non serviam #23

8/4/2019 Non Serviam #23

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self-ownership & self-enjoyment

Alexander Green:

Stirner & Marx

Max Stirner:A Historio-

Graphical Sketch

Alastair Mcleish:

Against

Max Stirner

non serviamnon serviam


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Communism rightly revolts against theoppression I experience from individual

proprietors, but more horrible is the mightit puts into the hand of the collectivity.

Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own


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Non Serviam 23

Editor

Svein Olav Nyberg

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Web: nonserviam.com

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Hans Trygve Jensen

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April 2006

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Hegel scholar Lawrence Stepelevichstated that the Hegelian project had twopossible contemporary conclusions: ei-ther the much touted and publicly testedMarxian one, or the less known and quietindividualist conclusions of Max Stirner.

Either the most successful collectivistideology, or the most radical and uncom-promising form of individualism.

In this issue ofNon Serviam, we havetwo authors stating the cases for theseopposing philosophies:

Alexander Green introduces the com-battants, and argues that Max Stirner

defeated all forms of Feuerbachianism,and that Marx despite his struggles to re-define and rearrange his philosophy, neversucceeded in escaping his Feuerbachianroots, and therefore never succeeded inescaping the Stirnerian critique. He alsodefends Stirner against the Marxiancharges that Stirners philosophy eitherlacks content or sets up a new ideal and

chimera.Alastair Mcleish offers a paper previously

published in Studies in Marxism1, in whichhe argues the case of the Feuerbachianyounger Marx against Stirners onslaught,

Editors Word

no

nserviam2

3

1. Studies in Marxism, no 10 (2004)

pp 85-100, an annual volume from the

Marxist Specialist Group of the Political Stud-

ies Association of Great Britain. Editor: Mark

Cowling of Teeside University.


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Non Serviam 234

and against the older Marx the young-er Marx had protectively turned him-

self into after having readDer Einzige.He does this by defending the Feuerbachian claim that human beings pos-sess and must possess a generalcontent, and by attacking Stirner forlacking just such a content, without

which, he states, Stirners unique indi-vidual is but an empty abstraction.

I will leave further comments to myreaders, or at least until the next issue. Thisissue is already the largest one yet by far,breaking with the technologically imposed

tradition of keeping the issues below 32kB, the size above which email software

used to break an email into parts.Max Stirner was born on 25. Oct.

1806, so in 2006 we can celebrate Max200th birthday. I therefore invite read-ers to contribute material to the nextissue ofNon Serviam, in a spirit of cel-ebrating old Max. All material will be

welcome, including commentary arti-

cles on the Stirner/Marx debate.

Svein Olav Nyberg

April 2006

23

Svein Olav Nyberg:

Alexander Green:

Alastair Mcleish:

Editors Word

Stirner and Marx

Max Stirner:

A Historiographical Sketch

Against Max Stirner

A Defence Of Marxisms

Humanist Standpoint

5

4

This egoism is simply the essence of present

society and present man brought to conscious-

ness, the ultimate that can be said against usby present society, the culmination of all the

theory intrinsic to the prevailing stupidity. But

thats precisely what makes the thing important,

more important than Hess, for one, holds it to

be. We must not simply cast [Stirners book]

aside, but rather use it as the perfect expression

of present-day folly and, while inverting it, con-

tinue to build on it. This egoism is taken to such

a pitch, it is so absurd and at the same time so

self-aware, that it cannot maintain itself even

for an instant in its one-sidedness, but must im-

mediately change into communism. In the rst

place its a simple matter to prove to Stirner thathis egoistic man is bound to become communist

out of sheer egoism. Thats the way to answer

the fellow. In the second place he must be told

that in its egoism the human heart is of itself,

from the very outset, unselsh and self-sacric-

ing, so that he nally ends up with what he is

combating.

Friedrich Engels in a letter to Karl Marx,

November 19 1844, Barmen, Germany


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The impact of Max Stirners The Egoand Its Own (1844)1on the modernEuropean thought has been strangelyneglected. Few other figures in the his-tory of philosophy have been as sys-tematically misread, misunderstood,suppressed and pigeonholed as that

of Max Stirner. He has been labelledan anarchist, a nihilist, a crude proto-Nietzsche and his influence constant-ly overlooked by both philosophicalmovements and intellectual historiansalike. Whilst there is no direct recipientof Stirners version of egoism, it appearsto exert a diffuse yet substantial influ-ence on modern philosophical thought.

Identifying the ultimate or unintendedbeneficiaries of Stirners ideas is chal-lenging. Recognition of his only major

work emerged half a century after itsconception when The Ego surfaced ina range of intellectual projects, recentlyincluding feminism and postmodern-ism. What is paradoxical about Stirnersimpact is that his most critical influence

on the work of Karl Marx and FriedrichEngels, has been obscured from the

field of intellectual history. Stirners of-ficial role in the philosophically fraughtperiod which saw the birth of historicalmaterialism (1844-5) was relegated tomore deviant tributaries of Europeanphilosophy.2

Despite its apparent distinctiveness,

The Ego was very much a product ofthe milieu of the eighteen forties andof the Left Hegelian movement in par-ticular. Ironically, it is in this contextthat some of the most genuine praisefor Stirners surprising contribution toLeft Hegelianism was voiced, despitethe critique of the groups theoreticalleaders that had prompted The Ego.

The Free Ones (hereafterDie Freien)were a group of radical Berlin publicists,poets and philosophers who gathereddaily in Hippels Weinstube; many ofits members were imbued with revo-lutionary fervour, others were simplyinebriated. The groups leaders werethe Bauer brothers, Bruno and Edgar.Marx, Engels and the poets Herwegh

and Hoffmann von Fallersleben wereoccasional visitors.4 Ludwig Feuerbach,

Max Stirner:A Historiographical Sketch

Stirner and Marx

By Alexander Green


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Moses Hess, Ludwig Bhl, Adolf Ruten-berg, Eduard Meyen, and Julius Faucheralso frequented Hippels. Arnold Ruge,the self-appointed godfather of these

Hegelians, carried on nightly debates which were often very bitter.5 Engelsgives a description of Stirner at such agathering in his comic poem The Tri-umph of Faith:

Look at Stirner, look at him,

the peaceful enemy of all constraint.

For the moment, he is still drinking beer,

soon he will be drinking blood

as though it were water.

When others cry savagely

down with the kings

Stirner immediately supplements

down with the laws also.

Stirner full of dignity proclaims;

you bend your will power,

and you dare to call yourselves free,

You become accustomed to slavery;

Down with dogmatism, down with law.

Die Freien were the last remnants ofBruno Bauers Doktorklub, the sameclub had once counted Marx as a mem-ber. Stirner cannot have joined beforethe end of 1841. At that time the young

Marx was leaving for Paris and, as a re-sult, the two were never to meet. Stirn-er spent most of 1843 completing TheEgo; it was published in November of1844. For English readers, the English-Latin word ego comes constrained bynuances of a possible Freudian or Prot-estant analysis. However a careful read-ing suggests that The Unique One &

His Property (or Own-ness) would bet-ter elucidate Stirners intentions. The

Unique One might be best understoodas the individual self, not in oppositionto later concepts of the Freudian idorlibido or even the spirit or soul, but

as certain kind of absolute. The Ego im-mediately established Stirner as one ofthe most formidable opponents of the

very people with which he had seemedto have so much in common with. Com-munists, critical philosophers, humani-tarians and reformers of every degree

were attacked in Stirners philosophy,a philosophy that Engels labelled Ego-

ism.7 Among the Young Hegelians, Bau-er, Ruge, Moses Hess and even the fa-mous Feuerbach joined forces in orderto combat what they saw as the menac-ing nihilism of Stirners egoism.

Bruno Bauer and Szeliga both wrotearticles, Feuerbach also replied. Hess

wrote an essay whilst Marx and En-

gels wrote the best part of a book.

8

All seemed happy to admit Stirner wasan adversary of note. Bauer wrote thatStirner was the most capable and cou-rageous of all combatants of his owntheory of pure criticism9 whereasFeuerbach described Stirner as themost gifted and the freest writer it hasbeen given me to meet.10 Arnold Ruge

even heralded Stirner as the theoreti-cal liberator of German philosophy;The Ego had represented a triumphon behalf of the concrete living indi-

vidual over abstract generalities. Engelshimself, in a letter to Marx, wrote thatamong theFreien it is plain that Stirnerhas the most talent, personality and en-ergy.11 S.E. Parker12 notes that Engelss

initial sympathetic response to Stirnerwas probably subject to a severe repri-


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mand from Marx. Engels views radicallychanged as we shall see, and deferenceis made to Marx in dealing with the chi-mera of Stirners egoism. Nevertheless,Stirner enjoyed fleeting and alarmingfame, his conscious egoism was paro-died in a popular novel and he himselfhad even appeared, thinly disguised, asa philosophical character in another

novel.1

However, the speculative excite-ment overThe Ego was as frantic as it

was transient, and the political eventsof 1848 obliterated the traces of thosephilosophical struggles which had pre-ceded them. In that year, along with therevolutionary hopes of German radicals,the Left Hegelian movement collapsed

into itself, becoming insignificant inboth intellectual and political life,14

emasculated in the face of an adamantunion between a defensive Church anda reactionary Monarchy.15The Ego hadsounded the theoretical death knell forthe group and Left Hegelianism reacheda final and angry impasse.1 Stirnerhad made a clean sweep of everything,leaving only naked self-assertion, withThe Ego he had taken the Hegelian sys-

tem to its dialectical limit ... and trans-formed it into its opposite.17

Johann Caspar Schmidt (1806-56), who wrote and was known as MaxStirner, had been a close friend of En-gels during the year he spent in Ber-lin. Engels was evidently impressed byStirner, who was his senior by a numberof years. He was able to render a pen-

cil sketch of Stirner fifty years later, andrecalled that they were great friends

Fig. I: Pencil sketch by Engels, Stirner stands on the middle right, leaning against the table. He is a

lonely gure: highbrowed, bespectacled and smoking a cigarette. For Engels illustrated letters see:

Zwischen 18 und 25 Jugend Briefe von Friedrich Engels.


