1NC

1nc - Reg Spec VOTE NEG. They make the debate pointless by failing to specify a tax regulatory regime. A.) It is impossible to evaluate the cost and benefits B.) It puts us at a competitive disadvantage by restricting our to the most indefensible args in the legalization debate Kleiman 13 – Professor of public policy @ UCLA [Mark Kleiman, “How to Legalize Cannabis,” Washington Monthly, December 26, 2013 11:03 AM , pg. http://tinyurl.com/mc82k9y

Debating whether to legalize pot is increasingly pointless . Unless there’s an unexpected shock to public opinion, it’s going to

happen, and sooner rather than later. The important debate now is how to legalize it . The results of legalization

depend strongly on the details of the post-prohibition tax and regulatory regimes . In the current situation,

continued prohibition might be the worst option. Full commercial legalization on the alcohol model might well be the second-worst.

But that is the way we’re heading.

I’m preparing an essay about designing a post-prohibition regime. After the jump is a set of topic sentences and paragraphs for sections of that essay, not yet in a well-defined order.

Substantive comments are welcome. Rant and snark will be ruthlessly zapped.

We probably should legalize cannabis. Prohibition is now breaking down. $35B/yr. is a lot of money to give to criminals, and no one has a plausible plan to shrink the illicit market under prohibition. Even where “medical marijuana” has degenerated into system when anyone can buy a user license from a crooked doctor, the voters still like it. Arguably, prohibition was worth trying. But it’s time to go home.

Everything has advantages and disadvantages. Cannabis legalization will reduce criminal revenue, intrusive enforcement, arrest, incarceration, and disorder around illicit markets, and enhance personal liberty, consumer choice, and respect for the law, and probably reduce bloodshed in Mexico. It might foster safer and more beneficial practices of cannabis use.

Legalization will certainly increase drug abuse, including heavy use by minors. Every adult is a potential source of leakage to minors. And if we insist on making minors consume illicitly-produced pot, we reserve 20-25% of the market for criminals. Much better to tolerate leakage and have a grey-market supply to minors like the current system that provides them with alcohol.

The polarized nature of the debate means that both sides wind up spend ing lots of time denying the

obvious .

Good design tries to get as much of the advantages, and as little of the disadvantages, as possible.

The policies most likely to help control increases in drug abuse are taxation and other efforts to keep prices high, rules about consumer information (labeling and marketing), and “nudge” strategies to enhance consumer mindfulness.

It matters a lot whether, under conditions of legality, cannabis turns out to be a substitute for alcohol or instead a complement. Right now, no one knows the answer, which might not be the same for all parts of the population or the same in the long run as in the short run.

Analysis can help, but there’s no substitute for experience. The trick is not to get locked in to a set of bad policies. We need a process designed to learn from mistakes.

Neither “cannabis” nor “legalization” names its object with enough specificity . Lots of different things are legalization. Lots of different things are cannabis.

1NC DA 1Climate bill will pass but it’ll be a battle.Paradise Post, 2/10/2015. “Climate change: California lawmakers to introduce sweeping new measures to increase renewable energy, cut fossil fuel use,” http://www.paradisepost.com/general-news/20150210/climate-change-california-lawmakers-to-introduce-sweeping-new-measures-to-increase-renewable-energy-cut-fossil-fuel-use.

California lawmakers on Tuesday unveiled a sweeping package of bills that would boost the Golden State's reputation as a national leader in the battle against climate change.

If enacted, the legislation would in the decades ahead trigger fundamental shifts in the kind of cars Californians drive and the way they power their homes and businesses .

The bills would beef up the state's investments in clean energy, increase building efficiency standards and cut gasoline use in half by requiring cars and trucks to meet tougher emissions and gas mileage standards.

Senate President Pro Tem Kevin de Len, a sponsor of the most far-reaching bill, stressed that the proposals are as much about helping the environment as they are about creating jobs for Californians still struggling to rebound from the Great Recession.

"We need to move the state away from fossil fuels, away from the grip of oil," de Len said at a Sacramento news conference. "This is common sense climate policy."

The proposals drew wide praise from environmentalists but the wrath of the oil industry.

"Mandates to force reductions in gasoline use are not climate change policies," said Catherine Reheis-Boyd, president of the Western States Petroleum Association. "They are attacks on an important industry in California designed to create conflict and controversy."

The legislation mirrors Gov. Jerry Brown's vision laid out in his State of the State speech last month and sets up another battle over how far California should go to fight global warming -- and how much those efforts will cost taxpayers and businesses.

There appears to be a strong chance the legislation will pass this session .

Democrats control large majorities in both the Senate and the Assembly. And the immediate reaction from GOP leaders was surprisingly muted and conciliatory .

"Senate Republicans will give careful consideration to the renewable energy goals revealed by the Senate president pro tem

and look forward to a full public debate," said Senate leader Bob Huff, of Diamond Bar.

"I'm pleased that the majority party has also recognized our unacceptably high statewide unemployment rate," Huff said. "It's the belief of Senate Republicans that any course of action should be weighed against California's ability to create or sustain jobs for the middle class."

But Sen. Andy Vidak, R-Hanford, blasted the proposal as "blatant coastal elitism at its worst." He argued that the legislation would kill "thousands of blue- and white-collar jobs in the Central Valley, as well as mountain and inland regions."

Senate Bill 350, sponsored by de Len, D-Los Angeles, and Sen. Mark Leno, D-San Francisco, would require the California Air Resources Board to reduce petroleum use by cars and trucks by 50 percent from now until 2030, most likely through rules limiting greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles, new incentives for electric vehicle purchases and rules requiring lower carbon content of petroleum fuels.

The bill would also require California utilities to generate at least 50 percent of their electricity from

solar, wind and other renewable energy sources by 2030 -- an increase from the current law which requires 33 percent

renewable sources by 2020. It also would require state agencies to toughen building standards to require a 50 percent increase in energy efficiency in new and existing buildings from now until 2030.

Another measure in the package, SB32, sponsored by Sen. Fran Pavley, D-Agoura Hills, would extend California's landmark climate law, AB32. The current law, signed by former Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2006, requires California to cut greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, a reduction of about 20 percent from "business as usual." The state is on target to meet that goal.

The new bill would go much further, locking into law a goal that Schwarzenegger had set: cutting greenhouse gas emissions 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. The bill would require the California Air Resources Board to set new rules to meet the standards, and likely would involve further crackdowns and fees on the oil industry, petroleum power plants and gas-burning vehicles, with more incentives for renewable energy and electric vehicles.

California will expand RPS renewables mandate but Brown’s PC is key.The Desert Sun, 1/10/2015. “Experts: Brown's support bodes well for green mandate,” Sammy Roth, http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/2015/01/09/brown-calls-percent-renewable-mandate/21514667/.

With Gov. Jerry Brown throwing his political weight behind a plan to get half of California's electricity from renewable energy , experts say the idea is an ambitious but attainable way to limit climate change .

California utilities are on track to meet the state's current clean energy mandate , which requires them to buy 33 percent of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020. In his inaugural address last week, Brown proposed raising that mandate to 50 percent by 2030 , as one of several steps to reduce emissions of planet-warming greenhouse gases.

"This is exciting, it is bold and it is absolutely necessary if we are to have any chance of stopping potentially catastrophic changes to our climate system," the Democrat told state lawmakers.

A   previous effort   to raise the renewable energy mandate above 50 percent — championed by then-Assemblyman V. Manuel Pérez, a Coachella Democrat — died in the state Legislature   a year ago. Pérez's bill faced stiff opposition from utilities and businesses groups, who argued that the plan would drive up energy costs.

Now, though, Brown has thrown his substantial influence behind the proposal, coming off a re-election in which he cruised to victory by 20 points.

"With his leadership and commitment, and extensive political capital to

spend at this point , I think we're very confident that achieving that

outcome is doable," said Alex Jackson, legal director for the Natural Resources Defense Council's California Climate Program.

The details of Brown's renewable energy plan are still up in the air, and his office declined to offer more specifics.

But an increase in the renewable energy mandate could kick-start solar,

wind and geothermal development in the desert , all of which have slowed

over the last few years.

"The people putting money into renewable energy need to have a clearer signal that there is going to be a market for renewable energy," said Nancy Rader, executive director of the California Wind Energy Association. "It was great for him to propose that goal."

Ambitious, but achievable

Energy and climate experts have long assumed that California would raise its renewable energy mandate, officially known as the Renewables Portfolio Standard.

State policymakers have set a goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, and that will be all but impossible without deeper cuts from the electricity sector, which accounts for about one-fifth of all emissions.

From a technical standpoint, energy experts say California should have little difficulty getting 50 percent of its electricity from renewable energy. The state has some of the best solar, wind and geothermal resources in the world, and it also has the option of importing renewable energy from other Western states.

While Democrats' control of both houses in the state Legislature doesn't give Brown a slam dunk , political observers and renewable energy advocates say his decision to highlight the plan in the inaugural address shows he's willing to fight for it.

Recreational legalization triggers a huge political fight in California --- groups are divided over how to implement and medical supporters backlash.Hilary Bricken, 11/21/2014. Attorney. “The “Why” Behind California’s Battle to Legalize Marijuana,” CannaLaw Blog, Published by CannaLaw Group, of Harris Moure, http://www.cannalawblog.com/first-in-last-out-californias-battle-to-legalize-continues/.

In what is now being coined “the marijuana mid-term elections,” one state was notably

missing from the pack that legalized marijuana: California .

California has had a surprisingly long and embittered fight with itself over legalizing marijuana. Why can’t California, once a leader in the cannabis movement, get its act together enough to join in the swell of legalization momentum? The following serve as some of the answers:

1.  California’s cannabis community is divided . In all states that seek to go from

legalized medical to legalized recreational, there will always be those

within the medical marijuana community who will oppose legalizing recreational

marijuana . This is because medical businesses are profiting from the existing

situation and they do not want the change or competition or increased regulation that legalizing recreational marijuana might bring. In fact, some in the medical community fear the elimination of medical marijuana due to the legalization of

recreational marijuana. Then there are those in the medical marijuana community who truly believe that marijuana should be used strictly as a medicine and that it is not akin to alcohol and should not be regulated as such.

There will probably always be at least some tension between the medical and the recreational marijuana communities. California’s existing situation makes that tension almost inevitable.

In California right now, medical marijuana faces virtually no state regulation or oversight and many medical marijuana businesses are thriving in the massive gray area of the law. Many in California’s large and entrenched MMJ industry are loathe to see legalization that could, at best, lead to regulation and competition and, at worst, lead to their having to close down. This sort of infighting does not lend itself to peaceably passing a legalization initiative.

2.  California is a very large , economically diverse state . The bigger they are, the

harder they fall. Compared to California, the states of Oregon, Alaska, Washington, and Colorado are all tiny marketplaces. In turn, the consequences of their legalization experiments will not have

nearly the same social and fiscal impacts that legalization in California would have. California going legal scares many both within California and outside of it . Are we really ready for legalization in such a big state? What if it does not work? For all its problems, California’s

economy is huge and diverse and overall doing pretty well. San Francisco, San Diego, L os A ngeles, and Orange County are doing just fine without marijuana

legalization and they are not desperate for the tax revenues or permitting fees that

legalizing recreational marijuana would bring them.

3.   California has too many cooks in the kitchen . Legalization , especially in a state the

size of California, is not a simple thing. Compromise must be reached on countless complicated and potentially divisive issues to make a law that can pass   and   that can actually work . Just by way of a few examples, who should be able to participate in the legal marijuana business? How should those people be chosen? And how should they be taxed? What will happen to medical marijuana in California after legalization?

Thus far, the multiple opinions of Californians have combined to create too many competing initiatives for legalization over the years, none of which have garnered enough financial backing or voter support to become serious contenders for passage. If California is going to legalize marijuana through a vote of its people, its recreational advocates will need to band together, under one uniform voice, behind a well-thought out set proposals.

4.  The politics ain’t pretty . Politics have and always will complicate any

legalization attempts and California is no different . Once state representatives and law enforcement get involved , the rhetoric around legalization can get pretty muddied , depending on personal and communal motivations. California’s governor, Jerry Brown, has made it pretty clear he’s not a fan of legalization, though his Attorney General does not seem to mind as much. Having state leadership hostile to legalization is not usually a good thing for legalizing.

Brown’s proposals are modeled and drive global climate solutions. Carl Pope, 1/13/2015. Former executive director and chairman, Sierra Club. “Flood Tide for the Climate Movement,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-pope/flood-tide-for-the-climate-movement_b_6446832.html.

Two days later, here in Sacramento, California Governor Jerry Brown committed the world's seventh largest economy to   the world's boldest clean energy goals yet: going from 25% to 50% renewable electricity by 2030 , and -- stunningly in the

state which birthed the freeway culture -- cutting oil consumption by 50% by the same date.So shocked was the oil industry that all they commented was that they would work with the governor for "solutions that will sustain today's energy and economic realities while protecting both our environment and future energy needs." (Don't hold your breath.)

Brown's and Modi's electricity goals are bold, ambitious and exciting. They will be

attacked as expensive and unwise. But they cannot be dismissed as impossible --- California has already reached 25% renewable electricity, India is producing the world's cheapest solar power, and other countries like Portugal and Denmark have demonstrated that renewable electricity is ready to carry more than half of their power load.California's oil target is breathtaking. It is what is needed - the latest report on the how much oil we can afford to burn and stay on a 2 degree pathway says that a third of existing global oil reserves must remain underground, including all of such unconventional sources as the deep oceans, the Arctic and tar sands. It is consistent with goals articulated by climate advocates and organizations.

But California - and the world -- are starting from almost scratch in seeking

fuel diversity in the transportation sector- oil powers more than 90% of the world's transport. Both India and the US have enacted tough fuel efficiency standards to reduce petroleum waste. But California State's low-carbon fuel standard and ZEV mandates are only beginning to kick in, and transportation fuels have just been placed under the state's AB32 cap. (Oregon joined California a few days after Brown's speech putting in place requirements the fuels sold

in the state have 10% less carbon by 2020.) Ramping up to a 50% reduction in petroleum use by 2030 will require a massive replacement of the state's existing vehicle fleets, engine technologies, transportation infrastructure and fuel networks.

But if California can realize this vision, the odds that the rest of the world

moves beyond oil dependency go up staggeringly . Big oil gets this. Houston,

Wichita, Calgary and Riyadh have no doubt seen dozens of meetings in the last week about how to crush Brown's vision before the public realizes just how practical it is.

"Mission Impossible" will be the war-cry. "They're going to take your car away" the Koch Brother ads and sound bites will babble. "Renewable power isn't reliable" the coal companies will croak.

The reality is they are losing. Their campaign strategy - which worked for decades - was to mire the public debate down in climate science and risk, and thereby keep action on climate solutions at the "too small to really matter" scale. But they got greedy, and allowed the price of oil and coal to steadily soar. That opened up a market for clean energy that wasn't based on climate protection, although climate security is its most important benefit. No, Tesla and Solar City - and their Indian counterparts -- are powered by the fact that they offered better energy products with cheaper fuels.Renewable energy investment demonstrated this again in 2014. Even as coal, oil and natural gas prices fell, global investment in renewable energy jumped by 16%, and with steadily dropping costs for renewable energy, the volume of new clean energy increased by more than 25%.

Now that clean energy technologies have moved to a scale that anyone whose eyes are open can see that we don't necessarily need fossil fuels for much longer, leaders like Modi and Brown - and others around the world - can offer programs that both capture the popular imagination and confront the scale of the energy revolution we need. And as these technologies get bigger, they get cheaper - unlike coal and oil for whom demand growth means ever higher and higher costs.

1NC CP 1The President of the United States should eliminate executive’s support for drug prohibition at the United Nations and advocate for international standards and an independent international monitoring mechanism for states prohibiting drug use. The Executive Branch of the United States should -publish a scientific review documenting the ineffectiveness of drug prohibition-deliver speeches defending the review and opposing the international regime supporting drug prohibition.-move marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III in the Controlled Substances Act and eliminate any additional prohibitions on medical marijuana research including the requirement to obtain marijuana from the National Institute on Drug Abuse.The Attorney General should reclassify marijuana to allow scientific research. The Food and Drug Administration should accelerate approval on cannabis-based pharmaceuticals.Pentagon and State Department should eliminate all support for illicit drug control and compulsory drug treatment domestically and internationally. The Treasury Department should eliminate rules that fail to accommodate legal marijuana businesses. State governments in the United States other than Oklahoma and Nebraska should legalize and regulate the cultivation, possession, consumption and distribution of marihuana. The Supreme Court should grant Nebraska and Oklahoma permission to sue Colorado on the basis that its laws regulating marihuana are a violation of the Controlled Substance Act. The Supreme Court should issue an expedited ruling on the case and award damages if Nebraska and Oklahoma prevail. The United States should legalize hemp and provide support for its cultivation.

The CP solve their federal signal links and set the table for more extensive federal reforms Weiner 1/20/15 – Former US Representative [Anthony Weiner, “Now Is The Time For Obama To Make A Move On Marijuana,” The Business Insider, Jan. 20, 2015, 5:07 PM, pg. http://tinyurl.com/qgpeql6

Some issues advance because of forceful and unifying leadership from politicians,

but more often progress happens and politicians take notice.  Gay marriage and relations with Cuba had evolved so far in the public debate that eventually courts and elected leaders

came around in a way that was unforeseen even a few years ago. Marijuana policy is following a similar arc . Twenty three states and the District of Columbia have now have legalized cannabis for medical or recreational use. Most of these laws have come from citizen referenda and many of the states in question have Republican legislatures.

This isn't a fringe issue any more. In fact, a coalition of libertarians, millennials, social liberals, medical experts , patients' rights advocates, economists, and law

enforcement officials, have moved marijuana smack in the middle of the

mainstream of policy .

But the President doesn't have to be pro-pot to take some smart and needed steps to clear up some of the odd disconnections that exist in a country where states have made uses of marijuana legal while the federal government hasn't caught on. 

Here are three common sense executive actions that the President should announce

tonight that would set the table for a more sober pot policy :

1. Make it legal for scientists to study the benefits of marijuana:

There is now broad consensus in the medical community that there are legitimate

and hugely helpful uses of cannabis as treatment for many diseases and ailments. For example, the oils have been shown to reduce seizures in children with epilepsy and the plant is in wide use to help soldiers calm the symptoms of PTSD. But in a bizarre Catch 22, the only way to study marijuana is to be in violation of federal law that still makes it illegal to own the stuff.

Cannabis is considered a Class 1 narcotic by the Food and Drug Administration. As such, it is treated as though it

has high abuse potential and zero medicinal value (even Cocaine isn't Class 1). Because of this federal regulation, marijuana can't be used in a study or even transported to a clinician's lab.  In his address this evening, the President should announce he is asking the FDA to review

whether marijuana should be reclassified so we can conduct further scientific research.

2. Announce that states rights will be respected on marijuana laws: 

State legislators and voters have set up regimes in their states with laws, regulations, and taxes for marijuana. However, a law abiding citizen of Connecticut or Alabama could still find themselves at the wrong side of a federal indictment because of the schizophrenia that exists between federal and state law enforcement. 

