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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS

COMMANDANTMajor General John H. Cushman

DEPUTY COMMANDANTBrigadier General Benjamin L. Harrison

Editor in ChiefCOL Jolin H Chitty. Jr.Associate EditorCOL Alfred J MorkArmy War College

Assistant EditorHAJ Joseph E Burlas

Features EditorCPT Robert C MrDonaldManaging Editor

CPT Robert F Witt

Production Editorixie R ominguezSpanish American EditorLTC Juan Horta Merly

Brazilian EditorsCOL Joao Olimpio FilhoLTC Haroldo Netto

Publication OfficerMAJ Steven E. BartelsArt and Design

Jerome F heele


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ilitaryReviewProfessional Journal of the US rmyFIFTY THREE YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICEVOL LV MAY 975 NO

RTICLESPower ProjectIOn 1990 . LTC William M. Stokes III, USA et al. 3US Position on Chemical Warfare Disarmament MAJ Ray W. Bills, USA 12The Vital Center COL Norman L. Dodd, British Army, Ret 4General Hugh S. Johnson and the War Industries Board John Kennedy Ohl 35Strategy and Tactics BRIG C. N. Barclay, British Army, Ret 49Bicentennial Feature:

Marquis de Lafayette and the American RevolutionWaterloo and the Prmciples of War Joseph R. Goldman 56MAJ Carter H. Brantner, USA 58One Man Command COL GEN Aleksander N. Yefimov, Soviet Air Force 73The Australian AIIVolunteer ForcePart II-The Impact on Force LevelsWestern Strategy

Kenneth J. Coffey 78LTC Peter A. Koman, Austrian Army 86

Reader ForumArticles of InterestMilitary NotesMilitary Books

DEP RTMENTS

COVERSketch of 1st Infantry Division troops by staff artist Jerome F. Scheele from aphotograph by Specialist 5 Robert A Tousignant. US Army.

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MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly in English. Spanish and Portuguese by the US Army Commandand General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027. Use of funds for printing this pUblication approvedby Headquarters, Department of the Army, 8 April 1974. Second class postage paid at Leavenworth. KS66048. Subscription: $6.00 per year US and APO/FPO: $7.50 foreign. Single copies 75 US and APO/FPO:$1.00 foreign. Address all mall to Military Review, USACGSC Ft LeavenwoHh, KS 66027. Telephone (91316845642 or AUTOVON 5525642. Unless otherWise stated, the views herem are those of the authors andare not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof.US ISSN 0026-4148


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~ t RE DER ORUMAmerican Military P r o f ~ s s i o n

The American Military ProfessIOn:n Egalitarian View by LieutenantColonel Parham in the November 1974Military Review says a lot that should

have been said long ago. However, Iwould like to correct a couple. of minorinaccuracies

FIrSt: The origin of the militia systemof the US as with many other nations,dates to Kmg Henry II's ASSIze of Armsin l lB l from which the National Guardis a descendant. The system was carriedover to the Virginia and Plymouth settlements and, subsequently, to our presentday.

Second: The Second Amendmentreferred 'to in his article does in fact placesome emphasis on the militia. It wasplaced in the Bill of Rights to ensure thatevery freeman shall always have t ~ inalienable nght to keep and bear armsupon which the milltla system is largelydependent. Jefferson and Mason wereinsistent upon this and the other nine Billof Rights as a guarantee against infringement upon the inalienable rights of thepeople.

The colonel is in error, however, whenhe cites ArtIcle II of the Consutuuon.This article pertains to the powers of thePresident, and Section 2 of Article IIestablishes the President as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,as well as the militia when called intoFederal service.Article I Section (15), (16), notArticle II, firmly establishes the citizensoldier concept, providing for the train-

ing, arming, equipping and diSCiplining ofthe organized or standing militia. ArticleI Section B (12), (13), is applicable tothe standing Army and Navy.t is obvious that the Second Amendment is not a duplication of Article ISection B We therefore, must look tothe meaning of the Second Amendmentand, for that, we go to the origmal draftby James Mason who wrote to JohnLamb the following:

That the People have a Right to keepand bear arms that a well-regulated mliitia, composed of the ody of the Peopletrillned to arms is the proper, natural andsafe Defense of a free state.

The militia is defined as the body ofthe people and legally includes all males16 years of ge to age 65. The militia iscomposed of the organized or standingmilitia and the unorgamzed mUltla composed of ~ h mainder of the body ofthe people ' It is this latter group thatforms ou third line of defense to becalled up under a general militia call andto which the Second Amendment Sapplicable.

Such a call up is not without precedent. The United States issued generalmilitia calls on a regional basis -for example, Baltimore-Washington during the Warof IBI2 There were other such calls. Inrecent times, we saw Ethiopia issue ageneral milltla call for defense of theirhome, and 1940 saw the English defenseless for lack of private arms when it

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(continued from page 2)

issued its general militia call-up.So, in a sense, Colonel Parham iscorrect. The Second Amendmentstrengthens the roll of the militia in ourdefense because the militia concept since1181 depends upon the ability of thecitizen to possess weapons and to beproficient in its use.There may well be those who cite theBattle of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane asproof of the Regular Army superiority.

For their benefit, I would remind themthat the American Army was practicallyn l and could in no w y match the Britishm number or proficiency even if conscription had been imposed. General Scottrelied upon rigorous and better trainingto offset the disadvantage. t should alsobe remembered that the Regulars, whatthere was of them, were not much bettertrained than the militia. The units underGeneral Brown were the 9th, 11th, 21st,22d, 23d and 25th Infan try and twocompanies of the 2d Artillery, organIZedinto two brigades commanded by Scottand Ripley. They were all new units andby no stretch of the imagmation could itbe said there wa t anything regularabout them except thg J)tle. Scott tookraw citizen material, disciplined and'trained them, and made them Regulars.Equally tramed, there S little distinctIOnbetween Regulars and the citizen General Scott proved that point.I believe a distmctlOn must be madebetween the regular Or standing army andprofessional. As Colonel Parham pointsout quite well, anyone trained m themilitary, whether Active or Reserve, is aprofessional. t is a matter of a primary orsecondary career and, therefore, thedegree of proficiency. t should be re-called that the references made by somethat differentiate Regulars from militiawere self-serving, mainly by the FederalIsts who msisted upon a large-standingarmy Without reliance upon the militiaunits. Secretary of War C-alhoun was afirm believer m the Regular Army, comprised by creating a full skeleton of aMay 975

RE DER FORUM

wartime Regular Army in to which wartime recruits would be absorbed and whowould quickly become as proficient asthe Regulars.As the colonel points out, the difference is in the training and must not beconfused with the term professional. Cal-

houn laid the cornerstone for the UnitedStates Army. Obviously, the RegularArmy, as distinguished from Reserves OrNational Guard, is better trained thoughno more professional than the Reserves orNational Guard. Calhoun's wisdom is no~ s s valid today. We do need the Regular

Army so that the disasters due to the lackof training that occurred during the Rev-olutionary War, War of 1812 and the CivilWar will never again be repeated. Thecornerstone is still the Regular Army, asdistinguished from Reserve and NationalGuard, but the backbone S the citizenarmy which includes the Reserves,National Guard and the Regular Army.Stephen 0 rngo Jr

Finnish PolicyMajor Gustav Hagglund wrote to theMilitary eview (Reader Forum, October

1974) commenting on Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Gaustad's April 1974 evlewarticle on Fmnish policy. ~ o r Haqglundcontends that Colonel Gaustad did notaccurately portray the threat to Finlandof a Soviet occupation of Finmsh territory under the post World War II peacetreaty. Unfortupately, Major Hagglund'sview S more patriotic than accurate, andthere is a historic crisis to illustrate wherethe truth lies the views of these twoofficers.It is Important flfst to look at thesource documents because observers l l terested in Scandinavian affairs routinelyfail to distinguish rigorously amongRusso-Finnish agreements. Two treatiesare of particular interest in this discussion: The Treaty of Peace With Finland


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signed in Paris on 10 February 1947between Finland and the allied andassociated powers mcluding the SovietUnion. This treaty limited the size andnature of the Finnish Armed Forces andalso imposed restrictions on weaponry. Itdid not. however. contain any provisionswhich might authorize th Soviet Unionunilaterally to occupy Finnish territory.except for those specific geographic areasceded to the Soviet Union (the provinceof Pechenga) by the Peace Treaty of12 March 1940 ending the Winter WarThe 1947 Treaty also permitted theSoviet Union to lease l a n v l base inthe Porkkala-Udd area for 50 years and toretain free access through Fmnish territory to and from that base. Otherwise.Finland retamed lts territorial integntyunder the 1947 Peace Treaty.In terms of the stationing of Soviettroops in Finland. a second later treaty Sfar more Significant. ThiS treaty is thebilateral Agreement of Friendship. Cooperation and Mutual Assistance betweenthe Republic of Fmland and the Umon ofSoviet Socialist Repu bilcs signed inMoscow on 6 Apnl 1948. Under Article Iof the treaty. the Soviet Union pledgesassistance to Fmland in the event of anarmed attack by Germany or ny Stateallied with the latter. In the Soviet noteof 30 October 1961. the USSR invokedArticle I of the treaty and called -formili tary consultations with Finlandbecause of a revanchist Germany. TheSOVlCts cited the formation of the NATOBaltic Approaches Command with WestGerman participation as eVidence of thegrowing threat. Even with the erection ofthe Berlin Wall m August 1961 and theexplOSIOn of the first Soviet 50-megatonH-bomb on the same day as the note. theSoviet insistence on military staff consultations came as a surprise to the Finns.The ensuing criSIS usually called theFinno-Soviet Note CriSIS of 1961. hadrepercussions throughout northern Europe and particularly n the Scandinaviancountries. Norway and Denmark reactedby drawing closer to NATO and madeveiled pronouncements about permitting

