networks, groups, bureaucracies, and societies · sion making to all levels of the bureaucracy, and...

ONL INE CHAPTERTWENTY-ONE

Networks, Groups,Bureaucracies, and Societies

In this chapter you will learn that

• We commonly explain the way people act in terms of their interests and emotions.However, sometimes people act against their interests and suppress their emotionsbecause various social collectivities (groups, networks, bureaucracies, and soci-eties) exert a powerful influence on what people do.

• We live in a surprisingly small world. Only a few social ties separate us from com-plete strangers.

• The patterns of social ties through which emotional and material resources flow formsocial networks. Information, communicable diseases, social support, and otherresources typically spread through social networks.

• People who are bound together by interaction and a common identity form socialgroups. Groups impose conformity on members and draw boundary lines betweenthose who belong and those who do not.

• Bureaucracies are large, impersonal organizations that operate with varying degreesof efficiency. Efficient bureaucracies keep hierarchy to a minimum, distribute deci-sion making to all levels of the bureaucracy, and keep lines of communication openbetween different units of the bureaucracy.

• Societies are collectivities of interacting people who share a culture and a territory.As societies evolve, the relationship of humans to nature changes, with conse-quences for population size, the permanence of settlements, the specialization ofwork tasks, labour productivity, and social inequality.

• Although our freedom is constrained by various social collectivities, we can also usethem to increase our freedom. Networks, groups, organizations, and entire societiescan be mobilized for good or evil.

Robert J. Brym UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

John LieUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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Steven RytinaMCGILL UNIVERSITY

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PART S I X • METHODS21-2

BEYOND INDIVIDUAL MOTIVES

THE HOLOCAUST

In 1941, the large stone-and-glass train station wasone of the proudest structures in Smolensk, a provin-cial capital of about 100 000 people on Russia’swestern border. Always bustling, it was especially busyon the morning of June 28: Besides the usual passen-gers and well-wishers, hundreds of Soviet Red Armysoldiers were nervously talking, smoking, writing hur-ried letters to their loved ones, and sleeping fitfully onthe station floor while waiting for their train. Nazitroops had invaded the nearby city of Minsk inBelarus a couple of days before. The Soviet soldierswere being positioned to defend Russia against theinevitable German onslaught.

Robert Brym’s father, then in his 20s, had beenstanding in line for nearly two hours to buy food whenhe noticed flares arching over the station. Within sec-onds, Stuka bombers, the pride of the German airforce, swept down, releasing their bombs just beforepulling out of their dive. Inside the station, shards ofglass, blocks of stone, and mounds of earth fell indis-criminately on sleeping soldiers and nursing mothersalike. Everyone panicked. People trampled over oneanother to get out. In minutes, the train station wasrubble.

Nearly two years earlier, Robert’s father hadmanaged to escape Poland when the Nazis invadedhis hometown near Warsaw. Now, he was on the runagain. By the time the Nazis occupied Smolensk a fewweeks after their dive-bombers had destroyed its trainstation, Robert’s father was deep in the Russian inte-rior serving in a workers’ battalion attached to theSoviet Red Army.

“My father was one of 300 000 Polish Jews whofled eastward into Russia before the Nazi genocidemachine could reach them,” says Robert. “Theremaining 3 million Polish Jews were killed in variousways. Some died in battle. Many more, like myfather’s mother and younger siblings, were roundedup like diseased cattle and shot. However, most ofPoland’s Jews wound up in the concentration camps.Those deemed unfit were shipped to the gas cham-bers. Those declared able to work were turned intoslaves until they could work no more. Then they, too,met their fate. A mere 9 percent of Poland’s 3.3 mil-lion Jews survived World War II. The Nazi regimewas responsible for the death of 6 million Jews inEurope (Burleigh, 2000).

“One question that always perplexed my fatherabout the war was this: How was it possible for manythousands of ordinary Germans—products of what heregarded as the most advanced civilization on earth—to systematically murder millions of defenceless andinnocent Jews, Roma (‘Gypsies’), homosexuals, andpeople with mental disabilities in the death camps? Toanswer this question adequately, we must borrowideas from the sociological study of networks, groups,and bureaucracies.”

THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF EVIL

How could ordinary German citizens commit thecrime of the century? The conventional, nonsocio-logical answer is that many Nazis were evil, sadistic,or deluded enough to think that Jews and otherundesirables threatened the existence of theGerman people. Therefore, in the Nazi mind, theinnocents had to be killed. This answer is given inthe 1993 movie Schindler’s List and in many otheraccounts.

Yet, it is far from the whole story. Sociologistsemphasize three other factors:

1. Norms of solidarity demand conformity. When weform relationships with friends, lovers, spouses,teammates, and comrades-in-arms, we developshared ideas or “norms of solidarity” about how

How was it possible for many thousands of ordinary Germans to

systematically murder millions of defenceless and innocent Jews,

Roma (“Gypsies”), homosexuals, and people with mental disabil-

ities in the death camps?

SOURCE: AFP/Getty Images.

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ONL INE CHAPTER TWENTY -ONE • NETWORKS , GROUPS , BUREAUCRAC I ES , AND SOC I E T I ES 21-3

we should behave toward them to sustain therelationships. Because these relationships areemotionally important to us, we sometimes paymore attention to norms of solidarity than tothe morality of our actions. For example, astudy of the Nazis who roamed the Polishcountryside to shoot and kill Jews and other“enemies” of Nazi Germany found that the sol-diers often did not hate the people they system-atically slaughtered, nor did they have manyqualms about their actions (Browning, 1992).They simply developed deep loyalty to eachother. They felt they had to get their assignedjob done or face letting down their comrades.Thus, they committed atrocities partly becausethey just wanted to maintain group morale, sol-idarity, and loyalty. They committed evil deedsnot because they were extraordinarily bad butbecause they were quite ordinary—ordinary inthe sense that they acted to sustain their friend-ship ties and to serve their group, just like mostpeople. It is the power of norms of solidaritythat helps us understand how soldiers are ableto undertake many unpalatable actions. As onesoldier says in the 2001 movie Black HawkDown: “When I go home people will ask me,‘Hey, Hoot, why do you do it, man? Why? Areyou some kinda war junkie?’ I won’t say a god-damn word. Why? They won’t understand.They won’t understand why we do it. Theywon’t understand it’s about the men next toyou. And that’s it. That’s all it is.”

The case of the Nazi regime may seemextreme, but other instances of going along withcriminal behaviour uncover a similar dynamic atwork. Why do people rarely report crimes com-mitted by corporations? Employees may worryabout being reprimanded or fired if they becomewhistleblowers, but they also worry about lettingdown their co-workers. Why do gang membersengage in criminal acts? They may seek financialgain, but they also regard crime as a way of main-taining a close social bond with their fellow gangmembers (see Box 21.1, p. 21-4).

A study of the small number of PolishChristians who helped save Jews during WorldWar II helps clarify why some people violategroup norms (Tec, 1986). The heroism of thesePolish Christians was not correlated with theireducational attainment, political orientation,religious background, or even attitudes toward

Jews. In fact, some Polish Christians who helpedsave Jews were quite anti-Semitic. Instead, theseChristian heroes were, for one reason oranother, estranged or cut off from mainstreamnorms. Because they were poorly socialized intothe norms of their society, they were freer not toconform and instead act in ways they believedwere right. We could tell a roughly similar storyabout corporate whistleblowers or people whoturn in their fellow gang members. They aredisloyal from an insider’s point of view butheroic from an outsider’s viewpoint, often becausethey have been poorly socialized into thegroup’s norms.

2. Structures of authority tend to render people obe-dient. Most people find it difficult to disobeyauthorities because they fear ridicule, ostracism,and punishment. This was strikingly demon-strated in an experiment conducted by socialpsychologist Stanley Milgram (1974). Milgraminformed his experimental subjects they weretaking part in a study on punishment andlearning. He brought each subject to a roomwhere a man was strapped to a chair. An elec-trode was attached to the man’s wrist. Theexperimental subject sat in front of a console. Itcontained 30 switches with labels ranging from“15 volts” to “450 volts” in 15-volt increments.Labels ranging from “slight shock” to “danger:severe shock” were pasted below the switches.The experimental subjects were told to admin-ister a 15-volt shock for the man’s first wronganswer and then increase the voltage each timehe made an error. The man strapped in the chairwas, in fact, an actor. He did not actually receivea shock. As the experimental subject increasedthe current, however, the actor began to writhe,shouting for mercy and begging to be released.If the experimental subjects grew reluctant toadminister more current, Milgram assured themthe man strapped in the chair would be fine andinsisted that the success of the experimentdepended on the subject’s obedience. The sub-jects were, however, free to abort the experi-ment at any time. Remarkably, 71 percent ofexperimental subjects were prepared to admin-ister shocks of 285 volts or more even thoughthe switches at starting that level were labelled“intense shock,” “extreme intensity shock,” and“danger: severe shock” and despite the fact thatthe actor appeared to be in great distress at this


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BOX 21.1 GROUP LOYALTY OR BETRAYAL?

Group cohesion led Nazi soldiers to commit geno-cide. Group loyalty led many ordinary German citi-zens to support them. Although the Nazis are anextreme case, ordinary people often face a starkchoice between group loyalty and group betrayal.

Glen Ridge, New Jersey, is an affluent suburb of7800 people: white, orderly, and leafy. It is the home-town of the all-American boy, Tom Cruise. It was alsothe site of a terrible rape case in 1989. A group of13 teenage boys lured a sweet-natured youngwoman with an IQ of 49 and the mental age of asecond-grader into a basement. There, four of themraped her while three others looked on; six left whenthey realized what was going to happen. The rapistsused a baseball bat and a broomstick. The boys werethe most popular students in the local high school.They had everything going for them. They were everymother’s dream, every father’s pride. The youngwoman was not a stranger to them. Some of themhad known her since she was five years old, whenthey had convinced her to lick the point of a ballpointpen that had been coated in dog feces.

What possessed these boys to gang rape ahelpless young woman? And how can we explain thesubsequent actions of many of the leading citizensof Glen Ridge? It was weeks before anyonereported the rape to the police and years before theboys went to trial. At trial, many members of thecommunity rallied behind the boys, blaming andostracizing the rape victim. The courts eventuallyfound three of the four young men guilty of first-degree rape, but they were allowed to go free foreight years while their cases were appealed andfinally received only light sentences in 1997. Withgood behaviour, two were expected to be releasedfrom jail in 1999 and one in 1998. Why did mem-bers of the community refuse to believe the clear-cut evidence? What made them defend the rapists?Why were the boys let off so easily?

Bernard Lefkowitz (1997a) interviewed 250 keyplayers and observers in the Glen Ridge Rape case.Ultimately, he indicted the community for the rape. Heconcluded that “[the rapists] adhered to a code ofbehaviour that mimicked, distorted, and exaggeratedthe values of the adult world around them,” while “thecitizens supported the boys because they didn’t wantto taint the town they treasured” (Lefkowitz, 1997a:493). What were some of the community values theelders upheld and the boys aped?