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[Duzbrder].18 However, it was Engels who helped in obscuring evidence ofStirners influence on his colleague andlifelong friend, Karl Marx. After reading

The Ego, Engels wrote to Marx explicit-ly stating his opinion, one which wouldpowerfully colour Stirners legacy: Wemust not simply cast it [The Ego] aside,but rather use it as the perfect expres-sion of the present-day folly, and, whileinverting it, contin-ue to build on it.19

Marx responded byburying himself inThe Ego, and con-structing his reply inThe German Ideol-

ogy.20 For Marx andEngels, coming toterms with The Ego

was a deeply funda-mental moment inthe development ofCommunist theory.Marx claimed that theaim of The GermanIdeology was simplyto settle accounts

with our erstwhile

philosophical con-science.21 First published in 1932, thebulk (three quarters) of the work is achapter entitled Sankt Max, Marx epic

yet uncomfortable diatribe on The Ego.The unpublished status ofThe GermanIdeology did not allow for public dis-cussion of Marx criticisms of Stirner, inhis own words it was left to the gnaw-

ing criticism of mice.22Stirners legacy suffered yet more in-

terference from Engels essay LudwigFeuerbach and the End of Classical Ger-man Philosophy (1886), his account ofthe development of historical material-

ism. It attempted to minimise the im-portance ofThe German Ideology, andtherefore The Ego in Marx formativephilosophy. Engels claimed Darwinstheory of evolution had played a criti-

cal role in the routeto dialectical materi-alism, though Marx

was always more of

a Hegelian than En-gels would give himcredit for. However,Engels at least rec-ognised Feuerbachsinfluence whoseconcept of species-being/essence was

easily transposedonto Marx socialbeing; convenientlyreplacing the old

materialism with anew dialectical form.There is no mentionthat Marx rejectionof the humanism of

Feuerbach was onlymade possible by reading The Ego in1844. Engels account mentions Stirneronly in passing Stirner remained anoddity, even after Bakunin blended him

with Proudhon and labelled the blendanarchism. Feuerbach alone was of sig-nificance as a philosopher.2 Engels oc-cluded Stirners self-evident catalytic24

contribution to the young Marx earlyphilosophic formulations. By labelling

Fig. II: Max Stirner Pencil sketch, in-

scription reads Max Stirner. Drawn

from memory by Frederick Engels,

London , 1892 reproduced in MECW

5:27, (Moscow 197).


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him the prophet of contemporary an-archism, Engels misaligned Stirner withProudhon and Bakunin, two thinkers hehad openly condemned.

Marxists studying the theoretical de-velopment of the young Marx tend tofollow Engels and ignore the criticismsof Stirner featured in Sankt Max. Forthe purposes of the Marxist exegesis,Marx most characteristic aphorisms areto be found in the deceptively short yetlucid chapter on Feuerbach, the mostbona fide Marxist chapter ofThe Ger-

man Ideology. However, as we willlearn, Marx criticisms of Feuerbach

were merely perspectives which hadbeen progressively opened to Marx andEngels in the course of their study ofDer Einzige und sein Eigenthum.25

At the close of the nineteenth cen-tury John Henry Mackay, a Scottish poet

turned Germanophile, rediscoveredStirner and initiated what has sincebeen called the Stirner renaissance.2Mackay happened to find a brief cita-tion regarding Stirner in Langes His-tory of Materialism: The man who inGerman literature has most preachedEgoism recklessly and logically, MaxStirner, finds himself in distinct op-

position to Feuerbach. After finding acopy of The Ego, Mackay immediatelybecame a disciple, and claimed the roleof necromancer to the lifeless corpseof Stirners thought. Stirners revival

was also concurrent with the impact ofFriedrich Nietzsches work. As Karl L-

with points out Stirner has often beencompared with Nietzsche, to the point

of asserting that Stirner was intellectualarsenal from which Nietzsche derived

his weapons.27 Some went further inthis comparison, Eduard von Hartmannclaimed not only is this [The Ego] abrilliant work not inferior in respect of

style to Nietzsches work, but in respectof philosophical value it surpasses thelatter a thousand times.28The spreadingof Nietzsches celebrity ignited a freshand sympathetic interest in Stirnersethic of self-will and indirectly helpedto sustain historians interest in The Egointo the twentieth-century.

Few historians have found consen-

sus when discussing Stirners place inthe history of philosophy, not to sug-gest that they should. Scholars remaindivided in determining the place thatThe Ego might belong in Europeanthought, or even if it should belongat all. Mackays resurrection of Stirn-ers book caused a more extensive re-

sponse; it confirmed Stirners identifica-tion with his most commonly assignedphilosophical genre. For over a centuryThe Ego has maintained a place amongthe founders and luminaries of modernanarchism. Woodcock states of all thelibertarian classics [The Ego] remainsthe expression of a point of view thatbelongs clearly to one end of the var-

ied spectrum of anarchist theory.29

Theanarchic elements in Stirners thoughtare even pronounced enough for Avronto declare Stirner anarchisms mostoriginal and most consistent thinker.0The orthodox Marxist Hans G. Helmshas argued the influence ofThe Ego hasbeen as much political as philosophical.In his recent study, Die Ideologie der

anonymen Gesellschaft1 he argues thatStirner inspired various German groups


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who were the immediate precursorsof fascism. Stirner has even been usedby the New Right specifically to evokethe darkness of the interregnum and

emphasise the need for a total culturaltransformation.2 In the 1963 Libertar-ian Book Club edition ofThe Ego James

J. Martin wrote it is at once a historicaldocument, a pamphlet of the intellec-tual disturbance of the mid-nineteenthcentury, and a timeless classic.

The publication history of The Egoalso shows the strength of this initial

revival of Stirner. Forty-nine editions ap-peared between 1900 and 1929. Howev-er, after the 1930s,The Ego again slippedinto relative obscurity. Even amongst thethinkers who knew Stirner opinion wasradically divided. There were a few dur-ing that period who had a better insightinto the meaning of Stirners thought.

In 1939, Sidney Hook indicated that theforgotten debate between Marx andStirner involved the fundamental prob-lems of any possible system of ethics orpublic morality and later in 1963 Isai-ah Berlin noted that the theory of thealienation of the proletarians was enun-ciated by Max Stirner at least one yearbefore Marx.4 These voices were in

the extreme minority, yet significantlythey identified the unresolved nature ofthe Stirner-Marx relationship, and suggest-ed that Stirners influence might not beas negligible as was previously thought.These writers have paved the way for arevaluation of Stirnerian thought.

In 1968 a new German edition ofThe Ego made its appearance. It had

been preceded, two years earlier, by afull study of Stirners thought and in-

fluence, the first since Henri Avrons in1954, which had linked Stirner with ex-istentialism.5 1971 saw the publicationof the first extensive study of Stirners

philosophy ever to appear in English, R. W. K. Pattersons The Nihilistic Egoist.Patersons study sought to be the mostcomprehensively objective treatmentof Stirner to date, yet Marx accusationsagainst Stirner are restated, minus the

vitriol, and Stirners vision is describedas frivolous. The Nihilistic Egoist re-mains a useful, if dated, springboard for

a revisionist perspective aiming to re-discover Stirners own intentionality.

In John CarrollsBreak-out from theCrystal Palace, The Anarcho-Psycho-

logical Critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dos-

toyevsky (1974), a sociological approachwas applied to Stirners thought. Carrollrecognised the psychological dimension

of anarchism beyond its more familiarappearance as political ideology. Whilstidentifying Stirners radical individualistpsychology, he sees Stirner much likeGeorges Sorel in considering society assenile, in need of fresh, invigorating pas-sions; a view that appealed to the youngMussolini and to the French fascist aes-thete Robert Brasillach (see William Tuck-

ers The Fascist Ego ). Carroll ultimatelypresents Stirner as a difficult, inspiring,

yet flawed champion of rebellion andthe unceasing quest for self-understand-ing, self-realization, and new values.

