janissaries and the revolt of 1740 in istanbul

8/9/2019 Janissaries and the Revolt of 1740 in Istanbul

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industries were based. Corruption and bribery of governmentalofficials added to the lack of control. The increase n free enterprisealso contributed to the frustrations of Ottoman attempts to in-dustrialize; he domestic opposition was aided by foreign opposition 7).While many high officials apparently participated through briberyin the economic boom, the Porte did not. The arrears of ulzfe (wagesof the soldiers) caused rebellion in 1717, I718 and 1719 8). Duringthis same period the Ottomans fought a major war with Russia in1711, and with Venice and Austria in 17I 5. Inability to pay the soldieryfurther decreased those who answered the call for mobilization intime of war. In 1715 the roster (yoklama) of Timar holders in theeyalet (province) of Erzurum was only forty percent of the numberavailable in x616 9).

The opening of the Persian wars in 1723 was followed by an increasein taxes, rising food prices, and scarcity of food supplies, all of whichwere accompanied by a continued debasement of coinage. On top ofall this, extraordinary campaign axes were levied to meet the needsof the Persian war. The campaign taxes of imad-i seferriye, avartz-idivaniye and takilif-i drfiye increased the agitation among the popu-lation 10)

The higher taxes, the shrinking frontiers, and the agricultural declineresulted in the early eighteenth century in an unprecedented emigrationfrom the provinces to the cities xx).The emigrants and refugees were

8) Ibid.9) A. Dimitrov and V. P. Mutafgieva, Sur l'itat du systimedes timars des XVII*& XVIIIe SS (Sofia, 1968), pp. 33-56: 194-251. In 1715 yoklama ists accounted

for 2,119 Timars compared to 5,279 in i606, a sixty percent drop. For a critiqueof Demitrov and Mutafqieva's book see Omer Lutfi Barkan, Biblioyografya ,ZFM, 27, (November, 1967- March, 1968), pp. xx -124.

io) Islam Ansikliopedesi, ol. 2, Aviriz , pp. I3-14. The effects of the extra-ordinary taxes were also felt heavily in the Balkans. See Avdo Su&eska, Bedeutung

und Entwicklung des Begriffes A'yin in Osmanischen Reich , Siidost-ForschungenXXV (1966), pp. 3-2I and the same author's Die Entwicklung der Besteuerungdurch die 'Aviriz-i diviniye und die teklif-i drfiye im Osmanischen Reich waihrenddes x6. und i8. Jahrhunderts , Siidost-Forschungen, XVII (1968), pp. 89-I3o.

II) The flight from the land to the cities was not peculiar to the early eighteenthcentury but an acceleration of a pattern begun during the Celali rebellions in the


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188 R. W. OLSON

not only composed of Turks or Muslims, but also were from variousmillets and nationalities, the most troublesome of whom were the

Albanians. The influx of refugees to Istanbul added greatly to theproblems of the already seething capital beset by unemployment.The hungry and workless crowds were prone to riot and rebellion.One of the major ways in which they expressed heir anger and con-tempt for the Porte and the luxury loving Ottoman court was arson 12).In the decade 1720-30 arson was a danger o the capital tself.

Unable o meet the domestic need for government pending, hePorte was forced to enact new revenue producing measures nd taxesin I726-27 in order to meet the needs of the war against Esref Shah,the Afghan nvader. No sooner had a treaty been signed with EsrefShah in 1727 than the Porte was confronted with renewed threatsfrom Nadir Shah, he Persian onqueror, who was rapidly ggrandizingpower and property n Persia. The economic measures f the GrandVizier not only alienated he Janissaries, rovincial oldiery and putincreased burdens on the reaya, but it also put new demands on theesnaf artisans nd skilled craftmen), he petite [in some cases not sopetite] bourgeoisie of Istanbul. The esnaf's complaints entered onwhat they considered hree major problems: i) the continued debase-ment of the currency nd the problems which accompanied t; (2) thechanges resulting n the guild systemof the esnaf ecauseof the influxof emigrants rom Anatolia nd Rumeli; 3) the army ax (ordu akgesi)extracted rom the esnaf n time of mobilization for war 13a)

middle sixteenth century. See Mustafa Akdag, Celdli Isyanlar: (1550-I603), (Ankara,1963), and also the same author's Celili Isyanlanri Biiyiik Kaggunluk (1603-1606),Tarih Arasthrmalart Dergisi, II, no. 2-3 (1966), pp. I149.