For the most part, the Justice Department has taken an unofficial hands off policy. Still, if the President drops a line or two into his speech on Tuesday that makes it clear he respects the

rights of the states here, it will calm the concerns of many in those jurisdictions,

encourage investment, and also probably get both sides of the aisle clapping at once in a Congress where that rarely happens.

3. Deregulate the banking industry for marijuana businesses. 

Drug-related crime is down in states that have legalized some uses of marijuana. Just as drug reform advocates predicted, when you lift an industry out of the black market, regulate it, and tax it, the criminals move on to other things. However, because of the federal banking regulations, lawful marijuana businesses can't use normal banks. Because of this one crime is on the rise: business having stashes of cash that they can't deposit anywhere stolen. 

This isn't an easy problem to untangle because of the thicket of anti-money laundering laws that

are on the books and the different bank charter rules in the 50 states. Still, the area is ripe for executive

action that few could disagree with: order the treasury department to review

the laws to accommodate legal marijuana businesses . 

If we want to encourage a stable and well-regulated industry, the first step may be to loosen the rules that keep the operating cash, profits, and even the collected taxes in shoe boxes rather than checking accounts.

Solves treatiesCeste et al. 10 – Deputy director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Programme [Joanne Ceste, Richard Parker (Professor of Sociomedical Sciences @ Columbia University) & Nancy Worthington (PhD Candidate at Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University), “Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health,” Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, Law and Policy Project Working Paper, (March 2010)

In April 2009, the influential health journal The Lancet ran an article under the headline “The USA shifts away from the ‘war on drugs’,”128 an example of many hopeful expressions from the public health world that a new era of progressive US leadership on drug control was dawning. In light of the evidence presented here, that headline

seems premature. The Obama White House has aligned itself rhetorically , to some degree, with those who would manage illicit drug use as a public health rather than a criminal law problem, but funds, programs and statements in key international forums have not materialized to concretize that stance. It is, certainly, early in the administration, and, as is often repeated by the president and his staff, extraordinary economic and political problems have confronted the new White House since its first hours. It may be that the Obama administration has explicitly sought to delay tackling divisive social issues to keep the focus on what are perceived to be more central concerns, perhaps mindful of the Clinton White House’s experience on gays in the military in its early days. Nonetheless, lives

continue to be lost to ill‐conceived and inhumane policies related to illicit drugs. A new direction for US policy on illicit drugs cannot come too soon.

The need for new thinking on US drug policy is all the more urgent in light of the

enormous global influence that US action and leadership have had and will continue

to have in this area. The administration faces a global policy environment where receptivity to progressive drug policy directions may be greater than it supposes. The 26 countries that defied business as usual in the March 2009 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs by insisting that harm reduction was an essential part of services for drug users represented frustration with military and criminal law solutions. In February 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, convened by former presidents of Mexico, Colombia and Brazil, explicitly called for a turn away from “war on drugs” policies in the region in favor of more humane and effective health‐centered strategies.129 In addition, in its “outcome framework” for 2009‐2011, UNAIDS has committed itself, somewhat more forthrightly than in the past, to removal of “punitive laws” that impede effective responses to HIV and to “ensuring that legal and policy frameworks serve HIV prevention efforts” among drug users.130

President Obama, whose instinct for caution often shows itself to be well developed, should not fail to appreciate the room that he has internationally and, increasingly, domestically for

boldness in this challenging policy arena . An administration that loses no opportunity to

differentiate itself from its predecessor in its commitment to evidence‐based policies must make that commitment

real in this policy area that has been lethally compromised by ideology and fear‐mongering. The

administration’s leadership is urgently needed in the following ways:

END PROHIBITIONISM AS POLICY DIRECTION

There must be an official rethinking of prohibitionist strategies and their dire

consequences for people who use illicit drugs and their societies more broadly. It is promising that the new director of ONDCP is concerned that “drug war” rhetoric makes people feel as though their government is at war with them, but the administration should speak and

act boldly on the breadth and depth of the harms of prohibitionism as it leads a movement toward peace in

the drug war. A president who unquestionably knows how to use his privileged public platform should take on the task of helping US and global audiences to appreciate the benefits of other

sound and pragmatic approaches to illicit drugs. The administration should become the ally of those who have carefully documented the political, social, human rights and human life costs of the war on drugs and should

ensure that persons most harmed by past policies play a meaningful role in shaping a new policy direction. The

administration should recognize in a n explicit and pub lic way the structural

factors that prevent people living with drug dependence from receiving humane and affordable medical care as

well as those that lead impoverished rural people with few alternatives to grow coca or opium poppies.

On the United Nations stage, backing away from prohibitionism as the central tenet of

drug control would place the US in a progressive leadership position that

could dramatically change the course of international policy and the lives of millions

of people who use illicit drugs. The administration’s delegation to the next CND should work side by side with countries that have already expressed the need for humane and effective policies and national and multilateral budgets that are not dominated by supply reduction measures. At little

or no political cost to itself, the Obama White House could help inaugurate a new era of

affordable, humane and respectful treatment for drug dependence, accompanied

by international standards of practice and effective mechanisms for monitoring

and redress – all of which have been blocked by approaching drug addiction as a crime or a character flaw. Broader leadership on harm reduction – a phrase that seems to bring out the worst irrationality in drug policy debates – will be more challenging, but the administration would find itself in the company of many other countries if it set out to reduce that irrationality.

BE TRUE TO A COMMITMENT TO EVIDENCE‐BASED POLICY AND PROGRAMS

Whether the subject is stem cells, abstinence‐only sexuality education, or climate change, the Obama

administration has repeatedly sought to differentiate itself from its predecessor by asserting its commitment to scientifically sound, evidence ‐ based policy . It would be an important step forward for the White House to acknowledge publicly the vast body of scientific evidence that shows the ineffectiveness – and, indeed, counter-productiveness – of policies, including crop eradication, that have been central to US drug efforts for decades. A serious review of the science – complemented by meaningful

involvement of farmers themselves – would be useful in shaping livelihood programs and other non ‐ punitive approaches for communities that rely on cultivation of coca and opium poppies. Efforts In the Andes Should benefit from the same rejection of crop eradication that has been

announced for Afghanistan. The Pentagon ’s Involvement in illicit drug control abroad should be phased out. US Engagement in training for military ‐ or police ‐ run compulsory drug “treatment” centers where abuses including beatings, forced labor, starvation and

interruption of medical treatment, without any efficacy in treatment of drug dependence, should be reexamined; US Involvement should be restricted to humanitarian assistance rather than “capacity building” of inhumane and ineffective institutions.

These issues are a test of the administration ’s commitment to science, as is the need for

leadership in the face of new federal policy on the funding of needle exchange. The president should

rediscover his voice as a leader on this issue internationally . The White House should

ensure that PEPFAR policies, as repeatedly promised, clearly enable US support for life-saving sterile syringe programs. Increasing public awareness of the importance of needle exchange domestically and internationally is urgently needed and would be a distinctive achievement of the administration.

Similarly, while the US has funded some methadone programs abroad, it has not been a leader in the struggle for humane, scientifically sound and affordable treatment for drug dependence in the many parts of the world where

leadership is sorely needed. Leadership from the Obama administration in this area should take several forms , including (1) increasing US funding for scientifically sound drug

treatment as a central part of official development assistance , (2) leading global

advocacy for international standards

on the practice of treatment for drug dependence and an independent international monitoring mechanism to highlight abuses, and (3) ensuring that US funding is never applied to drug “treatment” that amounts to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading practices. It is also high time that the federal guidelines for methadone and buprenorphine therapy in the US, including the requirement of directly observed ingestion of methadone for

patients that have demonstrated long-term adherence, be revisited. Good practices in drug treatment in the US can be useful models for the world . Pg. 12-13

Hemp solves food – 1AC authorSamuel Becker 14, a business and auto writer for Wall St. Cheat Sheet "7 Industries That Will Benefit From Marijuana Legalization," 10-9-2014, Cheat Sheet, http://wallstcheatsheet.com/business/7-industries-that-will-benefit-from-marijuana-legalization.html/?a=viewall, DOA: 12-15-2014, y2k

Without a doubt, the legalization of marijuana is an exciting new development. Two states have full legalization, and others are weighing the benefits and drawbacks, with more states potentially legalizing over the next several election cycles. But what has many in the business world excited about prohibition ending isn’t that people can freely use cannabis as they want, but

the other potential applications that plant has. Hemp, marijuana’s non-psychoactive cousin, may be the panacea for many

problems the economy faces. Not only is it relatively cheap and easy to grow, but it’s also one of the most versatile and easy-to-apply materials in the world. Farmers can generate

several crops per year, and its malleability allows it to be used in a variety of different ways. Of course, this is simply one other reason to get excited about legalization, but the potential economic effects could be incredible. There are obvious industries that look to grow and profit in a big way from marijuana legalization, and others that see it as a large threat. But if current political trends continue to develop as they have over the past couple of years, it looks like legalization is set to sweep the country. What does that mean for business and the economy at

large? Probably good things. So, what industries specifically could see a big benefit to marijuana legalization ? With the

wide range of applications that cannabis poses as both a consumable and as a usable material, there are several. Read on to see which seven stand out. 1. Medicine Perhaps one of the most obvious industries that could harness the power of marijuana for immense profit is pharmaceuticals.

The medical marijuana community has been around for decades now, and there is plenty of research to back up the claims that cannabis can effectively treat many medical conditions. The problem, however, is that many companies have been unwilling to touch on cannabis’ healing properties while it still remains on the list of outlawed substances. There are a handful of smaller companies, like GW Pharmaceuticals, that have gone out on a limb to incorporate marijuana into its products with success. As legalization takes hold, look for others to do so as well, with

potentially huge results. 2. Food Production Agriculture — and food production in particular — could be one of the beneficiaries of cannabis

legalization. There are startups currently working on improving cultivation methods, indoor farming practices, and even developing plants with natural resistance to insects, which farmers could benefit from by abandoning potentially dangerous insecticides. Farmers may even look to marijuana cultivators — many of whom have been growing indoors for years — to find effective ways to grow hydroponically. As drought conditions in the American west and climate change hit agriculture hard, moving food production indoors may need to take place — at least partially.

However, preserving the inconsistency between Amendment 64 and the CSA forms the foundation for the Nebraska/Oklahoma suit against Colorado. Federal legalization eliminates the constitutional justification the Court would use to rule in favor of Nebraska/Oklahoma Rivkin & Foley 12/28/14 – Constitutional litigator who served in the Justice Department and White House Counsel’s Office in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations & professor of constitutional law @ Florida International University College of Law [David B. Rivkin Jr. & Elizabeth Price Foley “Federal Antidrug Law Goes Up in Smoke,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 28, 2014 6:52 p.m. ET, http://tinyurl.com/nfmufvu

The Controlled Substances Act can be amended or repealed . Congress has taken a step in this direction by providing in its recent omnibus spending bill that the Justice Department cannot use appropriated funds to prevent states from implementing “laws that authorize the use, distribution or cultivation of medicinal marijuana.”

This development may lead the Supreme Court to take another look at the CSA’s constitutionality, something that could occur in the context of the Oklahoma and Nebraska

lawsuit against Colorado . Alternatively , Attorney General Eric Holder could use his

authority under the Controlled Substances Act to remove marijuana from Schedule I. But Coloradans—or the citizens of any other state—lack the power in our constitutional regime to enact a law that conflicts with the CSA.

When federal power has been legitimately invoked, states may not go rogue. When they do, sister states that can demonstrate concrete injury are entitled to obtain a court declaration that state laws in conflict with federal law are unconstitutional. Normally such lawsuits wouldn’t be necessary because the federal government would enforce its superior law against rogue states. But these aren’t ordinary constitutional times, and it isn’t “fair-weather federalism” to defend these core constitutional principles.

A win for Nebraska and Oklahoma results in a regulatory explosion of new state lawsuits that solves GHG pollutionStern 12/30/14 (Mark, Slate, “Federalist Rolling Papers”, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/12/oklahoma_and_nebraska_sue_colorado_a_hypocritical_lawsuit_could_undermine.html)

If Nebraska and Oklahoma prevail on their claim —if they convince five justices that federal law forces states to ban weed,

and that such a law is constitutional—states’ rights would take a brutal blow. A Congress that can force states to criminalize

marijuana can also force states to do just about anything —like, say, expand Medicaid , or perform

background checks on gun buyers , or regulate polluting waste . This expansion of federal power would be a

catastrophe for federalists, a near-total reversal of their recent triumphs.

Speaking of guns and pollution : If Nebraska and Oklahoma actually get their case before the Supreme Court,

regulating both would become a good deal easier . The two states claim they have standing—that is, the ability to sue

Colorado in court—because Colorado’s newly legalized marijuana creates an interstate public nuisance . By

permitting Coloradans to cultivate and sell marijuana, the other states argue, Colorado is introducing more marijuana into the interstate flow of drugs—and much of that marijuana winds up in Nebraska and Oklahoma, which still

criminalize the substance. Thus, both states (and, presumably, a slew of others) have standing to sue Colorado, because they are suffering from the detrimental effects of Colorado’s marijuana “nuisance.”

This theory is a bold departure from traditional interstate nuisance lawsuits , which generally deal with some industrial practice (like smelting) that dumps noxious pollution into a neighboring state. Should the Supreme Court accept

Nebraska and Oklahoma’s basic premise—that they’re being seriously harmed by Colorado’s marijuana— the floodgates will be

busted open . Florida could sue West Virginia for releasing so much carbon into the atmosphere, arguing

that West Virginia’s coal factories harm Florida by causing sea levels to rise. Oregon could sue Idaho over its loose gun laws,

arguing that too many firearms constitute a nuisance that Idaho is obligated to control before those guns leave the state. The ultimate

result would likely be a regulatory explosion , as more and more states were forced by lawsuits to control the spread of any “nuisance” before it crossed state lines.

This isn’t just a fun thought experiment. Nebraska and Oklahoma’s lawsuit could create chaos only if the Supreme Court weighed in. That might

seem unlikely, given how weak the states’ claims appear. But involvement by the Supreme Court isn’t improbable— it’s

inevitable . The Constitution gives the high court original and exclusive jurisdiction over suits between

states, meaning the Supreme Court (and nobody else) must hear those cases.

Successful litigation will halt climate change. Litigation forces Congressional reforms Flynn 13 – JD Candidate @ Georgia State University College of Law [James Flynn, “Climate of Confusion: Climate Change Litigation in the wake of American Electric Power v. Connecticut,” Georgia State University Law Review, Spring, 2013, 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 823, pg. lexis

1. Monitoring Current Enforcement

In light of the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and the Court's decision in American Electric,

global warming activists must ask themselves whether litigation is still a useful way to spur

governmental action . Indeed, it may be that such litigation is becoming counterproductive. Is it time to

"call off the dogs" and let the federal government work? The answer is a resounding no. n255 Concerned

advocates and states must continue to litigate climate change issues.

 [*860]  Climate change is an issue that requires action sooner rather than later . n256 While the EPA, as an expert agency, may be in the best position to deal with the issue, as the American Electric

Court suggests, it would be unwise for advocates to postpone litigation for two reasons:

first, the EPA's ability and authority to regulate greenhouse gases are subject to change; and second, even if the EPA regulates those emissions, the process may be delayed. The EPA, an administrative agency, i s subject to policy changes with each new president. n257 Future policy changes may undermine any regulatory action the EPA takes on greenhouse gas emissions. n258 Moreover, the agency is subject to the whim of Congressional funding. Hostile Republican legislators in 2011 threatened the EPA's ability to enforce any of its regulations. n259 Congressional rhetoric portrays the agency as a

job-killing behemoth. n260 Precious time will be lost if advocates refrain from litigating the issue and Congress manages to limit or repeal the agency's ability to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.

Even if Congressional threats to the EPA do not succeed, American Electric suggests that the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions displaces federal common law nuisance claims, even if the EPA refuses to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants.

n261 Delays in the rulemaking process   [*861]  could postpone any actual regulation of those emissions. n262 Furthermore, the EPA's authority to regulate and the regulations themselves are often challenged in court , n263 which could lead to

further delay in implementing new regulations. Thus, advocates must use litigation to put pressure on the EPA to ensure it complies with its duty to regulate greenhouse gases. That pressure should be shifted to fossil fuel companies if the EPA fails to issue regulations that are sufficient to make an impact on global warming.

2. Turning Up the Heat on Congress: Litigating to Legislate

The only solution to anthropogenic global warming is a concerted global effort. n264 Such an effort

cannot succeed without the leadership, or at least support, of the United States. n265 Real change in the United States requires comprehensive legislation that covers all facets of global warming: greenhouse gas emissions, land use, efficiency, and sustainable growth. In addition to maximizing time

until the EPA either issues regulations or is prevented from doing so by Congress, litigation advances the goal of such comprehensive legislation in three ways.

First, litigation keeps the pressure on fossil fuel companies and other large emitters.

Comprehensive legislation is a near impossibility as long as the largest contributors to

global greenhouse gas emissions are able to exert powerful control over the nation's

[*862] energy policy and the climate change discussion. n266 While the companies have the financial resources to battle in court, it is imperative that advocates and states make

them do so. One need only look at the tobacco litigation of the 1960s through the 1990s

to understand that success against a major industry is possible . n267 Here, though,

the stakes are even higher. The chances of obtaining a largescale settlement from the fossil fuel

industry is likely smaller now that the Court has ruled that some federal common law nuisance claims are displaced, because lower courts may hold that nuisance claims for money damages are also

displaced. n268 However, advocates of climate change legislation should keep trying to obtain such a settlement through other tort remedies. A substantially damaging settlement

may encourage fossil fuel companies to reposition their assets into more

sustainable technologies to avoid more settlements, thus minimizing future

emissions . Alternatively, if the fossil fuel companies feel threatened enough, they

may begin to use their clout to persuade Congress to pass comprehensive legislation to protect their industry from such wide-ranging suits. n269

Second, litigation keeps the issue in the public consciousness during a time when the media is failing at its responsibilities to the public. n270 The media's coverage of climate change has been both inadequate and misleading. n271 Indeed, some polls suggest Americans  [*863]  believe less in climate change now than just a

few years ago. n272 Litigation, especially high-profile litigation, forces the issue into the public sphere, even though it may receive a negative connotation in the media. The more the public hears about the issue, the greater chance that people will demand their local and state

politicians take action.

Finally, litigation sends a clear message to Congress that simple appeasements will

not suffice. n273 Comprehensive legislation is needed--legislation that mandates

consistently declining emissions levels while simultaneously propping up

replacement sources of energy . n274 Fill-in measures, like the EPA's authority to regulate

emissions from power plants, are not sufficient. Humans need energy, and there can be no doubt that we must

strike a balance between energy needs and risks to the environment. Catastrophic climate change,

however, is simply a risk that we cannot take; it overwhelms the short-term benefits

we receive from the burning of fossil fuels. n275 Advocates and states must demonstrate to Congress   [*864]  through continuing litigation that the issue is critical and that plaintiffs like those in Kivalina and Comer are suffering genuine losses that demand redress that current statutes do not currently provide.

