indiana aaronson k neg texas round4

7/24/2019 Indiana Aaronson K Neg Texas Round4

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1nc &Their securit$ discourse sanitizes glo)al destruction )$ proli#eratings$mptom-#ocused solutions to glo)al power im)alances causes c$cles o#violence that ma&e glo)al war#are and extinction inevita)le+hmed 1F bestsellin0 author) investi0ative 7ournalist an% international securityscholarG e?ecutive %irector of the -nstitute for *olicy +esearch H Aevelopment Ar.Iafeez Mosa%%eq) 9The international relations of crisis an% the crisis of internationalrelations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society) &lobalJhan0e) *eace H Security: formerly *aci3ca +eview: *eace) Security H &lobalJhan0e) 6olume 2,) -ssue ,) !//2"!2) Taylor an% Krancis#

This analysis thus calls for a broa%er approach to environmental security base% on retrievin0 the manner in which politicalactors construct discourses o# 6scarcit$6 in response to ecological( energ$ andeconomic crises critical security stu%ies# in the conte?t of the historicallyLspeci3c socioLpolitical an% 0eopolitical relations of %omination by which their power is constitute% )an% which are often implicated in the acceleration o# these ver$ crises historical sociolo0y

an% historical materialism#. -nstea%) both realist an% liberal ortho%o? -+ approachesfocus on %i5erentaspects of interstate behaviour) conictual an% cooperative respectively) but each lac=s the capacity to 0rasp that the unsustainabletra7ectory of state an% interLstate behaviour is only e?plicable in the conte?t of a wi%er 0lobal system concurrently overLe?ploitin0

the biophysical environment in which it is embe%%e%. They are) in other wor%s) unable to a%%ress therelationship of the interLstate system itself to the biophysical environment as a =eyanalytical cate0ory for un%erstan%in0 the acceleration of 0lobal crises. They simultaneouslytherefore cannot reco0nise the embe%%e%ness of the economy in society an% the concomitant politicallyLconstitute% nature of

economics. ence) they ne0lect the profoun% irrationality of collective state behaviour)which systematically ero%es this relationship) glo)alising insecurit$ on amassive scale - in the ver$ process o# see&ing securit$ . -n Jo?Ns wor%s) becausepositivist -+ theory 6does not uestion the present order Cit instea%E has the

e5ect of le0itimisin0 an% reifyin0 it N.8 7rthodox I/ sanitises glo)all$-destructive collective inter-state )ehaviour as a normal function ofinstrumental reasonLthus rationalising what are clearl$ deepl$ irrationalcollective human actions that threaten to permanentlyero%e state power an% security by%estroyin0 the ver$ conditions o# human existence . -n%ee%) the prevalence of ortho%o? -+ as abo%y of %isciplinary beliefs) norms an% prescriptions or0anically con7oine% with actual policyLma=in0 in the international system

hi0hli0hts the e?tent to which both realism and li)eralism are ideologicall$ implicated in

the acceleration o# glo)al s$stemic crises4 ;y the same to=en) the incapacityto reco0nise an% criticall$ interrogate how prevailing social( political andeconomic structures are %rivin0 0lobal crisis acceleration has le% to the

proli#eration o# s$mptom-led solutions focuse% on the e?pansion ofstate/re0ime militaryLpolitical power rather than any attempt to transform rootstructural causes . -t is in this conte?t that) as the prospects for meanin0ful reformthrou0h interLstate cooperation appear increasin0ly nulli3e%un%er the pressure of actors with aveste% interest in sustainin0 prevailin0 0eopolitical an% economic structures) states have resorte% pro0ressivelymore to militarised responses %esi0ne% to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from%an0erous new threats. -n e5ect) the failure of ortho%o? approaches to accuratel$ diagnose


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glo)al crises ( %irectly accentuates a tendenc$ to 6securitise6 them L an% this)ironically) fuels the proli#eration o# violent con8ict an% militarisation responsible for ma0ni3e% 0lobalinsecurity. NSecuritisationN refers to a 6speech act6 - an act o# la)elling L wherebypolitical authorities i%entify particular issuesor inci%ents as an e?istential threatwhich)because of their e?treme nature) 7ustify 0oin0 beyon% the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. -t thus

le0itimises resort to special e?traLle0al powers. ;y labellin0 issues a matter of NsecurityN) therefore) states are able tomove them outsi%e the remit of %emocratic %ecisionLma=in0 an% into the realm ofemer0ency powers) all in the name o# survival itsel#. Kar from representin0 a mere aberrationfrom %emocratic state practice) this %iscloses a %eeper N%ualN structure of the state in itsinstitutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise e?traor%inary e?traLle0al militaryLpolice measures in purporte% response to an e?istential %an0er. The problem in theconte?t of 0lobal ecolo0ical) economic an% ener0y crises is that such levels ofemer0ency mobilisation an% militarisation have no positive impact on the very0lobal crises 0eneratin0 Nnew security challen0esN) an% are thus entirely %isproportionate.(" +llthat remains to examine is on the 6sur#ace6 of the international system 0eopolitical competition)

the balance of power) international re0imes) 0lobalisation an% so on#) phenomena which are %islocate% from

their structural causes by way of bein0 unable to reco0nise the biophysicallyLembe%%e% an% politicallyLconstitute% social relations of which they are comprise%.

The consequence is that ortho%o? -+ has no means of respon%in0 to 0lobal systemiccrises other than to reduce them to their s$mptoms . -n%ee%) ortho%o? -+theory has lar0ely respon%e% to 0lobal systemic crises not with new theor$( )utwith the expanded application o# existing theor$ to 6new securit$

challenges6 such as NlowLintensityN intraLstate conictsG ineualit$ and povert$ Genvironmental degradation G international criminal activities inclu%in0 %ru0s an%arms tra>c=in0 G proli#eration of weapons of mass %estructionG an% internationalterrorism .(! @lthou0h the ma7ority of such Nnew security challen0esN are nonLmilitary in ori0in L whether their referents are

states or in%ivi%uals L the ina%equacy of systemic theoretical framewor=s to %ia0nose themmeans they are primarily examined through the lenses o# militar$-politicalpower4(2 -n other wor%s) the escalation of 0lobal ecolo0ical) ener0y an% economiccrises is reco0nise% not as evi%ence that the current or0anisation of the 0lobalpolitical economy is #undamentall$ unsustaina)le ) requirin0 ur0ent transformation) but asvin%icatin0 the necessity for states to ra%icalise the e?ertion of their militaryLpolitical capacities to maintain e?istin0 power structures) to &eep the lid on .(, &lobalcrises are thus viewe% as amplifyin0 factors that coul% mobilise the popular will in ways that challen0e e?istin0 political an%economic structures) which it is presume% 0iven that state power itself is constitute% by these structures# %eserve protection. This

7usti3es the stateNs a%option of e?traLle0al measures outsi%e the normal sphere of %emocratic politics. -n the conte?t of 0lobal crisis

impacts) thiscounterL%emocratic tren%Lline can result in a 0rowin0 propensity to problematise

potentially recalcitrant populations L rationalising violence towar% them as a control mechanism.Jonsequently) for the most part) the policy implications of ortho%o? -+ approaches involve are%un%ant conceptualisation of 0lobal systemic crises purely aspotential 6threat-multipliers6 o# traditional securit$ issues such as 6political insta)ilit$ aroun% theworl%) the collapse o# governments and the creation of terrorist sa#e havens6 . Jlimatechan0e will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism) particularly in re0ions with lar0e populations an% scarce resources.

The US @rmy) for instance) %epicts climate chan0e as a NstressLmultiplierN that willNe?acerbate tensionsNan% Ncomplicate @merican forei0n policyNG while the U perceives it as a NthreatLmultiplier which


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e?acerbates e?istin0 tren%s) tensions an% instabilityN.( -n practice) this 0eneratesan excessivepreoccupation not with the causes of 0lobal crisis acceleration an% how to ameliorate them throu0h

structural transformation) )ut with their purportedl$ inevita)le impacts ) an% how toprepare for them by controllin0problematic populations. *ara%o?ically) this 6securitisation6o# glo)al crises does not render us sa#er . -nstea%) by necessitating moreviolence ) while inhi)iting preventive action( it guarantees greaterinsecurit$ . Thus) a recent US Aepartment of Aefense report e?plores the future of international conict up to 2"". -t warnsof Nresource competition in%uce% by 0rowin0 populations an% e?pan%in0 economiesN) particularly %ue to a pro7ecte% Nyouth bul0eN inthe South) which Nwill consume ever increasin0 amounts of foo%) water an% ener0yN. This will prompt a Nreturn to tra%itional securitythreats pose% by emer0in0 nearLpeers as we compete 0lobally for %epletin0 natural resources an% overseas mar=etsN. Kinally)climate chan0e will Ncompoun%N these stressors by 0eneratin0 humanitarian crises) population mi0rations an% other comple?emer0encies.(8 @ similar stu%y by the US Ooint Korces Jomman% %raws attention to the %an0er of 0lobal ener0y %epletion throu0hto 2",". 1arnin0 of Pthe %an0erous vulnerabilities the 0rowin0 ener0y crisis presents$) the report conclu%es that PThe implicationsfor future conict are ominous.$(' Qnce a0ain) the sub7ect turns to %emo0raphics: P-n total) the worl% will a%% appro?imately 8"million people each year an% reach a total of billion by the 2","s$) ( per cent accruin0 to %evelopin0 countries) while populationsin %evelope% countries slow or %ecline. P+e0ions such as the Mi%%le ast an% SubLSaharan @frica) where the youth bul0e will reachover "R of the population) will possess fewer inhibitions about en0a0in0 in conict.$( The assumption is that re0ions whichhappen to be both ener0yLrich an% MuslimLma7ority will also be sites of violent conict %ue to their rapi%ly 0rowin0 populations. @;ritish Ministry of Aefence report concurs with this assessment) hi0hli0htin0 an inevitable Pyouth bul0e$ by 2",) with some ' percent of all people un%er the a0e of 2 inhabitin0 %evelopin0 countries. -n particular) the Mi%%le ast population will increase by !,2

per cent an% subLSaharan @frica by ! per cent. &rowin0 resentment %ue to Pen%emic unemployment$ will be channelle% throu0hPpolitical militancy) inclu%in0 ra%ical political -slam whose concept of Umma) the 0lobal -slamic community) an% resistance tocapitalism may lie uneasily in an international system base% on nationLstates an% 0lobal mar=et forces$. More stran0ely) pre%ictin0an intensifyin0 0lobal %ivi%e between a superLrich elite) the mi%%le classes an% an urban un%erLclass) the report warns: PThe worl%$smi%%le classes mi0ht unite) usin0 access to =nowle%0e) resources an% s=ills to shape transnational processes in their own class

interest.$(( Thus) the securitisation of 0lobal crisis lea%s not only tothe pro)lematisationo# particular religious and ethnic groups in forei0n re0ions of 0eopolitical interest) butpotentially e?ten%s this problematisation to an$ social group which mi0htchallen0e prevailin00lobal political economic structuresacross racial) national an% class lines. The previouse?amples illustrate how securLitisation paradoxicall$ generates insecurit$ by rei#$ing aprocess o# militarizationa0ainstsocial 0roupsthat are constructe% as e?ternal to theprevailin0 0eopolitical an% economic or%er .-n other wor%s) the internal re%uctionism)

fra0mentation an% compartmentalisation that pla0ues ortho%o? theory an% policyrepro%ucesprecisely these characteristics by e?ternalisin0 0lobal crises from one another) externalisingstates from one another) e?ternalisin0 the interLstate system from its biophysical environment) an% e?ternalisin0 new social

