on the interperetation of terrorist violence - eta and the basque political process

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On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process

Author(s): William A. Douglass and Joseba Zulaika

Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 32, No. 2, (Apr., 1990), pp. 238-257

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/178914

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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE 239in no way be construedas an attemptto "explain" any of them in a causalsense.THEORETICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF TERRORISMWe might begin by considering certain definitional anomalies and meth-odologicalquandaries.Studiesof politicalterrorism rovideagoodexampleofhow a researchfield can flourish withouteven minimalagreementregardingthe definition of basic terms. One only has to consider the overview inSchmid's Political Terrorism:A ResearchGuide to Concepts,Theories,DataBases and Literatureto find thatthere is almostcomplete lack of consensusregarding such notions as "political," "power," "aggression," and"force," which in turnareusedto define "terrorism."Infact, if one reviewsthe literatureon terrorism,the majorconsensus among the various authorsseems to be that there s no adequatedefinitionof it, thedifficultybeingnotthedegreeof detailor comprehensivenessbutthevery "generalframework that]is chosen for definition" (Schmid 1983:8). We continueto argueoverwhetherterrorisms theresultof primitive ogic, religiousfanaticism,atypeof warfare,ritualaction, faultyvestibular unctions nthe middleear,orpsychopathology.Indeed, it mightbe well to sound two cautionarynotes drawnfromthe socialscientific literature.One regardsthe similaritiesbetweenthe presenttheorieson terrorismandthoseproduceddecadesago by pioneeringanthropologistsnthe fields of magic, religion, and totemism. The other derives from MaxWeber's methodologicalconcernswith the desirabilityof causalexplanationand with distinguishingobjectivityfrom valuejudgment.At the turnof the century, armchairanthropologistsregularly interpretedfragmentarydataon religion, witchcraft, taboo, and othersocial institutionswithoutmuchregardfor theirbroaderculturalcontexts;rather,the tendencywas to explain seemingly quaint practices in terms of emotional states orlogical mistakes.Fear, awe, fanaticism,evil projections,anddeficientcausalinferenceswere employed profusely to accountfor a varietyof institutions.Subsequently, social anthropologistsdenounced this "psychological fal-lacy," also knownas the "If I were a horse" argument,whereinone projectsone's own emotions and attitudesonto the subjectunderstudywere he to beplaced in their situation.A fine example of the approach s Spencer'streat-ment (1882) of primitive religion, which he derives from dreams and thebelief in ghosts, his conclusion being that ancestorworshipis at the root ofeveryprimitivereligioussystem. Tylor(1871) evoked thenotionof "anima"(soul) and the theory of animism, which remainedunchallengedfor manyyearsuntiladvances in bothpsychology andethnologypromptedts abandon-ment.In the "dream theories" of religion, the investigatorimposed his ownlogical constructsuponprimitivebelief systems. Contemporary nalystswhoexplain violent nationalistmovements as the productof a mere "millenarian


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240 WILLIAM A. DOUGLASS, JOSEBA ZULAIKA

dream" or who contend that terrorisms the result of "messianism" can beconsidered heirs to such thinking. The anthropologicalstudy of totemismprovidesa somewhat different lesson for the studentof terrorism.W. H. R.Rivers defined it in 1914 as a combination of (1) a social element (theconnection of an animal or plant with, typically, an exogamous group orclan); (2) a psychological element (a belief in a relationof kinshipbetweenmembersof thegroupand the animal,plant,orthing);and(3) a ritualelement(tabooson eating the totem). By 1920, Van Gennep distinguished orty-onetheories of totemism;yet as early as 1916 Boas had chargedthat it was anartificialentitythat existed nowhereoutsideof the mindof theanthropologist.Rather,totemismin nature was epiphenomenal o the formationof a socialsystem. Levi-Strausspostulateda homology in responseto the question ofwhy the animaland vegetable domainsoffer a nomenclature or denotingasocial system andwhat logical relations exist betweenthe system of denota-tion and the denotedsystem thatwas situatednot so muchwithin the systemof denotation,as Boas contended, but in a differential featureexisting be-tween the given species and the clans. The lesson is that when the semanticfield is distortedby singlingout certainaspectsat theexpenseof others andbygranting heman originalitythatthey do not in fact possess, we are deceivedby the mirageof illusorycategories-such as totemism.Consequently,Levi-Strausssaid thattotemisms like hysterian thatoncewe arepersuadedo doubt hat t is possiblearbitrarilyo isolate ertain henomenand ogrouphem ogethersdiagnosticignsof anillness,or of anobjectivenstitution,hesymptomshemselvesanish rappearrefractory o any unifying interpretation. . . But the comparisonwith totemismsug-gestsa relation f another rderbetween cientificheories ndculture, nein whichthemindof the scholar imselfplaysaslargeapart s theminds f thepeople tudied;it is as thoughhewereseeking,consciouslyrunconsciously,ndunder heguiseofscientific bjectivity,omake he atter-whethermental atientsr so-called"primi-tives"moredifferenthan hey reallyare(1962:1).By substituting"terrorism"for "totemism" it is hard to imagine a moreprecise characterization f the muddledstate of affairsin our studies.There is a similarproblemwith the anthropologicalanalysisof witchcraftand sorcery, since these terms may turnout to be "labels for social phe-nomenathatdifferradicallyfromsociety to society" (Beidelman 1970:351).Suchtaxonomicpreoccupationsmayconcealproblematical nterdependencieswhen appliedon a comparative evel, and we may "feel we have explainedmattersaway throughhaving imposed some nominalcategory" (Beidelman1970). Consequently,Crickhas proposedthat "our understandingwill ad-vance when 'witchcraft' s analyticallydissolved into a largerframeof refer-ence" (1976:112). If the foregoingcan be said of anthropologistswho havecarriedout extensive anddetailedstudiesof totemismand witchcraft n manysocieties, it is even more applicableto those of us who, possessing scarcely