• The subordination of women. All the boys grew upin families where men were the dominant person-alities. Only one of them had a sister. Not a singlewoman occupied a position of authority in GlenRidge High School. The boys classified theirfemale classmates either as “little mothers” who

fawned over them or as “bad girls” who weresexual objects.

• Lack of compassion for the weak. According tothe minister of Glen Ridge CongregationalChurch, “[a]chievement was honored andrespected almost to the point of pathology,whether it was the achievements of high schoolathletes or the achievements of corporate worldconquerors.” Adds Lefkowitz: “Compassion forthe weak wasn’t par t of the curriculum”(Lefkowitz, 1997a: 130).

• Tolerance of male misconduct. The boys routinelyengaged in delinquent acts, including one spec-tacular trashing of a house. However, their par-ents always paid damages, covered up themisdeeds, and rationalized them with phrases like“boys will be boys.” Especially because they weretown football heroes, many people felt they coulddo no wrong.

• Intense group loyalty. “The guys prized their inti-macy with each other far above what could beachieved with a girl,” writes Lefkowitz (1997a:146). The boys formed a tight clique, and teamsports reinforced group solidarity. Under such cir-cumstances, the probability of someone “ratting”on his friends was very low. In the end, of course,there was a “rat.” His name was CharlesFigueroa. He did not participate in the rape but hewas an athlete, part of the jock clique, and there-fore aware of what had happened. Significantly,he was one of the few black boys in the school,tolerated because of his athletic ability but nevertrusted because of his race and often called an—— by his teammates behind his back. Thisyoung man’s family was highly intelligent andmorally sensitive. He was the only one to havethe courage to betray the group (Lefkowitz,1997a, 1997b).

Lefkowitz presents a strong indictment of thecommunity as a whole and the values it upheld.Beyond that, however, he raises the impor tantquestion of where we ought to draw the linebetween group loyalty and group betrayal.Considering your own group loyalties, are theretimes when you regret not having spoken up? Arethere times when you regret not having been moreloyal? What is the difference between these twotypes of situations? Can you specify criteria fordeciding when loyalty is required and whenbetrayal is the right thing to do? You may have tochoose between group loyalty and betrayal onmore than one occasion, so thinking about thesecriteria—and clearly understanding the values forwhich your group stands—will help you make amore informed choice.


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level of current. Moreover, willingness toadminister severe shocks increased if the exper-imental subject could not hear the actorscreaming or see him writhing.

Milgram’s experiment teaches us that as soonas we are introduced to a structure of authority,we are inclined to obey those in power. This isthe case even if the authority structure is new andhighly artificial, even if we are free to walk awayfrom it with no penalty, and even if we think thatby remaining in its grip we are inflicting terriblepain on another human being. In this context, theactions and inactions of German citizens inWorld War II become more understandable if nomore forgivable.

3. Bureaucracies are highly effective structures ofauthority. The Nazi genocide machine was alsoso effective because it was bureaucraticallyorganized. As Max Weber (1978) defined theterm, a bureaucracy is a large, impersonalorganization comprising many clearly definedpositions arranged in a hierarchy. A bureau-cracy has a permanent, salaried staff of qualifiedexperts and written goals, rules, and proce-dures. Staff members always try to find ways ofrunning their organization more efficiently.Efficiency means achieving the bureaucracy’sgoals at the least cost. The goal of the Nazigenocide machine was to kill Jews and otherundesirables. To achieve that goal with max-imum efficiency, the job was broken into manysmall tasks. Most officials performed only onefunction, such as checking train schedules,organizing entertainment for camp guards,maintaining supplies of Zyklon B gas, andremoving ashes from the crematoria. The fullhorror of what was happening eluded manyofficials or at least could be convenientlyignored as they concentrated on their jobs,most of them far removed from the gas cham-bers and death camps in occupied Poland.Many factors account for variations in Jewishvictimization rates across Europe during WorldWar II. One factor was bureaucratic organiza-tion. Not coincidentally, the proportion of Jewskilled was highest not in the Nazi-controlledcountries where the hatred of Jews was mostintense (e.g., Romania), but in countries wherethe Nazi bureaucracy was best organized (e.g.,Holland) (Bauman, 1991; Sofsky, 1997 [1993]).

In short, the sociological reply to the questionposed by Robert’s father is that it was not just blindhatred but the nature of groups and bureaucraciesthat made it possible for the Nazis to kill innocentpeople so ruthlessly.

We commonly think individual motives promptour actions, and for good reason. We often makerational calculations to maximize gains and minimizelosses. In addition, our deeply held emotions partlygovern our behaviour. However, this chapter asks youto make a conceptual leap beyond the individualmotives that prompt us to act in certain ways. We askyou to consider the way three kinds of social collectivitiesshape our actions: networks, groups, and bureaucraticorganizations. The limitations of an analysis basedexclusively on individual motives should be clear fromour discussion of the social roots of evil. The advantagesof considering how social collectivities affect us shouldbecome clear in the following sections. We begin byconsidering the nature and effects of social networks.

NETWORKS

IT’S A SMALL WORLD

You have probably said “It’s a small world” more thanonce, and you are right. There are more than 32 mil-lion Canadians, of whom just a few hundred are yourfamily members, friends, acquaintances, and workcolleagues. Yet if you were asked to get in touch witha complete stranger on the other side of the countryby using only personal ties—you contact a personyou know on a first-name basis and that person con-tacts someone else whom he or she knows on a first-name basis, and so forth—it would take only aboutsix contacts to reach the stranger. How is it possiblethat only about six links separate any of us frompeople we don’t know on the other side of thecountry? (See Box 21.2, p. 21-6.)

NETWORK ANALYSIS

The short sociological answer is that we areenmeshed in overlapping sets of social relations, orsocial networks. Although any particular individualmay know a small number of people, his or her familymembers, friends, co-workers, and others know manymore people who extend far beyond that individual’spersonal network. So, for example, the authors of thistextbook are likely to be complete strangers to you.


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Yet your professor may know one of us or at leastknow someone who knows one of us. Probably nomore than three links separate us from you. Put dif-ferently, although our personal networks are small,they lead quickly to much larger networks. We live ina small world because our social networks connect usto the larger world.

What is a social network? A social network is abounded set of individuals linked by the exchange ofmaterial or emotional resources, everything from moneyto friendship. The patterns of exchange determine

the boundaries of the network. Members exchangeresources more frequently with each other than withnon-members. They also think of themselves as networkmembers. Social networks may be formal (defined inwriting) or informal (defined only in practice). Thepeople you know personally form the boundaries of yourpersonal network. However, each of your networkmembers is linked to other people. This is what con-nects you to people you have never met, creating a “small world” that extends far beyond your personalnetwork.

The Internet Movie Database (2003) contains infor-mation on the half-million actors who have ever per-formed in a commercially released movie. Althoughthis number is large, you might be surprised to learnthat, socially, they form a small world. We candemonstrate that by first selecting a well-known actorwho is not a huge star—someone like Kevin Bacon.We can then use the Internet Movie Database to findout which other actors have ever been in a moviewith him (University of Virginia, 2003). Acting in amovie with another actor constitutes a link. Two linkstie 119 754 actors to Bacon. They have never beenin a movie with Bacon but they have been in a moviewith another actor who has been in a movie with him.Remarkably, more than 85 percent of the half-millionactors in the database have one, two, or three linksto Bacon. Nearly 99 percent of the half-million actorshave four or fewer links to him. We conclude thatalthough film acting stretches back more than a cen-tury and has involved people in many countries, thehalf-million people who have ever acted in films forma pretty small world.

What is true for the world of film actors turnsout to be true for the rest of us, too. Jef freyTravers and Stanley Milgram (1969) conducted afamous study in which they asked 300 randomlyselected people in Nebraska and Kansas to maila document to a complete stranger, a stockbrokerin Boston. However, the people could not mail thedocument directly to the stockbroker. They had tomail it to a person they knew on a first-namebasis who, in turn, could send it only to a personhe or she knew on a first-name basis, and sofor th. Travers and Milgram defined this passing ofa letter from one person to another as a link or a“degree of separation.” Most people thought itwould take many degrees of separation, perhapshundreds, to get the letter to the Boston stock-broker. Remarkably, however, the average numberwas about six. Following publication of the study,the idea became widespread that no more than

six degrees of separation separate any twopeople in the United States. An attempt to applythe idea to the entire world via the Internet isunderway at Columbia University’s Department ofSociology.

Among all actors who have ever performed in a movie, Kevin

Bacon is the 1161st most central. That is, 1160 other actors

have a smaller average number of ties to all other actors. Still,

nearly a quarter of all people who have ever acted in a movie

are separated from Bacon by just one or two links, and more

than 85 percent are separated by fewer than four links.

SOURCE: Christine Chew/UPI/Landov.

BOX 21.2 SIX DEGREES OF KEVIN BACON


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The study of social networks is not restricted toties among individuals (Berkowitz, 1982; Wassermanand Faust, 1994; Wellman and Berkowitz, 1997). Theunits of analysis or nodes in a network can be individ-uals, groups, organizations, and even countries. Thus,social network analysts have examined everythingfrom intimate relationships among lovers to diplo-matic relations among nations.

Unlike organizations, most networks lack namesand offices. There is a Boy Scouts of Canada but noNorth American Trading Bloc. In a sense, networkslie beneath the more visible collectivities of social life,but that makes them no less real or important. Someanalysts claim we can gain only a partial sense of whycertain things happen in the social world by focusingon highly visible collectivities. From their point ofview, the whole story requires probing below the sur-face and examining the network level. The study ofsocial networks clarifies a wide range of social phe-nomena, including how people find jobs, how infor-mation, innovations, and communicable diseasesspread, and how some people exert influence overothers. To illustrate further the value of networkanalysis, we now focus on each of these issues in turn.

FINDING A JOB

The old saying “It’s not what you know but who youknow” contains much sociological truth. For example,many bright and inquisitive students have passingthoughts about becoming a professor. What mighttransform that momentary interest into a lifelongcareer is often a mentor who encourages the studentand provides him or her with useful advice,including introductions to other ambitious students,stimulating professors, great books, and graduateprograms.

Many people learn about important events, ideas,and opportunities from their social networks. Friendsand acquaintances often introduce you to everythingfrom an interesting post-secondary course or a greatrestaurant to a satisfying occupation or a futurespouse. Of course, social networks are not the onlysource of information, but they are highly significant.