William Brazills recent work, TheYoung Hegelians (1970) as well asDavid McLellans The Young Hegeliansand Karl Marx(1980) both direct con-

siderable attention to Stirners thought.In addition, John Edward Toews has


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significantly revised Stirners placein the history of philosophy in his re-cent studyHegelianism, The Path To-ward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-41

(1980), opening the way up for a morehistorically sensitive, rather than philo-sophical/ideological interpretation ofStirners contribution to the history ofphilosophy. Toews contextualises Stirn-ers position amongst the Left Hegelians,and attacks those who see Stirners ego-ism as purely subjective. He identi-fies the core contradiction that Hegels

radical heirs had to wrangle with dur-ing the 1840s, that self-liberation andself-affirmation required revolutionarydestruction in order for their concretehistorical actualisation.7 However,revolution necessitated commitmentto suprapersonal values and a beliefin an objective meaning in history.8

Such values were a direct denial of in-dividual autonomy, self-expression andself-enjoyment that constituted Stirn-ers aim of an inward rebellion, whichsought to end the historical pathologyof self-alienation.9 Toewss penetrating

work indicates that The Egowas deep-ly rooted in the struggles of Hegelianthought during the 1840s and impor-

tantly Stirner is given an independentand original role in disintegration of theLeft Hegelian movement. As LawrenceStepelevich notes hopefully, we may beseeing the beginning of another cycleof interest in Stirner.40 The continuedpublication of the journal Stirner-Stu-dien since 1994 similarly reflects therenewed academic interest in Stirner in

his native Germany.41The debate of 1845 still reverberates

in late twentieth-century European in-tellectual discourse. Indeed, there aremany unusual and overlooked parallelsbetween Stirners critique of Enlighten-

ment humanism, universal rationalityand essential identities, and similar cri-tiques developed by thinkers such asMichel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, GillesDeleuze and others. Such intellectualaffinities have recently prompted SaulNewman to attempt to reconcile clas-sical anarchism with poststructuralistthought (in order to define postanar-

chism) using Stirner to break out ofthe Enlightenment humanist paradigmof essentialism ... which continues toinform radical political theory.42 Stirn-ers ideas are also discernible in primi-tivism (John Zerzan), immediatism(Hakim Bey) and insurrectionary anar-chism (Alfredo Bonnano).

This thesis aims to assess the difficultrelationship between Marx and Stirnerand their respective ideas. It is timelyto reconsider Stirners place amongstthe philosophic heavyweights of thenineteenth century, having suffered un-der the suffocating modernity of Marxand Nietzsche and been misconstruedby many as an intellectual oddity. It is

high time that the relevance of Stirn-ers thought, especially in relation tothe development of Marx theories, wasrestored to its correct place in historyof philosophy. By examining Marx cri-tique in The German Ideology it willemerge that Stirners legacy is morethan that of an anarcho-existentialist

whose egoism is untenable. Both think-

ers will be firmly set against the con-text of the rise and fall of Left Hegelian


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humanism. Whilst by 1845 its key lumi-naries accused each other of retreatingto abstract and undialectical positionsof either metaphysical idealism or mate-

rialism, all (including Marx and Stirner)had laid claim to dialectical inheritance(Hegel). Therefore, it is instructive tosee the thinkers on a level playing field,Marx, Feuerbach, Bauer and Stirner allsharing this existential ontology. Theiropposing solutions similarly should beregarded as embedded in their owncontext, remembering that the exis-

tential reductions of 1844-5 were putforward as constructive appropriationsof the real content of Hegelian thought.Stirner was no exception as his form ofnihilism did not abandon the redemp-tive core of the Hegelian project. Ratherthan a simple appendage of Marx earlyformulations, The Ego must be given

independent value and seen as seriousattempt to tackle the problems facingGerman philosophy in the 1840s. Themain objective of this thesis will be toextricate Stirner from Marx rambling,

left-handed invective and reinstate himas a thinker who deserves our attentionand whose relevance and influencehave not been fully appreciated. We can-

not simply overlook Sankt Max as keyevidence of Marx formative intellec-tual development. Marx clearly exertedmuch cerebral effort to write a critiquethat ended up being lengthier than TheEgo itself. In short, the full effects ofTheEgo upon the philosophy of the youngMarx have yet to be fully assessed.4

It is relatively easy to grasp the basic

contemporary relevance, significanceand durability of The Ego in the his-tory of philosophy. Yet we still need toperceive more about Stirners complex,often incongruous, relationship withKarl Marx figure who seems destinedto remain significant, despite the recentinterest in Nietzschean thought. What

Derrida says of Marx is equally applica-ble to Stirner: a ghost never dies norcan there be any future without thememory and inheritance ... of at leastone of his spirits.44

Born in 1806, Johann Caspar Schmidt was the son of Albert and SophiaSchmidt who lived in a comfortablehouse overlooking the Marktplatz in Bay-

reuth. The Schmidts were a lower-mid-dle-class family of evangelical Lutheran

denomination. In 1826 Stirner matricu-lated in the Philosophy Faculty of the

Context And Purpose

In The Ego And Its Own

Chapter I


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University of Berlin and spent two yearsstudying a range of subjects includinglogic, Greek literature and geography.

Whilst at Berlin, unlike Marx, Strauss or

Engels, Stirner attended Hegels lectureson the Philosophy of Religion, the His-tory of Philosophy, and in the winter of1827 his lectures on the Philosophy ofthe SubjectiveSpirit. In 1832Stirner returnedto Berlin, wherehe would spend

the rest of hislife. Continuinghis philosophi-cal studies,he attended atwo-semester course on Aris-totle conducted

by the Hegelianp h i l o s o p h e r Karl L. Michelet.Stirners formalacquaintance

with Hegelianphilosophy, as

well as Hegelianphi losophers

themselves, farsurpassed thatobtained byother Left He-gelians. However, Stirner fell short ofacademic success in his formal exami-nations in the upper forms of the gym-nasium and was awarded a conditionalfacultas docendi, never realising his am-

bition to become a Gymnasiallehrer.In 1839, Stirner obtained regular em-

ployment at a Berlin girls school. Hetaught both history and literature withgreat success, and for next five years en-

joyed a relatively stable and ordered life,

with a modest income and ample free-dom to pursue his philosophical reflec-tions. Ostensibly, this quiet middle-classschool teacher hardly seems a likely

candidate toproduce whathas been calledthe most revo-lutionary [book]

ever written.45However, 1840sBerlin was amelting pot ofpolitical disaf-fection and in-tellectual unrest,

whilst the revo-

lution was notbeing foughtfor in blood,the clubs andcafes of Berlinformed politicalhubs in whichgroups of youngradicals could

meet and makepreparat ions.Stirner beganattending meet-

ings of Die Freien in 1841; his formaleducation was undoubtedly supple-mented by meetings with Hegelians at

various clubs and Weinstuben. Duringlong boisterous evenings at their favour-

ite haunt (Hippels), Stirner would havehad the chance to review the metaphys-

Figure III: Stirners birthplace, from John Henry Mackays

book Max Stirner: Sein Leben und Sein Werk.


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ical exuberance of Berlins disaffectedand rootless intelligentsia and literati. Inthe midst of such radical clamour, Stirn-er met Bruno Bauer, the only member

ofDie Freien in the Left Hegelian circlewith whom he maintained a close rela-tionship until his death. It was throughsocialising withDie Freien that Stirneralso met his second wife (his first wifehad died giving birth to a still-bornchild), Marie Dahnhart. Marie was anuninhibited cigar smoking, beer-drink-ing 25 year old who was about to en-

joy an inheritance of 30,000 thalers. In1843, Stirner astutely married her.

The years between 1815 and 1848have been seen as an era of polarisa-tion4, a conflict between modernityand tradition. However, the post-1815era of German restoration was notthreatened by philosophical trends; nei-

ther the moral creeds and entrencheddogmas of rigid conservatives, nor thepassionate individualism of the Ro-mantics sought to challenge the feudalcomplacency that still survived in someGerman states. The loathed GermanConfederation soon showed its true col-ours, with censorship and surveillancelaws embodied in the Karslbad Decrees

of 1819 and the Final Act of 1820. Bothushered in an era of oppression and illi-liberality for the German states, one that

would be strongly attacked by manycontemporary thinkers.

During the 1830s the movementknown as Junges Deutschland(YoungGermany), produced poets, thinkers and

journalists, all of whom reacted against

the introspection and particularism ofRomanticism. The Romantic Movement

was seen as apolitical lacking the activ-ism that Germanys burgeoning intelli-gentsia required. Decades of compulso-ry school attendance in German states

had resulted in mass literacy and an ex-cess of educated males which the estab-lishment could not subsume. Combined

with the advantage of the low cost print-ing press these factors caused a rushinto the so-called free professions.

The German states, specifically thePrussian government, had a basic dis-trust of speculative thought. On occa-

sion the state would sometimes sponsorphilosophical teachings that offered anintellectual foundation for the authori-tarian organisation of society.47 Hege-lianism was adopted as the academicstandard for appointments in 1820s and30s. To begin with, Hegelianism was re-garded as the staunchest ideological

bulwark of Prussian aristocracy yet bythe 1840s devotion to Hegelian thoughthad led to a period readjustment, and thelate 1830s and early 1840s resembledmore a post-mortem of Hegelianism in

which thinkers extended or recast He-gelian phenomenology.48 One outcomeof this method of criticism was the radi-cal Left Hegelianism of the early 1840s,

which Stirner found himself heir to. TheYoung Hegelians (hereafter referredto as Left) sought to decisively chal-lenge both the Church and State, findingresonance with the Young Germanyof the 1830s, and no longer allies of theestablishment, they were rejected as in-tellectual outcasts. The official Hegelian-ism that was extolled in lecture theatres

in Stirners undergraduate days had be-come the philosophy of disaffection.49


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Stirner occupied a unique position

among the Left Hegelians, sharing an es-sentially similar methodology to his clos-est contemporaries. By using classical

Hegelian concepts and modes of argu-ment, the Left Hegelians quickly reachedconclusions that in effect nullified the

whole upshot of Hegels original system.Hegels universal synthesis of Being hadbegun to produce discordant results. Byreviving the republican idealism of eight-eenth century, Left Hegelians believededucation and political liberties would

solve all social problems without chang-ing the system of property on whichmaterial production and economic ex-changes were based. Stirners early workreflected these broad aims.

