lasalle, units 1 & 2, license amendments 61 & 42 ... · the amendments revise the lasalle...

January 18, 19b6

Docket Nos: 50-373 and 50-374

Mr. Henry E. Bliss Nuclear Licensing Manager Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. Bliss:

DISTRIBUTION Docket file PDIII-2 r/f fIVirgilio LLuther OGC EJordan TMeek (4) EButcher GPA/PA

NRC & Local PDRs DNul ler GHolahan PShemanski DHagan BGrines Wdones ACRS (10) ARM/LFrIB PDIII-2 Plant file

Subject: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS.61 AND 42 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NO. NPF-11 AND NO. NPF-18 - LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. 64849 AND 64850)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 61 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 42 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letter dated March 6, 1987 supplemented January 6 and March 9, 1988 and January 6, 1989.

The amendments revise the LaSalle County Station, Units I and 2 Technical Specifications by removing all references to the ammonia detector monitoring instrument system.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation supporting Amendment No. 61 to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 42 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Paul C. Shemanski, Project Manager Project Directorate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III,

IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosures:

I,

Amendment No.61 Amendment No.42 Safety Evaluation

to License No. NPF-11 to License No. NPF-18

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Enclosures: 1. Amendment 2. Amendment 3. Safety Evi

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6Uc.Paul C. Shemanski, Project Manager Project Directorate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III,


to License No. NPF-11 • to License No. NPF-18

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ket Nos: 50-373 Docket file NRC & Loc PDRs and 50-374 PDIII-2 r/f DMuller

MVirgilio GHolah Mr. Henry E. Bliss LLuther PShem ski Nuclear Licensing Manager OGC DHa n

Commonwealth Edison Company EJordan BG mes P.O. Box 767 TMeek (4) ones

Chicago, Illinois 60690 EButcher CRS (10) GPA/PA ARM/LFMB

Dear Mr. Bliss: PDIII-2 r/f PDIII-2 Plant file

Subject: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. AND TO FA LITY OPERATING LICENSES NO. NPF-11 AND NO. NPF-18 - LASALLE COUNTY TATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. 64849 AND 64850)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issue the enclosed Amendment No. to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Am ndment No. to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle C unty Station, Units I and 2. These amendments are in response to your let r dated March 6, 1987 supplemented January 6 and March 9, 1988.

The amendments revise the LaSalle County tation, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications by removing all referenc to the ammonia detector monitoring instrument system.

A copy of the related Safety Evalua on supporting Amendment No. to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and endment No. to Facility Operating License

No. NPF-18 is enclosed. The Noti e of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Re ister notice.

0 .UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

January 18, 1989

Docket Nos: 50-373 and 50-374

Mr. Henry E. Bliss Nuclear Licensing Manager Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. Bliss:

Subject: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 61 AND 42 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NO. NPF-11 AND NO. NPF-18 - LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. 64849 AND 64850)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 61 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 42 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letter dated March 6, 1987 supplemented January 6 and March 9, 1988 and January 6, 1989.

The amendments revise the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications by removing all references to the ammonia detector monitoring instrument system.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation supporting Amendment No. 61 to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and Amendment No. 42 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ITZ c. Paul C. Shemanski, Project Manager Project Directorate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III,


Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 61 to License No. NPF-11 2. Amendment No. 42 to License No. NPF-18 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

Mr. Henry E. Bliss Commonwealth Edison Company

LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station Units I & 2

cc:

Phillip P. Steptoe, Esquire Sidley and Austin One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60603

Assistant Attorney General 100 West Randolph Street Suite 12 Chicago, Illinois 60601

John W. McCaffrey Chief, Public Utilities Division

SOIC 100 West Randolph Street Chicago, Illinois 60601

Resident Inspector/LaSalle, NPS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rural Route No. I P. 0. Box 224 Marseilles, Illinois 61341

Chairman LaSalle County Board of Supervisors LaSalle County Courthouse Ottawa, Illinois 61350

