la fortaleza - grtm

Resilient Neighborhoods: The fight for a voice against eminent domain strategies

Abstract

This paper examines the role of citizen activism in regards to drug-related urban violence in Mexico City. The impact on communities of eminent domain due to a new legal framework of forfeiture (extinción de dominio) implemented by the city government to tackle violence ridden neighborhoods is a double-edge sword. The law dissolves the concept of private property, a real estate instrument of crime, providing the authority the discretionary power to seize opportunity (spaces believed to harbor unlawful activities, without having to prove guilt. Owners, regardless of their connection to the actual crime are ‘presumed guilty’ until proven innocent, which may take months or years. By looking at the 128 cases this law has affected in the past year, and focusing on the landmark site La Fortaleza in Tepito, that helped engineer the law, I explore the intricacies provoqued by this judicial tool in terms of rights, and how those rights can be heard and respected. Crime (or presumed crime) becomes an immediate inhibitor of the citizen’s fight for the respect of their rights. Which leads us to see that even if the law is being used unfairly, there is no pushback from the communities. In Mexico the law has been approved at a federal level, however it has only been implemented in the capital city since 2011. In Colombia, where the law was designed and has been implemented for a decade, close to 10 properties are seized daily. This leads us to look closely about the implications this law may have in Mexico’s cities when and if approved in all regions and how the voice of communities affected by it can be heard.

Index:

1.Introduction

! ! Urban violence

! ! Mexico City

! ! Local vs State

! ! Extinción de Dominio

2. Case study: La Fortaleza

! ! Timeline JS

3. Resilient neighborhoods

! ! Next steps

! ! Challenges

Appendix: The story of La Fortaleza and documentation pertaining FOIA

Ruiz de Teresa, Guillermo Introduction to Civic MediaHarvard School of Design Draft version

1 - Introduction

A few weeks after Felipe Calderon began his six-year term as president in 2006, he decided to declare the ‘war on drugs’, leading to the eruption of violence across Mexico’s urban landscape.

By 2010, 13 out of the 50 most violent cities in the world1 were located in Mexico, with the most violent one, Juárez, reporting 229 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.2 Calderon’s launch of the

‘War on Drugs’ declaration implied bringing the mexican army out into the streets to fight those involved in the trade. The massive deployment of troops across the nation was accompanied by

an important proposal to reform the Health Law3 that pushed local governments into the middle of the war. Among many different changes proposed by this law, one of the main consecuences

was the decentralization of the drug war. However devastating the impact of the war on drugs and its entailing violence has been in cities until 2006, drug-trade had been an issue outside of

the competence of local governments and local police, it was largely a federal issue. In the reform, drug-trade (or narco-trafficking) was differentiated from street-level drug trafficking, the

latter being attributedly an urban issue, was therefore to be addressed locally by mayors and their municipalities from then on. This was no small thing, with this particular aspect of the drug

trade or narcomenudeo,4 as is known in Mexico, having grown 450% in the last 9 years5 and attributed to be a key producer of the violence being faced in cities. This shift in criminal

jurisdiction, from federal to local, dramatically transformed the role cities had been playing in the issue. At the same time, it pushed them to be enterpreneurial and attempt to create the

institutional framework and legal capacity to abide.

Urban Violence


1”Estudio comparativo de la incidencia de homicidio doloso en ciudades y jurisdicciones sub-nacionales de los paises del mundo.” Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y Jusitica Penal (2010):

2 ibid: Ciudad Juárez.

3 A reform to the General Health Law, the National Penal Code and the National code of Penal procedures was approved by the Human Rights and Justice Comission in Congress regarding commerce or supply of drugs, an issue that used to be only of federal concern.

4 Narcomenudeo can also be translated as street level drug trafficking, retail drug dealing, market drug trafficking, street sales of illegal drugs, or petty drug dealing.

5 “Aprueba la ALDF reformas para combatir el narcomenudeo en el DF” Proceso (April 18, 2011): http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=268131

It is no secret that drug-related violence in Mexico has been increasing dramatically since 2006.

Drug-related murders have long withstandingly been attributed to cartels struggling to control major arteries into the US market. Shifts in US foreign policy and a change in the policing of the

coasts reshuffled the transnational distribution routes of cocaine6 and claimed Mexican territories during the nineties. Policies following 9/11, fortified the Mexico-US border and

provoqued a dramatic drop in the drug penetration to the US, causing an excess supply in Mexico that found new channels of distribution through urban environments.7 This meant that

some of the cocaine and marihuana that flowed through Mexico en route to the north was now trapped in a depreciated economy and forced to find new consumers. A new landscape of

consumption of more than 500 tons of drugs per year with profits of more than 1 billion dollars related only to narcomenudeo8 emerged while shifting its spatial distribution from transport

infrastructure, ports and border crossings to any urban environment were new markets could be found or formed. This process proves to be symptomatic of a country that morphs from being

mostly a transit territory to becoming a consumer market.

Cartels in Mexico have been fighting for the claim of transportation routes for decades, given how impactful the control of smuggling routes and local economies are in relation to profits. The

bursting of a Mexican consumer market saw an opportunity to seize new territories and establish control of these new urban markets. The importance of turf control has made intra

and inter-cartel violence bloody. It is no longer about how to get there faster and better but how to establish boundaries of consumer markets in heavily contested urban environments. The

“middlemen” traffickers are now actual members of the cartel bringing significant profit through the ‘conquering’ of territory, the bordering of marketable real estate. Whether through the

claiming of public hubs of consumption such as bars and clubs, or actual storefronts and informal vendors, the entire urban territory is codified and attributed for, but the edges that

define the codification are contested everyday. The government may have been armed, but was most definitely not prepared for an increase in drug addiction and a large part of the youth being


6 Cocaine previously transported from Colombia to the eastern coasts of the US started to be redistributed through Mexico and introduced to the US by land.

7 The threat of narco-trafficking in the Americas. (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Oct. 2008).

8 Statement by Monte Alejandro Rubido García, Subsecretario de Prevención, Vinculación y Derechos Humanos de la Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, as reported by “Narcomenudeo genera 13 MMDP en México: SSPF” Proceso (Marzo 2, 2010) http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=108133

swept up by gang related activities. Having undertaken a war against organized crime,

narcomenudeo became the primary cause of delinquency in the country.9

The urban pertinence of narcomenudeo is reiterated by a number of geographic studies in Mexico City which reveal how narcomenudeo is a territorially concentrated, largely immobile

crime.10 The conceptualizing of narcomenudeo as an urban issue with specific territorial implications provide new possibilities on how we think of the city and its spaces as technology of

crime. Its intrinsic spatial conditions11 show a primary tendency to concentrate, and therefore allow for geographic patterns and processes to be construed. Identifying areas penetrated by

the drug market is usually based on correlations of criminality. The most common signal of drug crime is the appearance of other acts of violence such as homicides or robbery 12. Areas with

poor police surveillance13 have also proven to be a causal variable that creates hospitable environments.

Mexico City

Even if Mexico City is the largest and most important city in the country, is not in the infamous most violent list, and significantly hasn’t experienced the same amount of increase in drug-

related violence that other major cities in the country have encountered.14 It has been regarded as an “island in the middle of a climate of violence that pervades large part of the country” due

to its mitigated violence and relative absence of cartel visibility.15 Large scale drug trading en route to the US has mostly avoided the city’s territory. However, Mexico City is the fifth most

important urban market in the country for this type of trade and the city’s borders that extend to


9 Secretaria de Seguridad Pública, SSP: http://www.ssp.df.gob.mx/

10Vilalta, Carlos J. “The Local Geography of Retail Drug-Dealing: Patterns, Processes and Urban Policy Recommendations” Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos, Vol. 24 No.1 (Jan-Apr 2009): 52-53.

11 ibid, 5.

12 Vilalta, Carlos J. “Spatial Dynamics and Socioeconomic correlates of drug arrests in Mexico City” Applied Geography 30, (Elsevier: 2010), 264.