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the stationing of NATO troOps and nuclear weapons in their countries. TheSwedish Cabinet met in emergency ses-sion, and the Swedes intensified theoperatIOn of their early warning system.. From a statement by Mr Gromyko itbecame apparent that the motivationbehind the Soviet note was the establishmen t of Soviet radar stations in Finlandas an improvement to the Soviet missilewarning system.The important fact of the crisis is theSoviet view that the 1948 AssistanceAgreement permits the USSR to stationSoviet troops in Finland under certainthreat conditions from West Germany.Finland did not share this Soviet interpretation, and the crisis eventually passedfollowing a meeting in Novosibirsk on24 November 1961 between PresidentKekkonen and Chairman Khrushchev.Contrary to Major Hagglund's assertion,however. the Soviet Union has neverretracted the text of the 30 October 1961Note nor recanted its assumed right tostation troops within Finland under theprovisions of Article J of the 1948 Assistance Agreement.The 1961 Note Cnsis also illustratesFinnish courage under Soviet pressure.and there is little doubt, given the example of the Winter War and World War II,that the Finns would fight tenaciously todefend their country. Major Hagglund Scorrect that Finnish policy is to resist anattempt to carry out an occupation by-force and to resist by force of arms inspite of the overwhelming odds.It is true, however, that the Finnssigned the 1948 Assistance Agreementwith the Soviets which. unfortunately. bySoviet interpretation, implies the Sovietright to station troops in Finland and toassist Finland against German aggression. Fortunately. the Finns have considerable experience and skill in dealing withthe Soviets, sO that this brave peopleremains free in spite of Soviet paranoiaabou t Finland as a possible threat toSoviet security.

COL A. L Romanoski, USA

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ort Leavenworth Hall of ame

In 1970 the Fort Leavenworth Hall of Fame was established to recognize leadersof the United States Army or the Army of the Confederate States of Americawho have been stationed at Fort Leavenworth and who have made a significantcontribution to Army achievement, tradition or heritage. This memorial,co-sponsored by the Command and General Staff College and the HenryLeavenworth Chapter of the Association of the United States Army, conSISts ofa display of bronze shadow boxes in Bell Hall. Within each box is a photographand short biographical sketch of the honored Individual.Each year a panel of esteemed military and civilian leaders and historians selectadditions to the Hall of Fame from a list of nominees, spanning the history ofFort Leavenworth. To date, 27 individuals have been Inducted, to Include HenryLeavenworth, Robert E. Lee, J, E. B. S t ~ a r t Philip H. Sheridan, James F. Bell,George C. Marshall, Dwight D. EISenhower, Matthew Ridgway and MaxwellTaylor. One new addition to this impressive group and the first enlisted man s ohonored-Percival G. Lowe-will be formally inducted dUring the first week inMay 1975.Private Lowe came to Fort Leavenworth in 1849 and campaigned With the FirstDragoons south to Mexico and West to the Rocky Mountains. He terminated hisfive-year Army career at the age of 25 with the rank of first sergeant. As cIviliancontractor with the Quartermaster Department at Fort Leavenworth from 1854to 1859, he was in charge of supply and transportation for various majorexpeditions to the West. After three years In the mercantile and freightingbusiness in Colorado, Lowe settled in Leavenworth. in 1862. He was active incommunity and Civic affairS, becoming preSident of the Leavenworth CityCouncil 186370), sheriff of Leavenworth County 187781) and a member ofthe Kansas State Senate 188589). He was also a member and preSident of theKansas State Historical Society as well as a frequent contributor to that society',publications and to the United States Cavalry Journal. HIS autobiography, FiveYears A Dragoon is a classic of the early West and covers the period between theMexican and Civil Wars.


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~ ~ ~ ~ PROJE TION ~ ~ ~ O OThe Role of U Military Power

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Stokes III United States Army et a .

S ERIOUS study of the role of USmilitary power in the 1990s isoften dismissed as being either unimportant or infeasible and, therefore, awaste of time. No one will deny thepitfalls involved in long-range planning. The complexities of the dynamics of global interaction are clearenough to planners, futurists andmodel builders. But, to national powermanagers, the need to grapple withthe future should be equally clear; thealternative to not planning for thelong haul is to ignore vital needs ofthe future or treat them with such

superficiality that events control USsecurity rather than the United Stateshavi ng even the possibi i t; of pu 1 -posefully influencing events.

For the United States. the questionfor the 1990s is not whether or notpower should be projected, but how itCan be projected to best sen e nationalinterests and contribute to reasonablestability in the world. Traditionally.emphasis has been placed upon the de-velopment of military strategy andforce capabilities to meet perceivedthreats. Inadequate attention has beengiven to the use of military power to

This article is based on a research project conducted by the following members of the class, 01 1974 at the US Army War College: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew P Chambers. US Army:Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Connolly. US Air Force: Colonel Alfred M. Gray Jr US MarineCorps: Colonel John L Heiss III. US Army: Lieutenant Colonel William M. Stokes III, US Army:and Lieutenant Colonel Howard C. Whittaker. The faculty research leader was Lieutenant Colonel.Lewis S. Sorley III. US Army. Department 01 Military Planning and Strategy.

May 1975
http:///reader/full/Wbittak.erhttp:///reader/full/Wbittak.er


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PDWER PRDJECTIDN 99D

help support national objectives andpolicy .\lilitary power projection willbe an important ingredient in the nation' ability, to renuce the need forwarfighting through deterrence andleverage.

HOW THE WORLD WILL BE IN 199

When the 19908 begin, it is lIkelythat no global war \\ ill have occurredin the past 4:; yenrs, The CnitedStates and the Soviet lJnion will stillbe the onl; major powers \\ ith formidable capabilities in all aspects of national power, and these two powerswill continue to maintain a competitiverelatiomhip. t is unlikely that a truemultipolar world will have emerged.Western Europe, China and Japan willjoin the Sm'iet Union and the UnitedState as power centers, hut theij lackof balanced power-political, militaryand economic-will preclude the em,ergence of a multipolar balance ofpower. Although a greater permeability will likely exist between polarboundaries, the United States land theSoviet Union will continue to influenceheavily those states attracted to theirp ~ l e s Spheres of influence wiII notexist in the classical sense, however,and a large segment of t h ~ world willremain nonaligned. t will continue tobe in the interest of the United Statesand the Soviet Union to retain oldfriends and attract new ones, and togain support from the nonaligned. world for selected objectives. However, a condominium relationshipcould well develop between the UnitedStates and the USSR. While each polar power will be free to pursue itsnational goals, each will share the responsibility of harnessing major destructive power and supporting co-

operative activities designed to cu-; bdysfunctional international behavior,

Of necessity, in the 1990s, theUSSR will devote more attention tothe development of its resource andindustrial potential. Consequently, itwill become a more balanced power.The Eastern bloc nations will gainfreer access to the Free World, particularly in economic and cultural affairs, resulting in greater accommodation between East and West Europe,lessened tension and increased interdependence, Western Europe will continue to make progress toward political and economic unification, but willremain highly dependent upon energyand raw materials imports. Dependence upon outside resources will helpshape Western Europe's interests andpolicies and tend to solidi fy the European Economic Community. NATOwill remain a political and militaryorganization, but force commitmentswill decrease.

The Middle East will remain anarea of vital interest to Western Europe and Japan; the region will beimportant to US interests althoughour need for Middle Eastern oil willhave decreased significantly. The survival of Israel will continue to be animportant objecti\ e of US foreignpolicy.US interests in Asia will increase,and Soviet interests in the area wiIIcontinue; Southeast Asia, however,will ferment in isolation. Japan willbecome a major economic and politicalpower and is likely to increase its defensive military capabilities. t willremain highly dependent on worldtrade and wiII play an increased rolein regional economic and political associations. China will progress economically, but will not be strong inall aspects of power potential. Consequently. China's influence will be Iim-

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ited primarily to regional affairs.

