Keerpunten in de Koude Oorlog

van de dood van Stalintot de bouw van de Muur

1953-1961

Laurien CrumpGeschiedenis van de Internationale BetrekkingenUniversiteit Utrecht

1953: ‘DE NIEUWE KOERS’ ONTSPOORD?

JUNE 02, 1953OTTO GROTEWOHL’S NOTES ON MEETINGS BETWEEN EAST GERMAN AND SOVIET LEADERS IN MOSCOW

Malenkov: the starting-point for everything has to be a change in conditions in the GDR.Beria: We all have made mistakes; no accusationsMolotov: So many mistakes, therefore correcting it in a way that all of G[ermany] can see it.Kaganovich: the flight from the republic is bad. Our document is reversal, yours is reform.Malenkov: Not to worry about prestige; if we don't correct [the situation] now, a catastrophe will happen. Frank corrections.Delayed--lost much time.

1955: Een nieuwe buitenlandpolitiek

Mei 1955: Toetreding BRD tot de NAVO 14 mei 1955: Oprichting van het Warschaupact

(gemodelleerd naar Noord-Atlantisch verdrag) http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=14465 http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_pcc/wapa_treaty.cfm vgl. http

://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

Politiek of militair? Communistisch? Bondgenootschap of ‘cardboard castle’? 15 mei 1955: Neutraliteit Oostenrijk 25 mei 1955: verzoening met Tito Sovjet troepen worden gereduceerd ‘Paradigm shift’ in buitenlandbeleid

Chroesjtsjovs geheime toespraak: PR of nieuwe politiek?

Januari 1956: eerste Warschaupactvergadering Nieuwe doctrine: initiatief voor Oost-Europese

landen Februari 1956: Chroesjtsjovs ‘geheime toespraak’http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115995

Vreedzame co-existentie en einde persoonlijkheidscultus

Het vacuüm van de destalinisatie De gevolgen voor de relaties met

China De Oost-Europese volkeren

KHRUSHCHEV'S "SECRET SPEECH," DELIVERED AT THE TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, FEBRUARY 25, 1956

Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man, who above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness, and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc.”

De ironie van liberaliseringen: Polen en Hongarije in 1956

Oktober 1956: Chroesjtsjov vs. Gomulka Okt./Nov. 1956: Poolse echo’s in Hongarije Verklaring 30 oktober 1956

http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113647

Waarin gaan de Hongaren te ver? (Tweede) invasie: 4 november 1956 Kremlin: doortastend of verward? Unilateraal of multilateraal? Geopolitieke omstandigheden? Rol van de Chinezen? Rol van het Warschaupact?

WORKING NOTES FROM THE SESSION OF THE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM ON 30 OCTOBER 1956

Khrushchev:We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people's democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based. The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position.Bulganin: The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect impression of our relations with the countries of people's democracy.

1958-1959: Chroesjtsjov op drift?

1958: Warschaupact vergadering over troepenverminderingen

Terugtrekking troepen uit Roemenië 27 november 1958: ultimatum over Berlijn 1959: bezoek aan VS (daarna pas China) ‘The spirit of Camp David’vs. Sino-Sovjet

schisma De vooravond van de jaren zestig:

(ont)spanning? http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118893

DECEMBER, 1959MAO ZEDONG, OUTLINE FOR A SPEECH ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Khrushchev and his group are very naïve. He does not understand Marxism- Leninism and is easily fooled by imperialism.He does not understand China, to an extreme extent. He doesn’t research [China] and believes a whole bunch of incorrect information. He gives irresponsible talks. If he doesn’t correct [his mistakes], in a few years he’ll be completely bankrupt (after 8 years).He panics over China. The panic has reached its extreme.He has two main fears: imperialism and Chinese Communism.

De Duitse Kwestie wederom op scherp

1961: Aantal vluchtelingen uit DDR neemt toe Juni 1961: mislukte top met Kennedy http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/156/berlin-wall http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110206

Chroestjsov staat onder druk van Ulbricht 3-5 Augustus WP top: Gomulka vs. Ulbricht Conclusie: wel grenzen afsluiten, geen vredesverdrag 13 aug. 1961: bouw van de muur, met WP

goedkeuring Kennedy: ‘A wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.’ Consolidatie van de Koude Oorlog?

Duitse kwestie bezegeld? Sino-Sovjet schisma onomkeerbaar?

NOTES ON THE CONVERSATION OF COMRADE N.S. KHRUSHCHEV WITH COMRADE W. ULBRICHT ON 1 AUGUST 1961

N. S. Khrushchev: I have a technical question. How will the border control be realized on streets in which one side is in the GDR and the other is in West Berlin?W. Ulbricht: We have a specific plan. In houses with exits into West Berlin, they will be walled up. In other places, barbed wire barriers will be erected. The barbed wire has already been delivered. It can all happen very quickly. It will be harder with transportation routes. We will the reconstruct the train platforms of the city trains (S-bahn) and underground trains (U-bahn) that go to West Berlin.