The False Principle of Our Edu-

cation is considered the most valu-able and significant of Stirners shorter

works.

50

Stirner, for the first time, canbe seen in pursuit of the goal of individ-ual self-awareness and an insistence onthe primacy of the individual person-ality. He rejected both humanism andrealism as authorities external to theindividual that limited his freedom. Informal education, Stirner saw that the

world of antiquity through classics and

the Bible rule over us as a mistress.51

He went on to stress the importanceof personality and the free-movingego in education, insisting bluntly thateducation is the most important socialquestion in the world. Stirners surpris-ingly modern insistence on the primacyof education and knowledge was tiedto mans self-discovery, through Truth

man discovers himself and experiencesthe liberation from all that is alien, the

uttermost abstraction or release fromall authority, the re-won naturalness.52However, the Left Hegelians sought in

vain to educate their fellow country-

men and the 1840s brought disenchant-ment and schism; political rulers andacademics strove uselessly to restore acultural unity and a national idealism toGermany.

The disintegration of the Left Hege-lian movement was born out of the in-ability to make its philosophy the focusof any political movement, especially

one involving the countrys social forc-es. Mass poverty, economic dislocationand social unrest had been rife in Ger-many, from the student protests of the1830s to the hungry 1840s. In someareas socialists and communists hadtaken advantage of this. Yet unlike Marxexperiences in Britain, industrialization

had only made very modest advances inGerman states by 1848. German society was overwhelmingly rural even dur-ing the 1840s, 70% of the populationstill worked on the land. Within a shortspace of time the Left Hegelians be-came static and ineffective, wrecked bytheir own internal theoretical disputesand confined to Berlins bourgeois, pre-

industrial world.Before its disintegration, the Left He-

gelian movement underwent a series oftransformations. The emanation of di-

vergent positions, is crucial in regard toStirner, who inherited and then reactedagainst the semiotic system or distinc-tive language that Hegelian thinkerscreated and altered.5 The period be-

tween 1835 and 1843 can be seen as aperiod in which thinkers attempted to


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translate the original metaphysical Hege-lian language of Absolute Spirit into thelanguage of Hegelian humanism. Duringthis period the concept Absolute Spirit

was replaced by the idea of humanity,human species-being or human self-consciousness.54 This secularisation orhumanisation of Hegelian thought wasthe basis for the radical Left Hegelianmovement. Strauss began this trend withhisLife of Jesus (1835) where he assert-ed that religious representation was theobjectification of human essence, thus

religious consciousness contributed toalienation and kept human beings fromtheir own essential nature. By the timeStrauss had cemented his new human-ist outlook in 1840-41, Bruno Bauerhad developed his own variant of thetransformative humanist interpretationof the Hegelian language of Absolute

Spirit. For Bauer, Strauss had not gonefar enough; the idea of humanity itselfremained enigmatic unless it actualiseditself in human history through its in-ternalisation in the free activity of hu-man self-consciousness.55 In book andarticles published in 1840-42, Bauer de-nounced terms such as God, AbsoluteSpirit and world-spirit as deceptions

implying a supranatural transcendentpower realising itself in human self-consciousness. Bauers critical theoryof human self-consciousness thereforesought to liberate the I which lives,creates, works and is everything and isthe only power in the world and history,and history has no other meaning thanthe becoming and development of self-

consciousness.5A third version of the humanist trans-

lation of Hegelianism was constructedby Ludwig Feuerbach around 1840. He-gels Absolute Spirit was a transcend-ent mystification, a self-alienation of a

human process and limitation on hu-man thought. In The Essence of Chris-tianity (1840-41) Feuerbach claimedreligious consciousness and languagemeant a projection of humanitys es-sential nature as an emotional and sen-suous being, governed and made happyonly by images.57 Whilst the rightfulcontent of Hegelian metaphysics was

thus affirmed by Bauer as human self-consciousness, for Feuerbach such es-sential human content was more a sen-suous and emotional essence. By 1841,these thinkers were publicly attributed

with developing a distinctive theoreti-cal perspective, Bauer and Feuerbachaccepted their roles as the intellectual

mentors of radical Left Hegelians.Historical reality ultimately under-mined Hegelian humanism when itstheoretical practice failed to gain wideappeal. Left Hegelianism was in termi-nal decline when The Ego was pub-lished in 1844. Academic positions weredenied to the Left Hegelians in the citythat they deemed philosophically and

politically the capital of Germany. Theconstant pressure of governmental cen-sorship and academic rejection meantthat even Arnold Ruges attempts torally a political party around the bannerof Left Hegelianism soon failed. In 1843,the Deutsche Jahrbcherwas prohib-ited from publication, even in liberalSaxony. It was equally a defeat by poli-

tics as it was by abstract thought itself.Soon most members of the movement


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became disillusioned with the idea ofa political public as the agent of lib-eration. The declarations of Feuerbach,Bauer, Hess and Ruge in 1841 had set

the Left Hegelians against all prevailingorthodoxy be it religious, philosophical,economic or political; yet all had failedat insurrection of existing institutionsor a political association based its ideas.

Such failure was reflected in thethought produced during the period1843-46, which saw the publication ofThe Ego. It was a divisive process of

mutual criticism, where Stirner and oth-ers criticised the theological illusionsof a movement caught in a language ofessence. Stirner inherited the problemthat reality must be comprehendedand described as contingent, concrete,finite existence with reason and mean-ing emerging from actions of individual

beings. The analytic of existence wasself-consciously presented not merelyas a translation, but as a step beyond He-gelian thought in some respects, seek-ing to transcend it.58 The humanismthat had for a short time enjoyed theattention of the movements most ablethinkers was scoffed at by Stirner: Inour days, ... they have not realised that

man has killed God in order to become sole God on high ... God has had togive place, not to us, but to human-ity.59 Stirner specifically condemnedFeuerbach and Bauer for creating thisnew god, Humanity to replace theChristian god. For Stirner this was sim-ply a change of masters.0

Hegelian humanism encountered

strong criticism from former disciplesand comrades, most significantly in the

publication of Stirners The Ego andMarxThe German Ideology. Both think-ers proposed a more radical break withpast Left Hegelian positions, and the

language that had justified it. Despite ac-cusations of nihilism, Stirners heaven-storming dismissal of the objectivity,universality, value, truth and meaningstill presented a description of individ-ual-centred existence, with the ego assovereign as a positive appropriationof the true content of his cultural andphilosophical inheritance. It is a mistake

therefore to see Stirner as anomaly inthe history of philosophy or even as dis-cordant in some way.1The Ego did notexist in an intellectual vacuum, and thecontext of Left-Hegelianism reveals howStirners thought was a legitimate prod-uct of this movements wider discourse,a serious attempt to understand the

transition from religion to philosophy.Stirner (as all Left Hegelians did) sawhimself as dialectically concluding andfulfilling the Hegelian project. SimilarlyMarx saw that within Hegelian thought

were the means, and even the impera-tive, to go beyond Hegel. He understoodexactly what Stirner was attempting, astep which leads beyond Hegelian ideal-

ism and negates it2

, he also knew howpotentially damaging this could be tothe direction of his own work.

Rather than view The Ego as some wild or severely mutilated transfor-mation of Hegels characteristic con-cepts, its construction should be seenas a result of that philosophical para-digm which all Left Hegelians practiced

and embraced, dialectical development.There is even room to regard Stirner as a


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concordant Hegelianpar excellence . Hisintimacy with Hegel has been exploredby Stepelevich, who argues that Stirnerreinterprets HegelsPhenomenology of

Spiritwith new and improved vision.4For Hegel, the Absolute is the powerof the negative, i.e. that which viewsand criticises every determinate thought the Subject. For Stirner, in his critique,this power of the negative is the singleconsciousness himself, or the ego. KarlLwith similarly detected a logical con-nection stating that The Ego is in reality

an ultimate logical consequence of He-gels historical system.5 Whilst these

interpretations elevate Stirner from theoften eccentric billing he is given in in-tellectual history, describing Stirner asthe Last of the Hegelians implies that

The Ego is the end of a historical se-ries of ever more decadent inheritorsof Hegels doctrines. We should rec-ognise that whilst he attacked Hegelian-ism Stirners thought was still a productof it, bound within its parameters, bethem linguistic or logical. Therefore thechoice lies between seeing a terminalorantithetical relationship, one which

could make Stirner, in a sense, theper-fectedHegelian.7

The dissolution of Left Hegelianismcoincided with the early thinkingof Marx who grew up among the ru-ins of their philosophy. Together with

Stirner, Marx accepted the philosophi-cal categories and problems of Hege-lian thought. Placing Stirner among themany strands and mutations of Hegelianthought highlights his intellectual prox-imity to the thought of the young Marx.