0roups as %an0erous Noutsi%ers. ence) a simple %iscursive analysis of state militarisation an% the construction of newoutsi%er i%entities is insu>cient to un%erstan% the causal %ynamics %rivin0 theprocess of NQtherisationN. @s Aou0 Sto=es points out) the 1estern state preoccupation with the on0oin0military stru00le a0ainst international terrorism reveals an un%erlyin0 N%iscursive comple?) where representations about terrorisman% nonL1estern populations are premise% on Nthe construction of star= boun%aries that Noperate to e?clu%e an% inclu%e. et thesee?clusionary %iscourses are Nintimately boun% up with political an% economic processesN) such as strate0ic interests in proliferatin0military bases in the Mi%%le ast) economic interests in control of oil) an% the wi%er political 0oal of Nmaintainin0 @merican

he0emony by %ominatin0 a resourceLrich re0ion critical for 0lobal capitalism.!"" ;ut even this %oes not 0o far enou0h) forar0uably the construction of certain he0emonic %iscourses is mutually constitute%

by these 0eopolitical) strate0ic an% economic interests B e?clusionary %iscoursesare politically constitute%. Iew conceptual %evelopments in 0enoci%e stu%ies throw further li0ht on this in terms ofthe concrete socioLpolitical %ynamics of securitisation processes. -t is now wi%ely reco0nise%) for instance) that the %istin0uishin0criterion of 0enoci%e is not the preLe?istence of primor%ial 0roups) one of which %estroys the other on the basis of a preeminence inbureaucratic militaryLpolitical power. +ather) 0enoci%e is the intentional attempt to %estroy a particular social 0roup that has beensocially constructe% as %i5erent. @s inton observes) 0enoci%es precisely constitute a process of Notherin0 in which an ima0ine%community becomes reshape% so that previously Ninclu%e% 0roups become Ni%eolo0ically recastN an% %ehumanise% as threatenin0

an% %an0erous outsi%ers) be it alon0 ethnic) reli0ious) political or economic lines B eventually legitimising their

annihilation.!"2 -n other wor%s) 0enoci%al violence is inherently roote% in a prioran% on0oin0 i%eolo0ical process) whereby e?clusionary 0roup cate0ories are


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innovate%) constructe% an% NQtherise%N in accor%ance with a speci3c socioLpoliticalpro0ramme. The very process of i%entifyin0 an% classifyin0 particular 0roups as outsi%e the boun%aries of an ima0ine%community of Ninclusion) 7ustifyin0 e?culpatory violence towar% them) is itself a political act without which 0enoci%e woul% be

impossible.! , This recalls Vem=inNs reco0nition that the intention to %estroy a 0roup is inte0rallyconnecte% with a wi%er socioLpolitical pro7ect L or colonial pro7ect B %esi0ne% toperpetuatethe political) economic) cultural an% i%eolo0ical relations of the perpetrators in the

place of that of the victims) by interruptin0 or era%icatin0 their means of socialrepro%uction. 7nl$ )$ interrogating the d$namic an% ori0ins of this pro0rammeto uncover the social relations from which that pro0ramme %erives can theemergence o# genocidal intent become e?plicable. ;uil%in0 on this insi0ht) Semelin %emonstratesthat the process of e?clusionary social 0roup construction invariably %erives from political processes emer0in0 from %eepLseate%sociopolitical crises that un%ermine the prevailin0 framewor= of civil or%er an% social normsG an% which can) for one social 0roup) be

seemin0ly resolve% by pro7ectin0 an?ieties onto a new Noutsi%erN 0roup %eeme% to be somehow responsible for crisis con%itions. -tis in this conte?t that various forms of mass violence ) which may or may noteventually culminate in actual genocide) can become legitimised ascontri)uting to the resolution o# crises .!"This %oes not imply that thesecuritisation of 0lobal crises by 1estern %efence a0encies is 0enoci%al. +ather) the

same essential %ynamics of social polarisation an% e?clusionary 0roup i%entityformation evi%ent in 0enoci%es are hi0hly relevant in un%erstan%in0 thera%icalisation processes behin% mass violence. This hi0hli0hts the fun%amentalconnection between social crisis) the brea=%own of prevailin0 norms) the formationof new e?clusionary 0roup i%entities) an% the pro7ection of blame for crisis onto anewly constructe% Noutsi%erN 0roup vin%icatin0 various forms of violence.

The drone war wraps its victims in )lan&ets o# secrec$ and allows stri&esto extend )e$ond all )orders( with no meaning#ul oversight theirglori'cation o# the 9I+ as :exercising patience and discretion; #eeds intomilitarism and causes the expansion o# a glo)al shadow war4

A+W


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planet) an% that the norm for us is to be at war somewhere at any moment$. ;acevich2"!") 22# traces this state of a5airs to what he calls the P1ashL in0ton rules$ that lon0 preL%ate (/!!. These arePthe conviction that the obli0ations of lea%ership require the Unite% States to maintain a 0lobal military presLence)con30ure its arme% forces for power pro7ection) an% employ them to impose chan0es abroa%$) which he ar0ueshave forme% Pthe en%urin0 leitmotif of US national security policy$ for the last 8" years an% Ppropelle% the Unite%States into a con%ition appro?imatin0 perpetual war$. ach of these temporal formulations implies spatialformations. Kor +TQ+T 2"") !",# Pmilitary neoL liberalism$ is Pthe true 0lobalization of our time$.The planetary

0arrison that pro7ects US military power is %ivi%e% into si? 0eo0raphically %e3ne% uni3e% comL batant comman%s Fli=e US Jentral Jomman%) JITJQM F whose @reas of +esponsibility cover every re0ion on earth an% which operatethrou0h a 0lobal networ= of bases. -f you thin= this unremar=L able) as= yourself ;acevich$s question: how woul% theUnite% States react if Jhina were to mirror these movesX Thin=) too) of the zones in which the sha%ow of US militaryviolence still falls: not 7ust @f0hanistan an% -raq) but also -ran) Vibya) *a=istan) Somalia) emen. Then thin= of thezones where the rhetoric of the Pwar on terror$ has been use% by other states to le0itimise repression: Jhechnya)Vibya) *alestine) the *hilippines) Sri Van=a. @n% then thin= of the cities that have become %isplacements of thespace of war) punctuation points in what Sassen 2"!") ,'# calls Pa new =in% of multiLsite% war$: Jasablanca)Vahore) Von%on) Ma%ri%) Moscow) Mumbai. @ll these lists are incomplete) but even in this truncate% form they

su00est the nee% to analyse not only Pthe forever war$ but also what we mi0ht call Pthe everyL where war$.This isat once a conceptual an% a material pro7ect whose scope can be in%e?e% by three0eoL0raphs that trace a movement from the abstract to the concrete: Koucault$s!('F8# prescient su00estion that war has become the pervasive matri? withinwhich social life is constitute%G the replacement of the concept of the battle3el% inUS military %octrine by the multiLscalar) multiL%imensional Pbattlespace$ with Pnofront or bac=$ an% where Peverythin0 becomes a site of permaL nent war$ &raham2""() ,(G 2"!") ,!#G an% the assault on the 0lobal bor%erlan%s where the Unite%States an% its allies now con%uct their military operaL tions. The 3rst two are never far fromthe surface of this essay) but it is the thir% that is my primary focus. Au>el% 2""!) ,"(# once %escribe% thebor%erlan%s as Pan ima0ine% 0eo0raphical space where) in the eyes of metropolitan actors an% a0encies) thecharacterisL tics of brutality) e?cess an% brea=%own pre%ominate$. There) in the Pwil% zones$ of the 0lobal South)wars are suppose% to occur Pthrou0h 0ree% an% sectarian 0ain) social fabric is %estroye% an% %evelopmental 0ainsreverse%) nonLcombatants =ille%) humanitarian assisL tance abuse% an% all civility aban%one%$. This ima0iL native0eo0raphy fol%s in an% out of the rhetorical %istinction between Pour$ wars F wars con%ucte% by a%vance% militariesthat are suppose% to be sur0ical) sensitive an% scrupulous F an% Ptheir$ wars. -n reality) however) the boun%aries areblurre% an% each blee%s into its other &re0ory 2"!"#. Thus the USLle% invasion of @f0hanistan in Qctober 2""!combine% a lon0L %istance) hi0hLaltitu%e war from the air with a 0roun% war spearhea%e% by the warlor%s an%

militias of the Iorthern @lliance operatin0 with US infantry an% Special KorcesG counterinsur0ency in @f0hanistanan% -raq has involve% the coLoption of ra0ta0 militias to supplement US military operationsG an% in @f0haniL stan theUS @rmy pays o5 warlor%s an% ultimately perhaps even the Taliban to ensure that its overlan% supply chain isprotecte% from attac= +eport of the Ma7ority Sta5 2"!"#. -n mappin0 these bor%erlan%s F which are alsosha%owlan%s) spaces that enter uropean an% @meriL can ima0inaries in phantasmatic form) barely =nown butvivi%ly ima0ine% F we 7ibe a0ainst the limits of carto0raphic an% so of 0eopolitical reason. Krom +atL zel$s view of %erWrie0 als Schule %es +aumes to Vacoste$s stin0in0 %enunciation F Pla 0Zo0raphie) [a sert) %$abor%) \ faire la 0uerre$F the %ea%ly liaison between mo%ern war an% mo%ern 0eo0raphy has been con%ucte% in resolutely territorial terms.