Consider how people find jobs. Do you look inthe “Help Wanted” section of your local newspaper,scan the Internet, or walk around certain areas oftown looking for “Employee Wanted” signs?Although these strategies are common, people often

learn about employment opportunities from otherpeople. But what kind of people? According to MarkGranovetter (1973), you may have strong or weak tiesto another person. You have strong ties to people whoare close to you, such as family members and friends.You have weak ties to mere acquaintances, such aspeople you meet at parties and friends of friends. Inhis research, Granovetter found that weak ties aremore important than strong ties in finding a job,which is contrary to common sense. One might rea-sonably assume that a mere acquaintance would notdo much to help you find a job whereas a close friendor relative would make a lot more effort in thisregard. However, by focusing on the flow of informa-tion in personal networks, Granovetter found some-thing different. Mere acquaintances are more likely toprovide useful information about employment oppor-tunities than friends or family members are becausepeople who are close to you typically share overlap-ping networks. Therefore, the information they canprovide about job opportunities is often redundant. Incontrast, mere acquaintances are likely to be con-nected to diverse networks. They can therefore pro-vide information about many different job openingsand make introductions to many different potentialemployers. Moreover, because people typically havemore weak ties than strong ties, the sum of weak tiesholds more information about job opportunities thanthe sum of strong ties. These features of personal net-works allow Granovetter to conclude that the“strength of weak ties” lies in their diversity andabundance.

URBAN NETWORKS, SCIENTIFICINNOVATION, AND THE SPREAD OF HIV/AIDS

We rely on social networks for a lot more than jobinformation. Consider everyday life in the big city.We often think of big cities as cold and alienatingplaces where few people know one another. In thisview, urban acquaintanceships tend to be few andfunctionally specific; we know someone fleetingly as abank teller or a server in a restaurant but not as awhole person. Even dating often involves a long seriesof brief encounters. In contrast, people often think ofsmall towns as friendly, comfortable places whereeveryone knows everyone else (and everyone else’sbusiness). Indeed, some of the founders of sociologyemphasized just this distinction. Notably, German


sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1988 [1887]) con-trasted “community” with “society.” According toTönnies, a community is marked by intimate andemotionally intense social ties, whereas a society ismarked by impersonal relationships held togetherlargely by self-interest. A big city is a prime exampleof a society in Tönnies’s judgment.

Tönnies’s view prevailed until network analystsstarted studying big city life in the 1970s. WhereTönnies saw only sparse, functionally specific ties,network analysts found elaborate social networks,some functionally specific and some not. Forexample, Barry Wellman and his colleagues studiedpersonal networks in Toronto (Wellman, Carrington,and Hall, 1997). They found that each Torontonianhas an average of about 400 social ties, includingimmediate and extended kin, neighbours, friends, andco-workers. These ties provide everything from emo-tional aid (e.g., visits after a personal tragedy) andfinancial support (e.g., small loans) to minor services(e.g., fixing a car) and information of the kindGranovetter studied. Strong ties that last a long timeare typically restricted to immediate family members,a few close relatives and friends, and a close co-worker or two. Beyond that, however, people rely ona wide array of ties for different purposes at differenttimes. Downtown residents sitting on their frontstoop on a summer evening, sipping soda and chattingwith neighbours as the kids play road hockey, may beless common than it was 50 years ago. However, theautomobile, public transportation, the telephone, andthe Internet help people stay in close touch with awide range of contacts for a variety of purposes(Haythornthwaite and Wellman, 2002). Far fromliving in an impersonal and alienating world,Torontonians’ lives are network-rich. Research con-ducted elsewhere in North America reveals much thesame pattern of urban life.

One of the advantages of network analysis is itsfocus on people’s actual social relationships ratherthan their abstract attributes, such as their age,gender, or occupation. This focus is useful forhelping us understand many aspects of social life.For example, how does information spread? Youmight think that people with a particular set of occu-pational attributes, such as leading scientists in aparticular field of study, first gain and then distributeinformation to other scientists in their field. At acrude level, this fact is true. However, new informa-tion does not diffuse evenly throughout a scientificcommunity. Instead, it flows through networks of

friends, co-researchers, and people who have studiedtogether, only later spreading to the broader com-munity (Rogers, 1995). Networks also shape scien-tific influence because scientists in a social networktend to share similar scientific beliefs and are thusmore open to some influences than others are(Friedkin, 1998).

Another example of the usefulness of focusingon concrete social ties rather than on abstractattributes comes from the study of how communi-cable diseases spread. HIV/AIDS was widely con-sidered a “gay” disease in the 1980s. HIV/AIDSspread rapidly in the gay community during thatdecade. However, network analysis helped to showthat the characterization of HIV/AIDS as a gay dis-ease was an oversimplification (Watts, 2003). Thedisease did not spread uniformly throughout thecommunity. Rather, it spread along the friendshipand acquaintanceship networks of people firstexposed to it. Meanwhile, in India and parts ofAfrica, HIV/AIDS did not initially spread amonggay men at all. Instead, it spread through a networkof long-distance truck drivers and the prostituteswho catered to them. Again, concrete social networks—not abstract categories like “gay men” or“truck drivers”—track the spread of the disease.

THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS

Researchers often use mathematical models andcomputer programs to analyze social networks.However, no matter how sophisticated the mathe-matics or the software, network analysts begin froman understanding of the basic building blocks ofsocial networks.

The most elementary network form is the dyad,a social relationship between two nodes or social units(e.g., people, firms, organizations, countries, etc.). Atriad is a social relationship among three nodes. Thedifference between a dyad and a triad may seem small.However, the social dynamics of these two elemen-tary network forms are fundamentally different, associologist Georg Simmel showed early in the twen-tieth century (Simmel, 1950; see Figure 21.1).

In a dyadic relationship, such as a marriage, bothpartners tend to be intensely and intimately involved.Moreover, the dyad needs both partners to live butonly one to opt out to die. A marriage, for example,can endure only if both partners are intenselyinvolved; if one partner ceases active participation,

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the marriage is over in practice if not in law. Thisneed for intense involvement on the part of bothpartners is also why a dyad can have no “free riders,”or partners who benefit from the relationshipwithout contributing to it. Finally, in a dyadic rela-tionship, the partners must assume full responsibilityfor all that transpires. Neither partner can shiftresponsibility to some larger collectivity because nolarger collectivity exists beyond the relationshipbetween the two partners.

In contrast, when a third person (or other socialunit) enters the picture, thereby creating a triad, rela-tionships tend to be less intimate and intense. Equallysignificantly, the triad restricts individuality byallowing one partner to be constrained for the collec-tive good. This situation occurs when a majority out-votes one partner. The existence of a triad also allowscoalitions or factions to form. Furthermore, it allowsone partner to mediate conflict between the other two,exploit rivalry between the other two, or encouragerivalry between the other two to achieve dominance.Thus, the introduction of a third partner makes pos-sible a completely new set of social dynamics that arestructurally impossible in a dyadic relationship.

GROUPS

LOVE AND GROUP LOYALTY

Although intensity and intimacy characterize dyadicrelationships, outside forces often destroy them. Forinstance, the star-crossed lovers in Romeo and Juliet

are torn between their love for each other and theirloyalty to the feuding Montague and Capulet families.In the end, Romeo and Juliet die, victims of the feud.

Love thwarted by conflicting group loyalty is thestuff of many tragic plays, novels, and movies. Mostaudiences have no problem grasping the fact thatgroup loyalty is often more powerful than romanticlove. However, why group loyalty holds such powerover us is unclear. The sociological study of groupsprovides some useful answers.

VARIETIES OF GROUP EXPERIENCE

Social groups comprise one or more networks ofpeople who identify with one another and adhere todefined norms, roles, and statuses. We usually distin-guish social groups from social categories, peoplewho share similar status but do not identify with oneanother. Coffee drinkers form a social category. Theydo not, however, normally share norms and identifywith one another. In contrast, members of a group,such as a family, sports team, or college, are aware ofshared membership. They identify with the collec-tivity and think of themselves as members.

Many kinds of social groups exist. However, sociol-ogists make a basic distinction between primary and sec-ondary groups. In primary groups, norms, roles, andstatuses are agreed on but are not put in writing. Socialinteraction creates strong emotional ties. It extends over a long period and involves a wide range of acti-vities. It results in group members knowing one anotherwell. The family is the most important primary group.

FIGURE 21.1 DYAD AND TRIAD

C B

A

A B

Characteristics of the dyad

• Both partners are intensely absorbed in the relationship.

• The dyad needs both partners to live but dies if only one partner opts out.

• No free riders are possible.

• Neither partner can deny responsibility by shifting it to a larger collectivity.

Characteristics of the triad

• Intensity and intimacy are reduced.

• The triad restricts individuality by allowing a partner to be constrained for

the collective good. A partner can be outvoted by a majority, for example.

• Coalitions are possible.

• Third-party mediation of conflict between two partners is possible.

• Third-party exploitation of rivalry between two partners is possible.

• A third-party divide-and-conquer strategy is possible.

• Free riders are possible.

• It is possible to shift responsibility to the larger collectivity.


Secondary groups are larger and more imper-sonal than primary groups. Compared with primarygroups, social interaction in secondary groups createsweaker emotional ties. It extends over a shorterperiod and involves a narrow range of activities. Itresults in most group members having at most apassing acquaintance with one another. Your soci-ology class is an example of a secondary group.

Bearing these distinctions in mind, we can beginto explore the power of groups to ensure conformity.

CONFORMITY AND “GROUPTHINK”

Television’s first reality TV show was Candid Camera.On an early episode, an unsuspecting man waited foran elevator. When the elevator door opened, he foundfour people, all confederates of the show, facing theelevator’s back wall. Seeing the four people with theirbacks to him, the man at first hesitated. He then ten-tatively entered the elevator. However, rather thanturning around so he would face the door, heremained facing the back wall, just like the others.The scene was repeated several times. Men andwomen, black and white, all behaved the same way.Confronting unanimously bizarre behaviour, theychose conformity over common sense.

Conformity is an integral part of group life, andprimary groups generate more pressure to conformthan do secondary groups. Strong social ties createemotional intimacy. They also ensure that primarygroup members share similar attitudes, beliefs, andinformation. Beyond the family, friendship groups (orcliques) and gangs demonstrate these features. Groupmembers tend to dress and act alike, speak the same“lingo,” share the same likes and dislikes, and demandloyalty, especially in the face of external threat.Conformity ensures group cohesion.

A classic study of soldiers in World War IIdemonstrates the power of conformity to get peopleto face extreme danger. Samuel Stouffer and his col-leagues (Stouffer et al., 1949) showed that primarygroup cohesion was the main factor motivating sol-diers to engage in combat. Rather than belief in acause, such as upholding liberty or fighting theevils of Nazism, the feeling of camaraderie, loyalty,and solidarity with fellow soldiers supplied theprincipal motivation to face danger. As BrigadierGeneral S.L.A. Marshall (1947: 160–61) famouslywrote: “A man fights to help the man next to him. . . .Men do not fight for a cause but because they do

not want to let their comrades down.” As such, ifyou want to create a great military force, you needto promote group solidarity and identity. Hencethe importance of wearing uniforms, singinganthems, displaying insignia, hoisting flags, con-ducting drills, training under duress, and instillinghatred of the enemy.

