapsulated the sentiment of those appalled by the horror of9/11: “We’re facing a new kind of enemy—somebody so barbaric that theywould fly airplanes into [a] building full of innocent people” (FDCHTranscripts 16 Sept. 2001: 3). The intentional attacks on such a large numberof civilian men, women, and children were unprecedented, according to theBush administration’s public campaign.

The magnitude of the 9/11 terrorists’ success within the borders of theUnited States was indeed unmatched in the nation’s history. Nevertheless,barbarism in terrorist warfare was not new. The American Indian, the firstgroup to be labeled terrorist by a US administration, not only slit throats, butscalped men, women, and children to instill terror in the remaining colonial-ists. Timothy McVeigh knowingly attacked a day care center populated withsmall children. Hitler and his “Nazi terrorists”3 were perhaps the standardbearer of the barbaric category, with their calculated murder of more than sixmillion Jews, as well as Soviets, Poles, the sick and mentally ill, priests andnuns, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, artists, intellectuals, and majorpolitical figures. Barbarity has been the mainstay of terrorism, due to its abil-ity to produce fear in a larger audience.

Despite the questionable credibility of the Bush administration’s claimsthat terrorism was new, the labeling strategy served an important function.Like the claims of his presidential predecessors, Bush’s insistence that thenation confronted a new enemy provided the needed rationale for alteringthe nation’s response options. The 9/11 Commission Report detailed the prob-lem the Bush administration faced: “As presently configured, the nationalsecurity institutions of the U.S. government are still the institutions con-structed to win the Cold War. The United States confronts a very differentworld today. Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United


States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the bound-aries of traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative and agileresponses” (National Commission, Final Report 399). Stopping short of con-cluding that such factors were new under the Bush administration, the com-mission nevertheless made the case that the nation needed to change torespond to threats more effectively.

The enemy’s characteristics (i.e., being barbaric, unconventional, anddifficult to locate) were not new, but they nevertheless posed a challenge forthe administration. Vice President Dick Cheney, convinced of the compara-tive ease of confronting states rather than nonstate actors, argued behind thescenes that the goals of US policy should be broadened to include state spon-sors of terrorism (Woodward, Bush at War 43). Publicly, Bush agreed, main-taining he would “make no distinction between the terrorists who committedthese acts and those who harbor them” (FDCH Transcripts 11 Sept. 2001: 2).Public statements from the administration’s key national security spokesper-sons from September to December 2001 expounded on the new standard forqualifying as a terrorist actor. The new definition now encompassed anynation, group, entity, or individual that harbored, housed, supported, facili-tated, financed, succored, tolerated, or conducted business with terrorists.4

The administration’s revised interpretation of what constituted anoffending state did not require the nation to participate in an act of terrorismdirectly. In the early aftermath of September 11, Cheney introduced thephrase “terrorist-supported state” (Federal News Service 15 Nov. 2001: 4) todepict states that had a symbiotic relationship with terrorists operatingwithin their borders. At hearings before the House International RelationsCommittee, Powell used the example of Afghanistan to explicate how thegovernment would judge the behavior of foreign regimes: “The presidentmade it clear from the very beginning that if the Taliban regime did not turnover Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization resident inAfghanistan, that they had essentially designated themselves a terroristregime. They did not. And so they have to pay the consequences, and theTaliban government must now go, because they are part and parcel to al-Qaeda” (Federal News Service 24 Oct. 2001: 7). Failure to abide by theexpressed demands of the United States with respect to suspected terroristsbecame a sufficient condition for foreign regimes to find themselves taggedas terrorists.

Bush demonstrated the approach’s expansive possibilities in his 2002State of the Union address. Without offering any current linkage with terror-ists, Bush used the existence of North Korea’s nuclear program, its attemptsto seek concessions from the United States, and the oppressive nature of itsregime to justify its inclusion in the “axis of evil” (Suskind 187). By the end ofmajor combat operations in Iraq, the standard for what qualified as a terrorist


state expanded farther. States no longer had to actually possess weapons ofmass destruction to fall within the parameters of the terrorist coalition. Bushannounced, “Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks orpossesses weapons of mass destruction is a great danger to the civilizedworld—and will be confronted” (White House 1 May 2003: 3, emphasismine). The evidentiary standard for qualifying as a terrorist state became lessrigorous as the United States had difficulty proving that Iraq met a morestringent benchmark.

The dilution of the standard was troubling for members of Congresscharged with the oversight of many of the administration’s actions in Iraq andAfghanistan. Bob Graham, the ranking member of the Senate IntelligenceCommittee, became dismayed that the administration had elevated Iraq into acritical front in the war on terror despite its lack of connection to the events of9/11, its lack of involvement in harboring the terrorists who were, and itsinability to have militarily usable weapons of mass destruction for five years(Woodward, Plan of Attack 193–94). Graham concluded, “Now, we’re defin-ing a terrorist state as those states which might have the ability to provideweapons of mass destruction, even it they themselves are not engaged in ter-rorist activities or providing sanctuary” (qtd. in ibid., 194). The relaxedbenchmarks for terrorist states, coupled with ready application of the terroristlabel to a variety of nonstate actors, made the Bush administration’s approachthe most expansive terrorist labeling strategy in the history of the nation.

Publicly, the Bush administration handled the case of the anthrax lettersin a dramatically different way. Officials were far more reluctant to label theanthrax letters acts of terrorism, as the example of Robert Stevens, the firstvictim of the anthrax poisoning in 2001, demonstrates. His doctors con-cluded that in all likelihood, Stevens became infected with inhalation anthraxon September 19 (Parker and Sternberg). For the remainder of Septemberand into the middle of October, administration spokespersons avoided usingthe terrorism label to depict the cause of Steven’s death. Instead, Acting USAttorney Guy Lewis cautiously reported, “We have not made any prematureconclusions” (qtd. in “Third Person Shows Exposure”). After a secondFlorida resident tested positive for inhalation anthrax, Attorney GeneralJohn Ashcroft encouraged the public to wait for the conclusions of the med-ical experts before giving in to concerns about bioterrorism. Ashcroftannounced, “We are relying on the Centers for Disease Control and healthauthorities to provide expertise which we do not have. And, very frankly, weare unable to make a conclusive statement about the nature of this as eitheran attack or an occurrence, absent more definitive laboratory and other inves-tigative returns” (Federal News Service 8 Oct. 2001: 2). Experts, not the gov-ernment or the public at large, would make the determination of whether theanthrax letters constituted acts of terrorism.


Not until the week of October 16, when Barbara Rosenberg of theFederation of American Scientists, the biowarfare convention specialist Janvan Aken, and the ex-UN inspector Richard Spertzel concluded that thestrain of anthrax was homegrown, did the administration shift its publicstrategy. Bush, Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller each dubbedanyone (past or present) sending anthrax through the mail a terrorist(Ashcroft, Federal News Service 16 Oct. 2001: 1; Mueller, FDCH Transcripts18 Oct. 2001: 5; G. W. Bush, FDCH Transcripts 20 Oct. 2001: 1). Gonewere broader concerns about those who might aid, abet, finance, or other-wise tolerate terrorists in their midst. The government immediately limitedthe scope of responsibility for the letters to a single person. Ashcroftannounced, “[T]he FBI has determined that they believe all four of theanthrax letters have come from a single individual [. . .] it’s an individualaccustomed to working with toxic and dangerous chemistry. It’s an individualwho has certain technical skills and capabilities, and a variety of other things”(Federal News Service 26 Nov. 2001: 4). By treating the anthrax terrorist as aloner unconnected to a broader international network of terrorist actors, theadministration deflected fears of an international bioterrorism assault.

While the administration limited those responsible for the anthrax let-ters, it was expansive in its approach to those allegedly engaged in anthraxhoaxes. Mueller dramatically illustrated the widespread nature of the prob-lem by placing his agency’s workload in a historical perspective: “Now, in anaverage year the FBI handles approximately 250 assessments and responsesinvolving chemical or biological agents or other weapons of mass destruction.Over the past 18 days alone, we’ve handled more than 3,300, including 2,500involving suspected anthrax threats alone” (FDCH Transcripts 18 Oct. 2001:5). Bush officials justified severe punishment for any perpetrator of suchhoaxes as a necessary step to stop substantial waste of the government’s finiteresources for fighting bioterrorism. Diverting attention away from theunsolved cases of the actual anthrax letters, the administration’s strategy refo-cused public attention on a problem it could more readily solve (i.e., hoaxes).

Taken as a whole, the administration employed a two-pronged strategyfor handling the terrorist threats of September 2001. In the case of theattacks of September 11, officials reflected and even fueled public fears byemploying the terrorist label without hesitation and by broadening the label’susage to all individuals, groups, or states associated with anyone who perpe-trated acts of terrorism. In the case of the anthrax letters, officials attemptedto contain the public’s reaction by initially refusing to confirm the terroristnature of the act and then by diverting public attention to more solvableproblems. Consistently, the administration framed the attacks of September11 as the dominant issue of public deliberation, while allowing the anthraxattacks to recede into the technical sphere of medical expertise. Within such


a context, it is perhaps unsurprising that the attacks of September 11 becamethe focus of the administration’s terrorist narrative.

THE TERRORIST NARRATIVE

Like his Republican predecessors, Bush employed the rubric of the ColdWar narrative as the basic framework for the story his administration toldabout terrorism. Once again, spokespersons in the executive branch retrofit-ted the narrative to accommodate the exigencies of terrorists’ newfoundeffectiveness. Despite the reinvention of the public strategy, the fundamentaltenets of the conventional Cold War narrative reemerged and providedrhetorical continuity for members of Bush’s political base.

Bush officials described the scene they encountered upon assumingoffice to be that of a fragile place grown complacent with previous victories.Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Bush’s top aides lamented thatAmerica and the world community had let their guards down against emerg-ing threats. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld insisted, “Since the end ofthe Cold War, there’s been a relaxation of tension [. . .]—it’s had a lot ofeffects. It’s led to proliferation. It’s led to the movement towards asymmetri-cal threats, as opposed to more conventional threats. One of the other effectshas been it has had an effect on how people handle classified information”(Federal News Service 12 Sept. 2001: 1). Official spokespersons portrayedweapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and breached security as the unfor-tunate byproducts of a world overly satisfied with its former victories. Theypointed to the United Nations as a representative example of complacency,citing the organization’s failure to force Iraq’s compliance with its securitymandates for twelve years.

Richard Clarke, Bush’s head of counterterrorism, argued that it was theBush camp, not its predecessors, who were complacent in the face of the ter-rorist threat. Clarke maintained that during the Clinton/Bush transition,“the Bush appointees distrusted anything invented by the Clinton adminis-tration and anything of a multilateral nature. [. . .] The new Bush focus inearly 2001 was on confronting China, withdrawing from multilateral obliga-tions, and spending much more money on an antimissile defense system—not on looking into al Qaeda’s financial network” (Against All Enemies 196).In Clarke’s view the administration’s misplaced priorities removed thefocused attention needed to prevent the looming terrorist attacks plannedagainst the United States.5

The Bush narrative held that the 9/11 scene jolted America out of itsmisguided comfort garnered from the Cold War victory. Ashcroftannounced that the nation was now “awakened to danger” (Federal News


Service 8 Nov. 2001: 1). For Bush, 9/11 was a key historical moment thatchanged the nation’s defense strategy. On the one-year anniversary of 9/11events, he reasoned, “There is a line in our time, and in every time, betweenthose who believe all men are created equal, and those who believe that somemen and women and children are expendable in the pursuit of power. Thereis a line in our time, and in every time, between the defenders of human lib-erty and those who seek to master the minds and souls of others. Our gener-ation has now heard history’s call, and we will answer it” (G. W. Bush, WhiteHouse 11 Sept. 2002: 1). The attacks on the World Trade Center and thePentagon emerged as the starting point for the Bush narrative.

The choice of 9/11 as the beginning point for the terrorism story hadseveral advantages for the Bush administration. First, the strategy allowedthe administration to claim that all of its subsequent actions were defensive,rather than offensive. Bush explained why in a speech to the FBI Academy:“As we wage this war abroad, we must remember where it began, here on ourhomeland. In this new kind of war, the enemy’s objective is to strike us onour own territory and make our people live in fear. This danger places all ofyou, every person here and the people you work with, on the frontlines of thewar on terror” (FDCH Transcripts 15 Sept. 2003: 3). Lacking public consen-sus on the strategy of preemptive war, the administration’s resurrected aclaim of self-defense grounded in the 9/11 attacks on the homeland.

The administration broadly applied the self-defense doctrine by includ-ing the entire international community in its depiction of the scene.According to the Bush narrative, the attacks on the Pentagon and the WorldTrade Center had demonstrated that all countries around the globe werefragile due to their potential vulnerability to terrorism. Oceans could nolonger protect nations from terrorist violence. Bush presented the precariousstate of the global community in repeated statements like the one he madebefore the Australian parliament: “No country can live peacefully in a worldthat the terrorists would make for us. And no people are immune from thesudden violence that can come to an office building or an airplane or a night-club or a city bus” (White House 27 Oct. 2003: 1–2). While some nations hadnot yet experienced the devastation of a terrorist attack, the possibility thatterrorists could strike anywhere rendered every nation qualified to assert alegitimate claim of self-defense.

A second benefit of the narrative’s starting point was its refocus of publicattention away from the government’s handling of threat assessment prior tothe 9/11 attacks. Not until 2004, when the 9/11 Commission began publichearings, did the American electorate concentrate in a focused way on whythe FBI, CIA, and White House had failed to prevent the catastrophicresults. Even when damaging revelations did become public (i.e., the FBIfield memo warning of improper conduct by enrollees in the nation’s flight


schools, the Justice Department’s choice not to increase counterterrorismfunding in the high threat period, and the reports of al Qaeda sleeper cellswithin US borders), the various congressional committees and bipartisancommissions discussed such breakdowns within the context of post-ColdWar complacency under both the Bush and Clinton administrations.

Finally, using 9/11 as the beginning point of the narrative bolstered thecase for the American public to accept expanded powers for the commanderin chief. Bush compared the events of 9/11 to two key historical momentswhen the United States had been under attack: the War of 1812 and PearlHarbor (FDCH Transcripts 15 Nov. 2001: 2). In these earlier wars, the com-mander in chief had assumed broadened powers to defend the nation. Bytreating 9/11 as a similarly crucial historical moment, rather than as a cul-mination of a multiyear war with al Qaeda, the Bush administration pre-pared the public to accept an immediate expansion of presidential powersand prerogatives.

Reinforcing the need for broadened powers, the administration used9/11 to demonstrate that terrorists were both willing and able to use weaponsof mass destruction. As Cheney declared before the Veterans of ForeignWars, “Nine-eleven and its aftermath awakened this nation to danger, to thetrue ambitions of the global terror network, and to the reality that weaponsof mass destruction are being sought by determined enemies who would nothesitate to use them against us” (“Full Text” 2). The administration’s use of9/11 reconfigured conventional understandings of weapons of mass destruc-tion (i.e., chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons) into anyact of violence that could potentially result in a high loss of life. Protectingthe nation’s security in the context of a more broadly defined notion ofWMD justified less restrained thinking about response options.

Having emphasized a fragile setting, the Bush administration presentedan enemy poised to capitalize on that vulnerability. Remaining consistentwith the constraints of the Cold War narrative while doing so, however,posed a challenge. How could the administration make a convincing casethat the world’s terrorists in 2001, like their Communist predecessors, had agoal of worldwide conquest? While few would dispute that al Qaeda haddemonstrated its destructive power by committing spectacular acts withinAmerican borders, the conclusion that such acts were designed to accomplisha world takeover were more tenuous.

The Bush narrative implied the terrorists’ ambitions by emphasizing theglobal dispersal of the al Qaeda network. US spokespersons reiterated that alQaeda members moved frequently through more than sixty countries world-wide and that they lacked any stable homeland. According to top administra-tion officials, terrorists had “no borders” (G. W. Bush, FDCH Transcripts 17Sept. 2001: 3) and had “no geography” (Powell, FDCH Transcripts 27 Sept.


2001: 2). To emphasize the wide-ranging reach of terrorist organizations,the administration catalogued attacks occurring around the globe. Whenspeaking to the American Legion, for example, Bush mentioned attacks inBali, Mombasa, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Jerusalem (FDCH Transcripts 1 Sept.2003: 2). Before the United Nations, he repeated his earlier list but addedCasablanca and Jakarta (FDCH Transcripts 29 Sept. 2003: 1). Terrorists’ lackof focus in any one region or state created the impression that their objectiveswere broader than those of conflicts between traditional nation-states.

The administration emphasized the terrorists’ previous seizure of sover-eign governments to underscore their ambitious global objectives.Spokespersons focused on the experience of the Taliban government as awarning, announcing that bin Laden and al Qaeda had come “for one singlepurpose; to invade that country, be a foreign presence, a hostile presence inAfghanistan so they could conduct terrorist activities around the world”(Powell, FDCH Transcripts 18 Oct. 2001: 4). In the administration’s publicaccount, however, terrorists wanted more than Afghanistan. Terrorism, forBush, was more generally “a threat to established governments” (FDCHTranscripts 19 Oct. 2001: 2) and “an enemy of all law, all liberty, all morality,all religion” (FDCH Transcripts 11 Oct. 2001: 3-4). Free nations were partic-ularly vulnerable. Bush pronounced, “[Terrorists] hate freedom. They hatefree nations” (FDCH Transcripts 24 Nov. 2003: 2). The Bush narrative main-tained that terrorists intended to destroy any nation that valued freedom orsupported the existing world order.

While Bush’s approach generally evoked the conventions of the ColdWar enemy characterization, a key distinction emerged. In the Bush por-trayal, the goal of the terrorists was realizing global destruction, rather thanachieving world conquest. While the administration built the public case thatal Qaeda had designs on replacing democratic governments with Islamicregimes, such reasoning was not readily applicable to its other front in thewar on terror, namely, Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s secular leadership, when con-sidered within the context of the international collective of terrorist regimes,undercut the claim that all terrorists had a united enemy goal of expandingIslamic regimes.

