part iv: h5n1 human outbreaks. chotani, gidsas-jhu, 2006 gidsas avian influenza a(h5n1), 1997 avian...
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Part IV: H5N1 Human Part IV: H5N1 Human OutbreaksOutbreaks
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Avian Avian Influenza A(H5N1), 1997 Influenza A(H5N1), 1997
Avian Influenza A(H5N1) caused Avian Influenza A(H5N1) caused 18 cases of influenza with 6 deaths 18 cases of influenza with 6 deaths in the Hong Kong area. Experts are in the Hong Kong area. Experts are concerned that the virus may concerned that the virus may acquire a mutation encouraging acquire a mutation encouraging human-to-human transmission. human-to-human transmission.
3/9/99 46
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS The H5N1 Influenza Pandemic ThreatThe H5N1 Influenza Pandemic Threat
• Avian infection in 9 countries• 34 human cases and 23 deaths (68%)• Culled >100 m chickens
• Avian infection in 4 countries• 7 human cases and 6 deaths (86%)• Person-to-person?
2003 20041997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
• Avian infection in Hong Kong• 18 human cases and 6 deaths (33%)• Culled poultry
• Ongoing avian H5N1 infections
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Affected Countries with Confirmed Human Affected Countries with Confirmed Human Cases of H5N1 Influenza since 2003Cases of H5N1 Influenza since 2003
As of May 24, 2006. Source: WHO/WPRO
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Affected Countries with Confirmed Human Affected Countries with Confirmed Human Cases of H5N1 Influenza since 2006Cases of H5N1 Influenza since 2006
As of May 24, 2006. Source: WHO/WPRO
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Geographic Location of the North Sumatra Cluster Geographic Location of the North Sumatra Cluster and cases Confirmed on May 29, Indonesia, 2006and cases Confirmed on May 29, Indonesia, 2006
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSASCumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) since 26 December of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) since 26 December 2003 to 24 May 20062003 to 24 May 2006
8 618
1
14
42
2
2212
93
5 612
06
33
214
4
42
0
25
50
75
100
Azerb
aija
n
Cambod
ia
China
Djibout
i
Egypt
Indon
esia
Iraq
Thaila
nd
Turke
y
Viet N
am
Countries
No
. o
f R
epo
rted
Cas
es
218 Cases 124 Deaths
Source: WHO
As of May 24, 2006.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) since 26 December of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) since 26 December 2003 to 24 May 20062003 to 24 May 2006
3
46
95
74
3
3241
48
010
2030
405060
7080
90100
2003 2004 2005 2006
Countries
No
. of
Rep
ort
ed C
ases
Cases Deaths Linear (Cases)
Source: WHO
Mortality: 100%
Mortality: 70%
Mortality: 43%
Mortality: 65%
As of May 24, 2006.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSASCumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) since 26 December of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) since 26 December 2003 to 24 May 20062003 to 24 May 2006
Source: WHO
Deaths, 124, 57%
Survived, 95, 43%
As of May 24, 2006.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS
Avian & Human H5N1 Identified in No. of Countries Avian & Human H5N1 Identified in No. of Countries
(Since 26 December 2003 to 24 May 2006)(Since 26 December 2003 to 24 May 2006)
1
11
18
46
1 25
10
05
1015
202530
3540
4550
2003 2004 2005 2006
Countries
No
. o
f R
ep
ort
ed
Cases Cases in Birds Cases in Humans
Source: WHO
As of April 24, 2006.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSASNations With Confirmed Cases Nations With Confirmed Cases H5N1 Avian Influenza (May 19, 2006) H5N1 Avian Influenza (May 19, 2006)
Dept of Health and Human Services: www.pandemicflu.gov
Part V: InterventionsPart V: Interventions
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS WHO Global Influenza WHO Global Influenza Surveillance NetworkSurveillance Network
Antigenic & Genetic AnalysisWHO CC
Diagnostic ReagentsVaccine Strains
Potency Testing Reagents
Serologic StudiesNational
Licensing Agencies
Isolation of Representative Strain from Clinical SampleNational Influenza Centers
Disease & Epidemiology Data
Makes recommendations on influenza vaccine formulation
Source: WHO Global Influenza Program
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Influenza Vaccine DevelopmentInfluenza Vaccine Development
Source: WHO Global Influenza Program
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS
Lag between pandemic strain detection and full scale vaccine production
Clinical batch production & Testing
1-2 months????