A famous experiment conducted by social psy-chologist Solomon Asch half a century ago alsodemonstrates how group pressure creates confor-mity (Asch, 1955). Asch assembled a group of sevenmen. One of them was the experimental subject; theother six were Asch’s confederates. Asch showed theseven men a card with a line drawn on it. He thenshowed them a second card with three lines ofvarying length drawn on it (see Figure 21.2). One byone, he asked the confederates to judge which lineon card 2 was the same length as the line on card 1.The answer was obvious. One line on card 2 wasmuch shorter than the line on card 1. One line wasmuch longer. One was exactly the same length. Yet,as instructed by Asch, all six confederates said thateither the shorter or the longer line was the samelength as the line on card 1. When it came time forthe experimental subject to make his judgment, hetypically overruled his own perception and agreedwith the majority. Only 25 percent of Asch’s exper-imental subjects consistently gave the right answer.Asch thus demonstrated how easily group pressurecan overturn individual conviction and result inconformity.

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FIGURE 21.2 THE ASCH EXPERIMENT

Card 2Card 1


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Asch’s work and subsequent research show thatseveral factors affect the likelihood of conformity(Sternberg, 1998: 499–500). First, the likelihood ofconformity increases as group size increases to three orfour members. For groups larger than four, the likeli-hood of conformity generally does not increase.Second, as group cohesiveness increases, so does thelikelihood of conformity. Where greater intimacy andsharing of values occur, group members are less likelyto express dissent. Third, social status affects the likeli-hood of conformity. People with low status in a group(e.g., because of their gender or race) are less likely todissent than people with high status. Fourth, culturematters. People in individualistic societies, likeCanada’s, tend to conform less than do people in col-lectivist societies, like China’s. Fifth, the appearance ofunanimity affects the likelihood of conformity. Evenone dissenting voice greatly increases the chance thatothers will dissent.

The power of groups to ensure conformity isoften a valuable asset. Armies could not functionwithout willingness to undergo personal sacrifice forthe good of the group, nor could sports teams excel.However, being a good team player can have a down-side because the consensus of a group can sometimesbe misguided or dangerous. Dissent might save thegroup from making mistakes, but the pressure to con-form despite individual misgivings—sometimes calledgroupthink (Janis, 1972)—can lead to disaster.

Great managers are able to encourage frank andopen discussion, assess ideas based on their merit,develop a strategy that incorporates the best ideasvoiced, and then create consensus on how to implementthe ideas. Inadequate managers feel they know it all.They rationalize their plan of action, squelch dissent,and fail to examine alternatives. They create a groupculture that inhibits people from expressing their mis-givings and use the fact that people do not want toappear disloyal to impose consensus on the group.High-stress situations—a war room, an operatingroom—often do not allow a more democratic manage-rial style. Therefore, it is precisely in high-stress situa-tions that the dangers of groupthink are greatest.Groupthink was at work in high-level meetings pre-ceding the space shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003.Transcripts of those meetings show that the NASAofficial who ran shuttle management meetings, a non-engineer, believed from the outset that foam insulationdebris could not damage the spacecraft. She dismissedthe issue and cut off discussion when an engineer

expressed his concerns. The others present quickly fellinto line with the non-engineer running the meeting(Wald and Schwartz, 2003). A few days later, damagecaused by foam insulation debris caused Columbia tobreak apart on reentry into Earth’s atmosphere.

Other famous examples of how the lack of a singledissenting voice can result in tragedy come from twohomicide cases that grabbed the world’s attention. In1964 in Queens, New York, 28-year-old KittyGenovese parked her car after returning home fromwork. When she got out, a man grabbed and stabbedher. She screamed for help. For 35 minutes, at least 38 middle-class, law-abiding neighbours watchedfrom darkened windows as the man repeatedlyattacked Genovese and stabbed her 17 times. Finally,one neighbour called the police, but only after he hadcalled a friend and asked what to do. Some of theneighbours later pled ignorance. Others said theythought it was just a lovers’ quarrel or “some kidshaving fun.” Still others admitted they did not want toget involved (Gado, 2003). A similar thing happenedin 1993 near Liverpool, England. Two 10-year-oldboys abducted 2-year-old James Bulger from a shop-ping mall. They took him on a long, aimless walk, tor-turing him along the way—dropping him on his headand kicking him in the ribs. Motorists and pedestrianssaw the toddler crying, noticed his wounds, and evenwitnessed some of the violence. “A persuading kick”was the way one motorist later described the blow tothe ribs (Scott, 2003). Nobody called the police. Thesecases illustrate “bystander apathy.” As the number ofbystanders increases, the likelihood of any onebystander helping another decreases because thegreater the number of bystanders, the less responsi-bility any one individual feels. This behaviour showsthat people usually take their cues for action fromothers and again demonstrates the power of groupsover individuals. If no one else in a large collectivityresponds, most people figure nothing is wrong.

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

If a group exists, some people must not belong to it.Accordingly, sociologists distinguish in-group mem-bers (those who belong) from out-group members(those who do not). Members of an in-group typicallydraw a boundary separating themselves from mem-bers of the out-group, and they try to keep out-groupmembers from crossing the line. Anyone who hasgone to high school knows all about in-groups and


out-groups. They have seen first-hand how race,class, athletic ability, academic talent, and physicalattractiveness act as boundaries separating groups.Sadly, only in the movies can someone in a highschool out-group get a chance to return to school as ayoung adult and use her savvy to become a member ofthe in-group (see Never Been Kissed, starring DrewBarrymore [1999]).

Why do group boundaries crystallize? Onetheory is that group boundaries emerge when peoplecompete for scarce resources. For example, old immi-grants may greet new immigrants with hostility if thelatter are seen as competitors for scarce jobs (Levineand Campbell, 1972). Another theory is that groupboundaries emerge when people are motivated toprotect their self-esteem. From this point of view,drawing group boundaries allows people to increasetheir self-esteem by believing that out-groups havelow status (Tajfel, 1981).

Both theories are supported by the classicexperiment on prejudice, The Robber’s Cave Study(Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif, 1988[1961]). Researchers brought two groups of 11-year-old boys to a summer camp at Robber’s CaveState Park in Oklahoma in 1954. The boys werestrangers to one another and for about a week thetwo groups were kept apart. They swam, camped,and hiked. Each group chose a name for itself andthe boys printed their group’s name on their capsand T-shirts. Then the two groups met. A series ofathletic competitions were set up between them.Soon, each group became highly antagonistictoward the other. Each group came to hold theother in low esteem. The boys ransacked cabins,started food fights, and stole various items frommembers of the other group. Thus, under competi-tive conditions, the boys drew group boundariesstarkly and quickly.

The investigators next stopped the athletic com-petitions and created several apparent emergencieswhose solution required cooperation between the twogroups. One such emergency involved a leak in thepipe supplying water to the camp. The researchersassigned the boys to teams of members from bothgroups. Their job was to inspect the pipe and fix theleak. After engaging in several such cooperative ven-tures, the boys started playing together withoutfighting. Once cooperation replaced competition andthe groups ceased to hold each other in low esteem,group boundaries melted away as quickly as they hadformed. Significantly, the two groups were of equal

status—the boys were all white, middle-class, and 11 years old—and their contact involved face-to-faceinteraction in a setting where norms established bythe investigators promoted a reduction of group prej-udice. Social scientists today recognize that all theseconditions must be in place before the boundariesbetween an in-group and an out-group fade away(Sternberg, 1998: 512).

The boundaries separating groups often seemunchangeable and even “natural.” In general, how-ever, dominant groups construct group boundariesin particular circumstances to further their goals(Barth, 1969; Tajfel, 1981). Consider Germans andJews. By the early twentieth century, Jews were wellintegrated into Germany society. They were eco-nomically successful, culturally innovative, andpolitically influential, and many of them consideredthemselves more German than Jewish. In 1933, theyear Hitler seized power, 44 percent of marriagesinvolving at least one German Jew were marriagesto a non-Jew. In addition, some German Jews con-verted before marrying non-Jewish Germans(Gordon, 1984). Yet, although the boundary sepa-rating Germans from Jews was quite weak, theNazis chose to redraw and reinforce it. Defining aJew as anyone who had at least one Jewish grand-parent, the Nazis passed a whole series of anti-Jewish laws and, in the end, systematicallyslaughtered the Jews of Europe. The divisionbetween Germans and Jews was not “natural.” Itcame into existence because of its perceived useful-ness to a dominant group.

GROUPS AND SOCIAL IMAGINATION

So far, we have focused almost exclusively on face-to-face interaction in groups. However, people alsointeract with other group members in their imagina-tion. Take reference groups, for example. A referencegroup comprises people against whom an individualevaluates his or her situation or conduct. Put differ-ently, members of a reference group function as rolemodels. The classic case of a reference group isTheodore Newcomb’s (1943) study of students in onecollege. Although nearly all the students came frompolitically conservative families, they tended tobecome more liberal with every passing year. Twentyyears later, they remained liberals. Newcomb arguedthat their liberalism grew because over time theycame to identify less with their conservative parents(members of their primary group) and more with

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their liberal professors (their reference group).Interestingly, reference groups may influence us eventhough they represent a largely imaginary ideal. Theadvertising industry promotes certain body ideals thatmany people try to emulate although we all know thathardly anyone looks like a runway model or a Barbiedoll (see Chapter 4, Gender and Sexuality andChapter 17, Health and Aging).

We should not exaggerate the influence of refer-ence groups, however; despite their influence, mostpeople continue to highly value the opinions of in-group members. Thus, professors did not influencethe individual students that Newcomb studied one byone. Rather, groups of students came to admire andemulate the faculty reference group. Similarly, indi-vidual girls do not dream of looking like Barbie.Rather, groups of girls come to share the body idealrepresented by the Barbie role model. Referencegroups are important influences, but evidence gath-ered by social psychologists points to the prepon-derant power of in-groups in determining whichreference groups matter to us (Wilder, 1990).

We have to exercise our imagination vigorously toparticipate in the group life of a society like ours,because much social life in a complex society involvesbelonging to secondary groups without knowing orinteracting with most group members. For an indi-vidual to interact with any more than a small fraction ofthe 32 million people living in this country is impos-sible. Nonetheless, most Canadians feel a strong emo-tional bond to their fellow citizens. Similarly, thinkabout the employees and students at your college oruniversity. They know they belong to the same sec-ondary group and many of them are probably loyal toit. Yet how many people at your school have you met?You have probably met no more than a small fraction of the total. One way to make sense of the paradox ofintimacy despite distance is to think of your post-secondary institution or Canada as “imagined commu-nities.” They are imagined because you cannot possiblymeet most members of the group and can only specu-late about what they must be like. They are, nonethe-less, communities because people believe strongly intheir existence and importance (Anderson, 1991).

Many secondary groups are formal organiza-tions, secondary groups designed to achieve explicitobjectives. In complex societies like ours, the mostcommon and influential formal organizations arebureaucracies. We now turn to an examination of theseoften frustrating but necessary organizational forms.

BUREAUCRACIES

BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY

At the beginning of this chapter, we noted that Weberregarded bureaucracies as the most efficient type of secondary group. This runs against the grain ofcommon knowledge. In everyday speech, whensomeone says bureaucracy, people commonly think ofbored clerks sitting in small cubicles spinning out end-less trails of “red tape” that create needless waste andfrustrate the goals of clients (see Figure 21.3, p. 21-14). Theidea that bureaucracies are efficient may seem very odd.