Attorney General 500 South 2nd Street Springfield, Illinois 62701

Chairman Illinois Commerce Commission Leland Building 527 East Capitol Avenue Springfield, Illinois 62706

Mr. Michael C. Parker, Chief Division of Engineering Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704

Regional Administrator, Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road, Bldg. #4 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

UNITED STATES "NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-373

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 61 License No. NPF-I1

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated March 6, 1987 supplemented January 6 and March 9, 1988 and January 6, 1989 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 61 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

::, f , 0• C3 3"",7

-2

3. This amendment is effective upon date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

i R. Muler, Director

Project Directorate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III,


Enclosure: Changes to the Technical

Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 18, 1989

_. -=• >

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 61

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11

DOCKET NO. 50-373

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment No. 61 and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

V

INSERT

V

3/4 3-74

3/4 7-5

3/4 7-6

B 3/4 3-5

B 3/4 3-6

3/4 3-74

3/4 7-5

3/4 7-6

B 3/4 3-5

B 3/4 3-6

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SECTION PAGE

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION .................... 3/4 3-1

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION .......................... 3/4 3-9

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ...... 3/4 3-23

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation .......... 3/4 3-35

End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation ............................................ 3/4 3-39

3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION

INSTRUMENTATION ............................................ 3/4 3-45

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION ................. 3/4 3-50

3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation ......................... 3/4 3-56

Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation ........................... 3/4 3-60

Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation .................... 3/4 3-63

Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation ................... 3/4 3-66

Accident Monitoring Instrumentation .......................... 3/4 3-69

Source Range Monitors ........................................ 3/4 3-72

Traversing In-core Probe System .............................. 3/4 3-73

Fire Detection Instrumentation ............................... 3/4 3-75

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ....... 3/4 3-81

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ...... 3/4 3-86

Loose-Part Detection System .................................. 3/4 3-91

3/4.3.8 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ............................................. 3/4 3-92

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 Amendment No. 61V

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 Amendment No. 613/4 3-74

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 18 months## or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the train by:

1. Verifying that the train satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the train flow rate is 4000 cfm ± 10%.

2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

3. Verifying a train flow rate of 4000 cfm + 10% during subsystem operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

c. After every 720** hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Positon C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 8 inches Water Gauge while operating the train at a flow rate of 4000 cfm ± 10%.

##This surveillance shall include the recirculating charcoal filter, "odor eater,"

in the normal control room supply filter train using ANSI N510-1975 as a guide to verify > 70% efficiency in removing freon test gas.

"**Except that recirculating charcoal filter samples shall be removed and analyzed at least once per 18 months.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. 61

PLANT SYSTEMS


2. Verifying that on each of the below pressurization mode actuation test signals, the emergency train automatically switches to the pressurization mode of operation and the control room is maintained at a positive pressure of 1/8 inch W.G. relative to the adjacent areas during emergency train operation at a flow rate less than or equal to 4000 cfm:

a) Outside air smoke detection, and

b) Air intake radiation monitors.

3. Verifying that the heaters dissipate 20 ± 2.0 Kw when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975. This reading shall include the appropriate correction for variations from 480 volts at the bus.

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99% of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm ± 10%.

f. After#each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 99% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm ± 10%.

##This surveillance shall include the recirculating charcoal filter, "odor eater," in the normal control room supply filter train using ANSI N510-1975 as a guide to verify > 70% efficiency in removing freon test gas.

LA SALLE - UNIT I 3/4 7-6 Amendment No. 61

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS

The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions should not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the intermediate range monitors are on scale adequate information is available without the SRMs and they can be retracted.

3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe (TIP) system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.

The specification allows use of substituted TIP data from symmetric channels if the control rod pattern is symmetric since the TIP data is adjusted by the plant computer to remove machine dependent and power level dependent bias. The source of data for the substitution may also be a 3-dimensional BWR core simulator calculated data set which is normalized to available real data. Since uncertainty could be introduced by the simulation and normalization process, an evaluation of the specific control rod pattern and core operating state must be performed to ensure that adequate margin to core operating limits

- : is maintained.