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the essential discontinuitybetween factual and normative statements-be-tween the "is" and the "ought":Whats reallyat issue s theintrinsicallyimpledemandhat heinvestigatornd heteachershouldkeep unconditionallyeparatehe establishmentf empiricalacts(includinghe "value-oriented"onductof the empiricalndividualwhomhe isinvestigating)and his own practicalevaluation. . . . These two things are logicallydifferent nd o dealwith hemasthough heywere hesamerepresentsconfusion fentirelyheterogeneousroblems1949:11).The crucial implicationof such a methodologicalviewpoint is that scientificanalysis can help determinethe efficacy of adoptingcertain means for theattainmentof certaingoals, althoughno amountof scientificknowledgecandeterminehow a person should value the latter. Faced with irreconcilablycompeting ideals, empirical knowledge and logical analysis can only helpclarifytheirnature;however, science cannot tell a social actorhow to choose.As summarizedby Giddens, "The whole point of Weber's analysis is thatthereis an absolutegulf between factualandethicaltruth,andthatno amountof empiricalknowledge can validate the pursuitof one ethic rather han theother" (1971:137). Suchthinking ed Weberto distinguishbetweena politicalconductguided by an "ethic of responsibility"andone guidedby an "ethicof ultimateends"; in the latter there is no rational calculation of means tosecurethe ultimate deals. The practicalpoliticianwill be compelledto medi-ate-and ultimatelychoose-between antagonisticpositions, but "this hasnothingwhatsoeverto do with scientific 'objectivity'" (1949:57). Thisby nomeans implies moral indifferenceto the issues studied or the eliminationofideals from scientific discussion.Given the emotional andpracticalconsequencesof terrorismn the modemworld, it is scarcelysurprising hat muchof the researchon it is commissionedby existing states or is otherwise advocacy by its nature. In the study ofpoliticalviolence we areparticularlyempted o disregard heepistemologicalgulf between factual and normativepropositions, as if there should be noquestion as to what "ought to be" the case regardingsuch a heinous phe-nomenon. This tendency-to define terrorismas more of a "problem"to bedealt with rather han as a "phenomenon"to be studiedin its own terms-therebyviolates Weber's dictum that the social sciences "are the least fittedto presumeto save the individual hedifficultyof makinga choice" (1949:10)and consequentlyalso disregards he methodologicalimperative hat sciencecannot determinethe validity or falsity of ultimate ideals.BASQUE NATIONALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF ETAGiven the foregoing generaldefinitionalproblemsand the advocatorynatureof much of theresearchon terrorism,t is scarcelysurprisinghattheliteratureis dominatedby instrumentalist pproacheswhichfrequently ead to prescrip-


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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE 243tive conclusions.2The extentto which this is so maybe illustratedby examin-ing the Basque case, and particularly he attempts o understandETA.The moder Basque nationalistmovementwas founded in the last decadeof the nineteenthcentury by Sabinode Arana. It was in largemeasurestimu-latedby the perception hatBasqueculturewas in imminentdangerof extinc-tion. Duringthe nineteenthcentury, Basques fought and lost two wars (theCarlistcampaigns)againstliberal, centralistSpanishgovernments n defenseof regional privilege as guaranteedby ancient Basquefueros or charters.Militarilydefeatedandpoliticallyprostrateby the end of the nineteenthcen-tury, the Basque provinces were experiencinga new threatto their culturalidentity. Rampant ndustrialization nd urbanizationof the Basque area hadconvertedit into a magnet for migrationfrom throughout beria. The new-comers became a majority in key Basque economic centers. Meanwhile,Basque culture, and particularlyuse of the language, was retreatingvisibly.Aranacalled for repatriation f non-BasqueSpaniardso theirnatalareas andproclaimedthat the Basque countryshould be exclusively the homeland ofthose who were racially Basque.The labyrinthinehistoryof Basquenationalism s beyondthe scope of thispaper.Suffice it to say thatits fortuneswaxedand waned in theearly yearsasit experiencedschisms between the hardliners eeking total independenceofthe BasqueCountryand the more moderateregionalistswho envisionedvary-ing degrees of Basque autonomy within a Spanish state structure.Basqueethnonationalism-a coalitionof the traditional ocial elite, a segmentof thebourgeoisie, and the rural peasantry-was ideologically conservative andparticularlyeery of the politicalrhetoricof class conflict in the urban, ndus-trialcenters as a politicalradicalism hat was easily identifiablewith the non-Basque, lower-class immigrants.The BasqueCatholicclergy exertedconsid-erable influence within the movement, giving it theocraticovertones.