Whilst preparing to demolish GermanIdealism, Marx entered the metaphysi-cal fray at same moment as Stirner, and

wrestled with the same ontologicalquestions. The publication of The Ego

shook the pro-Feuerbachian positionMarx found himself in 1844 and per-haps more than any of his contemporar-ies, Marx was to experience the depth

and implications of Stirners criticism.Marx had originally planned to write areview ofThe Ego; however he stalled

whilst Bauer and Feuerbach fieldedtheir responses. Then, feeling clearlypersonally provoked, Marx postponedpreviously commissioned works topen Sankt Max. After completing the

work, Marx wavered and the criticism

of Stirner remained unprinted. Withinthis privately led dispute, The German

The Chrisis Of 1845: The Ego AndThe Origins Of Historical Materialism

Chapter II


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Ideology contained the seeds of a newphilosophy, created to be immune to aStirnerian criticism: historical material-ism. The birth of this radical new theory

was muted. These ideas were left in adrawer along with Sankt Max, whilstMarx, wishing to escape the idealist phi-losophy of the Left Hegelians, chargedinto political life, into intellectual feuds

with Proundhon and Bakunin.Between 1844 and 1846 Marx and

Engels were busy forging their new rev-olutionary outlook. The German Ideol-

ogy was composed in Brussels, whereMarx had moved in 1845 following hisdeportation from Paris by the Guizotgovernment who had been pressuredby Prussia to expel the leading collabo-rators ofVorwrts. During the last threemonths of 1845, Marx and Engels wroteThe German Ideology. In early 1846,

both men visited London in order tofound a network of communist corre-spondence committees to provide Ger-man, French and English socialists withaccess to each others ideas and activi-ties. The backdrop to Marx life was oneof financial struggle, censorship andpolitical activity and exile. However, thepair had integrated their theoretical and

practical aims, revolutionary communistteaching and rallying the progressiveelements of the proletariat and revolu-tionary intelligentsia.

In theoretical terms, this revolu-tionary outlook was partially createdthrough the intellectual struggle with

what Marx saw as bourgeois and pettybourgeois ideology of the Left Hegeli-

ans, of which Max Stirner was seen asthe perfect embodiment. The German

Ideology directed criticism against themany apparent failings of Left Hegeli-anism, many which echo Stirners owncritique of the movement. For Marx,

however, the authority of delusions orStirners spooks over human minds

was not a result of mental distortioncured by working upon the conscious-ness, but rather rooted in social condi-tions. For both Stirner and Marx, LeftHegelian humanism was governed byfalse ideas where men are enslaved tothe creations of their minds. For Marx,

the power of philosophy was to exposeand destroy these false ideas and revo-lutionise society. In the Preface ofTheGerman Ideology Marx outlined his ob-

jections to the Left Hegelians, and sawclearly his task in:

uncloaking these sheep, who

take themselves and are taken for

wolves; of showing that their bleating

merely imitates in a philosophic form

the conceptions of the German mid-

dle class; that the boasting of these

philosophic commentators only mir-

rors the wretchedness of the real

conditions in Germany.8

Throughout The German IdeologyMarx clearly enjoys making fun of thephilosophical pretensions of the LeftHegelians, yet he also levels the seri-ous claim that the movements achieve-ments only embodied a corruptionof Hegel, i.e. the putrescence of theabsolute spirit.9

Why then compose such a lengthy

rebuttal of German post-Hegelianphilosophy if all it amounted to was


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shadows of reality?70 The answer issimple: Stirner. Marxists tend to regardThe German Ideology as nothing morethan a secondary attack against Left

Hegelians, even an enlarged version ofThe Holy Family. However,The Ego hadunsettled Marx, regardless of whethera public debate was to be had, he feltinclined to convince himself at leastthat Stirner was wrong. Marx realisedthat Stirners position was perfectlyconcordant with general developmentof post-Hegelian dialectics in German

philosophy and thus an alternativeto his profanization of the Hegel. Inreading The Ego, Marx came to rejectFeuerbachian humanism, of which hehad previously thought highly, praisingFeuerbachs brilliant arguments in theEssence of Christianity and defendinghis real humanism in The Holy Fam-

ily. Now revealed as a pious atheistby Stirner, Marx could not avoid denun-ciating Feuerbach, but equally had toavoid an association with the powerfulStirnerian position that had originallyprompted the rejection.71The GermanIdeology was less an attack, but more asan angry defence against the theologi-cally inspired and passivist humanism

of Feuerbach and the extreme volun-tarism and subjectivist individualism ofStirner.72

Marx familiarity with the aims of LeftHegelianism meant he agreed that themore progressive an idea was, the moreit desecrated the quasi-religious statusHegels legacy. In The German Ideol-ogy Marx attempted to be more radical

than both Bauer and Feuerbach in pro-faning the regions of Hegels thought

which had been transfigured. Howev-er whilst Marx believed that, like Stirner,he could fight against illusions and opi-ates, against religion, political ideals and

eventually against Hegelian philosophyitself, he still retained a hidden escha-tological attitude and implicit revolu-tionary drive underlying Hegelianism inmid-1840s.7 Unlike Marx, Stirner didntretain Hegels eschatology and regardedit as simply another phantom to beexorcised from the mind, one perhapsessential if Hegelian thought was to be

overcome. Marx adhered to Hegel in sofar as he chose not to abandon someform of philosophical reconciliation,though not of the speculative sort. Forreconciliation to be attained in the ma-terial transformation of the real world,Marx would have to elaborate and ex-pound one of his most controversial and

debated theories: historical materialism.Rather disingenuously the old Marxconsidered the birth of historical ma-terialism as simply theoretical analysiseschewing from purely theoretical re-search.74 Unfortunately there was nocomprehensive or detached study ofsocioeconomic realities that came tosupport Marx theory in 1845; instead

he was motivated by his desire to de-fend the passion and idealism ema-nating from the dissolution of Hegelsphilosophy against Stirners noxiousphilosophy of total disillusionment.75Stirner, as a minority of commentatorshave observed, played a decisive rolein motivating Marx socialist thought inthis direction. The subjective origins of

the materialistic conception of historyreflected Marx attempt to show that


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the putrescence of the absolute spiritmust not go as far as it does in The Ego,

yet it was perfectly acceptable to be aHegelian of revolutionary inspiration.

It seems paradoxical to think that his-torical materialism, Marx great episte-mological break could have emergedfrom the context described above. Stirn-ers impact has been displaced. Regard-less of the self-assured position Marxfelt he had reached in The GermanIdeology with regard to the specificcriticisms of Left Hegelians, the real

gem of the work was clearly the mate-rialist conception of history. For Marx,it provided an ingenious escape routefrom the all-too parochial problems ofLeft Hegelianism and German IdealistPhilosophy, whilst it also served as amethodological prerequisite for a newpolitical economy. In a letter to German

publishers in Leske on August 1 1846,Marx pointed out that the publicationof a polemical work against the Germanphilosophers was necessary in order toprepare readers for his point of viewin this field of economic science. TheGerman Ideology should therefore beseen chiefly as a polemical work; onethat Marx felt sure would lift him up and

away from the ontological squabblingof the Left Hegelians towards econom-ics, historical analysis and socialism.

For Marx, speculative philosophy hadresulted in idealist self-deception epito-mised in the work of the Left Hegelians.Marx frequently attacked the sterile andstatic nature of his milieu, stating Ger-man critique has, right up to its latest

efforts, never left the realm of philoso-phy.7 The movements ignorance of

both of the need to specify an agent forrevolutionary change and of the natureof social and historical explanation hadmeant their philosophy failed. Despite

the decline of Left Hegelian humanism,Marx complaint was essentially meth-odological.77 The Left Hegelians, likeDescartes, thought that the illusions ofsocial life could be left behind if onetakes the standpoint of self-conscious-ness , species or the ego. For Marx,this was a truly insulated standpoint.However, Stirner too had attacked the

Archimedean standpoint or standpointoutside the world in 1844: This for-eign standpoint is the world of mind,of ideas, thoughts, concepts, essences;it is heaven.78 In concordance withMarx, Stirner attacked the Left Hegeli-ans with similar gusto, identifying thesame weaknesses:

Now nothing but mind rules in the

world. An innumerable multitude

of concepts buzz about in peoples

heads, and what are those doing who

endeavour to get further? They are

negating these concepts to put new

ones in their place!.Thus the confu-

sion of concepts moves forward.79

In recognising the force of Stirnerscriticism and the implications for LeftHegelian modes of thought Marx hadto be just as hard-line on idealism asStirner had been. He had to adopt a po-sition in which all ideas were divestedof their independence and autonomy.For a moment at least, Marx was allied

with Stirners heaven-storming nihilism,but only in order to escape it:


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Morality, religion, metaphysics.

