[A.C. No. 4943. January 26, 2001]DIANA D. DE GUZMAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, respondent.R E SO L U T I O NPARDO, J.:The case before the Court is a complaint[endnoteRef:2][1] for disbarment against Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios on the ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the code of Professional Responsibility, for representing conflicting interests, and of Article 1491 Civil Code, for acquiring property in litigation. [2: ]

In 1995, complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel in order to form a corporation, which would engage in hotel and restaurant business in Olongapo City.On January 10, 1996, with the assistance of Atty. De Dios, complainant registered Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) with the Securities and Exchange Commission.[endnoteRef:3][2] Complainant paid on respondent a monthly retainer fee of P5,000.00. [3: ]

On December 15, 1997, the corporation required complainant to pay her unpaid subscribed shares of stock amounting to two million two hundred and thirty five thousand pesos (P2,235,000.00) or 22,350 shares, on or before December 30, 1997.On January 29, 1998,[endnoteRef:4][3] complainant received notice of the public auction sale of her delinquent shares and a copy of a board resolution dated January 6, 1998 authorizing such sale.[endnoteRef:5][4] Complainant soon learned that her shares had been acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI. The sale ousted complainant from the corporation completely. While respondent rose to be president of the corporation, complainant lost all her lifes savings invested therein. [4: ] [5: ]

Complainant alleged that she relied on the advice of Atty. De Dios and believed that as the majority stockholder, Atty. de Dios would help her with the management of the corporation.Complainant pointed out that respondent appeared as her counsel and signed pleadings in a case where complainant was one of the parties.[endnoteRef:6][5] Respondent, however, explained that she only appeared because the property involved belonged to SBHI. Respondent alleged that complainant misunderstood the role of respondent as legal counsel of Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. Respondent manifested that her appearance as counsel for complainant Diana de Guzman was to protect the rights and interest of SBHI since the latter was real owner of the land in controversy. [6: ]

Respondent further said that the land on which the resort was established belonged to the Japanese incorporators, not to complainant. The relationship of the complainant and the Japanese investors turned sour because complainant misappropriated the funds and property of the corporation. To save the corporation from bankruptcy, respondent advised all concerned stockholders that it was proper to call for the payment of unpaid subscriptions and subsequent sale of the delinquent shares. These lead to the auction of the unpaid shares of complainant and hence, the ouster of complainant from the corporation.Meantime, Mr. Del Rosario transferred one hundred (100) shares to respondent in payment of legal services as evidenced by a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of corporate Shares of Stock.On October 22, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution[endnoteRef:7][6] finding that the acts of respondent were not motivated by ill will as she acts in the best interest of her client, SBHI. The IBP found that complainant failed to present convincing proof of her attorney-client relationship with respondent other than the pleadings respondent filed in the trial court where complainant was one of the parties. [7: ]

We disagree.We find merit in the complaint. There are certain facts presented before us that created doubt on the propriety of the declaration of delinquent shares and subsequent sale of complainants entire subscription. Complainant subscribed to 29,800 shares equivalent to two million nine hundred and eighty thousand pesos (P2,980,000.00). She was the majority stockholder. Out of the subscribed shares, she paid up seven hundred forty-five thousand pesos (P745,000.00) during the stage of incorporation.How complainant got ousted from the corporation considering the amount she had invested in it is beyond us. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, what happened to her original shares? This, at least, should have been explained.Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client relationship between her and complainant. The claim has no merit. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. She appeared as counsel in behalf of complainant.There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. Indeed, the board of directors nowe included respondent as the president, Ramon del Rosario as secretary, Hikoi Suzuki as chairman, Agnes Rodriguez as treasurer and Takayuki Sato as director.[endnoteRef:8][7] The present situation shows a clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent. [8: ]

Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[endnoteRef:9][8] [9: ]

We said:To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.[endnoteRef:10][9] [10: ]

Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests and engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[endnoteRef:11][10] [11: ]