13 Weisburd & Mazerolle, 2000 as cited by Vilalta, Carlos J.

14 ibid: Mexico City is not part of the Top 50 most violent cities in the world in the report.

15 Olmos,”La burbuja”.

the greater metropolitan area shared with the State of Mexico, have shown the largest rise in

narcomenudeo in the country.16. While 5,174 retail points were located in Mexico City when surveyed in 2007, the figure went above 40,000 when mapped again two years later.17 This

narcomenudeo ecosystem involves the collaboration of more than 200,000 people, under the organization of around 40 gangs that divide infinitely into distribution cells within the city.18 Most

of the transactions of these ‘cells’ take place in the districts of Iztapalapa and Cuauhtémoc as well as the neighboring Gustavo A. Madero. Between the three, they concentrate 48% of the

drugs sold everyday in Mexico City.

The district of Cuauhtémoc in particular, concentrates the highest density of narcotienditas or

retail spots (361), and in turn reports the largest amount of crimes related to drugs in the city (1252).19 Within Cuauhtémoc, Tepito is the neighborhood that operates as point of entry for

drugs intended for this market and constitutes the most significant distribution center for narcomenudeo in the city.20

Local vs State

Persecuting narcomenudeo in Mexico has always been stumped with a jurisdictional conflict. Narcomenudeo-related crimes were fought, processed and punished at a federal scale (SSP

and PGR), yet detention usually occured through local authorities (SSP-DF and PGJDF). This not only created a massive budgetary tug of war, but a very inefficient system where the

fractured relationship between the local and federal administrations created a pervasive no-mans land. The Unidades Mixtas de Atención al Narcomenudeo or UMAN, the agencies in


16 ibid.

17 “La guerra del narcomenudeo en el DF” Milenio Semanal (November 6, 2010).

18 ibid, “The PGJDF identifies amongst the most dangerous Los Pelones, Los Perros, la de El Chino, Los Negros, el cártel de Tepito and La Unión.”

19 Medellín, Jorge A. “Concentran 3 delegaciones 48% del narcomenudeo. El Universal (March 13, 2007.)

20“Drugs are not produced in DF. Cocaine comes from Colombia and arrives through the airport or by boat, from the coast of Michoacan. Marihuana also comes from Michoacan and is housed in warehouses in Centro, most of them within Tepito in Cuauhtémoc district.” Fernandez, Jorge and Ana María Salazar. The Enemy at Home: Drugs and Drug Dealing in Mexico. (Mexico City: Aguilar, 2008)

charge of following through the problem, were the institutional embodiment of said no man’s

land, where less than 3% of those arrested were succesfully convicted. 21

When Marcelo Ebrard was named mayor of Mexico City in 2006,22 he approached retail drug

trafficking as a territorial issue, largely influenced by the recommendations against violence presented by Giuliani and partners in 2003, when he was the Minister of Public Safety.23 Within

only a few weeks of inheriting Calderon’s decentralizad war, he launched a claim for territory as his administrations’ attempt to spatialize security and deploy strategies of contention through

the use of eminent domain.His team wanted to hit the ground running, but first needed clear diagnostics, because

narcomenudeo is inherently geographic and doesn’t migrate quickly,24 it was crucial to map the conditions out. However, in order to create a map, trustworthy information was needed about

where drugs were being sold, so a cooperative action with citizens to obtain information was created in the form of a Citizen observatory.

Quadrant program: Citizen observatory and the Atlas of Crime

The city was divided into 918 quadrants,25 in order to define smaller demarcations that could be easily surveyed. Each quadrant was to be headed by a Quadrant Chief that in turn would

communicate with citizens of the area in order to locate drug retailers, repeated theft spots and other crimes. An effort was launched in order for citizens to become proactive in reclaiming their

neighborhoods and take charge of their own localities, with a reported participation of 1,300,000 households in the program.26 The information obtained in 2007 was translated into an Atlas of


21Declared by SSP as reported by Lagunas, Icela. “Darán a conocer a los MP que dejen libres a narcos.” El Universal (February 4, 2006).

22 Marcelo Ebrard, from the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) is the governor of Mexico City from december 2006 until december 2012.

23 The tropicalization of some of the work presented by the consulting firm of the former New York City mayor such as the usage of geographic tools like CompStat or NY-style neighbor comittees developed into three main programs to be implemented in the first half of his government. See also (Davis, 2007)

24 Vilalta, Carlos J. “The spatial dynamics,” 265.

25 Taking a cue from Giuliani’s report and the conceptual framework of the CompStat program. Information provided by the SSP. http://www.ssp.df.gob.mx/

26 Accordingly to reports from the SSP, after the implementation of the program, 30% of the emergency calls made daily are related to citizen denouncement of drug retailing localities.ver “Promete Mondragón Atlas de Incidencia Delictiva.” Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal (September 29, 2011), web.

Crime that identified drug sale and distribution points on the ground. At the time, although the

map was not made public, the Ministry of Public Safety declared it was composed by 5,174 points of conflict. Two years later, in 2009, the total mapped points in the atlas was up to

40,000.27

COE, the new UMANsAlong with new institutions for diagnosis, the UMANs had to be replaced as well, and the

replacing institution had to follow the territorial strategy already laid out by the Quadrant program and the Atlas. The new institutions would be called Operative Strategy Centers (COE)

and were to be district bound. The first two are to be installed in Cuauhtémoc and Iztapalapa, the two districts with the highest concentration of narcomenudeo.28

Expropriation

Marcelo Ebrard started his mandate with a public statement to expropriate six buildings in Iztapalapa, Tláhuac, Miguel Hidalgo, Tlalpan and Coyoacán, beginning with the landmark case

of La Fortaleza in Tepito.29 However, citizen mobilization created substantial political damage, and a highly bureaucratic process stalled what was intended as a quick political tour de force by

mayor Ebrard. The first expropriation and demolishing to actually take place was to be the most symbollic. Ebrard would attempt to take down the hub of narcomenudeo, one single property

responsible for almost 10% of the narcomenudeo of all Mexico City, at the heart of the most emblematic neighborhood, Tepito. The feat30 ended up taking four years (2007-2011) and losing

all political momentum in that process after strong citizen resistance and violent confrontation.

Extinción de Dominio


27 According to published information by SSP in: http://www.ssp.df.gob.mx/.

28 A third one is to be built in Miguel Hidalgo due to the donation of the land by the district. The COE are comprised of three sectors: facilities, infrastructure and computational equipment, and personnel training, with a budget of about 4 million dollars per center and the support of Mexico’s Attorney General office. Around 100 specially trained officials (from bureaucrats to public prosecutors) are to operate in two shifts to fight narcomenudeo, initially concentrating their efforts in their particular district.”PGR y COE combatirán narcomenudeo en la ciudad de México.” Excelsior (March 3, 2011).

29 In 2007, the government had seized a lot in Tenochtitlan 40 known as La Fortaleza and Jesús Carranza 33 because drugs were sold housed and distributed within these properties.

30 La Ford was also expropriated, but not because of drug-trafficking.

As La Fortaleza first encountered citizen resistance, Ebrard introduced Extinción de Dominio

through the media and multiple public appearances while it was being discussed by academics and policymakers in Mexico. It sounded like the precisely right tool for the local government to

circumvent the troubles encountered with expropriation and displacement.31 Its design was an antidote to eminent domain’s slow and loud upheaval.