To be sure) the 0enealo0y of territory has multiple valences) an% +atzel$s +aum is not Vacoste$s espace) but a critiLcal analysis of the everywhere war requires cartoL 0raphic reason to be supplemente% by other) more abilespatialities. This is not only a matter of tranL scen%in0 the 0eopolitical) connectin0 it to the bioL political an% the0eoLeconomic) but also of trac=in0 space as a P%oin0$) precarious) partially open an% never complete. -t is insomethin0 of this spirit that ;auman 2""2) ,# i%enti3es the Pplanetary frontierL lan%s$ as sta0in0 0roun%s ofto%ay$s wars) where e5orts to Ppin the %ivisions an% mutual enmities to the 0roun% sel%om brin0 results$. -n thecourse of PinterL minable frontierlan% warfare$) so he ar0ues) Ptrenches are sel%om %u0$) a%versaries are Pconstantlyon

the move$ an% have become for all intents an% purposes Pe?traterritorial$. - am not sure about the last ;auman is evi%ently thin=in0 of al ]ae%a)

which is scarcely the summation of late mo%ern war#) but this is an arrestin0 if impressionistic canvas an% the ui%ity conL veye% by ;auman$s broa%brushLstro=es nee%s to be eshe% out. @fter the USLle% invasion of -raq it was commonplace to %istin0uish the &reen ^one an% its satellites the USpoliticalLmilitary bastion in ;a0h%a% an% its penumbra of Korwar% Qperatin0 ;ases# from the Pre% zone$ that was everywhere else. ;ut this catL e0orical%ivision is mislea%in0. The colours seepe% into an% swirle% aroun% one another) so that occupie% -raq became not so much a patchwor= of 0reen zonesan% re% zones as a thorou0hly militarise% lan%scape saturate% in varyin0 intensities of brown =ha=i#: Pintensities$ because within this warscape militaryan% paramilitary violence coul% %escen% at any moment without warnin0) an% within it precarious local or%ers were constantly formin0 an% reLformin0. -thin= this is what @n%erson 2"!!# means when he %escribes insur0encies oscillatin0 Pbetween e?ten%e% perio%s of absence as a function of their%ispersion$ an% Pmoments of %isruptive) punctual presence$) but these variable intensities entrain all si%es in to%ay$s Pwars amon0st the people$ F an%most of all those cau0ht in the mi%%le. This is to emphasise the emer0ent) PeventLful$ quality of contemporary violence) what &ros 2"!") 28"# sees asPmoments of pure laceration$ that puncL ture the every%ay) as a %i5use an% %isperse% Pstate of violence$ replaces the usual con30urations of war. 6iolencecan erupt on a commuter train in Ma%ri%) a house in &aza Jity) a poppy 3el% in elman% or a street in Jiu%a% Ouarez: such is the contrapuntal 0eo0L raphy

of the everywhere war. -t is also to claim that) as carto0raphic reason falters an% military violence is loose% from its frames) theconventional ties between war an% 0eo0raphy have come un%one: that) as M_n=ler 2"") ,# has it) Pwar has lost its


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wellL%e3ne% contours$. -n what follows) - propose to ta=e M_n=ler at his wor% an% consi%er threebor%erlan%s beyon%@f0hanistan an% -raq that illuminate some of the ways in which) since (/!!) late mo%ern war is bein0 transL forme% by the slippery spaces within whichan% throu0h which it is con%ucte%. - focus in turn on P@fL*a=$) P@me?ica$ an% cyberspace) partly because these concrete instances remin% us that the everyLwhere war is also always somewhere Spar=e 2""') !!'#) an% partly because they brin0 into view features of a %istinctly if not uniquely @merican way ofwar. @fL*a=$ P@fL*a=$ is the cover term coine% by the Qbama a%ministration) an% probably by its Special +epresenL tative for @f0hanistan an% *a=istan+ichar% olL broo=e) to %escribe the re0ional battlespace in which the Unite% States pursues its arme% conict with the Taliban an% al ]ae%a. The term iswi%ely %isli=e% in @f0hanistan an% *a=istan) but its hyphen mar=s a proL foun%ly ambi0uous zone. The bor%er was surveye% between !(4 an% !(8 to%elimit ;ritish colonial territories in -n%ia alon0 the northLwest frontier with @f0hanistan. This soLcalle% Auran% Vine bisecte% the cultural re0ion of*ashtunistan) %ivi%in0 villa0es an% e?ten%e% families with stron0 culture an% =inship connections between them) an% ever since the formaL tion of *a=istanin !(4') @f0hanistan has insiste% that the %emarcation lapse% with the en% of colonial rule. The establishe% bo%y of international law re7ects the @f0han

position) but Mahmu% 2"!"# ar0ues that the continue% entan0lements of law an% colonial power show that in this postLcolonial space law is still part ofthe problem rather than the solution because the bor%er freezeLframes colonial %emarcations. Iot surL prisin0ly) the bor%erlan%s are hi0hly porous an%many of their inhabitants routinely cross from @f0hanistan into *a=istan an% bac= without botherin0 about any bor%er formalities. This inclu%es the Taliban)whose movements are both episo%ic) eein0 hot pursuit from @f0hanistan) an% seasonal) returnin0 from *a=istan when 30htin0 resumes in the sprin0. Thisrecent history has compoun%e% the porosity of the re0ion so that P@fL*a=$ also con7ures up a sha%owy) still more %isperse% Pris=y 0eo0raphy$ that wires@f0hanistan an% *a=istan to PVon%onistan$ an% other uropean cities) an% to terrorist cells an% militant 0roups that threaten urope an% the continentalUnite% States @moore an% %e &oe%e 2"!!#. @lthou0h the Taliban is pre%ominantly *ashtun) it is not a monolith that stra%%les the bor%er. The Talibanemer0e% in the early !(("s as an arme% an% pre%omiL nantly *ashtun response to the brutalisin0 rule of the militias of the Iorthern @lliance who0overne% @f0hanistan in the turbulent aftermath of the Soviet occupation in !((. The Taliban sou0ht to impose its own strin0ent version of -slamic law)an% its a%vance %rew thousan%s of veterans from the 0uerilla war a0ainst the +e% @rmy an% from @f0han refu0ee camps in *a=istan. The civil war thatensue% was a bloo%y an% protracte% a5airG hun%re%s of alL]ae%a 30hters fou0ht alon0si%e Taliban troops) althou0h the relations between the two were farfrom strai0htforwar%) an% by the en% of the %eca%e @f0hanistan ha% been virtually consume% by the violence. The insular) ultraL nationalist pro7ect of theTaliban was supporte% by *a=istan throu0hout the !(("s) an% the neoLTaliban that re0roupe% after the USLle% invasion of @f0haniL stan has continue% tosee= an accommo%ation with -slamaba% &re0ory 2""4) 4!F2#. -ts lea%ership council was %riven from Wan%ahar an% is now base% in ]uettaG its fourre0ional military councils are base% in *a=istan too) an% it en7oys the support of *a=istan$s Airectorate for -nterLServices -ntelli0ence. These a>liL ationssharply %istin0uish the @f0han Taliban from the *a=istan Taliban) or Tehri=LiLTaliban TT*#) which was forme% in Aecember 2""' as a loose coalition ofmilitant -slamicist 0roups un%er ;aitullah Mehsu%. The *a=istan Taliban en%orses the stru00le a0ainst the USLle% -nternational Security @ssistance Korce-S@K# in @f0hanistan) but its primary tar0et is the *a=istani state: it see=s to establish its own rule over the Ke%erL ally @%ministere% Tribal @reas K@T@# onthe bor%er. The *a=istan military has con%ucte% a series of o5enL sive operations a0ainst the TT* in those areas) puncL tuate% by waverin0 truces) but theK@T@ continue to have a tense an% attenuate% relationship to -slamaba%) an% in Ur%u they are =nown as ilaqa 0hair) Palien$) Pforei0n$) or even Pforbi%%en$

lan%s. These ambivalences have a %irect impact on stri=es by Unmanne% @erial 6ehicles U@6s# in the K@T@. The attac=s are carrie% out by arme% M]L!*re%ators an% M]L( +eapers launche% from bases in @f0hanistan an% until early this year in *a=istan too# but remotely controlle% by the J-@ from thecontinental Unite% States. The *re%ator was 7ointly %evelope% for the US @ir Korce an% the J-@) an% at the J-@$s request it was arme% with ell3re missilesin early 2""!. @fter (/!! *resi%ent &eor0e 1. ;ush si0ne% an authorisation that 0ave the J-@ wi%e latitu%e in the Pwar on terror$ throu0h the issue of P=ill)capture or %etain$ or%ers a0ainst members of al ]ae%a. -ts imme%iate conseL quence was the initiation in Qctober of the same year of the pro0ram ofe?traor%inary ren%ition con%ucte% in the sha%ows of the 0lobal war prison: the seizure) incarceration an% torture of terrorist suspects at Pblac= sites$. Thiswas subsequently supplemente% by a pro0ram %irecte% at =illin0 name% in%ivi%uals F Pi0h 6alue Tar0ets$ F who were on a list compile% by the J-@$sJounterterrorism Jenter. The 3rst U@6 stri=e in *a=istan too= place on ! Oune 2""4. The initial pace was slow) in part because the number of U@6s waslimite% but also because the tar0et list was restricte% an% 0roun% intelli0ence mea0re. There were ei0ht more stri=es before the assassination of ;enazir;hutto on 2' Aecember 2""' prompte% ;ush to e?pan% the tar0et list from al ]ae%a to a wi%er array of in%ivi%uals) an% thus to increase the rate of stri=eGby the en% of 2"" there ha% been 48 stri=es in *a=istan. @s e?traor%inary ren%itions were terminate% an% blac= sites close%) *resi%ent ;arac= Qbamawi%ene% the scope of the tar0et list still further an% %ramatically steppe% up the tempoG faster an% more powerful +eapers were presse% into service)borrowe% from @ir Korce operations in @f0hanistan) an% by the en% of 2"!" there ha% been a further !" stri=es. ;aitullah Mehsu% was assassinate% by a*re%ator stri=e in @u0ust 2""( F after !8 unsuccessful stri=es over !4 months that =ille% several hun%re% others Mayer 2""(# F but this seems to havebeen a rare success. The vast ma7ority =ille% in the last 2 years have reporte%ly been or%inary foot sol%iers F people Pwhose names were un=nown or aboutwhom the @0ency ha% only fra0mentary information$ Jlou% 2"!"#) althou0h it ha% no hesitation in %eclarin0 virL tually none of them civilians F an% thishas le% to %oubts about the purpose an% parameters of the camL pai0n Miller 2"!!#. These operations raise troublin0 questions. Some arise from theresort to e?traL7u%icial =illin0 that the Unite% States once con%emne%: if it is wron0 to torture suspects) how can it be ri0ht to assassinate themX owsecure is the evi%ential basis on which tar0etin0 %ecisions are ma%eX Qthers arise from the use of U@6s an% the timeFspace compressions proL %uce% bythe technoLcultural armature of this new mo%e of war) althou0h - thin= that most of the critiL cism about vi%eo fee%s re%ucin0 war to a vi%eo 0ame is

misplace% F these are profoun%ly immersive techL nolo0ies that have quite other an% more serious# conL sequences for =illin0 F but in any case theseconcerns apply with equal force to the stri=es carrie% out by the @ir Korce$s *re%ators an% +eapers in @f0hanistan that use the *enta0on$s Ooint -nte0rate%

*rioritise% Tar0et Vist to Pput warhea%s on forehea%s$ &re0ory 2"!!#. Still others arise from the le0al apparatus that constiLtutes thee?ten%e% war zone) an% it is these that concern me here. *lainly the Unite% States isnot at war with *a=istan) an% even thou0h -slamaba% 0ives the no% to the stri=es Fwhile closin0 its eyes to their e5ects F Murphy 2""() !"# claims that the authorityof -slamaba% to sanction US military actions in the K@T@ is far from clear. Kor its part)the Qbama a%minL istration represents the stri=es as le0itimate acts of selfL%efencea0ainst the @f0han Taliban who are en0a0e% in a transnational arme% conict an%see= sanctuary across the bor%er an% as e5ective counterL terrorism tactics a0ainstal ]ae%a an% its a>liates hi%in0 in *a=istan. ;ut these are ina%equate responses forat least three reasons that all revolve aroun% the battlespace as a 0rey zone. Kirst)

even thou0h the @ir Korce may be involve% to some %e0ree) it is the J-@ that plansan% e?ecutes the stri=es. The J-@ was create% in !(4' as a civilian a0ency tocounterbalance the inuence of the miliL tary. Since then there has been a 0eneralPcivilianisaL tion$ of war in all sorts of ways) which inclu%es the outsourcin0 ofsupport services to contractors) an% the J-@ has been transforme% from a civiliana0ency into Pa paramilitary or0anisation at the van0uar% of @meriL ca$s farLun0wars$ operatin0 from an Parchipela0o of 3reLbases$ in @f0hanistan an% beyon%Mazzetti 2"!"G Shane et al. 2"!"#. ;ut the J-@ %oes not operate un%er military