Real events often reinforce the common view.Consider, for instance, the case of the Challengerspace shuttle, which exploded shortly after takeoff onJanuary 28, 1986, killing all seven crewmembers. Theweather was cold, and the flexible O-rings that weresupposed to seal the sections of the booster rockets hadbecome rigid, which allowed burning gas to leak. Theburning gas triggered the explosion. Some engineers atthe National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) and at the company that manufactured the O-rings knew they would not function properly in coldweather. However, this information did not reachNASA’s top bureaucrats:

[The] rigid hierarchy that had arisen atNASA . . . made communication betweendepartments formal and not particularlyeffective. [In the huge bureaucracy,] mostcommunication was done through memosand reports. Everything was meticulouslydocumented, but critical details tended toget lost in the paperwork blizzard. Theresult was that the upper-level managerswere kept informed about possible problemswith the O-rings . . . but they never trulyunderstood the seriousness of the issue.(Pool, 1997: 257)

As this tragedy shows, then, bureaucratic ineffi-ciencies can sometimes have tragic consequences.Indeed, some of the lessons of the 1986 disasterappear to have gone unheeded. As mentioned previ-ously, in 2003 the shuttle Columbia was destroyed onreentry into Earth’s atmosphere, killing all sevenastronauts on board. NASA Administrator SeanO’Keefe was roundly criticized for bureaucratic mis-management. The critics demanded to know whyO’Keefe had not received internal NASA e-mails that


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expressed safety concerns about damage caused bydebris during the takeoff. As U.S. RepresentativeAnthony Weiner told O’Keefe: “I read this stuffbefore you did. That’s crazy” (quoted in Stenger,2003).

How can we square the reality of bureaucraticinefficiencies—even tragedies—with Weber’s viewthat bureaucracies are the most efficient type of sec-ondary group? The answer is twofold. First, we mustrecognize that when Weber wrote about the effi-ciency of bureaucracy, he was comparing it witholder organizational forms. These operated on thebasis of either traditional practice (“We do it this way

because we’ve always done it this way”) or thecharisma of their leaders (“We do it this way becauseour chief inspires us to do it this way”). Comparedwith such “traditional” and “charismatic” organiza-tions, bureaucracies are generally more efficient.Second, we must recognize that Weber thoughtbureaucracies could operate efficiently only in theideal case. He wrote extensively about some ofbureaucracy’s less admirable aspects in the real world.In other words, he understood that reality is oftenmessier than the ideal case. So should we. In reality,bureaucracies vary in efficiency. Therefore, ratherthan proclaiming bureaucracy efficient or inefficient,

WHICH CHANGE OF ADDRESS FORM SHOULD YOU FILE?

Follow the arrows to find out whether you must file the Long Form

624Z87M or Short Form 624Z87M-A. By answering ”yes” or “no”

to each question in turn, you will easily be led to the final answer.

Is your new home inthe U.S.?

NO

YES

Are you moving within10 miles of your oldhome?

YES

YES

RENT

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Was yourmortgage over$100,000?

YOU MUST FILELONG FORM624Z87M

YES

EVEN

Are you renting orbuying your new home?

BUY

Did you obtain yourmortgage throughFillmore FiduciaryTrust?

NO

Do you plan to obtaina 2nd mortgagethrough FillmoreFiduciary Trust?

YES

Is the differencebetween your new zipcode and your old zipcode odd or even?

Did you eat breakfastthis morning?

ODD

Are you relocating asa result of an atomicwar or other nucleardisaster?

YES

YESYOU MUST FILESHORT FORM624Z87M-A

How many times haveyou moved within thepast year?

A LOTSOME

Have you made abank deposit withinthe past 5 days?

YES

Are your moving inwith your in-laws?

YES

Have you made abank withdrawalwithin the last 5 days?

NO

YES

NONE

NO

NO

NO

Do you own a luxurycar, a vacation home,a VCR, or a wide-screen TV; andif so, are you willingto donate any or allof these propertiesto the President ofFillmore FiduciaryTrust?

YES

The 1980s Infocom game “Bureaucracy” satirized the conventional view of bureaucratic red tape.

SOURCE: Infocom (2003).

FIGURE 21.3 RED TAPE


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we should find out what makes bureaucracies workwell or poorly. We can then apply this knowledge toimproving the operation of bureaucracies.

Traditionally, sociologists have lodged four maincriticisms against bureaucracies. First is the problemof dehumanization. Rather than treating clients andpersonnel as people with unique needs, bureaucraciessometimes treat clients as standard cases and per-sonnel as cogs in a giant machine. This treatmentfrustrates clients and lowers worker morale. Second isthe problem of bureaucratic ritualism (Merton, 1968[1949]). Bureaucrats sometimes get so preoccupiedwith rules and regulations they make it difficult forthe organization to fulfill its goals. Third is theproblem of oligarchy, or “rule of the few” (Michels,1949 [1911]). Some sociologists have argued that inall bureaucracies power tends to become increasinglyconcentrated in the hands of a few people at the topof the organizational pyramid. This tendency is par-ticularly problematic in political organizationsbecause it hinders democracy and renders leadersunaccountable to the public. Fourth is the problem ofbureaucratic inertia. Bureaucracies are sometimesso large and rigid that they lose touch with reality andcontinue their policies even when their clients’ needschange. Like the Titanic, they are so big that they findit difficult to shift course and steer clear of dangerousobstacles.

Two main factors underlie bureaucratic ineffi-ciency: size and social structure. Consider size first.Something can be said for the view that bigger isalmost inevitably more problematic. Some of theproblems caused by size are evident even when youremember some of the differences between dyads andtriads. When only two people are involved in a rela-tionship, they may form a strong social bond. If theydo, communication is direct. Once a third person isintroduced, however, a secret may be kept, a coalitionof two against one may crystallize, and jealousy mayresult. Communication is more problematic.

Problems can multiply in groups of more thanthree people. For example, as Figure 21.4 shows, onlyone dyadic relationship can exist between two people,whereas three dyadic relationships can exist amongthree people and six dyadic relationships among fourpeople. The number of potential dyadic relationshipsincreases exponentially with the number of people.Hence, 300 dyadic relationships are possible among25 people and 1225 dyadic relationships are possibleamong 50 people. The possibility of clique formation,rivalries, conflict, and miscommunication rises asquickly as the number of possible dyadic social rela-tionships in an organization.

The second factor underlying bureaucratic ineffi-ciency is social structure. Figure 21.5 (p. 21-16) showsa typical bureaucratic structure. Note that it is a

Num

ber

of

dya

dic

rela

tionship

s �

(n

2 �

n)/

2,

where

n i

s t

he n

um

ber

of

people

0

1 400

Two people can have one dyadic relationship.

Three people can have three dyadic relationships.

Four people can have six dyadic relationships.

BA

DC

BA

BA

C

1 200

1 000

800

600

400

200

504540353025

Number of people

20155 100

FIGURE 21.4 NUMBER OF POSSIBLE DYADIC RELATIONSHIPS BYNUMBER OF PEOPLE IN GROUP


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Head

Department BDepartment A Department C

Division B2Division B1 Division C2Division C1Division A2Division A1

FIGURE 21.5 BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE

hierarchy. The bureaucracy has a head. Below the headare three divisions. Below the divisions are six depart-ments. As you move up the hierarchy, the power of thestaff increases. Note also the lines of communicationthat join the various bureaucratic units. Departmentsreport only to their divisions. Divisions report only tothe head.

Usually, the more levels in a bureaucratic struc-ture, the more difficult communication becomes,because people have to communicate indirectly,through department and division heads, rather thandirectly with each other. Information may be lost,blocked, reinterpreted, or distorted as it moves up thehierarchy, or an excess of information may cause toplevels to become engulfed in a “paperwork blizzard”that prevents them from clearly seeing the needs ofthe organization and its clients. Bureaucratic headsmay have only a vague and imprecise idea of what ishappening “on the ground” (Wilensky, 1967).

Consider also what happens when the lines ofcommunication directly joining departments or divi-sions are weak or nonexistent. As the lines joiningunits in Figure 21.5 suggest, department A1 may haveinformation that could help department B1 do its jobbetter but may have to communicate that informationindirectly through the division level. At the divisionlevel, the information may be lost, blocked, reinter-preted, or distorted. Thus, just as people who haveauthority may lack information, people who haveinformation may lack the authority to act on itdirectly (Crozier, 1964 [1963]).

Below we consider some ways of overcomingbureaucratic inefficiency. As you will see, these typicallyinvolve establishing patterns of social relations thatflatten the bureaucratic hierarchy and cut across thesort of bureaucratic rigidities illustrated in Figure 21.5.As a useful prelude to this discussion, we first note someshortcomings of Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy.Weber tended to ignore both bureaucracy’s informal sideand the role of leadership in influencing bureaucratic

performance. Yet, as you will learn, it is precisely bypaying attention to such issues that we can makebureaucracies more efficient.

BUREAUCRACY’S INFORMAL SIDE

Weber was concerned mainly with the formal struc-ture or chain of command in a bureaucracy. He paidlittle attention to the social networks that underlie thechain of command.

Evidence for the existence of social networks andtheir importance in the operation of bureaucraciesgoes back to the 1930s. Officials at the Hawthorneplant of the Western Electric Company near Chicagowanted to see how various aspects of the work environment affected productivity. They sent socialscientists in to investigate. Among other things,researchers found that workers in one section of theplant had established a norm for daily output.Workers who failed to meet the norm were helped byco-workers until their output increased. Workers who exceeded the norm were chided by co-workersuntil their productivity fell. Company officials andresearchers previously had regarded employeesmerely as individuals who worked as hard or as littleas they could in response to wage levels and workconditions. However, the Hawthorne study showedthat employees are members of social networks that regulate output (Roethlisberger and Dickson,1939).

In the 1970s, Rosabeth Moss Kanter conductedanother landmark study of informal social relations inbureaucracies (Kanter, 1977). Kanter studied a corpo-ration in which most women were sales agents. Theywere locked out of managerial positions. However,she did not find that the corporation discriminatedagainst women as a matter of policy. She did find amale-only social network whose members sharedgossip, went drinking, and told sexist jokes. The costof being excluded from the network was high: To getgood raises and promotions, a person had to beaccepted as “one of the boys” and be sponsored by amale executive, which was impossible for women.Thus, despite a company policy that did not discrim-inate against women, an informal network of socialrelations ensured that the company discriminatedagainst women in practice.

Despite their overt commitment to impersonalityand written rules, bureaucracies rely profoundly oninformal interaction to get the job done (Barnard,1938; Blau, 1963). This fact is true even at the highest


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levels. For example, executives usually decide impor-tant matters in face-to-face meetings, not in writingor via the phone. That is because people feel morecomfortable in intimate settings, where they can getto know “the whole person.” Meeting face to face,people can use their verbal and nonverbal interactionskills to gauge other people’s trustworthiness.Socializing—talking over dinner, for example—is animportant part of any business because the establish-ment of trust lies at the heart of all social interactionsthat require cooperation (Gambetta, 1988).