Vaccine Prototype Development1-2 months
Influenza Pandemic VaccineInfluenza Pandemic Vaccine
2 4 60Months
TodayOptimistic Projection
Source: WHO Global Influenza Program
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Key “bottlenecks”Key “bottlenecks”
1. “Purity” of strain2. Production requirements
Production system “EGG”Biosecurity
3. Clinical data allowing increase in vaccine availability
……
Source: WHO Global Influenza Program
Reverse genetics
Clinical Trials
Clinical data allowing increase in vaccine availability
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Vaccine Production CapacityVaccine Production Capacity
Source: WHO Global Influenza Program
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Vaccine Consumption - 2000Vaccine Consumption - 2000
Source: WHO Global Influenza Program
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS VaccineVaccine
Challenges:Challenges:H5 HA is poorly immunogenic as compared H5 HA is poorly immunogenic as compared to H3N2 or H1N1 virusesto H3N2 or H1N1 viruses
• To date vaccines against H5 have To date vaccines against H5 have required 2 doses or an adjuvant to induce required 2 doses or an adjuvant to induce necessary level of neutralizing antibodiesnecessary level of neutralizing antibodies
Influenza virus has a high error rate making Influenza virus has a high error rate making it evolve continuouslyit evolve continuously
There are already two clades of HPAI H5N1 There are already two clades of HPAI H5N1 virus circulatingvirus circulating
Manufacturing capacity is limited and Manufacturing capacity is limited and licensing requirements are stringent licensing requirements are stringent
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS VaccineVaccine
September 16, 2005 – HHS September 16, 2005 – HHS
News HeadlinesNews HeadlinesUS DHHS buying $100 million of US DHHS buying $100 million of avian vaccineavian vaccine
Vaccine has not been approved Vaccine has not been approved by FDAby FDA
Proper dosage being determinedProper dosage being determined• Protection for 2 to 20 million Protection for 2 to 20 million
AmericansAmericans
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS VaccineVaccine
Inactivated vaccine candidate:Sanofi Pasture has developed an unadjuvanted, inactivated H5N1 vaccine candidateProspective, randomized, double-blind trials (~450 adults, 18-64 years) established the need for two doses (neutralizing titer 1:40)Now being tested in children and elderly
Live, attenuated vaccine candidate:MedImmune will develop (under US contract) will develop at least one vaccine for each of the 16 HACandidate vaccine has been developed for H5 & H9 (phase 1 clinical trials)
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS VaccineVaccine
Sanofi Pasture has developed an unadjuvanted, inactivated H5N1 (virus isolated in Southeast Asia in 2004) vaccine candidate. Reported in NEJM
The higher the dosage of vaccine, the greater the antibody response produced. Of the 99 people evaluated in the 90-mcg, high-dose group, 54 percent achieved a neutralizing antibody response to the vaccine at serum dilutions of 1:40 or greaterOnly 22 percent of the 100 people evaluated who received the 15-mcg dose developed a similar response to the vaccine.Generally, all dosages of the vaccine appeared to be well tolerated: Almost all reported side effects were mild The second dose of vaccine did not cause more local or systemic symptoms than the first Systemic complaints of fever, malaise, muscle aches, headaches and nausea occurred with the same frequency in all dosage groups as in the placebo group Lab tests did not reveal any clinically significant abnormalities
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS VaccineVaccine
A new genetically engineered vaccine created by scientists at the CDC, is egg-independent and adjuvant-independent.
Hoelscher MA at al. Lancet. 2006 Feb 11;367(9509):475-81.
A similar vaccine, adenovirus-based influenza A virus vaccine directed against the hemagglutinin (HA) protein of the A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1) (VN/1203/04) strain isolated during the lethal human outbreak in Vietnam from 2003 to 2005.
