rudolf dinu - romanian foreign policy 1878-1914 draft

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ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM BERLIN TO SARAJEVO, 1878-1914. SOME CARACTERISTICS* Rudolf Dinu

The diplomacy1 of the Old Kingdom as an historical era corresponds to the period between the War of Independence (1877-1878) and the disappearance of King Carol I, in October 1914. Somehow bizarre, its history has never been written without bias, despite its indisputable performance, the constancy and the credibility it has enjoyed, or the prudence it has characterized it. What apparently predominates in the Romanian historiography is a way of seeing and analysing the pre-war diplomacy not based on its substance and logic, but rather as a simple premise of what happened afterwards, overlapping successive realities of a Romania which was in the post-Berlin period significantly different from the one after the First World War. Its defining elements, in particular the ones regarding the security strategy built around the collaboration with the Central Powers, have been constantly viewed negatively and described with a post-war view of things. However, it is often forgotten that the objectives of this policy centred on the idea of security for the Romania territory were significantly others than the ones promoted by the decision-makers who succeeded the first King of Modern Romania.

The present study sums up a number of observations which try to distance themselves from the above mentioned vision, in which the foreign policy of the Old Kingdom, by comparison with the post 1914 directions, appeared rather as an abnormal intermezzo.

*

One of the aspects that individualize the pre-World War period refers to the decision making groups and mechanisms characteristic for

* An early version of this paper (Diplomaia Vechiului Regat, 1878-1914:

management, obiective, evoluie) was published in Gh. Cliveti, Bogdan Ceobanu, Ionu Nistor (eds.), Cultur, politic i societate n timpul domniei lui Carol I. 130 de ani de la proclamarea Regatului Romniei, Iai, 2011, p. 121-146.

1 I use the term diplomacy to describe Romanian foreign policy and security strategy, along with the traditional meaning which refers to the process of negotiation and deliberation through which the epistemic community of diplomats and decision makers promotes peace and cooperation among states.

ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM BERLIN TO SARAJEVO, 1878-1914 207

foreign policy. It particularizes the epoch not just the Romania space, as the secret and dynastic diplomacy still represented at the end of the 19th century the general emblem of the governmental landscape in Europe: If with regard to domestic policy issues wrote an Italian journalist in 1906 referring to international politics the Parliament, the universal suffrage, the public opinion, and the politicians matter for a long time now, when it comes to foreign affairs, the policy remains in a necessary way narrow, dark, jealous, esoteric, as was during the time of Richelieu. Honestly speaking, it does not reach, simultaneously, the number of 25 personas contributing to the regulation of international affairs2.

The first observation therefore refers to the decision making groups and mechanisms typical for the Romanian foreign policy. In pre-war Romania, diplomacy was a domain reserved to King Carol I, the sovereign being seen, in the context of the parliamentary life and as in many other European countries, as the only guarantor of the foreign policys continuity. The way the Romanian sovereign and his ministers, similar otherwise to the majority of the crowned heads of that era, managed the foreign affairs, was, at least until the First World War, an absolutist one, rational, still based on the idea of arcana imperii and outside of Parliaments control. King Carol I was during his entire reign a constant presence in the field of foreign affairs, all directions being defined and set according to his own will. His associates were in general the president of the Council of Ministers and/or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The layout of the Romanian decision-making group put forward a high degree of mobility, especially from the perspective of its structure, extremely fluctuant in time. The bipolar unit, mostly in the formula of King/president of the Council, or even King/Minister of Foreign Affairs, substituted itself often to a tripolar unit in the formula of King/president of the Council/Minister of Foreign Affairs. Its permanently reduced dimensions and, indirectly, its mobility were first of all due to the express desire of the sovereign, a desire directly connected to the idea of arcana imperii. The collective nature of decision unquestionably marked the local decision-making mechanism during the entire period delimited by the great liberal government (1881-1888) until Ion C. Brtianus retirement in 1888. Subsequently, until 1914, the Kings role within the decision-making group became predominant, rapidly subordinating the other decision-making actors. Such a reality is broadly attested in the sources of that period, either diplomatic or of another nature. King Carols tendency after this zero moment point, somehow unrealistic, was to freeze the composition of the decision-making group. Certainly, not just the members of the Parliament were

2 Quoted in E. Decleva, Fra raccoglimento e politica attiva. La politica

estera nella stampa liberale italiana, 1870-1914, in Idem, Lincerto alleato. Ricerche sugli orientamenti internazionali dellItalia unita, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1987, p. 16.

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excluded from the process of managing foreign affairs, but also the majority of the Governments members3.

Due to its elasticity, or rather the confusion of the constitutional provisions in this area, the Parliaments role of co-partner in elaborating the countrys foreign policy had atrophied considerably, especially after 1880. The National Representative obviously continued to exert a certain right to information and control in this area by voting certain laws, among others the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by examining the Green Books, by inquiring and hearing the Minister of Foreign Affairs etc. However, the development of guidelines for the external strategy, recruitment and organization of the diplomatic corps, and even the final decision at times of crisis, remained outside of the Parliaments knowledge. An exception was the time of the Balkan Wars, when, due to objective reasons, the Parliament was called to give its endorsement to the Governments foreign policy4.