As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment,[endnoteRef:12][11] or other disciplinary action.[endnoteRef:13][12] The acts of respondent Atty. De Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate. [12: ] [13: ]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios remiss in her sworn duty to her client, and to the bar. The Court hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the charges will be dealth with more severely.Let a copy ofthis decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4539. May 14, 1997]ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct unbecoming a lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 1992[endnoteRef:14][1] over a piece of property subject of a pending civil case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-5434.[endnoteRef:15][2] [14: ] [15: ]

On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint. He failed to comply despite service upon him of our Resolution together with copy of the complaint.On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his right to do so and directed the case submitted for decision.On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for making it appear in the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Quitclaim in question that the affiant therein signed the document and acknowledged the contents thereof before him as Notary Public on 5 May 1992 when in truth and in fact the affiant did not and could not have done so.The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was purportedly executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor of Juanito V. Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.[endnoteRef:16][3] The subject document was notarized by respondent on the same date. The document was apparently used as evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order plus damages. [16: ]

The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant Irene Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.[endnoteRef:17][4] Moreover, Irene Maligsa could not have signed the document because she "never knew how to write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered." [endnoteRef:18][5] [17: ] [18: ]

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 [endnoteRef:19][6] provides [19: ]

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned document specifically provides "BEFORE ME personally appeared IRENE MALIGSA x x x x" [endnoteRef:20][7] Clearly, the party acknowledging must personally appear before the Notary Public or any other person authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments or documents. [20: ]

In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity and validity before respondent notary public on the same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to require the personal appearance of the person executing a document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been involved in an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics.In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,[endnoteRef:21][8] the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code and Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional ethics in the practice of law is apropos. [21: ]

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. [endnoteRef:22][9] [22: ]

Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and protection of the interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and the administrative offices generally.[endnoteRef:23][10] Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. [23: ]

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [endnoteRef:24][11] Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for which he was penalized with a six (6) month suspension from the practice of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty. [24: ]