LEADERSHIP

Apart from overlooking the role of informal relations inthe operation of bureaucracies, Weber also paid insuffi-cient attention to the issue of leadership. Weber thoughtthe formal structure of a bureaucracy largely determineshow it operates. However, sociologists now realize thatleadership style also has a big bearing on bureaucraticperformance (Barnard, 1938; Ridgeway, 1983).

Research shows that the least effective leader isthe one who allows subordinates to work things outlargely on their own, with almost no direction fromabove. This is known as laissez-faire leadership,from the French expression “let them do.” Note,however, that laissez-faire leadership can be effectiveunder some circumstances. It works best when groupmembers are highly experienced, trained, motivated,and educated, and when trust and confidence ingroup members are high. In such conditions, a strongleader is not really needed for the group to accomplishits goals. At the other extreme is authoritarian lead-ership. Authoritarian leaders demand strict compli-ance from subordinates. They are most effective in acrisis, such as a war or the emergency room of a hos-pital. They may earn grudging respect from subor-dinates for achieving the group’s goals in the face ofdifficult circumstances, but they rarely win popu-larity contests. Democratic leadership offers moreguidance than the laissez-faire variety but less con-trol than the authoritarian type. Democratic leaderstry to include all group members in the decision-making process, taking the best ideas from the groupand moulding them into a strategy that all can iden-tify with. Except for crisis situations, democraticleadership is usually the most effective leadershipstyle.

In sum, contemporary researchers have modifiedWeber’s characterization of bureaucracy in two main

ways. First, they have stressed the importance ofinformal social networks in shaping bureaucraticoperations. Second, they have shown that democ-ratic leaders are most effective in noncrisis situationsbecause they tend to distribute decision-makingauthority and rewards widely. As you will now see,these lessons are important when it comes tothinking about how to make bureaucracies moreefficient.

OVERCOMING BUREAUCRATICINEFFICIENCY

In the business world, large bureaucratic organiza-tions sometimes find themselves unable to competeagainst smaller, innovative firms, particularly inindustries that are changing quickly (Burns andStalker, 1961). This situation occurs partly becauseinnovative firms tend to have flatter and more demo-cratic organizational structures, such as the networkillustrated in Figure 21.6. Compare the flat networkstructure in Figure 21.6 with the traditional bureau-cratic structure in Figure 21.5. Note that the networkstructure has fewer levels than the traditional bureau-cratic structure. Moreover, in the network structure,lines of communication link all units. In the tradi-tional bureaucratic structure, information flows onlyupward.

Evidence suggests that flatter bureaucracies withdecentralized decision making and multiple lines ofcommunication produce more satisfied workers, hap-pier clients, and bigger profits (Kanter, 1989). Someof this evidence comes from Sweden and Japan.Beginning in the early 1970s, such corporations asVolvo and Toyota were at the forefront of bureau-cratic innovation in those countries. They beganeliminating middle-management positions. Theyallowed worker participation in a variety of tasksrelated to their main functions. They delegatedauthority to autonomous teams of a dozen or so

Head

Division 1 Division 3Division 2

FIGURE 21.6 NETWORK STRUCTURE


workers who were allowed to make many decisionsthemselves. They formed “quality circles” of workersto monitor and correct defects in products and ser-vices. As a result, product quality, worker morale, andprofitability improved. Today, these ideas have spreadwell beyond the Swedish and Japanese automobileindustry and are evident in such companies asGeneral Motors, Ford, Boeing, and Caterpillar. In the1980s and 1990s, companies outside the manufac-turing sector introduced similar bureaucratic reforms,again with positive effects.

ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

If flatter organizations are more efficient, why aren’tall bureaucracies flatter? Mainly, say sociologists,because of the environment in which they operate. Anorganizational environment comprises a host ofeconomic, political, and cultural factors that lie out-side an organization and affect the way it works(Aldrich, 1979; Meyer and Scott, 1983). Some organi-zational environments are conducive to the formationof flatter, network-like bureaucracies. Others are not.We can illustrate the effects of organizational envi-ronments by discussing two cases that have attractedmuch attention in recent years: the United States andJapan.

In the 1970s, American business bureaucraciestended to be more hierarchical than their Japanesecounterparts. This was one reason that worker dissat-isfaction was high and labour productivity was low inthe United States. In Japan, where corporate decisionmaking was more decentralized, worker morale andproductivity were high (Dore, 1983). Several aspectsof the organizational environment help to explainJapanese–American differences in the 1970s:

• Japanese workers were in a position to demand andachieve more decision-making authority thanAmerican workers were. After World War II, theproportion of Japanese workers in unionsincreased whereas the proportion of Americanworkers in unions declined. Unions gaveJapanese workers more clout than their Americancounterparts enjoyed.

• International competition encouraged bureaucratic effi-ciency in Japan. Many big Japanese corporationsmatured in the highly competitive post–WorldWar II international environment. Many bigAmerican corporations originated earlier, in an

international environment with few competitors.Thus, Japanese corporations had a bigger incen-tive to develop more efficient organizational struc-tures (Harrison, 1994).

• The availability of external suppliers allowed Japanesefirms to remain lean. Many large American compa-nies matured when external sources of supplywere scarce. For example, when IBM entered thecomputer market in the 1950s, it had to produceall components internally because nobody elsewas making them. This situation led IBM todevelop a large, hierarchical bureaucracy. In con-trast, Japanese computer manufacturers couldrely on many external suppliers in the 1970s.Therefore, they could develop flatter organiza-tional structures (Podolny and Page, 1998).

Today, Japanese–American differences have sub-stantially decreased because most big businesses inAmerica have introduced Japanese-style bureaucraticreforms (Tsutsui, 1998). For instance, Silicon Valley,the centre of the American computer industry today,is full of companies that fit the “Japanese” organiza-tional pattern. These companies originated in the1980s and 1990s, when external suppliers were abun-dant and international competitiveness was intense.In addition, American companies started to copyJapanese business structures because they saw them assuccessful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). We thus seehow changes in the organizational environment helpaccount for convergence between Japanese andAmerican bureaucratic forms.

The experience of the United States over the pastfew decades holds out hope for increasing bureau-cratic efficiency and the continued growth ofemployee autonomy and creativity at work. It doesnot mean, however, that bureaucracies in Japan andthe United States will be alike in all respects in 20 or50 or 100 years. The organizational environment isunpredictable, and sociologists are just beginning tounderstand its operation. It is therefore anyone’sguess how far convergence will continue.

SOCIETIESNetworks, groups, and bureaucracies are embedded insocieties, collectivities of interacting people whoshare a culture and a territory.1 Like smaller collectiv-ities, societies help shape human action. They influ-ence the kind of work we do and how productively

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we work. They mould patterns of class, gender, racial,and ethnic inequality. They impinge on the way reli-gious, family, and other institutions operate. They affectthe way we govern and the way we think of ourselves.

Despite the pervasiveness of these influences,most people are blind to them. We tend to believethat we are free to do what we want. Yet the plain factis that societies affect even our most personal and inti-mate choices. For example, deciding how many chil-dren to have is one of the most intensely private andemotional issues a woman must face. So why is it thattens of millions of women have decided in the spaceof just a few decades to have an average of two babiesinstead of six, or eight babies instead of four? Why doso many individuals make almost exactly the same pri-vate decision at almost precisely the same historicalmoment? The answer is that certain identifiable socialconditions prompt them to reach the same conclu-sion, in this case to have fewer or more babies. And soit is with many decisions. Identifiable social condi-tions increase the chance that we will choose onecourse of action over another.

The relationship between people and nature isthe most basic determinant of how societies are struc-tured and therefore how people’s choices are con-strained. Accordingly, researchers have identified sixstages of human evolution, each characterized by ashift in the relationship between people and nature.As we review each of these stages, note what happensto the human–nature relationship: With each succes-sive stage, people are less at the mercy of nature andtransform it more radically. The changing relation-ship between people and nature has huge implications

for all aspects of social life (Table 21.1). Let us iden-tify these implications as we sketch the evolution ofhuman society in bold strokes.

FORAGING SOCIETIES

Until about 10 000 years ago, all people lived in for-aging societies. They lived by searching for wildplants and hunting wild animals (Lenski, Nolan, andLenski, 1995; O’Neil, 2004; Sahlins, 1972). They werepassively dependent on nature, taking whatever itmade available and transforming it only slightly tomeet their needs. They built simple tools, such as bas-kets, bows and arrows, spears, and digging sticks.They sometimes burned grasslands to encourage thegrowth of new vegetation and attract game, but theyneither planted crops nor domesticated many animals.

Most foragers lived in temporary encampments,and when food was scarce they migrated to morebountiful regions. Harsh environments could sup-port 3 people per 25 to 130 square kilometres (1 person per 10 to 50 square miles). Rich environmentscould support 25 to 80 people per square kilometre(10 to 30 people per square mile). Foraging commu-nities or bands averaged about 25 to 30 people butcould be as large as 100 people. Aquatic foragers, suchas those on the western coast of North America, con-centrated on fishing and hunting marine mammals.Equestrian foragers, such as the Great Plains Indiansof North America, hunted large mammals fromhorseback. Pedestrian foragers engaged in diversifiedhunting and gathering on foot and could be found onall continents.

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TYPE OF SOCIETY foraging horticultural, intensive industrial postindustrial postnaturalpastoral agricultural

APPROXIMATE YEARS 100 000 10 000 5000 225 60 30SINCE ORIGIN

REVOLUTIONARY simple domestication plow steam computer recombinant TECHNOLOGY hand tools engine DNA

PRODUCTIVITY, DIVISION 6 5 4 3 2 1OF LABOUR, POPULATION SIZE, PERMANENCE OF SETTLEMENTS (RANK)

GENDER EQUALITY 1 2 4 3 2 2(RANK)

CLASS EQUALITY 1 2 3 3, then 2 2, but ?(RANK) increasing

TABLE 21.1 THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN SOCIETIES OVER THE PAST 100 000 YEARS


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Marine foragers had much leisure time to invest in ornamenta-

tion, suggesting that their lives were by no means a constant

struggle for survival.

SOURCE: PhotoDisc.

Until the middle of the twentieth century,most social scientists thought that foragers livedbrief, grim lives. In their view, foragers wereengaged in a desperate struggle for existence thatwas typically cut short by disease, starvation, pesti-lence, or some other force of nature. We now knowthat this characterization says more about thebiases of early anthropologists than about the livesforagers actually lived. Consider the !Kung of theKalahari Desert in southern Africa, who main-tained their traditional way of life until the 1960s(Lee, 1979). Young !Kung did not fully join theworkforce until they reached the age of 20. Adultsworked only about 15 hours a week. Mainlybecause of disease, children faced a much smallerchance of surviving childhood than is the case incontemporary society, but about 10 percent of the!Kung were older than 60, the same percentage asCanadians in the early 1970s. It thus seems that the!Kung who survived childhood lived relatively long,secure, leisurely, healthy, and happy lives. Theywere not unique. The tall totem poles, ornate woodcarvings, colourful masks, and elaborate clothing ofthe Kwakiutl on Vancouver Island serve as beautifulreminders that many foragers had the leisure timeto invest considerable energy in ornamentation.