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control so that) as Sin0er 2"!"# observes) the clan%estine air war in *a=istan iscomman%e% not by an @ir Korce 0eneral but by Pa former con0ressman fromJalifornia$) Veon *anetta) the Airector of the J-@. @ccor%in0 to orton 2"!"#) this isPthe 3rst time in U.S. history that a stateLofLtheLart) cuttin0Le%0e weapons systemhas been place% in the han%s of the J-@$. ence Sin0er$s 2"!"# complaint that

civilians are operatin0 a%vance% weapons systems outsi%e the military chain ofcomman% an% Pwrestlin0 with comple? issues of war$ for which they have neither the necessary trainin0 F this is a moot point: it may be that J-@ operatorsfollow similar proce%ures protocols to their @ir Korce counterparts) inclu%in0 the incorporaL tion of le0al a%visers into the =illLchain to en%orse thePprosecution of the tar0et$ tzioni 2"!"G Mc=elvey 2"!!# F nor) accor%in0 to the Iational Security @ct) the le0al authority. This is the most %ama0in0ob7ecL tion because it turns J-@ operators into the cate0ory that ;ush so con3%ently consi0ne% to the 0lobal war prison after (/!!: unlawful combatantsQ$Jonnell 2""(#. This is such an obvious point that *aust 2"!") 4#) who otherwise en%orses the stri=es as acts of selfL%efence) conclu%es that the J-@$slawyers must be leftovers from the ;ush a%ministration Pwho have proven either to be remar=ably i0norant of the laws of war or conveniently quiet an%complicit %urin0 the ;ushFJheney pro0ram of serial an% casca%in0 crimiL nality$. These consi%erations ra%ically transform the battlespace as the linebetween the J-@ an% the miliL tary is %eliberately blurre%. Qbama$s recent %ecision to appoint *anetta as Secretary of Aefense an% have &eneral Aavi%*etraeus ta=e his place as Airector of the J-@ ma=es at least that much clear. So too %o the brai%in0 lines of responsibility between the J-@ an% SpecialKorces in the =illin0 of Qsama bin Va%en in @bbottaba% in May 2"!!) which for that reason an% others# was un%erta=en in what @?e 2"!!# portrays as aPle0al 0rey zone$ between two US co%es) Title !" which inclu%es the Uniforme% Jo%e of Military Oustice# an% Title " which authorises the J-@ an% its

covert operations# Stone2"",#.The role of the J-@ in this notLsoLsecret war in *a=istan thusmar=s the forL mation of what n0elhar%t an% Turse 2"!"# call Pa new LstyleCbattlespaceE that the @merican public =nows remar=ably little about ) an% thatbears little relationship to the @f0han 1ar as we ima0ine it or as our lea%ers

0enerally %iscuss it$. Secon%) representin0 each %rone stri=e as a sepaL rate act ofselfL%efence obscures the systematic an% cumulative nature of the campai0n.@lthou0h the Qbama a%ministration insists that its tar0etin0 proce%ures a%here tothe laws of arme% conict) the covert nature o# a war con%ucte% by aclan%estine a0ency ensures that most of its victims are wrapped in )lan&ets o#secrec$4 @ccountability is limite% enou0h in the case of a %eclare% warG in anun%eclare% war it all but %isappears .There is little or no reco0nition of civiliancasualties) no inquiries into inci%ents that violate the principles of %iscriminationan% proportionality) an% no mechanism for provi%in0 compensation. The JamL pai0nfor -nnocent 6ictims in Jonict reports from the K@T@ that: Arone victims receive noassistance from the *a=istani or US 0overnments) %espite the e?istence of *a=istani

compensation e5orts for other conictLvictims an% US comL pensation mechanismscurrently operatin0 in -raq an% @f0hanistan. 6ictims are left to cope with losses ontheir own while neither the *a=istani nor the US 0overnments ac=nowle%0eresponsibility for the stri=es or the civilian status of those collaterally harme%. +o0ers2"!") 84# The sin0le e?ception to %ate has been the %ecision by -slamaba% to compensate victims of a US %rone stri=e in Iorth 1aziristan in March 2"!!.The %etails) such as they are) are revealin0. Vocal people ha% 0athere% at a mar=et with Taliban me%iators to settle a %ispute over a chromite mineG twoU@6s launche% four misL siles that =ille% at least 4" people. *a=istan$s *rime Minister an% the Jhief of @rmy Sta5 both sharply con%emne% the stri=e as arec=less attac= on civilians) inclu%in0 el%ers an% chil%ren) but US o>cials insiste% that the meetin0 was a le0itimate terrorist tar0et not Pa ba=e sale$)

Pcounty fair$) Pcharity car wash$ or Pthe local men$s 0lee club$sic# Masoo% an% Shah 2"!!G +o%ri0uez 2"!!#. @seven this case shows) the a%vance% technolo0y that ma=es the U@6 campai0npossible F the combination of sensor an% shooter in a sin0le platform F %oes not%ispel the fo0 of war. Kar from ma=in0 the battlespace transparent) this newapparatus actively e?ploits another 0rey zone) the space between civilian an%

combatant that is people% by the spectral 30ures that haunt the lan%scape ofinsur0ency. Thir%) the le0al lo0ic throu0h which the battlespace is e?ten%e% beyon%the %eclare% zone of combat in @f0hanistan is itself in3nitely e?ten%ible. -f theUnite% States is 30htin0 a 0lobal war) if it arro0ates to itself the ri0ht to =ill or %etainits enemies wherever it 3n%s them) where %oes it en%X ;lan= 2"!"F!!#. uman+i0hts 1atch pose% the =ey questions in a letter to Qbama on ' Aecember 2"!":1hile the Unite% States is a party to arme% conicts in @f0hanistan an% -raq an%coul% become a party to arme% conicts elsewhere) the notion that the entire worl%


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is automatically by e?tension a battle0roun% in which the laws of war are applicableis contrary to international law. ow %oes the a%ministration %e3ne the P0lobal battleL 3el%$ an% what isthe le0al basis for that %e3nitionX 1hat) if any) limits e?ist on or%erin0 tar0ete% =illin0s within itX Aoes it view thebattle3el% as 0lobal in a literal sense) allowin0 lethal force to be use%) in accor%ance with the laws of war) a0ainst asuspecte% terrorist in an apartment in *aris) a shoppin0 mall in Von%on) or a bus station in -owa JityX Ao the rules0overnin0 tar0ete% =illin0 vary from one place to another F for e?ample) are %i5erent criteria use% in emen an%*a=istanX$ uman +i0hts 1atch 2"!"# These bloo%y 0eo0raphies e?ploit another 0rey zone. Ve0al opinions are

sharply %ivi%e% about the re0ulaL tion of arme% conict between state an% nonLstate actors that ta=es place beyon%state bor%ers PtransnaL tional arme% conicts$#. -t is those states that have most strenuously presse% for there0ulation of intraL state wars an% the establishment of international criminal tribunals for conicts in +uan%a an%the former u0oslavia that have most vi0orously insiste% on bein0 allowe% the ma?imum free%om to con%uct theirown transLbor%er campai0ns a0ainst nonLstate actors ;envenisti 2"!"#. Vaw an% war have always beenintertwine%) an% international law is often reLma%e throu0h war F in fact operatin0 at the mar0ins of the law is oneof the most powerful ways of chan0L in0 it F an% the U@6 stri=es in *a=istan are evi%ently no e?ception. They see=

at once to e?pan% the battlespace an% to contract the le0al armature that re0uL lates its constitution. - have ar0ue%elsewhere that the @merican way of war has chan0e% since (/!!) thou0h not uniquely because of it &re0ory 2"!"#) an% there are crucial continuities aswell as %i5erences between the ;ush an% Qbama a%ministrations: PThe man who many consi%ere% the peace can%i%ate in the last election wastransforme% into the war presi%ent$ Jarter 2"!!) 4#. This requires a careful tellin0) an% - %o not mean to re%uce the three stu%ies - have s=etche% here toa sin0le interpretative narrative. et there are connections between them as well as contra%ictions) an% - have in%icate% some of these en route. Qthershave note% them too. *a=istan$s *resi%ent has remar=e% that the war in @f0hanistan has 0rave consequences for his country P7ust as the Me?ican %ru0 waron US bor%ers ma=es a %i5erence to @merican society$) an% one scholar has su00este% that the Unite% States %raws le0al authority to con%uct militaryoperations across the bor%er from @f0hanistan inclu%in0 the =illin0 of bin Va%en) co%ename% P&eronimo$# from its history of e?traLterritorial operaL tionsa0ainst nonLstate actors in Me?ico in the !'"s an% !"s inclu%in0 the capture of the real &eronimo# Mar0olies 2"!!#. 1hatever one ma=es of this) one

of the most persistent threa%s connectin0 all three cases isthe question of le0ality) which runs li=e a re%ribbon throu0hout the prosecution of late mo%ern war. Qn one si%e) commentatorsclaim that new wars in the 0lobal South are PnonLpolitical$) intrinsically pre%atorycriminal enterprises) that cartels are morphin0 into insur0encies) an% that theori0ins of cyber warfare lie in the %ar= networ=s of cyber crimeG on the other si%e) the Unite% States places a premium onthe rule an% role of law in its new counterinsur0ency %octrine) accentuates the involvement of le0al a%visers in tar0etin0 %ecisions by the US@K an% theJ-@) an% even as it refuses to con3rm its U@6 stri=es in *a=istan provi%es ar0uments for their le0ality. The invocation of le0ality wor=s to mar0inalise ethicsan% politics by ma=in0 available a seemin0ly neutral) ob7ective lan0ua0e: %isa0reement an% %ebate then become purely technical issues that involvematters of opinion) certainly) but not values. The appeal to le0ality F an% to the quasiL7u%icial process it invo=es F thus helps to authorise a wi%esprea% an%wi%enin0 militarisation of our worl%. 1hile - thin= it is both premature an% e?cessive to see this as a transformation from 0overnmentality to Pmilitariality$

Marzec 2""(#) - %o believe thatKoucault$s 2"",# in7unction F PSociety must be %efen%e%$ F has been transforme% into anuncon%itional imperative since (/!! an% that this involves an intensifyin0 trian0ulation of the planet by le0ality)security an% war. 1e mi0ht remember that biopolitics) one of the central pro7ects of late mo%ern war) requires ale0al armature to authorise its intervenL tions) an% that necropolitics is not always outsi%e the law. This trian0ulationhas become such a commonplace an% provi%es such an establishe% baseLline for contemporary politics that - am

remin%e% of an interL view with ^ize= soon after (/!! F which for him mar=e% the last war of the twentieth century Fwhen he pre%icte% that the Pnew wars$ of the twentyL3rst century woul% be %istin0uishe% by a ra%ical uncertainty: Pitwill not even be clear whether it is a war or not$ AeichL mann et al. 2""2#. Ieither will it be F nor is it F clear wherethe battlespace be0ins an% en%s. @s - have trie% toshow) the two are closely connecte%. Kor this reason - am able to close on a lesspessimistic note. @s - %rafte% this essay) - was watchin0 events unfol% on the streets of Jairo an% other 0yptian cities) 7ust wee=s after similar scenes inTunisia. - hope that the real) lastin0 counterpoint to (/!! is to be foun% in those places) not in @f0hanistan) *a=istan or -raq. Kor those events show thatPfree%om$ an% P%emocracy$ cannot be limite% to the boastful banners of military a%venturL ism) hun0 from the barrels of 0uns or %rape% across warships)an% that or%inary people can successfully rise up a0ainst autocratic) repressive an% corrupt re0imes: inclu%in0 those proppe% up for so lon0 by the Unite%States an% its uropean allies. *erhaps one %ay someone will be able to write about Pthe nowhere war$ F an% not from urope or Iorth @merica.