I2) The frequency of fires and attempts to organize fire brigades is given inIslam Ansikliopedesi, vol. 5

Istanbul , pp. 1214-21. The immense destructioncaused by fires and arson can be found in Mustafa Cezar, Osmanhl Devr'indiIstanbul Yapllarinda Tahribat Yapan Yangminlar e Tabi Afetler , Tuirk Sanat Tarihi

Arastzrma ve Incelemeleri, I (1963), PP. 327-414; Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall,Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches translated to French by J. J. Hellert (Paris, 1839),XIV, pp. i79-80 who follows Ismail Aslm Kiigiikgelebizade, Tarih (Istanbul, 1282A.H. - i865 A.D.) who records fires for 1722-1728 on pages I1, 69, 77, 90, 118,178, 224, 242, 467, 270, 409, 416, 419 and 493.

13) Aktepe, Patrona Isyamn, -I I; and see also Olson, The Esnaf , p. 335.


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190 R. W. OLSON

of their complicity with those infidels [French and Russian] whowere now threatening Muslim rule from two sides and from within.

Thus a religiously oriented anti-western movement became the secondstrand running across the whole history of the Turkish transformation,in contrast to the Westernist strand 17)which had begun during thereign of Ahmet III.

Although not a specialist in eighteenth century Ottoman historyand relying upon secondary sources, I think it is noteworthy, that thewell known Turkish political scientist, Professor Serif Mardin, suggeststhat the Patrona Halil Rebellion s an important example of the cleavagein the center-periphery relations of Ottoman and modern Turkishpolitics 1s). The center in the Ottoman Empire consisted of the Sultan,the ulema or learned religious class and the elite members of theasakir or military class. Mardin stresses that several factors contributedto the strained relations between the center and the periphery, amongwhich were the incompatibility of urban dwellers with the nomadsociety of Anatolia, the estrangement of the center from the pre-Ottoman nobility during the early history of the empire, and thereligious orthodoxy (Sunni) of the center and the heterodoxy (Shi'isects) of the provinces. This incompatibility often ended in rebellionor war. The fact that many members of the center, i.e. the militaryelite, Janissaries and the Sultan's ministers were converted Christians,coupled with the organization of the non-Muslim communities intoself-governing millets, provided them with a great deal of autonomywhich further alienated the masses from governmental power centeredin Istanbul. To be sure, there were administrative and politicallyintegrative nstitutions and elements which made the Ottoman govern-mental apparatus lexible enough to ameliorate rom time to time theaccumulated tension among conflicting groups, but the Patronarebellion introduced new disruptive urban elements on a scale hitherto

17) Berkes, The Development of Secularism, p. 52.18) Serif Mardin S., Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics ,

Daedalus, I02oz,no. I (Winter, 1973), pp. 169-190.


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JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF 19gI

unprecedented in the capital which culminated in the first anti-modernTurkish outbreak. Professor Mardin concludes,

There had been many rebellions in Istanbul before, but this was the firstto show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: an effort to Westernizemilitary and administrative organization propounded by a section of the of-ficial elite, accompanied by some aping of Western manners, and used byanother interest group [ulema] to mobilize the masses against Westernization.Turkish modernists have concentrated exclusively upon the background ofpolitical intrigues by statesmen which, indeed, was an aspect of this and similarrevolts. However, for a complete picture we should also dwell on the culturalalienation of the masses from the rulers, of the periphery from the center.

During later phases of modernization, his alienation was to be compounded 19).During the course of the Patrona rebellion the rebels and some

of their supporters succeeded for a short time in acquiring some ofthe highest offices n the Empire with the support of elements, especiallythe ulema, that had formerly supported the Sultan. The rebellionof 1730 caused a realignment of those groups which supported oropposed the policy of increased contact with Europe advocated bythe Sultan and his Grand Vizier. The major support of the Sultanateprior to I730 had come from the military elite and ulema. After 1730oelements of the military elite, especially those opposed to the intro-duction of western military methods, and the ulema who were opposedto the subversion of Ottoman society by Europe began to collaboratewith the anti-Sultan forces whenever they felt it in their intereststo do so. The post 1730o-3 alignment was much more volatile than

the pre-I730 one, because elements of the Janissaries and/or theulema could alternate heir support for the Sultan or for his opponentsdepending upon the circumstances and strength of the Sultan 0).This new instability was one of the reasons for the centralization ofpower in the hands of the Sultan-a policy which began to bear fruitduring the reigns of Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmut II (I808-I839).