The two main principles for eminent domain to take place according to Mexican Law are to

seize the property for the public good, and to compensate the displaced citizens according to market value. However the Extinción has a completely different procedure. The assets don’t

have to be seized because after the assets have been the vehicle of crime, their property can no longer be established. In other words, the right to the property is lost in favor of the state,

without compensation of any kind to its owner. It is an autonomous action (quasi in rem), taken in relation to property, regardless of criminal responsibility.32 By 2008, the ‘Ley de Extinción de

Dominio’ was approved in the local congress. A law that was only starting to be discussed in the federal congress, and had not yet been read by the senate, was ready to be used by local

authorities in Mexico City. This innovative law, attributed to US Foreign Policy by some of its detractors, had first been introduced in Colombia in 1996 by Carlos Medellín, then Minister of

Justice.33 Its novel approach is its direct application nulos ab initio. It is designed as a judicial process, separate from any penal action. By distancing it from a causality it stays away from

previous legal instruments like expropriation, eminent domain or confiscation. It is the ‘loss of the right to property in favor of the state.’34 The first procedure is the establishment by the state

of the ‘ownership’ of the asset and the nulification of any property title35 when the assets are serving as instruments or house of crime.


31 Quintero, Maria Eloísa. Acciones contra bienes que son objeto, instrumento y producto de actividades delictivas. INACEP (2012).

32 Jurisdiction in rem assumes the property or status is the primary object of the action, rather than personal liabilities not necessarily associated with the property.

33 The Law has been imported and transformed locally by Mexico, Guatemala, Perú and Ecuador. The Law was introduced in 1996 with Law 333 in the Colombian Constitution. This in turn is based on the fifth article of the 1988 Vienna Convention, which in turn is slightly modeled on the US Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act introduced in the 1970s.

34 El Salvador

35 In the case of Colombia this is used to fight corruption as well so it not only has to be the object of crime, but it can be the product of crime.

It was first intended to hurt the finances of cartels, focusing on seizing their assets without

having to prove its criminal intent. It is a law intended to act on a short term, yet respect due process and the right to appeal. As mentioned before, it is a patrimonial action, with its objective

the asset itself, and no reference to a punishment to be imposed on a person for illegal activities that may have caused the ‘extinción.’

Its main criticism amongst scholars is its authoritarian and discretionary vain, possibly causing serious grievance to citizens subject to this action, whether from a patrimonial or moral

standpoint. At the same time its critics would also say it recognizes the countries impunity, and its inhability to pursue the criminals and charge them with crimes such as money laundering,

corruption, drug-trafficking, etc.

After the implementation of the law in Mexico City’s local congress, it took almost two years for the law to be approved nationwide. Its negotiated form left many of its key components on the

floor during the process. The final law written into the Mexican Constitution is to some critics unoperational.36 To exemplify, between 2010 and 2011 the state, through the Attorney General,

was only able to process 3 cases under Extinción de Dominio, which are still pending, in the same time period, Colombia and Guatemala processed 2700.

On the other hand, in Mexico City a total of 128 cases have been presented before a judge

(2009-2012), out of which only 38 had been processed effectively and around 13 were dismissed in its entirety. Mexico City´s version of the law is a lot closer to the Colombian, yet

some of its main problems have to do with how the system is set up, from its institutional design, to the way private property is framed under the Mexican Constitution. In explaining the large

amount of cases dismissed, sources from the PGR state that judges have consistently “first considered the economic right to property over the contribution to fighting organized crime.”37

While in the law’s original design (and its implementation in Colombia) the sentencing in the

criminal process is unrelated to the results of the extinción case, in Mexico the extinción is dependent of the criminal action. This creates barriers for authorities not only to initiate a

process of extinción, but also to win it. Proof has to be given that the asset is ilegal, and that it


36 Quintero, 2012.

37 Mendez, Alfredo. La Jornada (2012).

has a clear relationship with the crime. An attempt to reform was made this year (2012) by

amplifying the concept of ‘crime’ to a vaguer ‘ilicit act’.

Another clear difference between the colombian model and the mexican one is the role of the police. In Colombia, all police can trigger a process and have a 72 hour framework to hand over

the case to a judge, however a specialized police unit was created for this regard, and is in charge of the research and proof gathering. In Mexico these considerations have not yet been

made. In terms of pursuing the crime, unlike Colombia, not all police can participate. There are only two areas within the Attorney General’s office can pursue these processes. And no

expertise has been developed amongst the Ministerio Publico to address the issue at a local or national level.

Four years after its implementation in Mexico City, close to half the regions in Mexico have

introduced this law into their local congress.38 In the meantime the investigative arm of Mexican Congress (CESOP) published earlier this year an overview on the issue and significant

suggestion to further boost the piece of legislation with a reform to the law that would entail the creation of an autonomous unit for its investigation, and a wider catalogue of ‘ilicit acts’ that this

figure might comprise.39 Nevertheless, public opinion appears increasingly skeptical of a tool that hasn’t managed to be deployed effectively in three years of attempts. Specially considering

its embedded suspicion on the grounds of authoritarianism and excess of power, and its incapacity to distinguish between criminal and citizen.

By looking at the colombian example, where close to 8 properties are seized everyday, the

restructuring of such an instrument in to a highly ‘effective’ tool may transform mexican cities dramatically in the coming years, and affect thousands of communities. The reforms and

restructuring of crime fighting entities may have an effect in the eficacy of the tool, yet the authoritive nature and complexity of implications would only rise, specially in an environment

like Mexico where trust in institutions and rule of law are at the center of every debate.


38 Morelos, San Luis Potosí, Nuevo León, Tabasco and Chiapas (2009), Chihuahua (2010), Puebla, Hidalgo y Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Estado de México (2011), Tlaxcala and Sonora (2012).

39 CESOP, 2012.

2 - Case study: La Fortaleza

The story on the particular case of La Fortaleza can be visualized through this: http://bit.ly/

VBbiFv timeline or is also explained in further detail in the appendix.

3 - Resilient neighborhoods

My interest is to explore the impact this legal framework is having in its inhabitants and their communities. I am attempting to render visible the narratives inscribed in these properties, the

real visibility of this law in urban environments it is affecting, and the way affected communities can raise their voices in a collective fashion around one of these events.

For the purpose of this investigation I have attempted to gain access, through the mexican equivalent of the Freedom of Information Act, to the information on properties being seized

through Extinción de Dominio. I solicited the geographical location or street address of the properties seized between January 2011 and September 2012.40 I received and followed

through a series of correspondance41 with the corresponding authorities in order to gain access to said information, only to receive endless letters of documentation without any useful

information. I have now filed a complaint to the federal institution in charge of transparency and access to information in order to receive the relevant information to continue my investigation. In

the meantime, I have decided to focus on the landmark expropriation during Ebrard`s administration, La Fortaleza. In the previous chapter I explored its history, the community which

surrounds the property, the process of expropriation (2007-2012), and the ways citizens reacted throughout the process. To conclude I will set up a set of next steps and theoretical

considerations when moving forward with my research.

An analysis of the geography and demography subject to the extinction of domain laws can breed important findings about what methods could be best employed where and with whom.

However I am most interested in the stories behind these procedures, the reaction of affected


40 According to reports in Milenio, it is a total of 128 properties.

41 see Apendix

http://bit.ly/VBbiFv




citizens and the surrounding communities. If this tool becomes used in municipalities all around

the country it is imperative to bring to the public a way to examine the impact of this tool more closely and develop dialectical tools to unveil all the different layers this law actually impacts,

and render visible any possible violation of citizen’s rights. Evaluations of whether a specific population demographic is constantly targeted can perhaps

say something about how to approach idiosyncratic communities. By understanding their customs and habits, the formal and informal mechanisms in place to engage with public

authority and what are the current processes to report crimes, may show loopholes into how best to approach a network as an ‘outsider’ researcher, without being subject to mistrust and

rejection. I propose to take Tepito as a point of reference and La Fortaleza as a pilot project that leverages digital tools to create a participatory documentary that could potentially be replicated

in the other 128 sites.

I established contact with two local neighborhood organizations in Tepito.42 My next steps is to explore the ways in which digital tools could provide a place for collective storytelling around a

particular issue such as the expropriation of ‘el 40’.43 The reconstruction of the particular space amongst the community immaginery may provide a more nuanced and layered understanding of

the significance of said property, the myths around the events that took place, and the impact it had on the community. A collective storytelling tool such as Vojo could be used to gather and

share stories amongst the community around Tenochtitlan 40. In an effort to begin to understand the complex networks of trust and reliance implicit in a neighborhood like this, and

how they enable or are affected by a tool such as Eminent Domain or Extinción de Dominio, a participatory documentary that tells the story of this event in an effort to reconcile with the

community’s own history understand the complex picture and relationships at play, and as a way to move forward.