By highlighting the cooperative terrorist ventures between al Qaeda andIraq, the Bush team had a public strategy that could resolve the disparateintentions of those encompassed under the terrorist label. Senior officialsmade public statements touting the linkage between Saddam Hussein and alQaeda after receiving a briefing by an unofficial Pentagon intelligence cell onSeptember 16, 2002 (Coman 2). Spokespersons emphasized the centralizedtraining of the terrorist operatives in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Rumsfeldcharacterized the Afghani training camps as an environment that nurturedmultiple acts of global violence when he noted, “[W]hile the Afghani people


live in poverty the terrorist oppressors spend millions of dollars trainingpeople and sending them all over the globe to kill people (Federal New Service13 Nov. 2001: 2). Bush claimed the Iraqi government was similarly engagingin the training and harboring of the world’s most dangerous terrorists: “Iraqis a part of the war on terror. Iraq is a country that has got terrorist ties. It’s acountry with wealth. It’s a country that trains terrorists, a country that couldarm terrorists” (Federal News Service 6 Mar. 2003: 3). As the United Statesprepared for war against Iraq, the public apparently accepted that terrorists inAfghanistan and Iraq constituted an integrated international collective. Amajority responded to pollsters stating they believed that Saddam Husseinwas “personally involved in the September 11 terror attacks” (as rptd. in K.Phillips 311).

The characterization of a united global terrorist effort with designs todestroy all free nations exaggerated the conclusions available from US intelli-gence. Particularly questionable was the claim that members of al Qaeda andIraq were working in tandem to defeat the United States and its allies. Afterexamining intelligence relevant to the issue, the Staff Report of the 9/11Commission concluded, “Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to estab-lish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraqapparently never responded. There have been reports that contacts betweenIraq and al Qaeda also occurred after Bin Ladin had returned toAfghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative rela-tionship. Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that anyties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence thatIraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States” (NationalCommission, “9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 15” 6). After Bushhimself publicly critiqued the conclusion of the staff report as mistaken, thecommission requested and examined additional intelligence the administra-tion believed supported the linkage. In its final report, the commission didnot waiver from the staff’s earlier finding. They found no “collaborative oper-ational relationship” (66) and no evidence indicating “that Iraq cooperatedwith al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the UnitedStates” (ibid.).

The administration’s case for Saddam Hussein’s global ambitions, how-ever, was not limited to his ties to a broader international terrorist network.Reverting to the public claims of the first Bush administration, the currentBush team reiterated that the Iraqi leader had goals of usurping control overkey oil reserves in the Middle East. Cheney laid out Hussein’s global inten-tions: “What [Saddam] wants is time and more time to husband hisresources, to invest in the ongoing chemical and biological weapons program,and to gain possession of nuclear arms. [. . .] Armed with an arsenal of theseweapons of terror, and seated atop ten percent of the world’s oil reserves,


Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entireMiddle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies,directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region, and subject theUnited States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail” (“Full Text” 4). Inthe administration’s narrative, Saddam Hussein would only be satisfied whenhe became a dominant player in world politics. Recall of the 1990 invasion ofKuwait helped underscore the Iraqi leader’s aggressive ambitions.

Establishing that Cold War Communists and modern-day terroristsused comparable means to achieve their objectives was more straight forward.The September 11 attacks dramatically illustrated the barbarism of al Qaeda.While the Pentagon was arguably a military target, the inhabitants of theWorld Trade Center and the passengers of the four airplanes were civilians.Bush called the terrorists who committed the 9/11 attacks “evil-doers”(FDCH Transcripts 17 Sept. 2001: 2) and “barbaric people” (3). He labeledthe Taliban in Afghanistan “one of the most repressive regimes in the historyof mankind” (Federal News Service 13 Nov. 2001: 4) and referred to SaddamHussein as a “homicidal dictator” (White House 7 Oct. 2002: 2). In the Bushnarrative, the terrorist enemy was an unimaginable evil dispersed throughoutthe international community.

Spokespersons dramatized the barbarism by recalling specific atrocitiescommitted by the Afghan and Iraqi governments. Bush, in particular,focused on the horrors experienced by women and children. He revealed thatin Afghanistan, “Women are executed in Kabul’s soccer stadium. They canbe beaten for wearing socks that are too thin” (Federal News Service 10 Oct.2001: 3). In Iraq, the depicted depravity of the foreign leader was even moreextreme. Bush cataloged that on Saddam Hussein’s orders, “opponents havebeen decapitated, wives and mothers of political opponents have been sys-tematically raped as a method of intimidation, and political prisoners havebeen forced to watch their own children being tortured” (White House 7 Oct.2002: 5). Repeated mentions of Saddam’s prior uses of chemical weapons inIraq and Iran further reinforced the claim that the Iraqi leader lacked regardfor innocent civilians.

Like the Communists before them, the terrorists in the Bush narrativesubjugated the people residing in their communities. Spokespersons claimedthat both Iraq and Afghanistan had denied rights of self-determination totheir citizens. Focusing on the dictatorial nature of the Taliban regime andthe tyrannical leadership of Saddam Hussein, the narrative maintained thatthe citizens of those two nations had no hope for free elections without out-side intervention. Bush defined the general nature of the enemy in the waron terror when he noted, “The terrorists rely on the death of innocent peopleto create the conditions of fear that, therefore, will cause people to lose theirwill” (FDCH Transcripts 3 Nov. 2003: 8). The characterization recalled a


theme prominent in Vietnam War era: the absence of individual liberty ledto a loss of hope that, in turn, produced more terrorists.

Bush echoed the final enemy characteristic in the Cold War narrative bydepicting all terrorists as untrustworthy. Bush was most blunt and unequivo-cal about the Iraqi regime’s willingness to lie. In the buildup to the US-Iraqmilitary operations, he declared, “These are not the actions of a regime thatis disarming. These are the actions of a regime engaged in a willful charade.These are the actions of a regime that systematically and deliberately is defy-ing the world” (FDCH Transcripts Nov. 2003:1). Claiming to have no incli-nation to trust the leaderships of either Iraq or Afghanistan, Bush dismissedclaims by both governments that they had taken the necessary actions torejoin the civilized international community.

Ultimately, the Bush administration’s own trustworthiness fell intoquestion with regard to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Despite a year-long search by US weapons inspectors in the aftermath of major combatoperations, no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons were found.6 TheSenate Select Committee on Intelligence determined that the administra-tion’s intelligence assessments regarding Iraqi WMD were flawed. In July2004, the committee determined that the CIA had misled members of theadministration by exaggerating the Iraqi threat. The committee’s report con-cluded, “The major key judgments in the National Intelligence Estimate,particularly that Iraq ‘is reconstituting its nuclear program,’ ‘has chemical andbiological weapons,’ was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)‘probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents,’ and that ‘all keyaspects—research & development (R&D), production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons (BW) program are active and that mostelements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War,’either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligencereporting provided to the Committee” (Select Committee 32). The commit-tee cited the CIA’s failure to communicate its own uncertainty to policymakers, a culture of group-think, a tendency to base assessments on priorjudgments without appropriate acknowledgment of their own uncertainties,inadequate supervision, weaknesses in human intelligence, and the agency’sabuse of its position relative to other US intelligence agencies as the reasonsfor the flawed results (34–44).

Over time, evidence began to accumulate suggesting that Bush and hisprimary spokespersons on Iraq may have known that their public statementsabout the WMD program were exaggerated. Bush’s former head of counter-terrorism revealed that the administration knew its evidence of Iraq’s chemi-cal and biological capability was dated as it built the case for militaryintervention (Clarke, Against All Enemies 266–67). Bush’s former treasurysecretary unveiled that the administration had knowingly employed startling


public exaggerations of intelligence to relate the story of Iraq’s weapons ofmass destruction program in late August 2002 (as rept. in Suskind 324–25).The secret notes of a British prime minister’s meeting held July 23, 2002reported on recent talks between the United States and a senior British intel-ligence official related to Iraq. The notes read, “There was a perceptive shiftin attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitible. Bush wanted Saddam,through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” (Rycroft,as qtd. in Manning 1) Evidence from key figures in the administration andthose working for key US allies confirmed that the US leadership wasmanipulating intelligence to build the case that war with Iraq was justified.

Recent information related to the inner workings of the Bush adminis-tration raises more questions about the veracity of public statements madeby official spokespersons. Internal debates regarding the credibility of infor-mants charging the existence of mobile biology labs, the expressed doubts ofCIA and Air Force intelligence related to the biologically armed unmannedaerial vehicles, and the call by the staff of the National Security Council fornew intelligence to bolster the claim that Hussein had chemical, biological,and nuclear weapons only days before Bush’s State of the Union addressreinforced charges that the administration was misinforming the public(Pincus 1–3). Facing public charges from the International Atomic EnergyAssociation that the administration had knowingly used falsified intelli-gence information in the public case for Iraq’s WMD program, the Bushadministration retracted the following statement from Bush’s State of theUnion address: “The British government has learned that Saddam Husseinrecently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa” (Federal NewsService 28 Jan. 2003).

A report compiled by the Minority Staff of the US House ofRepresentatives Committee on Government Reform attempted to summa-rize the totality of misinformation espoused by Bush official spokespersons.It concluded, “In 125 separate appearances, [President Bush, Vice PresidentCheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National SecurityAdvisor Rice] made 11 misleading statements about the urgency of Iraq’sthreat, 81 misleading statements about Iraq’s nuclear activities, 84 misleadingstatements about Iraq’s chemical and biological capabilities, and 61 mislead-ing statements about Iraq’s relationship with al Qaeda” (SpecialInvestigations Division 30). With substantial media attention devoted to thecredibility of the statements, the Bush administration’s questionable accuracyblurred the conventional distinctions between the enemy and hero characterof the Cold War narrative.

Returning once again to the foundations of the Cold War narrative, theBush approach featured the US as the hero character needed to repel the


dangerous enemy. As before, America had a responsibility to defend freedomand liberty around the globe. Bush defined his war on terrorism by saying,“This is a fight for freedom” (FDCH Transcripts 17 Sept. 2001: 4). Heevoked the long-standing role of America in encouraging and preserving lib-erty in the international community, calling the United States the “defenderof liberty all over the world” (Federal News Service 15 Oct. 2001: 1). In linewith America’s historic mission, governmental spokespersons repeatedlypromised rights of self-determination for the peoples of both Afghanistanand Iraq.

The administration’s strategy for achieving the spread of freedom, how-ever, was at odds with conventional portrayals of the Cold War narrative.Bush’s publicly announced plan of regime change arguably did not constitutea right of self-determination for the citizens of Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead,the approach was vulnerable to the charge it was simply external interferenceby the United States into the internal affairs of two foreign states. The Bushapproach expanded the conventional mission of the Cold War narrative to aproactive mode of spreading, rather than defending, freedom and libertyaround the globe. Bush’s strategy hearkened back to the campaign for thepromotion of worldwide democracy that Woodrow Wilson had undertakenafter World War I. Bush explicated why such extremes were needed in thecause of global freedom and liberty. In remarks delivered before the NationalEndowment of Democracy, he insisted,

There are, however, essential principles common to every success-ful society in every culture. Successful societies limit the power ofthe state and the power of the military, so that governmentsrespond to the will of the people and not the will of the elite.Successful societies protect freedom with the consistent and impar-tial rule of law, instead of selectively applying the law to punishpolitical opponents. Successful societies allow room for healthycivic institutions, for political parties and labor unions and inde-pendent newspapers and broadcast media. Successful societiesguarantee religious liberty, the right to serve and honor God with-out fear of persecution. Successful societies privatize theireconomies and secure the rights of property. They prohibit andpunish official corruption and invest in the health and education oftheir people. They recognize the rights of women. And instead ofdirecting hatred and resentment against others, successful societiesappeal to the hopes of their own people. (FDCH Transcripts 6 Nov.2003: 6)

Since neither the Taliban nor the regime of Saddam Hussein met Bush’sstandards for a successful society, they had to be removed.


Like his Cold War predecessors, Bush depicted America’s mission to bea divine calling. Maintaining that the events of 9/11 had prompted reexami-nation by the entire American citizenry, Bush concluded, “Our deepestnational conviction is that every life is precious, because every life is the giftof a Creator who intended us to live in liberty and equality” (White House 11Sept. 2002: 1). Bush reserved the religious sanction for only those thatfought on the side of the United States in the war on terror. He announced,“The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome certain. Freedomand fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that Godis not neutral between them” (FDCH Transcripts 20 Sept 2001: 9). Bush bor-rowed from the teachings of Book of Revelation, Isaiah, Job, Jeremiah, andMatthew to announce the US attack on Afghanistan (Lincoln 30–32). Atthe end of major combat operations in Iraq, he quoted the prophet Isaiah:“To the captives, ‘come out,’—and to those in the darkness, ‘be free’” (WhiteHouse 1 May 2003: 3). Devoted to the side of the divine, Bush remainedpublicly confident the coalition would prevail.

The Bush administration’s implementation of the hero’s divine missionreengaged the long-standing debate over whether crime or war constitutedthe most appropriate metaphor for the nation’s terrorism strategy. War,rather that criminal prosecution, became the chief means the Bush camppublicly espoused as the appropriate response to terrorism. Speaking before ajoint inquiry of the Senate and House intelligence committees, DeputyNational Security Advisor Steve Hadley announced that the administrationhad made sweeping changes in US terrorism policy that diminished anemphasis on crime. The shift occurred on September 10, 2001, after theadministration had completed a senior-level review of the nation’s approachto al Qaeda (National Commission, Final Report 214). Hadley announcedthat the nation had to “move beyond the policy of containment, criminalprosecution, and limited retaliation for specific attacks, toward attempting to‘roll back’ Al Qaeda” (Pincus and Milbank 1). The new goal was to eliminategroups with a global reach that had the ability to conduct terrorist attacksagainst the United States. The shrinking weight of the crime metaphor inthe nation’s terrorism response had implications for both law enforcementand the nation’s security apparatuses.

In the legal arena, the new stance weakened many long-standing rightsof alleged terrorists. At home, security concerns trumped conventional dueprocess rights of defendants, as institutionalized in the Patriot Act. The gov-ernment held captive those suspected of being in collusion with terrorists, ofhaving information about terrorists, and of contemplating future terroristacts. Within the mantra of “get terrorists off the street before they can harmmore Americans” (Ashcroft, Federal News Service 8 Nov. 2001: 2), the USgovernment detained hundreds of potential suspects for months without


affording them the right to a preliminary judicial hearing and without notifi-cation of the charges to be lodged against them.

The Bush administration was more stringent when prioritizing securityconcerns over traditional legal safeguards for suspected foreign terrorists.Bush established military tribunals for foreigners suspected of terrorism thatfell well short of the legal protections afforded by civilian courts. JohnAshcroft explained the rationale for the shift: “[F]oreign terrorists do notdeserve the protections of the American Constitution, particularly whenthere could be very serious and important reasons related to not bringingthem back to the United States for justice” (Federal New Service 14 Nov.2001: 6). Foreign captives held at Guantanamo Bay were imprisoned formore than three years with no charges filed against them. Each faced theprospect of a US military jury with the power to impose punishments, up toand including the death penalty.

The administration classified alleged al Qaeda members captured inAfghanistan as “unlawful combatants” or “battlefield detainees” to highlighttheir non-prisoner of war status in a different type of war. The move gar-nered the public wrath of the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) because it opened the possibility that the government would notextend legal and human rights protections normally afforded to prisoners ofwar (Ford, “Fate of ‘Detainees’ ” 1). A March 2003 report by Pentagonlawyers assessing the interrogation rules employed at Guantanamo Baydemonstrated that the ICRC’s concerns were warranted. It concluded, “It isthe position of the U.S. Government that none of the provisions of theGeneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ofAugust 12, 1949 [. . .] apply to al Qaida detainees because, inter alia, al Qaidais not a High Contracting Party to the Convention” (Working GroupReport 4). The same report concluded, “[T]he Torture Statute does notapply to the conduct of U.S. personnel at GTMO” (7). The Pentagonreport, as well as other documents released by the US government, left nodoubt that conventional interpretations of the rules of warfare had changed.

A major challenge to the administration’s approach presented itself withthe capture of the American Taliban fighter John Walker Lindh. NorthernAlliance forces holding Lindh discovered his nationality in the aftermath of aprison riot in Mazar-e-Sharif, an action that resulted in the first combat-related American death in Afghanistan military maneuvers. After the USgovernment received notification of the capture, Cheney floated a publicinterpretation that would have denied Lindh his domestic status, renderinghim nothing more than a foreign terrorist. He told NBC’s Meet the Press, “Icertainly consider him to have been a traitor to our country” (as qtd. in“Walker Talking”). Perhaps cognizant of the political fallout likely to accom-pany the stripping of an American citizen’s civil rights, Cheney was quick to


add, “But you know that’s not a decision, with respect to the legal act thatwill be taken, that I’m going to be making” (ibid.).

The Lindh case tested the persuasive limits of the administration’s newlegal standards. While many members of the American public were willingto accept forfeiture of the rights of foreign terrorists, application of the con-cept to American citizens was more controversial. A Newsweek poll takenshortly after Lindh’s capture reported forty-one percent of Americansbelieved he should be charged with treason and put on trial for fighting withthe enemy. Another forty-two percent said he should be tried only if therewas specific evidence of him fighting against Americans (Soloway et al. 30).With the country divided on the proper approach to take, the administrationproceeded cautiously.