The fluidity of the new alignment s also demonstrated by the actionsof the esnafor petite bourgeoisie of artisans and merchants who in 1730were one of the most vocal opponents of the Sultan and Grand Vizier.

I9) Ibid., p. I75.zo) Olson, The Esnaf , pp. 332-333.


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In the spring of 173 the esnaf n face of a threat o their businesses by thecontinuing disorders n the city, threw their support to the new Sultan

Mahmut I (1730-1754) and the last supporters of Patrona Halil wereexecuted or imprisoned. Even though Mahmut I promised to rescindthe extraordinary ampaign axes imposed by his predecessor he newlywon allegiance of the esnaf,many of whom were non-Muslim, was to bea mainstay of his reign. The switch of allegiance of the esnaf to theSultan was one of the most sudden and significant changes resultingfrom the rebellions of I730-3I, and, indeed, of eighteenth century

Ottoman history. One of the few people to observe this historicswitch was Lord Kinnoull, the British ambassador o the Porte, whostated that the rebels have made the Grand Signor stronger by showingthe Janissaries hat the merchants and tradesmen of the city will alwaysbe ready to join his favor unless he should make himself hated by somenew impression 21).

During the next decade the new allegiance of the esnaf was not an

easy one for Mahmut I to nurture. The ten years following the Patronarebellion were among the most trying of the new Sultan's reign. Notonly the territorial ntegrity of the empire but also the very under-pinnings of the Caliphate and the sovereignty of the Sultan werethreatened by the military successes and the religious propaganda ofNadir Shah of Persia. Peace on the eastern ront was still being negotiatedwhen war with Russia and Austria began in 1736. It seemed to thepeople of the Ottoman Empire, especially of Istanbul, that peacewas as chimerical as contented Janissaries. The treaty of Belgrade(I739) despite its advantageous articles for the Porte did not quellthe disquiet of the people of Istanbul or the war party at the Porte.The Russo-Austro-Ottoman war of 1736-39 was not without victories

21) For this highly significant development see the dispatch of Lord Kinnoull,the British Resident in Istanbul, dated 4/15 April, 1731 in State papers, Series 97,volume 26. Series 97 of the State Papers records correspondence between the BritishResidents of Istanbul with the Foreign Office in London. The State Papers are depos-ited in the Public Record Office in London. Henceforth the State Papers will bereferred to by the abbreviation SP.


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JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF I95

and Grand Vizier paralleled the circumstances of 1730, but theresults were not to be the same. In the absence of the Sultan and Grand

Vikier, Nisancl Sehla Ahmet, Hasan Pasa, Aga of the Janissaries, andanother Janissary officer, Kulluk ?orbactsl Hasan, took quick actionto prevent the disturbance from mushrooming into full-fledgedrebellion. It was ?orbaci Hasan's bravery which nipped the outbreakin the bud. ?orbaci Hasan was the leader of a group of Janissariesnear the At Meydamn,he area where the rebels were headed. He con-fronted the mutineers directly and spoke with their leader. The exchangedid not quiet the rebels, and Hasan's comrades were reluctant o attackthem. Hasan, however, charged into the mass of mutineers shoutingthat he preferred death to the bowstring. Without further ado hemade straight for the rebel bearing the green flag whom he struckdown in one blow. The quick death of the banner-bearer eartenedthe hesitating Janissaries, and they fell in behind (orbaci Hasan andattacked the rebels. Despite the quick and unexpected death of their

standard bearer the mutineers still offered resistance, but they weresoon dispersed, carrying with them two dead comrades 32). TheJanissary Aga, Hasan Pasa, arrived shortly thereafter with a forceof a few hundred (bir kag ytiz nefer). The Janissary Aga split hisforces with those of ?orbaci Hasan and formed a pincer which cutthe rebels' road to the At Meydamn,The rebels were trapped in thepincers and most of them were killed33. At this point the GrandVizier, Mehmet Pasa, arrived from Sa'dabad and issued orders tocrush all those suspected of participating n the outbreak.