During the second decade of the twentiethcenturyand the periodof theSpanishRepublic(1931-36), the mainstreamBasqueNationalistParty PNV)was able to contest (at times quite successfully) local and nationalelections,becominga dominantpoliticalforce in municipalandprovincialbodies and avocal minority within the Spanish Parliament.Conversely, duringthe dic-tatorshipof Primo de Rivera (1923-30) the movement was outlawed andforced into underground landestinity.Probablythe most impressive-if ill-fated-political triumphof Basque2 One of the most ambitious and influentialbooks on politicalviolence in the moder world,Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, unabashedlystates that political stability and conflictreductionare positive values. The authornotes, "It is... both fruitless and undesirabletoattemptto abolish ethnic affiliations, but not at all fruitless to attemptto limit their impact"(1984:xiii). For a particularly gregious exampleof treatment f a "terrorist"groupas a politicalanathemavirtuallyby definition,see Conor CruiseO'Brien's(1988) recent,ostensibly objective,analysis of the Sikh movementin the Punjab.


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244 WILLIAM A. DOUGLASS, JOSEBA ZULAIKAnationalismwas creationof the Governmentof Euskadiduringthe first ninemonths (1936-37) of the SpanishCivil War. While the Basque state was acoalition of nationalistand republican orces, the formercontrolledthe keyposts (includingthe presidency). Defeated by Francoin 1937, the Basquegovernmentwas forced into exile, establishingits seat in Paris with littlesemblance of its former coalitionist character. That is, it became almostsynonymouswith the BasqueNationalistParty.Basquenationalismduringthe Francoyearspursuedan anti-Madrid am-paign in international orums. The exiled Basque president,Jose AntonioAguirre,andhis supporters ollaborated losely withthe Allies duringWorldWar II, establishing intelligence networks in Europe and throughouttheBasque emigrantcommunities n Latin Americaand Asia. Confidentthatthefall of Mussolini and Hitler presaged that of Franco, Aguirre establishedresidence in New York City to press the Basque case before the UnitedNations. Ultimately,however, the effort was a victim of theColdWarandthepoliticalconsiderationsof the superpowers.Desirousof establishingmilitarybases in Spain duringthe early 1950s, the United States reversedwhat hadbeen an effective internationalpoliticalandeconomicboycottof the Spanishregime. Consequently,the Basque NationalistPartywas beset with a failedpolicy and an aging leadershipin the late 1950s, which were the darkestdepthsof the Francoyears, since they were characterized y systematicstatesuppressionof all Basqueculturalexpressionsincludinguse of the language.While it continuedpassive resistancewithin Spain andcommanded he loy-alties and financial supportof many Basques in the emigrantdiaspora,thepartyseemed locked into a waitinggame of simply outlasting he Francoists.It was at thisjuncture n 1959, that a groupof Basque youths, exasperatedwith the "do little" policy, formedETA, proclaiming hatthe BasqueCoun-try was occupied by a foreign power and calling for a campaignof nationalliberation.This was consonantwith one ideological strandwithintraditionalBasquenationalism;however, ETA made threeoriginalcontributions.First,it eschewed confessionalismby advocatingthe exclusion of the church frompolitics. Second, it rejectedrace as a basis of Basquenessand substituted henotion of ethnos as expressed in commitmentto the language and Basquecultural ideals. By rejecting biological criteria, ETA made it possible toaccommodatenon-Basques,particularlyhe sympatheticdescendantsof for-mer non-Basquemigrantsto the area. Third,ETA evinced concernover theplightof the workerswithin thecapitalistsystemand advocatedcreationof anindependentsocialist state for Basques (Jauregui,1986:592-5).In 1964 ETA released a pamphletentitled "Insurrection n the BasqueCountry," in which it likened the area to a Spanishcolony, identified t withFanon's colonized "wretchedof the earth," and called for rebellionagainstthe oppressors.Recognizingthatdirectmilitaryconfrontationwas out of thequestion, ETA opted for the classic third-world nsurrectionistmodel, in