The administration was noticeably reluctant to label Lindh a terrorist.Initially, Bush called him a “poor fellow” who “has been misled.” (as qtd. inSoloway et al. 36). Over time, the administration drew a sharp public dis-tinction between the rights afforded to Lindh and those reserved for othercaptured foreigners alleged to be terrorists. Wolfowitz insisted, “One thingfor sure is we want to make sure as an American citizen that he is treatedfairly and in proper judicial manner” (ibid.). Behind the scenes the adminis-tration implemented a somewhat different approach. Lindh was tied nakedto a stretcher during questioning, he was not advised of his rights, and hisrequest for access to a lawyer and to immediate medical attention wentunheeded for a lengthy period of time. A US Army intelligence officerreported that he had received advice from the secretary of defense’s counselto “take the gloves off” (Buncombe and Penketh 1) when questioning Lindh.The results of the interrogation were cabled back to Washington every hour(ibid.). Lindh eventually pled guilty to reduced charges in exchange for asentence of twenty years and an agreement to drop claims that US personnelhad tortured him.

The administration’s new efforts to prioritize security needs overdetainees’ rights became public in an even more negative way in early 2003.On January 13, 2003, Joseph Darby, a military policeman at Abu Ghraib,turned over a CD of photographs to support his allegations of wrongdoing tothe US Army’s Investigation Division. The photos, as well as subsequentinvestigations, revealed that military police and interrogators had used stressand duress techniques, acts of sexual humiliation, induced anxiety fromthreatening attack dogs, sleep deprivation, isolation for more than thirtydays, exposure to temperature extremes, death threats, and deadly physicalblows in various prisons and other CIA-monitored security locations. Anarmy investigation headed by General Paul J. Kern announced that fromSepember 20 to December 13, 2003, fifty-four military intelligence, militarypolice, medical soldiers, and contractors “had some degree of culpability in


the abuse” (Garamone 1). By 2005, at least 28 foreign detainees had diedwhile being held in US custody.

The subsequent international firestorm resulted in the ICRC concludingthat the actions were “tantamount to torture” (as rptd. in Barry, Hirsh, andIsikoff 3). US military lawyers known as JAGs at Guantanamo objected tothe interrogation techniques, but Pentagon officials ignored their requests fora changed policy (Meek 1). The Bush administration maintained that thegovernment had never supported the use of torture either in Iraq orGuantanamo Bay. Members of the press, various human rights organiza-tions, and investigating congressional committees disagreed, positing thatthe administration’s new rendering of interrogation techniques constituted aviolation of the Geneva Conventions, as well as other laws related to tortureand inhumane treatment where the United States was a signatory.

The administration’s legal memoranda released during the related con-gressional investigations reveal that the elevation of the war frame for fight-ing terrorism redefined interpretations of how traditional war crimes shouldbe handled. The Pentagon’s legal opinion, for example, narrowed the stan-dard for torture to cases where the person suffered prolonged mental harm(such as PTSD or chronic depression), where the person was subject to athreat of imminent death (not a vague reference to what might happenremote in time), or when the use of drugs penetrated “to the core of an indi-vidual’s ability to perceive the world around him, substantially interferingwith his cognitive abilities or fundamentally alter his personality” (WorkingGroup Report 15). Besides redefining conventional, international under-standings of torture, the legal opinion authorized the commander in chief touse torture when necessary to protect the nation’s security (20–24).

Spokespersons for the Bush administration have insisted that they nar-rowly applied their reinterpretation of the Geneva Conventions to membersof al Qaeda and other nonstate actors in the war on terrorism. Nevertheless,members of the military accused of conducting torture in Iraq’s Abu Ghraibprison have defended their actions as being in accordance with the newadministration guidelines. Paul Bergrin, the defense lawyer for Staff Sgt.Javal S. Davis, told his military court, “One of the last words my client heardbefore being deployed was the president of the United States saying this is awar on terrorism and the Geneva Conventions do not apply” (as qtd. inKaplow A3). The Kern investigation confirmed that abuse occurred becauseof confusion about the law and policy of the United States, but concludedthat no direct complicity in the abuse happened above the level of thebrigade (as rptd. in Garamone 1). The administration publicly retractedmuch of its new latitude for interrogation procedures in the week prior to theconfirmation hearings of Anthony Gonzalez to become US AttorneyGeneral. As the author of the memos justifying more extreme interrogation


practices, Gonzalez nevertheless underwent intense public scrutiny of hiswillingness to condone the torture of terror suspects.

While the Bush narrative narrowed conventional interpretations of therights of the accused, it substantially broadened the president’s war-fightingprerogatives. Federal spending for defense, homeland security, and interna-tional affairs rose by more than fifty percent from FY 2001 to FY 2004(National Commission, Final Report 361). More dramatic, however, was apublic shift in how the nation would engage the terrorist enemy. The admin-istration defended the need for preemptive war against alleged terrorist actors.Donald Rumsfeld explained the reasoning behind the shift from defensive tooffensive war fighting: “The reality is that a terrorist can attack at any time inany place using any technique, and it is physically impossible for a free peopleto defend in every place at every time against every technique. Now what doesthat mean? It means [. . .] that we have to take this battle, this war to the ter-rorists, where they are. And the best defense is an effective offense in thiscase, and that means they have to be rooted out” (FDCH Transcripts 16 Sept.2001: 3). The administration’s use of preemptive war in Iraq constituted anincremental, but important, step from the nation’s previous covert preemptivemilitary actions against terrorists. Now the public doctrine of preemptive warplaced all state and nonstate actors on alert that the United States would bethe aggressor in its quest to quell all potential terrorist activities.

As the administration engaged in an unprecedented expansion of com-mander-in-chief powers, it relied on the America’s historical narratives topublicly justify its response to terrorism. In particular, the Bush administra-tion resurrected strategies of the nation’s founders struggling to defeat theAmerican Indians (Winkler 85–105). In the early years of the new republic,the nation’s leadership considered the conquest of barbaric savages a neces-sary step toward a superior, civilized culture (Onuf 23–33). To achieve thegoal, Thomas Jefferson initially demanded assimilation or expulsion of thetribal residents. Jefferson, writing to William Henry Harrison in 1803, madethe strategy explicit: “[The Indians] will in time either incorporate with us ascitizens of the United States, or remove beyond the Mississippi. [. . .] Shouldany tribe be foolhardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizingthe whole country of that tribe, and driving them across the Mississippi, asthe only condition of peace, would be an example to others, and a further-ance of our final consolidation” (as qtd. in Prucha 23). Jefferson’s forcedchoice of assimilation or removal became insufficient over time for achievingthe nation’s objectives. As the US secretary of the interior argued in 1851,“The policy of removal [. . .] must necessarily be abandoned; and the onlyalternatives left are to civilize or exterminate them” (as qtd. in Wilson 289).The combination of assimilation, removal, and extermination emerged as themeans for handling the nation’s Indians.


The Bush administration’s public approach to the war on terrorism bor-rowed from each of these three strategies. Initially, the administrationoffered the option of assimilation. Foreign governments previously associatedwith terrorist groups received the chance to change their behavior and jointhe other members of civilized society. Powell spoke of the benefits foreignstates would receive for accepting the US offer of amnesty when he stated,“We have designated those [who harbor and aid terrorism] as sponsors ofterrorism [. . .] it is not in their interest to continue acting in this way,because they will risk further isolation and increasing pressure if they partici-pate in such activities. And hopefully the message will get through andthey’ll start to change past patterns of behavior” (Federal News Service 21 Sept2001: 3). Bush used multiple public forums to present the Taliban with thechoice of assimilation, an option he conceptualized as turning over binLaden and the other top lieutenants of al Qaeda. He similarly offeredSaddam Hussein the opportunity to fully comply with the UN resolutionsimposed after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The choice was straightforward:either for or against the US war on terrorism.

For those who failed to recognize the value of assimilation, the option ofremoval awaited them. The task of the United States, as Rumsfeld defined it,was “to root out the global terrorist networks—not just in Afghanistan butwherever they are—and to ensure that they cannot threaten the Americanpeople or our way of life” (Federal News Service 1 Nov. 2001: 2).Administration officials relied on a number of euphemisms to demonstratetheir commitment to removing the terrorists. Among the oft-repeatedphrases reminiscent of the colonial period were “rooting them out,” “drainingthe swamp,” “smoking them out,” and “getting them running.” Governmentswho chose to support terrorists faced a similar fate of removal. Americaninterests, according to Rumsfeld, were “to help the people of [Afghanistan]get rid of the foreign invaders who have come in and taken over a majorchunk of their country” (Federal News Service 12 Oct. 2001: 6). The samestrategy appeared in the president’s justification for the war with Iraq. Bushoffered Saddam Hussein the opportunity to leave Iraq in exile as heannounced, “[R]egime change in Iraq is the only certain means of removinga great danger to our nation” (White House 7 Oct 2002: 4). Rendered illegiti-mate by their support for terrorism in the administration’s narrative, the gov-ernments of Iraq and Afghanistan had to yield the lands they occupied toothers willing to assimilate into the civilized world community.

As before in the nation’s history, removal alone did not qualify as a suf-ficient strategy for the defeat of terrorism. When asked by a reporter “Doyou want bin Laden dead?” Bush’s recalled an old poster from the AmericanWest: “Wanted, Dead or Alive” (FDCH Transcripts 17 Nov. 2001: 2). While


the single remark does not constitute proof by itself that the administrationconsidered extermination, the inference was far from isolated in official dis-course. Consider Rumsfeld’s insistence that the United States would have a“long and sustained campaign to liquidate terrorist networks [. . .]” (FederalNews Service 18 Oct. 2001: 1; emphasis mine), or Bush’s stated belief that“the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it,eliminate it and destroy it where it grows” (FDCH Transcripts 20 Sept. 2001:6; emphasis mine). US allies in the region, most notably the Afghani minis-ter for frontier and tribal affairs, announced that Eastern Afghanistan wouldundergo an “Al-Qaeda cleansing” campaign (Smucker 1). Even Bush’s infa-mous antithesis that the United States should bring justice to the terrorists orbring the terrorists to justice suggested a form of vigilantism that threatenedthe continued existence of the American nemesis.

The Bush administration publicly denied that their use of the earlyrepublic’s rhetorical strategy meant that they intended to reinvent America’smanifest destiny doctrine. In Afghanistan, Rumsfeld insisted, “The UnitedStates covets no one else’s land—certainly not Afghanistan. We’re there todo a job. We’re there to root out the terrorists and the terrorist networks andto see that the Taliban government who invited them in and has been har-boring terrorists is gone. And that is our interest, period” (Federal NewsService 27 Nov. 2001). After the capture of Saddam Hussein, Bush offered asimilar message to the Iraqi people: “The goals of our coalition are the sameas your goals: Sovereignty for your country; dignity for your great culture;and for every Iraqi citizen, the opportunity for a better life” (FDCHTranscripts 22 Dec. 2003: 1). By June 30, 2004, the administration trans-ferred sovereignty of Iraq back to its people and garnered support for a UNresolution recognizing the new Iraqi government. While the transferstrengthened the case that America did not plan to maintain autonomy overthe Middle Eastern nation, public criticism at home and abroad continued tohighlight the role of the ongoing military occupation of Iraq, the substantialUS influence on Iraq’s new constitution, and America’s corporate involve-ment in the reconstruction of Iraq’s economy.

In sum, the Bush administration’s public communication strategy in thewar on terrorism reconstituted the Cold War narrative to recall the approachof the early republic’s leaders. Just as Thomas Jefferson publicly advocatedthe eventual assimilation, removal, and extermination of the AmericanIndians from their lands, so the Bush narrative promised a similar fate forindividuals, groups, or states that attempted to thwart American interests byusing terrorism at home or abroad. Rhetorically relieved of the responsibilityof bad acts through the promise of a superior civilization, the leadershipacted ideologically in the name of what is right, good, and moral.



Having aroused pain and danger, the most powerful of human passions, theevents of September 11 readied American audiences for expanded interpreta-tions of threats to their cultural existence. In response, Bush displayed noreluctance in framing the conflict between terrorists and the United States asideological warfare. He insisted, “Terrorists [. . . do] have a common ideol-ogy, and that is, they hate freedom and they hate freedom-loving people.And they particularly hate America at this moment” (FDCH Transcripts 19Sept. 2001: 3). For Bush, terrorists did not oppose particular US foreignpolicy initiatives that he could change to eliminate the threat; they contestedthe fundamental defining characteristics of American culture.

The Bush administration’s ideological depiction of terrorism was notlimited to actual perpetrators of such acts. Ashcroft grouped terrorists withthe nations that supported them into a monolithic ideological opponent. Hesurmised, “[Terrorist] organizations operate across borders to advance theirideological agendas. They benefit from the shelter and the protection oflike-minded regimes” (FDCH Transcripts 24 Sept. 2001: 2). Within such aframework, any individual, group, or entity the government dubbed a “ter-rorist” functioned as a cultural threat to the United States.

The 9/11 Commission agreed that the terrorist threat the United Statesfaced had become an ideologically driven enemy. Quoting from MehdiMozaffari in its final report, the commission explained the nature of the newthreat: “Islamic terrorism is an immediate derivative of Islamism. This termdistinguishes itself from Islamic by the fact that the latter refers to a religionand culture in existence over a millennium, whereas the first is apolitical/religious phenomenon linked to the great events of the 20th cen-tury. Furthermore, Islamists define themselves as ‘Islamiyyoun/Islamists’ pre-cisely to differentiate themselves from ‘Muslimun/Muslims.’ [. . .] Islamism isdefined as an Islamic military, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holisticvision of Islam whose final aim is the caliphate’” (National Commission,Final Report 562). As a minority strain in the Muslim community, Islamismposed a threat to all non-Islamic nations.

The Bush administration, like the 9/11 Commission, downplayed criti-cisms that the ideological approach constituted a clash of civilizations. Bushreminded his audiences of US words and actions in support of moderateMuslims around the world. Recalling “the American tradition of toleranceand religious liberty” (FDCH Transcripts 24 Nov. 2001: 1), Bush maintainedthat the United States was not attacking the Muslim faith or the Afghanipeople. Offering a story he claimed demonstrated the “true nature ofAmerica” (FDCH Transcripts 11 Oct. 2001: 2), Bush spoke of Christian andJewish women going shopping with Muslim women afraid to go outside


alone (3). Spokespersons recalled prior conflicts, such as Bosnia or the 1979Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to demonstrate the historical willingness ofthe United States to come to the aid of its Muslim neighbors. They alsorepeatedly referenced airdrops of food to the Afghani refugees and theAmerican commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq. From the Bushadministration’s perspective, the alliance with America, not the Muslim fun-damentalists, held the best hope for the future of moderate Arabs. Similar tothe claim by the 9/11 Commission Report that the United States was caughtup in a “clash within a civilization” (National Commission, Final Report 363),Bush maintained that the actual conflict prompting acts of terrorism wasbeing fought between the various elements of Muslim societies.

The Bush administration’s related public diplomacy strategy in theMiddle East, however, suffered setbacks due to various official statementsthat reinforced the clash of civilizations hypothesis. Bush himself was thefirst to contribute to the fray when on September 16, 2001, he announced,“This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while” (as qtd. in Ford,“Europe Cringes” 1). His reference to crusades hearkened back to the reli-gious wars between Muslims and Christians that erupted during the MiddleAges. Seeking to contain the damage from his public remarks, Bushappeared the next day in an Islamic Center and praised the shared humani-tarian values of all faiths.

Public comments by Major General William Boykin before Christianfundamentalist churches bolstered the case that the war on terror was a clashof civilizations. The Los Angeles Times initially reported one incident whereBoykin, a top intelligence official at the Defense Department involved in thedecisions related to detainee interrogations at Iraqi prisons, was speaking toBaptists in Florida in 2003. In his address Boykin relayed an account wherein victory he had faced a Muslim warlord in Somalia who announced thatAllah would protect him. Boykin responded by boasting, “I knew my Godwas bigger than his” (as qtd. in Cooper 1). In June 2003, he spoke again, thistime at the Good Shepherd Community Church in Oregon. Boykin told thecongregation, “Islamic terrorists hate the U.S. because we’re a Christiannation, because our foundation and our roots are Judeo-Christian [. . .] andthe enemy is a guy named Satan” (as qtd. in “General Says” 1). Boykin’sdecision to dress in his US military uniform while making such commentsfueled speculation that his views represented those of the administration.

The Bush camp moved quickly to disassociate itself publicly fromBoykin’s incendiary statements. Bush announced that Boykin’s view “doesn’treflect my point of view or the point of view of my administration” (as qtd. inG. Taylor). Despite the efforts at disassociation, the American MuslimAssociation (AMA) denounced Bush for not rebuking others who had pub-licly reinforced the conflict between the two religions (i.e., Franklin Graham,


Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, John Ashcroft, and Daniel Pipes). ImperialHubris presents a litany of such statements made by the other speakersdenounced by the AMA: “When Pat Robertson says ‘Adolph Hitler is bad,but what the Muslims do to the Jews is worse’; the Reverend Jerry Falwellrefers to the Prophet as a ‘terrorist’; Jimmy Swaggart prays that ‘God blessesthose who bless Israel and damns those who damn it’; and the ReverendFranklin Graham calls Islam a ‘wicked religion’ and says Christianity andIslam are ‘different as lightness and darkness,’ Muslims believe that ‘[n]everhas Islam faced such a frantic campaign of insult for centuries’ ” (3). Recentpolls conducted in the Middle East reveal widespread sentiment consistentwith the concerns of the AMA. Consolidating the results of available publicopinion data, Anderson and Stansfield conclude, “[T]he vast majority ofArabs still prefer to believe that 9/11 was a self-inflicted wound designed tojustify a ‘crusade’ against the Muslim world” (189).