CONCLUSION

American Electric proved less important for the precedent it set than for the questions it left unanswered. While courts wrestled over standing, the political question doctrine, and displacement in climate change nuisance cases in the years preceding American Electric, the Supreme Court relied only on the clear displacement path

illuminated by its earlier decision in Massachusetts. While the decision in American Electric narrowed the litigation options that climate change advocates have at their disposal, it subtly sent a message to Congress that greater federal action is needed. In writing such a narrow

ruling, Justice Ginsburg also sent a message to states and advocates--whether intentionally or not--that climate change litigation is not dead. Until Congress enacts comprehensive climate change legislation, global warming lawsuits will, and must, continue.

Failure risks extinctionCribb 14 - Canberra science writer [Julian Cribb, “Human extinction: it is possible?,” Sydney Morning Herald, Published: April 2, 2014 - 12:28PM, Pg. http://www.smh.com.au/comment/human-extinction-it-is-possible-20140402-zqpln.html

However our own behaviour is liable to be a far more immediate determinant of human survival or extinction. Above two degrees – which we have already locked in – the world’s food harvest is going to become increasingly unreliable, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change warned this week. That means mid-century famines in places like India , China ,

the Middle East and Africa . But what scientists cannot predict is how humans living in the tropics

and subtropics will respond to this form of stress. So let us turn to the strategic and military think tanks, who like to explore such scenarios, instead.

The Age of Consequences study by the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies says that under a 2.6 degree rise “nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such

as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress …as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and\ changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of

coastal communities around the world… has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities.

Armed conflict between nations over resources… is likely and nuclear war is possible .

The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos.” Of five degrees – which the world is on course for by 2100 if present carbon emissions continue – it simply says the consequences are "inconceivable".

Eighteen nations currently have nuclear weapons technology or access to it, raising

the stakes on nuclear conflict to the highest level since the end of the Cold

War. At the same time, with more than 4 billion people living in the world’s most vulnerable regions, scope for

refugee tsunamis and pandemic disease is also large. It is on the basis of scenarios such as these that scientists like Peter Schellnhuber – science advisor to German President Angela Merkel – and

Canadian author Gwynne Dyer have warned of the potential loss of most of the human

population in the conflicts, famines and pandemics spinning out of climate

impacts. Whether that adds up to extinction or not rather depends on how many of the world’s 20,000 nukes are let off in the process. These issues all involve assumptions about human, national and religious behaviour and are thus beyond the remit of scientific bodies like the IPCC, which can only hint at what they truly think will happen. So you are not getting the full picture from them.

However in a classic case of improvident human behaviour, a global energy stampede is taking place as oil, gas, coal, tar sands and other miners (who, being technical folk, understand quite

clearly what they are doing to the planet) rush to release as much carbon as possible as profitably as possible before society takes the inevitable decision to ban it

altogether. Thanks to them, humanity isn’t sleep-walking to disaster so much as racing

headlong to embrace it . Do the rest of us have the foresight, and the guts, to stop them? Our

ultimate survival will be predicated entirely on our behaviour – not only on how well we adapt to

unavoidable change, but also how quickly we apply the brakes.

Which form of human behaviour prevails will probably settle the extinction

argument , one way or the other. It’s our call.

CP 2The United States should: propose amendments to the international drug control treaties to authorize signatories to legalize marijuana, to be made binding upon the U.S. in event of acceptance and freeze any additional moves towards marihuana legalization, including halting legalization in the District of Colombia, pending the outcome of treaty reform. Upon acceptance of the treaty, the United States should legalize marijuana in the United States.

Pharma

1NC PharmaPatents collapse the drug industry – allows neglected diseases to be more prevalentDuggan et al. 14 (Mark Duggan Stanford University Department of Economics, Craig Garthwaite Department of Management and Strategy Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University Aparajita Goyal World Bank October 2014, “THE MARKET IMPACTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA”, JEL No. I11,L1,O34

As discussed above, the change in prices and quantities sold resulting from patents is primarily a question of static efficiency . However, policymakers and economists are also concerned about the dynamic efficiency in the form of r esearch and d evelopment (R&D) by pharma ceutical firms. Consistent with this, many firms argue that the lack of adequate patent protection in developing countries has dampened research into diseases that are more prevalent in these countries. Research into the historical provision of intellectual property finds a connection between firm investments in innovation and patent policy (Moser, 2005).

However, the implementation of TRIPS has produced far more mixed ev idence concerning the dynamic

effects – particularly in the developing world . Arora, Branstetter, and Chatterjee (2008) found an increase in patenting

activity in India after 2005 and Borrell (2005) found that product patent systems caused a swifter introduction of HIV/AIDS treatments in

developing countries with relatively equal income distributions. However, Lanjouw and Cockburn (2001) found little effect of TRIPS on the development of products targeting diseases prevalent in developing countries. The authors

posit this is likely the result of insufficient time for firms to respond. In a later and more definitive study , Kyle and McGahan

(2012) estimated the dynamic efficiency of the TRIPS reform and find little change in R&D expenditures

for “neglected diseases ” such as malaria and river blindness that have a higher prevalence in poorer countries. This lack of a change in R&D activity could be a result of insufficiently profitable markets for these products in

developing countries even after reform. However, it could also be the result of a poorly functioning patent system

that does little to change the static efficiency and provide the incentives necessary for innovation

Neglected diseases lead to state failure – trigger political instability in nuclear-weapons statesHotez 10 (Peter J. Hotez, distinguished research professor and chair of the Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Tropical Medicine at George Washington University. He is also president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute, January 21, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/21/gandhis_hookworms?page=0,1, “Gandhi’s Hookworms”)

The people at highest risk for acquiring these NTDs also live in areas of greatest concern to the global

security interests of the United States. As much as one half of the world's poor who suffer from NTDs

live in the nations that comprise the Organization of the Islamic Conference, including Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Almost as

many live in pockets of poverty in middle-income countries that either hold and maintain nuclear weapons

stockpiles or aspire to produce them, including India, Pakistan, China, Iran , and North Korea . In these

countries, people are not only trapped in poverty because of their health conditions, they are also trapped in

conflict.

As NTDs spread throughout impoverished areas of Islamic countries and nuclear weapons states , they

can promote global insecurity by increasing poverty and the possibility for radicalization . The security risks created by high endemic rates of NTDs argue strongly for seeking low-cost solutions for their control and elimination.

AT: DiseasePatents aren’t key to drug research. --increased innovation in the absence of patents, Switzerland and Italy until the late 1970s were able to make more developments

--innovation comes from learning and dynamic adjustment to prices that come from development of new medicines, monopoly power dissuades from that

--incentives come from social surplus.

Hashemi 12 (Fariba Hashemi Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne, Switzerland “Industry Dynamics in Pharmaceuticals”, Pharmacology & Pharmacy, 2012, 3, 1-6 http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/pp.2012.31001 Published Online January 2012 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/pp))

As early as in the early seventies, Jack Hirshleifer [22] illustrated that economically valuable information can be traded in

the absence of patents and under condition of competition . More recently, Boldrin and Levine [1] use historical

evidence to illustrate that i ntellectual p roperty protection in Pharma ceuticals has varied enormously over

time and space, and that the modern Pharma ceutical industry developed faster in those countries

where pat-ents were fewer and weaker, example Switzerland and Italy until late 1970s (see “World’s

Shortest History of Pharmaceutical Patents” in Boldrin and Levine 2008, Chapter 9). Boldrin and Levine [23-26] have forcefully argued that

there is no theoretical need to postulate either increasing returns or monopoly power to understand

the dynamics of innovation in Pharmaceuticals, and that the traditional competitive model provides a

more solid foundation for the examination of R & D processes in this industry. R & D is the life blood of the

Pharmaceu-tical industry. The industry’s best hope lies in innova-tion —its traditional strength . Boldrin and Levine

argue that learning and dynamic adjustment to equilibrium are weakened by obstacles such as patents ,

which suppress the sharing of ideas and limit the availability of material for imitation and trial-and-error. It would be worthwhile to incorporate the impact of competition and intellectual property policies on the evolution of Pharmaceutical in-dustry. Different market structures determine different allocations of the social surplus of innovation among inventors, imitators and consumers, and hence, provide different incentives to innovate. A good understanding of which kinds of characteristics lead to which kinds of dy-namics helps us better understand how incentives should be provided for the socially optimal amount of creative activity to take place.

AT: Science DiplomacyScience diplomacy inevitable and no impactDickson 9 David, Director, SciDev.Net, 4 June, “ The limits of science diplomacy,” SciDev, http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html

Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push , in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy " in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries such as Iraq and

Pakistan.¶ But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June) — using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it seems.¶ Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example,

a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East.¶ But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved.¶ Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the

American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to

turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking . ¶ Conflicting ethos¶ Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world.¶ There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals,

institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community.¶ But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests///

.¶ John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve.¶ Worlds apart yet co-dependent¶ The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need

political support to fund their research.¶ But they also occupy different universes. Politics is , at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes.

AT: FoodInnovation inev nowRafael Pampillón and Cristina M. de Haro 9/26/14 (Rafael: Doctor in Economics and Management, Cristina: Licenciada en Economía (I think this means she has some degree in economics) “Technological Advances Will Continue to Spur World Economic Development” http://forbesindia.com/article/ie/technological-advances-will-continue-to-spur-world-economic-development/38701/1)

This statistic shows that innovation remains a factor in the so-called Third Industrial Revolution, which began in the nineteen seventies and continues today. The development of

electronics, robotics , biotech nology and especially the globalisation of the internet have all contributed to ongoing productivity growth. As can be seen in the chart, North American industrial productivity grew at an annual rate 4.1% between 1990 and 2000, a period of only ten years. Moreover, this

productivity growth continued up until 2007 at a rate of 3.9%. While it is clear that productivity growth rates have fallen over recent years as a result of the economic crisis (an increase of only 1.8% in the United States between 2007 and 2013), we do not think there are enough reasons to affirm that growth has completely stopped. Fortunately, scientific research has continued, and we now have new advances in transportation , with unmanned flights; in medicine, with progress in genetics; in 3D printing;

and in the comprehensive integration of the internet in daily life, with "the internet of things". The positive effects on the economy from

these innovations will be seen when they are applied and extended throughout society . However, this transformation is not immediate. The life cycle of a technology requires a passage of time between the scientific discovery, the creation of the innovation and the spreading of the technology. Thus, the technical evolution of the First Industrial Revolution took a century and a half to run its course, and eighty years after the beginning of the Second Industrial Revolution its innovations were still boosting

increases in productivity. This behaviour of technology cycles leads us to believe that the effects of the Third Industrial Revolution are probably

not over , and that its innovations still have the capacity to generate future economic growth . Moreover, the recent crisis has slowed down the economic cycle, since companies cut down on investments in improving existing technologies and developing new knowledge via research and development (R&D) policies. Accordingly, we can expect that as the economy improves, the technology cycle will continue to evolve, allowing Third Industrial Revolution technological changes to complete their effects. In

addition, researchers - who will be progressively more advanced and better educated - will continue to push ahead the frontiers of knowledge. This will lead to further increases in productivity , which will continue to act as the engine behind growth. In short, we expect

that the future will continue to bring scientific advances that will open the door to greater levels of economic development and social welfare.

Treaties

I-Law

UN reform is inevitable – but breaking technical compliance undermines the entire UNHasse, 13 – New York consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition (Heather, “The 2016 Drugs UNGASS: What does it mean for drug reform?” 10/14,

http://drogasenmovimiento.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/13-10-14-the-2016-drugs-ungass-e28093what-does-it-mean-for-drug-reform_.pdf)

A little bit of background: At the UN level , drug issues are normally handled by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) at annual meeting s in Vienna; however, a country or group of countries may request that the UNGA hold a Special Session in NY to assess the world drug problem and review the situation . Much like the first drugs UNGASS convened in 1998 , the 2016 UNGASS was called in response to a proposal from Mexico,

and was co -‐ sponsored by 95 UN members . This time around, the UNGA will review progresses made since the 19 98 UNGASS , “including an assessment of the achievements and challenges in countering the world drug problem, within the framework of the three international drug control conventions and other relevant United Nations instruments.” The 2016 UNGASS will be a highly significant meeting, since it offers not only a broader venue (the CND is comprised of 53 members while the UNGA consists of 193), but the chance for a “fresh set of eyes” to review the issues. Finally, there may be an opportunity for a broader group of UN agencies (i.e., UNAIDS , UNDP , DPA ) to provide input into the process than usually happens at meetings of the CND.

2016 may sound like a long way off, but earnest preparations have already begun : The UN Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking, appointed by Secretary General Ban Ki -‐ Moon i n March 201 1 ,

and co -‐ chaired by UNODC and the UN Department of Political Affairs, is now tasked with helping to guide preparations for

the UNGASS. This past June, UNODC held an event on the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (“ World

Drug Day ”) , which was hailed as part of the “lead -‐ up” to the UNGASS. On the civil society side, the ( longstanding but dormant )

NY NGO Committee on drugs haxs been reconvened in New York as a conduit for NGOs to participate in the 2016 UNGASS and the preparations leading up to it. IDPC and Harm Reduction Coalition are both very active in the process – holding events at the UN to build awareness around drug issues , mee ting with missions and UN agencies to garner support for the cause and

ensure meaningful participation of civil society , and reporting back to the NGO community . Meanwhile, governments, heads of state, citizens, NGOs and other organizations around the world are tuned in to the process.

But why? With all of the progress made in reform around the world lately, many - especially in the US - are asking if the UN is even relevant to domestic drug reform at this point. With the recent marijuana laws passed in Colorado and Washington and the proposed legislation in Uruguay - not to mention decriminalization measures enacted in Portugal and a growing number of other countries - reform

seems inevitable. At some point, the argument goes, the UN system will simply be overtaken by "real world" reform on the ground. Why even bother with advocacy at the UN?

This is not an easy question to answer; however, 1 truly believe that to be effective, reform efforts must be made at every level - locally, nationally, and globally.

It may be true that reform efforts in the US and around the world have made significant progress in the last 10 years. But there is still a long way to go - marijuana is still not completely legal anywhere in the world (despite state laws to the contrary, marijuana still remains illegal under federal law throughout the US), and many human rights abuses continue to be carried out against drug users throughout the world in the name

of drug control. Meanwhile, the international drug control treaties - the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its

progeny - remain in place and, in fact, enjoy nearly universal adherence by 184 member states.

That so many countries comply – at least technically , if not in “spirit” – with the international drug treaty system, shows just how highly the international community regards the system . As well it should – the UN system is invaluable and even vital in many areas, including climate change, HIV/ AIDS reduction, and , most recently, the Syrian chemical weapons crisis (and don’t forget that the international drug treaty system also governs the

flow of licit medication). While it is not unheard of for a country to disregard a treaty, a system in which countries pick and choose which treaty provisions suit them and ignore the rest is, shall we say, less than ideal.

But beyond the idea of simple respect for international law, there are practical aspects of reform to

consider. The drug problem is a global one , involving not only consuming countries but producing and transit countries as

well. Without global cooperation, any changes will at best be limited (marijuana reform in Washington and Colorado hardly affects the issue of human rights abuses in Singapore or the limitations on harm reduction

measures in Russia). At worst, reform efforts enacted ad hoc around the world could be contradictory and incompatible -‐ as might be the result if, for example, Colombia and the US opted for a regulated market without the cooperation of Costa Rica or Honduras, both transit countries.

Full on state legalization links—tanks Obama’s wait and see approachBennett, 10/16/14 - Brookings fellow in governance studies (Wells, Interview conducted by Jonathan Rauch, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/10/16-marijuana-enforcement-modernize-international-drug-treaties-rauch)

As a legal matter, what do you think of the administration’s argument that it has this kind of discretion?

It has a basis in i nternational law—though the argument will lose a lot of force quickly, if marijuana legalization moves forward and the federal government holds back on enforcement. Considering the policy alternatives, the United States’ approach is nevertheless quite well justified under the circumstances, practically speaking.

So you think it’s okay as a short-term response?

Right, if you want to push domestic policy right now in a direction more respectful of the drug treaties, you would have to do things in domestic law that would be either very difficult or politically toxic. For example, there was a call in some quarters to have the Justice Department bring a lawsuit establishing that the federal Controlled Substances Act, which bans marijuana, preempts the states’ regimes. But doing that would essentially only upend the states’ marijuana rules without restoring their criminal prohibitions of marijuana. In other words, a legal victory on those grounds—which, by the way, is not assured—would require the federal government to take on a much broader enforcement portfolio with regard to marijuana, something it lacks the resources and political appetite to do.

It also matters that the international cost to the United States, right now, is not off the charts at all. The body established by the treaties to monitor compliance has disagreed with the administration’s claim that it is

acting lawfully, but it hasn’t gone further than that. And other nations have not publicly been making a lot

of noise about the United States’ views. For those and other reasons, wait-and-see is a short-term response that

makes a lot of sense .

So, if what the administration is doing makes some sense, what’s the problem?

A wait-and-see strategy, under these circumstances, will look really good if marijuana legalization goes really badly. But if legalization proceeds in a smart and rigorous way—if 10, 15, 20 states enact and operate responsible regimes for the regulation of marijuana—we will be enforcing the Controlled Substances Act less and less in jurisdictions that have

regulated, legal marijuana markets. And that will create more and more tension with our international

commitments to suppress marijuana . At that point, it will be extraordinarily difficult for the U.S. to maintain that it complies with its obligation s.

AfghanistanExperts conclude Afghanistan will remain stable.Karp and O’Hanlon 1/7, Candace: PhD, Senior Program Officer at US Institute for Peace, Michael: PhD, director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins, 2015, “Protecting the Gains in Afghanistan,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/07-protecting-afghanistan-gains-ohanlon, Accessed 1/20/15

By most U.S. media accounts , Afghanistan is at best a largely forgotten cause; at worst, lost . Even apart from the recent

attacks on Kabul and Taliban gains, costs have been higher and accomplishments less solid than they should have been.

But measured against core standards , the mission is far from a failure. Two imperative goals have been preventing future extremist attacks against the West from Afghan soil and giving Afghans a solid stake in their future so they will not turn again to the Taliban or be vulnerable to a takeover. By both metrics, success is much closer than failure–that is, if we stay the course and avoid a complete departure in two years, as President Barack Obama and the international community intend.

Here is why those plans for premature departure should be revised.

Among the successes achieved since 2001:

* Life expectancy had increased to 61 years in 2012 from 51 years in 2001.

* Infant mortality had declined, in 2012, to 72 deaths before age 1 per 1,000 live births, from 93 deaths in 2001.

*As of 2014, 50% of Afghans had access to basic health care.

*Fifty-six percent of the rural population had access to clean water in 2012, up from 44% in 2008.

*Primary school enrollment (including overage, underage, and repeating students) is up severalfold from 21% in 2001.

But all of these gains are not the main point. Less easily quantifiable, yet even more important, is the shift in Afghans’ view of government . Many are no longer willing to perceive central government as little more

than an abstract irritation. ////

There is an expectation, even in outlying areas, that government must respond to the interests of all Afghans and deliver a modicum of services to justify its presence and the demands made of citizens. For the most part, the Taliban are widely disdained.