The daily management of Romanian foreign policy was in general the task of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the specialized personnel below him. In the period between the Berlin Congress and the crisis of July 1914, the Foreign Affairs portfolio was monopolized by the experts in foreign policy of the two ruling parties, liberal and conservative. The longest of them was, by far, the liberal leader Dimitrie A. Sturdza, responsible for the fate of the Romanian diplomacy for more than 11 years, between 1882-1885, 1895-1896, 1897-1899, 1901-1902, 1904 and 1907-1908. Although trained since the beginning in a variety of fields and apparently improvised in their appointment as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, most holders of this position Vasile Boerescu, D. A. Sturdza, Mihail Pherekyde, Ion Cmpineanu, Petre P. Carp, Ion Blceanu, Constantin Esarcu, Titu Maiorescu had prior experience in the field of international relations, being the outcome of a diplomatic career rather than of the political environment in which they activated5.

Within the decision-making group, starting with the crisis of 1882-1883 and until the Great War, there was almost always present a predominantly pro-German structure, and to some extent anti-Russian. Aside from the sovereign a Hohenzollern, for whom a certain sentimental connection towards Germany was natural there were other politicians and diplomats involved in the decision making process, almost all obviously attracted by this Great Power, whom they admired its military force and economic dynamics, some of them having a German educational background (D. A. Sturdza, Petre P. Carp, Titu Maiorescu) or being even disciples of the German development model

3 Rudolf Dinu, King Charles I and Decision Making Process in the Romanian

Foreign Policy before the First World War, in Idem, Studi italo-romeni. Diplomazia e societ, 1879-1914, second edition, Bucureti, 2009, p. 185 sqq.

4 Ibidem, p. 189. 5 Idem, Diplomacy in the Old Kingdom (1878-1914), in Dinu C. Giurescu,

Rudolf Dinu, Laureniu Constantiniu, Romanian Diplomacy. An Illustrated History, 1862-1947, Bucureti, 2010, p. 96-97.


(P. P. Carp). Besides the structure of the international system at that time, the above remarks explain why this limited decision group, with the King permanently at the top, had an original way of gathering information about the evolutions in Europe. In other words, its mental map was drown based on direct, almost exclusive contacts with officials from Berlin and Vienna, established and conducted by the group members, the King, the president of the Council, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs6.

Due to the monopole claimed by the sovereign and his ministers in the field of foreign affairs, the diplomatic elite of the Old Kingdom retained in general a relatively volatile role in the decision making process. The technological progress in the fields of communications (the appearance and generalization of telegraph), gathering and transmitting information, induced, beginning with the second half of the 20th century, a significant development in the European sphere, drastically limiting the diplomats room for manoeuvre (temporal and real) and pushing him away from the deliberative to the consultative sphere. In the case of the Romanian diplomatic corps, its almost exclusively implementing and executive function was increased by the absolutist vision of some of the Kings intimate advisors on the daily management of foreign policy, adepts of Bismarcks model of administration, defined by a precise and rigid hierarchy, an absolute obedience of an official unable to state his opinion, and whose only duty was to carry into effect as soon as possible and without any interfering the instructions received7.

Therefore in Romania and not only the decision was a political one, in all key moments, in October 1883, in July 1913, in August 1914, and again in August 1916, and was influenced by a small group of actors. It did not belong to the Parliament, called indeed to sanction the governments decisions, as well as the ones of the Crown Council (in August 1914/1916). Just as it did not belong to the street, the public opinion. The street certainly shaped the Romanian pre-war policy, but the street was to a great extend the creation of the political sphere, fed with the ideas and the ambitions of the metropolitan political and intellectual world.

*

The second observation focuses on the substance of the Romanian foreign policy during the Old Kingdom. The objectives pursued by the Romanian authorities after 1878 were: maintaining state independence, creating the necessary conditions for its development in a stable and secure international environment, and providing security to its citizens. These objectives were permanently in the centre of the Romanian

6 Ibidem, p. 97. 7 Ibidem, p. 98-99. For the characteristics of the Romanian diplomatic corps see

Ibidem, p. 71 sqq.

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foreign strategy and all the other directions of foreign policy evolved in direct connection with them.

After independence and with the cancellation of the protective umbrella created by the Peace Congress in Paris the collective guarantee of the seven Great Powers Romania had to define its own external strategy. An easy explanation was and still is, that the possibility itself to opt for an alliance was present in the analysis of the Romanian government immediately after obtaining the independence and that the foreseen options, various in theory, were restrained given the geopolitical and geostrategic conditions of the country, as well as the balance of power at that moment at the two neighbouring Empires, Austria-Hungary and Russia. In the end, the balance tipped in favour of the dualist Monarchy. In reality, Romanias road to an alliance with the Central Powers was more than a simple choice, and must be seen from a more nuanced point of view rather than based on the rudimentary dichotomy of sympathies and aversions towards the Central Empires or the Western Powers.