MERGING N TION L POLICY ND STR TEGY

National self-interest should be themajor determinant of US policies andstrategy for the 1990s. The UnitedStates should pursue policies whichmaintain its position as a key worldpower and which provide it with adequate security. Having ensured suchimperatives. national policies can focus upon courses -of action which promote freedom. Justice. stability andgrowth elsewhere.Recognizing the continuance of aloose bipolar world. US leadership inworld affairs will be essential to harmonious international relations andUS well-being in the 1aaOs. TheUnited States should share international responsibilities to a greaterextent with other states. but keep uppermost among its objectives nationalsecurity and the creation of conditions under which the nation mayflourish. US leadership and contributions to international harmony willdepend upon the ability to integrateand coordinate strong defense programs. revitalize international political arrangements and meet the increasing challenges of internationaleconomicsWhile it is not possible. with anyassurance. to distinguish the specificdetail of US national strategy in the1990s, it is possible to suggest certainthrusts which could lead to programsmore supportive of policy aims. First.it is essential that broader recognitionbe given to the synergistic effect ofintegrated p o w r projection. Thewhole range of US power-political.economic. psychological and mili tarymust be applied in concert and in bal-May 1975

POWER PROJE TION 199ance. Application of integrated powershould permit greater use of nonmilitary means to achieve national goals.Second. more selective use should bemade of alliances and other arrangements. The United States should avoidinv01vement in unwieldy multilateralalignments which restrict flexibility;greater use should be made of bilateral interactions which can be tailoredmore closely to US needs. Abrogationof existing arrangements would notbe required; arrangements could besupported in varying degrees depending upon US needs. Additionally, theUnited States should foster regionalalliances among other states whichcontribute to its interests and security. Third. the United States should.develop a strong preference for solution of disputes by nom iolent means.As competition for limited resourcesincreases and nations continue theirsearch for identity. opportunities forconfrontation will increase. Diplomatic means and economic policiesshould playa greater role in futureconflict resolution. A meaningful capability in conflict resolution will require the fuller development of longneglected diplomatic skills. Finallynational policies must be pursued withthe full support of a strategy of conflict deterrence. backed by effectivemilitary capabilities.

ECONOMIC ND TECHNOLOGIC L CONSIDER TIONS

A comprehensive shaping of n,,tional policies in the lagOs will colorUS perception of the threats and concepts for using military force. Theinternational environment and domestic factors. particularly national will.social perceptions. economic requirements and technological possibilities.


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will help shape the national securityposture . In order to narrow the focusof examination. only the economic andtechnological factors affecting the1990 military posture will be exploredhere since these forces will be the major ones determining the manner inwhich military forre will serve thecountry.

Economic onsiderationsEconomic trends will be determined

largely by political and economic policies of the United States. the SovietUnion. China. Western Europe andJapan Population growth. food distribution. technological progress. the gapbetween developed and developing nations. social change and the organization of economic structures will havea dynamic Impact on economic relationships.The world population will exceedfive billion by 1990 if the presentgrowth rate is maintained. The highest growth rates will occur in regionsleast able to cope with them. Population pressures will widen the economicgap between the developed and developing countries and o n t i n u ~ to restrain general e con 0 m i c progress.Global food requirements will be enormous. Satisfaction of these food needswould contribute to international stability and. thereby. US security.

atural resour es will ontinue tohe of world concern and will be a potential source of international conflict. The distribution of strategicresources may change geopoliticalpower relationships. The Soviet Unionis likely to be the most self-sufficientnation with respect to natural resources. The lack of hard mineral resources will make it virtually impossible for many underdeveloped regionsto establish heavy industrial bases. Ofgreat significance is the potential end

of petroleum products as a criticalenergy source by the 21st Century.The diminution of oil supplies willrequire an acceleration of efforts tocreate alternative energy sources andwill impact upon the petrochemicalindustry.

Continued efforts will be made toassist developing nations in meetinginfrastructure and social needs. t isunlikely that strong international supervision will develop to tend comprehensive multilateral programs. Andsome aid recipients probably will continue to abuse assistance by applyingit to less essential prestige projects.

Increased economic interdependencewill be a major feature of international relations. Such interdependenceoffers the United States prospects ofboth cooperation and internationalfriction. The possibility of a moresatisfactory sharing of raw materials.greater stability in trade and improved international economic procedures could better both economies andinternational understanding amongparticipating states. On the otherhand. greater competition for scarceresources and world markets-hothlegitimate s t t e objectives-couldprove destabilizing. National interestswill dictate the degree of cooperation.

With international economics assuming greater importance. consideration must he given to the interrelationship between military force andeconomics. t is unlikely that militaryintervention will he requited to support US economic objectives. Nevertheless. allied perceptions of US contributions in the event of aggressionand security assistance programs unquestionably will buttress US economic interests. Similarly. US economic pursuits will support securityaims. The economic-military link willbe ohvious to potential adversaries.

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Technological ConsiderationsNational strategy in the 1990s will

require continued translation of scien-tific knowledge into practical use.Technology. will be essential to thedevelopment of effective economic andmilitary capabilities and to the abilityto project these elements of nationalpower. No nation is likely to surpassthe United States in balanced technological capabilities d u r i n g the1990s, but there will be increasedchallenges to our leadership in thisfield. The United States must seektechnological capabilities which reducedependence upon external resourcesand help overcome the environmentindustrial conflict.

Six major areas of technology areof particular concern to the 1990smilitary strategy:

The United States should improve existing means of destructionand develop new ones while seekingcapabilities for reducing the destructive potential of its own and enemyweapons. eapon development may becircumscribed by arms control agreements, but such agreements will notdiminish the need to explore improvements in explosives, propellants, fuz-ing, accuracy, range, system platforms, defenses, noise and weight.

During the next 20 years, technology should be capable of producingvirtually any commann, control andcommnnication ~ y ~ t e m necessary tosupport military requirements if thenation is willing to pay for it. o -mand and control problems of the19 1Os are likely to he associated morewith um a n decisionmaking thantechnological capabilities.

T e c h n o l o g ~ - will permit advancesin the collection, processing and eval-uation of intelligence information, aswell as means to protect data. Tech-nological capabilities will permit meas-May 1975

POWER PROJECTION 199urement of potential enemy capabilities and contribute to the assessmentof intentions. Developments will permit improvement of electronic warfare and countermeasure capabilities,but So\ iet strengths in these fieldswill prevent a significant relative ad-vantage from accruing.

Logistics capabilities can be de-veloped in the 1990s to support military requirements adequately. Funding, however, will continue to retardthe fielding of all desired supportmeans. No major breakthroughs willhave occurred in transportation o ys-tems although strategic mobility improvements will permit more rapiddeployment of greatel tonnages.

ower requirement.s and l e- tsource availability will spur the ex-pansion of nuclear power and thedevelopment of other power sources.Nuclear power will become more eco-nomical in its application to maritimetransportatIOn although its practicality for aircraft use is unlikel, to hm ebeen realized.

Within reasonable bounds ofcost and effectiveness. the UnitedStates \\ ill continue to dewlop capabilities for replacing human resourceson the battlefield \\ ith materiel. De-sirable as this goal m a ~ be. sO,ldierswill remain essential to the proper ap-plication of military f o r l ~ . They wiIIremain the final arbiters of the hattlefield

N TION L POLICY ND THE THRE T

Processes for deriving and executing national policies will be essentiallythe same in the 1990s. The nationalpurpose and supportive goals and appraisals of the domestic and foreignenvironments wiII provide the direc-

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POWER PROJE TION 199

tiim for military policies and strategy.The militarY establishment will remain a key contributor to the successful accomplishment of national objectives.

The capabilities of potential adversaries will continue to be a majorfactor in the development of militarystrategy and forces. Hopefully, how-eve,', the 1990s will bring us closer toan ability to judge intentions withina satisfactory range of accuracy. Ma-jor adversary intentions will be ofgreater importance to military strategy in the future; greater ~ s k s canbe assumed where perceived intentions and eapabilities do not threatenUS vital interests. The only vital secUl'ity interest in the 1990s will bethe protection of the United Statesagainst di ect attack.

Technology, economic growth andperceived. threats will result in increased capabilities for military aggression in the 1990s. Only the majo 'states, however. will be capable oflarge-scale military aggression. Insurgen ies and civil w r ~ will continueto be facts of life, and wars win con-tinue among lesser powers. Threatperception by the enited States willchange, and the threshold of threatidentification vIII be raised. US interest in presel'\'ing international harmony should continne into the future,but greater tolerance should he shownfor lesser conflicts.

MILIT RY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1990s

I t will remain axiomatic in the1990s that military forces will be required for deterrence and defense. Asa minimum, military forces will beneeded to guarantee US survival.However, US leadership in interna-

tional affairs can only be achieved ifour relations are underpinned bystrong military forces.

Therefore, military forces will berequired for national policy leverage,as well as deterrence and defense.Military forces should not functionmerely as an insurance policy, butmust be integrated fully with the diplomatic and economic aspects of foreign policy. US military forces in the1990s should be designed primarily toI e d u c e the need for warfightingthrough deterrence and leverage. I t isunlikely that radical changes will oc-cur in security philosophy; suchchanges are frequently destabilizing.Incremental shifts in policies for theuse of military forces are more likely.

The major role for military forceswill be deterrence of hostilities whichcould result in major attacks againstUS geographic areas-the only vitalUS interest. Another important objec-tive of dete,rence will be preventionof major hostilities im'olving otherworld power centers and states closelya11ied with the polar powers. Deterrence of conflicts which could resultin a US-Soviet confrontation will beessentia1. Forces will be required tosupport US and Soviet condominiumefforts to create and maintain reasonable stability in the world. Deterrentactions may be jointly declared oragreed upon in secret.

The increasing interdependence ofstates in international economics andthe need for the United States to remain a world political and economicleader require leverage forces forachievement of a reasonable degree ofpolitical support in international activities. Leverage forces should beused to discourage interference withpursuit of economic objectives and toprovide alternative means of positjv2action in support of stability opera-

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tions. Stability operations might in-clude the p p l i ~ t i o n of US forceswith other national power) in a se-

curity assistance role and the threatof direct involvement i f necessary.