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, increasing the frequency of fire watch patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-5 Amendment No.61

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/3.3.7.10 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with the procedures in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.7.11 RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with the procedures in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the waste gas holdup system. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.7.12 LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components. The allowable outof-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors." 3/4.3.8 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate the feedwater system/main turbine trip system in the event of reactor vessel water level equal to or greater than the level 8 setpoint associated with a feedwater controller failure, to prevent overfilling the reactor vessel which may result in high pressure liquid discharge through the safety/relief valve discharge lines.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 61

.-._0 UNITED STATES 0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



DOCKET NO. 50-374

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 42 License No. NPF-18

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated March 6, 1987 supplemented January 6 and March 9, 1988 and January 6, 1989 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 42 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

-2

3. This amendment is effective upon date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

el ýR. Muler, Director Project Directorate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III,


Enclosure: Changes to the Technical

Specifications

Date uf Issuance: January 18, 1989

- A

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 42

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

DOCKET NO. 50-374

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment No. 42 and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT

v V

3/4 3-74 3/4 3-74

3/4 7-5 3/4 7-5

3/4 7-6 3/4 7-6

B 3/4 3-5 B 3/4 3-5

B 3/4 3-6 B 3/4 3-6

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SECTION PAGE

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION .................... 3/4 3-1

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION .......................... 3/4 3-9

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ...... 3/4 3-23

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation .......... 3/4 3-35

End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation ............................................ 3/4 3-39

3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ............................................ 3/4 3-45

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION ................. 3/4 3-50

3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation ......................... 3/4 3-57

Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation ........................... 3/4 3-60

Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation .................... 3/4 3-63

Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation ................... 3/4 3-66

Accident Monitoring Instrumentation .......................... 3/4 3-69

"Source Range Monitors ........................................ 3/4 3-72

Traversing In-core Probe System .............................. 3/4 3-73 I Fire Detection Instrumentation ............................... 3/4 3-75

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ....... 3/4 3-81

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ...... 3/4 3-86

Loose-Part Detection System .................................. 3/4 3-91

3/4.3.8 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ............................................. 3/4 3-92

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 V Amendment No. 42

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


PLANT SYSTEMS


b. At least once per 18 months## or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the train by:

1. Verifying that the train satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the train flow rate is 4000 cfm ± 10%.

2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

3. Verifying a train flow rate of 4000 cfm + 10% during subsystem operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

c. After every 720** hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Positon C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 8 inches Water Gauge while operating the train at a flow rate of 4000 cfm ± 10%.

##This surveillance shall include the recirculating charcoal filter, "odor eater," in the normal control room supply filter train using ANSI N510-1975 as a guide to verify > 70% efficiency in removing freon test gas.

"**Except that recirculating charcoal filter samples shall be removed and analyzed at least once per 18 months.

Amendment No. 42LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-5

PLANT SYSTEMS


2. Verifying that on each of the below pressurization mode actuation test signals, the emergency train automatically switches to the pressurization mode of operation and the control room is maintained at a positive pressure of 1/8 inch W.G. relative to the adjacent areas during emergency train operation at a flow rate less than or equal to 4000 cfm:

a) Outside air smoke detection, and

b) Air intake radiation monitors.

3. Verifying that the heaters dissipate 20 ± 2.0 Kw when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975. This reading shall include the appropriate correction for variations from 480 volts at the bus.

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99% of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm ± 10%.

f. After.,each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank'' by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 99% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm ± 10%.

##This surveillance shall include the recirculating charcoal filter, "odor eater,"

in the normal control room supply filter train using ANSI N510-1975 as a guide to verify > 70% efficiency in removing freon test gas.


INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations".

3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS

The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions should not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the intermediate range monitors are on scale adequate information is available without the SRMs and they can be retracted.

3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe (TIP) system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.