Equestrian foragers were hierarchical, male-dominated, and warlike, especially after they acquiredrifles in the nineteenth century. However, the socialstructure of pedestrian foragers—the great majorityof all foragers—was remarkably nonhierarchical.They shared what little wealth they had, and womenand men enjoyed approximately equal status.

PASTORAL AND HORTICULTURALSOCIETIES

Substantial social inequality became widespread about10 000 years ago, when some bands began to domesti-cate various wild plants and animals, especially cattle,camels, pigs, goats, sheep, horses, and reindeer(Lenski, Nolan, and Lenski, 1995; O’Neil, 2004). Byusing hand tools to garden in highly fertile areas (hor-ticultural societies) and herding animals in more aridareas (pastoral societies), people increased the foodsupply and made it more dependable. Nature couldnow support more people. Moreover, pastoral andhorticultural societies enabled fewer people to spe-cialize in producing food and more people to spe-cialize in constructing tools and weapons, makingclothing and jewellery, and trading valuable objectswith other bands. Some families and bands accumu-lated more domesticated animals, cropland, andvalued objects than others did. As a result, pastoral andhorticultural societies developed a higher level ofsocial inequality than was evident in most foragingsocieties.

As wealth accumulated, feuding and warfaregrew, particularly among pastoralists. Men whocontrolled large herds of animals and conductedsuccessful predatory raids acquired much prestigeand power and came to be recognized as chiefs.Some chiefs formed large, fierce, mobile armies.The Mongols and the Zulus were horse pastoralistswho conquered large parts of Asia and Africa,respectively.

Most pastoralists were nomadic, with migrationpatterns dictated by their animals’ needs for foodand water. Some pastoralists migrated regularlyfrom the same cool highlands in the summer to thesame warm lowland valleys in the winter and wereable to establish villages in both locations.Horticulturalists often established permanent settle-ments beside their croplands. These settlementsmight include several hundred people. However, the development of large permanent settlements,including the first cities, took place only with thedevelopment of intensive agriculture.

AGRICULTURAL SOCIETIES

Especially in the fertile river valleys of the MiddleEast, India, China, and South America, human popu-lations flourished—so much so that, about 5000 years


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ago, they could no longer be sustained by pastoral andhorticulture techniques. It was then that agriculturalsocieties originated. The plow was invented to har-ness animal power for more intensive and efficientagricultural production. The plow allowed farmers toplant crops over much larger areas and dig below thetopsoil, bringing nutrients to the surface and thusincreasing yield (Lenski, Nolan, and Lenski, 1995;O’Neil, 2004).

Because the source of food was immobile, manypeople now built permanent settlements, and becausepeople were now able to produce considerably morefood than was necessary for their own subsistence,surpluses were sold in village markets. Some of thesecentres became towns and then cities, home to rulers,religious figures, soldiers, craft workers, and govern-ment officials. The population of some agriculturalsocieties numbered in the millions.

The crystallization of the idea of private propertywas one of the most significant developments of theera. Among pedestrian foragers, there was no privateownership of land or water. Among horticulturalists,particular families might be recognized as havingrights to some property, but only while they wereusing it. If the property was not in use, they wereobliged to share it or give it to a family that needed it.In contrast, in societies that practised intensive agri-culture, powerful individuals succeeded in having theidea of individual property rights legally recognized.It was now possible for people to buy land and water,to call them their own, and to transmit ownership totheir offspring. People could now become rich and,through inheritance, make their children rich.

Ancient civilizations thus became rigidly dividedinto classes. Royalty surrounded itself with loyallandowners, protected itself with professional sol-diers, and justified its rule with the help of priests,part of whose job was to convince ordinary peasantsthat the existing social order was God’s will.Government officials collected taxes and religiousofficials collected tithes, thus enriching the upperclasses with the peasantry’s surplus production. In thisera, inequality between women and men also reachedits historical high point (Boulding, 1976).

INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

Stimulated by international exploration, trade, andcommerce, the Industrial Revolution began in Britainin the 1780s. A century later, it had spread to all of

Western Europe, North America, Japan, and Russia.It involved the use of fuel—at first, water power andsteam—to drive machines and thereby greatlyincrease productivity, the quantity of things thatcould be produced with a given amount of effort.

If you have ever read a Charles Dickens novel,such as Oliver Twist, you know that hellish workingconditions and deep social inequalities characterizedearly industrial societies. Work in factories and minesbecame so productive that owners amassed previouslyunimaginable fortunes but ordinary labourers worked16-hour days in dangerous conditions and earnedbarely enough to survive. They struggled for the rightto form and join unions and expand the vote to all adultcitizens, hoping to use union power and political influ-ence to win improvements in the conditions of theirexistence. At the same time, new technologies and waysof organizing work made it possible to produce evermore goods at a lower cost per unit. This made it pos-sible to meet many of the workers’ demands and raiseliving standards for the entire population.

Increasingly, businesses required a literate,numerate, and highly trained workforce. To raiseprofits, they were eager to identify and hire the mosttalented people. They encouraged everyone to developtheir talents and rewarded them for doing so by payinghigher salaries. Even inequality between women andmen began to decrease because of the demand for talentand women’s struggles to enter the paid workforce onan equal footing with men. Why hire an incompetentman over a competent woman when you can profitmore from the services of a capable employee? Put inthis way, women’s demands for equality made goodbusiness sense. For all these reasons, class and genderinequality declined as industrial societies matured.

POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

In the early 1970s, sociologist Daniel Bell (1973) arguedthat industrial society was rapidly becoming a thing of the past. According to Bell, just as agriculture gave wayto manufacturing as the driving force of the economy inthe nineteenth century, so did manufacturing give way toservice industries by the mid-twentieth century, resultingin the birth of postindustrial societies.

Even in pre-agricultural societies, a few individ-uals specialized in providing services rather than inproducing goods. For example, a person consideredadept at tending to the ill, forecasting the weather,or predicting the movement of animals might be

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relieved of hunting responsibilities to focus on theseservices. However, such jobs were rare because pro-ductivity was low. Nearly everyone had to do phys-ical work for the tribe to survive. Even in earlyagricultural societies, it took 80 to 100 farmers tosupport one non-farmer (Hodson and Sullivan,1995: 10). Only at the beginning of the nineteenthcentury in industrialized countries did productivityincrease to the point where a quarter of the labourforce could be employed in services. By 1960, all thehighly industrialized countries had reached thatthreshold.

In postindustrial societies, women have beenrecruited to the service sector in disproportionatelylarge numbers, and that has helped to ensure agradual increase in equality between women andmen in terms of education, income, and other indi-cators of rank (see Chapter 4, Gender and Sexuality).The picture with respect to inequality betweenclasses is more complex. Most postindustrial soci-eties, and especially the United States, have experi-enced large increases in class inequality. Otherpostindustrial societies, such as Canada, have not. Atleast one postindustrial society—France—had lessinequality in 2000 than in 1977, bucking the broadertrend (Smeeding, 2004). We discuss the reasons forthese different patterns in Chapter 6, SocialStratification.

Rapid change in the composition of the labourforce during the final decades of the twentieth cen-tury was made possible by the computer. The com-puter automated many manufacturing and officeprocedures. It created jobs in the service sector asquickly as it eliminated them in manufacturing.The computer is to the service sector as the steamengine was to manufacturing, the plow was tointensive agriculture, domestication was to horti-culture and pastoralism, and simple hand toolswere to foraging.

POSTNATURAL SOCIETIES

On February 28, 1953, two men walked into a pub inCambridge, England, and offered drinks all around.“We have discovered the secret of life!” proclaimedone of the men. He was James Watson. With his col-league, Francis Crick, he had found the structure ofdeoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, the chemical thatmakes up genes. During cell division, a single DNAmolecule uncoils into two strands. New, identical

molecules are formed from each strand. In this way,growth takes place and traits are passed from one gen-eration to the next. It was one of the most importantscientific discoveries ever (Watson, 1968).

By the early 1970s, scientists were beginning todevelop techniques for manipulating DNA (so-calledrecombinant DNA). Soon they could cut a segmentout of a DNA strand and join the remaining sectionstogether, or they could take a DNA strand and con-nect it to segments of DNA from another livingthing. This meant that scientists could now createnew life forms, a capability that had until then beenrestricted in the popular imagination to God alone.Enthusiasts proclaimed a “second genesis” as theybegan to speculate about the potential of the newtechnology to rid the world of hereditary disease, feed the hungry with higher-yield, disease-resistantfarm products, and even create more intelligent,

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The DNA molecule

SOURCE: Shutterstock.


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beautiful, and athletic children. For many millionsof years, nature had selected the “fittest” livingthings for survival. Now it seemed possible forhumans to speed up natural selection, thus escapingthe whims of nature and creating a more perfectsociety under their control. The invention of recom-binant DNA marked the onset of a new social era—what we prefer to call the era of postnatural society(Dyson, 1999; Watson, 2000).

Genetic engineering could easily result inincreased social inequality. For example, the tech-nology for creating more perfect babies willundoubtedly be expensive, so rich countries andrich people are more likely to benefit from it.Princeton University biologist Lee Silver andNobel Prize–winning physicist Freeman Dysongo so far as to speculate that the ultimate result ofgenetic engineering will be several distincthuman species. People who are in a position totake full advantage of genetic engineering will bebetter looking, more intelligent, less likely tosuffer from disease, and more athletic. Peoplewho are not so fortunate will have to face nature’scaprice in handing out talents and disadvantages,just as our foraging ancestors did (Brave, 2003).The main, and perhaps only, safeguard againstsuch an outcome is true democracy, which wouldallow ordinary people to decide how the benefitsof genetic engineering should be distributedwithin and across populations (Häyry and Lehto,1998).

FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINT IN SOCIAL LIFEThroughout this chapter, we emphasized the capacityof networks, groups, bureaucracies, and societies toconstrain human behaviour. As we have seen, suchsocial collectivities can even encourage dangerouslyhigh levels of conformity, compel people to actagainst their better judgment, dominate people in avice of organizational rigidities, and affect the level ofsocial inequality in society.

We stressed the constraining aspect of social col-lectivities because we wanted to counter the common-sense view that motives alone determine the waypeople act. Now, however, in conclusion, it wouldserve us well to remind you that people often have twooptions other than bowing to the will of their social

collectivities: “exit” and “voice” (Hirschman, 1970). In some circumstances, they can leave the social collec-tivities to which they belong (exit). In other circum-stances, they can struggle against the constraints theirsocial collectivities seek to impose on them (voice). AsFrench philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre once remarked, itis always possible to say no, even to the worst tyrant.Less dramatically but no less importantly, knowledge,including sociological knowledge, can increase theability of people to resist the constraints imposed onthem. Recall the Milgram experiment we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in which subjectsadministered what they thought were painful shocks topeople just because the experimenters told them to.When the experiment was replicated years later, manyof the subjects refused to go along with the demands ofthe experimenters. Some invoked the example of theNazis to justify their refusal to comply. Others men-tioned Milgram’s original experiment. Their knowl-edge, some of it perhaps gained in sociology courses,enabled them to resist unreasonable demands(Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982).