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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE 245which guerrillaactionwas designedto provokestaterepressionof the generalpopulace, therebyraisingthe latter'spoliticalconsciousness andresentment,which could then be channeledinto support or the guerrillamovement. TheFrancodictatorship,which was quickto react to any challenge, providedtheperfect foil.In order to maximize its effectiveness while minimizingits exposure,ETAoptedfor an atomisticcellular structure f unconnected ocal groupsof a fewindividuals acting autonomouslyor on orders from a single contact fromabove. This madeit extremelydifficultfor the Spanishpolice to penetrate heorganizationand also assureddamage control by restrictingthe amount ofinformationa capturedactivist could provide, even underthe duress of thetorturewhich had become commonplaceduringinterrogation essions. MostETA activists were young, single males who were part-timers, n the sensethat they were students, workers, or agriculturistswho were activatedonlysporadicallyfor an ekintza(action). At any one time there were only a fewliberados (liberatedindividuals)who were providedwith financial supportfrom the organizationto enable them to devote all of their energies to itspurposes. They periodicallymet in assemblyto formulatetactics and goals.Three other situational actors facilitatedETA's activities as well. First, ithadaccess to an international etworkof othernational iberationmovements.The nature and extent of such ties is but imperfectlyunderstood.It is clear,however, thatETA received some of its arms from abroad,maintainedcon-tacts with groupslike the IRA, and trainedat least some of its key activists inplaces like Algeria. Second, ETA was able to makeexcellent strategicuse ofEuropeandiscomfort with the Francodictatorship.France,in particular,pro-videdrefugeforpoliticaldissidents.The adjacentFrenchBasqueareabecamean ideal haven for those activists who had been identifiedby Spanish au-thorities. While less politicizedthanSpanish Basques, there was a modicumof sympathyfor Basquenationalismamongsome FrenchBasques, a fact thatallowed ETA to use their area as a staginggroundfor its activities acrosstheborder. The frontier itself was extremely porous. Spain dependedheavilyupontradewith the CommonMarketcountriesandEuropean ourismand wasthereforenot in a positionto seal its borders.Therewere also thelongstandingBasque contrabandnetworks throughthe Pyrenees and a myriadof smallvessels engaged in the extensive Basque maritimeactivity in the Bay ofBiscay. ETA was therefore able to move personneland armswith near im-punity both into and out of Spain.3 ETA's thirdtactical advantagewas thevery natureof its guerrillaactivity. In large measurethe organizationcouldselect the time and place of each ekintzawith an eye towardmaximizingitssymbolicvalue throughselection of prominentandprecisetargets,rather han

3 In point of fact, of the thousandsof detentions of suspectedETA membersby the Spanishauthoritiesover thepasttwo decades, virtuallynone hastranspired ttheFrench-Spanishborder.


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resorting o indiscriminateviolence. It didnot limit its activities to the Basquearea, but it operatedin such places as Barcelona,Madrid,and Zaragoza-forcing the Spanishgovernmentto institute a nationalstate of alert. ETA'smost spectacularaccomplishmentalongthese lines was the 1973assassinationof Admiral CarreroBlanco, Franco'shandpickedsuccessor, in the streetsofMadrid.Despite such strengths,ETA's fortuneswaxed and waned. The very suc-cess in provoking the Spanish state periodically broughtits full repressivecapacitydown uponthe BasqueCountry,resulting n harshpolice tacticsthatled to the detention of many ETA members and sympathizersand forcedothers to flee abroad. Anotherproblemwas the internaldivision within theorganization,which led to two majorschisms. In 1966 ETA leadersheldtheirwatershed Fifth Assembly duringwhich three factions emerged. One grouparguedfor the primacyof working-classconflict over the goals of Basquenationalism and opted for incorporationwithin the revolutionarymovementsof the new Europeanleft. Another faction rejected Marxism in favor oftraditionalBasque nationalistobjectives. Yet a thirdcontingentstressed ac-tivism and armedconflict, arguingthatliberationof the BasqueCountrywasthe primeobjective andthatideological debateshouldbe postponeduntil the