The specification allows use of substituted TIP data from symmetric channels if the control rod pattern is symmetric since the TIP data is adjusted by the plant computer to remove machine dependent and power level dependent bias. The source of data for the substitution may also be a 3-dimensional BWR core simulator calculated data set which is normalized to available real data. Since uncertainty could be introduced by the simulation and normalization process, an evaluation of the specific control rod pattern and core operating state must be performed to ensure that adequate margin to core operating limits is maintained.

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, increasing the frequency of fire watch patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/3.3.7.10 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in


INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with the procedures in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.7.11 RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with the procedures in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the waste gas holdup system. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.7.12 LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components. The allowable outof-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors."

3/4.3.8 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate the feedwater system/main turbine trip system in the event of reactor vessel water level equal to or greater than the level 8 setpoint associated with a feedwater controller failure to prevent overfilling the reactor vessel which may result in high pressure liquid discharge through the safety/relief valve discharge lines.


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 61 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 AND

AMENDMENT NO. 42 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18


LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Commonwealth Edison Company submitted a license amendment dated March 6, 1987 requesting a Technical Specification change to remove all references to the ammonia detector monitoring instrument system consistent with their plans for physical removal of the system.

In 1975, the licensee conducted a survey of industries and transportation routes which may use, store and/or transport hazardous chemicals in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station. The survey indicated that anhydrous ammonia was transported in the area of the LaSalle Station. At that time, in order to expedite resolution of any related concerns, redundant ammonia detectors were provided on each air intake of the control room, thus eliminating the need for performing further analysis to determine whether uninhabitable conditions could indeed be caused in the control room during an accidental release of anhydrous ammonia.

The ammonia detectors are a high maintenance item. Performance of weekly preventive maintenance tasks, functional tests, calibrations and maintenance requires an average of 48 man-hours each month. These detectors have experienced numerous trips on numerous occasions with resulting actuation of the recirculation mode of the control room and the auxiliary electric equipment room ventilation systems. The actuation logic for the ammonia detection system is one out of two taken once.

Because of the high level of maintenance and number of ESF actuations associated with the ammonia detectors, the licensee conducted a second set of surveys in 1986 and 1987 to supplement the 1975 data and to provide additional information needed to perform quantitative analyses of the LaSalle Station control room habitability and exposure risk due to accidental release of anhydrous ammonia. The licensee also performed a probability analysis to evaluate the likelihood of development of toxic concentrations in the control room. The conclusion of the probability analysis serves as the basis for the removal of the ammonia detection system and its references in the Technical Specification.

The staff reviewed the March 6, 1987 submittal and found errors in the probability analysis and determined that an unacceptable method was used to lower the conservative aggregate probability in order to meet the guideline of Standard

F , D . .. 1. -. F' ciil

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Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.2.3. Following discussions with the staff, the licensee transmitted a revised submittal dated January 6, 1988, in which a revised probability analysis was provided. However, the staff found that the referenced method to lower the conservative aggregate probability was still unacceptable.

On March 9, 1988, the licensee forwarded a final revised submittal, in which a buoyancy factor was used for the ammonia dispersion analyses which reduced the concentration to acceptable levels. By using a rationale considering both ammonia dispersion analyses and ammonia accident probability analyses, the licensee asserted that the low aggregate probability of an uninhabitable control room meets the SRP Section 2.2.3 guideline.

2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.4 specifies that quick-acting toxic gas detectors be provided for the emergency zone ventilation system of the control room when toxic substances stored or transported in the vicinity of the site may pose a threat to the plant operators upon a postulated accidental release.

Regulatory Guide 1.78 specifies that mobile and stationary sources of anhydrous ammonia within a five mile radius of the plant be included in the habitability analysis.

Regulatory Guide 1.70 specifies that all facilities and activities within 5 miles of the plant be considered in the analysis. Also, facilities and activities at greater distances should be considered as appropriate to their significance.

SRP Section 2.2.3 states that:

The probability of occurrence of the initiating events leading to potential consequences in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines should be estimated using assumptions that are as representative of the specific site as is practicable. In addition, because of the low probabilities of the events under consideration, data are often not available to permit accurate calculation of probabilities. Accordingly, the expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess of ghe 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines of approximately 10 per year is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower.