The immediate pecter of a rebellion on the scale of 1730 was dispelledbut the Sultan was taking no chances. He issued aferman which statedthat any shopowner who closed his shop during a rebellion would beconsidered a rebel and punished as such. Shopkeepers who did notheed the ferman were arrested and some of them were killed 34). TheJanissary Aga and Grand Vizier patrolled the streets of Istanbul the

32) Subhi, Tarih, fol. 177-178; Fawkener, June 17, 1740 SP, 97, vol. 31.33) Subhi, Tarib, fol. 178.34) Ibid.


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entire night and raided numerous hamams where the suspected in-stigators of the rebellion, the perfidious and hypocritical Albanians

usually gathered. As in 1730o, he main suspects were again Albanians.The Grand Vizier and Janissary Aga showed no mercy to those theycaught; all were killed 35). The estimated death toll for the June 6rebellion and subsequent suppressions was as high as three thousand 36).Boatsful of rebels' bodies, many of whom had been strangled, pliedup and down the Bosphorus dumping their cargo in the Black Sea.The openness of this action, often undertaken in broad daylight,was surprising to residents of the city as such actions had formerlybeen carried out at night in a more discreet manner and in secludedplaces. Everard Fawkener was convinced this was proof that theJanissaries and other parts of the army were not involved in therebellion 37). The Janissaries disclaimed their involvement and rei-terated promises f allegiance o the Sultan which allowed he Porte ocrush he uprising without ear rom that sector. The Porte took moreprecautions to assure law and order in the city. Fermans were issuedto return anyone who had not resided n Istanbul or at least ten yearsto his former place of residence 8). For days Hasan Pasa filled boatswith people and sent them to Uskiidar nd Izmit with the cooperationof the quarter mahalle) mam. All of the hans, hamams and shopswere checked for suspects; hose apprehended were exiled to Ana-tolia 39). A ferman was sent to the Molla (chief religious dignity) ofEdirne to take the strictest measures to prevent peasants from aban-doning their plots of ground and immigrating to Istanbul. Especiallystrong measures were taken to keep Albanians from coming to Istan-bu1 40). Villages in Anatolia and Rumeli were to delegate one or two

35) Ibid., fol. 177.36) Fawkener, June 17, 1740, SP 97, vol. 31.37) Ibid.

38) Subbi, Tarih, ol. I78.39) Ibid.40) Miihimme Defterleri, no. 147, p. 152, Arnavud taifesini bila terreddud

geriye izlere iizere kalayetlerine iade ve irac . Miihimme Defterleri, henceforthabbreviated as MD, are registers located in Basbakanhk Argivi (Prime MinisterArchives) in Istanbul in which are recorded the correspondence, e.g. hatt-t hiimayuns,


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people to go to Istanbul to transact the necessary business and tobuy provisions for the entire village. All merchants traveling in and

out of Istanbul had to show a special permit to guards at the gateof the city. The merchants were allowed to pass only after diligentinspection 1).

Everard Fawkener hought hat the hatt-t hiimayun hich ordered llshopkeepers o keep their shops open during a rebellionwas a remark-able proclamation n that the shopkeepers were also commanded nthreat of being hanged rom their own shopdoors o take up arms andto attack the insurgents 2). Three days later (June 9) there was an-other flare-up, ut before t could gather momentum t was suppressedby the people in the neighborhood mahalle)where t occurred. Thepeople fell upon the rebels and knocked n the Head the Mutineersas they were directed y the hatt-t himayun hich had called or theretaliation n the part of the esnafwho had beenarmed or this purpose.There were those in Istanbul who were of the opinion hat the June 9outbreak was not a general uprising of the people, but rather only aquarrel among Janissaries. But the suppression of it by the esnafand people of the neighborhood ould have given great offense tothe Janissaries. According to Fawkener he retaliation n the partof the esnafwas detested by the Janissaries nd it made the hatt-ihiimayun eem ill judged, for now the esnaf-many of whom wereChristians and Jews-were called upon to take arms against the

batt-t ferifs, ermans and other dispatches from the Sultan, Grand Vizier and Sey-hiilislam to provincial, military and religious officials located outside of Istanbul.