The alternative is to vote negative interrogating @usti'cations andre@ecting securit$ is &e$ to success#ul policies9heeseman A Bruce!(CD&raeme) Senior Vecturer at the University of Iew South 1ales) an% +obert) @ssociate*rofessor in social sciences at Jurtin university) 9Aiscourses of Aan0er H Area% Krontiers) p. L) MT#

This 0oal is pursue% in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in @ustralia) eventhou0h they are 0ainin0 inuence worl%wi%e as tra%itional mo%es of theory an% practice are ren%ere% ina%equate by 0lobal tren%s

that %efy comprehension) let alone policy.The inability to 0ive meanin0to 0lobal chan0es reectspartly theenclose%) elitist worl% of professional security analysts an% bureaucratic e?perts)where entry is 0aine% by learnin0 an% acceptin0 to spea= a particular) e?clusionary lan0ua0e. The contributors to this boo= arefamiliar with the %iscourse) but accor% no privile0e% place to its P=nowle%0e form as reality$ in %ebates on %efence an% security.

-n%ee%) they believe that de)ate will )e #urthered onl$ through a lon0 over%ue critical re-

evaluationof elite perspectives. *luralistic) %emocraticallyLoriente% perspectives on @ustralia$s i%entity are both require%

an% essential if @ustralia$s thin=in0 on %efence an% security is to be invi0orate%.This is not a conventional policy boo=Gnor should it )e( in the sense of o5erin0 policyLma=ers an% their aca%emic counterparts sets of neat


10/41

alternative solutions ) in familiar lan0ua0e an% format) to problems they pose.This e?pectation is initself a considera)le part o# the pro)lem to be analyse%. -t is) however) a boo= about policy)one that questions how pro)lems are #ramed by policyLma=ers. -t challen0es the propositionthat irre%ucible bo%ies of real =nowle%0e on %efence an% security e?ist in%epen%ently of their Pconte?t in the worl%$) an% it

%emonstrates how security policy is articulate% authoritatively by the elite =eepers of that =nowle%0e) e?perts traine% toreco0nize en%urin0) universal wis%om. @ll others) from this perspective) must accept such wis%om or remain outsi%e the e?pert

%omain) tainte% by their inability to comply with the Pri0htness$ of the o>cial line. ;ut it is precisely the o>cial line) or at least its

ima0e of the worl%) that nee%s to be problematise% . -f the critic respon%s %irectly to the%eman% for policy alternatives) without a%%ressin0 this ima0e) he or she is tacitlyen%orsin0 it. Be#ore en0a0in0 in the polic$ de)ate the critics need to re#ramethe basicterms o# re#erence . This boo=) then) reects an% un%erlines the importance of @ntonio &ramsci an%%war% Sai%$s Pcritical intellectuals$.!The %eman% )tacit or otherwise) that the policyLma=er$s frame ofreference be accepte% as the only basis for %iscussion an% analysis i0nores a threethousand $ear old tradition commonly associate% with Socrates an% purporte%ly integral to the1estern tra%ition of %emocratic %ialo0ue. More imme%iately) it i0nores postLseventeenth century %emocratic tra%itionswhich insist that a 0oo% society musthave within it some way of critically assessin0 its =nowle%0ean% the %ecisions base% upon that =nowle%0e which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tra%ition with a sli0htly %i5erent

connotation in contemporary liberal %emocracies which) %urin0 the Jol% 1ar) were proclaime% %i5erent an% superior to thetotalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional chec=s an% balances upon power. -n short) one of the ma7or %i5erencesbetween Popen societies$ an% their close%# counterparts behin% the -ron Jurtain was that the former encoura0e% the critical testin0of the =nowle%0e an% %ecisions of the powerful an% assessin0 them a0ainst liberal %emocratic principles. The latter tolerate%criticism only on rare an% limite% occasions. Kor some) this represente% the triumph of rationalLscienti3c metho%s of inquiry an%techniques of falsi3cation. Kor others) especially since positivism an% rationalism have lost much of their allure) it meant that forsociety to become open an% liberal) sectors of the population must be in%epen%ent of the state an% free to question its =nowle%0ean% power. Thou0h we %o not e?pect this position to be accepte% by every rea%er) contributors to this boo= believe that critical%ialo0ue is lon0 over%ue in @ustralia an% nee%s to be listene% to. Kor all its liberal %emocratic trappin0s) @ustralia$s securitycommunity continues to invo=e close% monolo0ical narratives on %efence an% security. This boo= also questions the %istinctionsbetween policy practice an% aca%emic theory that inform conventional accounts of @ustralian security. Qne of its ma7or concerns)

particularly in chapters ! an% 2) is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis an% policyprescription. The boo= also calls on policyLma=ers) aca%emics an% stu%ents of %efence an% security to thin= critically aboutwhat they are rea%in0) writin0 an% sayin0G to be0in to as=) of their wor= an% stu%y) %i>cult an% searchin0 questions raise% in other%isciplinesG to reco0nise) no matter how uncomfortable it feels) that what is involve% in theory an% practice is not the ability to

i%entify a replacement for faile% mo%els) but a realisation that

terms an% conceptsF state

soverei0nty)

balance of power) security) an% so on F are conteste% an% problematic) an% that the worl% isin%eterminate) always becomin0 what is written about it. Jritical analysis which shows how particular =in%sof theoretical presumptions can e5ectively exclude vital areas o# political li#e fromanalysis has direct practical implications for policyLma=ers) aca%emics an% citizens who face the%auntin0 tas= of steerin0 @ustralia throu0h some potentially choppy international waters over the ne?t few years. There is also muchof interest in the chapters for those stru00lin0 to 0ive meanin0 to a worl% where so much that has lon0 been ta=en for 0rante% now%eman%s ima0inative) incisive reappraisal. The contributors) too) have stru00le% to 3n% meanin0) often %espairin0 at the terriblehuman costs of international violence. This is why rea%ers will 3n% no sin0le) fully forme% panacea for the worl%$s ills in 0eneral) or@ustralia$s security in particular. There are none. very chapter) however) in its own way) o5ers somethin0 more than is foun% inortho%o? literature) often by e?posin0 ritualistic Jol% 1ar %efence an% security min%Lsets that are %resse% up as new thin=in0.Jhapters ' an% () for e?ample) present alternative ways of en0a0in0 in security an% %efence practice. Qthers chapters ,) 4) ) 8

an% # see= to alert policyLma=ers) aca%emics an% stu%ents to alternative theoretical possibilitieswhich mi0ht)etter serve an @ustralian community pursuin0 security an% prosperityin an uncertain worl%. @ll chaptersconfront the policy community an% its counterparts in the aca%emy with a %eep awareness of the intellectual an% materialconstraints impose% by %ominant tra%itions of realism) but they avoi% %ismissive an% e?clusionary terms which often in the past

characterize% e?chan0es between policyLma=ers an% their critics. This is because) as note% earlier) attentionnee%s tobe pai%to the wor%s an% thethou0ht processesof those bein0 criticize%. @ close rea%in0 of this =in% %raws attention toun%erlyin0 assumptions) showin0 they nee% to be reco0nize% an% questione%. @ sense of %oubt in place of con3%ent certainty# isa necessar$ prelude to a 0enuinesearch for alternative policies. Eirst comes anawareness of the nee% for new perspectives) then speci3c policies may follow.@s Oim&eor0e ar0ues in the followin0 chapter) we need to loo& not so much at contending policies


11/41

as they are ma%e for us but at challenging Fthe discursive process which 0ivesCfavoure%interpretations of 9realityE their meanin0 an% which%irectC@ustralia$sE policy/analytical/militaryresponses$. This process is not restricte% to the small) o>cial %efence an% security establishment hu%%le% aroun% the USL@ustralian 1ar Memorial in Janberra. -t also encompasses much of @ustralia$s aca%emic %efence an% security community locate%primarily thou0h not e?clusively within the @ustralian Iational University an% the University Jolle0e of the University of Iew South1ales. These %iscursive processes are e?amine% in %etail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to ma=e sense of a politics ofe?clusion an% closure which e?ercises %isciplinary power over @ustralia$s security community. They also question the %iscourse of

Pre0ional security$) Psecurity cooperation$) Ppeace=eepin0$ an% Palliance politics$ that are central to @ustralia$s o>cial an% aca%emicsecurity a0en%a in the !(("s. This is seen as an important tas= especially when) as is reveale%) the %isciplines of -nternational+elations an% Strate0ic Stu%ies are un%er challen0e from critical an% theoretical %ebates ran0in0 across the social sciences an%humanitiesG %ebates that are nowhere to be foun% in @ustralian %efence an% security stu%ies. The chapters 0raphically illustrate how@ustralia$s public policies on %efence an% security are informe%) un%erpinne% an% le0itimise% by a narrowlyLbase% intellectualenterprise which %raws stren0th from conteste% concepts of realism an% liberalism) which in turn see= le0itimacy throu0h policyLma=in0 processes. Jontributors as= whether @ustralia$s policyLma=ers an% their aca%emic a%visors are unaware of broa%erintellectual %ebates) or resistant to them) or choose not to un%erstan% them) an% whyX


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9ase


13/41

Terrorism


14/41

1nc terror lin&+pocal$ptic terrorism scenarios are grounded in vested political interestsand violent modes o# national-identit$ #ormation in which political re#ormsli&e the plan are used to carve the world into li)eral and illi)eral spheres the impact is a racist extermination o# alterit$ and expansive structuralviolenceAesiree Br$an 1) +esearch @ssistant -ntern at Mi%%le ast -nstitute. MScJQIJan%i%ate: Security Stu%ies at @berystwyth University) The *opularity of the PIew

Terrorism$ Aiscourse) http://www.eLir.info/2"!2/"8/22/theLpopularityLofLtheLnewLterrorismL%iscourse/