In the March 6, 1987 submittal, the licensee listed the 1986 and 1987 survey of the on-site and off-site transportation and storage of anhydrous ammonia as follows:

(1) Shipments of anhydrous ammonia on the nearest highways and the nearest railroad need not be considered in the control room habitability analysis, as they are more than 5 miles from the control room.

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(2) The nearest county road (county road 6) which is approximately 2560 ft away from the control room ventilation air intake is used for the transportation of ammonia tanks which contain approximately 6350 pounds of ammonia. The maximum calculated concentration in the control room, after 2 minutes from initial detection by odor, would be 99.7 ppm. Since the toxic concentration limit for anhydrous ammonia is 100 ppm, this source was not included in the aggregate probability of causing inhabitable conditions in the control room by accidents involving ammonia releases.

(3) A section of the Illinois River passes within 5 miles of the station control room air intake; a survey indicated that shipments totaling 310,500 tons by 121 barges on the Illinois River is representative of the annual barge shipments of anhydrous ammonia in the vicinity of the station. The ammonia is shipped in specially constructed refrigerated cylinders of 1800 tons each, with two cylinders per barge. The resultant ammonia accident concentration would be 480 ppm in the control room after 2 minutes from initial detection by odor.

(4) The Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Company stores anhy drous ammonia in two refrigerated tanks (20,000 tons and 22,500 tons) which are located just outside of the 5 mile radius. The Service Port Authority also stores 30,000 tons of ammonia in a refrigerated tank which is approximately 5.75 miles from the plant.

(5) Commonwealth Edison is currently leasing approximately 300 acres of land to local farmers. It was assumed in the analysis that as many as 10 tanks, each carrying approximately 6350 lbs of ammonia, could be used on the leased property each year. This ammonia would be transported on county road 6 to the fields via the station service road which passes within 550 ft of the control room air intake. It was further assumed that one tank would be stored on site for a period of 24 hours.

Based on the above data, the licensee performed two types of quantitative analyses: dispersion analysis and probability analysis. The results of these analyses are listed as in Table 1.

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TABLE 1

AMMONIA ACCIDENTAL RELEASES AND THE AMMONIA ACCIDENT PROBABILITY

Ammonia Source

(1) Barge traffic 1800 ton container

(2) Kaiser Agricultural

Dispersion Analysis

480 ppm

Probability Analysis (Conservative)

3.63X10-7

6.68X10"7

(3) Seneca Port Authority 4.87X10-7 Tank (30,000 tons)

(4) Fertilizer Tanks on Station Service Road

(5) Fertilizer Tanks on Leased Land

2434 ppm

99.7 ppm

2.70X10-7

2.74X10-7

= 2.0XIO"6

= aggregate probability.

A conservative factor of 10 can be applied to the aggregate probability to address the number of operator incapacitation events that could result in exposures in excess of 10 CFR 100 guidelines.

The staff initially found that since the potential concentration of ammonia could be as high as 72436 ppm, the initial proposal to lower the probability to the order of 10- per year was unacceptable.

In the licensee's revised submittal dated January 6, 1988, the dispersion analysis remained the same, but the probability analyses were revised. These revised results are listed in Table 2.

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TABLE 2

Ammonia So

REVISED AMMONIA ACCIDENT DISPERSION ANALYSES AND PROBABILITY ANALYSIS

Proi )urce Dispersion Analysis (Coi

bability Analysis nservative)

(1) Barge traffic 1800 tons contained

(2) Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Tanks (22,000 tons and 22,500 tons)

(3) Seneca Port Authority Tank (30,000 tons)

(4) Fertilizer Tanks on Service Road

(5) Fertilizer Tanks on leased land

(6) Tank Truck on County Rd.