period of postindependence.This third faction triumphedand expelled thefirst two from the movement (Jauregui1986:598). There was yet one moreschism within ETA in 1974 of considerablehistorical mportance.There wasa debateon the eve of Franco's death over the tacticswhich had divided theorganizationinto ETA politico-militar (ETApm)and ETA militar (ETAm).The former,while espousing nationalistgoals, evinced a concernwith work-ing-class issues. ETApm also advocated a blend of conventionalpoliticalactivity with selective armed action. Conversely, ETAm favoredcontinued,unrelentingarmed resistanceas the only avenue towardtruenational libera-tion.To the surpriseof many observers,Spain in the post-Francoperiodunder-went a successful democratictransformation nd, as a partof the process,received a new constitution hatguaranteeda high degreeof politicalautono-my to the regions, particularly o the "historic territories"of Catalunyaandthe Basque Country. Both were allowed to institute regional governmentswith a president,parliament,and ministries.In the case of the Basques, thisprocess has been dominatedby the BasqueNationalistParty.In pointof factconventional politics in the Basque Country now embrace a spectrumofpolitical partiesrangingfrom the rightto the radicalleft, some of which areBasquenationalistand othersSpanish n orientation.Despitethisconsiderabledegree of freedom in political expression, ETA remainsan unresolved chal-lenge to the system. Forthe ETA hardliners, he enemy was never FrancobutratherMadrid, and those Basques who participatein the currentpoliticalprocess are simply collaborators.The mantleof armed resistance has passed


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subject.4Thereview forms,however, the necessarybasis for the critiquethatfollows, for it is our contentionthatanalysesof ETA to datehave tendedtoemphasizetwo aspectsof thephenomenon:he concernwith its organizationalpropertiesandactivities(internalstructure,recruitment,membershipprofile,ideology, andtactics), as well as interest n determininghe extentof supportenjoyed by the organizationwithin the Basque Country. The underlyingpremisein most of the analysesis that t is necessary o understand heoriginsand supportingrationalesof ETA in orderto prescriberemedies for it.UNDERSTANDING ETAGiven the precedingemphasesandobjectives, the literature n ETA is domi-nated by detailed historiographyand the analysis of electoral results andpublicopinionpolls. Therehas also been one majorattempt o synthesizetheresultsof such studiesin the 1986reportby a panelof internationalxpertsonterrorism Rose et al., 1986), which had been commissionedby the Basquegovernmentas a way of prescribinga planof action forcombatingETA.5 Allsuch treatments endedto emphasizeand indeedreify ETA's organizationalproperties,andled to suchstatementsas thoseindicating hat15percentof theBasque populace "supports"ETA (as reflectedin the electoraltallies of EEand HB) and 50 percent "understand" t (thatis, empathizewith it to somedegree), as determinedby public opinion polls (Jauregui1986:603). Suchinterpretationsare not incorrectbut, in our view, incomplete. In order toachieve a morecomprehensiveunderstanding f ETA, andits manyseeminganomalies, it is necessary to explore the full implications of Jauregui's(1986:599) statementthat: "ETA always defines itself as a movement ofnationalliberationand not as a political party.Its activity is not exclusivelypolitical but fundamentallyresistant;it is a regenerativeactivity." In thisrespectETA is as much a concept (with symbolicproperties)as a structure.Hence, attempts o situate t withintheBasque politicalspectrumandmeasureits publicsupportcaptureonly some of its severaldimensions.In a conceptualsense, ETA permeatesthe Basque scene andis even capableof transcendingBasque politics per se in responseto situationaland symbolic exigencies. Itthereforebecomesextremelydifficultto measuresupport or ETA in standardpolitical termsand equateor translatesuch support nto a measureof ETA'sstrengthor efficacy. We will considereach of these points in turn.ETA and the Political ProcessThereare several issues which obfuscateany effortto gauge ETA's politicalsupport.First, thereis the fact thatthe organizationhas denounced he politi-

4 Fortwo of thebetterones, see JaureguiBereciartu 1981) andClark 1984). Foran excellentdiscussionof the ETA's recent tactics, see IbarraGiiell (1987).5 The exercise provedto be largelysterileandbanal,as the conclusionsand recommendationsof the panel scarcely transcendeda statementof the obvious, therebybecominga majorembar-rassmentfor its sponsors. For an analysisof the report,see Zulaika,n.d.