Research design proposal

Pilot:


42 Tepito Arte Aca and Centro de estudios tepiteños.

43 Significant activity in YouTube and Yahoo Answers around the expropriation of La Fortaleza signal a community already online that has an emotional investment on this event.

Assemble a small team of people in conjunction with my community partners and spend

January 2013 interviewing members of the community around La Fortaleza. Field work:

I would start by tracking down all evicted residents (72 families). I would also include the voices of the two major housing estates around it: Casa Blanca and Jesus Carranza 6, as well as the

alleged ‘real’ Fortaleza in Peñon.44 In order to paint a complex picture I would include police officers and the head of police at the time, as well the judicial advisor for the government, the

then minister of Public Safety, comissioner of Human Rights. I would solicit through my community partners, media allies and social media messages the

testimonies of local reporters, protesters, community leaders and government bureaucrats that may have experienced part of the process.

A mix of solicited testimonies with open call for submission can guarantee larger diversity and depth to the storyline while ensuring the essential voices are an important part of the narrative

Steps after the pilot with La Fortaleza

While documenting La Fortaleza and setting up the documentary online to enable participation I will continue my efforts to acquire the information regarding the localities of the other 128 cases,

or at least a fraction of them. I will travel to Mexico in December, and have meetings with several government officials and academic researchers involved in the topic for the next two

weeks in order to attempt to source that information. The idea is that when finishing the sourcing of the content of the pilot site and setting up the mechanisms for furthering participation, there

would already have an understanding of which other sites would be included as the next phase of the project. In order to accomplish this by summer 2013, I will also try to get local citizen

journalist organizations and journalism students from local universities involved in order to be able to achieve the sourcing of material at least from all identifiable affected residents, and set

up the promotional mechanisms, both offline and online, to elicit participation directly by the rest of the communities.

Why use social media as a participatory storytelling platform? Because in cases like this, trust is

an integral part of the process. In such a complicated environment of violence it is important to protect the integrity of the community and allow a space for that community to manifest itself


44 Conduct interviews and posters with info on how to call in or text testimonies as well as online submission.

around such an issue without the lens of the media and leverage their power against potential

abuse from the state. If such a tool can be tested out and put in place to tell the stories of future properties (we have 128 to begin with), a deeper understanding could be rendered about

communities, even to the ruling judge. The only testament of what took place in La Fortaleza that exists today, is lensed through the media; a media that has a complex relationship with

sources of power, and which in this particular case was kept at arms lenght during the actual eviction process. Perhaps the video narrative version of the signs ‘Casa Blanca’ hung on its

facade to claim their innocence, or the cries the mother gave to dennounce the assasination perpetrated by her crack dealing son. Civic media can potentially portray a more immediate,

multifaceted, complex picture of the event as they unravel, all documented from within. As Monroy Hernández has mentioned, “Mexican citizens are turning to social media platforms to

report violent events in their localities because tradicional news media are being censored by organized crime and even some local governments.” So it is not just about the community

reacting against the authoritarian actions of the state, or the local gangs extorsion, but about the different stories behind a communities effort to move beyond crime and repression.

In localities where the rule of law is lax, it is hard to define and place rigid borders on what

classifies as legal or illegal acts. The fine line that separates them applies to both state and non-state actors and allows the emergence of a space to navigate in between boundaries without

resulting in pertinent consequences for their transgressions, and can largely go unnoticed. For citizens to identify crimes committed against them requires the knowledge that the act being

made is either illegal, presents an abuse of authority or violates other underlying rights. For active citizens to engage in reporting crimes requires access to information necessary to pursue

the proper channels of reclaim, as well as the establishment of institutional framework able to build bridges between the tool as a participatory platform and those with the capabilities

necessary to act upon the resulting civic demands. The tool as participatory receptor then can gain ground by increasing responsiveness. This can possibly be accomplished by becoming the

“megaphone” to resonate demands, or by linking with key players that can allow for decisions to be made or due process of law to take place or change the status quo. Therefore the space

created by such a narrative platform when targeting future sites subject to Extinción de Dominio, may potentialy open up a more critical understanding of the law itself and a reflection on its

impact on citizen’s rights from the citizens themselves.


Challenges

However, there are significant obstacles in place when thinking about a documentary like this. Citizens are not just target of abuse by the state but can become also the focus of criminal

violence when publicly stating their views, specially in such deeply embedded communities . We have seen the effect the practices of control and coercion drug gangs and cartels have

practiced against journalists ‘which in part gave rise to remote and anonymous tactics of reporting taking place through the use of digital media.’45

The examples posed by Sandy Storyline and its diversity of options when navigating the story posits an interesting possibility to the issue of anonimity and vulnerability. The idea would be for

the stories to be submitted anonimously by default. Those citizens that would be actively engaged and visibly invested in the claims for rights could opt to make themselves visible in an

effort to improve the authenticity of the story, the emotional impact and attract more participants.


45 Monroy Hernandez

Appendix: The story of La Fortaleza

The 5,800 sq m housing estate in the center of one of Mexico City’s oldest hubs of crime, the

neighborhood of Tepito. The land known as The Fortress was identified as the largest center of counterfeit goods and piracy, and responsible for the commercialization of more than 10% of the

narcomenudeo of all Mexico City.46 The building and its neighborhood constitute an ideal case to map out how the relationship between violence, citizens and the local government. It presents

an opportunity to read the traces of the history of this particular urban environment in order to envision the real effects tactical procedure may have in deeply entrenced communities like

Tepito.

Tepito has always been the marketplace for the underprivileged, from the pre-colonial times

when it housed the ‘small market’ within Aztec Tlatelolco market, up until 1901 when the neighborhood became known for the ‘baratillo’ markets of used or stolen objects for the poor. Its

unified identity as a ‘market’ created a special form of social cohesion and developed a particular relationship to urban land, combining productive activities and commercial ventures

with the place of living. 47 Throughout the first half of the XXth century, its strong social network proved a fertile ground for a large group of artisans and informal workers to live and work.

Until the XXth century when avenue Reforma was laid accross Tepito, the neighborhood’s urban terrain had never been altered by outside forces. During the 1970s, the construction of Eje 1

and 2 provoked the first major act of displacement for its residents, hence the first confrontation of tepiteños as an organized entity against an overpowering state. During that same period, the

national economy was subject to high tariffs on imported goods as a way of protecting Mexican industry. This condition created an economic opportunity for foreign merchandise in the illegal

trade, which in turn flourished in the informal networks of Tepito. The growth of this market, known in Mexico as fayuca, transformed Tepito in its entirety, creating strong and efficient ties

(commercial ties) with the larger urban informal economy. Soon Tepito became the absolute hub of the fayuca, and enacted itself as a neighborhood wide informal retailer, but most importantly

as a distributor. This new illegal economy threaded a dense threshold against government


46 Declared by the SSP as reported by Mora, Fernando “Anuncia GDF expropiación en Tepito” EsMas (February 14, 2007): http://www.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/mexico/604237.html

47 Castro Nieto, Guillermina G. “Intermediarismo político y sector informal: el comercio ambulante en Tepito.” Revista Nueva Antropología (April 1990): 61.

intervention through the urban territory of Tepito and its vecindades. The barrio bravo became a

collective form of defense and protection, where the undetermined urban infrastructure and strong social networks enacted a flexible yet impermeable membrane that protected the trade of

the fayuca, rendering the territory semi-independent from rules of the city.48 Soon, the tianguis49 expanded and overtook the whole neighborhood, from the streets to its housing, where many of

the residences and workshops were turned into warehouses almost overnight. The commercial impetus gave the last blow to a displaced yet important population of Tepito, the artisans.