Military forces must permit theUnited States to emerge from anyconllict under conditions which ensuresurvival of the nation. Credible warfighting capabilities are needed forboth deterrence and leverage. Whileit is unlikely that the United Stateswill be required to participate in afull range of conllicts capabilitiesmust be maintained at a reasonablelevel. Military forces should be capa-ble of a full spectrum of violencebounded only by technological andeconomic feasibility.Conllict control will depend onstrong mi l i t r y forces economicstrength, national will and adept po-litical efforts. Complete control willnot always be possible or desirableMay 975

UMRRO

however. t may be in the interest ofthe United States to permit certainwars to run their courses. Generallyspeaking, it is best to terminate hos-tilities as quickly as possible. Earlytermination, however may not in allcases permit negotiations to evolve inways most favorable to US interests.Early and excessive use of powercould result in spasmodic actions andless rational application of militarypower.

NEED FOR M SS DESTRUCTIVE CAPABIlITIES

Mass destructive capabilities mustcontinue to be developed; the alternative is not to develop such capabilitieswhile other states do. Mass destructive capabilities are essential to theprotection of our one vital interest,and they should contribute to deter-


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POWER PROJECTION 99D

rence, warfighting and leverage.A Strategic Package (STRATPAC)will be an essential ingredient of anyviable strat'egy for the 1990s. TheSTRATP AC should consist of threemajor interrelated components: technology, control and strategic application. The central focus of STRATPACplanning would be the strategic application of forces, but parallel. interrelated efforts would be made in technolog,' and contl Ol. The product of thethree STRATPAC components , auldbe the strategic concept for the use ofrna destructive power. T.he impetusfOl a concept may origin te fromtechnological con,iderations, planningfor strategic application, or the needfor control. A more traditional viewholds that strategy drives technology;this article suggests that recommendationR concerl1ing m ss destructivepower rna? be driven by technologyand control needs as well as strategicplannmg.

The control aspect of STRA TPACwill continue to include the conventional approaches to arms limitationswe know today. The major djfferencein the concept for the future will liein the fulltlme effort that would gomto control development concurrentwith force development. Control willinteract with technology. The need forcontl Ol may drive technology-for example, control may require particularcapabilities for verification, communications or discrete application. Technological development, on the otherhand, may generate the need for newmeans of control 01 a different application of existing control mechanisms.The key feature of the control-technology relationship is the concurrencyaspect. As technology proceeds inweapons development, it is essentialthat efforts be made to defend againstsuch weapons and to devise measures1

to control their application.Strategic application planning may

precede or lag behind development ofthe technology and control componentsof STRATPAC, but its function meldsthe other components into the besttechniques for applying deterrenceand leverage in order to c6mpress anddiminish the need for warfighting insupport of national policy.

The Triad (a reasoned mix ofmanned aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launchedballistic missiles) will continue to bea feature of US military strategy.The Triad will provide a greaterrange of 'options than a single systern.

Research should cOlltlllue into theapplication of nonnuclear mass destruction weapons. While the UnitedStates has declared an unwillingnessto employ chemIcal and biologicalweaponR, continued ex min tion ofsuch weapons is vital fmm a defensive standpoint. Other means mustalso be explored.

The application of STRA TPAC toconflicts short of general war meritsfurther study. Roles might include thecreation of electromagnetic radiationfields to hinder enemy command andcontrol capabilities at critical periodsduring a battle, assistance in antisuhmarine operations and support forantishipping operations. Such an application of strategic forces shouldnot be permitted to degrade survivalforces, however. Concepts for employing strategic weapons in conditionsother than general war must be predicated upon the ability to create anawareness by other major nuclearstates that the actions do not constitute a threat to their vital interests.While capabilities should exist forengaging in nuclear exchanges on aselected basis, a meaningful and con-

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trollable concept for subholocaust ex-changes on national soil seems unlikely du ring the next 20 years.

NEED FOR A T CTIC L P CK GE

Like the Strategic Package, theTactical Package (T ACPAC) wouldbe developed to dampen enthusiasmfor warfighting as a means of resolv-ing international issues by extendingthe boundaries. of deterrence. TheTACPAC would be designed to minimize the intensity of hostilities regardless pf the US .point of entry onthe conllict spectrum. The most usefulapplication of TACPAC forces, how-ever, would .be their role in providingleverage for national policies. TAC-PAC forces, with obvious usablepower, can playa more active role insupporting power projection thanSTRATPAC forces which will be ableto provide a broad backdrop of deterrence with their enormous, but lessIIsable, power.

TACPAC forces will contribute tothe deterrence of major aggression aswell as military power projection bylesser states. Effective deterrence willhinge on credible capabilities to proJect military power and the perceivedwill to use such power. The nationalstrategy, therefore, must integratemilitary power in a more obvious way.Deterrence creates the essential shieldbehind which all foreign policy initiatives must be undertaken; deterrentcapabilities support power projectionby the United States and block suchprojection against US interests. Credible TACPAC war-fighting capabilities will be required for both deterrence and leverage.

Catered conllicts will be characteristic of the 1990s. Both the UnitedMay 1975

POWER PROJE TION 1990States and the Soviet Union will usesecurity assistance for leverage. TheTACPAC concept would recognizethis fact and consider the cateringof \\ rs or cQunterin:; urgencies con :currently with the So\iets. t mayalso be considerably cheaper for theUnited States to help restore ravagedareas than to participate in conllictsas a combatant. The TACP C conceptenvisions the use of vacuum forces toensure reasonable regional stabilitywhile selected conllicts are underway.Vacuum forces would be tailored torestrict external imolvement in astate or region s affairs Vacuumforces would not be interventionforces as such and, therefore, wouldbe tailored to insulate the conflictnrea.

Successful T ACP C power projection will require the support of mod-ern technology and employment con-cepts. New weapons will be requiredwith capabilities for more discreteapplication and increased range andaccuracy. Technology must focus onthe nagging, but critical, problem ofimproved tactical and strategic mo-bility to permit the rapid deploymentand buildup of military power and in-creased battlefield mobility for thdispersed maneuver patterns of future conllicts. However, the excite-ment of innovation should not be permitted to obscure the utility of triedconcepts and proven materiel.

The strategic initiatives suggestedhere offer meaningful possibilities forsecurity in the world of the 1990s andrealistic expectations of the ability toproject power commensurate with ournational goals and responsibilities.Hard as it is to predict the future,the relative insensitivity of theseinitiatives to variations in the worldenvironment offers some assurance oftheir usefulness. ~


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What Should e the United States

POSITIONONCHEMICALWARFAREDISARMAMENT?Major Ray W. Bills,nited States rmy

T HE United States has tradi-tionally followed a no-first-usepolicy with respect to chemical andbiological warfare (CBW). The development of a CBW arsenal was pursuedto acquire a deterrent and retaliatorycapability. The possession Ofl such acapability was an effeetive deterrentduring World War II where nonuseappeared to be the result of both sideshaving the capability and the exchangeof assurances that they would observethe Geneva Protocol of 1925. 1 Additionally. no substantiated l e ordexists of CBW being used by any ofthe powers involved in the Korean

. Conflict. 2Governmental interest and attentionto our CBW programs have been sporadic, rising during times of identifiedor perceived threats and public reaction. The use of chemical warfareCW) agents by the Axis Powers inWorld War 1 created an immediate demand for an intensified program of2

developing our own capabilities. Thisinterest subsided after World War II.and our efforts in CEW were, minimaluntil the late 1950s and early 19608

hen Congressional im estigations determined that our CBW capabilitiesand civil preparedness were not adequate to meet the Soviet threat. , j Thisrenewed effort continued into our involvement in the Vietnam conflictwhere our employment of riot-controlagents and herbicides brought adversereactions from the general US public,the scientific community and the international community. Many feltthat the use of these agents in Vietnam was contrary to the Geneva Pro-tocol which we espoused even thoughwe had not ratified it. The employment of herbicides and riot-controlagents by US forces in Vietnamcreated an international environmentconducive for a thorough review ofOur CBW policies.

In November 1969. President Rich- ilitaryReview


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ard M. Nixon declared that the UnitedStates would not produce or use offen-sive biological weapons of any kindand would destroy all its existingstocks; chemical weapons would beused only in retaliation for use ofsimilar weapons by an enemy.5 InFebruary 1970 President Nixon addedtoxins to the ban of biological weapons. Since those 1969 and 1970 statements, the United States has beeninstrumental in formulating a conference treaty for multilateral disarmament of biological weapons. 7 Thistreaty, negotiated by the Conferenceof the Committee on Disarmament inGeneva was signed by 89 nations on10 April 1972 and was sent to the USSenate for advice and consent to ratification on 10 August 1972. H ArticlesIX and XII of the Biological Treatyobligate the signatory nations to workdiligently for an effective prohibitionof CW weapons. 9 In May 1973 President Nixon again reiterated his desireto achieve effective international restraints on chemical weapons. 10

Historically, there have been manyattempts to create international agreements for the control of chemicalwarfare. The first major attemptwas the Hague Conference of 1899which proposed that all signatory na-

Major Ray W. Bills is assigned toHeadquarters, US Army ugwayProving Ground, Dugway, Utah. Hereceived a B.S. in Agronomy and anM.S. in Botany from Utah State Uni-versity, a Ph.D. in Botany and Genet-ics from Washington State Univer-sity and is a 1974 graduate of theUSACGSC. Previous assignments in-clude serving as Instructor and As-sistant Professor in the Departmentof Chemistry, USMA; Plant Scientistfor herbicide damage investigations,May 975