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support or HB. If the partyhadprovideda reasonable itmustest of ETAm'spoliticalstrength n 1979, the samemaynotbe saidforthe 1987results,whenHB attracteda protestvote divorced from the issue of ETA andeven Basquenationalismper se in both the Basque Countryand(to a lesserdegree)on thewider Spanish political scene. Thus, HB today enjoys the supportof someecologists (possibly stemmingfromETA's success in stoppingthe construc-tion of a nuclearpowerplantatLemoiz), gay rightssupporters,eminists,andpunk rockers. Similarly, in the 1987 Europeanparliamentary lection, HBreceived 111,189 votes outside of the BasqueCountry,including39,692 inBarcelonaProvince,whichpermitted ts candidate,TxemaMontero,to win aseat in the international ody. Consequently,HB was drawn ncreasingly ntoa broaderpolitical arena with an agendathat sometimestranscendedBasqueissues. While it managedto assume a seat in the EuropeanParliament,itsapplicationfor membership n Europe'sRainbowCoalition was rejectedde-spite its close associationswith West Germany'sGreenparty.To HB's cha-grin, EE was admittedin its stead.In the most recent European parliamentary election (June 15, 1989), themost salient political fact in the Basque country was the abstention of 43percent of the electorate. Consequently, HB's total support, like that of all ofthe other political parties, declined in absolute terms to 185,215 votes. Itsrelativesupportof 19.4 percentof the total vote cast was identical to that ofthe 1987 election, and HB continuedto receive the highesttotal in Gipuzkoa.Conversely,HB's supportoutsideof the Basque Countryerodednoticeablyto84,528 votes, including only slightly more than 15,000 in Barcelona.The prior discussion illustrates the difficulty of determiningsupportforETA by readingthe results for Basqueelections. Thereis, however, anotherconfusingfactor. Whetherat the ballotbox or in public opinion polls, supportfor ETA is intertwinedwith reactionsto the organization'sekintzak actions)andis thereforeconsiderablymore mercurial hanthatof the standardpoliticalparties,which have statedplatformsand structures. t is one thingto relate toa party's principlesand identifiable cast of charactersand quite anothertoopine abouta shadowyorganizationwhose trademark ndvery survivalployis anonymity.Hence, ETA is "personified" for electoral andpublic opinionpurposesthroughekintzak,whose verynaturemeansthatthey quickly acquirea life of their own and rapidlyculminatein historic "triumphs"or "trag-edies," with profound internaland external consequences for the organi-zation.7

7 It may be that ETAm's increased propensityfor such ekintzak is related to a desire todemonstratea capacity for spectacularaction at a time in which the reinsertionprogramhasprovenattractive o some operatives,France'sextraditionprogramhas removeda safehaven,andthere is a felt need for credibilityas a "dangerousfoe" in the currentnegotiationswith theSpanish government. There is also a sense in which the internallogic of political violencerequiresescalation.The deathof an individualguardiacivil or ETAoperativeno longerhas thesame impactand, hence, symbolic value, in either the BasqueCountryor a Spaininured o suchevents by nearlytwo decadesof ongoing political violence.


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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE 251

It is probablyaccurateto state that the assassinationof Admiral CarreroBlanco was receivedpositively-not only across muchof theBasquepoliticalspectrumbut also within certain sectors of Spanish and even internationalpublicopinion. Conversely,thekidnappingandeventualkillingof theBasqueindustrialistBerezadi in 1976 was condemned in most Basque circles andheightenedthe internaldebate withinETAover the use of violence and(a fewmonthslater)resultedin the disappearance f the moderate eader "Pertur,"who was presumedto have been killed by the hard-line faction. More re-cently, there was the death of "Yoyes," a high-ranking emale leader ofETAm, who left the organization, ived forseveralyearsin Mexico, andthen,upon her return o the Basque Country,was gunneddown in a public plazawhile walking her baby. Althoughthe killing was presumablya message tootherETA activistswho wereconsidering he government'soffer of "reinser-tion," the event was roundlycriticized.Finally, two ETA bombingsin 1987(at a shopping center in Barcelona and a military barracksin Zaragoza)indiscriminatelykilled many bystanders,which promptedenormouspublicdemonstrationsagainstthe violence (involvinghundredsof thousandsof par-ticipants).ETAm stated that it hadnot intended o produceciviliancasualtiesin the Barcelonacase and claimed thatthe authoritieshadbotchedthe situa-tion when given advance warning. Nevertheless, the recently elected HBrepresentative o the Europeanparliament,Txema Montero, denouncedthebombing as "multiple murders," while refusing, however, to speak out inStrasbourgagainst "terrorism."ETAas a ConceptWhether mplicitlyorexplicitly, bothspecialistsand the common mantend tomeasure the relativestrengthof "political" phenomena n terms of numbersof adherents, heirvote-getting capacity,andthesympathy nspiredwithinthegeneralpopulationfor theirgoals. Since there is clearlya politicaldimensionto ETA's activities and goals, it is not surprisingthat an instrumentalistapproachdominates the analyses of it. It is equally important,however, torecognize that ETA differs in certainqualitativerespects from all the otherorganizationswithin the Basque political spectrum.ETA is largelyirredentistand uncompromisingin principle, whereas compromise is generic to theconventionalpolitical process, particularlywithin democracies. When con-ventionalpolitical partiesstate theirgoals, no matterhow ambitious,they arelikely to be suffused with several elements which include ploys, wish-listdesires, and political posturing. In short, the statedgoals are as much of astance as a demand, a gambit in a game (albeit a serious one) which ischaracterizedby the interplayof conflicting goals andthe resultingcompro-mises.To enter into play at all is tacit recognitionthatthe end result is likely todiffer from each participant's nitial proposalbut will incorporateelementsfromthe severalconflicting viewpoints.There is also tacitrecognition hat the