The next big shift for Tepito came with the devastation the neighborhood suffered after the earthquake in 1985, when the destruction on its vecindades was pervasive. The ‘state of

exception’ created the opportunity for the government to enter the ‘forbidden territory’ and attempt to reorganize the neighborhood.

The neighbors of Tepito (along with others from Doctores, Guerrero, Tlatelolco, etc.)50 protested heavily and demanded expropriation to avoid proprietors to expel tennants.51 The ignited

tepiteños protested for weeks on end in Zocalo against the proprietors of the housing and their own cries for help while the proprietors themselves carried an equally powerful public

manifestation. The protest from the tennants side, ended with the creation of the Decreto de Expropiación (Expropriation Decree)52 benefiting those inhabitants who could prove their

previous occupation of those houses, through the implementation of the Renovation Program for Popular Housing.53

The sense of urgency the city (and therefore the country) was experiencing allowed what previously would’ve been impossible, the possibility for the government to ‘negotiate its entry


48 Castro Nieto, “Intermediarismo.”, 61.

49 Tianguis = informal market.

50 Gamboa de Buen, Jorge and José Revah “Reconstrucción y política urbana en la ciudad de México” Foro Internacional Vol.30 No. 4 (Apr-Jun 1990), 680.

51 Proprietors on the other hand wanted the government to respond to them, as an opportunity to end the ‘frozen rents’ that had been a government mandate since the 1940s. Duhau, Emilio. “La formación de una política social: el caso del Programa de Renovación Habitacional de la ciudad de México.” Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan-Apr 1987), 79.

52 Connolly, “La política habitacional,” 105-106.

53 The tennant’s fear of displacement and therefore will for resistance was subsumed mainly through three specific actions: personal rights certificates, the constitution of reconstruction comitees and an ‘open door’ policy towards protesters and the dammed to examine the process as closely as desired. Duhau, “La formación de una política social,” 91-92.

into the neighborhood and transform its structure’ relatively smoothly.54 The decree was the first

of its kind, which by invoking six different existing laws, created a tool that would become highly instrumental almost 40 years later as the basis for the expropriation of La Fortaleza.

More than double of the units programmed initially were built,55 a density that would never have been allowed in other circumstances. Large housing blocks were erected in the middle of the

neighborhood, the first time a vertical construction was part of the local landscape.56

The transformation of Tepito’s urban fabric was simultaneous with the beginning of the

liberalization of the economy. The fayuca market virtually disappeared overnight, pushing its robust commercial structure to shift into other black markets.57 Piracy and counterfeit goods

soon took center-stage, while narcomenudeo, steadily took hold of all the back-offices.58 This shift in social makeup also changed the neighborhood significantly in the years to come. From

120,000 inhabitants then, to no more than 50,000 today, with a floating population of around 220,000 that come during the day for ‘business’, yet sleep elsewhere. Tepito has positioned

itself as the center of the narcomenudeo in Mexico City,59 mainly due to its tradition as point of entry and distribution for fayuca and illegal merchandise60 and enabled by the many political and


54 Gamboa de Buen and Revah, “Reconstrucción”, 681.

55 The landscape was divided into a proprietor/tennant binomy. The expropriated plots (tennant) were developed into housing by the estate, while the vecindades reclaimed by their proprietors were funded for their reconstruction due to the heavy protests. The plans were orchestrated by neighbor organizations in alliance with the Autonomous University, “La política habitacional,” 115.

56 The two largest developments done in the era were later to be know as La Casa Blanca and La Fortaleza. The first is still to be expropriated by the GDF, the later already demolished and turn into a community center (see below). A total of 13 of these buildings were constructed throughout the poorest neighborhoods of city. “Programa de renovación habitacional popular en el DF. Resúmen de memorias del programa. Octubre 1985- Marzo 1987,” Renovación Habitacional Popular (México, 1987).

57 Mainly pirated video and DVD, porn, weapons and drugs. Pansters, Wil and Héctor Castillo Berthier “Violencia e inseguridad en la ciudad de México: entre la fragmentación y la politización.” Foro Internacional Vol. 47 No. 3 (Jul-Sep 2007) 592.

58 A total of 10,000 retail points occupy its 57 streets with a rent of 25 dlls per day, or 20,000 dlls to ‘acquire’ one. Castro Nieto, “Intermediarismo,” 3.

59 Vilalta, “The local geography”, 51-53,

60 Pansters and Castillo, “Violencia e inseguridad,” 593.

economic factors above described. It is attributed to be the only territory in the city, along with

specific sections from Iztapalapa, controlled entirely by violent actors.61

According to the current local attorney general, Tepito is considered a distribution and strategic

center, rather than just a retail spot. Their first attempt at this new spatial contention strategy had to be precise yet charged with meaning, It was clearly intended to debilitate the most

important distribution network while seizing an emblematic property, which would in turn lay out the conditions for a city-wide effort.

The largest plot within the heart of Tepito had been expropiated in 1985 and redeveloped by the government as part of the World Bank-funded program for housing. The housing estate located

in Tenochtitlan 40, to be infamously baptized by the public as La Fortaleza,62was comprised of 14 3-story buildings surrounding one large patio, with 4 apartments per floor for a total of 155

apartments. The apartments were given to housing credit owners (Infonavit), and previous inhabitants of the demolished vecindades that occupied the plot before the earthquake.

When the raid to expropriate the property took place, it was stated by the police that at least 60 apartments could be proven to have been used for illegal video production and retail drug

trafficking. The complex was mostly emptied at the moment of the intervention, and the information from property seized or total inhabitants63 displaced is not clear. Large and violent

protests with neighbors barricaded into the building ensued leaving the police no choice but to step back and leave the eviction halfway. with about 32 families still clingin to their property. One

week later, the police came back and finished the job promptly. Some of them were offered a monthly stipend of 200 dollars while they were relocated and others were given the possibility of

indemnization ($25,000 per household) if they had no criminal record and could prove property rights.64 However, in the following days of such a politically charged raid in such a large estate,

there appeared to be no significant citizen reaction. All press had been blocked from the area by more than 500 policemen during the weeks following the expropiation.

This void of information created various interesting attempts as seizing the narrative from the government, the media, and the community themselves. On the one hand, the media debated if


61ibid, 610.

62 The fortress = La fortaleza, due to its concrete impenetrable-seeming structure.

63 Media reports vary stating that between 47 and 72 families were displaced.

64 Accordingly, only between 40 and 50% of them had property rights and most of them had criminal record leaving them unable to claim compensation.

what was taken down was indeed the legendary Fortaleza, with Tepiteños arguing to reporters

that the real one is located in Peñon 97, and still operates clandestinely. At the same time, members of the PAN65, asked Ebrard’s government to clarify the actions taken over “El 40”,

because according to them, it had all been a fabrication for the media. They suspected of the passivity shown by the displaced inhabitants, and the swiftness of the whole operation in the

barrio bravo. Accordingly, it was until 10 days after the raid when protests from displaced tennants occured,66 which to PAN, seemed more like a reaction for the media. PAN’s allegations

were accompanied by media speculation about how the local government negotiated with the main gangs before the raid, making it more a symbollic start of a strategy, rather than a real

strike against narcomenudeo. Considering the story of the neighborhood and its mobilization and protesting mechanism when issues of displacement have arosen, it does appear to have

been a fairly negotiated move, similar to the ones orchestrated by Marcelo Ebrard when displacing informal vendors in the historical center.67 The message was hear loud and clear all

around the city. Other inhabitants of emblematic yet infamous housing estates from the 1985 redevelopment era like Casa Blanca quickly went into prevention mode. They spoke to the

media and hung large messages on their facades inviting the police to come into their homes and inspect, to prove to them that it was ‘a legitimate and clean community’.68 At the same time

independent media became an interesting space of contestation as well. Media vehicles denouncing ‘the atrocities’ of the state where released through DVDs throughout Tepito in a

similar way as pirated videos are distritbuted in its markets. Even a film that fictionalized the


65 The ruling party at a federal level responsible for the nation-wide ‘War on drugs’, yet the opposition party in the Mexico City government.