CHEMIC L W RF RE DIS RM MENT

tions agree to abstain from usingprojectiles which had the sole purposeof disseminating asphyxiating or dele-terious gases. The United States wasthe only participating nation to refuseto sign the agreement. The US rep-'resentative, Navy Captain Alfred T.Mahan, felt that gas projectiles werenot fully developed at that time andthat gas warfare was as humane as.other forms of warfare. From theemotional abhorrence generated byuse of gas warfare by the Axis Powers in World War I came additionalconference proposals for control of gaswarfare. The Versailles Treaty of1919 pr9hibited German productionof gas weapons. The United States didnot ratify this treaty primarily be-cause of its provisions establishing aLeague of Nations. The United Statesalso viewed the terms of the treaty tobe applicable only to Germany. TheWashington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments opened in Washington, D C . in 1921. During a ses-sion of that conference in 1922. theUnited States submitted a proposalcalling for universal prohibition ofCBW. This proposal was incorporatedas Article \Lin the Washington Treatyof 6 February 1922. The treaty, requiring ratification by all signatory

US Military Assisfance Command,Vietnam; and Division Chemical Of-ficer, 25th Infantry Division. Vietnam.3


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US All Force planes spraya dense jungle in Vietnamwith a defoliating liquid

nation, before becoming an effectiveinternational treaty. was signed ahdratified by the l'nited States. However. because France failed to ratify,it never became an effective ipternational document. In June 1925. theGeneva Protocol was signed by 29 nations. The protocol prohibits the usein war of chemical and biologicalagents by all signatory nations. Manynations signed and ratified the protocol with first-use reservations. Tothese nations the protocol, in effect,prohibits only the first use of CBWagents in war. The first-use reserva-

. tions permit retaliatory employmentof chemical and biological agentsagainst any nation initiating a CBWattack. The United States signed theprotocol without reservations. but theSenate rejected ratification. The principles of the protocol were espousedby 'President Roosevelt as US policyduring World War II .even though t4

had not been ratified by the Senate.;; The Geneva Protocol. the most, widely accepted international agree' ment on the control of chemical warfare, has been signed by 84 nationsand ratified by most major world po,,-

ers except the United States. ' TheUnited Nations Resolutions of 1966and 1968 call upon all member nationsto adhere to the restrictions on chemical warfare set forth in the protocol. Following these leads, PresidentNixon in August 1970 resubmittedthe protocol to the US Senate for ratification with the interpretation thatthe United States did not consider teal'gas and herbicides to be covered bythe protocol. The United States is inthe minority in this interpretation,and there is considerable pressure tochange this interpretation. The SenateForeign Relations Committee has refused to rati fy the protocol until thedministr tion reviews its reserv -tIOns on tear gas and herbicides.Opposition to the administration'sposition is based primarily on the UGeneral Assembly vote on Resolution2603A which takes the position that

the protocol does cover tear gas andherbicides and the feeling that theuse of tear gas and herbicides is abasis for proliferation and escalationof CWo 'US annual spending on CBW programs went from $10 to $20 millionin the early 1950s following the Korean War to $350 million (which in

c ~ d e s procurement of smoke andflame weapons) in the late 1960s. , In the late 1950s. Congressional investigations determined that both theoffensive and defensive CBW capability of the United States lagged significantly behind the capabilities ofthe Soviet Union. The feeling prevailed that an adequate offensive anddefensive capability was essential to

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maintain an effective deterrent. Efforts in research and development andin testing and evaluation were greatlyexpanded, and new technologies wereapplied to improve our CBW capa-bility. '

Expansion of our CBW capabilitiescontinued until 1968 when a nerveagent from Dugway Proving Ground,Utah, was implicated as a possiblecause of the death of several thousandsheep in the adjacent Skull Valley.The chemical agent was thought tohave drifted off the pl'Oving groundfollowing an aerial spray. The reactions to the Dugway incident and theadverse reactions to our employmentof riotcontrol agents and herbicidesin Vietnam brought our CBW programs under close scrutiny by thepublic, press, Congress, universitystudents and the scientific community.P,'ess criticism of our C W programs in the late I(J60s was led byjournalist Seymour Hersh 10 and theeditOl' of The Nell York Times.Hersh stated in one article that, Thewhole subject of CBW has overtonesof horror and revulsion that far outstrip the world's fears of nuclear holocallst. The editor of The Nell YorkTilllCs. commenting on the positionthat C W programs are necesMry fordeterrence. stated that. A deterrentwhich would have consequences no onecan foresee or calculate more in-credible than credible.Congressional concern and opposition to the then-current CBW programs was led by RepresentativeRichard D. :\icCarthy from NewYork. ' n McCarthy was concerned overthe cloak of security classification under which our programs developed andwhich did not permit public aWarenessor debate on US policies. He also feltthat our stated policy of no first use

w ~ being reversed by initiativesMay 1975


from the Defense Department. Hisactions were instrumental in focusingpublic attention on the United States'CBW programs and policies. Publicawareness was also intensified bypress publication of Defense Department plans to dispose of excess nerveagents at sea and the accompanyingtransfer of the agents from manufacturing sites to coastal embarkationfor oceanic disposal or new storagesites :. 1

The intensified investigations intoour CBW programs disclosed that several universities in the United Stateswere conducting classified scientificresearch on CBW under Governmentcontracts. This knowledge, coupledwith student dissidence over our involvement in Vietnam. resulted instudent and faculty demonstrationsdemanding the termination of all suchresearch contracts.Opposition to our CBW programsfrom the scientific community intensified rapidly in the I(J68-70 time period. Individual scientists and largef cientific associations decried our useof tear gas and herbicides in Vietnamand our programR of CBW reRearchand development. They called for cessation of the then-current researchand development programs and appliedprofessional pressure on scientists involved in these efforts to terminatethei r support of the programs. 0.\Typical of the scientific community'sreaction was that of the AmericanChemical Society. In EJ25. this organization recommended t h t theUnited States not ratify the GenevaProtocol. The society took the positionthat nonlethal. temporary incapacitating chemical agents that may be developed would make war more humane. In 1970. the society reversedits position and urged the Senate toratify the protocol. However. it did

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support the administration's interpre-tation excluding tear gas and herbi-cides from the protocol. In 1073, thesociety again changed its position andurged ratification of the protocol toinclude tear gas and herbicides. ',Opinions on the need for an, activeCW program are varied and controversial.'r, Proponents for an activeprogram argue that the best defenseis a good offensive capability. Theycite the publicly available informationon Soviet capabilities and their statedposition of planned use of CW in anyfuture war. They argue that a viableretaliatory capability is essential to aneffective deterrence, often citing the

. effectiveness of our capability as adeterrent in World War II. Proponents also argue that a CW capabilitygives the United States additional response flexibility by providing an option between an extended conventionalengagement and the employment ofnuclear weapons.In today's i n t e r n ~ i o n l environ-16

field crews in protectiveclothing and mask prepare a CWagentfilledtank for loading oan aircraft during atesting program

ment, the availability of an option between the employment of conventionalor nuclear weapons may be of greatersignificance than previously thought.From the end of World War II to theearly 1960s, the United States enjoyeda position of worldwide nuclear superiority which provided an unquestioned umbrella of security to theUnited States and its Allies. This nu-clear umbrella was thought to be anadequate deterrence against all formsof warfare. A recent study conductedby the Stanford Resem ch Institute(SRI) concludes that, in the currentinternational environment, a policy ofrelying on nuclear superiority as adeterrent to chemical attacks maycreate some major difficulties.20 Thereport states that the achievement of:approximate nuclear parity be-tween the U.S. and the USSR andthe S t I te g c Arms LimitationsAgreement have tended to modify the'Ole of strategic nuclear weapons as adeterrent to all types of warfare.

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This s t a t erne n t takes on evengreater significance when one con-siders the number of additional nations in the world who are currentlydeveloping nuclear capabilities. TheSRI report further states that the roleof the nuclear umbrella as a broaddeterrence has been narrowed to justone of the strong links in the chain ofdeterrence. f this p o ~ t o n is true,then the capability of nuclear weaponsto deter the use of chemical weaponsmay be significantly reduced.

There are numerous discussionsand evaluations of the Soviet CWcapability in the open Iiterature. kSome estimates indicate their capability is superior to that of the UnitedStates. Their military are well-trainedin offensive and defensive CW tactics.and estimates of up to 30 million ofthe civilian population have beentrained in CW defensive measures.t is known that the Soviets took German toxic gas production plants backto the USSR at the end of World WarII. The technology and facilities acquired from the Germans served asthe foundation for a vigorous CW research and development p ro g r amThere are published quotes from So-viet :llarshal Zhukov made in the early1950s that the Soviets viewed chemical and biological weapons as part ofan accepted and usable arsenal in anygeneral wars of the future .. MajorGeneral Drugov of the Military Medi-cal Service of the Red A rmy stated onthe 49th anniversary of the greatOctober Revolution that their scien-tists regarded research on the actionsof poisons and the development ofantidotes to be their patriotic duty.Soviet Army divisions have chemicallytrained personnel and units down tobattalion level. Some authors have estimated that as much as one-third ofthe Soviet's basic artillery load isMay 975


chemical munitions.:\' In a statementgiven on 9 May 1974 before the Subcommittee on National Security Pol-icy and Scientific Development of theHouse Foreign Affairs Committee.Mr. Amos A. Jordan. the Acting As-sistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, statedthat the Defense Department viewedthe CW preparedness of the SovietUnion and Warsaw Pact countries asa potential threat to US forces in Europe and elRewhere. Mr. Jordan alsostated that:the efense Depart11lent be-lieved thut the USSR is better pre-pal ed to operate offensively and de-fensively in a chemic l U'U1" are en-llil onment th n ny otlier n tion inthe world. .