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of his continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95026 October 4, 1991SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO TELAN, and SPOUSES VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN, respondent. Peter Donnely A. Barot for petitioners. Monsanto Law Office for private respondent.SARMIENTO, J.:pThis is a petition for review of the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 of the Court of Appeals 1 which considered the appeal of the herein petitioner, spouses Pedro and Angelina Telan (hereinafter PEDRO and ANGELINA), ABANDONED and DISMISSED, for their failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section I(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of the Court. The only issue involved in this petition for review on certiorari is: Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process.The circumstances under which the case arose are as follows:The petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high school graduate who settled in 1973 on a property abutting the national highway in Guibang, Gamu, Isabela. 2 In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to transfer his residence to the other side of the national highway on a lot owned by Luciano Sia where he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a month. 3Because the lot was en route to the shrine of Our Lady of Guibang which was frequented by pilgrims, PEDRO set up business enterprises such as a vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins, the herein private respondents Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and virginia Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO, VICENTE, and VIRGINIA), followed suit by setting up their own eatery within the same lot. 4On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his spouses ANGELINA received a Notice to Vacate from the Development Bank of the Philippine (DBP). This was followed by a letter from VIRGINIA herself, reiterating the said demand. Apparently VICENTE and VIRGINIA had executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared by PEDRO and ANGELINA. 5Soon, DBP as the mortgagee of Sia's lot, foreclosed the mortgage.On June 7, 1984, the DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a suit at the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela to evict PEDRO TELAN's family from the lot. The case was dismissed.Meanwhile, on September 22, 1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to secure a Certificate of Title in his name over the contested lot. 6With the new Transfer Certificate of Title, ROBERTO and the spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA filed a complaint denominated as Accion Publiciana against the petitioners, Spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA. 7At this point, PEDRO and ANGELINA hired the services of Atty. Antonio Paguiran to defend them in the suit. 8On October 27, 1988, the lower court awarded the possession of the property in question to ROBERTO and Souses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN.PEDRO and ANGELINA informed Atty. Paguiran that they wanted to appeal the case, but since Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA asked another person to sign for them. 9In the course of their eatery business, petitioner ANGELINA TELAN became acquainted with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a "lawyer." Having no counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked "Atty. Palma" to handle their case. he cosented and the petitioners paid his "lawyer's fees." 10In the meantime, on August 5, 1988, PEDRO TELAN broke his hip while he was getting off from a passenger jeepney. On September 5, 1988, unable to withstand the pain, he went to the Philippine General Hospital for treatment where he was diagnosed to have a "fractured, closed, complete, femoral neck garden type IV (R) femur." 11 On the spot, the doctors recommended an operation.Another operation followed on September 22, 1988. All the while, from September 5, 1988 up to October 2, 1988, PEDRO was confined a the PGH. He had to go back to PGH several times for check-up even after was released from the hospital. 12It was only by January 1990 that PEDRO managed to walk again although still with much difficulty.Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which considered the appeal interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for failure ... to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. 13The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came to know about it on May 1990, when somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at Ilagan informed PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no longer be found. PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of Attorneys with the Bar Confidant's Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal Case No. 389-90 for Estafa against "Atty. Palma." 15 By now PEDRO had realized that "Atty. Palma" was a fake.The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 27, 1990 ruled as follows:xxx xxx xxxIt should be recalled that the instant appeal was dismissed only on December 28, 1989 (p. 13 rollo). Prior thereto, appellant's counsel received on July 25, 1989 this Court's letter-notice dated July 14, 1989 requiring him to file the appellants' brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof. Per report dated October 185, 1989 of the brief, non has yet been filed as of said date and hence, this Court issued a Resolution dated October 20, 1989 for appellants to show cause, within ten (10) days, why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the appellants' brief within the reglementary period. Hence from July 25, 1989 when appellants' counsel received this Court's letter-notice to file brief until the JRD's report on December 15, 1989 that no appellant's brief has been filed, a period of about four (4) months and twenty-three (23) days have elapsed, thus giving appellants enough to time to file their brief. Unfortunately, no appellants' brief was ever filed during said period. Let it be stressed that the rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delay and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. (FJR Garment Industries v. CA, 130 SCRA 216, 218). 16On January 24, 1990, the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 became final and was entered on May 24, 1990 in the Book of Entries of Judgment.On September 12, 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ of Demolition for the enforcement of the decision. 17The Petition for Review on certiorari before this Court was filed on October 18, 1990 by the spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN with an Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction. 18On October 24, 1990, after deliberating on the petition for review on certiorari, the Court without giving due course required the respondents to COMMENT within ten (10) days form notice thereof. At the same time, as prayed for, effective "immediately" and "continuing until further orders from this Court", a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER was issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Order dated September 12, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 279.In due time, after the filing of the necessary pleadings, the petition was given due course and the parties were ordered to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. The petitioners filed their memorandum while the private respondents manifested to adopt their Comments dated November 5, 1990. However, after the filing of the petitioners' memorandum, the private respondents filed on June 10, 1991, a pleading they denominated as Addendum. Apparently, changing their minds, on July 23, 1991, the private respondents filed their memorandum.We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of law because they lost their to appeal when deprived of the right to counsel. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitutional provides:xxx xxx xxxNo person shall be deprived of life, or property, without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, 19 specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. 20There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.Even the most experienced lawyers ge tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as much form ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into a intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right.The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart. 21Curiously, the counsel of the private respondents, ROBERTO TELAN and spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA, would still insist that the petitioners, spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, had lost their right to appeal because of the negligence of their counsel, referring to "Atty. Palma."A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation even by the attorney's mistake or negligence in procedural technique. 22 But how can there be negligence by the counsel in the case at bar when the "lawyer", "Atty. Palma," turned out to be fake? The Affidavit of the petitioner PEDRO TELAN, the sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar Confidant's Office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the submitted records of Criminal Case No. 389-90 more than sufficiently establish the existence of an Ernesto Palma who misrepresented himself as a lawyer. 23WHEREFORE, the Petitioner is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R CV No. 20786 are hereby REINSTATED and the respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to give DUE COURSE to the appeal and to decide the same on the merits.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs.CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.MONTEMAYOR, J.:This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case. Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.x x x x x x x x x(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