66 According to various reports from local newspaper, El Universal: Starting on the 26 of the same month (10 days after the raid), around 300 citizens and vendors from Tepito with the support of the local chamber of commerce, Coparmex, blocked for a few weeks the streets around the area in protest for the government’s actions. Citing the support the barrio gave to the governor during his campaign a few months before, evicted residents told reporters they felt “betrayed,” and hung an effigy of Ebrard in protest.

67 The operation to remove the informal vendors was multi-faceted. On the one hand there was strong negotiation with the leaders of the vendors. The negotiation occured publicly and was heavily documented by the media. When the raid took place there was no significant violence, new spaces had been allocated and their informal yet cohesive organizational structures helped coordinate the transition promptly. At the same time, their powers of negotiation and will of resistance had been debilitated by a year long process of refurbishment for all streets in the Centro Historico, which forced them to displace temporarily anyway.

68 “Exigen vecinos de Tepito detener expropriaciones.” Terra (April 10, 2007), web.

events was promptly put out into the market through these same channels. Videos were

uploaded to youtube calling for further action and inviting viewers to create a guerrilla that ‘defends the territory’ from the ‘invasion of the police.’” The police themselves reacted with a film

of their own that attempted to exonerate them from any human rights violation. Much of the documentation on what actually happened with the Fortaleza and what was actually found there

is concealed by the Secretaria de Seguridad Pública, making these videos and the subsequent ‘press tours’ the only information has been released in order to justify the ‘assertive’ nature of

the strike by describing the kind of criminal infrastructure69 that had been setup within what seemed like an impenetrable structure. Traces of these conversations can still be threaded

through the commenting boxes in youtube versions of these videos, however Twitter was still not a tool utilized for communication or protest in these areas of Mexico City.

Whether it was a performance for the media, or a real stab at crime, remains to be seen, yet according to neighbors, the 6 in Jesus Carranza, right next door to La Fortaleza, is already the

substitute hub of narcomenudeo after the expropriation.70 It remains to be seen how the urban infrastructure would react to a subsequent city, or at least district wide multi-centered

expropriation strategy.

After all the controversy, 4 years and 10 million dollars later, a brand new recreational facility and community center of 7650 sq m was opened to the public on the grounds of the former

Fortaleza. The largest investment ever in Tepito and the largest budget for a community center


69 In order to reinforce the argument of La Fortaleza as the heart of market drug trafficking, the police has helped illustrate through media reports, the way the apparent narcomenudeo headquarters had been altered, designed and readapted to accomodate a complex set of spatial needs. From drug safekeeping to disorienting rooms for kidnapped prisoners, La Fortaleza reveals through its architecture, the operations of narcomenudeo, its spatial microcosms and the way the building enabled a larger neighborhood-wide network to instrumentalize the urban environment. The police chronicles show apartments with double bulletproof door, multiple high security locks electronic alarm system. The abandoned rooms with smashed figures of Malverde, revealed a secondary entries through the ceiling, adhoc security rooms on the roofs, false walls that revealed hidden rooms and fully equipped interconnecting tunnels hidden behind furniture and mirrors. According to other third party reports, the building also revealed its role within a larger urban myth, that of the whole neighborhood as infrastructure of crime. A major tunnel was discovered in the raid, the first of the much speculated 26 neighborhood tunnels to be found in Tepito. This network of tunnels, according to Antonio Magaña Rivas, coordinator of Grupo Sierra and informant to the city’s attorney general, is utilized by at least 41 criminal bands to react to any police intervention in Tepito, and escape swiftly with their inventory (usually drugs or weapons).

within the DIF network71, which hadn't been expanded since 1977. More than 225 minors

receive special care, as well as psychological and juridical counsel for families, rehabilitation services and recreational activities including swimming, computing, arts and English will also be

on offer. A year later (september 2012), a high school was inaugurated in its premises, the first public high school to serve the community in 50 years and an experimental excercise in the

community.

Although many protests have taken place by human rights organizations concerned for the

increased judicial uncertainty for citizens this entails, the law has been approved and will be implemented this year (2012).

The decision to erect spaces for community development in all of the expropriated land speaks about the will to prevent history to repeat itself. The enactment of spatial strategies of control

infused with community building are crucial elements for violence prevention. The decision of direct intervention over hotspots with an embedded “prevention” programme may render the

desired long term benefits for an ailing community.


71 The DIF network is comprised of 9 larger centers called Centros DIF, 22 community development centers, 8 urban social welfare centers and 19 family centers in 14 delegaciones or districts. 5 new Centros DIF, including La Fortaleza, have been inaugurated by Marcelo Ebrard’s administration. Pantoja, Sara “Convierten La Fortaleza en el mejor centro comunitario” El Universal (September 28, 2011).

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Aguilar, Adrián G. and María de Lourdes Sánchez. “Política Ambiental y Regenaración Urbana en la Ciudad de México.” Revista Geográfica No. 120 (Jul-Dec 1994) 91-118.

Castro Nieto, Guillermina G. “Intermediarismo político y sector informal: el comercio ambulante en Tepito.” Revista Nueva Antropología (April 1990): 61.

Cisneros, Armando. “Organizaciones sociales en la reconstrucción habitacional de la ciudad de México.” Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos Vol. 3 (May - Aug 1998) 339-352.

Connolly, Priscilla. “La política habitacional después de los sismos.” Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos Vol. 2 (Jan-Apr 1987), 117.

Davis, Diane. “El factor Giuliani: delincuencia, la ‘cero tolerancia’ en el trabajo policiaco y la transformación de la esfera pública en el centro de la ciudad de México.” Estudios Sociológicos Vol. 25 (Sep - Dec 2007) 639-681.

Duhau, Emilio. “La formación de una política social: el caso del Programa de Renovación Habitacional de la ciudad de México.” Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan-Apr 1987), 79.

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Vilalta, Carlos J. “The Local Geography of Retail Drug-Dealing: Patterns, Processes and Urban Policy Recommendations” Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos, Vol. 24 No.1 (Jan-Apr 2009): 52-53.

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-

-----“Aprueba la ALDF reformas para combatir el narcomenudeo en el DF” Proceso (April 18, 2011). http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=268131

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------“Exigen vecinos de Tepito detener expropriaciones.” Terra (April 10, 2007).http://www.terra.com.mx/noticias/articulo/226663/Advierten+presencia+de+guerrilla+en+Tepito.htm

------“Narcomenudeo genera 13 MMDP en México: SSPF” Proceso (March 2, 2010) http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=108133

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http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=268131
























http://www.terra.com.mx/noticias/articulo/226663/Advierten+presencia+de+guerrilla+en+Tepito.htm














































































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Pantoja, Sara “Convierten La Fortaleza en el mejor centro comunitario” El Universal (September 28, 2011).

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1

Oficio No. OIP/725/12 Exp. CDHDF/OIP/672/12

México D. F., 6 de noviembre de 2012.

Estimado solicitante P r e s e n t e Me refiero a la solicitud recibida en la Oficina de Información Pública de esta Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal (CDHDF) el 30 de octubrede 2012, y registrada en elsistema electrónico INFOMEXcon el número de folio 3200000067212, donde solicita:

“la ubicaciongeografica de las propiedades que se han sometido a la ley de extincion de dominio por narcomenudeo y crimen organizado entre 2011 y la actualidad. Si tienen alguna queja interpuesta ante la comision de derechos humanos del dftambien“ (sic)

Al respecto de su cuestionamiento “…Si tienen alguna queja interpuesta ante la comision de derechos humanos del dftambien“ con base en la información proporcionada por el Centro de Investigación Aplicada en Derechos Humanos de este Organismo estamos en posibilidad de proporcionar quejas calificadas como presuntamente violatorias a derechos humanos, donde en la narraciónde los hechos que las motivaron se refieren problemáticas relacionadas con la extinción de dominio, registradas de enero de 2011 a septiembre de 2012. Fuente

• Sistema Integral de Gestión de Información (SIIGESI), enero de 2011 a septiembre 2012, base de producción, con corte al 30 de septiembre de 2012.