Compounding the administration’s clash with the Muslim world were thepublic words of Osama bin Laden. Capitalizing on media coverage in the Arabworld on Al Jazeera, bin Laden borrowed heavily from the administration’sown narrative frame for the conflict. Specifically, he evoked the settings,characterizations, and themes of the ideologically based Cold War narrativeto call Muslims to war against the United States. He echoed the Americanrendition by depicting a scene grown fragile from complacency. After USand British air strikes began in Afghanistan, Al Jazeera aired a video thatfeatured bin Laden saying, “Our nation (the Islamic world) has been tastingthis humiliation and degradation for more than 80 years. Its sons are killed,its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked, and no-one hears and no-oneheeds” (Associated Press, “Text of Osama bin Ladin’s Statement”). The ref-erence in bin Laden’s words was to the suffering of the Palestinians caused asa result of the establishment of Israel by Allied Forces at the end of WorldWar II. In the same speech, he cataloged the ongoing suffering of theJapanese after the dropping of the A-bomb, of the Iraqis after the PersianGulf War, and of the Afghanis after the Clinton administration air strikes.In earlier statements bin Laden raised the Qana massacre in Lebanon andthe withholding of arms to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina as examplesof where the United States and its allies had caused the suffering of Muslimswith no meaningful response (bin Laden, “Osama bin Ladin v. Edicts”).

The enemy in the bin Laden narrative was the United States. Consistentwith the Cold War narrative, the goal of the enemy character was world con-quest, only this time the reference was to the defeat of the Islamic world. BinLaden emphasized the imperial intention of the United States, describingAmerica’s goals as “to annihilate Islam above anything else, because they arefully convinced that their plan in our country, on its various axes particularlythe economic, intellectual and military, cannot be implemented as long as


Islam exists and controls the region, because the Muslims indeed possess thefaith, the will and the capability to fight against their plans and to repulsetheir oppression eye for an eye” (bin Laden, “Prepared Text” 2). Bin Ladencast US envoy Paul Bremer’s decision not to accept Islam as the religion ofIraq in the post-Saddam period as proof of America’s ultimate objectives. Hereasoned, “[I]t shows the extent of their hidden hatred for the religion. Italso shows that the struggle is a religious and an ideological one, and that theclash is one of civilizations. They are keen to destroy the Islamic identity inthe entire Islamic world—and this is their real stand regarding us” (ibid.).For bin Laden, America’s imperial motives placed Muslims around the worldat risk.

The enemy’s methods as depicted in bin Laden’s narrative were alsoconsistent with those of the Cold War narrative. He emphasized the enslave-ment of the Muslim people as America’s first step toward realizing its ulti-mate goal of conquest. Bin Laden claimed that the intention of the UnitedStates was to strip Muslims of their rights of self-determination:“[Americans] have come out in force with their men and have turned eventhe countries that belong to Islam to this treachery, and they want to wagtheir tail at God, to fight Islam, to suppress people in the name of terrorism”(Associated Press, “Text of Osama bin Laden’s Statement”). Further, hedenounced America’s claim to accept all religions as a means “to suck thetreasures of the peoples, to enslave them and to Americanize them into theaxes the way they wish” (bin Laden, “Prepared Text” 2). Bin Laden insistedthat US designs were to strip the Islamic people of their religious choice, andby extension, their choice of government.

Bin Laden used the US transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people tobolster his case that the enemy sought to enslave Muslims. He encouragedthe Iraqi people not to be fooled by the hypocrisy of the United States. Heargued, “[T]he so-called transfer of power to the Iraqis is an obvious ployintended to sedate the people and to aborting [sic] the armed resistance” (binLaden, “Prepared Text” 3). Bin Laden’s word choice not only reinforced thecharacterization of the enemy as dictatorial, but also recalled the Cold War’scharacterization of the enemy as untrustworthy.

In bin Laden’s narrative, America had a historical record of barbaricbehavior as it pursued its quest to achieve dominance over the Islamic world.He remembered Japanese civilians who had died or suffered because of theUS decision to drop the atomic bomb, Iraqi children that were starving andkilled because of US policies, and his “the brothers and sisters” who sufferedin Palestine and Lebanon, to name but a few (bin Laden, “Remarks viaVideotape” 1). He even justified the attacks on the World Trade Center andthe Pentagon by recalling acts of US barbarity. Bin Laden pronounced thatthe people in those buildings had “supported the murder against the victims.


So God has given them back what they deserve” (ibid.). Whether directlyinvolved in the implementation of US foreign policy or indirectly supportiveof the governments involved, all US citizens qualified for bin Laden’s charac-terization as members of a barbaric regime.

Bin Laden claimed the role of hero character for Muslims within hisrendition of the narrative. Like the hero who conquered Communismduring the Cold War, he cast his own behavior and that of his colleagues asconstituting a religious mission. As early as August 23, 1996, bin Ladenissued “The Declaration of Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Countryof the Two Sacred Places,” a call for all Muslims as part of their religiousduty to attack US military targets. In the aftermath of the September 11attacks, Bin Laden renewed his earlier call for jihad. He insisted, “EveryMuslim has to rush to make his religion victorious” (Associated Press,“Text of Osama bin Laden’s Statement”). An al Qaeda lieutenant appear-ing by the side of bin Laden on a videotaped statement reiterated the sametheme: “[J]ihad for the sake of God today is an obligation on every Muslimin this land if he has no excuse” (Associated Press, “Text of al QaidaStatement”). Bin Laden indicated that jihad would continue until Americaabandoned its presence in Saudi Arabia, the homeland to the holy places ofMecca and Medina.

Confident in his pursuit of Allah’s goals, bin Laden predicted ultimatevictory for the Muslim forces. He again relied on history to bolster his casethat the divine cause of the Muslims would prevail. He remembered, “Thekilling of the Russians was after their invasion of Afghanistan and Chechnya;the killing of Europeans was after their invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan;and the killing of Americans on the day of New York was after their supportof the Jews in Palestine and their invasion of the Arabian Peninsula. Also,killing them in Somalia was after their invasion of it in Operation RescueHope. We made them leave without hope, praise be to God” (bin Laden,“Remarks Addressing European Nations” 3). Bin Laden promised that withthe faith and perseverance of all Muslims in the cause of jihad, there wouldbe an optimistic outcome for the believers of Allah.

The Bush administration responded to bin Laden’s narrative by refusingto yield the moral high ground, including divine providence, to Islamic fun-damentalists. Borrowing a rhetorical strategy from the Clinton administra-tion, the Bush camp depicted bin Laden and his followers as false prophetsthat were blaspheming the Muslim religion. Rumsfeld argued that terroristsare believers “not in the theology of God, but the theology of the self and inthe whispered words of temptation, ‘ye shall be as gods’” (FDCH Transcripts11 Oct. 2001: 2). Powell added that terrorists, by nature, were antithetical toreligious faith. He surmised, “It is terrorism that is directed against people. Itrepresents no faith, no religion. It is evil. It is murderous [. . .] and that’s why


the word terrorist is the right noun to apply to people like Osama bin Laden”(FDCH Transcripts 26 Oct. 2001: 5). To gain credibility on the issue, theadministration pointed to the statement by fifty-six Islamic nations denounc-ing the September 11th attacks and declaring that the incidents had violatedthe principles of Islam (Bush, FDCH Transcripts 11 Oct. 2001: 2). In theadministration’s public stance, Osama bin Laden served as the very antithesisof the fundamental tenets of all religious faiths.

The administration offered various examples of how Islamic fundamen-talists, represented by bin Laden and the Taliban, had distorted the teach-ings of religion. Bush decried the lack of religious freedom in Afghanistan,maintaining, “They destroy great monuments of human culture and religiousfaith. They execute people who convert to other religions. They steal foodfrom starving people” (Federal New Service 9 Nov. 2001: 1). Rumsfeldstressed the Taliban’s lack of humanitarian, if not Christian, values byreminding his audiences that they had killed hundreds of Afghanis whenthey took over the country initially, that they were cruel to the Afghanisduring their reign, and that they had executed Afghani citizens who weretrying to leave the country (Federal News Service 13 Nov. 2001: 2; FederalNews Service 19 Nov. 2001: 2). The Taliban emerged as the Bush adminis-tration’s representative anecdote for what various states could expect shouldthey be duped by the Muslim fundamentalists’ claim that they acted in thename of Allah.

In sum, the Bush administration simultaneously denounced bin Laden’sideological framing of the conflict, while defending its own. Not wanting togo to war with the Muslim community as a whole, the administrationframed its opponents as Islamic fundamentalists bent on the destruction ofthe United States and its way of life. Denying religious authority to theenemy while simultaneously assuming it for the American cause, the govern-ment’s spokespersons strived to build the case for civilized and free culturesaround the globe.


8

Terrorism and American Culture

Acts of terrorist violence are communication phenomena. Terrorist attackssymbolically represent far more than the actual bombing, kidnapping, or

other form of brutal assault. Terrorism is designed both to instill alarm in itsvictims and to create broader anxiety in those that fear they will be next. In aglobal era of instantaneous media communications, even a small-scale act ofterrorist violence can have a dramatic, far-reaching impact on the public.

To simply view terrorism as an instance of verbal or nonverbal symbol-ism, however, ignores a primary communicative function of the term.Terrorism functions as a linguistic marker of American culture. The term’smeaning guides appropriate beliefs and behaviors of those belonging to thecollective. Terrorism demarcates the unacceptable, as it embodies the evil,barbaric, unholy, and destructive impulses of society. Central to the commu-nity’s shared sense of belonging is the need to cleanse society of those whohave gone astray.

Terrorism’s potency as a resilient term of cultural definition helpsexplain why many consider it the most pejorative term in the English lan-guage. Presidents have applied the term to many of the nation’s most signifi-cant challenges (i.e., the birth of the republic, World War II, Vietnam, andSeptember 11th, to name but a few). The meaning of terrorism has bothshaped and been shaped by those experiences. The terrorism label, thus,functions today as a deeply rooted term of enmity that carries associationswith key foundational moments of American culture.

Like all terms of political allegiance, terrorism’s meaning is amorphous.The term’s adaptability has allowed it to encompass a wide range of threatsemerging both at home and abroad. When Thomas Jefferson called on theearly republic to respond forcefully to acts of terror by the American Indians,he could not have conceived that the label would someday apply to the use ofbiological, chemical or nuclear weapons against civilian populations. Giventhe past expansions of the term’s meaning and its future potential for evenbroader interpretations, few acts of enmity against US interests are immunefrom possible inclusion in the war on terror.

189

With the potential to encompass a diverse set of threats, the terror-ist label emerges as a unifying term of cultural discourse. Terrorism’sflexible meaning allows it to have resonance with a wide range of indi-viduals who otherwise hold diverse perspectives in the political arena.Those who denounce acts of violence by Palestinians against the state ofIsrael, those who worry about the growing power of domestic militiagroups, those concerned about drugs flowing into America, and thosewho oppose the hacking of business information systems can all unite inthe fight against terrorism.

Recognizing the power of the terrorism label, recent presidents havesubstantially increased the amount of their public discourse on the topic.While the nation’s leaders in the first half of the twentieth century rarelymentioned terrorism, some contemporary leaders have discussed it in upwardof a thousand public statements during their tenures in office. The leader-ship’s increased focus on terrorism has elevated the importance of the term ofenmity both at home and on the world stage.

Within the growing corpus of political speeches about terrorism, presi-dents have repeatedly insisted they faced new terrorist threats. Carter,Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush each announced that the terroristsoperating during their administrations were somehow unique and unprece-dented. By publicly reinventing the terrorist threat, presidents have presenteda renewed framework for designating appropriate beliefs and behaviors forthose desiring in-group status or alliance with American culture. Foreignleaders wishing to avoid their own inclusion within the US parameters of theterrorist label have altered their behavior in line with the new expectations(e.g., by policing their spheres of influence, accepting anti–money launderingstatutes, and establishing dual jurisdiction over individuals committing ter-rorist acts against US citizens abroad.). Some college students who once con-sidered computer hacking nothing more than an intriguing way to pass theirtime now restrict their hobby to avoid the label of cyberterrorist. In hind-sight, even members of the national media have criticized their own reluc-tance to question the existence of the administrations’ new terrorist threats,as the recent self-analyses of reporting in the run-up to the war with Iraq hasillustrated (Steinberg A14).

As presidents and their administrations have redefined the nation’s ene-mies, they have also created opportunities for the development of new publicexpectations regarding appropriate leadership. New enemies call for newresponse strategies, if not new leadership altogether. The current Bushadministration has justified the largest increase in defense spending sinceWorld War II and the largest reorganization of the federal government sinceHarry Truman, all in the name of a necessary response to a new terroristthreat. In short, terrorism not only defines American identity; it provides


opportunities for reconstituting the role of the executive branch in the gover-nance of the nation.

Tracing the expansion and contractions of terrorism’s meaning becomesa critical first step in determining how presidents have reconstituted expecta-tions for America’s identity and governance. The nation’s leadership couldnot possibly concentrate public attention on every incident of internationalterrorism. With between two and seven hundred attacks occurring each yearfrom 1970 to 2003 (see figure 8.1), the chief executives have necessarilyfocused on subsets of the entire terrorism problem in their public dialog.Their choices are revealing both in the aspects of the total problem they havechosen to feature and in the portions they have de-emphasized. Specifically,presidents have been selective in their descriptions of the agents, acts, agen-cies, scenes, and purposes of terrorism.

Close examination of how the administrations have highlighted partic-ular terrorist agents exposes a dramatic difference between domestic andforeign terrorists. When speaking about domestic terrorists who carry outviolent acts within the borders of the United States, presidents and theirsurrogates have presented those responsible as individuals acting alone, notas members of more dangerous collectives. Official spokespersons havehighlighted the individual identity of domestic terrorists by releasing thenames of even those suspected of being responsible for the attacks.According to the public statements of the Clinton and current Bush admin-istrations, Timothy McVeigh, Eric Rudolph, and the sender of the 2001anthrax letters acted alone or with one other person as they planned andcarried out their violent activities.

Terrorism and American Culture 191

Source: U.S. Dept of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents, 1968–1979;” U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl.Terrorism Incidents, 1980–1990;” U.S. Dept of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents, 1990–1999;and U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns 2003.

600

500

400

300

200

100

01970s 1980s 1990s 2000–2003

543

405 382299

Figure 8.1. Annual Average Number of International Terrorist Incidents by Decade

The decision to present domestic terrorists as sole actors becomes moreevident in light of governmental actions taken to protect such a framing ofthe enemy. Government prosecutors in the McVeigh trial argued vigorouslyagainst defense counsel motions to allow their client to present evidence ofhis connections to white supremacist groups, bin Laden and the al Qaedanetwork, or Saddam Hussein and Iraq. FBI discussions of the CentennialPark bomber shifted from early public mention of one sole actor (RichardJewell) to another (Eric Rudolph) as the manhunt continued. JusticeDepartment officials, despite their inability to arrest the sender of the 2001anthrax letters for more than three years, have announced “their certainty”that the perpetrator is a single individual (see chapter 6). Echoing the publicapproach used to depict the Centennial Park bomber, executive branchspokespersons in the anthrax case have adopted the stance of mentioning onesole actor after another as their primary suspect.

Considered from the perspective that terrorism demarcates the bound-aries of the culture, the leadership’s labeling strategy for domestic terrorism isnot surprising. Members of American society can agree that US citizens whocarry out terrorist acts are criminals who, after they have been tried and con-victed of unacceptable conduct, deserve punishment. Domestic groups, how-ever, function quite differently. Focusing on a particular collection ofAmericans as culpable for terrorist act(s) has the potential to divide, ratherthan unite, the culture. Richard Nixon’s off-the-cuff decision to label antiwarprotesters “terrorists” illustrates the tension such a perspective has with con-stitutionally protected rights of free association. If Americans who speak outagainst the government’s decision to go to war (or any of its other decisions)qualify as terrorists, the ability to broker a harmonious community withagreed-upon standards of appropriate belief and conduct is less certain.

By contrast, presidents routinely present foreign terrorists as members ofdangerous collectives that have ties to or the backing of foreign states. In theVietnam War, Johnson argued that the Viet Cong were collaborating withthe North Vietnamese and the Communist Chinese. In the final months ofthe Iranian hostage crisis, Carter’s team maintained that the student perpe-trators had the support of the Iranian government. Reagan focused on theSoviet-backed insurgents in Central America, the Iran-backed terrorists inHezbollah, the Palestinian-backed Palestinian Liberation Front, and Libya-backed terrorist acts in Europe. The current Bush administration held thatboth the Taliban and the Iraqi government had a supporting, collaborativerelationship with al Qaeda. Presidents have rarely mentioned the names ofthe individuals who carry out foreign acts of terrorism, with bin Laden andsome of his key associates in the post-9/11 period a notable exception. Whenthe leadership does disclose the identity of the perpetrators, it generallyreleases the name of the group (e.g., al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas).


Over time, presidents have shifted their depictions of how foreign stateshave participated in acts of international terrorism. In some cases the leader-ship has insisted that foreign states have served as sponsors of terrorism, bytheir provision of safe havens, logistical support, or financial means to theperpetrators of the violent acts. In others, the leaders of foreign nationsthemselves have qualified as terrorists due to their previous actions againsttheir own people or against US allies abroad. The latter portrayal has partic-ularly salient international ramifications due to its recent use as a public justi-fication for removal of foreign governments by US forces.

The decision to publicly link international terrorists to foreign states hasclear-cut implications for the response options available to presidents.Foreign state collaboration with terrorism adds diplomatic, economic, andmilitary approaches to the response arsenal. Absent such a linkage, thepotential for controversy arises. International outrage over Bill Clinton’sdecision to bomb the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant and the Taliban trainingcamps exemplifies the shortcomings of exercising military responses to ter-rorism without labeling the targeted foreign state as part of the terroristattack. While a sitting president would undoubtedly insist such attacks tar-geted the terrorists and not the state, foreign governments could easily inter-pret the measures as acts of war.