Many opponents of an active CWprogram argue that the retaliatoryflexibility provided by a CW capability is ineffective and unnecessary.They feel that our nuclear capabilityis a sufficient deterrent to aggressionagainst the United States or its Al-lies. Opponents further argue that anactive CW program provides an incentive for a continned arms race; addi-tionally. CW weapons represent arelatively cheap mass destruction ca-pability for small nations not havinga nuclear capability nor the means toacquire it. Proliferation. a, argued byCW opponents. greatly enhances thedestructh'e capability of smaller nations and has the potential to changethe world power balance. A recent. United Nations study concludes that.The momentum of the arms racewould clearly decrease if production

of (CBW) weapons were effectivelyand unconditionally banned.

The safety problems inherent inhandling, transferring and storingtoxic chemical agents have been thesubject of investigation for a number

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of years. The United States has developed binary munitions which significantly decrease the hazards ofhandling, transfer and storage. Thesemunitions al e filled with two nonlethalcompounds separated by a rupturablemembrane. Onl,' when the membraneis ruptured b;. firing or detonation dothe nonlethal components mix to formthe lethal CW agent. The Defense Department has ann a I I y requestedmoney for continued research and development of the binary concept,basing its request on the need to modernize our aging s t o ~ k p i l s in order tomaintain a deterrent and retaliatorycapability. . In November 1973, Mrs.Alva ;'vlyrdal. the retiring Swedishrepresentative to the disarmamentconference, stated that development ofthe binal''v concept would only contribute to a continued chemical armsrace and urged that t not be developed If} Th S same sentiment was ex-pressed by :\11 . Fred C. Ikle, the Director of the US ArmR Control andDisarmament Agenc;.' (ACDA). 37 br.Hebe t Scmille .J '., l l testimony givenon 3 Octoher 9n before a subcommittee of the 1l0uRe of Rep ',aReptativesCommittee on Armed Services, statedthe increased safety of handling andtranRPorting binary munitions mayincrease the potential for their use byextremists and terrorists. lIe also expressed a concern that binary technology may make the use of CW more

ttr ctive to many countries in theworld II>.The current position of the Defense. Department and the Department of

the Army is that the United Statesdoes need a credible deterrent and retaliatory capability,:m All availableinformation indicates that we are opposed by a potential enemy possessingan excellent CW capability and an active research and development pro-18

Soviet mlJitary re welltra ned in ollensiveand defensive chemical warfare taclics

gram. A current debate in the UnitedStates concerns the question of whythe Soviets continue their CW efforts.Many feel that they do t to maintaina retaliatory and deterrent forceagainst a known L:S capability. Theargument, then, i that any increa,ein our own CW programs is a provocation for continued Soviet activity anda resultant proliferation in the CWarms race. The inherent worldwideimplications of such a proliferationcreate strong preRsures for CW disarmament Many in the United Statesfeel strongly that we should take moreof the initiative in CW disarmamenteven if it iR unilateral action on ourpart. 40

Numerous segments of our society.. press for US ratification of the Ge-

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neva Protocol without the exclusion ofherbicides and tear gas. Such a ratification would not only contribute to amore precise definition of US policy,but would also bring the UnitedStates in line with the interpretationheld by the great majority of the international community. An additionalsignificant benefit of ratification wouldbe an increasell US credibility in theinternational arena. t must be pointedout, however, that ratification of theprotocol lIoes not represent an agreement on rlisarmament, nOr does i t fulfill the obligation imposed the biologica I treaty to strive for a total CWdisarmament agreement. The GenevaProtocol is a pledge against use ofCBW agents in war among signatorynations. t does not prevent any nation from pursuing an active ew rle-velopment program or the maintenanceof a retaliatory capability.

Fulfillment of our obligation to Articles IX and XII of the n72 Biologi-cal Treaty imposes the pursldt oftotal CW disarmament. The SovietUnion has proposed enw disarmament since ID52. The initial proposals did not address details forinternational enforcement of agreements. The Cnited States has agreedtn principle with the tnitial Sovietproposal but called for a continuousgygtem of disclosures and on site in-'peetions to assure compliance withany treaty agreements. The SovietsreJected the US inspection and verifi-cation proposals. They have contendedsince 1946 that each nation party to adisarmament agreement should determine whether it had violated theagreell]ent by national verificationmeans. Since 1962, there has been acontinuous effort by the disarmamentconference to negotiate a ew treaty.Numerous proposals have been submitteu by the United States, the USSRay 975


and Britain with comments and recommendations from other nations atthe conference. During tlie 1974 session, the conference heard testimoniesof experts on the various technical aspects of CW disarmament and con-sidered a draft disarmament proposalsubmitterl by Japan. 10

Disagreements on a eBW . ~ t r e a t ycentered principally on two aspects:the Soviet insistence that both chemical and biologIcal s>'stems be includerl10 the same treaty anrl the US insistence for on site inspection. Recog-nizing the rlifference in strategic valueof hiological and chemical weaponsand the greater unpredictability ofhiological weapons, Britain wbmitteda propo "al to make .separate treatiesfor biological and chemical warfare

s ~ s t e m s . They also subrvitted a draftbiological treat> which was acceptedand formed the basis for the BIOlogi-cal Treaty signed in 1 l72.

Attempb to de\'elop a treaty similar to the bIOlogical one for chemicalwarfare systcms go on. The principal difficulty in the current negotiations is the continuerl rlifferences between the United Slates and theSoviet Union concerning inspectionand verification means. The Sovietseompletely reject and claim they \\ llne\'er accept l 'S proposals for on-sIteinspections to assnre treaty compliance. The United States is adamant inits demand for on-site inspection andt o n t i n u e ~ to present working paperson this subject to the disarmamentconference. The United States iscurrently stUdying alternative verifi-cation procedures submitted duringthe 1974 session of the disarmamentconference. -.

Under a contract from the ACDA,the Midwest es e a r c h Institute(MRI) has c"onducted extensive investigations into the technical and verifi-

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CHEMIC L W RF RE DIS RM MENT. cation aspects of a chemical and biological arms control agreement. Considering the technical aspects ofagent production ahd production-related p r o c e s s e ~ the MRI studies conclude that the only foolproof methodof verification of any CBW armsagreement is on-site inspection byhighly qualified technical personnel.Any methods short of on-site inspection can, at best, only detect indicationof activity in the CRW area. Theseindirect indicators can easily he manipulated by any party desiring tobreech the terms of any disarmamentagreement

Disarmament can be viewed fromthree aspects: unilateral, bilateral andmultilateral. t s imperative that theconditions created b:c each of theseaspects be e\ aluated n determining aposition for negotiations. An announced unilateral policy would definitely demonstrate the sincerity ofour position and would represent asholl of leadership to the rest of theworld, Disadvantages to a unilate;alpolicy include the loss of a deterrentand retaliatory capability. This lossmay invite the use of CW against usby other nations. Our only recourseto a CW attack would be a conventional or nuclear retaliation. Nuclearretaliation wou Id create the possibility of escalation to a nuclear holocaust.A bilateral disarmament agreementbetween the United States and the Soviet Union would make a significantcontribution to the easing of worldtensions and would demonstrate aventure of joint leadership to theworld. A bilateral agreement would,however, increase US vulnerability toa CW attack from Third World countries. Any bilateral agreement wouldhave to include verifiable safeguardsto ensure that neither party to the2

U Marines in lull W protective clothing during atraining exercise at Dugway ProYing Ground Utah

agreement could supply lts allied natlOns with a W capability. As in thecase of a unilateral agreement, a bilateral agreement would make boththe United States and the Soviet{Jnion vulnerable to threats fromsmaller Third World nations having aCW capability. Both nations wouldhave to depend upon their conventional and nuclear superiority as adeterrent to a CW attack.

The most ideal type of disarmamentagreement would be a multilateral oneinvolving as many nations of theworld as possible. Such an agreementwould certainly ease international tensions and possibly result in improvedmutual relationships in the world

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community. The greatest drawback toa multilateral agreement would be anincreased vulnerability of treaty nations from nonsignatory nations. Thisvulnerability raises the question of thedesirability of a total disarmament.f disarmament is not total, then one

is left with the difficult que,tion ofspecifying wh t me sures re purelydefensive and what limits should beplaced on defensive actions. Thesequestion s are of extreme importanceand demand exacting answer,.

Essential to any bilateral or multilateral disarmament agreement isprovi,ion for adequate verification ofcompliance by all signatories. Lack ofadequate verification techniques couldresult in a sigmficant gain in theworld power balance by any nationwho choose, to ignore the terms ofthe treaty while other nations adhereto it. The question of verification techniques is currently the major stumbling block to a multilateral disarmament agreement. The Soviets accusethe United States of playing politicswith the disarmament conference. TheUnited State, rightly views the So-viet reluctance for on-site inspection

s reason for suspicion of their trueintentions.