Observaciones

• Los expedientes de queja se reportan de acuerdo con el avance que presenta la investigación al momento de realizar la consulta, por lo que es importante considerar que la situación y/o calificación de los expedientes puede modificarse diariamente de acuerdo con el trámite de investigación e integración.

• Es importante señalar que la información se proporciona en los términos en los que se encuentra procesada1.

Notas

• Los expedientes pueden referir otras situaciones diferentes a la temática que se reporta.

• Es importante mencionar que la información de la calificación de autoridades y derechos humanos presuntamente vulnerados se encuentra alimentada en el sistema de forma general, es decir, respecto a los expedientes de queja y no respecto a la situación particular de cada una de las personas que figuran como agraviadas dentro de los mismos; debido a esto las menciones de autoridad pueden estar relacionadas con otras afectaciones a personas no específicamente

1De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 11 párrafo cuarto de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública del Distrito Federal.

2

relacionadas con la temática que se informa, adicionalmente una persona puede o no haber sido afectada específicamente por la vulneración de alguno de los derechos calificados en la queja.

• Los agravios descritos en las narraciones de hechos de las quejas presuntamente violatorias, son clasificados por las Visitadurías Generales responsables de la investigación de acuerdo con el “Catálogo para la calificación e investigación de violaciones a derechos humanos”. A través de los “derechos humanos” se describen de manera general los hechos motivo de queja.

Información

• Quejas calificadas como presuntamente violatorias Periodo Quejas presuntamente violatorias

2011 2

Enero-septiembre 2012 5

Total general 7 Elaborado por Subdirección de Estadística-CIADH, Fuente: Sistema Integral de Gestión de Información (SIIGESI) 2012, base de producción con corte al 30 de septiembre de 2012

• Menciones a los derechos humanos presuntamente vulnerados

Menciones por periodo Tipo de violación

2011 Enero-septiembre 2012

Menciones por DH

Derecho a la propiedad privada 1 2 3

Derecho al debido proceso y garantías judiciales 1 1 2 Derechos de la víctima o persona ofendida 1 1 Derecho a no ser sometido a esclavitud o servidumbre 1 1 Derecho a la seguridad jurídica 1 1 Derecho de petición y pronta respuesta 1 1

Total general 2 7 9

Nota: En una queja puede calificarse la afectación de uno o más derechos Elaborado por Subdirección de Estadística-CIADH, Fuente: Sistema Integral de Gestión de Información (SIIGESI) enero 2011-septiembre 2012, base de producción con corte al 30 de septiembre de 2012

• Menciones a las Autoridades señaladas como probables responsables Menciones por periodo

Autoridad 2011 Enero-septiembre 2012

Menciones por autoridad

Procuraduría General de Justicia 1 5 6

Tribunal Superior de Justicia 1 1

Total general 2 5 7

Nota: en una queja puede señalarse a una o más autoridades como probables responsables Elaborado por Subdirección de Estadística-CIADH, Fuente: Sistema Integral de Gestión de Información (SIIGESI) enero 2011-septiembre 2012, base de producción con corte al 30 de septiembre de 2012

Ahora bien, por lo que hace a la pregunta “…la ubicaciongeografica de las propiedades que se han sometido a la ley de extincion de dominio por narcomenudeo y crimen organizado entre 2011 y la actualidad” le sugerimos solicitar la información ante el Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal mediante su Oficina de Información Pública de la cual le proporcionamos los datos:

3

Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal.

• Encargada de la OIP: Elsa Bibiana Peralta Hernández

• Ubicación: Av. Niños Héroes número 132, planta baja, Colonia Doctores, C.P. 06720, Delegación

Cuauhtémoc en México, Distrito Federal.

• Teléfono: 51341100extensión 1126

• Correo electrónico: [email protected] Para cualquier duda o comentario relacionado con esta respuesta, quedamos a sus órdenes en el número telefónico 52 29 56 00 extensiones 1750 y 1752, en un horario de atención de 9:00 a 18:00 horas de lunes a viernes. La respuesta se emite con fundamento en lo dispuesto por los artículos 6° de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos; 19 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos;3°, 33 párrafo tercero y 34 de la Ley de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal; 1, 2, 4 fracción IX, 6, 11 párrafo cuarto, 45, 46, 47, 49, 51 y 58 fracciones I y IV, de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública del Distrito Federal, así como 27 fracción III, y 35 quáterfracciones I, XI, XIV del Reglamento Interno de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal. En cumplimiento a lo dispuesto por los artículos 76 y 78 de la Ley de Transparencia de Acceso a la Información Pública del Distrito Federal, hago de su conocimiento que si no estuviere satisfechocon la respuesta, tiene derecho presentar un recurso de revisión ante el Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos Personales del Distrito Federal-INFODF, dentro de los quince días hábiles posteriores a la notificación de la misma. El Instituto se ubica en calle La Morena número 865, colonia Narvarte Poniente, delegación Benito Juárez, en México, Distrito Federal, código postal 03020, con número telefónico 56 36 21 20, página de Internet www.infodf.org.mx. A t e n t a m e n t e Alfonso García Castillo Encargadodel Despacho de la Dirección General de Quejas y Orientación y de la Oficina de Información Pública

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Oficio No. OIP/756/12 Exp. CDHDF/OIP/698/12

México D. F., 15 de noviembre de 2012.

Estimado solicitante P r e s e n t e Me refiero a la solicitud recibida en la Oficina de Información Pública de esta Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal (CDHDF) el 8 de noviembre de 2012, a través del sistema electrónico INFOMEX con el número de folio 3200000069812, donde solicita:

“la ubicacion geografica de las propiedades que se han sometido a la ley de extincion de dominio por narcomenudeo y crimen organizado entre 2011 y la actualidad. Si tienen alguna queja interpuesta ante la comision de derechos humanos del df tambien “ (sic)

Al respecto de su cuestionamiento “… Si tienen alguna queja interpuesta ante la comision de derechos humanos del df tambien “ con base en la información proporcionada por el Centro de Investigación Aplicada en Derechos Humanos de este Organismo estamos en posibilidad de proporcionar quejas calificadas como presuntamente violatorias a derechos humanos, donde en la narración de los hechos que las motivaron se refieren problemáticas relacionadas con la extinción de dominio, registradas de enero de 2011 a septiembre de 2012. Fuente

• Sistema Integral de Gestión de Información (SIIGESI), enero de 2011 a septiembre 2012, base de producción, con corte al 30 de septiembre de 2012.

Observaciones

• Los expedientes de queja se reportan de acuerdo con el avance que presenta la investigación al momento de realizar la consulta, por lo que es importante considerar que la situación y/o calificación de los expedientes puede modificarse diariamente de acuerdo con el trámite de investigación e integración.

• Es importante señalar que la información se proporciona en los términos en los que se encuentra procesada1.

Notas

• Los expedientes pueden referir otras situaciones diferentes a la temática que se reporta.

• Es importante mencionar que la información de la calificación de autoridades y derechos humanos presuntamente vulnerados se encuentra alimentada en el sistema de forma general, es decir, respecto a los expedientes de queja y no respecto a la situación particular de cada una de las personas que figuran como agraviadas dentro de los mismos; debido a esto las menciones de autoridad pueden estar relacionadas con otras afectaciones a personas no específicamente

1 De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 11 párrafo cuarto de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública del Distrito Federal.

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relacionadas con la temática que se informa, adicionalmente una persona puede o no haber sido afectada específicamente por la vulneración de alguno de los derechos calificados en la queja.

• Los agravios descritos en las narraciones de hechos de las quejas presuntamente violatorias, son clasificados por las Visitadurías Generales responsables de la investigación de acuerdo con el “Catálogo para la calificación e investigación de violaciones a derechos humanos”. A través de los “derechos humanos” se describen de manera general los hechos motivo de queja.