41) MD, 147, p. 152; Subhi, Tarib, fol. 178; also see Miinir Aktepe, XVIIIl.Asrin Ilk Yarislnda Istanbul'un Niifus Mes'elesine Dair Bazl Vesikalar , TaribDergisi (TD), IX, no. 13 (September, 1958), pp. 19-20 Ancak bir veya iki neferadem tevkil ve arz ve mahzar le o makulelerin kezilik tiiccar makulesinden asitaneyeecnis-i zehgir ve esya getiirenlerin miiriirlarina ruhsat verilup ve zeh~ir ve egya

nakleden tiiccara hilde muavenet olunarak bu vechile sahih erbib-i mesalih ilezehtir ve esya makleden tiiccardan maada efrid-i $feride dahi vir ferdin bild-emr-1serif miirurlarina cevaz g6stermeytip ve eger bir takrib ile gelecek olurlar ise bucinibde daima tecessiis olmagla la-mehale ahiz olunurlar .

42) Fawkener, June I7, 1740, SP 97, vol. 31; Subhi, Tarih, fol. I78, says nothingregarding the esnaf's call to arms.


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It would be well perhaps to leave the British ambassador's statementas put, but it is at once too highly provocative and of potential sig-

nificance not to attempt to unravel the jumble of power and depen-dence to which he alludes. We have evidence from Kinnoull's state-ment of April 4/15, 1731, that the merchants and tradesmen of thecity will always be ready o join in his [the Sultan's] avor . It was indeeda drastic switch of allegiance when we recall that the esnaf were amongthe major opponents of Ahmet III who were instrumental n precip-itating the Patrona Halil rebellion. It does, however, partially explainthe greater degree of stability that Mahmut I was able to obtain onhis accession, despite recurring outbreaks, in contrast to his pre-decessor. The decision of the esnaf o support rather han to oppose theSultan was due, in part, to the promise of Sultan Mahmut I to rescindthe extraordinary ampaign axes which had been the main grievanceof the esnaf prior to the rebellion in September of 1730. But the supportwhich the esnaf gave the Sultan after 1730 was also doubtlessly en-

couraged by the continual upheavels and disturbances which greatlycurtailed their business activities.

It is also significant that Everard Fawkener, the successor of LordKinnoull to the Istanbul Residency46), writing almost nine yearslater in his dispatch of June 17, 1740, was cognizant of the esnaf'ssupport of the Sultan, at least, in regard to the Janissary and popularinsurrections. Are we to assume then that it was the accepted policyof the British residents to recognize that the esnaf upported the Sultanto the extent that they were armed, even if unwillingly, in order tohelp suppress popular and Janissary nsurrections?

The activities of the esnaf between the years 1730o and 1740 impliesthat they must have been aware of the dangers and the risks their newpositions of importance gave them and the opposition this generatedon the part of the Janissaries and the Muslim population. Increasedtension between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities was indi-cated by the reimposition of the sumptuary laws in January, 1742.

46) Lord Kinnoull was replaced as British Resident in Istanbul by EverardFawkener in December, 1735 and he served to September, 1742.


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The Porte no doubt imposed them to quell increasingly strong op-position to the ostentatious display of wealth by Christians and Jews.

The display of such wealth in a city in the throes of a severe foodshortage, high unemployment, and suffering from an inundation ofrefugees from the provinces must have added to the animosity existingbetween the two communities. The esnaf's support of the Sultan wasin turn reciprocated by favors from the Sultan evidenced in the 1740French capitulations which broadened the immunities and protectionof the Jews and Christians rom prosecution and taxes under aegis of the

European embassies 47). As Professor Berkes stated The religiousreaction held the reformationists responsible for the destruction ofboth din (religion) and devlet (state) not only because of their alieninnovations which undermined the ancient tradition, but also becauseof their complicity with those infidels [French and Russian] whowere now threatening Muslim rule from two sides and from within.Thus a religiously oriented anti-Western movement became the

second strand running across the whole history of the Turkish trans-formation 8). What Professor Berkes does not mention in his wellarticulated statement is that the religiously oriented anti-Westernmovement -also gained support from the ulema-led Muslimmasses who saw wealthy Christians nd Jews with the apparent upportof the Sultan gain in power to the extent that they were able to armthemselves to help put down rebellions in opposition to the govern-ment. To be sure, as Professor Mardin has stated, the rebellion of1730 and subsequent rebellions were filled with political intrigue andestablished a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: an effortto Westernize military and administrative organizations propoundedby a section of the official elite, accompanied by some aping of Westernmanners, and used by another interest group [ulema] to mobilize the