Paradoxically, to succeed in challenging socialcollectivities, people must sometimes form a new social collectivity themselves. Half a century ago, Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, andJames S. Coleman (1956) conducted a classic socio-logical study that made just this point. They investi-gated the remarkable case of the InternationalTypographical Union—remarkable because in the1950s it was the outstanding exception to the ten-dency of trade union bureaucracies to turn into oli-garchies, or organizations run by the few. TheInternational Typographical Union remained demo-cratic because the nature of printing as an occupa-tion and an industry made the resources fordemocratic politics more widely available than istypical in trade unions. Strong local unions thatvalued their autonomy founded the internationalunion. The local and regional markets typical of theprinting industry at the time strengthened theirautonomy. At the same time, strong factions in theunion prevented any one faction from becomingdominant. Finally, robust social networks on theshop floor enabled ordinary printers to fight fortheir rights and resist the slide into oligarchy anddull obedience. What this case illustrates is the waypeople can form social collectivities to counteractother social collectivities. Embedded in social rela-tions, we can use them for good or evil.


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QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. Would you have acted any differently from ordi-nary Germans if you were living in Nazi Germany?Why or why not? What if you were a member of aNazi police battalion? Would you have been atraitor to your group? Why or why not?

2. If you were starting your own business, howwould you organize it? Why? Base your answeron theories and research discussed in thischapter.

1. People’s motives are important determinants oftheir actions, but social collectivities also influ-ence the way they behave. Because of the powerof social collectivities, people sometimes actagainst their interests, values, and emotions.

2. It is a small world. Most people interact repeatedly with a small circle of family members, friends, co-workers, and other strongties. However, our personal networks overlapwith other social networks, which is why only afew links separate us from complete strangers.

3. Network analysis is the study of the concretesocial relations linking people. By focusing onconcrete ties, network analysts often come upwith surprising results. For example, networkanalysis has demonstrated the strength of weakties in job searches, explained patterns in theflow of information and communicable diseases,and demonstrated that a rich web of social affiliations underlies urban life.

4. Groups are clusters of people who identify withone another. Primary groups involve intense, intimate, enduring relations, secondary groupsinvolve less personal and intense ties, and reference groups are groups against whichpeople measure their situation or conduct.Groups impose conformity on members andseek to exclude nonmembers.

5. Although bureaucracies often suffer from variousforms of inefficiency, they are generally efficientcompared with other organizational forms.Bureaucratic inefficiency increases with size anddegree of hierarchy. By flattening bureaucraticstructures, decentralizing decision-makingauthority, and opening lines of communicationbetween bureaucratic units, efficiency can oftenbe improved.

6. Social networks underlie the chain of commandin all bureaucracies and affect their operation.Weber ignored this aspect of bureaucracy. Healso downplayed the importance of leadership inthe functioning of bureaucracy. However,research shows that democratic leadershipimproves the efficiency of bureaucratic operationsin noncrisis situations, authoritarian leadershipworks best in crises, and laissez-faire leadershipis the least effective form of leadership in all situations.

7. The organizational environment influences thedegree to which bureaucratic efficiency can beachieved. For example, bureaucracies are lesshierarchical where workers are more powerful,competition with other bureaucracies is high,and external sources of supply are available.

8. Over the past 100 000 years, growing humandomination of nature has increased the supplyand dependability of food and finished goods,productivity, the division of labour, and the sizeand permanence of human settlements. Classand gender inequality increased until the nine-teenth century and then began to decline. Classinequality began to increase in some societies inthe last decades of the twentieth century andmay continue to increase in the future.

In foraging societies, people lived bysearching for wild plants and hunting wild animals. Horticultural and pastoral societiesemerged about 10 000 years ago. In horticulturalsocieties, people domesticated plants and usedsimple hand tools to garden. In pastoral soci-eties, people domesticated cattle, camels, pigs,goats, sheep, horses, and reindeer. Agriculturalsocieties first emerged about 5000 years ago. In such societies, people used plows and animalpower to produce food. Great Britain was the firstsociety to industrialize, beginning about 225 yearsago. Industrial societies used machines and fuel to greatly increase the supply and depend-ability of food and finished goods. Shortly after World War II, the United States became the first postindustrial society. In postindustrial societies, most workers are employed in the servicesector and computers spur substantial increases inthe division of labour and productivity. Some soci-eties may be said to have entered a postnaturalphase in the early 1970s, when genetic engineeringbecame possible. Genetic engineering enablespeople to create new life forms, holding out muchpromise for improving productivity, feeding the poor,and ridding the world of disease, but much uncertainty as to whether these benefits will beequitably distributed.

9. Networks, groups, bureaucracies, and societiesinfluence and constrain everyone. However, peoplecan also use these social collectivities to increasetheir freedom. In this sense, social collectivitiesare a source of both constraint and freedom.

SUMMARY


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GLOSSARYAgricultural societies are societies in which plowsand animal power are used to substantially increasefood supply and dependability as compared with hor-ticultural and pastoral societies. Agricultural societiesfirst emerged about 5000 years ago. Average settle-ment size and permanence, the division of labour,productivity, and inequality are higher in agriculturalsocieties than in horticultural and pastoral societies.

Authoritarian leadership demands strict compliancefrom subordinates. Authoritarian leaders are mosteffective in a crisis, such as a war or the emergencyroom of a hospital.

A bureaucracy is a large, impersonal organizationcomprising many clearly defined positions arranged ina hierarchy. A bureaucracy has a permanent, salariedstaff of qualified experts and written goals, rules,and procedures. Staff members always try to findways of running the bureaucracy more efficiently.

Bureaucratic inertia refers to the tendency of large,rigid bureaucracies to continue their policies evenwhen their clients’ needs change.

Bureaucratic ritualism involves bureaucrats gettingso preoccupied with rules and regulations that theymake it difficult for the organization to fulfill itsgoals.

Dehumanization occurs when bureaucracies treatclients as standard cases and personnel as cogs ina giant machine. This treatment frustrates clientsand lowers worker morale.

Democratic leadership offers more guidance thanthe laissez-faire variety but less control than theauthoritarian type. Democratic leaders try to includeall group members in the decision-making process,taking the best ideas from the group and mouldingthem into a strategy with which all can identify.Outside crisis situations, democratic leadership isusually the most effective leadership style.

A dyad is a social relationship between two nodes orother social units (e.g., people, firms, organizations,countries).

Foraging societies are those in which people live bysearching for wild plants and hunting wild animals.Such societies predominated until about 10 000years ago. Inequality, the division of labor, production,and settlement size are very low in such societies.

Formal organizations are secondary groups designedto achieve explicit objectives.

Groupthink is group pressure to conform despiteindividual misgivings.

Horticultural societies are societies in which peopledomesticate plants and use simple hand tools togarden. Such societies first emerged about 10 000years ago. Horticulture increases the food supply andmakes it more dependable. This increases averagesettlement size and permanence, the division of

labour, productivity, and inequality above the levelstypical of foraging societies.

Industrial societies use machines and fuel to greatlyincrease the supply and dependability of food and fin-ished goods. The first such societies emerged about225 years ago in Great Britain. Compared with agri-cultural societies, productivity, the division of labour,and average settlement size increased substantiallyin industrial societies. Although social inequality wassubstantial during early industrialism, it declined asthe industrial system matured.

In-group members are people who belong to a group.

Laissez-faire leadership allows subordinates to workthings out largely on their own, with almost no direction from above. It is the least effective type of leadership.

Oligarchy means “rule of the few.” All bureaucracieshave a supposed tendency for power to becomeincreasingly concentrated in the hands of a fewpeople at the top of the organizational pyramid.

An organizational environment comprises a host ofeconomic, political, cultural, and other factors that lieoutside an organization and affect the way it works.

Out-group members are people who are excludedfrom the in-group.

Pastoral societies are societies in which peopledomesticate cattle, camels, pigs, goats, sheep,horses, and reindeer. Such societies first emergedabout 10 000 years ago. Domesticating animalsincreases the food supply and makes it moredependable. This increases average settlement sizeand permanence, the division of labour, productivity,and inequality above the levels typical of foragingsocieties.

Postindustrial societies are societies in which mostworkers are employed in the service sector and com-puters spur substantial increases in the division oflabour and productivity. Shortly after World War II, theUnited States became the first postindustrial society.Gender inequality decreases in postindustrial soci-eties, partly because so many women are broughtinto the system of higher education and the paidlabour force. Class inequality increases in somepostindustrial societies.

Postnatural societies are societies in which geneticengineering enables people to create new life forms.Although genetic engineering holds out much promisefor improving productivity, feeding the poor, and ridding the world of disease, social inequality couldincrease in postnatural societies unless people democratically decide on the distribution of the benefits of genetic engineering.

Primary groups are groups whose members agree on norms, rules, and statuses without putting themin writing. Social interaction leads to strong


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SUGGESTED READING

Nolan, Patrick, and Gerhard Lenski. (2004 [1974]).Human Societies: An Introduction to

Macrosociology. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. This is an update of a classic studyof how the evolution of human societies is drivenby technology.

Vaughan, Diane. (1996). The Challenger Launch

Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance

at NASA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Vaughan provides a chilling analysis of group-think and bureaucracy gone wrong.

Wellman, Barry, and Caroline Haythornwaite. (2002).The Internet in Everyday Life. Oxford, UK:Blackwell. This is the first network analysis ofhow being online fits into people’s everydaylives.

NOTE

1. For “virtual societies” on the Internet, however,a shared territory is unnecessary.

emotional ties, extends over a long period, involves a wide range of activities, and results in group members knowing one another well.

Recombinant DNA involve removing a segment ofDNA from a gene or splicing together segments ofDNA from different living things, thus effectively creating a new life form.

A reference group comprises people against whoman individual evaluates his or her situation or conduct.

Secondary groups are larger and more impersonalthan primary groups. Compared with primary groups,social interaction in secondary groups createsweaker emotional ties. It extends over a shorterperiod and it involves a narrow range of activities. Itresults in most group members having at most apassing acquaintance with one another.

A social category comprises people who share asimilar status but do not identify with one another.

A social group comprises one or more networks ofpeople who identify with one another and adhere todefined norms, roles, and statuses.

A social network is a bounded set of individuals whoare linked by the exchange of material or emotionalresources. The patterns of exchange determine theboundaries of the network. Members exchangeresources more frequently with each other than withnonmembers. They also think of themselves as net-work members. Social networks may be formal(defined in writing), but they are more often informal(defined only in practice).

Societies are collectivities of interacting people whoshare a culture and a territory.

A triad is a social relationship among three nodes orother social units (e.g., people, firms, organizations,countries).

Aldrich, Howard E. (1979). Organizations and Environ-

ments. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. (1991). Imagined

Communities: Reflections on the Origin and

Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.Asch, Solomon. (1955). “Opinion and Social Pressure.”

Scientific American July: 31–35.Barnard, Chester I. (1938). “The Economy of

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