Información

• Quejas calificadas como presuntamente violatorias Periodo Quejas presuntamente violatorias

2011 2

Enero-septiembre 2012 5

Total general 7 Elaborado por Subdirección de Estadística-CIADH, Fuente: Sistema Integral de Gestión de Información (SIIGESI) 2012, base de producción con corte al 30 de septiembre de 2012

• Menciones a los derechos humanos presuntamente vulnerados

Tipo de violación Menciones por periodo Menciones por

DH 2011 Enero-septiembre 2012

Derecho a la propiedad privada 1 2 3

Derecho al debido proceso y garantías judiciales 1 1 2 Derechos de la víctima o persona ofendida 1 1 Derecho a no ser sometido a esclavitud o servidumbre 1 1 Derecho a la seguridad jurídica 1 1 Derecho de petición y pronta respuesta 1 1

Total general 2 7 9

Nota: En una queja puede calificarse la afectación de uno o más derechos Elaborado por Subdirección de Estadística-CIADH, Fuente: Sistema Integral de Gestión de Información (SIIGESI) enero 2011-septiembre 2012, base de producción con corte al 30 de septiembre de 2012

• Menciones a las Autoridades señaladas como probables responsables

Autoridad Menciones por periodo

Menciones por autoridad 2011 Enero-septiembre 2012

Procuraduría General de Justicia 1 5 6

Tribunal Superior de Justicia 1 1

Total general 2 5 7

Nota: en una queja puede señalarse a una o más autoridades como probables responsables Elaborado por Subdirección de Estadística-CIADH, Fuente: Sistema Integral de Gestión de Información (SIIGESI) enero 2011-septiembre 2012, base de producción con corte al 30 de septiembre de 2012

Ahora bien, por lo que hace a la pregunta “…la ubicacion geografica de las propiedades que se han sometido a la ley de extincion de dominio por narcomenudeo y crimen organizado entre 2011 y la actualidad” le sugerimos solicitar la información ante el Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal mediante su Oficina de Información Pública de la cual le proporcionamos los datos:

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Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal.

• Encargada de la OIP: Elsa Bibiana Peralta Hernández

• Ubicación: Av. Niños Héroes número 132, planta baja, Colonia Doctores, C.P. 06720, Delegación

Cuauhtémoc en México, Distrito Federal.

• Teléfono: 5134 1100 extensión 1126

• Correo electrónico: [email protected] Para cualquier duda o comentario relacionado con esta respuesta, quedamos a sus órdenes en el número telefónico 52 29 56 00 extensiones 1750 y 1752, en un horario de atención de 9:00 a 18:00 horas de lunes a viernes. La respuesta se emite con fundamento en lo dispuesto por los artículos 6° de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos; 19 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; 3°, 33 párrafo tercero y 34 de la Ley de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal; 1, 2, 4 fracción IX, 6, 11 párrafo cuarto, 45, 46, 47, 49, 51 y 58 fracciones I y IV, de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública del Distrito Federal, así como 27 fracción III, y 35 quáter fracciones I, XI, XIV del Reglamento Interno de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal. En cumplimiento a lo dispuesto por los artículos 76 y 78 de la Ley de Transparencia de Acceso a la Información Pública del Distrito Federal, hago de su conocimiento que si no estuviere satisfecho con la respuesta, tiene derecho presentar un recurso de revisión ante el Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos Personales del Distrito Federal-INFODF, dentro de los quince días hábiles posteriores a la notificación de la misma. El Instituto se ubica en calle La Morena número 865, colonia Narvarte Poniente, delegación Benito Juárez, en México, Distrito Federal, código postal 03020, con número telefónico 56 36 21 20, página de Internet www.infodf.org.mx. A t e n t a m e n t e Lic. Manuel Esparza Moreno Encargado del Despacho de la Dirección de la Oficina de Información Pública

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INFOMEX: 6000000169712

C. GUILLERMO RUIZ P R E S E N T E. Con relación a sus solicitudes de información recibidas en esta Dirección a través del sistema INFOMEX con el número de folio arriba citado, mediante la cual requiere: “La ubicación geográfica de las propiedades que se han sometido a la ley de extinción de dominio por narcomenudeo y crimen organizado entre 2011 y la actualidad. Si tiene alguna queja interpuesta ante la comisión de derechos humanos del df también.”, se hace de su conocimiento lo siguiente: Por lo que respecta a la parte de su solicitud concerniente a “…La ubicación geográfica de las propiedades que se han sometido a la ley de extinción de dominio por narcomenudeo y crimen organizado entre 2011 y la actualidad…”, se hace de su conocimiento que DE CONFORMIDAD CON LOS ARTÍCULOS 4, PÁRRAFO SEIS, Y 15, PÁRRAFO SEGUNDO, AMBOS DE LA LEY DE EXTINCIÓN DE DOMINIO PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL, ésta refiere a actividades que corresponde atenderlas a la Secretaría de Finanzas, la Oficialía Mayor y la Asamblea Legislativa, todos entes públicos del Distrito Federal. En cuanto a la parte de su solicitud consistente en “…Si tiene alguna queja interpuesta ante la comisión de derechos humanos del df también…”, se puntualiza que la misma corresponde atenderla, en todo caso, a la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal. En este orden de ideas, debido a que usted había presentado originariamente su solicitud de información a través del sistema INFOMEX, ante otro ente público, mismo que la canalizó al Tribunal Superior de Justicia, es que este último ya no puede realizar una nueva canalización, esto por restricciones técnicas que impone el propio sistema INFOMEX En tal virtud, esta Dirección le recomienda amablemente presentar otra vez su solicitud ante las Oficinas de Información Pública de los entes obligados mencionados, para que éstas puedan brindarle a la misma la atención correspondiente.

Oficina de Información Pública de la Secretaría de Finanzas del Distrito Federal

Responsable de la OIP: Lic. Jorge Mejía Astivia

Domicilio Dr. Lavista 144, 1° Piso. Acceso 1 Col. Doctores, C.P. 6720 Del. Cuauhtémoc

Teléfono: 5134 2500 Ext. 1370

Correo electrónico: [email protected],

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Oficina de Información Pública de la Oficialía Mayor del Gobierno del Distrito Federal

Responsable de la OIP: Lic. Lic. Jennifer Krystel Castillo Madrid

Domicilio Plaza de la Constitución 1, 1° Piso. Planta Baja Col. Centro, C.P. 06068 Del. Cuauhtémoc

Teléfono: 5345 8000 Ext. 1599


[email protected]

Oficina de Información Pública de la Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal

Responsable de la OIP: S/R

Domicilio Gante 15, 3° Piso, Col. Centro, C.P. 06010 Del. Cuauhtémoc

Teléfono: 51301980 Ext. 3316


[email protected]

Oficina de Información Pública de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal

Responsable de la OIP:

C. Gabriela Edith Morales Martínez

Domicilio Av. Universidad 1449. Col. Florida Pueblo de Axotla. C.P. 01030 Del. Álvaro Obregón

Teléfono: 5229 5600 Ext. 1769.

Correo electrónico: [email protected], [email protected]

[email protected]

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Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 47, párrafo octavo, de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública del Distrito Federal, que a la letra dice: “Si la solicitud es presentada ante un Ente Obligado que no es competente para entregar la información o que no la tenga por no ser de su ámbito de competencia o teniéndola sólo tenga atribuciones sobre la misma para su resguardo en calidad de archivo de concentración o histórico, la oficina receptora orientará al solicitante, y en un plazo no mayor de cinco días hábiles, deberá canalizar la solicitud a la Oficina de Información Pública que corresponda.” Aprovecho la ocasión para enviar a usted un saludo cordial.

A T E N T A M E N T E.

MÉXICO, D. F., 12 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2012. SUBDIRECTOR DE INFORMACIÓN PÚBLICA

MTRO. ALEJANDRO GARCÍA CARRILLO

Exp./Min.

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