Gao W et al. Protection of mice and poultry from lethal H5N1 avian influenza virus through adenovirus-based immunization. J Virol. 2006 Feb;80(4):1959-64.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS ChemotherapyChemotherapy
Prevent membrane fusion (M2 Inhibitors)
Amantidine (Symmetrel)Remantidine (Flumadine)
Neuraminidase inhibitorsZanamivir (Relenza)
• US buying $2.8 million (could treat 84,300 people)
Oseltamivir (Tamiflu)Peramivir (more potent in vitro)???
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS ChemotherapyChemotherapy
Relenza:Reduced the incidence of the disease in both young and older populationsFirst Study: In participants 18 years of age or older, the proportion of people who developed symptoms confirmed to be flu was 6.1% for the placebo group and 2.0% for the Relenza group. The second community study: enrolled people 12 to 94 years of age (56% of whom were older than 65 years).
• In this trial, the percent of people who developed symptoms confirmed to be flu were reduced from 1.4% of the participants on placebo to 0.2% for those who used Relenza.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Types of protective masksTypes of protective masks
Surgical masks Easily available and commonly used for routine surgical and examination procedures
High-filtration respiratory mask Special microstructure filter disc to flush out particles bigger than 0.3 micron. These masks are further classified:• oil proof• oil resistant• not resistant to oilThe more a mask is resistant to oil, the better it isThe masks have numbers beside them that indicate their filtration efficiency. For example, a N95 mask has 95% efficiency in filtering out particles greater than 0.3 micron under normal rate of respiration.
The next generation of masks are called Nanomasks. These boast of latest technologies like 2H filtration and nanotechnology, which are capable of blocking particles as small as 0.027 micron.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Food SafetyFood SafetyConventional cooking (temperatures at or above 70°C in all parts of a food item) will inactivate the H5N1 virus. Properly cooked poultry meat is therefore safe to consume.The H5N1 virus, if present in poultry meat, is not killed by refrigeration or freezing.Home slaughtering and preparation of sick or dead poultry for food is hazardous: this practice must be stopped.Eggs can contain H5N1 virus both on the outside (shell) and the inside (whites and yolk). Eggs from areas with H5N1 outbreaks in poultry should not be consumed raw or partially cooked (runny yolk); uncooked eggs should not be used in foods that will not be cooked, baked or heat-treated in other ways.There is no epidemiological evidence to indicate that people have been infected with the H5N1 virus following consumption of properly cooked poultry or eggs.The greatest risk of exposure to the virus is through the handling and slaughter of live infected poultry. Good hygiene practices are essential during slaughter and post- slaughter handling to prevent exposure via raw poultry meat or cross contamination from poultry to other foods, food preparation surfaces or equipment
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS
Source: World Health Organization. Highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) Interim infection control guidelines for health care facilities.
Survival of Influenza Virus on Surfaces*Survival of Influenza Virus on Surfaces*
(WHO) recommends that environmental surfaces be cleaned by :
disinfectants such as Sodium hypochloride 1% in-use dilution, 5% solution to be diluted 1:5 in clean water for materials contaminated with blood and body fluids; bleaching powder 7 gram/liter with 70% available chlorine for toilets and bathrooms; and 70% alcohol for smooth surfaces, tabletops and other surfaces where bleach cannot be used. Environmental cleaning must be done on a daily basis.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS New laboratory test New laboratory test
The FDA has approved a new laboratory test developed by the CDC The FDA has approved a new laboratory test developed by the CDC to diagnose H5 strains of influenza in patients suspected to be to diagnose H5 strains of influenza in patients suspected to be infected with the virus. infected with the virus. The product – the Influenza A/H5 (Asian lineage) Virus Real-time RT-The product – the Influenza A/H5 (Asian lineage) Virus Real-time RT-PCR Primer and Probe Set – provides preliminary results on PCR Primer and Probe Set – provides preliminary results on suspected H5 influenza samples within four hours once a sample is suspected H5 influenza samples within four hours once a sample is tested. tested. If the presence of the H5 strain is identified, then further testing is If the presence of the H5 strain is identified, then further testing is conducted to identify the subtype. conducted to identify the subtype. If clinicians suspect a patient may be infected with an avian influenza If clinicians suspect a patient may be infected with an avian influenza virus, they should contact their state or local health department. virus, they should contact their state or local health department. For more information: For more information:
CDC. New laboratory assay for diagnostic testing of avian CDC. New laboratory assay for diagnostic testing of avian influenza A/H5 (Asian lineage). influenza A/H5 (Asian lineage). MMWRMMWR. 2006;55(RR5):127.. 2006;55(RR5):127.