have no history, no development;

but human beings, developing their

material production and their mate-

rial intercourse, alter, along with this,their reality; also their thinking and

the products of their thinking.80

Marx response, that the material world takes primacy over the ideal,consciousness or thought itself, was notmerely a major development in termsof his thinking but was the thermo-nu-

clear antidote to Stirnerian egoism hedesperately needed.81

Hegel had maintained that the idealdetermined the material; Marx sup-posed modernism was finding the Hege-lian dialectic standing on its head andturning it right side up again.82 Quite

what Marx means is not readily appar-

ent. He inverted the primacy of the idealfound in German Idealist, Hegelian andpost-Hegelian philosophy by replacingit with an older form of materialism. Thematerialist conception of consciousnesscan be summed up Marx famous axiomLife is not determined by conscious-ness, but consciousness by life (1846).Marx paradigmatic shift invoked eight-

eenth-century materialism, which tookmatter as primary and regarded con-sciousness, thought and sensation assecondary. The French materialists ofthe eighteenth century provided Marx

with the simple mechanical categoriesthat constituted the terms in which theorigin and history of man were to be ex-plained. The newness of Marxian ma-

terialism, the idea of conceiving of mat-ter dialectically, highlights Marx innate

debt to Hegelian thought. Yet historicalmaterialism was also a backwards step.Marx wanted to reassert the fundamen-tal principle of eighteenth-century his-

torical naturalism; that historical eventshave natural causes. Hegel had brokenaway from naturalism but had not de-manded an autonomous history, Marx

went back on this demand and sweptHegel away; he subjected history to do-minion by natural science which Hegelhad freed it from.8 Thus Marx took aretrograde step, which was simulta-

neously also prelude to an advance interms of political economy.84 Despitecryptic statements such as standingHegel on his feet instead of his head,Marx conjuring trick essentially tookover the idea, inherited from both Kantand Hegel, in which history culminatedin the complete unity of man, the iden-

tification of existence with essence andthe abolition of contingency in humanlife. For Marx, humanity was not doomedto contingency, as Stirner maintained.85

As his response to Stirner suggests,Marx theory had no real scientific basis,and its genesis appears in a somewhatdubious light. Whilst it allowed Marx tocondemn the present world order in

terms of the immanent laws of historyitself; as a solution it was both ingen-ious and disingenuous.8 Stirners nihil-ism meant Marx had to defend the basicclaim to seek meaning in an ideal, ratherthan giving up the whole conception ofa salvation of man. Marx was of coursekeen to emphasise that he was not re-ally pursuing an ideal at all; his presup-

positions were not arbitrary ones, notdogmas, but real presuppositions from


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which abstraction can only be made inthe imagination.87 Marx saw them asempirical facts. Stirner, on the other handclaimed I presuppose only myself and

since it is I who presuppose myself, Ihave no presuppositions.88 Marx pains-takingly insists Stirner himself does haveideals and even his own morality. Yet, thematerialistic reduction of ideals to his-torical necessities very closely resemblesa Stirnerian abandoning of ideals; nihil-ism was inherent in both positions. Howcan Marx thought retain its revolution-

ary aspect if economic patterns and lawsthoroughly determine mans historicalexistence? Yet far from relinquishing hisrevolutionary ideals, Marx believed he hadsucceeded in preserving by integratingthem into real history. This was the coreof both Marx defence against Stirner andthe essence of the materialistic concep-

tion of history: the ideals pursued by theLeft Hegelians were declared to be theimmanent telos of history itself.89The Left Hegelian revolutionary forcebecame an immanent law of objectivehistory. In other words, Marx turned anoughtinto an is.

It has not been properly acknowl-edged just how much The Ego is re-

sponsible for pushing Marx into thisepistemological corner. By attemptingto incorporate ideals into actual his-tory, Marx went as far as it is possibleto rationalise the Left Hegelian revolu-tionary drive without abandoning thebasic Left Hegelian insight.90 Marxhad reached an impossible dilemma,one which has haunted his more in-

telligent disciples until today. As such,Marx could no longer encourage action

as he now predicted change; history didnot depend upon mans conscious in-tentions; it depended on what humansdo. This seems incompatible with Marx

dismissal of ideals and represents thebasic ambiguity of his thought, a blindspot which he left for Marxists to excuseor explain. The contradictory nature ofMarx position reflected how almostagainst his will Marx was forced intodismissal by Stirner.91 On the one hand

we have Marx the determinist, who willlater refer to laws and tendencies that

work with iron necessity towards in-evitable results92, on the other we haveMarx the voluntarist, keen to incite theproletariat to rebellion. However, thematerialist conception of history was, initself, a change of consciousness, merelya new theory of reality and thus rec-ognition of the existing order by means

of another interpretation.

9

The realdifference between Marx and the LeftHegelians was that instead of pretend-ing to save the world by changingtheir ideas, Marx arrived at an idea thatcouldnt be changed, a theory in whichhumanitysaves itself, regardless of phil-osophical speculations.

Historical materialism was the re-

sult of an attempt to preserve the LeftHegelian humanist heritage in spite ofStirners challenge. Stirners exposure ofquasi-religious basis of Man underminedthe idiom developed by Marx in hispre-1845 writings. To escape the neo-Christian ethics of humanism it was notenough to simply discard the legitimacyof the humanist or socialist goal. In a to-

talitarian fashion, Marx divested all ideasof any autonomous role whatsoever.


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Many commentators have argued thatthe doctrine of historical materialismprovided Marx with his most power-ful weapon against idealist philosophy.

It did not despite how much Marxmay have convinced himself deal suf-ficiently with Stirnerian thought. LikeMarx, Stirners project was destructive.The Ego sought to simply abolish phi-losophy in generalby affirming that it

was all nonsense, summed in Stirnersfamous aphorisms I have set my causeupon nothing and Nothing is more to

me than myself.94 Stirners modernityresides in this progressive leap beyondMarx, beyond a revolutionary mentality

which required moral postulates or anought. For Stirner, uniqueness and crea-tivity begin only when a person goesbeyond social identity and roles. He hadshocked Marx into revising the ethical

and humanistic assumptions of a social-ist agenda. At the same time Stirner in-directly contributed to the creation andevolution of the distinctive and classicalMarxist doctrines.

In short, The Ego moved Marx froma passionately moral, even sentimental,commitment to communism as a hu-manitarian creed, to a sociological affir-

mation of communism as the historicaloutcome of objective economic forces.During the mid-1840s Marx and Engelssaw themselves at a decisive stage in

working out the philosophical princi-ples of scientific communism or thescientific world outlook of the revolu-

tionary proletariat.95 Marx must havebeen painfully aware, therefore, of theneed to qualify his own action in theo-ry. This crisis for Marx reached its height

in 1845, when The German Ideologyindicated Marx final abandonment ofthe speculative abstractions of Feuer-bach and others; the very abstractions

which had served as the metaphysicalfoundations of his socialism. The unre-solved nature of Marx uncomfortableencounter with Stirner is also evidentin the development of the materialist

conception of history. Historical mate-rialisms more inconvenient implica-tions and thus the spectre ofThe Egohaunted Marx; burdening him with theself-defeating task of reconciling a vol-untarist movement in an economicallydetermined historical process.9

By revealing the hollowness of slo-

gans which appealed to humanity, coun-try, or abstract freedom ... Stirner hadprepared the way for a realistic analysisof the issues these phrases were usedto conceal.97 Despite Stirners nascentinfluence on the thought of the youngMarx, Marx came to dominate the his-torical era, his solution to the crises ofHegelian ontology emerged as legiti-

mate, whilst the history and intentional-ity of Stirners thought was excludedin a Foucauldian sense. However, as Ihave demonstrated by studying of thegenesis of historical materialism, the im-pact ofThe Ego on the evolution of so-cialist thought was far from negligible.


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In many respects, Stirners workstands as an anticipatory attack onMarx thought. Modern critics of Marx-ism have frequently pointed out inad-

equacies in the Marxist conception ofhistory, especially concerning what thetheory had rendered obsolete in tradi-tional philosophy. The Ego essentiallyanticipated these inadequacies. 1845 is

judged to be the moment in Marx phil-osophical career where he left behinda fundamental discourse on ethics; one

that Hook argues still occupies us to-day.98 Marx new theory of historicalmaterialism cut short a discussion aboutany systems of ethics or public morality.Many have recognised this negation inMarx work. For Marx, the crucial issue

was the validity of his theory of history;he felt notions of morality and of reli-gion had finally been eliminated from

his work. However, the old assumptionthat scientific socialism was a scientif-ic system has yielded to the notion thatsuch a system of thought is in essencemoralistic or even religious; what Mar-tin Buber calls a socialist secularisationof eschatology.99 If we accept this radi-cal new perspective, as many do, thenStirners stance in The Ego emerges

as more modern and radical than waspreviously considered. Stirner would

no doubt have agreed that the materi-alist conception of history was escha-tological; a religious mode of thought.Therefore, Stirners early, if somewhat

undeveloped attack on morality, oftendisguised as ideology, assumes a vitalposition as the original critique of the

young Marx.In spite of the anti-moral nature of

historical materialism and Marx ex-plicit repudiations of morality, his earlythought was packed with moral judge-

ments, (e.g. condemnations, directions,etc.). Whether or not we see Marx asmoralist is beside the point. Marx didnot practice moral philosophy in thetraditional sense of developing any formof system of ethics, or enquiry. Whilstcriticising The Ego, Marx was inspiredto claim:

The communists ... preach no mo-rality, which Stirner does too much ...