The communal, international nature of the threat also helps define theactors who should respond. A fight against internationally orchestrated ter-rorist groups invites a nonisolationist response strategy. With few exceptions,active engagement and partnership within the new global community hasbecome the preferred method of eradicating terrorism. America joined withSouth Vietnam to defeat the alliance of Communist China, North Vietnam,and the Viet Cong; with the Contras to defeat the alliance of the SovietUnion, Cuba, and the Sandinistas; with a broad coalition of both Arab andnon-Arab states against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War; and with the coalitionof the willing to defeat the al Qaeda network. As a previously discussedReagan era memo revealed (see chapter 5), a collective response in the inter-national community makes US global intervention against terrorists easierand absolves the nation of the burdensome responsibility if counterterrorismactions fail.

Finally, the focus on foreign states as primary actors in international ter-rorism serves to help unify the public in the fight against the enemy. Attacksfrom foreign states pit state against state, with the assumption that all citi-zens of those nations are under assault. Borrowing from the conventionalexpectations of war rhetoric, presidents insist that a unified public is neces-sary for the nation to prevail in the conflict.

Beyond a selective approach toward terrorist actors, presidents have alsobeen discerning about which terrorist acts they emphasize to promulgate their


views of proper conduct and belief within American culture. Prior to the endof Reagan’s terms in office, a primary focus of executive branch discourse wason hostage taking and kidnapping. Presidents in office from the VietnamWar up until the mid-1980s warned the public repeatedly that terrorists used

extortion, kidnapping, coercion, and intimidation to achieve their ends. Theleadership’s focus corresponded with official State Department statisticsshowing an annual average of thirty-five Americans held hostage in the1970s and forty-two in the 1980s (see figure 8.2).

The back-to-back Iranian hostage crisis and Iran-Contra scandal, how-ever, gave subsequent presidents pause. Despite the fact that the annual aver-age of Americans held hostage still hovered at forty in the 1990s (see figure8.2), George H. W. Bush was reticent to use the hostage label in any publiccontext, even after international media coverage revealed that Iraq was hold-ing US citizens in Kuwait. Clinton went further, publicly redefining terror-ism to exclude lingering crises and virtually omitting all public mention ofcitizens kidnapped and held abroad. George W. Bush publicly mentionedAmericans held hostage, but normally reserved his comments for incidentsresulting in quick, heinous deaths (e.g., the 2004 spate of beheadings inIraq). Taken as a whole, the most recent presidents have chosen to focustheir public attention on terrorist methods that strike quickly, hold thepotential of mass casualties, and have obvious closure.

The change in how presidents have described terrorists’ acts has implica-tions for American governance. Presidents’ depiction of the relative speed ofthe terrorists in the 1990s functioned as a justification for a quickening of thenation’s responses. The George H. W. Bush administration fought a ground


50

40

30

20

10

01970s 1980s 1990s

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents 1968–1979;” U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl.Terrorism Incidents 1980–1990;” and U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents1990–1999.” The chart does not include data from 2000–2003 due to the decision of the gov-ernment to only report attacks against U.S. facilities and attacks in which the U.S. suffered casu-alties.

Figure 8.2. Annual Average Number of Kidnappings by Decade

war in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict in one hundred hours. The Clintonadministration signed laws that reduced the delay in appeals for convictedterrorists and sped up the departure of foreigners suspected of terrorism. TheGeorge W. Bush administration displayed limited patience with interna-tional WMD inspectors and supported a preemptive war. As the nation’sleadership has had to cope in a dangerous world filled with quick decisionsand rapid consequences, it has become less willing to entertain extendeddiplomatic overtures or sustained economic sanctions.

The Presidents’ focus on speed has also had implications for interpretingthe separation of powers doctrine. A number of official spokespersons forvarious administrations have argued they could respond to the nation’sthreats faster (and better) if the congress and the courts did not interfere.They have maintained that assaults on US interests, whether against citizensor property, happen in the moment, with the result that the nation can illafford the time of consultation characteristic of previous eras. The enemy’sspeed has affected not only decisions as to the branch of government thatshould respond, but in what manner it should proceed.

Having narrowed public discussion of the agents and acts of terrorism,the nation’s leadership has also been selective about agency (i.e., the meansused by terrorists to achieve their objectives). A key feature of terrorism isthat its perpetrators are selective in their choice of victims to maximize thepublic impact of their acts. The various administrations have primarily por-trayed the victims of terrorism to be civilians. The leadership’s examples ofthe targets have included men, women, and children traveling aboard ships(Achille Lauro), airplanes (Pan Am 103, TWA 847, KAL 007, and the 9/11airliners), or trains (Tokyo subway station). Others have been at work at gov-ernmental service positions within the civilian sector, such as at foreignembassies (Iran, Lebanon, Tanzania, and Kenya) or in federal buildingslocated within the borders of the United States (Alfred Murrah Building inOklahoma City). From time to time, the nation’s leadership has singled outvarious targeted occupations such as village and hamlet officials, nuns andclergymen, journalists, and academic professors and administrators. Takentogether, the civilians mentioned by presidents have been those critical to theinfrastructure of American society.

While the administrations in this study have generally emphasized civil-ians as the terrorists’ victims, they have also presented military personnel as arepeated category of injured party. The Johnson and Nixon administrationsrecounted incidents where terrorists bombed American servicemen in the-aters and restaurants. The Reagan administration recalled the deaths of mili-tary servicemen visiting a Berlin discothèque and sleeping in their barracks inLebanon. The Clinton administration spoke of the bombing of military per-sonnel aboard the USS Cole, as they docked to restock in Yemen. Finally, the


current Bush administration remembered members of the military who diedor were injured in the attack on the Pentagon. By stressing off-duty militarypersonnel or civilians working within the defense establishment, presidentshave underscored both the innocence of the victims and the necessaryinvolvement of the commander in chief in responding to terrorism.

A review of the victim categories used by the State Department’sPatterns of Global Terrorism reveals that the choices of presidents were alsotelling in what types of victims the leadership omitted. The StateDepartment breaks down its official statistics of targeted facilities into fivesubcategories: diplomat, government, military, business, and other.Presidents’ public discussion of the victims of terrorist attacks has incorpo-rated each of the subdivisions with one exception: business. The omissionhas distorted the actual targets of terrorism for the public. In every decadecovered in this study, businesses experienced a greater number of attacksthan the other types of officially cataloged facilities (see figure 8.3). Further,the percentage of international terrorism incidents targeting business facili-ties has grown rapidly with each passing decade (see figure 8.4). Despite therise in attacks against businesses, each of the presidents since the VietnamWar has avoided repeated references to a spectacular or sustained terroristcampaign against any American business overseas.

Presidents have heightened their opportunities for unifying the public inthe war on terrorism by deflecting attention away from businesses as targets.Businesses operating overseas have historically prompted a number of publiccontroversies, such as substandard worker conditions, environmental con-cerns, and tax revenue losses. The mention of terrorist attacks against partic-ular businesses, consequently, has the potential to elicit a sympathetic


300

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150

100

50

01970s 1980s 1990s 2000–2003

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, “International Terrorism Incidents by Victim/Facility, 1969–1979;”U.S. Dept. of State, “International Terrorism Incidents by Victim/Facility, 1980-1990;” U.S.Dept. of State, “International Terrorism Incidents by Victim/Facility, 1990–1999;” and U.S. Dept.of State, Patterns 2002–2003. The official category of “other” is not presented in this figure.

Figure 8.3. Annual Average Number of Facilities Struck byInternational Terrorist Incidents

BusinessDiplomatGovt.Military

response from some Americans, to further galvanize the global environmen-tal protection movement, or to heighten public concerns about growingdeficits. By treating terrorism as a random assault on innocents both at homeand abroad, the leadership has emphasized that it is protecting all Ameri-cans— not the profit margins of a select few.

The scene mentioned in presidents’ featured terrorist attacks also dif-fers substantially from actual events. Most frequently, presidents havehighlighted terrorism attacks happening in the Middle East (e.g., the USEmbassy in Tehran in 1979–80, the US Embassy and military barracks inLebanon in 1983, TWA 847, Achille Lauro, American hostages heldthroughout the 1980s, Kuwait, and the USS Cole) or those perpetrated byMiddle Eastern agents outside of the region (the Berlin discothèque, PanAm 103, the World Trade Center in 1993, US embassies in Tanzania andKenya, and 9/11). Since the 1970s the bulk of actual terrorist incidentsinvolving the United States, however, have happened outside of theMiddle East; they have occurred in Latin America. From 1970 to 2003, arank ordering of the regions with the highest percentage of terroristattacks involving the United States reveals that the Middle East had fewerincidents than Latin America, Europe, and Asia (see figure 8.5). Thefocus on the Middle East in administration discourse has demonstratedthat strategic calculations are involved in the selection of particular acts ofterrorism for public focus. The nation’s need to secure competitive oilsupplies from the Middle East has rendered the region a focal point for


70%60%50%40%30%20%10%

0%1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–2003

Figure 8.4. Percentage of International Terrorist IncidentsTargeting Business Facilities

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents, 1968–1979;” U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl.Terrorism Incidents, 1980–1990;” U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents, 1990–1999;”and U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns 2000–2003.

securing US interests, regardless of whether the region has been the truehotbed of terrorism.

Finally, presidents since the Vietnam War have been selective about theirdepictions of the purposes for the enemy’s violence. The nation’s leadershiphas either refused to publicly discuss the motivations for terrorist violencealtogether or they have pronounced that the terrorists’ goals were to attackfoundational American values, such as freedom, democracy or liberty. Evenpresidents publicly seeking to downplay the ideological nature of the terroristthreat have focused on attacks targeting operations fundamental to the globalfunctioning of American society, such as U.S. embassies in Iran, Tanzania,and Kenya.

The presidents’ public strategy of deflecting attention away from the ter-rorists’ own stated causes for violence has functioned to unify the Americanpublic in a number of ways. First, the approach has minimized questionsabout how earlier U.S. actions might have contributed to such acts of vio-lence. Carter’s decision to admit the Shah into the U.S. for medical treat-ment, the shooting down of an Iranian airbus by the USS Vincennes duringthe Reagan administration, and George H. W. Bush’s administration’s con-versations with Saddam Hussein in the days immediately prior to Iraq’s inva-sion of Kuwait have all been examples of when the presidents have beenmotivated to deflect attention away from the terrorists’ stated causes, and inthe process, made a more compelling case for the American public to supportthe nation’s fight against terrorists. Absent US culpability, the terroristsalone have carried the burden of the nation’s retaliatory response.


50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%Latin America Europe Asia Middle East

Figure 8.5. Percentage of International Terrorism Incidents Involvingthe United States by Region: 1970–2003

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents, 1968–1979,” U.S. Dept. of State; “Intl.Terrorism Incidents, 1980–1990;” U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents, 1990–1999;”and U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns 2000–2003. The figures for 2000–2003 used in this calculationinclude all international terrorism incidents, rather than only the incidents involving the U.S.due to absence of more specific U.S. numbers in the official reports.

Second, omitting the enemy’s declared purposes has served to dehuman-ize the terrorists, rendering them more deserving of US punishment. Duringthe Reagan administration’s debriefing of the American passengers on TWA847, aides discovered that some of the ex-hostages had developed a bondwith their captors and gained sympathy for the Shi’ite cause after listening tothe hijackers’ appeals over a two-week period (Memo, What the President IsLikely to Hear). Perhaps fearing that a public reiteration of the enemy’smotives might similarly sway public opinion on a wider scale, the presidentshave deflected attention from the terrorists’ own explanations for their vio-lence. Instead, the leadership has insisted that all terrorists have been seekingto undercut the fundamental values of America and the world community,thereby making the case for a military response more palpable to the public.

Understood purely from the perspective of official US definitions,instances of international terrorism have been motivated by political, noteconomic objectives. When the State Department has cataloged acts ofinternational terrorism, they have done so according to the definition of ter-rorism contained in Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d): “The termterrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetratedagainst noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,usually intended to influence an audience” [emphasis mine] (U.S. StateDept., Patterns 2002). The State Department has relied upon this definitionthat features politically motivated violence to track terrorism since 1983.

Despite the official classification, however, contemporary presidentialdiscourse has confounded the distinctions between the political and eco-nomic objectives of the terrorists. Early on, the nation’s leadership subtlymerged the two. During the Vietnam War, Kennedy and Johnson arguedthat terrorists attacked the economic infrastructures of South Vietnam toundermine the ability of a fledgling democratic government to succeed. TheGeorge H. W. Bush administration similarly maintained that SaddamHussein sought control over Kuwait’s economic resources to undermine theeconomies of fledgling democracies around the globe. By the 1990s, how-ever, presidents were more blunt about their conflation of the two goals.Clinton insisted that a distinction between economic and national securityno longer existed. George W. Bush repeatedly emphasized the expansivephrase “our way of life” to describe what the terrorists sought to disrupt. Inshort, presidents functionally merged economic objectives within the contextof more conventional political goals, even as they avoided mention ofAmerican businesses as the target of terrorism.

Gradually moving terrorist’s objectives into the global economic arenacontributed to the emerging definition of America’s cultural identity. As thedepictions of the goals of terrorism changed over time, so too did the role thepresidents envisioned for the United States within the broader international


community. When terrorists sought the downfall of emerging democraticgovernments, presidents argued the United States represented the onlymeaningful check on Communist aggression worldwide. When the enemywanted to undermine open societies, presidents maintained that the UnitedStates functioned as the only meaningful check on totalitarian leadershiparound the globe. When terrorists harbored economic objectives, US identitychanged once again, this time expanding into the role of protector of theexisting world economic order. Having depicted terrorists as threats to thepolitical and economic interests of an increasingly interdependent world, theobligations of American leadership expanded in a corresponding fashion.

Engaged in a battle for the world’s economic future, recent presidentshave justified an expansion of executive powers into international financialaffairs. George H. W. Bush and Jimmy Carter seized the financial assets offoreign nations to provide a reserve for settling claims in the aftermath ofhostilities. The Clinton administration pressured international banks to con-form to anti–money laundering statutes and to open the banking records oftheir international clients for US inspection. The current Bush administra-tion seized the foreign assets of governments, groups, and individuals allegedto have contributed money knowingly or unknowingly in support of terroristcauses. Asserting privilege over new financial assets historically beyond theirreach, recent presidents have redefined the role of the United States in theglobal marketplace.

In sum, presidents have generally concentrated their own labeling strate-gies on enemy collectives who, without justifiable cause, have committed vio-lence with great speed in attacking US political and economic valuesprimarily in the Middle East. In the process of defining a discrete subset ofthe overall terrorism problem, presidents have invited the public, theCongress, the courts, and the international community to respond accord-ingly. Through reinvention of new terrorist threats in virtually each adminis-tration, the nation’s leadership has broadened executive powers and hasredefined the identity of American culture both at home and abroad.

Presidents do not reconstitute American identity through use of the ter-rorism label alone. They must either appropriate or develop a convincingnarrative framework to provide a coherent context for their interpretation ofthe threat and America’s response. Taken as a whole, presidents have enacteda critical distinction in their public approaches based upon political partyaffiliation. As this book has illustrated, Democratic presidents (with the earlyexception of Johnson) have relied upon narratives that feature crime as aprincipal theme: crimes against humanity in Carter’s tragic drama and crimesagainst God in Clinton’s prophetic tradition. Republican presidents, by con-trast, have featured war as a prevailing theme, employing the Cold War nar-rative as their fundamental framework.


In practice, leaders elected from both the Republican and Democraticparties have employed the tools of law enforcement and the military torespond to terrorism. Carter presented his case before the InternationalCourt of Justice and employed the US military to enact a rescue mission.Reagan sought extradition for those guilty of hijacking the Achille Lauro andused the American military to bomb Libya. Clinton’s Justice Departmenttried the case of the World Trade Center bombers and used the military tocarry out bombing raids on the Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The currentBush administration brought an unprecedented number of terrorism cases tothe court system, while conducting military operations to remove both theTaliban and the Iraqi regimes.

Increasingly, the wisdom of employing a terrorism policy that focusestoo heavily on crime or war has become a matter of public debate. The 9/11Commission Report critiqued a heavy emphasis on the crime frame by arguingthat the law enforcement process “was meant, by its nature, to mark for thepublic the events as finished—case solved, justice done. It was not designedto ask if the events might be harbingers of worse to come. Nor did it allowfor aggregating and analyzing facts to see if they could provide clues to ter-rorist tactics more generally—methods of entry and finance, and mode ofoperation inside the United States” (National Commission, Final Report 73).Others, working in the CIA, have argued that the domination of the lawenforcement mentality has only led to “strategically inconsequential tacticalvictories” (Imperial Hubris 87). US Air Force pilots have recounted problemswith an alleged overemphasis on crime in the immediate aftermath ofSeptember 11. The pilots reported that they had sighted senior al Qaeda andTaliban members on ten occasions, but had been unable to fire due to legal-istic delays caused by the requirements of the local American ambassadors(Hersh, “Gray Zone” 1). Such appraisals have consistently presented a pri-mary emphasis on crime as an insufficient, weak policy against terrorism.

Too strong a focus on war as a response to terrorism has also encoun-tered criticism. Concerns about the civil rights of alleged terrorists whoremain in captivity without charges filed against them, the expense of thewar efforts, the possibility of government-endorsed torture in wartime, andthe loss of life by military personnel suffered at the hands of insurgents haveall emerged as prevalent arguments in the public debate. The potential for aUS war on terror to have subversive goals in resource-rich regions of theworld has also raised skepticism around the globe. Too much emphasis onwar, the critics have argued, has long-term consequences for the foundationalprinciples of American society and the nation’s credibility worldwide.

