incomplete contracts and control - nobel prize · that ronald coase and oliver williamson, among...
TRANSCRIPT
Incomplete Contracts and Control
Oliver HartNobel Prize Lecture December 8, 2016
Howmyworkinthisareastarted
• Inearlysummer1983,SanfordGrossmanandIbecameinterestedinthefollowingquestion:
Whywouldonefirmeverbuyanotherfirmratherthanconductbusinesswiththatfirmthroughacontract?
• Inotherwords,whatarelimitsofcontracts?
• Weknewthattherewasaliteratureonthisquestionandthat RonaldCoaseandOliverWilliamson,amongothers,hadmadenotablecontributions.Buttheirworkwas“informal”.Aseconomictheoristsourgoalwastodevelopaformalmodelofthedifferencesbetweenarms-lengthcontractingandintegrationoramerger.
• Weworkedintensivelyfortendays.WithapologiestoJohnReed,itwastendaysthatshookmyworld.Atsomepointwerealizedthatthekeyelementstounderstandingthedifferencearecontractualincompletenessandthenotionofresidualcontrol(ordecision)rights.
• Toillustratetheseideas,considerapowerplantthatlocatesnexttoacoalminewiththepurposeofburning coaltomakeelectricity.
• Itcouldsignalong-termcontractwiththecoalmine,specifyingthequantity,quality,andpriceofcoalformanyyearstocome.
• Butanysuchcontractwillbeincomplete.Eventswilloccurthatthepartiescouldnotfullyforeseewhentheystartedout.
• Forexample,supposethatthepowerplantneedsthecoaltobepurebutthatitishardtospecifyinadvancewhatpuritymeansgiventhattherearemanypotentialimpurities.
• Imaginethattenyearson,ashcontentistherelevantimpurityandthathigh-ash-contentcoalismoreexpensiveforthepowerplanttoburnbutcheaperforthecoalminetoproduce.
• Giventhatthecontractisincomplete,ifthepowerplantandthecoalmineareseparatecompanies,thecoalminemaybewithinitsrightsunderthecontracttosupplyhigh-ash-contentcoal.
• Thepowerplantcan,ofcourse,offertopaythecoalminetoswitchtolow-ash-contentcoal,butthecoalmineisinaverystrongbargainingposition.Itcandemandaveryhighprice:ithasthepowerplant“overabarrel."
• Anticipatingthepossibilityofbeing“held-up”,thepowerplantmaybereluctanttobecometotallydependentonthecoalmineforitssourceofcoal,eventhoughthisisefficient.
• Itisworthgoingintomoredetailaboutthesourceofthecoalmine’s“hold-up”power.GrossmanandIarguedthatitisbecausetheownerofthecoalminehasresidualrightsofcontrol:therighttodecideonusesofthecoalmineaboutwhichthecontractissilent.
• Indeed,GrossmanandIessentiallydefinedownershiptomeanthis.
• Inthiscasethekeyresidualrightofcontrolisthedecisionaboutwhatkindofcoaltomine.
• Isthereanythingthepowerplantcandotoavoidthissituation?
• Shortofwritingabettercontract,onethingitcoulddoistobuythecoalmineinadvance.
• Thatwaythepowerplantasownerofthecoalminewillhavethekeyresidualcontrolright.Thecoalminecannolongerextractahighpricebythreateningtoproducehigh-ash-contentcoal:thepowerplantcanorderthecoalminemanagertominelow-ash-contentcoal.
• Inanextremecase,ifthecoalminemanagerthreatenstodisobeytheorder,thepowerplantcanfirethemanagerandreplacehimwithsomeoneelse.
• Oneconsequenceisthatthepowerplantmaynowbewillingtobecomedependentonthecoalmine.
• Thisisthebenefitofintegration—thepurchaseofthecoalminebythepowerplant.
• But,andthisveryimportant,themanagerofthecoalmine,who,say,previouslyownedit,isnowMOREvulnerable.
• Forexample,supposethatthemanagerhasanideaabouthowtominecoalmoreefficiently.Ifthemanagerownsthecoalminehecanbeconfidentaboutreapingthereturnsfromthisidea.Butifthepowerplantownsthecoalmine,themanager’spositionismuchlesssecure:forexample,thepowerplantcouldfirehimandusehisideaanyway.Anticipatingthis,themanagerhasalowerincentivetoinnovate.
• Bottomline:Integrationhascostsaswellasbenefits.
n Ina1990paperwithJohnMooreIgeneralizedtheanalysistothecaseofmanyassetsandworkers,andmorecomplicatedownershipstructures,suchasjointownership.
• Twomaindifferencesfromthepreviousliterature.
• Theanalysisismoreformal(can’tseeitfromtoday!)
• Thefocusisoncontroloverphysical(moregenerally,non-human)assetsratherthanauthorityoverpeople.
• Ownershipofthecoalmineisnotworthmuchtothepowerplantifthemanagerofthecoalmineisindispensable.
• Aswellashelpingustounderstandmergers,thisapproachhasotherapplications.
• Oneistocorporatefinance.
• Intheelectricity-coalexample,replacethepowerplantbyafinancialinvestor.
• Thatis,supposethecoalmineneedsmoneytoexpand/modernize.Itapproachessomeonewithdeeppocketsandpromisesthemasubstantialshareoffutureprofittopersuadethemtoinvest.