on the contrary, they know well that

egoism as well as self-sacrifice is, in

certain circumstances, a necessary

form of the self-assertion of individu-

als.100

The question of Marx status as a

clandestine moralist who openly op-posed moral philosophy remains a key

Stirner Contra Marx:Morality, Society And Liberty

Chapter III


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contradiction, especially in his earlythought. It represents a temporal rip inthe fabric of Marxian thought that stillplagues its acolytes today. Its origins,

found in young Marx reading of TheEgo, may further unsettle his adherents.If Marx needed inspiration, or even en-couragement to abandon his more ex-plicit moral leanings then he needed tolook no further than Stirners polemic.Stirner had refuted Left Hegelian hu-manism, especially targeting its innatemoral content. He also attacked most

forms of moral convention, challeng-ing the absolute basis of moral edictsagainst polygamy, blasphemous desecra-tion and even incest. Such acts were stillable to cause a moral shudder101 in thecommon man, an indication for Stirnerthat the actual emancipation of the ego,

what others might call spiritual emanci-

pation, had yet to be realised.For Stirner, self-possession was to besought by the judicious organisation ofdesire, rather than its arbitrary suppres-sion. Taking his cue from Charles Fourier,Stirner lauded animal appetites as morehealthy and poetic than a life of absti-nence. Just as Feuerbachian humanism

was seen as the negation of traditional

theology, Stirnerian egoism was hailedthe negation of traditional ethics.102Instead of Man creating God in his ownimage, Stirner taught that the individ-ual ego had created Man in his ownimage. In The Essence of Christianity(1841) Feuerbach believed he was be-ing truly radical by having dissolved thesubject (God) into all of its predicates

(Man); Stirner had simply demonstratedhow far such dialectical sabotage could

logically go, he chose to dissolve thepredicate Society, into the individualpronouns I, me, myself. The individualego was Stirners laughing heir to the

whole Hegelian project.10 Stirnerianegoism was not conceived of as a newform of morality, rather it was opposedto morality. This is not to say egoism wasinherently immoral, Stirner rejected theidea of absolute opposition betweenmoral categories, good and evil, re-garding them as antediluvian.104

Stirners claims of ethical antinomi-

anism were deeply felt and taken seri-ously by Marx.The Ego encouraged himto dispel any ethical ideas from the newdirection of his thought. Marx alreadyregarded the Hegelian accounts of po-litical, judicial and moral conceptions ascritically wrong, but The Ego tipped thebalance. If Marx moral or metaphysical

scepticism stems from Stirner, then thepotency of his criticism of the nihilisminherent in The Ego needs to be re-as-sessed. Marx used Stirners desecrationof morality to justify his own thought,then proceeded to decry Stirnerianegoism as religious thought, as evenpreaching a morality. Classifying allidealistic philosophies as theodicies, a

surreptitious sort of clericalism105

thatmust be repudiated, was a result of thedogmatic materialist positions that Marxand Engels came to adopt. All idealists

were by default religious thinkers, yetthe materialistic basis of their thoughtdid little to elucidate their position onmoral teaching. The mystification sur-rounding Marx conception of morality

finds its basis in his distortion of Stirn-ers moral nihilism. Rather than offering


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an alternative moral theory for commu-nism Marx had disregarded allmoralityin the pursuit of revolution and classstruggle.

In truth, evacuating the moral con-tent of his thought was something Marxonly aspired to. Ultimately, Stirner hadpushed Marx to a philosophical posi-tion where the moral content of his

work now had to be implicit. SidneyHook states Marx leaned so far back-

ward that, soon after his death, themyth became current that he had no

place for any ethics in his philosophyof social activity.10 Marx reaction wasa tactical manoeuvre, allowing him topreserve the silent moral content of his

work. Karl Popper saw Marx as a manfor whom principles of humanity anddecency ... needed no discussion they

were to be taken for granted.107 How-

ever, if Marx decided to adopt a person-al notion of moral principles, why re-spond to Stirnerian egoism which wasso obviously an aberration? It is difficultto believe that Marx simply avoided ex-plicit moral theory because he dislikedpreaching, as Popper assumes. Marxreal antipathy for moral philosophy wasrooted in his actual thought. The very

thought consolidated in The GermanIdeology as a result of reading The Ego.

Regardless of the problems Marxleft unresolved, the crisis of 1845 hadhelped him finally realise the aim of histhought: to prove future world revolu-tion. However, yet again another Marx-ian impossibility emerged; the problemof reconciling historical inevitability

with an ethical model. Historical in-evitability could hardly function as an

inherent moral value for Marx.108 Thedeterminism of the materialist concep-tion of history had necessitated an an-gry confrontation with Stirner. It also

illuminated a displeasing characteristicof the young Marx, his inability to rec-ognize any opposition to his revolution.Further, it showed that Marx underesti-mated the role of discontent in histori-cal events, which Stirner and Hegel didnot; they had allowed contingency animportant role in the historical process.Crucially, unlike Marx, Stirner argued

that the historical process had to bethe work of human hands; history wasnever an abstraction that caused events.It was concrete, specific and human inall its forms. He also recognised that cer-tain thinkers had hijacked history, anddivested it of its autonomy:

History seeks for man: but he is

I, you, we. Sought as a mysterious

essence, as the divine, first as God,

then as man (humanity, humane-

ness, and mankind), he is found as

the individual, the finite, the unique

one.109

Stirner saw that all kinds of politics

wanted to educate man, to bring him tothe realisation of his essence, to giveman a destiny to make something outof him namely, a true man.110 This it-self was a ruse, making thinkers fall forthe proper error of religion.111 Wheth-er one saw destiny as divine or human

was of no concern. Stirner found thatboth positions held that man should be-

come this and that: this postulate, thiscommandment, to besomething.


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Incongruously, in his reading of TheEgo Marx felt he could finally rejecta system of morality and yet maintainmoral positions. He was extremely anx-

ious about the fact that his descriptionof socialism could become tainted by ab-stract moral ideals, ideals which Stirnerhad shown to be transcendent. However,it was Stirner who had equipped Marx

with the very tools to wage a methodo-logical campaign against Feuerbachsquasi-religious conception of Man, en-abling him to reject an ethics of love or

a politics of socialism through his anal-ysis of the social nature of man. Such asolution would have been implausible toStirner. To many, the religious essence ofhistorical materialism was superficiallyobscured by Marx rejection of the tradi-tional religions.112 However, Stirner hadalready identified such religious essence

in Marx pre-1845 intellectual allies. Hiscriticisms of Feuerbach were equallyapplicable to the young Marx who hadstated: The criticism of religion ends

with the precept that the supreme be-ing for man is man.11 In the same wayStirner observed the religious essenceof Left Hegelian humanism and earlysocialism, Marx too stands accused, his

atheism was still a categorically religiousproposition.114 Thus, Stirners originalaccusation of the pious atheism of theLeft Hegelians is particularly compelling

when applied to the thought of youngMarx.115

It is probable that Stirner would haveseen the young Marx as a kind of post-theological moralist attempting to solve

problem of original sin and ethical com-mitment through the redemptive power

of human History. The picture thatMarx paints of capitalists and the bour-geois as manifestations of evil, and hisdismissal of the individuals responsibil-

ity for their own misery would surely beseen as the personification of clerical-ism. Stirnerian critique would no doubtpronounce Marx a vulgar moralist, sub-ordinating the individual to the newGod, History. Now that history itself

was moralised, the profound Hegelianawareness of history as amoral was lost.

Like morality, Stirner regarded so-

ciety as an equally fictive notion, andsaw that moral obligation was presum-ably derived from the social nature ofman. Stirner observed that mans socialdimension was merely an alternativetype of religious and moral ideology. Hishostility to sacred society abounds inThe Ego; it was the arena in which the

most oppressive evils make themselvesfelt11, its domination was more brutaland insensitive than any previous des-potism. Not only was Stirners notion ofstate antithetical to Marxism, but by ut-terly rejecting the constructions of ide-alist philosophers he could only discov-er consciousness inside the mind; not insome trans-empirical ego or the Marx-

ian social being. For Stirner, emphasisupon the social nature of the mind, theevaluation of all ideas in relation to thesocial whole (or state), represented amenace to individual freedom and tothe autonomy of the individual. Socialduties were considered as purely self-legislated. Our relationship to society

was seen as one mediated by the ego.

Whilst society may pattern self-realisa-tion and define the egoists rebellion, its


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formative influence fades in favour ofthe individual until society itself is en-tirely displaced. For Marx, however, theatomism of civil society was offensive

and had to be transcended: Stirner hadfailed to root his ideas in the social proc-ess, hence the arbitrary nature of hisideology. However, Stirner implied thatcertain ideas are not merely reflectionsof their social environment and canremain outside the appraisal that theyare socially conditioned by. For Stirnerthese were the figurative orderings of

experiences, the result of the irreduc-ible egocentric nature of the individual;self-reflection mediated by personaldrives and private needs.