As the debate over how to fight terrorism raged in the 2004 politicalcampaign season, very little attention was focused on the statistical record ofthe two parties in their actual handling of terrorist threats. On two key State


Department measures of terrorism, the Democratic presidents studied in thisbook have outperformed their Republican counterparts. The first concernsthe number of international terrorist incidents involving the United States.Under presidents elected from the Democratic Party, the annual average ofinternational terrorism attacks involving the United States has been 131,while the annual average for presidents elected from the Republican Partyhas been 158, a seventeen percent increase (see figures 8.6 and 8.7). Thesecond involves the annual number of deaths of American citizens from ter-rorist acts. Under Democratic presidential leadership, the annual averagenumber of American deaths was 11; under Republican presidential leader-ship, the annual average was 222 (see figure 8.8). Even when the high deathtotals of 2001 are not considered, the average number of US deaths from ter-rorism was more than four times higher under Republican presidents thanunder their Democratic presidential counterparts (see figure 8.9).1 The per-formance differential between Republican and Democratic presidentsbecomes more pronounced with the inclusion of the 2004 figures reported bycongressional aides briefed by the State Department and intelligence officialswhich showed a sharp jump (175 in 2003 to 650 in 2004) in significantinternational terrorist attacks (as rptd. in Mohammed).

The calculation of average annual incidents and American deaths fromterrorism ends at 2003, due to the decision by the Bush State Department tostop publishing statistical data in its 2004 Patterns of Global Terrorism. LarryJohnson, a former CIA analyst and state department terrorism expert, dis-closed the administration’s decision and the fact that it came to be after ana-


250

200

150

100

50

0Carter Reagan Bush Clinton Bush

Figure 8.6. Annual Average Number of International Terrorism IncidentsInvolving the United States by Presidency

126115

167197

161

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents Involving the US, 1968–1979;” U.S.Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents, Involving the US, 1980–1990;” U.S. Dept. of State,“Intl. Terrorism Incidents, Involving the US, 1990–1999;” U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns: Year inReview 1997–2002; and U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns 2003.

lysts in the National Counterterroism Center concluded that more terroristattacks happened in 2004 than any year previously dating back to 1985.Those figures do not include insurgent attacks on American forces in Iraq,which, if added, would inflate the increase further (as rptd. in Landay A12).In either case, however, Johnson’s 2004 figures would exaggerate the com-parison of the historical records of the leaders from the two political parties,but would not change the conclusion that Democratic presidents have lessincidents of international terrorism and less deaths to Americans from ter-rorism than their Republican counterparts.

Despite the comparative statistical records in the fight against terrorism,Republican presidents have enjoyed and continue to hold an edge in thepublic’s perception of which party produces leaders best qualified to respondto terrorism. A January 2004 poll conducted by the Pew Research Centerreported, “By 56%–19%, people who volunteer terrorism and homelanddefense as the biggest problem facing the country say the Republicans, notthe Democrats, are best able to address the issue” (Pew Research Center,“Economy and Anti-Terrorism” 1–2). Such polls echo the findings of theRoper Center for Public Opinion Research report released during the firstBush administration. The report claimed that terrorism “would tend to helpRepublicans—in the sense that it dominated the agenda and kept focus onsomething that has been a Republican strength, and that appears tostrengthen a Republican president” (Roper Center 18).

The public narratives of the two parties help explain the apparent dis-crepancy between the statistical record of presidential performance and thepublic perceptions of leadership and terrorism. Arguably, the Democratic


250

200

150

100

50

0Democrats Republicans

Figure 8.7. Annual Average Number of International Terrorism Incidentsby Presidential Party: 1976–2003

158131

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents Involving the US, 1968–1979;” U.S.Dept. of State, “Intl. Terrorism Incidents, Involving the US, 1980–1990;” U.S. Dept. of State,“Intl. Terrorism Incidents Involving the US, 1990–1999;” U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns: Year inReview 1997–2002; and U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns 2003.

presidents’ public focus on crime has politically undermined their image aseffective leaders against terrorism. Unlike in the war frame, in which the ulti-mate decision-making authority rests clearly with the commander in chief, aconcentration on crime puts the final judgment within the purview of theSupreme Court. Both Carter and Clinton assumed key roles within their ter-rorist narratives, but neither the tragic hero nor the prophet have the stand-ing of the commander in chief in a conflict with a dangerous external threat.By choosing to publicly de-emphasize their roles as commander in chief,Democratic presidents have left themselves vulnerable to charges they lackthe necessary strength to respond to terrorism effectively.


Figure 8.9. Annual Average Number of American Deaths from Terrorismby Presidential Party: 1976–2003 (excluding 2001)

250

200

150

100

50

Democrats Republicans

Figure 8.8. Annual Average Number of American Deaths fromTerrorism by Presidential Party: 1976–2003

11

222

Source: U.S. State Dept. “Casualties, 1968–1979;” U.S. State Dept. “Casualties, 1980–1990;”U.S. State Dept. “Casualties, 1990–1999;” and U.S. State Dept. Patterns 2001–2003.

Source: U.S. State Dept. “Casualties, 1968–1979;” U.S. State Dept. “Casualties, 1980–1990;”U.S. State Dept. “Casualties, 1990–1999;” and U.S. State Dept. Patterns 2001–2003.

11

46

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Democrats Republicans

A second challenge of the crime narrative involves religion. Increasingly,religion has become a key factor in presidential politics. The National Surveyof Religion and Politics conducted at the University of Akron reported thatin the 2000 presidential election, respondents who went to church more thanonce a week were more than twice as likely to vote for the Republican candi-date (68–32%), while those who never attended were far more likely to votefor the Democratic candidate (65–35%) (as rptd. in Page, “Churchgoing”). APew Research Center nationwide survey conducted from August 5 to August10, 2004, reported similarly, “While neither political party is seen as particu-larly unfriendly to religion, somewhat more say the Republican Party isfriendly toward religion (52%) than the Democratic Party (40%)” (PewResearch Center, “GOP the Religion-Friendly Party” 3). Recently, the reli-gion gap topped even the gender gap as predictive in close presidential con-tests (Page, “Churchgoing”).

Narratives that feature crime have no necessary, integral relationshipwith religion. Crime focuses on questions of innocence versus guilt arbitratedby judges; religion emphasizes questions of good versus evil adjudicated byGod. Carter and Clinton attempted to bridge the apparent gap by choosingnarratives that emphasized both crime and religion as central themes. Bothof their public approaches—tragic drama and the prophetic tradition—stressed subjects recurrent in various strains of the Christian religion, namely,guilt, suffering, sacrifice, isolation, and redemption. Nevertheless, clear con-nections between religion, crime, and terrorism are not obvious.

The Cold War narrative, by contrast, has religious appeal built into itsconventional characterizations of the hero character. The United States, as adivinely inspired entity, is responsible for defending freedom and democracyfrom the forces of growing evil around the globe. The Cold War narrative’slack of specificity about the identity of the higher authority has appeal forpeoples of all faiths, assuming they are Americans or in sympathy withAmerica’s cause. As Burke has written, “Religion will be monistic in thesense that, no matter how large a pantheon the various tribes imagine, alltheir gods can be subsumed under the general head of the divine” (Rhetoric ofReligion 311). The Cold War narrative’s invocation of a vaguely defined reli-gious mission has the potential for widespread public appeal.

Besides not articulating a clear relationship to religion or to the role ofcommander in chief, crime narratives do not display a lasting coherence forcountering the terrorist threat. Both the Carter and Clinton narratives pre-sented short-term time frames for how presidents could handle the terrorismproblem. The tragic hero had to experience spiritual (if not political) deathfor the guilty society to transcend its shortcomings and find reaffirmation.The prophet, while a more lasting figure than the tragic hero, still lacked the


ability to pass along his unique relationship with God to future leaders, bethey Democratic or Republican. Hence, the Democratic presidents’ uses ofcrime narratives lacked an ongoing, credible role for their successors.

The Cold War narrative, by contrast, provides a rhetorical strategy thatpermits continuity and coherence across various administrations. Regardlessof past successes or failures, the narrative portends that the United States hasan ongoing mission to defend freedom and democracy around the globe.Since America has and continues to be the leader of the free world, past, pre-sent and future presidents serve as the focal point for overseeing the success-ful implementation of that mission. Inspired by the divine, the hero characterin the Cold War narrative inevitably prevails.

While the political advantages of using war narratives have eclipsedthose that feature crime, the choice of the Cold War narrative to discuss ter-rorism has not been without consequence. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell andKathleen Hall Jamieson have studied the generic expectations of presidentialwar rhetoric. One of the recurrent substantive elements of war discourse theyidentify is strategic misrepresentation (188–24). After they acknowledge theimpossibility of portraying all truth within the limits of public messages moregenerally, Campbell and Jamieson note, “Presidential war rhetoric evinces anunusual tendency to misrepresent the events described therein in ways strate-gically related to the president’s desire to stifle dissent and unify the nationfor immediate and sustained action” (118). Historical attempts to retrofit theCold War narrative to the threat from terrorism make such misrepresenta-tions somewhat predictable. Members of the executive branch must glossactual distinctions between Communists and terrorists to remain consistentwith the Cold War narrative. The various renderings of the narrativedescribed in this book have unveiled a variety of enemy characteristics thattend toward misrepresentation in presidential discourse focusing on the sub-ject of terrorism.

One recurrent misrepresentation concerns the united nature of the ter-rorist threat. Presidents need to depict terrorists as a connected worldwideenemy if they are to be comparable to the Communists of the Cold War era.Gingrich’s 1983 explicit advice that Reagan present terrorism as a singlehomogenous threat to garner public support appears to have governed vari-ous reconstitutions of the Cold War narrative. Reagan publicly exaggeratedboth the Soviet’s role in terrorism during the first half of the 1980s and theinterconnections between his six state sponsors of terrorism in the secondhalf of the 1980s. The current Bush administration embellished knownmeetings between Iraq and al Qaeda into evidence of a collaborative relation-ship. The ongoing search for a simple public explanation for the diverserange of violent actors around the globe results in repeated mischaracteriza-tions of the nation’s threats.


A second predictable point of misrepresentation relates to the motiva-tions of terrorist actors. The leadership’s need to establish the terrorists’ambition of worldwide conquest to parallel the history of the Communistnemesis has led to repeated public distortions. Reagan publicly narrowed theterrorists’ motivational focus to an attack on open democracies worldwide,while his own intelligence showed that nondemocratic regimes in the MiddleEast were a frequent target of terrorism and the full range of the terrorists’actual motivations were far more diverse. George H. W. Bush publicly wor-ried about the world’s fledging democratic economies, while SaddamHussein was attacking one of the wealthiest nations in the Middle East(Kuwait) and had another (Saudi Arabia) in his sights. George W. Bushmaintained that al Qaeda had global ambitions against all democratic nationswithout mentioning that bin Laden’s own statements indicated that heplanned to attack any nation, Communist or democratic, that occupiedAfghanistan, Saudi Arabia, or other holy lands of the Middle East.

A final recurrent element of character misrepresentation relates to themeans that terrorists employ to achieve their objectives. To rise to the levelpreviously established by Communists in the US Cold War narratives, ter-rorists have to be barbaric. At times, the presidents in this study mischarac-terized the barbarity of the terrorist threat. Both the incubator story underthe George H. W. Bush administration and the recent claims of an activeIraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear program during the George W. Bushadministration have been examples of presidents relying on inaccurateaccounts of international events to justify the case for America to go to war.While the Iraqi regime has routinely displayed its willingness to use barbaricmethods such as murder, rape, and torture against the citizens of both Iraqand Kuwait, both internal and broadly circulated media polls during the1991 Persian Gulf War showed that the American public was unwilling toengage its military forces to correct foreign humanitarian crises alone.Expanding the scope of the terrorists’ barbarity to American citizens or thenation’s allies swayed public opinion to support a more forceful, militaryresponse, even though it was not based in reality.

While the characterizations of the enemy in reconstituted Cold Warnarratives can be particularly revealing about likely public distortions, theother key components of the narrative are also important to examine froman evolutionary perspective. Consider how the presidents’ depiction of thescene of the Cold War narrative has changed since the Vietnam War. Inshort, presidents have gradually expanded the scene needing Americanattention. The theme of a fragile environment has remained constant, butpresidents have applied that scenic portrayal first to emerging democracies(the Vietnam War), then to democracy as a whole (the Reagan era), then toan ordered world (George H. W. Bush in 1991 Persian Gulf War), and,


finally, to any nation on earth (George W. Bush in the post-9/11 period).The justification for US intervention concurrently expanded to anywhere onthe globe.

Shifts in how the presidents have depicted the mission of the hero char-acter in their reenactments of the Cold War narrative have also been telling.During the Vietnam War, the mission of the United States was to defendone fragile democratic state and to guard other fledgling democracies frombeing attacked in the future. During the Persian Gulf War, the missionexpanded from defense of democracies to defending the self-determinationrights of a monarchy that was central to US strategic interests. Finally, thecurrent Bush administration enlarged its missions from the defense of libertyto the spreading of freedom and liberty to those currently living under dicta-torships. Each of the instantiations of the nation’s mission referenced free-dom and liberty as values worth pursuing, but taken together, they reveal anincremental expansion of America’s interventionist role in global affairs.

The powerful persuasive force of the Cold War narrative suggests thatthe public strategy is unlikely to disappear in the near future. Its flexibleapplication to a wide range of global violent conflicts in the post–Cold Warera offers a means by which presidents can retain a consistent vision for for-eign policy. As some of the internal documents presented in this book makeclear, the nation’s leadership has both been aware of and willing to capitalizeupon the persuasive power of the Cold War narrative with domestic audi-ences, even if that strategy entails misrepresenting the terrorist threat to thepublic. Observing how that narrative changes over time, therefore, becomesan important means for critically assessing presidential terrorism discourse.In cases where future presidents present Communists and terrorists as mirrorimages, the chance of strategic misrepresentation arises and should promptclose scrutiny. In cases where the portrayal of the scene or the mission of thehero character changes, critical examination of the implications for globalgovernance are warranted.

Once labels, like terrorism, become key purpose terms in central societalnarratives, the final evolutionary step for terms to become ideological mark-ers of a culture is that they must perform as ideographs. At least since theVietnam War, US presidents have been aware of the ideological potential ofthe terrorism label. Johnson discovered that stopping terrorism, not the ide-ology of Communism or democracy, functioned as a unifying appeal for theSouth Vietnamese citizenry. Having adopted an effective strategy of taggingthe North Vietnamese as terrorists to sway the Vietnamese elections in 1966,Johnson demonstrated the potency of using terrorism as a cultural term.

The Reagan administration was the first to elevate terrorism into anideograph for American culture. The Iranian hostage crisis set the stage byrendering terrorism an ordinary term of political discourse that had culturally


specific meanings. As the news media ran nightly counts of the days UShostages remained in confinement, ordinary Americans denounced theabhorrent tactics of terrorists, while many in the Middle East interpreted theembassy seizure, not as an act of terrorism, but as a justified response to UShistorical support for the shah. The Iranian hostage crisis also began theprocess of unifying the public around normative, but ill-defined, goals.Internal polling demonstrated that the public wanted the president to dosomething to resolve the crisis, thereby opening an opportunity for expandedpresidential perogatives. However, Carter demurred, choosing instead toadopt a non-ideological framing of the crisis.

A number of factors coalesced during the Reagan administration totransform terrorism into an ideological marker of the culture. First, Reaganfaced a situation with the demise of the Soviet Union where a conventionalideograph, “Communism,” would soon be losing its dominant appeal as aunifying term for the public. Second, Reagan positioned terrorism as a“replacement” ideograph by juxtaposing the term as a threat to America’spositive ideographs, namely, democracy and freedom. Finally, the adminis-tration was willing to implement response measures heretofore unheard of inthe nation’s arsenal against terrorism. Reagan and his aides tested the bound-aries of what an American public fearful of attacks would accept in the fightagainst terrorism.

By the mid-1980s, the American public had coalesced into a broadly uni-fied collective backing Reagan’s responses to terrorism the Middle East. Pollsshowed seventy percent of the public wanting the administration to give amajor effort to fighting terrorism, eighty percent approving the military escortof the plane carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers, and seventy-one percentapproving the bombing of Libya (see chapter 4). Not only was the Americanpublic united behind the normative goal of responding to terrorism, but theyalso supported US response options that, in more normal circumstances,would not have qualified as publicly acceptable. Many abroad denouncedReagan’s choices as skyjacking, offensive war fighting, and violations of thestate sovereignty rights of members of the international community. The dis-tinctive reactions of domestic and international audiences to Reagan’srhetoric and actions underscored the culture-bound meaning of the term.

Aware of the demonstrated ideological potency of the terrorism label forAmerican audiences, presidents since Reagan have adopted variousapproaches for handling their public use of the term. Clinton, with his focuson terrorism as a crime of individuals against their God, cast ideological con-tests as relics of the past. The Republican presidents’ war narratives, by con-trast, have generally highlighted an ideological interpretation of terrorismconflicts, due, in part, to the Cold War narrative’s origins in the ideologicalcontest between democracy and Communism. As the two Bush administra-


tions have applied revised Cold War narratives to various iterations of theterrorist threat, the meaning of the label has expanded. The current Bushadministration has been explicit about the ideological nature of terrorism.Bush recently announced, “We actually misnamed the war on terror; it oughtto be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in freesocieties, who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the confi-dence of the free world.” (FDCH Transcipts, 6 Aug. 2004: 14).

Certain media pundits have likewise begun to suggest that crime, war,and ideology are three different frames for analyzing the nation’s response toterrorism. Relying heavily on the analysis described in the 9/11 CommissionReport, the columnist David Brooks has proffered, “We’re not in the middleof a war on terror. [. . .] We’re not facing an axis of evil. Instead, we are inthe midst of an ideological conflict” (A13). Such reasoning has juxtaposedideology and war narratives as two distinct frameworks that invite uniqueresponses by the nation’s leadership. A review of the historical record of pres-idential narratives related to terrorism, however, reveals that the two ideashave been far from separate. Presidents relying on the ideologically-basedCold War narratives since the Reagan administration have each engaged inwars against foreign states utilizing terrorism as justification for militaryaction. Taken in the context of earlier arguments in this study, the attemptto suggest that terrorism as ideology is something new would simply qualifyas another attempt to create an opening for a new definition of Americanidentity and governance.