Islamic State extremists have been on the march in Iraq and Syria, and bombing plots from Yemen in recent years have produced major near-misses in the U.S. homeland, but Afghanistan has not produced another major attack . To the contrary, it has provided bases that have helped coalition forces significantly diminish the al-Qaeda threat in Pakistan.

The greatest threat to Afghan gains is political uncertainty. Last year’s presidential election process was flawed–involving an initial vote in April,

a runoff in June, and lengthy negotiations before, finally, a new president in September. Yet Afghans, aided by Secretary of State John Kerry

and United Nations Special Representative Ján Kubiš, found their way to a power-sharing compromise. President Ashraf

Ghani and his rival Abdullah Abdullah struggle to form a cabinet, but fears of all-out ethnic competition or civil war have ebbed .

While the Taliban have taken back some rural areas, and have killed about 10,000 Afghan soldiers and police over the past

two years, they are not winning . Afghan cities and major roads are in government hands, and last year’s voter turnout shows that Afghans overwhelmingly support their new national project. Recruits continue to join the army and police. The Afghan people remain 90% opposed to the Taliban , the Brookings Institution’s Afghanistan index has found.

Escalation empirically denied by past 14 years of invasion

AT: LA RelationsElis ev is about economic and military ties the US has in Latin America—no reason those would cut off because of the drug warWarrant is also US strategic focus—plan can’t solve Russian and Chinese encroachment in the region—their evElis 12/8 Strategic Insights: The Strategic Relevance of Latin America for the United States, December 8, 2014, Dr. R. Evan Ellis, research professor of Latin American Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, with a research focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Strategic-Relevance-of-Latin-America/2014/12/08

A responsible commander would recognize that the occupation of that high ground by an adversary poses an unacceptable threat to his force,

and thus would dedicate resources to block the adversary from doing so. By this analogy, it would be a grave error for the U nited S tates to conclude that, in the absence of serious threats to the United States from Latin America, it is okay to merely watch as potential future adversaries such as Russia and China expand their positions in the region . While such neglect, in the short term, may “free up resources” to continue other engagements abroad,

over the long term, the willing cessation of its own neighborhood by the U.S. is the single factor most likely

to force the U nited S tates into a chaotic retreat from its external engagements .∂ Latin America is

strategically fundamental to the security and prosperity of the United States. This was a concept integral to the

launching of the process of defense ministerial summits with the 1995 Williamsburg summit. It is better that we rediscover that lesson today, rather than learn it at great cost in the future.

U.S.-Cuban normalization solves U.S-Latin American relations, OAS cohesion, and regional stability now Javier Ciurlizza 12-19, director of the International Crisis Group’s Latin America and Caribbean program, 12/19/14, “Cuba and the U.S.: Turning the Page,” http://blog.crisisgroup.org/latin-america/2014/12/19/cuba-and-the-u-s-a-new-chapter/

The dramatic improvement this week in U.S.-Cuban relations, and the possibility of an end to the decades-long U.S.

embargo of the island, is set to transform political relations in the entire hemisphere . In the three posts below, the director of Crisis Group’s Latin America and Caribbean program, Javier Ciurlizza, and our vice president and special adviser on Latin America, Mark Schneider, look ahead to how the U.S. and Cuban moves could transform the wider region.

Ending the “Hemispheric Anomaly”

The announcements made by presidents Obama and Castro were enthusiastically welcomed across Latin America , from Mexico to Argentina, and in at least some quarters of Venezuela. Although there is a great deal to be done before any true normalisation of relations between the two countries, the announcements do at least represent the end of 60 years of Cuba as a “hemispheric anomaly”.

The U.S. embargo of Cuba, in place since 1961, was only the most explicit of several sanctions and decisions that effectively isolated Cuba from the rest of the continent. Expelled from the Organisation of American States (OAS) and excluded from summits, the Caribbean nation was

caught up more than most in the maneuverings of the Cold War’s protagonists. Latin American countries aligned themselves with the United States during the 1960s and ’70s. In the 1980s they started to move toward a growing solidarity with their secluded neighbour.

In the past 20 years, a period marked by both a return to democracy and, in many Latin American countries, a marked shift to the left, the Cuba question was no longer taboo. It was continually pushed on to the regional political agenda ///

even by nations ideologically distant from Havana. In fact, rejection of the embargo was one of the few things on which politicians, from the Rio Grande to Patagonia, could agree.

The embargo gradually came to isolate the U.S . as well as Cuba. The aggressive enforcement of Cuba sanctions on

other Latin American countries trading with the island fanned resentment . It also distorted regional foreign relations . Some measured the friendship between nations according to the strength of their respective positions on the embargo. Others got caught up in an anti-imperialist discourse that undermined regional solidarity the more it insisted on it. The Cuba question sowed suspicion and raised temperatures when they needed lowering.

Normalisation of relations , then, is not just something for the U.S. and Cuba to carry out, it’s for the entire continent . Cuba will doubtless finally attend an Americas Summit – set for April in Panama – as suggested by President Obama, and its return to full membership in the Organisation of American States will be forcefully requested at the next OAS general assembly in Asunción, Paraguay, this coming June.

Cuba has worked for this normalisation, for example with its efforts, cited by Obama, to help combat Ebola. But I would say that two unacknowledged reasons were probably more important: what Cuba is doing for Colombia and what it can do for Venezuela.

The Colombia peace process , which is taking place thanks to the Castro brothers’ hospitality, would not have made the

progress it has without close Cuba n involvement , including in a recent and delicate hostage negotiation and in the strong (though implicit) message from Havana that the time really has come to end the last major armed conflict in the hemisphere. President Santos has not been shy about praising Cuba, whose continued participation in the process is the main external guarantor of a successful outcome.

In the case of Venezuela , Cuban pressure to reach a peaceful settlement to the political crisis may prove to be key. Cuba has now received the signal it needed from the U.S. that it will no longer be entirely dependent for its energy needs on Venezuela’s state-owned petroleum company and the chavista government’s Petro Caribe support program.

2NC

AT: Anti ComandeeringThis is a bad interpretation of the suit, this is NOT an anti-commandeering issue – this is an active participation issue – it’s aiding and abbeding. Snyder 12/19/14 (Frank, Professor Texas A&M University School of Law, “Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado: Not a Strong Claim, But Not Ridiculous”, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/cannabis_law/2014/12/nebraska-oklahoma-v-colorado-not-a-strong-claim-but-not-ridiculous.html)

Over at Marijuana Law, Policy, and Reform, Rob Mikos opines that the suit is a loser:

Not surprisingly, I think the suit lacks merit. As I’ve explained before, Congress can’t force states to criminalize marijuana. It follows that Congress also can’t stop states from legalizing marijuana; after all, legalization is just

repeal of criminalization. It would be odd to say Congress can’t force a state to criminalize marijuana in the first instance, but it could force a state to keep a criminal prohibition on its books if it had already passed one. There are, of course, limits to this anti-commandeering principle. For

example, Colorado probably couldn't open a state-run marijuana store. But nothing in the lawsuit remotely suggests that Colorado has yet exceeded those limits and done something that is preemptable.

Nobody knows more about this stuff that Professor Mikos, but I'm not sure I agree. That's because I read the complaint differently , I think.

The main gripe isn't that Colorado has effectively decriminalized marijuana . The claim seems to be

that Colorado has enacted a system that deliberately encourages and profits by violating the federal

C ontrolled S ubstances A ct.

Professor Mikos relies on the anti-commandeering doctrine, the rule that says Congress can't compel states to do things. Thus,

while Congress can prohibit marijuana, it can't compel the individual states to prohibit it. He lays that argument out, by the way, in his important article, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to

Legalize Federal Crime. I wholeheartedly agree that he's right on that point. Neither Congress nor any other state can make the State of Colorado do something it doesn't want to do.

But what's going on here isn't simple decriminalization . It is (so Nebraska and Oklahoma would argue) active

participation in the sale and distribution of marijuana that it knows will travel across state lines . And

while the anti-commandeering doctrine prohibits telling the states things that they must do, there's

no constitutional bar to telling states what they can't do.

To illustrate the problem, take this hypo: Suppose state X were to decide that increasing jobs was more important than clean air. It passes a detailed state scheme authorizing construction of power plants in the state that expressly violate federal environmental statutes. It sets hefty fees for these licenses and makes a tidy profit as power companies flock to the state to avoid federal regulation. A substantial amount of the pollution, however, from those plants enter states Y and Z. Now assume that an anti-environmentalist President and EPA issue “guidance” to state X that the feds won’t interfere with these noncompliant polluters so long as they’re legal under state law.

Note that all of the conduct involved occurs in X, and X receives all of the economic benefit, so we could

say that this is simply a state issue. But the actions harm Y and Z because of the influx of pollution . Y

and Z are trying to be good federal citizens, their voters prefer clean air, and they suffer the costs and economic hit involved in vigorously cracking down on polluters. They can stop the polluters within their borders, but those just across the border in X are immune. Y’s and Z’s efforts to get clean air are undercut by X’s actions.

If there were no federal clean air standards, Y and Z would probably be stuck. But if X is directly

aiding and abetting violations of the clean air standards, Y and Z presumably would sue . That seems

to me to be the case here.

Now, those opposed to environmental laws would argue that Y and Z should loosen up; just ignore the pollution, or even license polluting facilities in their own territories. But that simply means that instead of Y and Z imposing on X, X gets to impose on Y and Z.

Thus, although I'm a fan of federalism, I can't go along with Volokh Conspiracy's Jonathan Adler in calling the two

states hypocritical for trying to interfere in Colorado's internal affairs. They're not trying to get

Colorado to outlaw marijuana; they're trying to get Colorado to stop encouraging it and sending it

out into interstate commerce .

2NC Solves TreatiesTheir solvency takeouts do not assume the combination of executive and state action. We create full legalization across the United States Stroup 1/12/15 - Public-interest attorney who founded NORML [Keith Stroup, “Moving Legalization Forward in 2015,” Rethink the Leaf, January 12th, 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/pepdp88]

The beginning of a new year provides an opportunity for reflection about what we hope to accomplish over the coming year, and whether there is a need to revise or fine-tune our tactics or strategy. It is also a time for allowing our hopes and dreams to take flight, even as we acknowledge we may not accomplish everything on our

wish list within the next twelve months. By setting lofty goals, some of which may initially seem out-

of-reach, we will surely move closer to our ultimate goal of full legalization all

across the country .

Here are some strategies I propose we embrace for 2015.

1. Legalization is working well in Colorado and Washington, and we must continue to gather and spread the good news.

We must nurture our state political victories carefully, as many additional states will

surely follow if they see evidence the experiments in CO and WA have been successful. And by the end of

2015, we should have legalization programs up and running in Oregon and Alaska as well, which will provide further evidence of the benefits of regulation and control over prohibition.

Having actual legalization systems in place that can be quantified and evaluated gives us a huge advantage moving forward. We are no longer just talking theory, but real evidence. Legalization works! Let's spread the gospel.

2. Full legalization, regardless of why one smokes, must be our ultimate goal.

We must seek to resolve current tensions between those who use marijuana as a medicine, and those of us who smoke recreationally; we are all marijuana users and we all benefit from ending marijuana prohibition.

The vast majority of marijuana smokers are not using marijuana as a medicine; they are using it to relax and as a mild intoxicant, the way tens of millions of Americans use alcohol. The ultimate goal is not to define medical use so broadly that everyone could qualify (the California model); rather it should be to fully legalize marijuana for all adults in a manner that also protects patients.

Currently legalization states are having trouble convincing "patients" who might be more accurately described as recreational users to transfer from the medical marijuana system to the recreational system. The reason generally given is that their marijuana is cheaper if they purchase it as a medicine, with far lower taxes built into the price. It leads to the inevitable question of whether we might be better politically going from prohibition (or perhaps decriminalization) straight to legalization, without establishing a culture of marijuana users who feel both entitled and empowered because their claim for its use is medical.

If full legalization is the law, all users are protected, including medical users, regardless of why they smoke.

3. Reasonable regulations are politically necessary

Proposals to legalize marijuana with no age limits or other regulations regarding growing, selling and using marijuana (the so-called “tomato model”) are a distraction. In a perfect world, and if we had not lived through 75-plus years of criminal prohibition, it might be realistic to treat a drug as safe as marijuana with few, if any, controls.

Unfortunately, we live in a world in which people’s attitudes towards marijuana and marijuana smoking have in fact been shaped both by decades of exaggerated “reefer madness” propaganda, and by the fact of criminal prohibition. For the 86% of the public who are not marijuana smokers, their support for legalization, and their opposition to prohibition, depends on reasonable regulations being in place. They want assurances that juvenile

marijuana smoking will not skyrocket and that there will be a way to identify marijuana-impaired drivers and keep our roadways safe.

Without those conditions being met, we lose the support of some of our current supporters, leaving us once again in a minority political position, and leaving prohibition in place. Let’s not dissuade our non-smoking supporters by demanding unrealistic, pie-in-the-sky concepts that have no realistic chance to be approved.

The underlying issue we are fighting for is personal freedom, and getting bogged-down over age restrictions or other reasonable controls is counter-productive and only helps the prohibitionists. (Also, tomatoes do not get you high, so the analogy is both disingenuous and a waste of time.)

4. The Obama Administration should be a primary focus for the two years remaining in his

presidency.

Despite a recent, end-of-the-year statement by Senior Presidential Advisor Dan Pfeiffer, suggesting the administration had no further plans to move legalization efforts forward during the remaining two years of Obama’s second term, we should nonetheless focus like a laser on the Obama Administration, already the most

pot-friendly administration in history. We should do our best to persuade the President to continue to

use his executive powers to chip away at prohibition . After all, he has nothing to lose,

since he will never again face re-election; and much to gain by leaving a lasting legacy.

The President could use his executive powers to (1) reschedule marijuana to a lower schedule under federal law, reflecting both its relative safety and the myriad of valuable medical uses; (2)

commute the sentences of all non-violent marijuana-related federal prisoners; (3) make it clear to all

financial institutions that the feds will not use the money-laundering provisions

of the federal criminal code, or other sections of the criminal code, to prosecute or harass those institutions that wish to serve the legal marijuana industry in the states that have legalized marijuana; (4) transform the Drug Czar’s office from an

anti-drug propaganda headquarters to a science-based drug advisory office , providing the President and Congress with honest information about the relative dangers of all drugs, including

alcohol and tobacco as well as currently illegal drugs; and (5) use his “bully pulpit” to encourage more states to experiment with alternatives to marijuana prohibition, utilizing the states as laboratories of democracy.

5. We need to successfully enact full legalization legislatively in at least one state.

Without question, the voters are far more supportive of marijuana legalization than are our elected officials. That explains why the first four states to fully legalize marijuana have done so at the ballot box, not through the elected state legislature.

That is a strategy that will continue to dominate the legalization movement for a few more years, including especially in 2016, when three or four states are expected to have full legalization proposals on the ballot. And based on the latest polling, we would expect any mainstream marijuana legalization initiative that qualifies for the ballot will likely be approved by the voters.

But voter initiatives are terribly expensive to pursue, requiring supporters to come up with significant funding to cover polling to gauge what the voters will support; the collection of valid signatures to qualify for the ballot; and then to mount a professional advertising campaign in the months leading up to the vote. Obviously these are barriers that end up keeping many well-intentioned proposals off the ballot, even in states where a voter initiative is permitted.

And only half the states offer the voter initiative as a possible way to change public policy; in the other half of the states, there is simply no avenue for changing policy other than the state legislature (or convincing a court that the policy you oppose is unconstitutional; and only in Alaska have the courts been willing to make such a holding regarding marijuana prohibition).

So it is crucial that we continue to get more and more legalization bills introduced in the various state legislatures, and that we continue to build support for these bills among the elected

legislators. Winning full legalization the old-fashioned way – by getting it approved by a majority

of the legislature and signed by the governor – would be an enormous political achievement that would open up the possibility of legalization in the balance of those states that do not offer a voter initiative.

And it would demonstrate once and for all that supporting marijuana legalization

is now a viable option for state level elected officials, overcoming a long-held

presumption that supporting anything thought to be pro-pot was a sure bet to get one defeated at the next election by someone committed to continuing the drug war.

Broad state legalization visibly violates the regime – we’ll no longer be able to rely on flexibility or discretionBennett and Walsh, October ‘14 [Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare. John Walsh is a Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect human rights, public health and public safety. “Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties”. Brookings. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15%20marijuana%20legalization%20modernize%20drug%20treaties%20bennett%20walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf]

The prospect of future marijuana regulation raises a second, more fundamental reason to rethink things: the nation’s experiment with legalizing and regulating marijuana might actually go well. Suppose Colorado and Washington both operate their regulated marijuana markets smartly, without offending federal enforcement prerogatives, and—most importantly— without compromising public health and safety. We don’t think this is a fanciful or improbable scenario. Our Brookings colleague John Hudak was the first to examine Colorado’s implementation effort up close. And he tentatively concluded that so far, the state’s initial rollout has been

imperfect but quite effective. 39 If this path continues or even bends towards improvement, then other states may soon elect to follow Washington and Colorado’s lead. And that , in turn, stands to exacerbate an already visible tension between obligations imposed by the drug treaties, and the federal government’s enforcement posture towards legalizing states.

To put the point another way, if Colorado and Washington augur a real trend, then the costs to the United States of treaty breach could be swiftly ratcheted upwards. The INCB could raise the volume and severity of its criticisms; we wouldn’t be surprised to hear protests from more prohibitionist countries about the United States’ treaty compliance, or to see other nations start pushing the limits of other no less important treaties to which the United

States is party. When some or all of this happens, the U nited S tates

won’t get very far in emphasizing the CSA’s theoretical application nationwide, subject to enforcement priorities enunciated in the Cole Memo; or in appealing to larger objectives woven throughout the drug treaties, and their conferral of policy

flexibility . What if twenty or thirty states successfully establish , and police,

regulated markets for marijuana production and sale?