47) Regat Ekrem, Osmanlh Muahedeleri e Kapitiildsiyonlar 300oo-z920oe LoganMuahedesi 4 Temmuz 923 (Istanbul, 1934), PP. 430-437, especially articles 45,46,47, 48 and 60.

48) Berkes, The Development f Secularism, . 5 . See above pp. 189-1 90o.


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masses against Westernization 49). But in view of the statementsby Kinnoull and Fawkener s it not possible to deduce that the ulema

and the masses' [Muslim] alienation from Westernization , was due,in part, to the fact that they benefited little, if at all, from Westerni-zation but that the esnaf, many of whom were Christians and Jews,benefited a great deal? Second that this policy was apparently sup-ported by their Sultan-the leader and protector of all Muslims?

The jumble of power and dependence existing between the non-Muslim millets, the Janissaries and the Porte is well illustrated by

Fawkener's relation of the episode regarding the servant, either aChristian or Jew, of the Bezirgan Basi, the Jewish agent of the Janis-saries, in their relations with the esnaf. This episode is important forseveral reasons. It is the first evidence I have seen indicating a closerelationship, or, for that matter, any kind of relationship betweenthe Janissaries and the Jews at such an early date. Second, it indicatesthat the position of his master was such that he felt that he did not

have to comply with the newly reimposed sumptuary aws-a reali-zation which was justified by the subsequent action of the JanissaryAga. Third, if we accept Fawkener's statement that a Jewish agentcontrolled all applications to the Janissary corps. This is certainly anovel, highly significant, if not astounding statement, in itself. Finally itappears that the Grand Vizier was not aware of the extent of the re-lationship between the Janissaries and the Bezirgan Basi, but when

informed of it in this particular nstance he acquiesced o the JanissaryAga's request that he drop charges against the servant of the BezirganBast. This indicates some knowledge on the part of the Grand Vizierof the relations between the Janissaries, Jews and esnaf.

It is impossible to untangle the jumble of power implied inFawkener's statement on the basis of the available data but I hopethis article is suggestive enough to encourage more research on aprovocative topic.

49) Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations , p. I75. See above, p. 190.


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Dispatch dated une i7, 74t from Everard Fawkener, The British Residentin Istanbul o the Duke of Newcastle, The British Foreign Secretary, Con-

cerning heRebellion f une6-9 in Istanbul.Constantinople the i7th June 1740

My Lord

(fol. 6i) The last letter I had the honour of writing to Your Grace was dated the29.th past.

We have since had great alarms here, which however have had no other Effectthan the change of the Vizir & a few subordinate Officers.

The first tumult hapned the third Jvs. [June] in the afternoon, in the quarterof the Town where old Cloths are sold, there did not appear above seventeen oreighteen People, who at first seemed to have some quarrel amongst themselves,but one of them, when the rest drew their Swords, pulled out of his Bosom a greenFlag which he fixed to a Staff, & they then cried out that the Shops should be shut,& invited all good Mussulmans to follow them.

A great uproar immediately ensued & it was soon spread all over the City thatthere was a rebellion, which occasioned a general Confusion, the Shops were shut& all people were intent upon providing for their own safety.

The Sultan was at one of his Houses upon the canal, & the Vizir was out ofTown

uponan

airing,& this small

beginningeither

neglectedor attended

by anyunlucky event, might very easily have proceeded to a like fatal Catastrophe with therising ten years since, which at first was not so considerable as this; for matterswere very well disposed, & if the flame had got ever so little head, it would noteasily have been extinguished.