Iew Terrorism vs. Ql% Terrorism

The openin0 sentence of a te?tboo= on terrorism states) 9Terrorism has been a%ar= feature of humanbehavior since the %awn of recor%e% history Martin) 2"!") ,#. -f this is the case) what ma=es the Pnewterrorism$ %i5erent from the ol%X @ccor%in0 tothe mainstream ortho%o?yon terrorism) the ol%terrorism was0enerally characterize% by: left win0 i%eolo0yG the use of small scale)conventional weaponsG clearly i%enti3able or0anizationsor movements with equally clear politicalan% social messa0esG speci3c selection of tar0ets an% 9e?plicit 0rievances championin0 speci3c classes orethnonational 0roups Martin) 2"!") 2#. @lso accor%in0 to the ortho%o?y) the shift to the new terrorism) on theother han%) is thou0ht to have emer0e% in the early !(("s Oac=son) 2"!!# an% too= root in mass consciousness

with the September !!) 2""! terrorist attac=s on the U.S. Martin) 2"!") ,#. The new terrorism ischaracterize% by: 9loose) cellLbase% networ=s with minimal lines of comman% an% control) 9%esire%acquisition of hi0hLintensity weapons an% weapons of mass %estruction Martin) 2"!") 2'#) 9motivate%by reli0ious fanaticism rather than political i%eolo0y an% it is aime% at causin0 mass causality an% ma?imum%estruction Oac=son) 2""') !'(L!"#. owever) these %ichotomous %e3nitions of the ol% an% new types of

terrorism are not without problems.The3rstma7or problem is thatterrorism has beencharacterize% by the samefun%amental qualities throu0hout history. Some of the super3cialcharacteristics) the means of implementation e.0. the invention of the -nternet or %ynamite# or the %iscourse

communism vs. -slam# may have evolve%) but the central components remain the same.Thesecon%ma7orproblem is that the characterization of new terrorism is) at best) roote% in aparticularpolitical ideolog$( )iased and inaccurate . @t worst) it is racist( promotes war

mongering and has contri)uted to millions o# deaths . @s Aavi% +apoport states: Manycontemporary stu%ies be0in D by statin0 that althou0h terrorism has always been a feature of social e?istence) itbecame Psi0ni3cant$ D when it Pincrease% in frequency$ an% too= on Pnovel %imensions$ as an international ortransnational activity) creatin0 in the process a new Pmo%e of conict$ !(4) 8#. -sabelle Auyvesteyn points outthat this woul% in%icate evi%ence for the emer0ence of a new type of terrorism) if it were not for the fact that thearticle was written in !(4 an% %escribe% a situation from the !(8"s Auyvesteyn) 2""4) 4,(#. -t seems that therehave been many new phases of terrorism over the years. So many so that the %e3nition of Pnew$ has been stretche%si0ni3cantly an% applie% relatively across %eca%es. Ievertheless) the i%ea that this terrorism) that which the 1ar on

Terror 1oT# is %irecte% a0ainst) is the most si0ni3cant an% unique form of terrorism that has ta=en hol% in thepopular an% political %iscourse. Therefore) it is useful to a%%ress each of the soLcalle% new characteristics in turn.

The 3rst characteristic is the i%ea that new terrorism is base% on loosely or0anize% cellLbase% networ=s as oppose%

to the tra%itional terrorist 0roups) which were hi0hly localize% an% hierarchical in nature. @n oftLcite% e?ample of atra%itional terrorist 0roup is the -rish +epublican @rmy -+@#) who operate% un%er a military structure an% in arelatively in contrast to the perceive% transnational operations of alL]ae%a# localize% capacity. owever) some ofthe 3rst mo%ern terrorists were not hi0hly or0anize% 0roups but small fra0mente% 0roups of anarchists. These0roups were hee%in0 the call of revolutionary anarchist Mi=hail ;a=unin an% other contemporary anarchists toachieve anarchism) collectivism an% atheism via violent means Mor0an) 2""!) ,,#. Aespite the initial) selfL%escribe% 9amorphous nature of these 0roups) they were a =ey force in the +ussian +evolution Ma?imo5) &.#.Kurthermore) lea%in0 anarchist philosophers of the +ussian +evolution ar0ue% that terrorists 9shoul% or0anizethemselves into small 0roups) or cells Martin) 2"!") 2!'#. These small 0roups croppe% up all aroun% +ussia an%urope in subsequent years an% forme% an early form of a 9loosely or0anize% cellLbase% networ= not unli=emo%ern %ay al ]ae%a. Auyvesteyn further notes that both the *alestine Viberation Qr0anization *VQ#) which was


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foun%e% in !(84) an% ezbollah) foun%e% !(2) operate on a networ= structure with very little central control over

0roups 2""4) 444#. The secon% problematic i%ea of new terrorism is thatcontemporaryterrorist0roups aim to acquirean% use weapons of mass %estruction 1MAs#. This belief is simpl$ notsupported )$ empirical evidence . Qne of the =ey problems with this theory is that GM0s

are signi'cantl$ more dicult to o)tain and utilize than most people

understand. ven if aterrorist 0roup were to obtain abiolo0ical 1MA) 9;iolo0ist MatthewMeselson calculates that it woul% ta=e a ton of nerve 0as or 've tons o# mustard gas topro%uceheavy causalitiesamon0 unprotecte% people in an open area of one square =ilometer Mueller)2"") 4#. @n% that$s only an e?ample of the problem with the implementation of 1MAs) assumin0 they areacquire%) transporte% an% %esirable by a terrorist 0roup in the 3rst place. @%%itional problems)such as the fact that 1MAs9are e?tremely %i>cult to %eploy an% control Mueller) 2"") 4#an% that ma=in0 abomb9isan extraordinaril$ dicult tas= Mueller) 2"") 4(#) further%iminish the ris=. -t is interestin0 to note that) while thepotential %an0ers of 1MAs are much lau%e%)the attac=s of September !!th were low tech an% ha% beentechnolo0ically possible formorethan !"" years. Mueller also states) 9althou0h nuclear weapons have been aroun%for well over half a century) no state has ever 0ivenanother statemuch less a

terrorist 0roup# a nuclear weaponthat the recipient coul% use in%epen%ently 2"") 4("#. @ll of this tal=about the %i>cultly of acquirin0 an% %eployin0 1MAs by nonLstate a0ents#) is not to %iminish the question of what

terrorists have to 0ain by utilizin0 these weapons. -t is important to question whether it woul%even further the aims of terrorists to use1MAs. The evidence suggestsotherwise4 -n the 9*olitics of Kear Oac=son states) 9 Mass casualties are most often

counterproductive to terrorist aims F they alienate their supporters an% canprovo=e harsh reprisalsfrom the authorities CDE in a%%ition) 9CDE theywoul% un%erminecommunity support) %istort the terrorist$spolitical messa0e) an% invite overLwhelmin0retaliation2""') !(8L!('#. 0espite popular rhetoric to the contrar$( terroristsare :rational political actors an% are acutel$ aware o# these dangers Oac=son)

2""') !('#. &overnment appointe% studies on this issue have supporte% these views. Thislea%s us to the thir% problem with new terrorism) which is the i%ea that we are facin0 a new era of terrorismmotivate% by reli0ious fanaticism rather than political i%eolo0y. @s state% previously) earlier) soLcalle% tra%itionalforms of terrorism are associate% with left win0) political i%eolo0y) whereas contemporary terrorists are %escribe% ashavin0 9antiLmo%ern 0oals of returnin0 society to an i%ealize% version of the past an% are therefore necessarily antiL%emocratic) antiLpro0ressive an%) by implication) irrational &unnin0 an% Oac=son) ,#. +apoport ar0ues the i%eathat reli0ious terrorists are irrational) sayin0) 9what seems to be %istinctive about mo%ern Creli0iousE terrorists) theirbelief that terror can be or0anize% rationally) represents or %istorts a ma7or theme peculiar to our own culture CDE!(4) 88"#. Jonveniently for the interests of the political elites) as we shall see later) the i%ea of irrationalfanaticism ma=es the notion of ne0otiation an% listenin0 to the %eman%s of the other impossible. -n li0ht of this) it isinterestin0 to note that the U.S. has) for %eca%es) 0iven billions of %ollars in ai% to the State of -srael) which coul% bear0ue% to be a fun%amentalist) reli0ious or0anization that en0a0es in the terrorization of a 0roup of people. Kurther)it is %i>cult to spea= of The Troubles in Iorthern -relan% without spea=in0 of the reli0ious conict) yet it was neverassume% that the -+@ was 9absolutist) ine?ible) unrealistic) lac=in0 in political pra0matism) an% not amenable tone0otiation &unnin0 an% Oac=son) 4#. +apaport further reinforces the i%ea that reli0ious terrorism 0oes bac=

centuries by sayin0) 9;efore the nineteenth century) reli0ion provi%e% the only acceptable 7usti3cations for terrorD!(4) 8(#. @s we have seen here) problems with the %iscourse of new terrorism inclu%e the fact that these

elements o# terrorism are neither new nor are the popular )elie#s o# the

discourse supported )$ empirical evidence . The question remains) then) why is the i%ea ofnew terrorism so popularX This question will be a%%resse% ne?t. *olitical -nvestment in Iew Terrorism There are two

main cate0ories that e?plain the popularity of new terrorism. The 3rst cate0ory is 0overnment an% politicalinvestment in thepropa0ation of the i%ea that a %istinct ) historicallyun=nown typeof terrorism e?ists. The mainstream discourse C!E rein#orces) throu0h statements by


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political elites) me%ia) entertainment an% every other way ima0inable) the culture o# violence(

militarism and #eelings o# #ear . Throu0h mass me%ia) cultural norms an% the inte0ration of

neoliberal i%eolo0y into society) people are becomin0 increasin0ly%esensitize% to humanri0hts issues) war) social 7ustice an% social welfare) not to mention apathetic to thepolitical process in 0eneral. The discourse o# the GoT is merel$ the

contemporar$ incarnation o# this culture o# #ear and violence4 -n the past) variousthreats have inclu%e% @merican -n%ians) women) @frican @mericans) communists) -6/@-AS an% %ru0s) to name but

a few Jampbell) !((2#. -t can be ar0ue% that there are four main political functions of terrorism

discourse. The 3rst is as a distraction #rom other) more immediate and

domestic social pro)lems such as povert$ ( emplo$ment( racial ineualit$(

health and the environment . The second( more sinister #unction is to

control dissent . -n loo=in0 at both of these issues Oac=son states:There area number of clearpolitical a%vanta0es to be 0aine% from the creation of social an?iety an% moral panics. -nthe 3rst place) fearis a %isciplinin0 a0ent an% can bee5ectively %eploye% to %eLle0itimise %issent)mute criticism ) an% constrain internal opponents. CDE ither way) its primar$ #unction is to

ease the pressures o# accounta)ilit$ #or political elites . +s instrument o#elite rule( political #ear is in e5ect a political pro@ect aimed at rei#$ing

existing structures o# power . *olitics of Kear) 2""') !#. &irou? further reinforces the i%ea that a

culture of fearcreates conformity an% %eects attention from 0overnment accountabilitybysayin0) 9the on0oin0 appeal to 7in0oistic forms of patriotism %ivert the public from a%%ressin0 a number of pressin0