*** AT: VelimirovicThis evidence is all about state legalization and legalizing all drugs immediately which the aff doesn’t do but the CP solves Velimirovic, 14 [Sara, 11/24/14 “Could Drug Legalization Policies Be a Tool for Peace?” Former Coordinator for The Helsinki Committee on Human Rights, AND internally citing UN Data, and James Cockayne, head of the UN University Office at the United Nations in New York and Allison Holcomb, criminal justice director of ACLU. Research for this article included participation in the International Experts Forums at the International Peace Institute in NYC]

In the wake of a booming trend of legalization of cannabis, the debate about our efforts to combat drugs has taken off. In the past 50 years, the War on Drugs has created more problems than it has solved. Mass incarceration, corruption and drug cartel induced violence continue to destroy millions of lives and stall economic growth. Sadly, the most fragile regions entrenched in violent conflicts are the ones which provide fertile ground for organized

crime. In parallel, the question of peace still remains the most important question of our time. This article will present how the issues of organized crime, peace and legalization of cannabis are related, and if legalization of illicit drugs could be our silver bullet. The International Peace Institute, a think tank for the United Nations on peace and international security issues, organized an International Experts Forum last Thursday on the topic of peacebuilding and organized crime. Namely, organized crime is an important factor in the process of peacebuilding, a term usually used to describe the whole framework of work being done by international organizations in conflict areas. According to Richard Zajac Sannerholm, a researcher at Folke Bernadotte Academy, “organized crime seems to thrive in the environments where the political, economic and social factors in conjunction provide easy access, safety, and opportunities of control and manipulation.” Thus, working on the problem of organized crime means working on building peace in the conflict areas. But, how does organized crime look today? We do not see many “Godfather”-like figures walking around anymore, and it is certainly harder than before to spot who’s the boss and track down the financial flows of the business. James Cockayne, head of the U.N. University office at the U.N., illustrated at the conference on Thursday how today’s organized crime looks with a story from former CIA director James Woolsey: If you should strike up a conversation with an articulate English speaking Russian gentlemen in the restaurant of a lovely hotel by the shores of lake Geneva, and he says to you “I am an executive of a trading company and I would like to enter into a joint venture with you,” then there are four possibilities: the first possibility is that that’s exactly what he is, the second possibility is he is a Russian intelligence officer working under commercial cover, the third possibility is that he is a member of a Russian organized crime group and the fourth, and most interesting possibility, is that he is all of these things and all of these institutions are perfectly happy with that arrangement. This illustrative example, according to Cockayne, outlines the existence of “an intimate relationship” of organized crime with politics. Moreover, organized crime is becoming more often defined as a network rather than a hierarchical structure, which means it is harder and harder to pinpoint individuals and hold them accountable, according to Catalina Uribe Burcher, Democracy, Conflict and Security Officer at International IDEA. The increased interconnectedness of various parts of the world, commonly known under the umbrella term “globalization,” is another factor testifying to the increasing difficulty to find solutions for organized crime. According to the UNODC report, “as unprecedented openness in trade, finance, travel and communication has created economic growth and well-being, it has also given rise to massive opportunities for criminals to make their business prosper.” Therefore,

it seems that ever-more organized crime is here to stay. So how do we combat organized crime? Could the liberalization of certain products on the market be the solution? Let’s look at the statistics about the income of organized crime. According to this report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, around 1.5% of global GDP comes from organized crime. Illicit drugs amount to “half of transnational organized crime proceeds and 0.6% to 0.9% of global GDP.”1 As Antonio

Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC smartly put it, “the key is

to go after their money.” According to these statistics, if we legalized all drugs

right now , organized crime would lose 50% of its income, meaning that

many networks of organized crime would suffer severe damage or would completely

disappear. Naturally, these processes take time. But, the good news is

some of the solutions that can help us combat organized crime are actually trending already. For example, legalization of cannabis is booming all across the globe. Uruguay received wide global attention when it legalized marijuana in 2013 with the goal of combating illicit drug trade and social violence connected to organized crime. According to

Carolina de Robertis, this law “is not just a law about smoking pot; it’s a law about peace and safety.” What followed was the wave of legalization that hit the U.S. with states like Colorado, Alaska, Oregon, Washington and Washington D.C. Alison Holcomb, National Director of the ACLU Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, pointed out last Monday that California will most

certainly be casting a ballot related to the initiative in 2016. This is of great importance not only because California is the biggest state in the U.S., but also because the debate around legalization would include political and security issues in

neighboring Mexico. By legalizing, California would become the domestic

supplier of cannabis in the U.S., while, noted Holcomb, “ the citizens of Mexico

(would) continue to suffer from the failures of outdated drug policies .” The

recent disappearance of 43 students in Mexico has sparked media outrage and the debate around War on Drugs policies in this country. What are other benefits of legalization that could help rally public support? The argument that drugs should be legalized because they are taken consensually, and do not hurt others seems quite evident to many libertarians. Apart from this, a myriad of authors have already written about the benefits of marijuana legalization, and most of them agree on the following points: If legalized… substance is of higher quality for the consumer substance is safer for the consumer criminal networks are weakened new jobs are created the state can tax the transactions In fact, in a recent study by the CATO institute which looked into the budgetary impact of drug legalization in the U.S., researchers found legalizing all drugs “would save roughly $41.3 billion per year in government expenditure” and would yield $46.7 billion in tax revenue (assuming tax rates were similar to those of alcohol and tobacco.) Overall, the U.S. government would be in a $89 billion plus. Out of this sum, $17.4 billion

would be from marijuana alone. Looking at marijuana legalization success stories in terms of economic gains for the state, better quality of the product and apparent absence of negative

consequences, could these findings give credible grounds to push for other policies

of liberalization? In other words, could marijuana be a gateway drug for

libertarianism? The answer might lie in the upcoming UN General

Assembly Special Session scheduled for 2016. This is a meeting where the UN member states will discuss issues related to the global drug problem. Namely, last Monday, UN University organized a talk about the preparations for UNGASS 2016, which included many high level diplomats from countries of Latin America and members of the civil society. The conclusions made at this event testify of how global the issue of legalization of drugs has become, and how much has changed in a

matter of a few years. To be specific, one of the speakers, James Cockayne, emphasized

the case of legalization in California being the game-changer in the political

debate. He warned that if the heads of states and NGOs fail to consider drug

legalization policies more thoroughly, UNGASS 2016 is risking being seen

by the global media as yet another useless UN summit, and confirming

UN’s inability to rapidly respond to contemporary problems , as was the

case with the Kyoto summit and climate change. Alison Holcomb noted that conventions which

shape UN’s stance on drugs were created more than fifty years ago and the use of words such as abuse and misuse

is more common than the word “use.” Thus, she symbolically insinuated our policies are

outdated and the upcoming forum is an excellent chance to rethink our

interpretation of these conventions. Finally, legalizing a substance such as cocaine still seems

rather shocking to a lot of people, especially to the decision-makers who will take part in the UNGASS 2016.

Naturally, liberalization of all drugs is an issue that currently meets many

challenges, most notably lack of public support. Moreover, mentioning

legalization of drugs in fragile conflict ridden places such as Afghanistan

or Iraq seems far-fetched as there are many problems which are more pressing. However, we

cannot afford to ignore the potential of policies of decriminalization and

legalization of drugs to combat transnational organized crime globally.

Especially because the consequences of these policies easily transcend national borders. It is “one of the world’s most sophisticated and profitable business,” and we now have a growing pile of examples on how to take the business away. As we have seen, experts are warning that world governments will face scrutiny if they do not take the issue of legalization seriously. Fortunately, there is strong potential for these inherently libertarian policies to become a tool for peace. As outlined in the UNODC report, “Peacebuilding and peacekeeping make fragile regions less prone to the conflict that affects crime, while fighting

crime neutralizes spoilers who profit from instability.”Meaning, legalization could be a part of the process of peacebuilding. Thus, the international peacebuilding community should incorporate this debate into the larger framework for peace. This would mean creating a space in which political solutions related to the global trend of a loosening stance on drugs could answer to current challenges. Experts need to discuss issues of drug legalization, organized crime, and peacebuilding together, because this would lead us to a more comprehensive understanding of challenges for peacebuilding in conflict areas and to a more successful track record in our efforts for peace.

AT: Latin AmericaIt solves latin America, transformst he United states perception related to the war on drugs. Palmer 14 Legalize it? Latin America reconsiders pot, DOUG PALMER, one of the most experienced trade reporters in Washington, 9/19/14, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/marijuana-legal-latin-america-111144.html

Impact card is about dialogue not genuine change Elis 12/8 Strategic Insights: The Strategic Relevance of Latin America for the United States, December 8, 2014, Dr. R. Evan Ellis, research professor of Latin American Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, with a research focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Strategic-Relevance-of-Latin-America/2014/12/08One can debate whether senior U.S. officials visit or talk about Latin America and the Caribbean frequently enough, or whether programs such as Plan Colombia, Plan Merida, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, and the

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative are sufficient. Yet from Washington DC, Latin American and Caribbean challenges, such as drugs,

organized crime, and border issues just do not seem to “stack up” to the immediate, existential threats

confronting the United States elsewhere in the world: Ebola, the fight against ISIL, a resurgent China, and a newly assertive Russia.∂ Frighteningly, in decisions about how the United States should focus its resources and attention in the pursuit of global security in the post-Cold War era, this logic is almost ubiquitous. It is

also shortsighted and potentially creates grave risks for U.S. national security .∂ This essay argues that both those who argue for greater

U.S. attention to Latin America’s problems and those who argue the need to focus resources elsewhere, have it wrong . While Latin America

and the Caribbean face important challenges, such as transnational crime, governance, and development issues in the post-Cold War world, U.S. policymakers and analysts too seldom think in strategic terms about Latin America in the way that they do toward other parts of the world. Applying such a strategic lens to Latin America, the region’s core strategic value to the United States derives not from individual problems in the region itself (although it is

certainly in the U.S. interest to address such issues). Rather, the principal strategic imperative of Latin America for the U nited S tates

historically has been, and continues to be , its geographic and economic connectedness to this country and , by extension, the

potential for a powerful extra-hemispheric actor to use the region to harm the U nited S tates or

impair its ability to act in other parts of the world in the event of a future conflict .∂ The rise of China

and its projection onto the global stage, coupled with Russia’s increasingly bold reassertion of its

imperial ambitions, increases the undesirable possibility of a serious conflict between the United States, and one or both of these actors. Yet, while strategists regularly ponder the political and military dimensions of how such conflicts could play out in Asia, it is unthinkable that a power with global political, economic, and military ties, such as Russia or China, would allow the United States to

engage it in its own region without taking the fight to the U.S. “backyard” as well. ∂ In short, there is a worrisome disconnect between the possible conflicts that U.S. strategic planners for other theaters see on the

horizon, and the focus of planners responsible for assessing Latin America and the Caribbean . The later tend to evaluate the

risks to the United States in terms of the challenges coming from the region, but not those potentially coming through the region as a product of developments in other parts of the world.∂ Things were not always so. During the Cold War, U.S. planners instinctively saw the Americas as an arena where the Soviet Union would seek to act as part of its global struggle with the West. Concerns over of a U.S. rival acting against the United States through proxy states in Latin America and the Caribbean was manifest in U.S. attempts to contain Cuba, and to prevent pro-Soviet regimes from coming to power in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, among others.∂ It is not politically correct in the “enlightened” and globalized post-Cold War world to contemplate peer competitors acting against the United States through sympathetic regimes or poorly governed spaces within the Western

Hemisphere, and yet the incentives for such a rival to do so have not changed:∂ 1. The presence of such a threat

forces the U nited S tates to divert resources and attention from actions in other theaters. ∂ 2. U.S.

trade and financial interdependence with the region allows an adversary to harm the U nited S tates economically or undermine the sustainability of U.S. efforts elsewhere without acting directly against the United States.∂ 3. The geographic proximity to the United States gives an adversary the option to resupply forces or hold U.S. targets at risk from the region during a global conflict.∂ While neither Russia nor China can be expected to openly threaten the United States in the near term, both are significantly strengthening economic and military

positions in the region, and they are moving toward a posture in which a conflict with the United States is no longer

unthinkable . While the United States works to peacefully cohabit the globe with these states, it is the duty of those responsible for U.S. national security to contemplate how such actors might move against the

United States in the Western Hemisphere in time of conflict, and how the United States should respond during such a conflict, and mitigate risk in the period prior to it.∂ In 2008, when tensions escalated between Russia and the United States over the civil war in Georgia , Russia sent the United States a powerful message by sending two nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, to conduct flights in the Caribbean, followed 3 months later by the arrival of a naval flotilla led by the Russian cruiser, Peter the Great. In 2014 , as tensions with the United States and Europe heated up again over the crisis in the

Ukraine, Russia indicated its intention to establish facilities for the resupply of Russian naval vessels in Cuba, Venezuela, and/or Nicaragua, as well as the reactivation of the Soviet-era listening facility in

Lourdes, Cuba. Even if such actions are “bluffs,” each should be a wake-up call to U.S. policymakers and planners about the threats

posed to U.S. security through willing collaborators, or poorly governed spaces in the hemisphere.∂ Neither is Russia the only extra-regional power building alliances and constructing positions close to the United States . For example, in the past decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has significantly expanded its commercial presence in the region by providing gifts and investing in projects in the Caribbean at a level that is way out of

proportion to the value of the region to China as a market or a source of commodities. Some of these projects include: the expansion of Hutchison Whampoa’s container shipping facility at Freeport, Bahamas, less than 100 miles from the U.S. coastline; the planned construction of an additional shipping facility at Goat Island, Jamaica; the expansion of port facilities in Santiago, Cuba; and, $10 billion for hotel and gambling resorts on the tiny island of

Nassau, Bahamas, to name just a few.∂ Beyond economic interactions, the PRC also quietly built its military relationships in the region through

significantly expanded arms sales, as well as regular visits by Chinese military leaders, education and training activities, and a growing military presence in the region. Indeed, this presence has evolved from multilateral humanitarian activities such as, participation in the United

Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti multilateral peacekeeping mission from 2004-12, to the conduct of combat exercises with the Chilean, Argentine, and Brazilian navies in 2013.∂ China’s increasing willingness to engage with Latin America in an increasingly bold fashion has also been manifested in the diplomatic initiatives of Chinese leader Xi Jinping. His first trip to the region in June 2013, after he assumed the Presidency, focused on 11 bilateral summit

meetings in three states, all north of the Panama Canal, while his second trip concentrated exclusively on states which have troubled relations with or actively oppose the United States.∂ Although the PRC has not pursued defense

alliances or base access agreements in the Western Hemisphere, the combination of its commercial presence and political and military relationships give it the ability to conduct military operations from the hemisphere relatively rapidly

should hostilities with the United States cause it to do so. Chinese companies such as Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, and COSCO, for example, have detailed knowledge of Latin America’s port facilities and their support capabilities from years of operating there. In evacuating personnel from both Somalia and Libya, Chinese commercial airlines and shipping companies have shown that they will not hesitate to collaborate with the Chinese People’s

Liberation Army if needed to support China’s national interest.∂ Even short of military actions, in time of war, potential adversaries such as Russia and China could

use their economic leverage or intelligence on the region’s leaders to persuade governments to deny

cooperation to the U nited S tates with respect to passage through their territorial waters, aircraft overflight rights, or use of their facilities to support U.S. military operations. ∂ Beyond Russia and China, the aggressive public diplomacy of Iran’s previous President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, serves as a reminder that the

region’s proximity to the United States is also an attraction for mid-level powers . For example, Iranian actions include the use of Venezuela to introduce agents into the region, the establishment of factories in Venezuela and financial institutions in that country,

as well as in Ecuador for evading sanctions, and the recruitment of youth for religious indoctrination from

countries from Nicaragua to Colombia.∂ For those who doubt that the states of Latin America would “dare” to provide assistance to an extra-regional power against the United States, I offer five

responses:∂ 1. States such as Cuba and Venezuela, and perhaps others, have already done so, apparently based on the belief that there is no price to pay for

their actions;∂ 2. Some regimes may calculate that they can avoid provoking a response by representing their actions as “neutrality” in the face of a U.S. conflict with geopolitical rivals;∂ 3. There is little in the recent track record of the United States in Latin America to suggest that it reliably supports its allies, or imposes significant costs on those who work against it;∂ 4. Parts of the hemisphere, such as the southern cone, are thousands of miles distant, and a world away from Washington; and,∂ 5. Short of a nuclear war in which all sides would lose, it is not unthinkable that the United States could fail to prevail in a standoff with a future Chinese-Russian coalition, ushering in a new “truly multipolar” era, making a bet against the United States more rational than many in Washington like to imagine.∂

While the idea that adversaries could act against the United States from Latin America is not new, the senior decisionmakers and planners who assess conflict scenarios in other parts of the world may not have the detailed inputs from Latin American experts to understand how adversary actions in this hemisphere could impact the effective and sustained U.S. prosecution of a military campaign abroad. Reciprocally, while Latin American analysts presumably focus on threats like drugs, organized crime, and minor terrorist incidents, it is not clear that they regularly examine how actions by near-peer competitors in other theaters could affect their own area of responsibility.∂ In the short term, the greatest need regarding U.S. security in the Western Hemisphere is not more money, but different thinking. It is difficult to identify a senior U.S. policymaker or prominent analyst who analyzes Latin America and the Caribbean with the strategic analysis that luminaries such as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Brent Scowcroft apply to Asia, the Middle East, or Europe. Indeed, it is difficult to identify a major recent essay done by

Kissinger, Brzezinski, or Scowcroft themselves focused on Latin America and the Caribbean.∂ From a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) perspective, it is imperative that Latin American

and Caribbean experts be included in the “strategic thinking” that is done about Russia, China, Iran, and other extra-hemispheric actors and the associated national security challenges that extra-hemispheric actors pose in other theaters. Such inclusion would help those responsible for those theaters to understand in

a specific and realistic fashion how the economic, political, and military positions of a contemplated adversary in the Western Hemisphere could

impact the U.S. ability to mount a timely and sustained response to that adversary in the non- Western Hemisphere location from which the crisis emanates. ∂ Reciprocally, knowledgeable senior personnel integrated into U.S. planning in other

theaters should be embedded in the planning and decisionmaking processes for those responsible for the “Western Hemisphere,” i.e., U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), so that the threat matrix that they plan for is not limited solely to the threats of drugs, gangs, and organized crime “on the horizon” in Latin America and the Caribbean, but those which could flow out of a significant conflict with a global competitor in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East.∂ One important place to incorporate such “cross-fertilization” between regions is the wargaming done by the DoD and other U.S. Government organizations. Such exercises by U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command should include scenarios involving major conflicts in other theaters, with determined adversaries such Russia, China, or even Iran, seeking to act in the Western Hemisphere to distract, delay, or undermine the U.S. effort against them, or otherwise harm the United States in its own “neighborhood.” Additionally, wargames for commands such as U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), or U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) should include realistic play in the Western hemisphere that could impact the arrival or sustainability of U.S. and coalition forces available in their own theater, and even the level of cooperation of coalition partners coming from the Western Hemisphere. Ideally, such USCENTCOM, USPACOM, and USEUCOM exercises should also integrate U.S. Western Hemisphere allies with a stake in the outcome including Canada, and where possible, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, among others. Doing so would have the added benefit of strengthening U.S. relations with its security partners in the Western Hemisphere by bringing them into U.S. global planning processes as stakeholders, and not as mere resource providers or supplicants.∂ Beyond wargaming, an important component of the strategic-level response to the challenge presented by extra-regional actors in the hemisphere should be additional analysis about who are the extra-hemispheric “strategic partners” of the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as what is the “strategic terrain” of the region. This includes identifying key countries, groups, and economic sectors under varying scenarios, and on a recurring basis, as well as physical terrain. As an example, as aid to Colombia decreases, with that nation surrounded by Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America regimes opposed to U.S. interests in the region, we may wish to consider how the “loss” of that country as a close political partner, one willing to cooperate with the United States across a range of security and law enforcement issues, would impact U.S. influence in South America. Similarly, as the Mexican government of Enrique Peña Nieto seeks improved relations with the PRC, we may wish to examine how a Mexico that is less resistant to the economic and political advances of the PRC would impact the U.S. position in Central America and the Caribbean. Looking to the Caribbean in a similar fashion, the United States may wish to consider what would happen if it lost the strong cooperation of the Dominican Republic (or even became politically estranged from its own Puerto Rico) in a Caribbean basin increasingly inundated by extra-regional actors, including the Russian positions in Nicaragua and Cuba, the Chinese commercial ports in Freeport and Goat Island, the Chinese built satellites and telecommunications infrastructures, and the significant Chinese military relationships with virtually all of the nations which recognize it in the Caribbean basin, including Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana, Cuba, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.∂ Finally, U.S. strategic thinkers should consider how the United States can work more effectively with other extra-regional partners as part of its strategic response in the Western Hemisphere. These include, but are not limited to, states such as Japan and India, whose political systems,

economic practices, and global objectives may be more aligned with those of the United States, and who are less inclined to use their positions within Latin America against the United States in a time of conflict . In the

current era of global commerce and interdependence, it would be difficult, and probably

counterproductive, for the United States to attempt to prevent states of the region from developing

economic, political, and military relationships with extra-hemispheric actors . It can however, intelligently use its

commercial leverage and “soft power” to support the strengthening of positions in the region by those extra-regional actors most friendly to the United States and most aligned with Western international norms on issues of trade, international finance, and protection of intellectual property.∂