But the Janiser Aga, the Vizir Kayhauh [Kahya] o50), the Nisangee [Nisanci] 51)Pashau, late Camicam Kaymakam] 2)& now Vizir got immediately on horseback;it was also a fortunate Circumstance that a Guard of Janisaries which was nearat hand was commanded by a Man of bravery. It is said, one Guard which wasthereabouts withdrew upon the first Noise, but this officer made towards it, &

had something of a Parley with the Mutineers; who seemed disposed to defendthemselves. His people did not express any great forwardness to venture theirLives, but he reproaching (fol. 62) them with exposing their Commander to theString, told them he would at least avoid that ignominy, and made at the Ensign

50)The Vizier Kahya was the Grand Vizier's deputy responsible for domestic

and military as well as ceremonial affairs. See Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen,IslamicSociety nd he West, vol. i, part i, (Oxford University Press, 1963),pp. I21-I 22.

5I) The Nisanci Pasa was the official who traced the royal cipher (Tugra) onimperial documents. He had the authority to examine, correct and the re-

sponsibility to harmonize new laws with previous laws. By the eighteenth centuryhowever the office of Nisancl was largely a sinecure. Gibb and Bowen, IslamicSociety, pp. I24-126.

52) The Kaymakam was an official with the rank of Vizier appointed to replacethe Grand Vizier when the latter was on a campaign. Gibb and Bowen, IslamicSociety,pp. I14-115.


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Bearer with his sword, whom he had the good luck to lay dead at his feet; his fol-lowers encouraged by this fell upon the rest, & tho' they made some resistance,they were soon dispersed, one or two were killed upon the Spot & the rest taken.

The Grand Signor tho' he had this good news almost as soon as he heard of therising, came directly to his Palace in town. Strong Guards were placed every where& the Vizir himself was upon the Patrol all night. Great Numbers of People wereseized, & many put to death, & these executions continued with violence for agood while, & are not yet quite ceased. The number is made to amount high, Ihave heard as far as three thousand People but I dont see which way it is possibleto come at any certainty n this point, since it is very doubtful whether any accountis kept at all who or how many are taken off in such a Massacre.

The Mischief is fallen chiefly upon the Albanese & other Strangers about theCity, & it has been remarked that large boats have gone out publickly, filled withthe Carkasses of those Strangled Wretches, to be thrown into the Sea, which is awork which always used to done privately. This is said to be proof that the Janissaries& other Bodies of Militia were not concerned in this Business, & which they havedisowned any part in & made fresh promises of allegiance & fidelity.

Such of those People who have upon this occasion fall'en into the hands of theGovernment, as have escaped the String have been sent away & no Person oflow Rank is allowed to continue here, who is not established, or cannot find some-body to answer for him: and it has been said an account has been taken of thelabouring people who are Turks, which has been reduced to such a Number asis

thought equal to the work, & the rest are sent away.But what is most remarkable s a Proclamation which was made all over the Cityby the Publick Cryers, by which the Shopkeepers of what Religion soever areforbid to shut up their Shops upon all (fol. 63) people who shall raise any uproarin the Streets, & to endeavour to seize or kill them, & all this under penalty ofbeing hanged at their Shopdoors.

To shew an appearance of security the Grand Signor returned the day followingto his palace upon the Canal, & it was hoped under the great attention of the Govern-ment the publick quiet was quite restored. Yet on the 9.th there was another ap-pearance of a tumult & which was suppressed by the People of the Neighbourhood,

who fell upon & knocked on the Head the Mutineers as they were directed by theProclamation. There are those who say that this last affair was not an attempt tocreate a rising of the People, but realy a quarrel between a few Janissaries, & thatthis way of putting an End to it has given great offence to that Body. Howeverthis particular Case may be, that Proclamation seems ill judged for quarrels willunavoidably happen amongest the Soldiery & if at any time Christians or Jewsshould interpose in them in the manner precribed a general Massacre of those peoplemay one day very easily be the effect of it, as well as what further Mischief maybe apprehended rom the Militia's being got together in arms, & fearing the Punish-ment of it.

Upon this second Ruffle it was thought proper to change the Vizir which wasdone the I2.th & he is succeeded by Achmet Pashaw, Camaican Kaymakam] duringthe two last Campaigns & lately Nisangee [Nisancl].

I have for a good while thought him a very likely Person to ascend one day tothat great Dignity, & he seems to have been kept here on purpose for an Occasion,


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yet if things had been quiet it is probable Bekeer [Bekir] Pashaw who is just arrivedfrom Guidda [Jidda], might have preceeded him, but he was preferred for thepresent Conjuncture & the other succeeds him as Nisangee (Niganci).