• Likethecontractbetweenthepowerplantandthecoalmine,thefinancialcontractbetweentheinvestorandthecoalmineislikelytobeincomplete.Theinvestoristhereforeworriedaboutopportunisticbehavior(cf.hold-up)bythemanagerofthecoalmine.
• Forexample,themanagercoulddivertearnings:hecouldpayhimselfalargesalaryorreinvestprofitsratherthanpayingbacktheinvestor.
• Onewaytoprotecttheinvestoragainstopportunismisbygivingherresidualcontrolrightsorvotes.Forexample,shecouldbecometheownerofthecoalmine,ratherthanhavinganarms-lengthcontractwiththecoalmine.Thiswouldallowhertointervenetostopopportunisticbehavior,e.g.,shecouldcontrolthemanager’ssalaryorevenreplacehim.
• Butaswehaveseentherecanbeadownsideforthemanagerofthecoalmine:hisincentivetohaveideasmaybereducediftheinvestorhascontrol.
• Aghion andBolton(1992)showedthatonewaytobalancetheseeffectsistomakecontrolstate-contingent.Thatis,themanagerwillhavecontrolinsomesituations/statesoftheworld—typically,goodstates—andtheinvestorinothers—typically,badstates.ApaperbyKaplanandStromberg(2003)showedthatventurecapitalcontractsindeedhavethesefeatures.
• Inapaperwrittenin1989,andpublishedin1998,JohnMooreandIshowedthat,undersomeassumptions,theoptimalcontracttakestheformofadebtcontract:viz,
• Thecoalminepromisestomakeafixedstreamofpaymentstotheinvestor.Aslongasthesepaymentsaremadethemanagerofthecoalmineremainsincharge,i.e.,retains(residualrightsof)controloverthecoalmine.Ifapaymentisnotmadecontrolshiftstotheinvestor,whocandecidewhethertoreplacethemanagerorsellthemine.
• Debtcontractsare,ofcourse,ubiquitous,andtheanalysishelpstoexplainwhytheyareused.
• Theanalysisalsocastslightontheimportanceofcollateral.Theinvestorisbetterprotectedifthephysicalassetsofthemineareimportantrelativetothemanager’shumancapital.(SeealsoHartandMoore(1994).)Inthiscasetheinvestorcanappropriatealargefractionoftheproject’svalue.Thecoalminecanthereforeborrowmore.
• Further,themoreslowlythephysicalcapitaldepreciates(themore“durable”itis),thelongercanbethematurityofthedebtcontract.
• It’stheotherwayroundifthehumancapitalisimportantrelativetothephysicalcapital:nowit’shardforthecoalminetoborrowmuch.
• EmpiricalsupportfortheseimplicationshasbeenobtainedbyBenmelech (2009).
• Asecondapplicationistopublicvs.privateownership.Seemy1997paperwithAndreiShleiferandRobertVishny.
• Replacethepowerplantbythegovernmentandthecoalminebyaprison.
• Clearly,thegovernmenthastopayforprisonservicesbutdoesitneedtoowntheprison?
• Mightitbebettertocontractwithaprivatecompanytolookaftertheprisoners?
• Againitboilsdowntocontractualincompletenessandtheallocationofresidualcontrolrights.
• Iftheprisonisprivatelyrun,theprisoncompanymayfindwaysconsistentwiththecontracttosavemoneybutthismaybeattheexpenseofquality,whichisundesirableforthegovernment/society.
• Forexample,thecompanymighthirecheaperbutlesswell-trainedguards.(Thisisanalogoustothecoalminechoosingtominehigh-ash-contentcoal.)
• Ontheotherhand,aprivately-runprisonmighthaveagreaterincentivetoinnovate,e.g.,comeupwithsociallyvaluablerehabilitationprograms.(Thisisakintothemanagerofthecoalminehavingbetterideas.)
• Whicheffectismoreimportantwilldeterminewhetherpublicorprivateownershipisbetter.
• The1997paperarguedthatthefirsteffectislikelytodominatethesecondinthecaseofmaximumsecurityprisons,wherethequalityoftheguardsisparticularlyimportant.Thusprisonprivatizationisprobablyabadideainthiscase.
• Thereareothercaseswherethetrade-offgoestheotherwayandprivatizationisgood.
• Theanalysisisperhapsusefulinshowingthateconomicsratherthanpoliticscanguideusonthepublic-privatechoice.
If I had more time…
• IwouldtalkaboutwhyinrecentworkIhaveintroducedbehavioralelements—inparticular,aconcernbythecontractingpartiesforareasonableorfairoutcome—tounderstandatadeeperlevelwhycontractsareincomplete.
• IwouldalsotalkabouttwolegalcasesIwasinvolvedin,whereIusedtheworkIhavedescribedasanexpertwitnessfortheU.S.government.
• Youwillhavetowaitforthefulllecturetolearnaboutthese….
Someofmyco-authorsinthisendeavor…
• SanfordGrossman
JohnHardmanMoore
Some of my co-authors in this endeavor…
ChristianZehnder
Robert VishnyAndrei Shleifer
Ernst Fehr
Some of my co-authors in this endeavor…
n THANK YOU !!