Such thoughts are not a roadmap, but merely, to provoke a greater discourse. The problem in Washington,

DC, is arguably not the absence of bright people and deep thinkers, but rather, in focusing on the very real problems of the region itself, too few of them consider the strategic dimension of Latin America and the Caribbean in

the new era of emerging geopolitical rivals and global interdependence in the security and commercial domains.∂ The purpose of this essay is not to argue for a significant redirection of material resources toward Latin America, or to impose a new “Cold War” mentality on the region. Rather, it is to offer constructive recommendations for what responsible U.S. leaders and planners should consider, even as the United States continues to work toward productive and harmonious relationships with global actors such as Russia and China, and even as it continues to work with the region on the issues of democracy, development, security, and governance that are shared interest for all who share the Western Hemisphere.∂ To view the matter through a military analogy, Latin America is the unoccupied high-ground overseeing the U.S. position. A responsible commander would recognize that the occupation of that high ground by an adversary poses an unacceptable threat to his force, and thus would dedicate resources to block the adversary from doing so. By this analogy, it would be a grave error for the United States to conclude that, in the absence of serious threats to the United States from Latin America, it is okay to merely watch as potential future adversaries such as Russia and China expand their positions in the region. While such neglect, in the short term, may “free up resources” to continue other engagements abroad, over the long term, the willing cessation of its own neighborhood by the U.S. is the single factor most likely to force the United States into a chaotic retreat from its external engagements.∂ Latin America is strategically fundamental to the security and prosperity of the United States. This was a concept integral to the launching of the process of defense ministerial summits with the 1995 Williamsburg summit. It is better that we rediscover that lesson today, rather than learn it at great cost in the future.

1. The executive action portion of the counterplan calms concerns about federal overreach and encourages investment. It also sets the table for additional federal reforms that make it impossible for them to quantify and impact to the solvency deficit. That’s 1nc Weiner. The Omnibus Bill will force Congress to accommodate state legalization and removes the fear of federal circumvention The Inquistr 12/11/14 [“Marijuana Legalization: U.S. Congress Inadvertently Paves Way For States To Decide,” The Inquisitr, December 11, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/nltcfs6

Marijuana legalization took a major step forward today, even if it was disguised as a

setback. The U.S. Congress failed to vote for outright legalization of marijuana — an act that brought out

protesters, as reported in the Inquisitr, but one provision of a new budget bill could invariably

pave the way for states to decide for themselves to legalize marijuana .

The previous budget bill contained language that would effectively overturn the recent Washington, D.C., proposition — that voters approved — to decriminalize recreational marijuana use. Also included in the bill were cuts to funding for homeland security and attacks on Obama’s immigration reforms. That bill, called the Omnibus Bill, essentially died, and with it Congress’ attempt to overstep what was legally voted on by the populace of the District of Columbia.

A new budget bill is being written, this one with a better chance to pass both houses and, as the year draws to a

close, will most likely pass. This new bill has a provision attached that defunds the federal

government’s enforcement of drug laws in states where marijuana legalization has been passed by voters . Right now, those states include Colorado, Washington State, Alaska, and

Oregon. Without interference from the federal government on drug enforcement issues, these

states can now move forward with further implementation of legalized recreational pot —

along with the taxation that comes with it — paving the way for greater access to users, which in turn will bring in more money for the states.

The key issue here is that there are currently seven other states with varying forms of marijuana legalization bills in due process, and 23 states have some form of medicinal marijuana statutes already in

place. Proponents claim that this process has been hindered in the past due to fears that no matter what the voters choose at the polls, the federal government’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)

would just work to shut it all down. If this new budget bill defunds that possibility

of enforcement, the states will be free to choose for themselves whether or not

they want to jump in to what has become, in the last three years, a multi-billion dollar business.

The Law Enforcement Against Prohibition called the measure a “ stunning

victory .” As reported by ThinkProgress, Tony Newman of the Drug Policy Alliance explains

what the measure means for the states.

“For the first time, Congress is letting states set their own medical marijuana and hemp policies , a huge step forward for sensible drug policy . States will continue to

reform their marijuana laws and Congress will be forced to accommodate

them . It’s not a question of if, but when, federal marijuana prohibition will be

repealed .”

This major step in marijuana legalization could also effectively change the classification of marijuana from a schedule one drug (like cocaine or heroin), further

erasing the wrongly placed stigma on the naturally grown plant. It could also very well remove roadblocks

that are still in place for medicinal marijuana use. Any way it’s taken, the amendment in the new budget bill is a major step forward .

If this new budget passes, and the amendment becomes law, the DEA would be forced to step back on issues of marijuana use and sale on the state level, leaving the decisions to the states and the people living in the states. For the states where medicinal and recreational use has already been passed, it means greater access for users and greater tax incomes for the states. In states where the ideas are just now starting to take hold, this clearing of the path means that very possibly, those next seven states could see legalized marijuana use on the ballot as early as

2016, a presidential election, which usually has higher voter turnout. For proponents, this is a a “stunning victory,” indeed.

Fed will model the states. Short-term Congressional reforms solves their signal based advantages without full federal marijuana legalization Serrano 12/27/14 – News Editor @ Jazeera America [Alfonso Serrano, “The Year in Drug Policy: Movement at a crossroads,” Al Jazeera America, December 27, 2014 5:00AM ET, pg. http://tinyurl.com/odogzof

The 43-year-old war on drugs had never seen such a barrage of opposition as it did in 2014, with successful marijuana legalization initiatives in several U.S. states , California’s historic approval of sentencing reform for low level drug offenders and world leaders calling for the

legal regulation of all drugs — all of which cement the mainstream appeal of drug policy

alternatives and offer unprecedented momentum going into 2015.

Oregon, Alaska and Washington D. C. joined Colorado and Washington state in legalizing recreational marijuana and will soon start seeing the tax benefit from the estimated $41 billion that U.S. consumers spend annually on marijuana. That these states voted for legalization during a Republican romp in November elections underscores the conviction among drug policy analysts that legalization

has entered the mainstream culture. It’s a matter of time, they say, before more states — and

countries — follow suit .

Proof of that allure lies in the South , where conservative states had kept their distance from the

marijuana legalization until recently. Legalization activists have spearheaded decriminalization and medical marijuana campaigns in Texas, Alabama and

Georgia, with initial bi-partisan support in some state legislatures, and 2015 promises

further momentum. California , though, remains the state to watch . If the most populous state, and the world’s 8th largest economy, legalizes cannabis use via ballot initiative during the 2016 presidential elections, as it’s expected to do, it may lead

to a dramatic chain reaction across the country — following the path of the gay

marriage movement — and ultimately force the federal government to revisit

its policy on the drug .

And California is not idly waiting for 2016 — in November the state made a salvo on another drug war front. Voters approved Proposition 47, which will reduce penalties for low-level drug crimes. The possession of small amounts of cocaine and heroin, for example, will soon be treated as misdemeanors, not felonies — a move that is expected to affect about 40,000 offenders annually and save hundreds of millions of dollars.

The coming year will also witness implementation of a landmark decision in 2014 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which acted on the recommendation of Attorney General Eric Holder. Starting in November, low level drug offenders — an estimated 46,000 prisoners who have spent at least 10 years in prison — will be released from prison as part of a clemency initiative to reduce sentences for non-violent drug offenders.

And there are other signs Washington may be shifting direction in the drug war. Tucked away in the $1.1 trillion spending bill is an amendment that prohibits the Justice Department from using federal funds to target state-run medical marijuana programs —a major shift in federal drug policy. The provision also keeps federal agents from arresting people involved in pot businesses who are complying with state laws.

Expect similar legislative efforts in Washington during 2015, say drug policy watchers.

There is no way Congress will take up full legalization yet, especially with the GOP still divided on cannabis. But Congress will continue to introduce reform-centered legislation — though probably with not enough support to see passage — on issues like drug sentencing, industrial hemp use and medical access to marijuana.

Washington’s deviation will likely also reverberate through Latin America . In

October at the United Nations, Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield recognized the growing disconnect between Washington’s approach to marijuana legalization in the U.S. and abroad. He responded to growing criticism toward U.S. drug policy from Latin American leaders, who openly question why they should channel resources — and lives — against the drug trade when several U.S. states have legalized recreational cannabis. “We have to be tolerant of different countries, in response to their own national circumstances and conditions, exploring and using different national drug control policies," said Brownfield.

No country better exemplifies that exploration than Uruguay, which in late 2013 became the first country in the world to legalize recreational marijuana. This year saw the José Mujica slowly roll out the law, with some delays, and survive what would have been the measure’s demise, when Mujica’s ruling party won a presidential run-off against Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou, of the right-leaning National Party, who had vowed to repeal the law’s major provisions.

Countries like Mexico and Colombia have already decriminalized possession of drugs for

personal use. And the coming year will see the legalization of medical cannabis debated in Colombia, Chile and Jamaica. Additionally, Otto Perez Molina, the president of Guatemala and a major drug reform proponent, has vowed to decide on marijuana legalization in early 2015.

Fed action will happen sooner rather than later.

NB

2NC UQ Wall (To Read)CSA means that the courts will decide in favor of Nebraska, only the plan removes the precedent, answers Barnett – raich doesn’t matter because the CSA still exists. Their response will be “fed can’t force states to comply” that doesn’t matter because states still can’t pursue policies that undermine federal law – airzona v. United States proves. There is no hope for a federalism based decision. Rivkin & Foley 12/28/14 (Mr. Rivkin, a constitutional litigator, served in the Justice Department and White House Counsel’s Office in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Ms. Foley is a professor of constitutional law at Florida International University College of Law., “Federal Antidrug Law Goes Up in Smoke”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-b-rivkin-jr-and-elizabeth-price-foley-federal-antidrug-law-goes-up-in-smoke-1419810742)

The attorneys general of Nebraska and Oklahoma have asked the Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional Colorado’s law legalizing marijuana. The lawsuit states that, “The Constitution and the federal anti-drug laws do not permit the development of a patchwork of state and local pro-drug policies and licensed-distribution schemes throughout the country which conflict with federal laws.”

Many conservatives have criticized Nebraska and Oklahoma for being “fair-weather federalists” because their claims hinge, in part, on Gonzales v. Raich, a 2005 Supreme Court decision, upholding the broad reach of Congress’s power to regulate commerce.

Conservatives’ ire instead should be directed at the Obama administration’s decision to suspend enforcement of the federal law prohibiting marijuana—a decision so warping the rule of law that the complaining states’ reliance on Raich is justified and necessary.

In 1970 Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act, or CSA, listing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, and thus illegal to manufacture, distribute or possess. Nonetheless, in August 2013 the Obama administration employed its now-

signature response to disfavored laws, issuing a memo directing U.S. law enforcement to refrain from using “limited investigative and prosecutorial resources” to pursue marijuana-related violations of the CSA in states that chose to regulate marijuana businesses. The new law-by-memo told states they are free to ignore the federal ban.Read more…

The Controlled Substances Act is an exercise of Congress’s express power to regulate interstate commerce. The law declares that a “major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce” and that even locally grown and sold drugs have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Drugs manufactured, distributed or consumed within a single state cannot be tolerated because they undermine Congress’s desire to stop interstate drug trafficking.

State laws legalizing and regulating marijuana —in Colorado, Alaska, Oregon and Washington— conflict with the

CSA and cripple its effectiveness. States cannot be required to enforce federal law. But as the Supreme Court held in Arizona

v. United States (2012), whe n the federal government doesn’t enforce its own laws , states still “may

not pursue policies that undermine federal law .” Colorado ’s decision to legalize and regulate the sale of

marijuana undermines the C ontrolled S ubstances A ct , giving a major boost to all segments of that business. Indeed, in an interview this month Colorado’s attorney general, John Suthers, acknowledged that his state is “becoming a major exporter of marijuana.”

Neighboring states such as Nebraska and Oklahoma have seen a significant influx of high-potency marijuana purchased in and directed toward Colorado markets, increasing those states’ law-

enforcement costs. If the CSA is a valid federal statute, the U.S. Constitution’s supremacy clause (Article

VI, paragraph 2) instructs that conflicting state laws cannot be allowed to stand. This is where Raich

comes in.

In Raich, individuals who used marijuana pursuant to California’s “compassionate use” law asserted that the CSA was unconstitutional as it applied to them, because Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce couldn’t reach state-sanctioned intrastate marijuana use. The Raich majority refused to create a CSA “exemption” for medicinal marijuana, reasoning that “a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana . . . locally cultivated for personal use . . . may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily

popular substance.” It concluded that the CSA was a valid exercise of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce and that “marijuana possession and cultivation ‘in accordance with state law’ cannot serve to place respondents’ activities beyond congressional reach.”

Even the pro-federalism dissent by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor —which asserted that state compassionate-use laws could peacefully coexist with the CSA—acknowledged that medical marijuana was qualitatively distinct from recreational marijuana. More specifically, Justice O’Connor believed that the relatively small population of medical marijuana users didn’t have a “substantial effect” on the interstate market for recreational marijuana—the market Congress intended to extinguish in the Controlled Substances Act.

Whatever one thinks about Raich , it is still binding precedent . Colorado’s law is not about a limited ,

medical-need exemption for marijuana use. It is a full-scale defiance of the CSA. There is no

federalism defense to Colorado’s law , unless one believes that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce doesn’t

include the power to regulate the buying and selling of marijuana, a commercial market that involves interstate transportation, lures sellers and consumers from other states, and now generates more than $7 million in tax revenue for Colorado every month.

Framing issue, we don’t need to win that Nebraska and Oklahoma WIN the suit, just that they are allowed payment for damages rather than an injunction – this accesses the net benefit and avoids a majority of their offense, the CSA is necessary to that decision. (just so we’re clear Barnett is a volokh scholar)Volokh Citing DeVeaux and Mostad-Jensen 12/20/14 (Eugene, Eugene Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation policy., DeVeaux and Jensen, Concordia Univ. School of Law, “A defense of the Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado marijuana lawsuit¶ Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Share on Google Plus Share via Email More Options¶ Resize Text Print Article Comments”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/20/a-defense-of-the-nebraska-oklahoma-v-colorado-marijuana-lawsuit/)

But I thought it would be worthwhile to link to a draft of “Fear and Loathing in Colorado: Invoking the Supreme Court’s State-Controversy

Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-Legalization Experiment,” by professors Chad DeVeaux and Anne Mostad-Jensen

(Concordia Univ. School of Law), which defends a version of the Nebraska and Oklahoma position, at least as

to payment of damages rather than an injunction . I remain skeptical about the case; I think such matters should be

resolved through the legislative and executive branches of the federal government, not the judicial branch, and I don’t think that Congress’s earlier judgment categorically prohibiting commerce in marijuana is sufficient to justify this particular remedy. Still, I thought the contrary argument worth noting. Here is the introduction to the article; you can read the whole thing by downloading it from the SSRN site. (Note also that the article thanks law student “Bryan V. Norton, who first proposed the theory that a sister State could invoke the Supreme Court’s state-controversy jurisdiction to challenge Colorado’s marijuana-legalization experiment.”)

[Epigraph:] “One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with all the rest…. Yet, whenever … the action of

one State reaches … into the territory of another State, the question of the extent and the limitations of the

rights of the two States becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, and [the

Supreme Court] is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize the equal

rights of both and at the same time establish justice between them .” [Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46,

97-98 (1907).]

Louis Brandeis famously observed that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if

its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” In the wake of Colorado’s decriminalization of recreational marijuana, Justice Brandeis’s adage has become a shibboleth frequently wielded by pot-legalization advocates.

But the popular culture’s exuberant embrace of the marijuana-legalization experiment, undoubtedly fueled by the immense wealth

the industry — “Big Cannabis” — promises to generate, ignores a crucial caveat to this oft-quoted metaphor: The Constitution

permits States to “try novel social and economic experiments” only when such measures

come “without risk to the rest of the country.” Accordingly, a century ago when Tennessee permitted her

copper smelters to release noxious gases into the atmosphere causing the “wholesale destruction of forests, orchards, and crops” in neighboring Georgia, Justice Brandeis’s adage provided the Volunteer State no comfort.

The decision in that case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, stands as a bulwark of the Supreme

Court’s horizontal-federalism jurisprudence — the body of law protecting State polities from incursions by sister States. The Court unanimously recognized that while ultimate judgment

whether a State’s regulatory choices are “ doing more harm than good to her citizens ” is ordinarily reserved “for her to determine,” the Constitution bars States from undertaking endeavors that conscript

the citizens or property of their neighbors as guinea pigs in their experiments. Thus, Tennessee’s ability to embrace novel commercial endeavors was curbed by Georgia’s right to be free from harmful externalities — “side-effect[s] of … economic activity, [that] caus[e] [neighbors] to suffer

without compensation . ”

When it comes to cross-border externalities, the Constitution dictates that States are “not compelled to lower [themselves] to the

more degrading standards of a neighbor.” This limitation on State power derives from the ancient maxim

that embodies the law of nuisance — “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, that is, so use your own as not to injure another’s property.”

It is also inherent in the Constitution’s commitment to a republican form of government. While Tennesseans are empowered to determine for themselves whether the benefits of risky in-state innovations outweigh their costs, Georgians are “deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the [Tennessee] legislature in order to obtain a change in policy.” Georgians are also denied any share in the revenue that might justify the costs of the endeavor. For these reasons, the Court declared Tennessee’s smelting an interstate nuisance that violated the Constitution’s federalist covenant and ordered its abatement.

Tennessee Copper is just one of more than a dozen Supreme Court decisions standing in judgment of State experiments alleged to produce cross-border nuisances, or deplete resources shared by multiple States. The Constitution expressly endows the Supreme Court with “original jurisdiction” over such “Controversies between two or more States.” This “state-controversy jurisdiction” serves “as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies between sovereigns and a possible resort to force.”