The Chiaux [(avugl] 68) Pashaw is also deposed, & is sent to Baghdad to waitthere another ambassador rom Persia, & the Officer who killed the Ensign Bearer inthe first tumult, has a Reward of his courage beside a sum of Money, the office ofMuzur [Muhzir] 54) Agau or Commander of the Body of Janissaries which keepsguard at the Vizirs's Palace.

Other Changes are talked of particularly (fol. 64) that of the Reis Effendi 55);the Vizir Kayhauh [Kahya] s confirmed in his office, & I have been told with anexpress declaration from the Sultan to the Vizir, that He must consider him as aPerson placed in that office by him directly & therefore as Kayhauh [Kayha] ofthe Empire.

He bears the Character of Fidelity & Integrity but it is somewhat out of theway to put in a place of so much Business a Person who can neither write or read.The late Vizir is made Bashau of Guidda [Jidda].

It is apprehended that great disorders must have ensued, if the Rebellion hadtaken place for as the Memory of the Executions after the Establishment of thepresent Sultan [Mahmud I] is so fresh, those who had brought about this, & hadgot the power in their hands, would have been desperate, & have tried all meansfor their own safety. In that case it is very probable the pretence of dissatisfactionwould have been the accepting Belgrade demolished & consenting to such a Peace,

whilst the arms of the Empire were in a condition to procuremuch

greater Advan-tages: This would have been imputed to the arts of the Christian ministers & theignorance & corruption of those of the Porte; and the heats this must have raisedin a Mad Multitude might have put all Strangers in danger, especially those whowould have been looked upon as more immediately concerned.

The Government has had a great deal of Reason for sometime past to be upon its guard, & no doubt these strong marks of an unquiet Spirit abroad will re-double all their vigilance & attention, yet if at last the Mischief should overturnthem, these Executions will have exasperated Matters, & it will fall the heavier.I am afraid things would not pass as they have done heretofore upon the like oc-

casions, but that we should have a long scene of Confusion & Tumult to go through.I have however great Confidence n the ability, Vigilance & Resolution of the presentVizir, who will not easily be surprised.

53) The (avus Bast was one of the lieutenants of Grand Vizier in charge of judicialaffairs and of carrying out the orders of the courts of justice. Gibb and Bowen,Islamic Society, p. 118-I20.

54) The Muhzir Aga was head of the Janissary Aga's guard and controller ofthe prison located in the Janissary Aga's headquarters. He also represented theJanissaries n dealings with the government as a member of the staff of the Grand

Vizier whose residence was guarded, in part, by Janissaries under the commandof the Muhzir Aga. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, . 325.55) The Reis Efendi was the principal secretary of the Chancery in charge ofall affairs xcept financial matters, but including foreign affairs. He also was in charge

of preparing the Telhis or the communications rom the Grand Vizier to the Sultan.Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, p. 122-123.


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each of those bodys of Guard is a Colonel or Chiorbagee (?orbaci) 57). The Servantas he passt told the Guard to whom he belonged, & they immediately took himfrom the Vizir's People & sent him to some of their own Chambers; the Vizirdispleas'd at this insult offerd to his Servants & authority, sent immediately torequire this Person of the Janisar Agau; but he was told that the Body claimedhim as one belonging to them, & woud be offended if he was taken out of theirhands, & so the matter dropt. It is not easy to imagine the credit this Jew, Agentof the Janisaries has in that body. He disposes of all Offices, & applications are madeby the pretenders to them to him, in the first instances of this I have seen severalproofs, for as he is an Honorary British Druggoman, & in vertue of his Baratz[Berat] or Commission from the Sultan in that quality, is under my protection, Ihave had applications rom Officers of rank, even as high as Colonel, for recommen-dations to him; there is a

jumblehere of

power&

dependencenot

easilyto be

accounted for or explained 68.

57) A ?orbaci Baslwas a commander of an or/a or one of the I96 companies

of variable sizes which comprised the Janissary Corps. Gibb and Bowen, IslamicSociety,pp. 319-322.

58) See above, p. '99.

janissaries and the revolt of 1740 in istanbul

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