The recent emergence of terrorism as an ideograph offers insights intohow negative markers of the culture gain their potency. Given that negativeideographs are tags for unacceptable behaviors, such labels can initially func-tion as companion terms for recognized competing ideologies. Repeatedpresidential reference to Communist terrorists and Nazi terrorists in the 20thcentury allowed the then innocuous term, “terrorism,” to become a recurrentfeature of American society’s most prominent ideological narratives.

When labels function as companion terms within a community’s dis-course, their ideological function can be multifaceted. When Johnsonreferred to “Communist terrorists” during the Vietnam War, the first term,“Communist” had ideological appeal for one culture (the U.S.), while thesecond term, “terrorist,” performed ideological work for another (SouthVietnam). In a different historical context, either one of the terms mighthave had ideological appeal for both cultures. Finally, both terms might havelacked ideological force altogether, leaving both “communist” and “terrorist”as mere labels.

Once a label emerges on its own as a cultural marker, it has the potentialto transfer ideological significance to other labels. Terrorism, now an ideo-graph for American culture, has most recently served as a companion term in


the phrase, “Muslim fundamentalist terrorists.” Reinforced through repeti-tion by the nation’s leadership, the linguistic merger encourages the societalnarratives associated with the ideograph, “terrorism,” to be mapped on to thenation’s experience with Muslim fundamentalists. Consequently, the popu-lace may assume the existence of motives, means, and organizational struc-ture of terrorist groups, as well as the appropriate US responses, withoutproper debate about their actual applicability within the new context.

The choice to focus on Muslim fundamentalists as the emerging long-term terrorist threat to America’s security has a number of important impli-cations. First, it heightens the elusive nature of the enemy. Viewedhistorically, the presidents have constructed linguistic mergers that includenegative ideographs to be descriptive of the totality of an opposing group(i.e., the Communists during the Cold War and the Nazis during WorldWar II). In this new association, the targeted group of fundamentalists is asubpopulation of the broader Muslim community. Such a rendering posesconfusion, not unlike that caused by the military strikes that the Clintonadministration used against non-state actors in the Sudan after the assaultson U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Just as dividing state from non-state actors posed a challenge for Clinton at home and abroad, distinguishingbetween members of the Muslim community who are fundamentalist andthose who are moderate is a daunting task. The resulting ambiguity providesthe leadership wide latitude in defining who constitutes the real threat, butrisks the possibility of a broader cultural war.

Second, the focus on Muslim fundamentalists as a looming terroristthreat raises thorny questions about the activities of the fundamentalists whoobserve other religions. Do all religious fundamentalists who have some con-tact with the few of their members using violence to accomplish their objec-tives open themselves to charges that the belong to terrorist groups? EricRudolph, the Christian fundamentalist who bombing the 1996 OlmpicGames, publicly announced that his actions were justified in protest to the USgovernment’s support for abortion rights. Future actors may have the charismato turn cultural clashes embedded within the terrorist ideograph inward onAmerican society itself. Further division, rather than unity, may result.

If the public accepts that the terrorist label applies only to a small sub-population of misguided members of a fundamentalist group (albeit Muslim,Christian, or other), challenges still remain to an ideological framing of theterrorism problem. The narratives utilized to frame US conduct against for-eign terrorists may create impractical expectations for the handling of home-grown terrorists. Rudolph’s plea agreement, for example, was designed toallow the retrieval of hidden explosives near population centers and minimizethe potential loss of life. Nevertheless, many members of the public, seekingconsistency with the prior terrorist narratives, complained that the govern-


ment had made concessions to a terrorist by its decision not to seek the deathpenalty. Treating terrorist violence as an ongoing threat to the continuedexistence of American culture raises the stakes for governmental accountabil-ity in handling the terrorist problem.

The Department of Homeland Security has recently taken action thatappears to recognize the cultural ramifications of the terrorist ideograph. Onan internal list of the threats to the nation’s security drafted as apart of itsdocument entitled, “Integrated Planning Guidance, Fiscal years 2005–2011,”the department specified the threats it saw to homeland. As specified, thedepartment “expects to contend primarily with adversaries such as al Qaedaand other foreign entities affiliated with the Islamic Jihad movement, as wellas domestic radical Islamist groups” (Rood 1). Left off of the list entirely,however, were right-wing domestic terrorists or terrorist groups that had ahistory of bombings, bogus anthrax threats, and “plots to obtain and use con-ventional, chemical, and nuclear weapons against civilians” (ibid). By notemphasizing Christian fundamentalist groups engaged in violent methodsinside the United States, the department attempted to skirt the broaderpotential applications of the Muslim fundamentalist terrorist merger.

Now that terrorism is functioning as an ideological marker of Americanculture, its meaning will contract and expand over time. Given the term’scurrent capacity to unify, if not polarize, the public, attention to those defin-itional shifts remain an important, ongoing task. What continues to happenin the name of terrorism will remain a question of central importance to howAmerica defines itself.


Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. See chapter 3 for details on correspondence between Zbigniew Brzezinskiand Jimmy Carter.

2. Reagan administration aides leaked that Moammar Qadhafi had such pro-clivities.

3. See Hoffman and Carr 99–100 for another example.

4. The Hatch gaffe was arguably an orchestrated media event designed to jus-tify less information-sharing from the executive branch of government. The binLaden organization had previously stopped using satellite phones in 1997 because itbecame aware of US surveillance techniques (Bergen 229).

5. For a more extensive understanding of the ideograph, see Condit andLucaites; Delgado, “Chicano Movement Rhetoric” 446–54; Delgado, “Rhetoric ofFidel Castro” 1–14; M. P. Moore 47–64; M. A. Martin 12–25; Parry-Giles 182–96;Railsback 410–24; and Edwards and Winkler 289–310.

6. For the specifics of the polls, see chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6.

7. See chapter 3.

CHAPTER 5

1. For precise text of UN resolutions, see UN and the Persian Gulf Crisis(n.d.).

2. For a more detailed description of exchange, see Hassan 50–51.

3. For more on the incubator story, see MacArthur 37–77.

4. For a more extensive discussion of US conciliatory policy, see Berman andJentleson 93–128; and Rubin 255–72.

213

5. See, for example, “RCC Approves ‘Merger’ Decision with Kuwait, 8 August1990” 119–223.

6. For a more extensive analysis of the history of the conflict betweenChristians and Muslims, see Lewis 2002.

7. For a discussion of these strategies, see Farmer and Helman.

CHAPTER 6

1. For other examples of terrorists’ chemical weapons, see Schweitzer andDorsch 93–99.

2. The largest number of attacks occurred in Western Europe (666), followedby Latin America (594), the Middle East (299), Asia (193), Eurasia (131), Africa(130), and the United States (15), as extrapolated from U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns1999, 100–06.

3. According to the 9/11 Commission, such claims were false. As the reportnoted, “[W]hile the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did notserve the same purpose for al Qaeda, and there is no reliable evidence that Bin Ladinwas involved or made his money through drug trafficking” (National Commission,Final Report 171).

4. The 9/11 Commission Report explains that the CIA misinterpreted Clinton’sMemorandum of Notification to mean that they should capture, rather than actuallykill, bin Laden (National Commission, Final Report 132–33).

CHAPTER 7

1. As the speeches of George W. Bush and his key administration spokesper-son have not yet been amassed into Public Papers, this chapter’s citations will refer-ence various political transcript databases including: Federal Document Clearing HousePolitical Transcripts, Federal News Service, Presidential Documents Online, and WhiteHouse.

2. For more on public and technical spheres of argument, see Goodnight214–27.

3. FDR and Truman, for example, publicly referred to the Hitler regime asterrorist.

4. The seven spokespersons referred to were George W. Bush, Dick Cheney,Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, John Ashcroft, Condoleezza Rice, and Tom Ridge.

5. As the last chapter indicated, the 9/11 Commission concluded that Bushwas genuinely concerned about the threat posed by al Qaeda, but like Clinton, he

214 Notes to Chapters 5, 6, and 7

failed to act in a sufficient and timely manner (Nat. Commission, Final Report 343).Clarke would also admit to the commission that his advice, if taken, would not haveprevented the attacks of 9/11 (ibid. 348).

6. One rocket with sarin was discovered, but administration spokespersons didnot make public claims that the one weapon confirmed their original speculationabout Iraq’s arsenal.

CHAPTER 8

1. While the number of deaths in the events of September 11 have generallybeen understood to be approximately 3,000, which includes non-US citizen fatalitiesin the towers, the figures used in these calculations are those of the StateDepartment, which places the number of US deaths in 2001 at 1,440 (US Dept. ofState, Patterns: 1997–2002).

Notes to Chapters 7 and 8 215

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Index

Abbas, Abu, 67–68, 93, 100Abu Ghraib, 177–78Achille Lauro, 67–68, 87, 91–92, 100active defense measures, 93–94. See also

preemptive warAfghanistan, 14, 60–62, 130, 141, 163,

169, 171al Qaeda:

and Clinton era, 144, 150;and George W. Bush era, 3, 150,

155–56, 166, 168–70, 176;and weapons of mass destruction, 2,

133;barbarity of, 171–72; evaluation of war on terror against,

157;labeling strategy related to, 192;warnings about airliners as suicide

bombers, 161 Algeria, 161Al-Megrahi, Abdel Basset, 69American Embassy in Bogota, 76American Embassy in Riyadh, 101, 114American Indians, 159–60, 162, 179,

189American Revolution, 74Amnesty International, 110Anderson, Jack, 51–52 anthrax, 2, 158, 164–65, 191Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, 143

Aristotle, 46, 52, 54 Ashcroft, John, 164–67, 176, 182Aspin, Les, 114assassination, 8–9, 17–18, 34–35, 68,

130–31. See also fatalitiesAthens, 67Aum Shinrikyo, 128–29, 160Aziz, Tariq, 121

Baghdad Radio, 121Bahrain, 119Baker, James, 99, 102, 104, 109–10, 112 Barbary pirates, 71, 88, 89 battlefield detainees, 176–78Beirut, 56–57Belgium, 132Bennett, Harold, 31Bentson, Lloyd, 136Bergrin, Paul, 178Berri, Nabih, 83 bin Laden, Osama:

appropriation of Cold War narrative, 184–86;

appropriation of prophetic tradition, 151–52;

culture-bound interpretations of, 15; involvement in acts of terrorism, 129,

139, 155, 161; links to organized crime, terrorism,

and drug trafficking, 139;media focus on after 9/11, 6;

251

pursuit of chemical weapons, 132; reliance on untraceable communica-

tions, 5, 231n4;US failure against, 201

Black September Organization, 162Board of International Broadcasting, 62Boykin, William, 183Bremer, Paul, 185Brokaw, Tom, 158Brooks, David, 210Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 41–42, 52, 58–60,

62Buckley, William, 73Bundy, Bill, 34–35Burke, Kenneth, 3, 8, 137–38, 142 Bush, George H. W.:

collaborative relationship with Iraq, 107–11;

congressional briefing about hostages’ plight, 110–11;

downplay of ideology, 121–24; freezing of financial assets, 200;insistence on no-negotiations with

Iraq, 112; New World Order as fragile scene,

105–6;number of terrorist incidents, 127; pardon of Reagan officials, 103; perceptions of terrorism’s political

risks, 95; personal connections with Kuwait,

103;use of terrorism label for Hussein, 8,

98–100, 104, 194;Vietnam War and Persian Gulf con-

flict, 116–18;World War II and Persian Gulf con-

flict, 111–16 Bush, George W.:

and war metaphor, 6, 11, 175–79; broadened standards for state spon-

sorship, 163–64; clash of civilizations, 182–83; defense spending, 190;defines terrorists as attackers of free-

dom, 2–3, 169, 173–74, 182;

false claims about Iraqi WMD, 172–73;focus on hostage incidents with quick

closure, 194; plans for invasion of Iraq in 2001, 156;portrayed bin Laden as false prophet,

186–87;promised Iraqi sovereignty post–Sad-

dam, 181;religious framing of US terrorism

response, 175; secrecy of, 5, 202; served as international standard-

bearer for terrorism response, 4; suspects in 9/11 attacks, 3; uniqueness of terrorist threat, 159–63,

190;use of reconstituted Cold War narra-

tive, 166–81; use of response strategies for Ameri-

can Indians, 180–81;use of terrorism label, 8, 159, 165

businesses, as victim of, 196–97

Campbell, David, 3Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs, 11, 206Canada, 132Cannistraro, Vincent, 78, 80Carter, Hodding, 38–39Carter, Jimmy:

and Shah of Iran, 46–47;approval drop during hostage crisis,

103;comparison to Reagan on terrorism,

63;concern for oil dependency, 49; focus on extremist groups with state

influence, 8; inconsistent labeling strategy of,

38–39;planned invasion to influence election,

51;response to hostage crisis, 37–38, 200; Soviet Union and Iran, 59, 61; status as ex-President, 63; strategies to avoid war with Islamic

world, 57;

252 Index

uniqueness of embassy seizure, 190; use of Cold War narrative, 60–61; use of crime metaphor; 41; use of Nixon’s labeling strategies, 39; use of tragic drama, 42–55; willingness to admit US error in 1953

CIA overthrow of Iran, 53–54 Carter, Rosalynn, 43 Casey, Bill, 73, 80, 83casualties, 2, 34, 98, 156–57. See also

fatalitiescatharsis, 54Centennial Park bombing, 128, 191–92.

See also Olympic bombingsCenters for Disease Control, 164Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):

budget increases, 147;Contras’ murder manual, 72–73; effort to overthrow Hussein, 141; involvement in bombing targeting

Sheik Fadlallah, 67, 73; links to Tehran embassy, 49, 56; on crime metaphor, 201;on Iraq’s WMD, 173;on Soviet Union’s responsibility for

terrorism, 79–80; on Sudanese Pharmaceutical Plant,

142;ordered to kill bin Laden, 144; overthrow of Iranian government, 46; Phoenix Project, 20

Charland, Maurice, 10Charles, Sandra, 108Chemical Weapons Convention, 149Cheney, Dick, 163, 168, 170, 173,

176–77China, 24–25, 162, 166Christians, 211–12, 214n6Clarke, Richard, 134, 139, 150, 166,

172, 214–15n5Clinton, Bill:

call for sacrifice, 142–45, 146–48; characterized bin Laden as false

prophet, 152–53; criticisms of, 136, 140–41, 149–50;

deemphasized hostage taking, 130–31, 194;

defended secrecy, 5; foreign terrorist organizations, 135; mutual legal assistance treaties, 148; non-ideological framing of terrorism,

153–54;responses to terrorism, 141–42, 144,

193, 200; terrorism incidents during tenure, 127; uniqueness of terrorist threat, 130–36,

190;use of prophetic narrative, 136–51

Clinton, Chelsea, 146Cohen, William, 110–11Cold War narrative:

during Carter era, 60–61; during George H. W. Bush’s tenure,

105–18;during George W. Bush’s tenure,

166–81;during Reagan era, 80–90; during the Vietnam War, 23–28; enemy character portrayals in, 24; hero character portrayals in, 26–27,

208;political advantages of, 204–6; scenic portrayals in, 22–23, 207–8;tendency for misrepresentations of

terrorism, 206–7Cold War, 22Colombia, 76, 94, 135Communism, 17–22, 28–29, 35, 59–60Condit, Celeste, 7, 9, 12Congress (house, senate), 2, 109–110,

144–45, 172–73, 178Contras, 14, 72–74, 77, 83Counterterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, 149 counterterrorism, 32–35Cragg, Kenneth, 143–44Crenshaw, Marsha, 86crime, 15–16, 41–42, 48, 92, 200–4,

204–6Cuba, 71, 76, 84, 93–94cyberterrorism, 133–34

Index 253

Darby, Joseph, 177Darsey, James, 141, 150Daschle, Tom, 158David, Javal S., 178Davis, Tom, 163De Rosa, Gerardo, 67defoliation, 34Democratic presidents, 11, 43, 200–4,

202t, 203t, 204tDesert One, 37–38Deutsch, John, 132–33Dobkin, Beth, 90domino theory, 23 Douglas, Paul, 34–35Douglass, William, 6Downing Street memo, 173Duberstein, Ken, 78Duffy, Kevin, 127Dyke, Nancy, 71

Edelman, Murray, 3Egypt, 67, 91–92, 120Egyptian Islamic Front, 151Eisenhower, Dwight, 46El Salvador, 65–66, 72, 78, 80embedded reporters, 6Executive Order 13233, 5 Export Administration Act of 1979, 70 extradition, 67–68, 93, 147–48

Fabrizio, Tony, 113–14 fatalities:

and public opinion, 116–18; comparison of political parties, 202,

204t;during Carter era, 38, 63;during Clinton era, 127–29;during George H. W. Bush era, 117; during George W. Bush era, 156–58,

215n1;during Reagan era, 63, 65–70, 93; from chemical and biological terror-

ism, 2; from nuclear terrorism, 2; from terrorism in South Vietnam, 17; small relative to other threats, 2. See

also casualties

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),161

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),147, 165, 167–68

foreign media reaction, 90, 92, 94, 120 foreign terrorist organizations, 135Forrestal, Michael, 33From, Al, 41

Geneva Accords (Conventions), 25, 27,176, 178

Germany, 67–69, 132 Ghotbzadeh, Sadegh, 60Gingrich, Newt, 78–79Glad, Betty, 44Glaspie, April, 108, 122, 213n2Gonzalez, Anthony, 178–79Graham, Bob, 164Granum, Rex, 51Greenstein, Fred, 136Gregg, Donald, 71–72, 89Grenada, 78Guantanamo Bay, 176–78Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, 68,

87Gulf Cooperative Council, 101

Habermas, Jurgen, 9Hadley, Steve, 175Hamas, 145, 192Hanson, George, 50Harris, Lou, 28, 50, 92, 116–17 Harrison, William Henry, 179Hatch, Orin, 5, 213n4Hatfill, Steven, 158Henn, T. R., 55Henze, Paul, 59, 62Hezbollah, 66, 78, 192Hill, Charles, 85Hilsman, Roger, 24 Hitler, Adolf, 24, 113, 116, 160, 162.