The “cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that of equality of right” — each “stands on the same level with all the rest.” Nonetheless, when “the action of one State reaches … into the territory of another, … the question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them.” The

Constitution entrusts the Supreme Court “to settle” these disputes “in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice between them.”

Supreme Court intervention is necessary because “[t]he states of this Union cannot make war upon each other…. They cannot make reprisal on each other by embargo. They cannot enter upon diplomatic relations and make treaties.” The Constitution likewise prohibits States from conducting customs inspections of containers, vehicles, and persons entering their territory.

Federal common law provides the rule of decision in original actions for nuisance . “The elements of a claim based on the federal common law of nuisance are simply that the defendant is carrying on an activity that is causing an injury or significant threat of injury to some cognizable interest of the complainant .” Such claims “are founded on a theory of public nuisance” and

essentially mirror the traditional common law of public nuisance familiar to property attorneys around the country.

Historically, the bulk of the original nuisance actions heard by the Court involved pollution .

Congress’s passage of the Clean Air and Water Acts in 1960s and 70s, which established uniform national air and water-

quality standards and invested the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with jurisdiction to administer them, put an end to virtually all such disputes. Consequently, two generations of attorneys — and Justices — have matriculated without any experience

with this once-common species of Supreme Court litigation. Colorado’s embrace of the recreational- marijuana

industry has created a new form of cross-border pollution , re-awakening this long-dormant

field of constitutional law.

Unlike other state vice-legalization experiments such as gambling, prostitution, and prize-fighting — which

involve actions undertaken at a fixed location — Colorado’s initiative authorizes the trafficking

of goods

//// MARKED AT ////

— federal contraband — that can easily cross state lines inside luggage, through the mail, or in the

trunks of cars. In this way, marijuana legalization produces regional externalities that closely

resemble pollution.

Just as contaminants released into rivers flow across state lines, marijuana introduced into the stream of commerce from Colorado dispensaries will predictably flow into neighboring States through the simple expediency of placing lawfully purchased cannabis in vehicles which are then driven across state lines. And just as interstate watercourses are guided by the laws of gravity and hydrology, the

movement of Colorado pot is driven by greed. Marijuana is the most lucrative cash crop in the United States. The resulting “ high demand in the interstate market will draw” Colorado weed “into that market” thereby having a “substantial effect on the supply and demand” of the drug in the black markets of neighboring States.

The available data suggests that large quantities of Colorado cannabis are now being diverted into

these markets. The Court should employ the same principles it once applied in cases

involving interstate environmental nuisances to resolve this problem.

The burden faced by the Court in an original action challenging Colorado’s marijuana-legalization experiment is less

onerous than that presented by the environmental-nuisance cases of the past. The Court is not

comprised of scientists, and is ill-equipped to resolve controversies such as what concentration of a given pollutant in air or water is

acceptable. As such, in the days before the EPA, it was forced to rely on “ often vague and

indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence ” to resolve such disputes.

But it is well settled that “when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision

rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual lawmaking by federal courts

disappears .” Congress has not delegated adjudication of interstate nuisance actions involving

marijuana to an administrative agency as it did with air and water-quality disputes. But it also

has not left the question whether the introduction of marijuana into interstate commerce

constitutes a nuisance to the “often vague and indeterminate … maxims of equity jurisprudence.” An activity constitutes a public nuisance when it creates “significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience.”

Congress has conclusively determined that the “importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession” of marijuana has “a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people” and that the intrastate “distribution and possession of

[marijuana] contribute[s] to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.” These findings

rest on solid science. As a recent study published in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded, marijuana use causes

“long-lasting changes in brain function that can jeopardize educational, professional and social achievements.”

The Supreme Court held that Congress’s findings rest comfortably within its enumerated powers

and that they must be accepted by reviewing courts. Thus, the Supremacy Clause dictates that

the introduction of marijuana into the stream of commerce — even intrastate — constitutes

an interstate public nuisance as that term is used in the Court’s original-action jurisprudence .

While Congress has determined that the introduction of marijuana into commerce constitutes

a public nuisance it rem ains the Court’s duty to determine what remedy , if any, is available to

Colorado’s neighbors . Rather than issuing injunctive relief — the traditional remedy in original

nuisance actions — we posit that the Court should award damages to prevailing sister States

compensating them for the injuries inflicted by the incursion of Colorado marijuana into their

territory.

AT: BarnettBarnett is a tool, his involvement in Raich should make any evidence by him suspectAmar 12 (Akhil, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University, “America’s Unwritten Constitution: An Open

Letter to Randy Barnett ”, http://volokh.com/2012/09/10/americas-unwritten-constitution-an-open-letter-to-randy-barnett/)

Another example is even closer to home for you, given your involvement in the 2005 medical marijuana case of Gonzales v. Raich. I personally think that medical marijuana should be decriminalized, especially in situations such as the one in Raich. But as I say in the book, although the right of a “patient to use an otherwise illegal drug such as marijuana when a licensed physician has prescribed the drug to alleviate intense pain” is a right that has “considerable moral appeal to many thoughtful analysts and may one day come to persuade a majority of Americans and their elected lawmakers, that day has not yet arrived.” One final example — and there are many others I could invoke — involves the death penalty. I try to explain and justify why the Court struck down the death penalty in 1972, why it reversed course in 1976, and why its cases since then have gone back and forth on certain very specific issues regarding the death penalty (such as its use against low-IQ defendants). My account has nothing to do with my own views over time (which have stayed pretty constant); my account has everything to do with basic changes in the wider practices and attitudes in American living rooms, assembly rooms, court rooms, and jury rooms.

The zigging and zagging in this quadrant of case law does not mean that everything in the Constitution

is up for grabs , and that unpopular written rights should be ignored by judges. You wrongly suggest that this is my view: “If what the judiciary is doing is popular enough, the unwritten Constitution promulgated by judges takes precedence [according to Amar] over the written one.” I actually say something quite

different, and far more nuanced: In the domain of unenumerated rights, popularity counts. Here is one key passage:

“While a wave of new legislation would not ordinarily suffice to trump a precise and inflexible textual right, we must keep in mind that in this chapter we have been dealing with various rights that have not been specified in this way in the written Constitution. If the original judicial reason for deeming these rights to be full-fledged constitutional entitlements derived from the fact that American lawmakers generally respected these rights in practice, then such rights should lose their constitutional status if the legislative pattern changes dramatically. In this particular pocket of unwritten constitutionalism [my emphasis] what should ideally emerge is a genuine dialogue among judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens.” And here is

another passage: “Thus, if the Court at time T1 gets the Constitution’s text and original understanding wrong and proclaims a right that does not in fact properly exist at time T1, and if the vast majority of Americans come to

rejoice in this right, the Court at time T2 should affirm the originally erroneous precedent . The case,

though wrong when decided , has become right thanks to an intervening change of fact — broad and deep

popular endorsement — that the Constitution’s own text, via the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments , endows

with special significance. Note one key asymmetry: A case that construes a textual constitutional right too narrowly is different from one that construes the right too broadly. Even if both cases come to be widely embraced by the citizenry, only the rights-expanding case interacts with the text of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments so as to specially immunize it from subsequent reversal.”

CP SolvesLegalizing hemp will not legalize marijuana says DEA considers hemp a narcotic – that’s silly Yonavjak 13 – Forbes Contributor [Logan Yonavjak, “Industrial Hemp: A Win-Win For The Economy And The Environment,” Forbes, 5/29/2013 @ 2:54PM pg. http://tinyurl.com/prohmp6

Why is this incredible plant illegal?

Because it is erroneously confounded with marijuana , and many policymakers believe

that by legalizing hemp they are legalizing marijuana, which is not true . Canada,

Britain, France, Germany, and Spain, along with over twenty other countries, cultivate and process industrial hemp without affecting the enforcement of marijuana laws. (More common misperceptions about hemp and factual rebuttals.)

In fact, industrial hemp and marijuana are different breeds of Cannabis sativa;

hemp has no value as a recreational drug. Actually smoking large amounts of hemp flowers can produce a significant headache, but not a high.

Disease DefenseBurnout means no risk of extinction—1918 flu proves, only had a 2% kill rateKLEIN 13 Wonkblog – Washington Post [Don’t be afraid of fast zombies, Ezra Klein June 28, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/28/dont-be-afraid-of-fast-zombies/]

Schuchat, the director of the CDC’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, has worked

on meningitsis in West Africa, disease surveillance in South Africa and severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, in China. She worries about the diseases that infect worlds -- those you can’t bring down with a shot to the head. Zombies are pleasant compared with her concerns.

The really scary diseases, she said, tend to have three qualities: first, a host population that isn’t immune; second, the capacity to spread rapidly; third, severity.

Diseases face a choice between spreading easily and being severe . If a disease is too hard on its host,

kill ing quickly, it can’t spread. If it’s too easy on its host, it doesn’t much matter if it spreads . “That’s one of the reasons we talk about the 1918 influenza a lot, ” Schuchat said. “In many ways, it was a perfect weapon. Most people actually survived that influenza. The death rate was only about 2 percent . But that’s enormous

across a society.” Had its death rate been 100 percent , by contrast, the flu would’ve been stopped in its

tracks.

And for all the advances of modern medicine, influenza would have an enormous advantage today: Modern air travel means that a flu that begins the morning in Nairobi can end the day in New Jersey.

If globalization is influenza’s ally, the ability to rapidly disseminate information is its mortal enemy.

The quicker the world knows what disease is coming, the faster resources can be mobilized and behavior can be changed to stop it . This is where reality and “World War Z” -- the book this time, not the movie -- converge. SARS caught the world unprepared in 2002 because authorities in China, where it first appeared, covered it up. Brooks deploys a similar scenario at the start of his zombie near-apocalypse.

1NR

Theory---2NC The CP’s legitimate---negotiating the interactions between international and domestic drug law is a key topic controversy Heather J. Haase 12, Chair, New York City Bar Association Committee on Drugs & the Law Special Subcommittee on International Drug Law & Policy, August 2012, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?,” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf

To the contrary, in the case of drug control, international law has more influence on domestic legislation than most Americans realize or frankly, would want to admit. In fact, one of the most striking characteristics of the international drug control system is its overriding concern with the domestic affairs of the member countries , including the United States. The United States is actually very limited in what it can legally do vis-a-vis its international treaty obligations , regardless of what policy changes make sense for its own citizens.

Perm Do Both---2NC

Unilateral legalization destroys adherence to the drug treaties and spills over to the whole treaty system---means even if doing both achieves drug treaty reform, the framework will be ineffective Stephen Rolles 9, Senior Policy Analyst for Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2009, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,” http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/after-war-drugs-blueprint-regulation

Parties could simply ignore all or part of the treaties . If multiple states engaged in such a strategy, the treaties would eventually ‘wither on the vine’ , falling into disuse without any specific termination or reform. A n individual country disregarding the treaties , or applying them only partially, could in this way institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level , including arguably the most likely example: the actual legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland have been debating at the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the political agenda in a number of US states).

Such a move however, like all the other possible reforms discussed here, raises serious issues that go beyond the realm of drug control —particularly if taken unilaterally . The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten, or be perceived to threaten, the stability of the entire treaty system. The cost of such a threat and the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.

Say Yes---2NC

The plan requires U.S. denunciation of the Single Convention which collapses it---the CP leverages the possibility of U.S. withdrawal to achieve treaty amendment---the process is key and overcomes all solvency deficits David R. Bewley-Taylor 12, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University Wales, and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, March 2012, “Towards revision of the UN drug control conventions: The logic and dilemmas of Like-Minded Groups,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr19.pdf

However, in another scenario, an effective and strategically shrewd development of a cannabis regulation group, might generate enough support for , or critically limit resistance towards , treaty amendment.

This would be more likely if the LMG contained a credible mix of nations, including one or more ‘critical states’ , which could withstand or pacify opposition from other sections of the international community. In terms of process, it is worth pointing out that although strengthening the prohibitive credentials of the regime, the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention is the final product of numerous amendment proposals from the US with support from other states including the UK.43 In this respect, the use of denunciation may also be appropriate, but here as a trigger for treaty revision. By merely making moves to leave the confines of the regime , an LMG might be able to generate a critical mass sufficient to compel states favouring the status quo to engage with the process. Moreover, prohibition -oriented states, as well as those parts of the UN apparatus resistant to change, might be more open to treaty modification or amendment if it was felt that such a concession would prevent the collapse of the control system . By Lawrence Helfer’s analysis ‘withdrawing from an agreement (or threatening to withdraw) can give a denouncing state additional voice…by increasing its leverage to reshape the treaty…’ (Emphasis added).44

Under such circumstances, subsequent changes may be an acceptable cost to nations favouring the dominant architecture of the existing regime . Such a scenario is possible since it is generally agreed that denunciation of any treaty can lead to its demise . This would be possible in relation to the drug control treaties due to the nature of the issue and a reliance on widespread transnational adherence . Indeed, a sufficiently weighty ‘denouncers’ group may be able not only to withstand pressure from prohibition-oriented states, but also to apply significant pressure

itself. Moreover, regular meetings between likeminded countries outside the formal setting of CND sessions may, over

time, also create sufficient momentum to elicit a change in outlook within the Commission itself . And although driven by the specific goal of the group, circumventing the Commission in Vienna through engagement with other UN bodies elsewhere, such as the Human Rights Council in Geneva or the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples in New York, may generate

additional pressure for substantive change. Again, linking such efforts to the international treaties (and declarations)

upon which those forums are based is important. While certain to be an even more lengthy process, in the long run such

a route might be preferable to any specific revision via denunciation with re-accession and reservation

since it could create more general flexibility within the regime as a whole , as opposed to a somewhat limited one time fix. It would seem that, conscious of both a wide range of national, even local, imperatives and, as noted several times

above, a range of concurrent obligations relating to other treaties, the most productive result of any revisionist endeavour would be the creation of a more flexible and accommodating treaty framework. On this point, it is worth recalling the prescient words of the Minister of Justice of the Netherlands when addressing the 1988 International Conference on Drug Abuse and Trafficking in Vienna. Then, the former Minister of Justice of the Netherlands, Frits Korthals Altes urged, ‘international cooperation is

indispensible. However, an attempt to reach an internationalization of drug policies in the sense of a single, non-differentiated approach is bound to be counterproductive for many countries…’ 45

Amendment only requires a simple majority vote at UNGASSBewley-Taylor 14 - Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory (David,“The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition: the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform,” http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf

Substantially modifying the scheduling of cannabis (and coca leaf) via a WHO review might be a feasible scenario. Regarding amendments, an alternative option explained in the Commentary on the Single Convention is particularly interesting in light of the upcoming UNGASS in 2016 : “[T]he General Assembly may itself take the initiative in amending the Convention, either by itself adopting the revisions, or by calling a Plenipotentiary

Conference for this purpose.”43 The G eneral A ssembly could thus adopt treaty amendments by simple

majority vote, “always provided that no amendment , however adopted, would be binding upon a Party not accepting it ”.44 The Secretary- General or the General Assembly could first appoint an expert group or high-level panel to advise on various options for treaty reform, including the more ambitious idea for a new Single Convention. Cannabis, most likely, would no longer be part of the control system under such a new Single Convention. Another international control model for cannabis could perhaps be designed, as several have suggested, modelled on the WHO Tobacco Convention.45

Bewley-Taylor et al, 11-19-14(David, founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory at Swansea, Martin Jelsma is a political scientist who has specialised in Latin America and international drugs policy. Damon Barrett is a co-founder and Director of the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy and a Visiting Fellow at the Human Rights Centre, “Fatal Attraction: Brownfield's Flexibility Doctrine and Global Drug Policy Reform,” accessed 1-12-14, http://www.tni.org/article/fatal-attraction-brownfields-flexibility-doctrine-and-global-drug-policy-reform?context=595, hec)

State-level cannabis reforms, which gathered steam this month, have exposed the inability of the United States to abide by the terms of the legal bedrock of the global drug control system; the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This is something that should force a much-needed conversation about reform to long-standing international agreements. But while ostensibly 'welcoming' the international drug policy reform debate, it is a conversation the US federal government actually wishes to avoid. The result is a new official position on the UN drugs treaties that, despite its seductively progressive tone, serves only to sustain the status quo and may cause damage beyond drug policy. The 1961 Single Convention has been massively influential. Almost every state in the world is bound to prohibit cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis and a range of other substances such as coca and opium for anything but medical and scientific purposes. Wherever you are, your drugs laws are probably modeled on this agreement. The United States has been a staunch defender of this legal regime. The treaties are central to its foreign policy on drugs, including in Latin America. But at home the government has been clear that it will not trample on the will of voters with regard to cannabis, even though this places it in breach of the 1961 Convention. So the US faces a predicament; a treaty breach it does not wish to admit within a system it wishes to protect. The response is the new 'four pillars' approach, set out by Ambassador William Brownfield (Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement): Respect the integrity of the existing UN Drug Control Conventions... Accept flexible interpretation of those conventions... Tolerate different national drug policies...accept the fact that some countries will have very strict drug approaches; other countries will legalize entire categories of drugs... Combat and resist criminal organizations Brownfield's statement received some positive responses, welcoming it as a breakthrough in drug policy reform. However, its attractiveness is superficial and there are important reasons to be cautious. For US foreign policy on drugs the four pillars make sense in the short term. Through these pillars, the US can appear to embrace reform discussions while changing nothing of substance. US approaches to Latin America that have dominated US attentions can carry on as before. The US gets to continue to have presence in places it has no business being other than to fight the drug trade - the fourth pillar of this 'new' approach. In addition, in defending the 'integrity of the treaties', the US can go on using those treaties as a disciplinary tool against producer and transit nations in the region. Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, when a country does not fulfill the requirements of the international drugs conventions, the President determines that the country has 'failed demonstrably' to meet its obligations, which can lead to sanctions. Bolivia received such a determination again only a few weeks ago. While explaining the rationale for a more 'flexible interpretation' Brownfield said, 'Things have changed since 1961'. However, the Presidential Determination on Bolivia stressed that the 'frameworks established by the U.N. conventions are as applicable to the contemporary world as when they were negotiated and signed by the vast majority of U.N. member states'. The determination further expressed the US government's concern that Bolivia tries 'to limit, redefine, and circumvent the scope and control' for coca under the 1961 Convention, even though that is precisely what the US is doing in the case of cannabis. The US also objected to Bolivia's efforts to have traditional uses of coca removed from international control because it challenged the 'integrity of the treaties' - the very first pillar above. So which countries' reforms or interpretations will be deemed tolerable, and which will threaten the integrity of the treaties? Crucially, who decides? It is clear that a legally regulated market in cannabis is not permissible under the 1961 Single Convention. To deal with this the US, in the second pillar above, has signaled its acceptance of unilateral interpretation of multilateral agreements beyond what those agreements allow for. That is a very serious call beyond cannabis and beyond drug policies. The attempt under the Bush administration to argue that waterboarding was not a breach of the UN Convention Against Torture and that detainees in the war on terror were not covered by the Geneva Conventions should caution against allowing this kind of unilateral approach. In reality, beyond the progressive sounding words, the path the Brownfield doctrine set out leads to further US exceptionalism and the ongoing use of the treaties as it sees fit. But that exceptionalism cuts both ways, and the US has also vital interests, including national security, in holding states to international and bilateral treaty obligations. A recent example demonstrates the risks of failing to take this into account. In July, the US issued a determination that Russia was in violation of obligations of the Inter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a bilateral agreement banning the testing of ballistic missiles of a certain range. But if a 'flexible', a-la-carte approach is to be permissible under the drug control regime when it suits the US, why should that not apply here? Why not other important international agreements that matter to so many such as environmental protocols setting specific targets, or human rights law and its vital

protections? Following the second pillar to the extent the US suggests is a very slippery slope. The shift to regulated cannabis

markets in the US should open the space for a much-needed discussion of treaty reform. The

problem at hand is not the treaty breach by the US; the problem is the drug control treaty system

itself. Preparations have started for a UN summit on drugs in 2016 , the first in almost twenty years,

and where a conversation about treaty reform should begin . The Brownfield doctrine is part of US efforts to keep it off

the agenda. For governments, in an effort to avoid political controversy, the four pillars may seem attractive. For those who support drug policy

reform they may seem progressive. But this is no win for drug policy reform or progress towards policies grounded in evidence and human rights. To allow the US, for its own ends, to lead us into a politically calculated theatre of adherence simply serves to sustain a regime that is no longer fit for purpose. It is also harmful for the integrity of international law more broadly, from human rights, to security to the environment. The price of allowing the US to avoid its breach of the 1961 Convention, in other words, is too high. And the war on drugs has already cost too much.