Ammonia Source

(1) Barge Traffic 1800 tons contained

(2) Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Tanks (22,000 tons and 22,500 tons)

(3) Seneca Port Authority Tank (30,000 tons)

(4) Fertilizer Tanks on Service Road

(5) Fertilizer Tanks on leased land

480 ppm 3.15X10" 7 /year

6.60X10- 7 /year

4.87X10" 7 /year

2.74X10- 7 /year

2.74X10" 7/year

8.84XIO- 7 /year

2434 ppm

99.7 ppm

Probability Analysis (realistic)

3.15XIO-7/year

2.0XIO 7 /year

1.62X' 7 /year

2.70XIO-7/year

2.74X10" 7/year

(6) Tank Truck on County Rd. 2.81xIO- 7/Year

1.5XlO-6/year (Realistic Aggregate Probability)

1.5XIO-7/year (A factor of 10 can be applied to obtain the realistic aggregate probability)

The staff again found that this revised method used to lower the aggregate probability to be unacceptable.

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In the March 9, 1988 submittal, the licensee revised both dispersion analyses and probability analyses as follows:

(1) Barge Traffic

Anhydrous ammonia produces a buoyant plume of ammonia vapor when spilled on water. The height of rise of the ammonia plume due to this 1800-ton spill is estimated to range between 900 and 5000 feet. Under this condition, the concentration of ammonia at the control room intake ranges between negligible and 6.6 ppm which is far below the toxicity limit of 100 ppm. Therefore, the conservative probability of causing uninhabitable conditions in the control room due to 121 barge shipments per year can be reduced from 3.15X10- /year to a negligible value.

(2) Kaiser Tanks (22,000 tons 22,5000 tons anhydrous ammonia)

A reevaluation of the assumptions has determined that the probability attributable to thl Kaiser Agricultural tanks would not change and remains at 2.OXlO /year year.

(3) Seneca Port Tank (30,000 ton anhydrous ammonia)

Further investigations of the Seneca Port Authority Tank indicated that there is an earthen dike of sufficient height to contain the entire content of the tank. Assuming a complete rupture of the tank and using NRC NUREG-0570 analytical methods, the concentration in the control room is calculated to be 79.4 ppm which is lower than the toxicity limit of 100 ppm. Therefore, the conservative probability of causing uninhabitable conditions can be reduced from 4.87XI0" /year to a negligible value.

(4) County Road 6

The conservative probability of causing uninhabitable conditions due to release of anhydrous ammonia from a tank truck on County Road 6 was 8.44X10" /year. This calculation was based on a conservative assumption of 50 tank truck shipments per year. However, according to the owner of Walter Seed and Fertilizer Inc. the annual shipments to this company are more than 5 miles away from the station, and it can be concluded that County Road 6 would not be used to transport anhyhrouý ammonia in tank trucks. Therefore the above probability of 8.44X10- /year can be reduced to a negligible value.

(5) Tanks on Station Service Road and Tanks on Leased Land

The conservative probabilities of releases which cause uninhabitable conditions in-he control room duy to accidental releases were shown to be 2.70XO- /year and 2.76XIO- /year for accidents on the LaSalle access road and the leased lands, respectively.

The Commonwealth Edison Company has committed to insert a condition in the lease agreement with the farmers which would prohibit the ýse of anhydrous ammonia. 7 Based on this condition, the probability of 2.70X10- /year and 2.74X10 /year due to accidental releases from farm fertilizer containers

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on the LaSalle Station service road and the leased lands, respectively, can be reduced to a negligible value for both events.

Therefore, the realistic aggregate probability of uninhabitable ýonditions in the LaSalle County Station Control Room is approximately 2.OXIO- /year as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Ammonia Source

(1) Barge Traffic 1800 tons

Dispersion Analysis

6.6 ppm

Probability (Conservative)

3.15XIO' 7 /year

Analysis (Realistic)

(2) Kaiser Tanks

(3) Seneca Port

(4) Tanks on Service Road

(5) Tanks on leased land (lease agreement)

(6) Tank Trucks on County Rd. (not used)

79.4 ppm

2434 ppm

99.7 ppm

6.68X10-7

4.87X10-7

2.70X10-7

2.74X10-7

8.44X10-7

2. OXIO-7/year

aggregate probability = 2.OX1O-7 /year

"3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves changes in the installation and use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that this amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of an effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c).(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

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4.0 CONCLUSION

The licensee, in its final revised submittal dated March 6, 1988, performed ammonia dispersion analyses including a factor for plume buoyancy over water for the case of river barge accidents. The resultant ammonia accident concentration of 6.6 ppm, indicated that the river barge accidental ammonia spill would not be a design basis event and therefore, the probability of causing uninhabitable conditions in the control room can be reduced to a negligible value.