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politicalprocess is diachronic:While statingone's demands,eachparticipantagrees to exercise at least a modicum of restraintandpatience, therebyper-mittingproselytizationand debatewhich, if notalwaysabsolutelypeaceful, isat least largely nonviolent in nature. This may be contrastedwith ETA'spresumablynon-negotiabledemand for the Basques' self-determinationoftheirown political destiny. The operative political slogan thenbecomes Eu-skadiala hil (BasqueCountryor death).Framed n suchterms,the call is notto political activism but ratherto armedstruggle and possible martyrdom.Compromisein such a context is not only anathema,it is tantamount otreason.Hence, one can ask legitimatelywhetherETA is capableof genuineconcessionas partof a settlementor is simplyproffering ome sortof cosmet-ic solution to enable Spanish officials to dissimulate their capitulationtoETA's demands.The main anomaly, however, is that ETA is as much a concept as astructureat this historicaljuncture, since ETA represents he crossing of aconceptualRubiconforBasquenationalismn which thegoal is totalindepen-dence and that this justifies the means. Consequently,ETA's violence actu-alizes the mostradicalBasqueseparatistapproachandtherebybecomes a partof each Basquenationalist'sconsciousness(as well as thatof his enemies)byentering into each actor's political calculation (if only to be rejected bymany).Indeed, even those who eschew ETA's goals and tactics, such as mostBasque government officials and members of the moderate Basque Na-tionalistParty,find the organization'sexistence useful in their own dealingswith Madrid; or there is a sense in which ETA providesthe teeth for whatwould otherwisebe merely a barkingdog. ModerateBasquesare in essenceable to tell Madrid, "You can negotiatewith us or cope with ETA." There-fore, while ETA itself is not disposedto compromise,it has certainlybeen amajorfactorin the post-Francopoliticalprocess. In fact, while it is a some-whatmoot point, it is intriguing o speculatewhether herewouldeven be anautonomousBasqueregion today in Spainhad ETA never existed.ETA as a concept, then, transcendsanyparticularBasque politicalorgani-zation-including thatof ETA itself.8 We havealreadynoted thatindividualscan enteror leave ETA, and that factionswithin it arequite capableof schismover ideologicalandtacticaldifferences.It is possibleforany person,faction,or even generationof ETA's activists to effect a settlement,change tactics,abandon he struggle,andso forth;however,it is equallytruethatETAis nowa genie liberatedfromits bottle-a force thatis as muchpotentialas actual.

8 Indeed, it is interesting o note the semantic confusionthatpervadesboth the scientific andpopular iteraturen thisregard.Despitethe factthat from anorganizational tandpointherehavebeen severalETAsover theyearsas theresultof internal actionalism,there s ageneraltendencyto refer to "ETA" in monolithic terms. Referenceis clearlymoreto the ETA as conceptratherthan as structure.


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fromwork, one of the youthshad to applyfor a driver'slicense. The kidnap-ping went smoothly, and Berezadi was installed in the attic of an unusedfarmhouseof Itziar owned by the family of one of the kidnappers.The eventdominated the Spanishmedia. InteriorMinisterFragaIribare took the hardline that the authoritieswould not negotiate with terrorists.Berezadi's in-laws, who owned Sigma, equivocatedover the ransomdemands.Meanwhile, in Itziar,Berezadi and his captorsbecameclose, engaging inmany friendly political discussions, card games, and so forth. The victimbecame the group's cook. He was kept under constantsurveillancebut wasnot abused in any fashion. Captiveand captorsalike were confidentthat theaffair would end happily and made plans to meet subsequentlyto have adinnertogether n Franceto celebratehis release. The youthstook turnsgoingto the local bars to enjoy the television coverage thatriveted the attentionofthe Spanishnation.They could scarcelycontain theiramusementat the ironyof hearingtheirfellow villagers speculateover the whereaboutsof Berezadi.However, as the stalematedraggedon, the situationbecamemore desper-ate. Finally, one day the motherof the boy in whose farmBerezadiwas beingheld happenedto enter the groundfloor. She heard noises upstairsand con-fronted her son, who confided in her. While she grappledwith chagrinandindecision, the word was communicated to France that the haven was nolonger safe. ETA quickly convened its rulingcommittee of six memberstodecide whetheror not to kill Berezadi. At first the voting was deadlockedthreeto three, with the respectivefactionsled by the moderate"Pertur"andthe hardliner "Apala." On the third ballot one of "Pertur's" supportersabstainedand the order went out to Itziarto kill thevictim, since failure to doso would damageETA's credibility.Berezadi was executed-ironically at amomentwhen, unbeknownst o the kidnappers,his family was on the way toFrancewith the ransompayment.The death causedgreatconsternationn theBasqueCountryanderodedsome of ETA's popularsupport.It mayalso havebeen the deciding factorin makingthe division irreconcilablebetween "Per-tur" and "Apala," eventually culminatingin the split between ETAm andETApm.The pointof the two examples is to underscore he extent to which ETA iscapableof risingout of its own ashes, so to speak,andthedegreeto whichtheactivitiesof a handfulof inexperienced,immature,dedicatedindividualscaninfluence the political process, resulting in errors as well as successes ofhistoricproportions.We mightfurthernote thatETA as concepthas acquiredits own legends, myths, and martyrsafternearlythree decades of existence.Eachekintzahas thepotentialof becominga kind of morality ale with its ownheroesand villains. The ritualisticdimensionsof the dramaenhanceits sym-bolic impact. The fascinationof the more mundaneprocessof politicalcom-promise pales by comparison.Hence, a single bombing by ETA has muchgreaterpotential of making the pages of the New YorkTimes than do theresultsof municipalelections in the Basque Country.More importantly, t is