%omestic an% forei0n issuesG it also contributes to the increasin0 suppression of %issent 2"",) #. Having a

pro)lem that is :u)iuitous( catastrophic( and #airl$ opaue Oac=son) *olitics of

Kear) 2""') !# is use#ul to political elites( )ecause it is nearl$ impossi)le to

address the ecac$ o# com)ating the pro)lem . @t least) empirical evaluation can be) an%is) easily %iscoura0e% in aca%emic circles throu0h research fun%in0 %irectives. Aomestic problems such as theunemployment rate or health care reform) on the other han%) are %irectly measurable an% heavily monitore% by

%omestic sources. -t is possible to account for the success or failure of policies %esi0ne% to a%%ress these types ofproblems an% the re#election of politicians often %epen%s heavily on success in these areas. owever) the public isneither involve% on a participative level nor) often) socially aware of what is happenin0 in mur=ier an% unreachableareas li=e forei0n policy. The thir% political investment in maintainin0 the terrorism %iscourse has to %o with

economics. 9@t a material level) there area 0reat many veste% interests inmaintainin0 thewi%esprea%con%ition of fear) not least for the m ilitaryLin%ustrial co mple?whichbene3ts%irectlyfromincrease% spen%in0 on national security Oac=son) *olitics of Kear) 2""') !8#. This is true with allforms of crime an% insecurity as all of them factor into the 0reater securityLin%ustrial comple?. Iot only %o thesein%ustries employ millions of people an% support their families) they boost the economy. ;arry ;uzan tal=s of these

the importance of these issues to both the 0overnment an% the public in terms o# a Fthreat-de'cit"F

meanin0 that *44 polic$ and societ$ is dependent on having an external threat

;uzan) 2""') !!"!#.The fourth=ey political interest in terrorism %iscourse is constructin0

a national i%entity. This will be %iscusse% more thorou0hly in the followin0 section) however) it is important toac=nowle%0e the role the 1oT an% previous threats# has ha% on constructin0 an% reinforcin0 a collective i%entity.?amples of this can be seen in the %iscourse an% the subsequent reaction to anyone %arin0 to step outsi%e theparameters of the ;ush @%ministrationLestablishe% narrative in the %ays imme%iately followin0 the September !!thattac=s. @ number of 7ournalists) teachers an% university professors lost their 7obs for %arin0 to spea= out incriticism of U.S. policy an% actions followin0 the attac=s. -n 2""!) Vynne Jheney attac=e% the then %eputychancellor of the Iew or= Jity Schools) Ou%ith +izzo) for sayin0 9terrorist attac=s %emonstrate% the importance of

teachin0 about Muslim cultures &irou?) 2"",) 22#. @ccor%in0 to &irou?) this form of7in0oistic patriotism9becomes a euphemism for shuttin0 %own %issent) eliminatin0 critical %ialo0ue) an%con%emnin0 critical citizenship in the interest of conformity an% a %an0erous %eparture from what it


17/41

means to uphol% a viable %emocracy 2"",) 24#. The message is( we are not theother .Muslims3( patriotism equals a0reement an% compliance and our identit$ is )ased

on the shared values o# li)ert$ and @ustice . @ccor%in0 to Jarol 1in=ler) 9Ie0ativei%eo0raphs contribute to our collective i%entity by bran%in0 behavior that is unacceptable D @merican society%e3nes itself as much by its opposition to tyranny an% slavery as it %oes by a commitment to liberty 1in=ler)2""8) !2#. Terrorism) an% by association in this case) -slam) functions as a ne0ative i%eo0raph of @merican values. -t

thereby tells us what our values an% our i%entity are by tellin0 us who the enemy is an% who we are not. @ccor%in0to Oac=son) 9CDE some have ar0ue% that 1estern i%entity is %epen%ent on the appropriation ofa bac=war%) illiberal) violent -slamic Pother$ a0ainst which the 1est can or0anize acollective liberal)civilize% Pself$an% consolidate its cultural and politicalnormsOac=son) Jonstructin0 nemies) 2""') 42"#. Throu0h this analysis we can see there are four =ey waysin which the he0emonic system is investe% in propa0atin0 a culture of fear an% violence an% terrorism %iscourse.

Iot only is it =ey for political elites to support this system) it is also crucial thatthere be an ever renewin0threat that is uniuel$ dierent from past threats. Thesenew threats allow for the investment ofsi0ni3cantly more resources) the continuation of theeconomy) the renewal of a stron0 sense of cultural i%entity an% the in%octrination an% obe%ience of new0enerations of society. This essay will now loo= at how in%ivi%ual an% collective psycholo0y supports the popularityof the new terrorism %iscourse. *sycholo0y of the Masses The secon% cate0ory of reasons why new terrorism

%iscourse is popular can be calle% the psycholo0y of the masses. There are a number of factors that fall un%er thiscate0ory such as: the hyperLreality of the mo%ern eraG the culture of fearG the carryover of historical archetypes an%the in3ltration of neoliberal values into cultural norms. The topic of social an% in%ivi%ual psycholo0y an% how itrelates to the propa0ation an% acceptance of he0emonic %iscourse is broa%. -t is also an important aspect of criticalterrorism stu%ies an% merits further e?ploration. owever) in this section will outline the basis for the popularity ofnew terrorism %iscourse an% %iscuss several ways in which this popularity is manifeste% an% reinforce% incontemporary society.


18/41

1nc elliot/epresentations matter in the context o# terrorism the discourse )ehindpolitical texts and the aective responses the$ create are used to instillnational #ear and allow elite manipulation o# societal anxiet$=lliott ?1 F mory) University *rofessor of the University of Jalifornia an%Aistin0uishe% *rofessor of n0lish at the University of Jalifornia) +iversi%e Terror)

Theory) an% the umanities e%. Ai Veo) Qpen umanities *ress) Qnline#

-n a !((! interview for the Iew or= Times Ma0azine) Aon AeVillo e?presse% his views on the place of literature in

our times in a statement that he has echoe% many times since an% %evelope% most fully in his novel Mao --: -n arepressive society) a writer can be %eeply inuential) but in a society that$s 3lle%with 0lut an% en%less consumption) the act of terror may be the only meanin0fulact. *eople who are in power ma=e their arran0ements in secret) lar0ely as a way of maintainin0 an% furtherin0that power. *eople who are powerless ma=e an open theater of violence.True terror is a lan0ua0e an% avision. There is a %eep narrative structure to terrorist acts) an% they in3ltrate an%alter consciousness in ways that writers use% to aspire to.qt%. in Ae*ietro 4# Theimplications of AeVillo$s statement are that we are all en0a0e% in national) international) transnational) an% 0lobal

conicts in which acts of representation ) inclu%in0 those of terrorism an% spectacularphysical violence as well as those of lan0ua0e ) performance) an% art compete forthe attention of au%iences an% for inuence in the public sphere .-n the early %ays ofthe -raq 1ar) the Unite% States use% the power of ima0es) such as those of the 9motherof all bombs an% a wi%e array of weapons) as well as aesthetic techniques toinuence an% shape the consciousness o# millions an% to 0enerate stron0supportfor the war.The shoc=) fear) an% nationalism arouse% in those %ays after (/!! haveenable%the ;usha%ministration to pursue a military a0en%athat it ha% planne% before (/!!.Since then) the e?traor%inary %eath an% %estruction) scan%als an% ille0alities) an% %omestic an% international

%emonstrations an% criticisms have been unable to alter the %irection of this a0en%a.Those of us in thehumanities who are traine% as critical readers o# political and social texts) aswell as of comple? artistically constructe% te?ts)are nee%e% now more ur0ently than ever toanalyze the relationships between political power an% the wi%e ran0e of rhetoricalmetho%s bein0 employe% by politicians an% others to further their destructiveeects in the worl%.-f humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of howsuch aesthetic %evicessuch as we see in those photos achieve their a5ective appeal)citizens may be0in to un%erstan% how they are bein0 manipulated an% motivate%by emotionrather than by reason an% lo0ic. -n spite of our ability to e?pose some of these verbal an% visualconstructions as %evices of propa0an%a that function to ename passions an% stie reasonable %iscussion) wehumanities scholars 3n% ourselves mar0inalize%an% on the %efensive in our institutions of hi0herlearnin0 where our numbers have been %iminishe% an% where we are frequently bein0 as=e% to 7ustify

the si0ni3cance of our researchan% teachin0. 1hile we =now the basic truth that themost serious threats to our societies to%ay are more li=ely to result from cultural%i5erences an% failures of communication than from ina%equate scienti3cinformation or technolo0ical ina%equacies) we have been 0iven no voice in this %ebate. 1ith thestron0 ten%ency towar% polarize% thin=in0an% opinion an% the evan0elical an% fun%amentalistreli0ious positions in the US to%ay an% in other parts of the worl%) lea%ers continue to aban%on%iplomacy an% resort to military actions .Most 0overnment lea%ers 3n% the culturalan%social e?planations of the problems we faceto be va0ue) an%they are frustrate% by comple?


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human issues.That is not reason enou0h) however) for us to aban%on our e5orts toinuence an% perhaps even alter the current course of events.-n spite of the%iscoura0ements that we as scholars of the humanities are e?periencin0 in these times) it seems to me that wehave no option but to continue to pursue our research an% our teachin0 an% hope toinuence others to question the meanin0 an% motives of what they see an% hear .