For the case of Seneca Port Storage Tank (30,000 tons of anhydrous ammonia), the licensee's further investigation indicated a 500 ft diameter earthen dike was in place of sufficient height to contain the entire contents of the tank. This restricted the spread of the spilled ammonia and consequently slowed down its evaporation. The resultant ammonia concentration of 79.4 ppm was lower than the toxicity limit of 100 ppm, and therefore, the probability of causing uninhabitable conditions in the control room need not be considered for the same reason as stated above.

For the case of releases from the fertilizer tanks on the service road or on leased land, the dispersion analyses indicated concentrations at the control room intake to be 2434 ppm and 99.7 ppm respectively. In the March 6, 1988 submittal, the licensee indicated that the Commonwealth Edison Company will stipulate a condition in the lease agreement with the farmers which would specify that a tenant not use or transport across the leased premises, anhydrous ammonia fertilizer NH3, or any trailers, tanks and storage facilities containing this fertilizer.

Based on this stipulation, the respective conservative probability of causing uninhabitable conditions from these two sources (2.70X10- /year and 2.74X10- /year) need not be considered.

The staff found this case involved reliance upon farmers which may render the lease agreement less than 100% effective. Assuming a good faith effort on the part of the farmers to obey the lease agreement 90% of the time, the contribution of probability from these tyo sources toward the realstic aggregate probability would be (2.7X10- + 2.74X- /year) (1-0.9) = 5.44X10- /ýqar. This contribution would not alter the final aggregate probability (2.OX10 '/year).

The realistic aggregate probability of occurrence in the orger of 2.0X10-7/year is significantly lower than guidelines of approximately 10" /year specified in SRP Section 2.2.3. The licensee's March 9, 1988 submittal indicated that the probability of occurrence of an uninhabitable control room is sufficiently low that the postulated ammonia spill accident would not be a design basis event. However, the staff finds that this low probability of occurrence in the analysis relies heavily on the results of the revised ammonia dispersion analysis. The Radiation Protection Branch in the Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness performed an independent analysis to confirm the results of the licensee's revised ammonia dispersion analysis. The staff concludes that our review of the request is complete and there are no open items. While the licensee's request to delete ammonia detection monitoring instruments from

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Technical Specifications has been determined to be acceptable, based upon the number of ammonia sources in the vicinity of LaSalle County Station, the licensee should maintain the ammonia detection instruments operable in the manual mode to provide indication, at a minimum, to station personnel. This is a prudent action in light of the possible high concentrations associated with some of the low probability events. In addition, administrative means are required which will cause the LaSalle Station to be notified in a timely manner by local government or industry officials of a major release of anhydrous ammonia. Such arrangements should be documented in emergency plans (preferably), memoranda of understanding, or both. By letter dated January 6, 1989 the licensee committed to leaving the alarm function of the ammonia detectors in place and to work with CECo's emergency planning organization to pursue appropriate agreements to allow LaSalle to be notified in the event of a major anhydrous ammonia release off-site which could affect LaSalle station. The staff finds this acceptable.

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (52 FR 11357) on April 8, 1987, and consulted with the state of Illinois. No public comments were received, and the state of Illinois did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: .(I) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 REFERENCES

Letters from C. Allen, Commonwealth Edison to USNRC dated March 6, 1987 and January 6 and March 9, 1988 and January 6, 1989.

Principal Contributors: A. Chu, NRR/SPLB T. Essig, NRR/PRPB P. Shemanski, NRR/PDIII-2

Dated: January 18, 1989

lasalle, units 1 & 2, license amendments 61 & 42 ... · the amendments revise the lasalle...

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