As we enter the era of Mtenle andpeaceful coexistence, we may hope forthe development of a transideologicalconsensus, described by Aspaturian,in which different social and ideo-logical systems could interact and co-

operate rather than function as com-petitors. ' Such a consensus wouldf/)rm the foundation of greater mu-tual trust between the two great superpowers. This development of mutual trust is essential for the achieve-ment of the goals for exchangebetween the United States and theSoviet Union declared' in the jointcommunique released by PresidentMay 975


Nixon and Secretary Brezhne\ in1974. Exchange of ;cientific information was included as a desi red area ofexchange. A free exchange of industrial c hem i c a I information accom-panied by on-site visits to productionplants represent a major first step to-ward a meanlllgful CW dIsarmamentagreement. Until such an exchauge ofinformation can be assured, the USs i g n t u r e on a (,W disal'mamenttreaty, bilateral or multilateral, woul


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CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT

The US Senate ratified both the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972Biological Weapons Convention on 16 December 1974. The votes for ratification were a unanimous 90 to 0 for both treaties. The Geneva Protocolwas ratified with a first-use r e s e J ~ v a t i o n which states that the protocolwill cease to he binding upon the United States in regard to first-use ofCW by any state or its allies. With tegard to herbicides and riot-controlagents, the United States has reserved the right to use herbicides toclear vegetat;on around US basps and to use riot-control agents in situations where civilian lives are endangered. In cases where riot-controlagents are to be used, their use will be under the same restrictions imposed for similar use within the United States. l>President Ford signed the instruments of ratification for both the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention on 22 January1975. The action officially binds the United States as a party to both international agreements nn chemical and biological warfare.

:"OTESIFl"f'rlf'nrk .J Rrllwn. rh(,1n'f' u l li '(lTfnf(' 4Stl/dy I U,.lIral.n.olnr}1('uT.R'ldlo[oolral ll'Il"JuTP andI ts {1'/'iwr-mamclIt AS}lf'< ts, es C o n ~ r ( ' s < f:enatl"{'I 'mmltt('(> f in FOIP1J "n R jatlOn'l . A Study Prf'parerlhy the S' lbcommltke 011 Dlo.,m'mamrnt, R6th ( 'onj: l"e1 01 till' 110""(

( H' l I t ISt . VolumE' 2B, Number 2, 1972"('hpmleul and Da('tetiologicni ( n l o l n ~ l r a l )'Weapons and the Effect" of Thei[' PoI;' ' 'Rqwr t of the Secretary GI'1Ierortl l(/ (,hf'm1(l1,VertC Agents to or From AI'JI lH,btary iI,swl/a

tW l l m the Ult1tcd Stat fs fo r Storag f or torl'II1// fa l 'uT] lOSCS UI,z f '88 I t Is til.(' SCJlse (If Congressto Do So, US Congress, House Committee' onArmf'u Sprvice


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17 Cheml('al. BIOlogIcal. and RadIOlogIcal Agcnts,0]1. ( ' I t .IS Seymour M. Hersh, "Chemical and BtoloJ '1euiWeapon" -Thl' Secret Arsenal," The New l oTI.TtmeJJ. 5 August 11'J6f1, Section VI. p 26.Ifl "Defense'" Dark Comer ," Editorial, The Ncil'York Tnne.'f, 23 April 1969, p 46. eol 1.. O ChcUtIf.rtl-Rto(oYICal WItTfare. U.S. POltcU18al ld l l l tcnwt ol lai T:.'[Jects. op. ("It. pp 28-45; andRichard D. McCarthY, Thc UltImate Fo l l y , ll 'aT

b1J PI'sitlence. AsphYXIatIOn and DcfoitatIOn. Alfred A Knopf Inc,. N. Y . I )6 ).: 1 McCarthy, op. ot., pp 9'J-l.1;:4 and HtnTlI,n'Jon H,R. 9745, HR. 971;9. H.R. J0011, and H.RIflOI2. Idt"llit("al Rllf l l to bllJ11TC That No PubltlFunds Re Uscd fOT the PIITI_0:lC oj TTa/>,n'QT(rn"Chc'mH"ui XI'T 'C Afl l "tq to OT Frotn. A' 11 Mll l ran lInstallatIOn III tlu' Fml rd Statr ' l JOT StOTQge orStockluhno PnT1IOSt S U,l1e88 I t Is the 8rluJe oj

C071gTeSI$ fo Do So, on. Clt. For {'lI.phctt p r E ~ S rO\l('ragp. "( e 1'he Nelt l orfc TUnes, 16.31 July 196 )2. "Stu, t 'nts Occupy Stanford EI('ctronlc-. Lahoratory," Tile New YOTk Tlmc8, 11 April 196'),p 2.t, col 52'l Robm rJarke, Thc SdeJ/t Wralons. Da . iriMcKay Co Inc., NY, 1%8. pp 213-42.

l "Chemical SOCh'ty Ask, Kansa'- Cit:.,l'rfo. 197: , Volume I4 Vernon D. Aspnturmn, "The USSR, the USAand Chma in the SeH'ntles," Mll l tanl Ret'i('1('

Janualy 1974. p 62-18 "Aftel ' 50 Year"', U.S. Says No on Gl'rmWarfare," The Salt Lake TTlbul e, 17 December1974, and "The Geneva Protocol uf 1925, E.xcuti\l(J, 9Ist Conrrress, 2d SeSSIOn, The ConVl'nlton onthe Prohibition of Bacteriological TOXin Weapons,S eeutnre Q. 92d Congress. 2d Se'lSlOn, Tht:'Amended e ~ t to Art ldp VII of the 1965 Conven.tlOn on Facilitation of InternatIOnal Munilm{'Traffic. ExecutIve D, 93d Congress, 2d SeSSIOn,and the Consular Conventlon With Bulgana, E.xecutive H. 93d Congress, 2d Sesswn," Congres.Biollal Record. Volume 120, NllmbE"r 176. PI'lS215P7-607 and 21643-644,

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Headquarters AFCENT Brunssum The Netherlands24 Military Review


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Colonel Norman L Dodd, British Army, Retired

T HE sentiments expressed inthese two statements have notbeen' questioned by any responsibleauthority in the Western World. Yetthere is a constant demand for the re-duction in defense expenditures in allthe nations which together provide theshield for the Free World. There ispressure in the United States to with-draw troops from Europe. Belgiumhas reduced its forces and the COll-scription period to one year. WestMay 975

Germany has also reduced conscriptservice to 15 months, and the Nether-lands are considering proposals to re-duce theirs to 2 months. Canada haswithdrawn most of its forces fromCentral Europe, and the British LaborGovernment, while professing strongsupport for the alliance, has an-nounced that it will reduce the de-fense budget by several hundred mil-lion pounds.

NATO's Northern flank has always25


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been dangerously vulnerable, and nowthe Southern flank is in disarray dueto the T l I l k i s h - G r ~ e k confruntation inCyprus and the consequent withrlrawal of the Greek forces from theNATO command. Even in the post-DeGaulle era, France still stands somewhat aloof from the military planningfor the defense of Central Europe,the region which is absolutely vital forthe ,hole of NATO's defense structure.Allied Forces, C en t r a 1 Europe

A F C E ~ T ) . situated at Brunssum inthe South Limburg Province of the:-Ietherlands since 1969,' has neverbeen given the status or publicity thatits importance warrants. Too often, itis confused with SHAPE (Supreme

H e a d q u a ~ t e r s Allied Powers. Europe)or NATO Headquarters. and it is certainly not understood by civilians inBritain and the United States that theGerman Commander in Chief. AlliedForces. rentral Europe (CINCE:-IT).\\ ill command their armies and / airforces should the NATO deterrentfaIl.

General Emst Ferber. whose lastappointment \\as Chief of Stiff of thetierman Army and who has previom;ly_served \\'Ith the NATO StandingGroup. assumed the position ofrWCENT in 1973. He has held appointments at regimental. brigade, division and c o r p ~ level, as well as serving in higher headquarters. and ISwell-qualified to know whether or notthe forces assigned and earmarked tohis command are capable of carryingout the t.asks allotted to them andwhat might result from any furtherreductions.

As long ago as Hl56. the NATOCouncil agreed with the military recommendation that 30 combat-readydivisions were the minimum requiredfor the proper defense of the Central26

General Ernst Ferber,Commander in Chief, FCENT

Region. In 1967, the Council adoptedthe policy of basing the rlefense upona full range of appropriate reactions,conventional and nuclear, to meet alllevels of aggression 01' threat of ng

g r e ~ f i i o n as far forward as pOfifiible a conrept which has come to be kno nas flexible and forwarrl defense. Today, there are still only 2:l division;;available, and some of these are understrength. stationed too far to the westand not all completely combat-ready atall times. They are outnumbered :l to1 in tanks and 2 to 1 in artillery b.,the 60 Warsaw Pact divisions stationed in Eastern Europe. These diVIsions, which can be reinforced rapidly from Western Russia. are fullyequipped with standardized equipmentand weapons and manned by welldisciplined soldiers who carry out twoyears of tough training.