GIDSAS
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
Part VI: Where are we …..Part VI: Where are we …..
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS CURRENT WHO PHASE of PANDEMIC ALERTCURRENT WHO PHASE of PANDEMIC ALERT
Inter-Pandemic Phase
New Virus in Animals, NO Human Cases
Low Risk of Human Cases 1
High Risk of Human Cases 2
Pandemic ALERT
New Virus Causes Human Cases
No or Very Limited Human-to-Human Transmission
3
Evidence of Increased Human-to-Human Transmission
4
Evidence of Significant Human-to-Human Transmission
5
PANDEMIC Efficient & Sustained Human-to-Human Transmission
6
Source: WHO Global Influenza Program
WHO: May 23 reported a cluster of 8 individuals (Sumatra is ) of one extended family – raising questions of potential Human-to-Human transmission
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS THE NEXT PANDEMIC?THE NEXT PANDEMIC?
Potential impact of next pandemic (CDC)
2-7.4 million deaths globally
In high income countries:
• 134-233 million outpatient visits
• 1.5-5.2 million hospitalizations
• ~25% increase demand for ICU beds, ventilators, etc.
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Planning Assumptions: Planning Assumptions: US HealthcareUS Healthcare
50% or more of those who become sick will 50% or more of those who become sick will seek medical careseek medical careNumber of hospitalization and deaths will Number of hospitalization and deaths will depend upon the virulence of the pandemic depend upon the virulence of the pandemic virusvirus
Moderate (1957-like) Severe (1918-like)
Illness 90 million (30%) 90 million (30%)
Outpatient medical care 45 million (50%) 45 million (50%)
Hospitalization 865,000 9,900,000
ICU care 128,750 1,485,000
Mechanical ventilation 64,875 745,500
Deaths 209,000 1,903,000
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS What Needs to be Done?What Needs to be Done?SurveillanceSurveillanceCullingCulling
Domestic poultry vaccine issuesDomestic poultry vaccine issuesQuarantineQuarantine
Ring??Ring??Vaccination against circulating fluVaccination against circulating fluH5N1 vaccine developmentH5N1 vaccine developmentStockpiling of antiviralsStockpiling of antiviralsQuicker laboratory testingQuicker laboratory testingStringent infection control practicesStringent infection control practices
Handwashing Disinfection, Masks etcHandwashing Disinfection, Masks etcMasksMasksEducationEducation
Vaccination, antivirals, masks, food safety, Vaccination, antivirals, masks, food safety, handwashing, disinfection, etchandwashing, disinfection, etc
CoordinationCoordinationThrough planning & preparednessThrough planning & preparedness
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSASUS Pandemic Influenza Plan Funding 2006 US Pandemic Influenza Plan Funding 2006 Appropriations: HHS Allocations ($3.3B) Appropriations: HHS Allocations ($3.3B)
Dollars in Millions
Dept of Health and Human Services: www.pandemicflu.gov
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS Take-home messagesTake-home messages
The threat to public health will remain so The threat to public health will remain so long as the virus continues to cause disease long as the virus continues to cause disease in domestic poultryin domestic poultryThe outbreaks in poultry are likely to take a The outbreaks in poultry are likely to take a very long time to control very long time to control Should the final prerequisite for a pandemic Should the final prerequisite for a pandemic be met, the consequences for human health be met, the consequences for human health around the world could be devastatingaround the world could be devastatingRegardless of how the present situation Regardless of how the present situation evolves, the world needs to be better evolves, the world needs to be better prepared to respond to the next influenza prepared to respond to the next influenza pandemicpandemic
Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006Chotani, GIDSAS-JHU, 2006
GIDSAS
“The only thing more difficult than planning for an emergency is having to explain why you didn’t.”
We have to preparefor the next pandemic!!!
Be Proactive NOT Reactive!!!!Be Proactive NOT Reactive!!!!
Timing has a lot to do with Timing has a lot to do with the outcome of a rain dancethe outcome of a rain dance