See also NazisHoban, James, Jr., 146Holder, Eric, 133Holland, 132Holloway, James, 71, 85–86, 91

254 Index

Homeland Security, department of, 211Honduras, 80Horner, Charles, 123hostage taking:

in Carter era, 37–40, 45–53;in Clinton era, 130–31; in George H. W. Bush era, 99,

102–103, 110;in Reagan era, 66–67, 69;method of terrorism, 9; recent presidential reluctance to focus

on, 194. See also kidnappingHoveida, Fereydoun, 123Howland, Mike, 37Hussein, Saddam:

advantages prior to U.S. military involvement, 103–4, 114–15;

Bush depiction as terrorist, 99–100, 104, 109, 171–72;

motivations of, 106–7, 118–19, 170; perceived links to al Qaeda, 169–70,

170;public diplomacy attacks on coalitionforces, 119–21;removal plan after 9/11, 156; secular nature of leadership, 169; Soviet’s proposed concession plan for,

112use of ideological warfare, 118–21;

identity, 2–3, 9–10ideographs, 11–15, 90–95, 208–11ideology, 7–16 incubator story, 109–10insurgency, 73–75International Atomic Energy

Association, 173International Committee of the Red

Cross, 176–78International Communication Agency,

58, 62International Court of Justice, 49Iran, 3, 38–63, 65, 84, 93–94, 119, 156Iran-Contra scandal, 69, 103, 194Iranian hostage crisis, 37–55, 103, 194

Iraq:and Persian Gulf conflict, 97–98; casualties, 156, 185; Clinton’s response to, 141; dishonesty of, 108, 172–73; explanation for USS Stark bombing,

107;hostages held by, 98, 102; omission as state sponsor, 71;public support for bombing of, 14;suspect in 9/11 attacks, 3; terrorist training operations in,

169–70;US battle planning assistance for, 107; WMD, 111, 132, 156;

Islamic Jihad, 66, 69, 162, 212Israel, 66–67, 79, 117, 119–20Italy, 67–68, 93, 132Ivie, Robert, 23

Jamieson, Kathleen, 11, 43, 206Japan, 134, 185Jefferson, Thomas, 179, 189Jewell, Richard, 128, 191 Johnson, Larry, 202–3Johnson, Lyndon B., 19, 22–35, 208Joint US Public Affairs Office, 31–32Jordan, 121Jordan, Hamilton, 46

KAL 007 bombing, 69–70 Kennedy, John F., 17–18, 22, 24, 43,

142Kennedy, Ted, 47Kenya, bombing of US embassy, 129,

141, 148 Kern, Paul J., 177Kharg Island, 52Khomeini, Ayatollah, 14, 37, 40, 48, 50,

55–57kidnapping, 17–18, 48, 92, 130–31,

193–94, 194t. See also hostage takingKirkpatrick, Jeanne, 82Kirkpatrick, John, 72–73Klinghoffer, Leon, 67Kosczynski, Theodore, 162

Index 255

Krook, Dorothea, 45Kurds, 111Kuwait, 66, 97–99, 101–102, 104,

106–11, 115, 122–124, 141

labeling:definition of, 8;of actions, 8–9, 193–95; of agency, 9, 195–97; of agents, 8, 191–93; of purposes, 9, 198–200; of scenes, 9, 197–98; relationship to ideological orienta-

tions, 7 Laingen, Bruce, 37, 56Latin America, 197–98, 214n2Leahy, Patrick, 158Lebanon, 56–57, 66–67, 78, 80, 87–88,

94, 160, 185Leogrande, William, 77Lewis, Guy, 164Libya:

and Pan Am 103, 68–69; and TWA 847, 66;and West Berlin discotheque, 68; and World Trade Center, 161;application of NSDD 138 to, 93; as state sponsor of terrorism, 71, 84; chemical weapons acquisition by, 132; protests against America during

Iranian hostage crisis, 57; U.S. bombing raid on, 14, 68, 94

Lindh, John Walker, 176–77 Livingston, Steven, 6Loan, Nguyen Ngoc, 34–35Lodge, Henry Cabot, 18, 21Lucaites, John, 7, 9, 12

Maloney, Carolyn B., 161Manheim, Jarol, 6Matsch, Richard, 128Mattke, Terry, 76–77McCone, John, 19McDaniel, Rodney, 91McDonald, Al, 47, 53McFarlane, Robert, 71, 74–75, 78,

83–85, 93

McGee, Gale, 34–35McGee, Michael, 12–15McNamara, Robert, 25, 33–34McVeigh, Timothy, 127, 162, 191–92Medhurst, Martin, 22media, 5, 127–28, 150, 190, 210Meese, Edward, 74–75, 78, 83–84Menarchik, Doug, 71, 75, 89Middle East:

and the Carter era, 49–50, 57;and the Clinton era, 127–28, 140;and the George H. W. Bush era, 101,

113, 121;and the Reagan era, 65–66, 68, 85, 87;differences with US on terrorism, 209;recurrent subject of presidential

terrorism discourse, 9, 197;terrorists attacks related to, 197–98,

198t, 214n2military response, 1, 14, 68, 115–18Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 130 Moscow, 132–33Mossadegh, Mohammed, 46Moussaoui, Zacarias, 155Moyers, Bill, 28–29Mueller, John, 116Murad, Abdul Hakim, 161Muslims:

Carter’s focus on mutual interests with, 57–58;

fundamentalists as terrorists, 210; historical clash with Christians, 214n6;in Iranian hostage crisis, 38, 40,

55–56, 59; in 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, 118–21; Soviet attacks on, 61–62;terrorists’ demands for release of,

66–67, 69Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, 147–48

Nacos, Brigitte, 6narratives, 3, 7, 9–11, 15–16National Liberation Front, 30–32, 35National Security Directive 138, 93–94 National Security Directive 221, 75–76 National Security Directive 26, 108

256 Index

Nayirah, 109Nazis, 17–18, 162. See also Hitler, AdolfNew World Order, 100, 105–7Nicaragua, 74, 76–78, 84, 93–94Nichols, Terry, 1289/11 Commission:

on bin Laden, 150–51, 214n3;on changes to US terrorism responses,

162–63, 201;on early suspects of 9/11 bombings, 3; on pre-9/11 intelligence, 155, 160–61;on relationship between Hussein and

al Qaeda, 170;on Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant, 142; on terrorism as ideologically-driven,

183;on US response failures to 9/11, 167–68

Nixon, Richard M.: bifurcated approach to terrorism

labeling strategy, 20–21;influence on Carter, 39–40;labeled anti-war protesters as terror-

ists, 21, 192; Sky Marshall Program, 160;use of Reign of Terror analog, 21; use of Cold War narrative, 22–24

North Korea, 84, 93, 132, 156, 163 North Vietnam, 18–21, 24–25, 33–35.

See also Vietnam WarNunn, Sam, 115–16

O’Neill, Paul, 172–73Oakley, Robert, 78Odom, William E., 59oil, 79, 102–3, 170–71Oklahoma City bombing, 9, 127–28,

140, 143, 154Olympic bombings, 9. See also Centen-

nial Park bombingOots, Kent, 86Operation Desert Storm, 97–98Ortega, Daniel, 77

Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza (Shah ofIran), 46–48

Pakistan, 56, 156

Palestine, 185Palestinian Liberation Front, 67Palestinian Liberation Organization, 37,

67Palmer, Richard, 42Pan Am 103 bombing, 68–69, 87, 148 Panzer, Fred, 28Paris peace talks, 21Patriot Act, 175PDD-39, 144Pearl Harbor, 168Pearson, David, 70Pentagon attack, 2, 6, 15, 155–56,

167–68. See also September 11 attacksPentagon, 178Persian Gulf conflict:

and Vietnam War, 116–18; and World War II, 111–16;calculations for use of terrorism label

in, 102–4; details of, 97–98; fatalities of, 98; justifications for war, 100–1; public’s priorities related to, 102

Persian Gulf Working Group, 101–2,105, 113, 115–16

Peru, 135Philippines, 132Phoenix Project, 20PKK, 135Poindexter, John, 91, 94polls:

during Clinton presidency, 149–51; during George H. W. Bush presi-

dency, 101–2, 113–14, 116–18;during George W. Bush presidency,

2, 176;during Johnson presidency, 28–30;during Reagan presidency, 73, 79,

82–84, 88, 91–92, 94, 208–9;party comparison on terrorism, 203; Republicans more religion-friendly, 205

Powell, Colin, 122, 157, 159, 163, 173,177, 180, 186–87

Powell, Jody, 38, 61–62, 168–69Precht, William, 60

Index 257

preemptive war, 93–94, 179. See alsoactive defense measures

presidential approval: of Carter, 50, 103; of Clinton, 149–50; of George H. W. Bush, 101–2; of George W. Bush, 2; of Reagan, 69, 103

presidential discourse on terrorism, 4–7,11, 190

prophetic dualism, 26prophetic tradition, 136–39, 142,

144–46, 148, 150

Qadhafi, Moammar, 68, 94, 213n2 Quayle, Oliver and Co., 29–31, 35

Rademaker, Steven, 102, 104 RANCH HAND, 34Reagan, Ronald:

administration leaks about Qadhafi ascross-dresser, 1;

arms for hostage deal, 69;evidence of drug/terrorism link, 75–76;focus on state sponsors, 8, 71–73, 107;positioned terrorism as antithesis of

democracy, 84–85; public opinion related to, 73, 83–84,

91, 103;redeployed US forces after 1983 US

Marine barracks attack, 66; rise in terrorism during tenure, 65; terrorism incidents compared to

Democratic presidents, 63, 127; told political risks of terrorism, 95; uniqueness of terrorist threat, 190; use of Cold War narrative, 80–90; use of terrorism as ideograph, 90–95,

208;USS Stark incident, 107

Red Brigades, 162Reign of Terror, 13, 21, 160Reinhardt, John, 58Reno, Janet, 133Rentschler, James M., 58Republican presidents, 11, 200–5, 202t,

203t, 204t

rescue mission in Tehran, 14, 37, 52–53Revolutionary Council (Iran), 48Rice, Condoleezza, 6, 173Ridge, Tom, 160Roosevelt, Franklin D., 43, 114Rose Garden strategy, 50Rosenberg, Barbara, 165Rudolph, Eric Robert, 128, 162, 191–92Rumsfeld, Donald, 161, 166, 169, 173,

179–81Rusk, Dean, 18Ryan, Hewson, 32

Sacred Sword of the Patriots League,19–20

sacrifice, 49–51, 142–45, 146–48Said, Edward, 90Sandinistas, 77, 79sarin gas attack, 128–29Saudi Arabia, 73, 113, 116–17, 119–20,

123–24, 156Saunders, Harold, 39, 58, 62 Scheurer, Michael (Imperial Hubris),

152, 157, 184Scotland, 68–69Scowcroft, Brent, 101, 108–9 secrecy, 1, 5September 11 attack, 2–3, 6, 9, 15, 189.

See also Pentagon attack; World TradeCenter attacks

Sharon, Ariel, 4Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant (Sudan), 5,

141–42, 192 Sick, Gary, 51, 56, 60Smalley, Robert, 79, 82–83South Africa, 72, 132South Vietnam, 17–21, 23–30, 32–35.

See also Vietnam WarSouthern Poverty Law Center, 135Soviet Union (USSR):

application of NSDD 138 to, 93; as evil empire, 82; as source of nuclear weapons spread,

131;as threat to Iran, 60–62; KAL Flight 007, 69–70;

258 Index

not viewed as agent of TWA 847 hijacking, 83;

proposal for Iraqi concessions in Per-sian Gulf Conflict, 112;

Reagan’s scapegoat for terrorism, 79–81;U.S. fear of Iran-Soviet alliance, 58–59

Spain, 66Special Coordinating Committee

(SCC), 5, 50, 57, 59, 62Spertzel, Richard, 165 Sri Lanka, 135State Department:

annual list of terrorist acts, 5; comparison of presidential perform-

ance on terrorism, 201–3, 202t, 203t, 204t;

definition of terrorism, 198; influence on media, 6;international terrorism incidents, 191,

191t;locations of, 134, 214n2; on Iranian hostage crisis, 49;on Iraq, 107; on Lebanon, 67; on Libya, 68; on 9/11 attacks, 215n1;on Persian Gulf conflict, 113; on Vietnam War, 25; statistics on kidnapping, 194, 194t;2003 Patterns reports, 157–58; use of terrorism label in Kennedy era,

18;use of terrorism label in Nixon era, 21;victims of terrorism, 196, 196t, 197t

state sponsors of terrorism: controversy surrounding, 72–73; description of, 70–71; ideology of, 182; implications of, 71–72, 192–93;removal of Iraq as, 107; removal of Libya as, 69;state sponsors in Reagan’s second

term, 84; wide latitude of application, 71

Stetham, Robert, 66Stevens, Robert, 164

strategic hamlet program, 32–33Sudan, 14, 141Syria, 67, 71, 83–84, 93–94, 120–21

Taliban, 156, 163, 169, 171, 186–87,193

Tambs, Lewis, 75Tanzania, bombing of US Embassy,

129, 141, 148Task Force on Combating Terrorism,

70–71, 83, 87Taylor, Maxwell, 19 Teeter, Robert, 102Tenet, George, 139terrorism:

and Communism, 17–22, 35, 208; and drug trafficking, 75–78, 135, 138; and insurgency, 73–75; and Nazism, 17; and organized criminals, 135, 138; annual rate of facilities struck by

decade, 196, 196t;annual rate of incidents by decade,

191, 191t;annual rate of kidnappings by decade,

194, 194t;as ideograph, 11–15, 90–95, 208–9; causes of, 87; coalitions infrequent, 86; culture-bound meaning, 14–15, 19–20,

95, 189;debated as ideology, 7; elasticity of meaning, 13, 190; incidents targeting business facilities,

196, 197t; location of, 169, 197–98, 198t, 214n2;oppositional term of freedom and

democracy, 2, 12, 85, 182;redefined by various presidents, 190; State Department definition of, 199

Terrorist Protection Act of 1985, 93 terrorist-sponsored state, 163Tokyo subway, 128–29Tomseth, Victor, 37tragic drama, 42–43, 45–46, 48, 52,

54–55

Index 259

tragic hero, 42–44Truman, Harry, 27, 43, 190Tunis, 67, 69, 87Turkey, 120Turner, Stansfield, 1, 73TWA 847 bombing, 66–67, 83, 88, 199

UN Security Council, 49, 97, 110, 122Underhill, John, 159–60United Arab Emirates (UAE), 156 United States Information Agency

(USIA), 29–32, 90, 121unlawful combatants, 176. See also bat-

tlefield detainees US Embassy in Tehran, 37, 41, 44–46,

61US Embassy in Vietnam, 30US Embassy in West Beirut, 66US responses to terrorism:

after 9/11, 156–58; insubordination related to, 1; of Clinton era, 141, 144, 148–49; of Indians in early republic, 179–81; of Iranian hostage crisis, 37–38; of Reagan era, 91, 94; of Vietnam War, 32–35; range of options, 1, 14; threat redefinition prompts reengi-

neering of, 190 USS Cole, 129–30, 148, 160USS Saratoga, 67USS Stark, 107USS Vincennes, 68

van Aken, 165van Atta, Dale, 51–52Vance, Cyrus, 56victims, 25, 31, 195–97, 196t, 197t Viet Cong, 18–20; 24–25, 30–33, 160Vietnam War:

American priorities for, 28–29; anti-war protesters as terrorists, 15, 21;disassociation with Persian Gulf con-

flict, 116–17; implications of terrorism on South

Vietnam government, 18–19; implications of terrorism on South

Vietnam’s military, 18–19;

implications of terrorism on US response options in, 19;

influence on conflict in Nicaragua, 82–83;

influence on Iranian hostage crisis, 38–39, 41–42;

public merger of terrorism and Com-munism, 18;

South Vietnamese priorities for, 29–30;terrorism as justification for US

involvement in, 17–22, 189; terrorism in South Vietnam, 17. See

also North Vietnam, South Vietnamvon Rad, Gerhaard, 136Voice of America, 58

Wander, Phillip, 26War of 1812, 168 War narrative: 6, 11, 16, 41, 104,

175–79, 200–1, 205–6, 210War Powers Act, 4Ward, Angus, 162Washburn, John, 60Waxman, Henry A., 157, 161weapons of mass destruction (WMD),

9, 111, 132–33, 142, 168, 172–73 Webster, William, 114Weinberger, Casper, 66 Wexler, Anne, 41white supremacists, 160Wilson, Woodrow, 174Woodward, Bob, 73, 163–64Wolfowitz, Paul, 156, 176World Islamic Front, 129, 151World Trade Center attack, 2, 6, 9, 15,

127, 148, 155–56, 161, 167, 171. Seealso September 11 attacks

World War II, 6, 111–16, 189–90

Yemen, 71, 120–21, 129–30Young and Rubicam, 83–84Yousef, Ramzi, 127, 161Yugoslavia, 68

Zakhem, Sam, 113 Zuliaka, Joseba, 6

260 Index

in the name of terrorism; presidents on political violence in the post-world war ii (2006)

Education

terrorism presidents

origins of terrorism

persian gulf terrorism

presidency suny series

cold war narrative

editor suny series

era carol

postcold war era