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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE 255also much more likely to challenge each Basque citizen with hard choicesregarding he ultimatepoliticaldestinyof his or her homelandand the legiti-mate means of achieving it.CONCLUSIONThe seemingly senseless killing of Berezadiposes the question "as to whywas he slain"; yet this is notproperlya causalquerybut rather he expressionof a conundrum.10Accordingto the literature,a central eatureof terrorism sthat it is "random," "indiscriminate," and "unpredictable"-that is, abehaviorgovernedby the element of chance. At the same time, students ofterrorismareprimarilyconcernedwith the searchforthe functional"causes"that can be understoodas efficient or final ones. If terrorism s characterizedby what Webertermed "chancecausality" (1949:182), thengrantingpriorityto the search for instrumental ausation s logicallyerroneous.We believe thatthe phenomenon s best understood nstead as ritualaction and as such is notgovernedentirely(or even predominantly)by instrumentalmeans-ends con-siderations.ETA's ekintzak,of which Berezadi'skilling is an example, areritualizedactions in thatthey are condensedevents, as well as publicperfor-mances, in which chance plays a key role. Action for action's sake becomesquintessential o small militantgroupsandacquiresa momentousefficacythatfar surpasses its own instrumentality.As if by magic, each action, in itsrenewedchallenge to authority,signals a new beginningwhich promisestotriggera revolutionaryprocess aimed at transforming verything.These ac-tions are thereforenot intendedas partsof sustainedand cumulativeprocessesbut are thoroughlydiscontinuoussacrificial acts governedby the ritualprem-ise of markinga qualitativetransition o a different order."Since Aron defined terrorismas an action whose "psychologicaleffects areout of proportion o its purelyphysical result" (1966:170), it is standard ocharacterize t fundamentallyas a manipulation f the psychologyof violencethroughthe fear arousedin potentialvictims. Terrorismand ritualsacrificeshare the fundamental raitthat the victim (who condenses the purposeandmeaningof the action) is innocent.12The election of Berezadi was random,

10 For furtherdiscussionof ETA violence as a Basqueculturalconundrum, ee Zulaika1988.11 There is a subtle distinction to be made here betweenterroristacts andagendas.Terroristsare also capableof committingthe errorof militarycalculation n assessingthe efficacy of theirstruggle.The successful actionmay begetnew ones in thebelief that t is possibleto "turnuptheheat" on the enemy to force capitulation.The individualactionmay appear o be partof a largeragendain this regard;however, it is the very natureof terrorism hat it is the act rather han theagendawhichinspiresfear. Neither the numberof the terroristsnor theircapacityto influence(letalone control)events outside the contextof the particularerroristact commandrespect. Hence,the modem cliche that "we will nevernegotiatewith terrorists" s simplya wayof stating hatwewill never confer upon them the legitimacythatnegotiation implies.12 This is essential to ritual sacrifice.Some societies resort o the institutionof drawing ots toassure the ritual nnocence of the victim. To kill someoneforanoffense is an actof justice;to killsomeoneto placateanangrygod is a ritualsacrificein which the innocenceof thevictimhas to bemade patentthroughrandomselection.


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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE 257InternationalCommissionon Violence in the Basque Country. Gasteiz/Vitoria:Eusko Jaurlaritza.

Schmid, A. P. 1983. Political Terrorism:A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,Data Bases and Literature.New Brunswick:TransactionBooks.Spencer, H. 1882. The Principles of Sociology. New York:D. Appleton.Tylor, E. B. 1871. Primitive Culture. London:J. Murray.Van Gennep, A. L'etat actuel du probleme totemique.Paris:E. Leroux.Weber, M. 1949. The Methodologyof Social Sciences. New York: The Free Press.Zulaika, J. 1988. Basque Violence, Metaphorand Sacrament. Reno: UniversityofNevada Press.. n.d. "Terror,Totem and Taboo:Reportingon a Report." Ms.

on the interperetation of terrorist violence - eta and the basque political process

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