EN BANCJanuary 9, 1973IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.R E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM:On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.The following are the pertinent issues:(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:(1) Assist in the administration of justice;(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;(6) Encourage and foster legal education;(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position;(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:Constitutionality of Bar IntegrationJudicial Pronouncements.In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court. Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.1. Freedom of Association.To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.2. Regulatory Fee.For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax.A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues.3. Freedom of Speech.A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.4. Fair to All Lawyers.Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[footnoteRef:2][1] [2: ]

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[footnoteRef:3][2] [3: ]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[footnoteRef:4][3] [4: ]

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.[footnoteRef:5][4] [5: ]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.[footnoteRef:6][5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[footnoteRef:7][6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[footnoteRef:8][7] [6: ] [7: ] [8: ]

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[footnoteRef:9][8] which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[footnoteRef:10][9] [9: ] [10: ]

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[footnoteRef:11][10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [footnoteRef:12][11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003. [11: ] [12: ]

We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[footnoteRef:13][12] It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[footnoteRef:14][13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.[footnoteRef:15][14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[footnoteRef:16][15] The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: [13: ] [14: ] [15: ] [16: ]

1.A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;2.A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;3.A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;4.A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.[footnoteRef:17][16] [17: ]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[footnoteRef:18][17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[footnoteRef:19][18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority. [18: ] [19: ]

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,[footnoteRef:20][19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. [20: ]

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[footnoteRef:21][20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.[footnoteRef:22][21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[footnoteRef:23][22] [21: ] [22: ] [23: ]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check.[footnoteRef:24][1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.[footnoteRef:25][2] [24: ] [25: ]

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath.[footnoteRef:26][3] [26: ]

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.[footnoteRef:27][4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation Moved.[footnoteRef:28][5] The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.[footnoteRef:29][6] [27: ] [28: ] [29: ]

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.[footnoteRef:30][7] [30: ]

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.[footnoteRef:31][8] Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit: [31: ]

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.[footnoteRef:32][9] [32: ]

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment,[footnoteRef:33][10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.[footnoteRef:34][11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[footnoteRef:35][12] [33: ] [34: ] [35: ]

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession.[footnoteRef:36][13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession. [36: ]

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:CANON 1.A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[footnoteRef:37][14] We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession. [37: ]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 2797. October 4, 2002]ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant, vs. JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.R E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM:On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for disbarment, docketed as Administrative Case No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus Balicanta. After respondents comment to the complaint and complainants reply thereto, this Court, on March 29, 1995 referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for brevity) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. Commissioner George Briones of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was initially tasked to investigate the case. Commissioner Briones was later on replaced by Commissioner Renato Cunanan. Complainant filed a supplemental complaint which was duly admitted and, as agreed upon, the parties filed their respective position papers.Based on her complaint, supplemental complaint, reply and position paper, the complainant alleged the following facts:When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and her daughter Rosemarie inherited the properties left by the said decedent. All in all, complainant and her daughter inherited 21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The lawyer who helped her settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Jesus Balicanta.Sometime in the early part of 1981, respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a corporation that would develop the said real properties into a high-scale commercial complex with a beautiful penthouse for complainant. Relying on these apparently sincere proposals, complainant and her daughter assigned 19 parcels of land to Rosaura Enterprises, Incorporated, a newly-formed and duly registered corporation in which they assumed majority ownership. The subject parcels of land were then registered in the name of the corporation.Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity as Chairman of the Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer. The respondent also made complainant sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust agreement. Respondent likewise succeeded in making complainant sign a special power of attorney to sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land she inherited from her deceased husband. She later discovered that respondent transferred the titles of the properties to a certain Tion Suy Ong who became the new registered owner thereof. Respondent never accounted for the proceeds of said transfers.In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) using as collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her daughter contributed to the corporation. The respondent ostensibly intended to use the money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for brevity). Complainant later on found out that the structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco lumber and bamboo which could not have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan secured.For four years from the time the debt was contracted, respondent failed to pay even a single installment.