Marx communist vision would stillrequire the individual to conform toa pattern of behaviour, though notthrough traditional morals, but through

collective obligation. Stirners critiqueof Feuerbach and Proudhon had alreadyshown that socialist morality was full ofsuperstitions, just as much as the Apos-tles creed. Julius article in the second

volume ofWigands Vierteljahrschrift(1845) attacked the essentially Feuer-bachian character of Marx practicalhumanism, which Julius considered

religious alienation clearly inspiredby Stirners perception of socialism.117Stirners criticisms anticipate much lateraccusations, especially from contempo-rary existentialists, against Marxism: So-ciety ... is a new master, a new spook,a new supreme being which takesus into its service and allegiance.118 Ifsociety held the individual back from

achieving autonomy then communism was its most severe form of suppres-

sion. In criticising Weitlings commu-nism, Stirner stated that the Communistssought the welfare of all, true welfare,

which would eventually degenerate into

fixity.119 Stirner regarded communismas the strictest or most dogmatic para-digm based on the idea of Man. It wasa sovereign power exalting itself overmen, becoming their supreme essence,a new god. Do we not with this comeright to the point where religion beginsits dominion of violence? Stirner ar-gued.120 The philosophy of community

was enshrined in the old Feuerbachianproblem: separation from human es-sence. Essence was set above individu-als as something to be striven for, andStirner argued that both Communism,and, consciously egoism-reviling human-ism, still count on love.121 The socialiststipulation that individuals must work to

become truly human simply reproducedthe religious division of individuals intoan essential and unessential self.122Here, Stirner refers to an obscure arti-cle by a contemporary the young KarlMarx. The dualism that supported so-cial liberalism in all of its various guisescould not be tolerated and was brashlydismissed by Stirner: we will hear noth-

ing of this cutting in two.12

Marx misread The Ego, regarding

Stirner as an ideologue embroiled inthe malicious circle of critical diatribe

which had crippled Left Hegelian phi-losophy. Stirner, however, consciouslyrefused to uphold egoism as a set ofideas or principles.

Owness includes in itself everythingown, and brings to honour again what


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Christian language dishonoured. But

owness has not any alien standard

either, as it is not in any sense an

idea like freedom, morality, humanity

and the like: it is only a description ofthe owner.124

Stirner desired above all to break freeof the conceptual quagmire of the 1840s

where topostulate revolution was thetrend. Stirners critique of morality andsociety had shook the young Marx, forc-ing him to abandon notions of species,

man and estrangement that had previously been assigned crucial roles inhis earlier thought, but Stirners attackon the whole host of isms went deep-er still. If Marx repudiation ofThe Egonecessitated expunging the questionsof ethical meaning from his thought,then the issues of individual fulfilment

and emancipation the very nucleus ofStirners thought would also have to benegated.

Freedom for Stirner was alwaysfree-dom from some thing or other. Humanfreedom was better interpreted as free-dom to action; Stirner logically conclud-ed my freedom becomes complete only

when my might125. Neither is freedom

something to be given, it must be tak-en and defended: If you took might,freedom would come of itself.12 Ideo-logues of political liberty were moredangerous, in Stirners mind, than evenreligious or philosophical thinkers. Theidea of a society based upon a singleprinciple (e.g. Communism) was simplyan obligation putting man at the service

of the state: Liberty of thepeople is notmy liberty!.127 Stirner saw that modern

socialism, especially the kind espousedby Proudhon, interposed a new prin-ciple between the individual and theproperty of all, the socialist notion of

social justice, a concept just as poten-tially oppressive as the religious notionof divine grace. Both socialism andcommunism left the individuals mindunchanged; it was still a mind of de-pendence.128 Communism was a back-

ward step, a dependence on another ...on the generality or collectivity, a sta-tus, a condition hindering my free move-

ment, a sovereign power over me.129

Marx new form of social justice was founded on the notion of labour,compulsory work done in the serviceof society. For Stirner, the division oflabour, with all its subdivisions, wassimply conceptual apparatus directedagainst the individual. This of course

led to alienated labour, which Marx toowould later claim to resolve. Stirner ar-gued that for the individual to negoti-ate so many forms of alienation in the

world he simply had to expropriatehis property, his creative strength andactivity, to enable him to rely peacefullyon himself again. Like Hegel, true con-crete individuality (Einzelheit ) was a

return from alienation. Stirners notionof theEinzige, the Ego, more helpfullytranslated as The Unique One clarifieshis whole project. The Unique One isman in his irreducible uniqueness, thusegoism is the final definition of the hu-man essence, not the subject of an eth-ical category, but an uncomplicated ex-istential fact. If one could perceive this,

all conceivable forms of alienation, con-scious or unconscious, would be impos-


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sible.Eigentum (Own-ness or Property)did not mean a seizure of some moralcontent, but a mans identity with hismanifestations, above all, with his indi-

vidual existence. The notion has Hege-lian heritage: In Philosophy of Rightthe immediate manifestation of right(liberty ) was the possession by manof his body and his bodily functions(work ). Stirner took his position fromthe minor degree of liberty advocatedby Hegel. But the idea of liberty, like somany concepts for Stirner, had been set

up as a new absolute, that man shouldbe free. Stirner declared such a concept

was nothing more than ... a new long-ing, a new torment, a new deviation, anew deity, a new contrition ....10

Stirners opposition to the dogmaticideologues clearly engaged the thoughtof the young Marx. However, their two

antithetical worlds, the concrete directexperience of The Ego and the worldof universal labour outlined in The Ger-man Ideology; would never be recon-ciled. Marx, as ever the disciple ratherthan the usurper of Hegelian thought,had still sought some kind of accord.In attempting reconciliation, Marx de-cided to put forward the doctrine of

individual consciousness mediated bysocial consciousness. The real question

was to what extent social ties neces-sarily determined individual conscious-ness. Marx could not give a definitiveanswer. Such ambiguity lends supportfor Stirner; for if consciousness wascompletely determined by society thennothing was to be done, and an upheav-

al in the minds of men was thereforenot possible. Stirner allowed individual

consciousness to retain some autonomy,epitomised in the individual ego.

Marx could not perceive of any formsuch oppositionist consciousness11

that characterised Stirners position andsurely must arise if credence is given toideas that intend to transform politicalreality. Both Stirner and Bauer held thatrecognition of dissent or oppositionistconsciousness was essential to theirproject: the merciless use of the prin-ciples of criticism, the principle of thedialectic that would destroy the empty

forms founded on dualism.12 For Marx,criticism or thought alone was notenough. Thought was the acknowledgedservant of human needs and desiredthat philosophy (generalised thought)become an instrument in changing the

world. There was no oppositionist con-sciousness; only moments of opposi-

tion that were inevitably transformedinto successive phases of developmentin the historical process. Marx notionof social consciousness allowed him totranscend Stirners individualism andas well as abstract morality of Frenchmaterialism, and modify their historicalconceptions with the notion of a dy-namic, propelling movement in nature

and human thinking the dialectic.Stirner saw man as progressing

through stages of conflict and alienation.He understood as Hegel had, that free-dom in contemporary society was ex-plainable in terms of an individuals ori-entation to a set of moral postulates andsocial practices. Whilst opposing Hegel,Stirner ironically posed a truly Hegelian

problem: Could the negativity inherentin Hegels process of change, the dialec-


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tic, ever be halted for any possible ideo-logical reasons? Both Stirner and Marxlaid claim to the Hegelian dialectic, andboth claimed they were demystifying its

nature. Yet Marx fundamental difficultyvis--vis Stirner was the question ofhow will man be once he is free of al-ienation?.1 Stirner refused to observethat the ideological process required anintermediate stage; a total alienation ofconsciousness. For Marx, this stage wasto be found in the proletarian classesand necessitated revolution. Stirners

reality was the world of his immediateexperience; he wanted power straightaway, not after some remote and hypo-thetical proletarian revolution.

Despite Marx own revolutionary tac-tics, and tendencies of the future he sawdisplayed in his own age, historical ma-terialism meant he lacked a doctrine for

the immediate present least of all forthose whose existence was resigned tothe limits of the capitalisms grasp andeconomic process. On the other hand,for dissenting members of society whohad yet to become socialist and lookforward to the dawn of a new order,Stirnerian egoism provided an alterna-tive protest: disobedience, radical ques-

tioning, active resistance and bodily en-joyment. Most importantly, it aimed at thedeconstruction of linguistic spooks,fixed ideas which ruled the real world.For Marx, Stirners radical resistancedid not engage the working class and

was dismissed as a petty bourgeois es-sence. It is ironic that Marx consideredStirner as a quintessential wallflower of

history, epitomising a shopkeepers ego-

ism. Stirner considered himself as goingbeyond dissent, conjuring a picture ofinsurrection, rather than the polarisedimage of society that engendered a new,

Communistic change of masters: a newreligion of society. Stirner saw it as de-ceptive that the Enlightenment hadsimply amounted to transferring thebalance of religion to humanism in its

various bogus guises. Out of this last di-visive stage of Hegelianism, Stirner sawno reason for the dialectic to be sub-sumed in history. Unlike Marx, he laid

claim to its destructive force in the bat-tle against alienating concepts:

... why should I only dissent (think

otherwise) about a thing? Why not

push the thinking otherwise to its last

extremity, that of no longer having

any regard at all for the thing, and

therefore thinking its nothingness,

crushing it? Then the conception it-

self has en end, because there is no

longer anything to conceive of it.14

Now it is possible to understandhow Stirner would seen have the his-torical dialectic as the Will of Godreiterated in pseudo-secular terms, and

that Marx, in true theological fashion,attempted to mask the causal efficacygiven to ideological abstractions as em-pirical forces. Stirners position wasclearly nihilistic, but by attacking the

very idea of European Enlightenmentin the nineteenth-century he had calledinto question much more than its social-ist doctrines, and insisted that we lose

all of our ideological props.


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M

arx critique of Stirner in The Ger-man Ideology was a means of

distinguishing himself from what was,in his eyes, the impotent Left Hegelianmovement. For Marx, alienation wasno longer a spiritual phenomenon, butthe objective forms of mans economicproducts, the separation of man from hisproduc

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