Perm Do the CP---2NC Severance---the CP cannot possibly be a legal example of the plan---legalization requires withdrawal from the treaty that the CP amends Laurence R. Helfer 12, co-director of Duke Law School's Center for International and Comparative Law and a Senior Fellow with Duke's Kenan Institute for Ethics, 11/4/12, “Terminating Treaties,” http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5338&context=faculty_scholarship

It is helpful to begin with a definition of key terms. Denunciation and withdrawal are used interchangeably to refer to a unilateral act by which a nation that is currently a party to a treaty ends its membership in that treaty.6 In the case of multilateral agreements, denunciation or withdrawal generally does not affect the treaty’s continuation in force for the remaining parties.7 For bilateral agreements, in contrast, denunciation or withdrawal by either party results in the termination of the treaty for both parties. The termination of a multilateral agreement occurs when the treaty ceases to exist for all States parties.8

Severs “legalize”---it means to authorize conduct immediately, not to authorize future conduct Ballentine’s 10, Law Dictionary, 2010, “TERM: legalize,” p. lexis

TERM: legalize.

TEXT: To make legal that which otherwise is illegal. To confirm something already done; not to authorize something in the future.

AUTHORITY: Barker v Chesterfield, 102 Mass 127.

DA

2NR LinkThe U.S. has unique leverage to build consensus for drug treaty amendmentWells C. Bennett 10-15, Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution; and John Walsh, Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect human rights, public health and public safety, 10/15/14, “Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15%20marijuana%20legalization%20modernize%20drug%20treaties%20bennett%20walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf

The drug treaties contain some rather complex procedures for amendment.45 Beyond the procedural gymnastics

involved, the international politics of amendment likely would be tough, too. There’s unhelpful precedent: a staunch, U.S.-led opposition to Bolivia’s 2009 proposal to amend the drug treaties so as to permit coca leaf-chewing. Having spearheaded this effort— which the United States justified as necessary to ensure the treaties’ continued “integrity”46—it could be awkward for the United States to push an amendment to loosen the drug treaties’ marijuana rules.

But there is another precedent to consider, too . Decades before Bolivia’s 2009 amendment bid, there was a nother campaign to revise the 1961 Single Convention—one led by the United States in the early 1970s and that culminated in a conference involving 97 parties agreeing upon the 1972 Amending Protocol . To be sure,

the drug treaties are not easy to amend. But the United States played a central role in amending them before; it could do the same once again .

Such a revision would bring some needed coherence to the current policy, and in that respect it might be a relatively easier sell . It is difficult to understand why the United States (and, presumably, all other parties) should be entitled to the “flexibility” needed to enact “different national strategies” vis-à-vis marijuana,

notwithstanding contrary treaty language; but at the same time should stoutly resist any attempts to re-work the treaties so as to bring parties’ international obligations better into line with their shifting domestic policies and practices. Said differently, if flexible, unilateral re-interpretation doesn’t offend the “integrity” of the treaties in principle then amendment—a process established in the treaties themselves—should not offend it either , especially when a proposed amendment would only codify the status quo, and not undercut the United States’ current drug policy priorities.

This raises a related point: the United States has unique leverage . Exit or the credible threat of exit, for example, has brought about key changes in other multilateral treaties , including those establishing international organizations.47 To

be clear: we do not mean to draw any broad analogies between those situations and this one, or to recommend threatening exit as even a tentative negotiating strategy . But it would be wrong to downplay the importance, to other drug treaty signatories , of the U nited States’ continued law enforcement and other drug treaty-based cooperation worldwide. Those signatories have a strong interest in keeping the U nited States

within the drug treaties , and happily so. All of that stands to help the United States in building the international consensus needed to pass an amendment along the lines set forth above.

Obama’s “wait and see” approach lays groundwork for treaty reform, but legalizing now shreds the treaty systemBennett and Walsh, 10/14 - *Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND **John Walsh is a Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of the hemispheric debate on drug policy (“Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties” October, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuana-legalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf)

Wherever the limits of the United States’ enforcement discretion under the drug treaties might be drawn precisely, we know that

such discretion by definition cannot be an across-the-board, categorical affair, when the issue is federal tolerance of regulated ,

comprehensive marijuana markets established by state law . And that’s just it: if more states take a legalize -and- regulate approach, a federal-level decision not to prosecute similarly situated persons could start to look like blanket non-enforcement of implementing legislation—something that , in our view, the drug treaties do not contemplate.

The prospect of future marijuana regulation raises a second, more fundamental reason to rethink things: the nation’s experiment with legalizing and regulating marijuana might actually go well. Suppose Colorado and Washington both operate their regulated marijuana markets smartly, without offending federal enforcement prerogatives, and—most importantly— without compromising public health and safety. We don’t think this is a fanciful or improbable scenario. Our Brookings colleague John Hudak was the first to examine Colorado’s implementation effort up close. And he tentatively concluded that so far, the state’s initial rollout has been imperfect but quite effective.39 If this path continues or even bends towards improvement, then other states may soon elect to follow Washington and Colorado’s lead. And that, in turn, stands to exacerbate an already visible tension between obligations imposed by the drug treaties, and the federal government’s enforcement posture towards legalizing states.

To put the point another way, if Colorado and Washington augur a real trend, then the costs to the United States

of treaty breach could be swiftly ratchet ed up wards . The INCB could raise the volume and severity of its criticisms; we would n’t be surprised to hear protests from more prohibitionist countries about the United

States’ treaty compliance, or to see other nations start pushing the limits of other no less important treaties to which the United States is party. When some or all of this happens, the United States won’t get very far in emphasizing the CSA’s theoretical application nationwide, subject to enforcement priorities enunciated in the Cole Memo; or in appealing to larger objectives woven throughout the drug treaties, and their conferral of policy flexibility. What if twenty or thirty states successfully establish, and police, regulated markets for marijuana production and sale?

Having that scenario in mind, we lastly emphasize the United States’ unique relationship both to the drug treaties and to the wider international community. The

United States was a—if not the— key protagonist in developing the 1961, 1971, and 1988 Conventions, as well as the 1972

protocol amending the 1961 Convention; the United States has for decades been widely and correctly viewed as the treaties’ chief champion and defender .40 That fact feeds back onto this one: The United States also occupies a singular place in international relations. It can summon powers no other nation can summon, but it also confronts risks no other nation confronts.41 For that oft-cited reason, the United States has a profound interest in ensuring that counterparties perform their treaty obligations. Reciprocity is always a big deal for any

nation that trades promises with other ones— but it is perhaps uniquely so for ours .

These factors mean that caution is in order regarding international law and the viability of the Cole Memo in the longer run. If the United States can “flexibly interpret” the drug treaties with regard to marijuana, then Mexico is entitled to no less—though it might view the limits of its flexibility differently, or apply it to another controlled substance within the treaties’ purview. Or imagine that a foreign nation’s controversial policy butts up against seemingly contrary language, in a treaty covering an extremely important global issue other than drug control. Likely the United States will have a tougher time objecting when, rather than conceding the problem or changing course, that nation’s foreign ministry invokes the need to “tolera[te] different national approaches;” or recasts the relevant treaty as a “living document” subject to periodic, unilateral reinterpretation.

This is not to suggest that compliance challenges or complexity should always trigger a call to reshape the United States’ treaty commitments. Practice and prudence both support a more nuanced, case-specific approach than that. Sometimes the United States has sought to make significant adjustments to multilateral frameworks or even quit them; other times, the United States has weighed costs and benefits, and pressed on within the treaty despite consequential breaches—in situations much more obvious (and less open to reasonable contention) than that regarding marijuana.

But in those instances, the United States’ compliance failures often have come despite some hard striving by the federal government. The State Department, to name one well known example, tries mightily to make state law enforcement officers aware of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—notwithstanding some repeated and well-known violations of that treaty by the likes of Texas, Virginia, and Arizona.42 In this case, though, no external factors—federalism, say, or a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court—have frustrated a strong push by the executive branch to vindicate the drug treaties; the decision not to assert federal supremacy was in fact taken unilaterally by the Obama administration. Given the circumstances, we believe it was the

correct decision. The Cole Memo nevertheless establishes at least some friction with a treaty obligation, by holding back on CSA enforcement, so as to accommodate state-level regulation of marijuana. Again, the

reasons why are entirely understandable: given the incipient nature of the changes to which the Cole Memo was reacting, the United States essentially

opted to take a wait-and-see approach as to how problematic the treaty questions might become .

So far as we are aware, this strategy is without precedent in U.S. treaty practice . The United States should

approach it carefully and deliberatively, given the country’s outsized interest in reciprocal performance of treaty obligations. That depends in part on being able to credibly call out other nations for treaty

failings—something which in turn depends on strictly performing our own obligations , or at least making a

good show of trying hard to do so before coming up short.

Again, we think the U nited States can sustain the s tatus quo in the short term . But today’s model likely won’t hold up year in and year out, for the reasons we describe above. The government therefore ought to start think ing

about some of the fundamental treaty reforms that its public statements seemingly have downplayed. Better to have weighed such

options early on, should existing policy’s downsides start to overtake its upsides—as we predict they could.

Marijuana treaty compliance is a stress test for international law. Reforming domestic law to come into compliance is necessary for I-Law sustainability—also says it turns warming and terror-Marijuana/drug treaty compliance key to sustainability of I-Law—it’s a key stress test

-I-Law important now for various reasons

Wells C. BENNETT, Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare, AND John WALSH,

Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms, 14 [October 2014, “Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuana-legalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf]

In making the case for the United States to proactively open the door to future change in the drug treaties, we have emphasized, so far, the

negative value of avoiding conflict and instability. We would be remiss not to end on an equally important positive note. The political changes and incentives in play in the marijuana-policy debate open a real opportunity to demonstrate and improve the adaptability of the international legal system —a system on which the U nited States relies more and more.

No treaty can survive the collapse of a political consensus supporting it. And no treaty system can endure if it cannot cope

with changing political conditions. Sustainability in i nternational law depends not only on commitment

but also on resilience and adaptability .

At this writing, one or two more U.S. states may be about to adopt a version of marijuana legalization. If states continue to legalize , and if the fed eral government continues to allow their reforms to proceed, the short run for treaty reform may come quite soon. This is why we refer to the challenge of marijuana legalization

as a “stress test” for the adaptability of i nternational law . Should legalization prove politically popular or socially

successful, it will spread to more states and nations; should it spread, then one way or another both domestic and international politics will find ways to accommodate it—either by adapting formal legal commitments or by cutting new, informal channels around those commitments. The latter would

weaken international law ; the former would strengthen it .

Marijuana-related reform to the drug treaties offers, in several respects, good odds of achieving constructive adaptation. Reform need not entail any wholesale reconsideration of international drug policy, nor

need any brand new treaty be negotiated. Modest incrementalism can do the job . In the United States,

moreover, a growing political constituency, embracing members of both political parties, favors reform, so the issue is less partisan than many. Persuading the Senate to make more room for U.S. experimentation by revising an existing treaty is a lighter lift than persuading it to undertake

entirely new treaty obligations. And, if the United States plays its cards right (with, as we have suggested, suitably narrow

and hedged legal changes ), we believe a consensus abroad for modest change could become within reach. In any

case, broaching the subject relatively early on—by ruling treaty change in, now, as a possibility, instead of ruling it out as a non-starter—may

itself open the door to a new international conversation about modernizing and adapting drug treaties. In other words, marijuana offers

as good a chance as we are likely to see of setting a precedent for creative, consensual, and gradual

adaptation of a well-established international treaty structure .

The international legal system, however suspicious of it many Americans may be, has always mattered and has

never mattered more than now . For example, the campaign against ISIS and the Ukraine crisis

underscore all too dramatically the continuing importance of multilateral security commitments . If anything,

international law’s remit is growing as environmental , social, economic , and security problems

transcend national borders . From global warming to sanctions on Iran and Russia to the campaign against terrorism and military intervention in a host of theaters, the U nited States and its allies increasingly

rely on international agreements and commitments to legitimize and amplify joint action against common threats.

Of course, marijuana and the international narcotics treaties are only one small piece of that puzzle. But

they are a highly visible piece , and they offer a real opportunity to demonstrate adaptation through international legal channels, rather than around them. Laying groundwork for manageably incremental changes—by beginning conversations with treaty partners and other constituencies about where flexibility might lie— would reaffirm American commitment to constructive adaptation, and to

build ing consensus . Conversely, pushing the outer boundaries of the drug treaties’ flexibility could

weaken the international order and damage American interests .

To put the point another way: Marijuana policy reform is a stress test that the United States and the international order

should, and realistically can, pass.

AT: LA RelationsElis ev is about economic and military ties the US has in Latin America—no reason those would cut off because of the drug warWarrant is also US strategic focus—plan can’t solve Russian and Chinese encroachment in the region—their evElis 12/8 Strategic Insights: The Strategic Relevance of Latin America for the United States, December 8, 2014, Dr. R. Evan Ellis, research professor of Latin American Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, with a research focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Strategic-Relevance-of-Latin-America/2014/12/08

A responsible commander would recognize that the occupation of that high ground by an adversary poses an unacceptable threat to his force,

and thus would dedicate resources to block the adversary from doing so. By this analogy, it would be a grave error for the U nited S tates to conclude that, in the absence of serious threats to the United States from Latin America, it is okay to merely watch as potential future adversaries such as Russia and China expand their positions in the region . While such neglect, in the short term, may “free up resources” to continue other engagements abroad,

over the long term, the willing cessation of its own neighborhood by the U.S. is the single factor most likely

to force the U nited S tates into a chaotic retreat from its external engagements .∂ Latin America is

strategically fundamental to the security and prosperity of the United States. This was a concept integral to the

launching of the process of defense ministerial summits with the 1995 Williamsburg summit. It is better that we rediscover that lesson today, rather than learn it at great cost in the future.

U.S.-Cuban normalization solves U.S-Latin American relations, OAS cohesion, and regional stability now Javier Ciurlizza 12-19, director of the International Crisis Group’s Latin America and Caribbean program, 12/19/14, “Cuba and the U.S.: Turning the Page,” http://blog.crisisgroup.org/latin-america/2014/12/19/cuba-and-the-u-s-a-new-chapter/

The dramatic improvement this week in U.S.-Cuban relations, and the possibility of an end to the decades-long U.S.

embargo of the island, is set to transform political relations in the entire hemisphere . In the three posts below, the director of Crisis Group’s Latin America and Caribbean program, Javier Ciurlizza, and our vice president and special adviser on Latin America, Mark Schneider, look ahead to how the U.S. and Cuban moves could transform the wider region.

Ending the “Hemispheric Anomaly”

The announcements made by presidents Obama and Castro were enthusiastically welcomed across Latin America , from Mexico to Argentina, and in at least some quarters of Venezuela. Although there is a great deal to be done before any true normalisation of relations between the two countries, the announcements do at least represent the end of 60 years of Cuba as a “hemispheric anomaly”.

The U.S. embargo of Cuba, in place since 1961, was only the most explicit of several sanctions and decisions that effectively isolated Cuba from the rest of the continent. Expelled from the Organisation of American States (OAS) and excluded from summits, the Caribbean nation was

caught up more than most in the maneuverings of the Cold War’s protagonists. Latin American countries aligned themselves with the United States during the 1960s and ’70s. In the 1980s they started to move toward a growing solidarity with their secluded neighbour.

In the past 20 years, a period marked by both a return to democracy and, in many Latin American countries, a marked shift to the left, the Cuba question was no longer taboo. It was continually pushed on to the regional political agenda ///

even by nations ideologically distant from Havana. In fact, rejection of the embargo was one of the few things on which politicians, from the Rio Grande to Patagonia, could agree.

The embargo gradually came to isolate the U.S . as well as Cuba. The aggressive enforcement of Cuba sanctions on

other Latin American countries trading with the island fanned resentment . It also distorted regional foreign relations . Some measured the friendship between nations according to the strength of their respective positions on the embargo. Others got caught up in an anti-imperialist discourse that undermined regional solidarity the more it insisted on it. The Cuba question sowed suspicion and raised temperatures when they needed lowering.

Normalisation of relations , then, is not just something for the U.S. and Cuba to carry out, it’s for the entire continent . Cuba will doubtless finally attend an Americas Summit – set for April in Panama – as suggested by President Obama, and its return to full membership in the Organisation of American States will be forcefully requested at the next OAS general assembly in Asunción, Paraguay, this coming June.

Cuba has worked for this normalisation, for example with its efforts, cited by Obama, to help combat Ebola. But I would say that two unacknowledged reasons were probably more important: what Cuba is doing for Colombia and what it can do for Venezuela.

The Colombia peace process , which is taking place thanks to the Castro brothers’ hospitality, would not have made the

progress it has without close Cuba n involvement , including in a recent and delicate hostage negotiation and in the strong (though implicit) message from Havana that the time really has come to end the last major armed conflict in the hemisphere. President Santos has not been shy about praising Cuba, whose continued participation in the process is the main external guarantor of a successful outcome.

In the case of Venezuela , Cuban pressure to reach a peaceful settlement to the political crisis may prove to be key. Cuba has now received the signal it needed from the U.S. that it will no longer be entirely dependent for its energy needs on Venezuela’s state-owned petroleum company and the chavista government’s Petro Caribe support program.

US decline will not spark wars.MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments . It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer

militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness . Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability , which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation . In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations .

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions . In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline . The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding

China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas . Indeed,

even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the U nited States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China . Not least among the benefits of

retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101