The situation in the ail' is notmuch better. The Allied Tactical AirForces (ATAF) in Central Europeare also outnumbered some 2 to 1, and.here again. the Warsaw Pact has theadvantage of standardization. The Allies have, for the most part, excellent

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aircraft. but of too many types. Manydo not have interchangeable weapons.Happily, due to the speed and flexibility of air power. the reinforcementadvantage held by the Warsaw Pactis not so marked a ~ in the ground

f o r c e ~ and the professional skill ofthe Allied pilots. particularly those ofthe US Air Force (USAF) and the

~ o y l Air Force (RAF), generallyconsidered to be better than that oftheir potential enemies. General Fer-ber realizes only too well that. i theoutnumbered ground forces are tohave any chance of success, the maximum use of air power is essential. Forthis reason, new al'l'angements havebeen made for the command and control of the two Allied Tactical AirForces in peace and war.

Since NATO came into being. thebasic organization of the forces underthe command of the CINCENT havenot altered greatly. with the exceptions of the acceptance of the WestGerman forces into the Allied Command in 1955 and the withdrawal ofthe French forces from the Commandin 1966. The British Commanders inChief of the Northern Army Groupand the 2d Allied Tactical Ai,' FOI cestill have their headquarters in thesame buildings at Rheindahlen nearMonchengladbach. They control thearea from LUbeck and Hamburg inthe north to around Kassel in the center of the region. The American Commanders in Chief of the Central ArmyGroup and the 4th Allied Tactical AirForce, from their headquarters inMannheim and Ramstein respectively.are responsible for the southern halfof the region from around Kassel tothe Swiss and Austrian borders.

The land forces in the NorthernArmy Group are provided by the 1stBritish Corps. the 1st Belgian Corps,the 1st Netherlands Corps and a Ger-May 975

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man corps. Unfortunately. the Nether-lands corps is located mainly in Holland, and the Belgian corps is too farwest. In fact. most units are locatednonopel'ationaHy as they have tomake use of the barracks available,often a legacy from the war. The all'forces in the 2d ATAF are providedby the same nations plus one squadronfrom the USAF. located in Halland.

In the southern sector of the region,the United States and Germany eachprovide two corps and the Canadiansa battle group. These three nationsalso supply the air squadrons fol' the4th ATAF, with the main strengthcoming from the United States. TheFrench forces in Germany, about twodivisions, are also in this sector bntare under national and not NATO control. There are, however, British andUS liaison officers at the French Headquarters in Bad..en, and there areFrench liaison officers at the Bntishand US National Headquarters andwith Headquarters, AFCENT, itself.

The British, Americans and Frenchstill have certain responsibilIties fOIthe defense of and access to Berlin,and the British and Americans stillpatrol the ail' buffer zone along thedemarcation line bet een East andWest Germany. This, however, IS lIotthe concern_ of the CINCENT; he isresponsible for the propel' defense ofhis region in accordance with the provisions of the NATO Charter and onorders from the NATO Council. Inthis connection, under the NATOTreaty, the signatories agree that allattack on one is an attack on all, butonly commit themselves to immedi-ate consultations to decide what action, including military action, thateach must take. In theory. therefore.the CINCENT must await instruc-tions from the nations concerned before he can take any military action

7


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Dutch troops on maneuver

against Warsaw Pacr forces whichcross into \Vestern Germany, and hemust await the full assignment to .hiscommand of some of the forces. Theearlier Western European Union de-fense agreement, which is still validand remains in effect until 1DDS ismuch more definite. The signatories,which include the European membersof NATO, agree to come to the assIstance of any member who is the objectof an armed attack in Europe with allthe military and other aid and assist nce in their power. AFCENT is thedirect descendant of the originalWestern European Union Headquar-

. tel S set up by Field Marshal Mont-gomery in ID48. As Brigadier W. F. KThompson, Retired, noted in the April1974 NATO Re ieu', it is a pity thatAFCENT has not been given the posi-tion and prestige due in this role.A visit to Headquarters, AFCENT,and its Commander in Chief, however,is very heartening, for here there is a8

real knowledge of what confronts ourforces and the need to take every pos-sible step to reduce the odds by goodtrainmg, by coordinated plans and by~ t a n d a r d i z a t l n of weapons aircraftammunItion and procedures. GeneralFerber has said that he believes theforces under h;s command can pres-ently carry out their assigned tasks,but he con:.;iuers that any further re-ductions and withdrawals would havethe most serious repercussions on thecredIbIlIty of the defense posture inthe Central Region.

General Ferber :.;aid:The last four years have srcll thc

switch fmlll the old NATO policy tothe nen


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the ground forces and to strengthenthe conventional capability of the tac-tical air o)ces.

The lessons of the latest Arab-Israeli War have been closely studiedat AFCENT, and the conclusionreached is that no change is requiredin the plans for the antitank defense.The only mobile way of fighting an attacker s tank is still the tank. Its armor, cross-country perf0rmance andits effective gun make the tank indispensable on the battlefield. Tanks canbe concentrated rapidly and can speed-ily mount a counterattack. The finestand best arranged antitank belt ofweapons, be they guns or missiles, ranand will be disrupted by a coordinatedand determined attack. Once it is disrupted, there is no other means ofcounterattacking except by tanks. Antitank weapons are an essential partof the infantryman s armory because

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he must be able to defend himselfagainst local tank attacks. In CentralEurope, considerable efforts have beenmade to introduce more effective gunsand missiles for this purpose. Thesenow include the British SIL'ingjire, theUS TOW and Dragon as weIl as theCarl Gustav launcher and various antitank grenades. Remarkable progresshas been illade in the antitank capability of -the tactical air forces. TheBritish and Germans have the clusterbomb, the US the smart bomb and thelI1avaick-type weapons. Antitank helicopters such as the Lynx and theCobra are coming into service.

The successful defense of the region depends greatly upon the closecooperation between the land and airforces, and it is in this field that recentchanges have been made. On 28 June1974, a new a,ir headquarters was established d i r ~ t l y under the command

For a mobile antitank defense tanks and armored vehicles remain indispensable on the battlefield.Shown here is the German Marder.

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of the CINCENT. Named the Headquarters, A \lied Ai r Forces, CentralEurope (AA,fCE): it is presently located at Ramstein, Germany, with the4th ATAF, but, as soon as accommodations are available, it will move toBrunssum to be collocated withAFCENT.

The principal task of the Commander in Chief, AAFCE, GeneralJohn W. Vogt, USAF, is to exploit themaximum air power of the Allied Tactical Air Forces under his command.In peacetime, he is responsible for enhancing the activities of the air forcesby harmonizing procedures, encouraging standardization and commontraining to allow the air forces to beswitched throughout the region. "General Vogt," said General Ferber, "hasnot got an easy task because, unfortunately, procedures, electronics andtraining methods tend to vary in eachNation. The methods used by the 2dATA F tend to follow the pattern pethy the RAF while those in the 4thATAF follow those of the USAF. TheRAF favors very low flying, whereasthe USAF tends to fly higherJand relies more upon electronic methods topenetrate the enemy radar screens.The RAF is also a strong supporter ofthe use of the VSTOL (vertical andshort take-off and landing) Hal riersoperating from forward sides. Although squadron exchanges and crossservicing between ir forces are nor-mal procedures, it is not always possible to rearm at an "away" base. because the same bombs and weaponsare not used throughout the region.These problems highlight the wholequestion of standardization in NATO,perhaps one of the least successful alliance projects.

Although standardization is important both for efficiency and for economic reasons, if is resisted by na-30

tional industry and by those parliamentarians who must defend the jobsof their constituents. General Ferberadded another group: military menwith military ambitions He said:We milital Y men must sometimesaccept something which is 9 ofwhat we require if it is effective andaccepted for common use. We mustcompromise

He says that progress has beenslow, but there have been some successes. He points out that all the tanksin Central Europe, except the BritishChieftains use the same ammunition.In the artillery, the 155mm andI05mm guns are common user as areall small arms. In the air, the Phantomis used by three countries and theF 104 by four. The smaller nationshave not yet been able to agree on areplacement for the FI04 but at leastthe British and Germans look asthough they will both be u s n gthe Anglo-German-Italian Multi-RoleCombat Aircraft (MRCA) which hasnow made its first flight and will be iriservice by the 1980s.

Perhaps the most successful projecthas been the NATO Air DefenseGround Environment (NADGE) system which stretches from the Northern Cape to Eastern Turkey and ISused by all NATO nations.

The project which General Ferberthinks is most important is that offinding a standard battle tank. Hehopes that the present German-British-American discussions on the design of the new battle tank will besuccessful.

Without more standardization, thelogistical problems in the Central Region will remain complicated and expensive to resolve. Each nation has tosupply, store and transport its ownammunition, weapons and replacements. "NATO as a whole, said Dr.

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Part of the successful N UGE system used by all N TO nations

Theodor Tromp,. President of theNATO Industrial Advisory Group,wastes up to 870 million annually

uecause of duplication of arms andmilitary research, t is here, ratherthan in the reduction of forces, thatdefense budgets can ue lowered,One of the suggestions made in theearly days of the Western EuropeanUnion defense arrangements was thatinternational formations should uecreated, and even integrated unitswere considered, These suggestions,except in the case of the mliltinationalAllied Command, Europe (ACE). Mobile Force, were never implemented.General Ferber. when questioned onthis subject, said that he did not thinkthat multinational formations uelothe Army Group Headquarters levelwere necessary; national corps, bn-gades and divisions were more effective. The ACE Mobile Force is an ex-May 975

ception because it S designed for a'pecific purpose, that of showing phys-Ically on the ground NATO's solidar-Ity at a threatened p

military review may 1975

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