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1nc nu&e terrorNo ris& o# nuclear terror assumes ever$ warrantMueller 1?Oohn) professor of political science at Qhio State) Jalmin0 Qur Iuclear Oitters) -ssues in Science an% Technolo0y)1inter) http://www.issues.or0/28.2/mueller.html#

*oliticians of all stripes preach to an an?ious) appreciative) an% very numerous

choir when they)li=e*resi%ent Qbama) proclaim atomic terrorismto be 9the most imme%iatean% e?treme threatto 0lobal security. -t is the problem that) accor%in0 to Aefense Secretary +obert &ates) currently =eeps every senior lea%er awa=e at

ni0ht.This is har%ly a new an?iety. -n !(48) atomic bomb ma=er O. +obert Qppenheimer ominouslywarne% thatif three or four men coul% smu00le in units for an atomic bomb) they coul% blow up Iew

or=. Thiswas an early e?pression of a pattern of %ramatic ris= inationthat has persiste%throu0hout the nuclear a0e. -n fact) althou0h e?pan%in0 3res an% fallout mi0ht increase the e5ective %estructive ra%ius) theblast of a iroshimaLsize %evice woul% 9blow up about !R of the city $s areaBa tra0e%y) ofcourse) but not the same as one !"" times 0reater. -n the early !('"s) nuclear physicist Theo%ore Taylor proclaime% the atomicterrorist problem to be 9imme%iate) e?plainin0 at len0th 9how comparatively easy it woul% be to steal nuclear material an% step bystep ma=e it into a bomb. @t the time he thou0ht it was alrea%y too late to 9prevent the ma=in0 of a few bombs) here an% there)

now an% then) or 9in another ten or 3fteen years) it will be too late. Three %eca%es after Taylor) we continue to waitfor terrorists to carry out their 9easy tas=. -n contrast tothese pre%ictions) terrorist

0roupsseem to have e?hibite% only limited desire and even less progress in 0oin0atomic. This may be because) after brief e?ploration of the possible routes) they) unli=e 0enerations of alarmists) have%iscovere% that the tremen%ous e5ort require% is scarcely li=ely to be successful . The mostplausible route for terrorists) accor%in0 to most e?perts) woul% be to manufacture an atomic %evice themselves from purloine% 3ssilematerial plutonium or) more li=ely) hi0hly enriche% uranium#. This tas=) however) remains a %auntin0 one) requirin0 that a

consi%erable series of %i>cult hur%les be conquere% an% in sequence. Qutri0ht arme% theft of 3ssile material ise?cee%in0ly unli=ely not only because of the resistance of 0uar%s) but becausechase woul% be imme%iate. @ more promisin0 approach woul% be to corrupt insi%ers to smu00le out the require%substances. owever) this requires the terrorists to pay o5 a host of 0ree%y confe%erates)inclu%in0 bro=ers an% moneyLtransmitters) any one of whom coul% turn on them or) either out of 0uile orincompetence) furnish them with stu5 that is useless. -nsi%ers mi0ht also consi%er the possibility that once theheist was accomplishe%) the terrorists woul%) as analyst ;rian Oen=ins none too %elicately puts it) 9have every incentive to cover

their trail) be0innin0 with eliminatin0 their confe%erates. -f terrorists were somehow successful atobtainin0a su>cient mass of relevant material) they woul%then probably have to transport it along distance over un#amiliar terrain an% probably while bein0 pursue% by securityforces. Jrossin0 international bor%ers woul% be facilitate% by followin0 establishe% smu00lin0 routes) but these arenot as chaotic as they appear an% areoften un%er the watch of suspicious an% carefulcriminal re0ulators. -f bor%er personnel became suspicious of the commo%ity bein0 smu00le%) some of them mi0ht 3n% itin their interest to %isrupt passa0e) perhaps to collect the bounteous rewar% money that woul% probably be o5ere% by alarme%

0overnments once the uranium theft ha% been %iscovere%. Qnce outsi%e the countrywith their precious booty)terrorists woul% nee% to set up a lar0e an% wellLequippe% machine shop tomanufacture a bomb an% then to populate it with a very select team of highl$s&illed scientists ) technicians) machinists) an% a%ministrators.The 0roup woul% have to be

assemble% an% retaine% for the monumental tas= while no consequential suspicionswere 0enerate%amon0 frien%s) family) an% police about their curious an% su%%en absence from normal pursuits bac=home. Members of the bombLbuil%in0 teamwoul% also have to be utterly %evote% to the cause) of course) an%they woul% have to be willin0 to put their livesan% certainly their careers at hi0h ris=) because aftertheir bomb was %iscovere% or e?plo%e% they woul% probably become the tar0ets of an intense worl%wi%e %ra0net operation. Someobservers have insiste% that it woul% be easy for terrorists to assemble a cru%e bomb if they coul% 0et enou0h 3ssile material. ;utJhristoph 1irz an% mmanuel 00er) two senior physicists in char0e of nuclear issues at Switzerlan%Ps Spiez Vaboratory) bluntly

conclu%e that the tas= 9coul% har%ly be accomplishe% by a subnational 0roup. They point outthat precise )lueprints are require%) not 7ust s=etches an% 0eneral i%eas) an% that even with a 0oo%


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blueprint the terrorist 0roup woul%most certainly be force% to re%esi0n. They also stress that thewor= is %i>cult) %an0erous) an% e?tremely e?actin0) an% that the technical requirementsin several 3el%s ver0e on the un#easi)le. Stephen oun0er) former %irector of nuclear weapons research at Vos@lamos Vaboratories) has ma%e a similar ar0ument) pointin0 out that uranium is 9e?ceptionally %i>cult tomachine whereas 9plutonium is one of the most comple? metals ever %iscovere%) amaterial whose basic properties are sensitive to e?actly how it is processe%.9 Stressin0 the 9%auntin0 problems associate% with

material purity) machinin0) an% a host of other issues) oun0er conclu%es) 9 to thin= that a terrorist 0roup)wor=in0 in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity an% little access to toolsan% supplies coul% fabricate a bomb 9is farfetche% at best. Un%er the bestcircumstances) the process of ma=in0 a bomb coul% ta=emonths or even a year or more)which woul%) of course) have to be carrie% out in utter secrecy. -n a%%ition) people in the area) inclu%in0criminals) may observe with increasin0 curiosity an% puzzlement the constant comin0 an% 0oin0 of technicians unli=ely to be locals.

-f the e5ort to buil% a bomb was successful) the 3nishe% pro%uct) wei0hin0 a tonormore) woul% then have to be transporte% to an% smu00le% into the relevant tar0etcountry where it woul% have to be receive% by collaborators who areat once totally%e%icate% an% technically pro3cientat han%lin0) maintainin0) %etonatin0) an% perhaps assemblin0 the weaponafter it arrives.The 3nancial costsof this e?tensive an% e?ten%e% operation coul%easily become

monumental. There woul% be e?pensive equipment to buy) smu00le) an% set up an%people to pay or pay o5. Some operatives mi0ht wor= for free out of utter %e%ication to the cause) but the vastconspiracyalso requiresthe subversion of a consi%erable array of criminalsan% opportunists) eachof whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as hi0h as possible .@ny criminals competent an% capable enou0h to be e5ective allies are also li=ely to be both smart enou0h to see boun%lessopportunities for e?tortion an% psycholo0ically equippe% by their profession to be willin0 to e?ploit them. Those who warn about theli=elihoo% of a terrorist bomb conten% that a terrorist 0roup coul%) if with 0reat %i>culty) overcome each obstacle an% that %oin0 so

in each case is 9not impossible. ;ut althou0h it may not be impossible to surmount eachin%ivi%ual step) the li=elihoo% that a 0roup coul% surmount a series of them quic=lybecomes vanishin0ly small. Table ! attempts to catalo0ue the barriers that must be overcome un%er the scenarioconsi%ere% most li=ely to be successful. -n contemplatin0 the tas= before them) woul%Lbe atomic terroristswoul%e5ectively be require% to 0o thou0h an e?ercise that loo=s much li=e this. -f an% when they %o) they will un%oubte%ly

conclu%e that their prospects are%auntin0 an% accor%in0ly uninspirin0 or even terminally %ispiritin0.-t is possible to calculate the chances for success. @%optin0 probability estimates thatpurposely an% heavilybiasthe case in the terrorists$ favorBfor e?ample) assumin0 the terrorists have a "R chance of overcomin0 each ofthe 2" obstaclesBthe chances that a concerte% e5ort woul% be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. -f one

assumes) somewhat more realistically) that their chances at each barrier are one in three) the cumulative o%%s thatthey will be able to pull o5 the %ee% %rop to one in well over three )illion . Qtherrouteswoul%Lbe terrorists mi0ht ta=e to acquire a bomb are even more problematic.

They are unli=ely to be 0iven or sol% a bombby a 0enerous li=eLmin%e% nuclear state for %elivery abroa%because the ris= woul% be hi0h) even for a country le% by e?tremists) that the bomb an% itssource# woul% be %iscovere%even before %elivery or that it woul% be e?plo%e% in a manner an% on a tar0et the%onor woul% not approve) inclu%in0 on the %onor itself. @nother concern woul% be that the terrorist 0roup mi0ht bein3ltrate% by forei0n intelli0ence.The terrorist 0roup mi0htalso see= to steal or illicitlypurchase a 9loose nu&e 9 somewhere. owever) it seems probable that none exist . @ll0overnments have an intense interest in controllin0 any weapons on their territorybecause of fears that they mi0ht become the primary tar0et. Moreover) as technolo0y has %evelope%) 3nishe% bombshave been outL3tte% with %evices thattri00er a nonLnuclear e?plosion that %estroy s the bomb i#

it is tampered with . @n% there are other security techniques: ;ombs can be =ept %isassemble%with the component parts store% in separate hi0hLsecurity vaults) an% a process can be set up in which two people an%

multiple codes are reuired not only to use the bomb but to store) maintain) an%


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%eploy it. @s oun0er points out) 9only a few people in the worl% have the =nowle%0e to cause an unauthorize% %etonation of anuclear weapon. There coul% be %an0ers in the chaos that woul% emer0e if a nuclear state were to utterlycollapseG *a=istan is frequently cite% in this conte?t an% sometimes Iorth Worea as well. owever) even un%er such con%itions)nuclear weapons woul%probably remain under heav$ guard by people who =now that a purloine%bomb mi0ht be use% in their own territory.They woul% still have loc=s an% ) inthe case of *a=istan) the

weapons woul% be %isassemble%. The al ]ae%a factorThe %e0ree to which al ]ae%a) the onlyterrorist 0roup that seems to want to tar0et the Unite% States) has pursue% or even has much interest in anuclear weapon may have been e?a00erate%. The (/!! Jommission state% that 9al ]ae%a has trie% toacquire or ma=e nuclear weapons for at least ten years) but the only substantial evi%ence it supplies comes from an episo%e that issuppose% to have ta=en place about !((, in Su%an) when al ]ae%a members may have sou0ht to purchase some uranium thatturne% out to be bo0us. -nformation about this suppose% venture apparently comes entirely from Oamal al Ka%l) who %efecte% from al]ae%a in !((8 after bein0 cau0ht stealin0

uranium) assert that althou0h there were various other scams ta=in0 place at the time that may have serve% as 0rist for Ka%l) theuranium episo%e never happene%. @s a =ey in%ication of al ]ae%a$s %esire to obtain atomic weapons) many havefocuse% on a set of conversations in @f0hanistan in @u0ust 2""! that two *a=istani nuclear scientists reporte%ly ha% with Qsama binVa%en an% three other al ]ae%a o>cials. *a=istani intelli0ence o>cers characterize the %iscussions as 9aca%emic in nature. -tseems that the %iscussion was wi%eLran0in0 an% ru%imentary an% that the scientists provi%e% no material or speci3c plans.

Moreover) the scientistsprobably were incapable of provi%in0 truly helpful informationbecause their e?pertise was not in bomb %esi0nbut in the processin0 of 3ssile material) which isalmost certainly beyon% the capacities of a nonstate 0roup. Wali% Shei=h Mohamme%) the apparentplanner of the (/!! attac=s) reporte%ly says that al ]ae%a$s bomb e5orts never went beyon%searchin0 the -nternet. @fter the fall of the Taliban in 2""!) technical e?perts from the J-@ an% the Aepartment ofner0y e?amine% %ocuments an% other information that were uncovere% by intelli0ence a0encies an% the me%ia in @f0hanistan.

They uncovere% no cre%ible information that al ]ae%a ha% obtaine% 3ssile material or acquire% a nuclear weapon. Moreover) theyfoun% no evi%ence of any ra%ioactive material suitable for weapons. They %i% uncover) however) a 9nuclearLrelate% %ocument%iscus

indiana aaronson k neg texas round4

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