Perceiving the threat as coming from Russia explains, for example, why the Central Powers were the chosen ones. The antagonist attitude of Russia said Ion I. C. Brtianu in 1919, in a speech in from of the Parliament has separated the waters! Then we found ourselves [in 1878 n. R.D.] without possible support in the West. Set between two powers: a pan-Slavic Russia which did not give up to reach Constantinople through the Balkan Peninsula, and a Germany, which, together with Austria-Hungary, formed the core of the Central Powers, to which Italy associated. [] Do not forget that, actually, Bulgaria at that time was a Russian province, that its prince was rather a governor, a nephew of the Emperor, surrounded by three Russian generals: the Minister of War, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that, therefore, Russias expansion towards us and over us was the most considerable threat that modern Romania had faced even since the time of Nicolae [I] Pavlovici, before the Crimean War8.

However, the fear of Russia, manifested in 1878 and the following years, does not explain, especially if its interpreted dissociated from the mind map of the Romanian decision makers, why the alliance politics became an option only five years later. In my opinion, the option for an alliance was imposed with enough difficulty in a political climate still dominated by ideas and principles which had been the corner stone in the building of the modern state. The Romanian political elite found itself in the situation of elaborating its foreign policy strategies in a moment when it was still influenced by the experiences of circa 25 years of guaranteed neutrality. Therefore, after the Berlin

8 Speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on December 16, 1919, published

in Romnia n timpul Primului Rzboi Mondial. Mrturii documentare, vol. I, 1914-1916, Bucureti, 1996, p. 26-27.

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Congress the guiding line of the Romanian officials continued to be, for a while, neutrality, the independent policy, while the almost unanimous consensus existing within the political sphere with regard to this option prevented any attempt of the decision making group towards a formal political-military commitment.

The option for an alliance policy as a solution to the security problems and support for the external strategy of the Romanian state took shape after more than three years of continued deterioration of its international position, in the turbulent context created by the direct and fierce confrontations with the Great Powers on the issue of navigation on the Lower Danube. The Danube question9 (1880-1883) favoured the first major diplomatic action of Romania at the conti-nental level, meant to safeguard its interests which seamed to be just according to the international law. The policy of the Romanian Government was rather visceral, dominated by feelings, bereft of the diplomatic flexibility given by tradition and experience, but vigorous, sustained, in accordance with what the entire domestic political spectrum and public opinion resonated at that time. The Danube question proved to be an important formative experience for the diplomacy of the Old Kingdom, hastening its maturation and the recovery of the conceptual backwardness in relation to the general European trend. And this because the Danube dispute, initially considered a regional litigation without much chance to escalate, had evolved relatively quickly, due to the direct influence on the expansionist policies of some powers interested in the Lower Danube. The dispute turned into an issue with broad political and security connotations for Romania, and upon its resolution may have depended, to a large extent, the countrys future as an independent state within the international system.

For the Romanian decision making, the Danube question functioned on the long term, just like the Tunisian crisis of 1881 worked for Italy. It was the supreme evidence that highlighted Romanias international isolation and the impossibility of practicing a policy of neutrality, while acting as a catalyst in the process of articulating the external strategy, and choosing a policy of alliance.

*

The security strategy envisioned in this context was translated into Romanias connection to the Triple Alliance by signing on October 30,

9 erban Rdulescu-Zoner, La souverainet de la Roumanie et le problme du

Danube aprs le Congrs du Berlin, in Revue des tudes sud-est europennes, IX, no. 1, 1971, p. 152 sqq; Gh. N. Czan, La question du Danube et les relations roumano-austro-hongroises dans les annes 1878-1883, in Revue roumaine dhistoire, XVIII, no. 1, 1979, p. 43-61; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, DDR, Rudolf Dinu, Alin Ciupal, Antal Lukcs (eds.), seria I, vol. 11, 1883, Bucureti, 2006, passim.

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1883, a treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, to which Germany unconditionally subscribed the same day. Romanian decision makers wanted, in fact, a direct alliance with Berlin and, just as a last resort given the policy of sparing Russia promoted by Chancellor von Bismarck were they forced to settle for an alliance by ricochet10. The alliance was defensive and secret (Art. 6), valid for five years and automatically extended for another three years if either party did not give notice one year before the expiring date, or did not require its revision (Art. 5). Military matters were to be regulated by a special agreement (Art. 3). Article 4 provided that the parties had the obligation, in the case of a joint war, not to negotiate and not to conclude a separate peace. Casus foederis was defined in article 2 and required the two parties to offer mutual assistance in case of an unprovoked attack11.

In the autumn of 1883 the Romanian Kingdom became therefore associated party to the Triple Alliance, due to direct and indirect treaties which put it nevertheless in a satellite position in relation to the three Great Powers. For many political, military, moral, and even legal reasons, Romania was never accepted as pari passu in this alliance, despite the fact, that at one point, she formally requested to become a partner with equal status.

For Austria-Hungary, signing the treaty with the Romanian Kingdom meant the completion of the alliance system protecting the southern border, as well as a real win for the Monarchys defence system as a whole12. In the light of the agreement, even though the text had no express provision in this matter, the government from Vienna had reasons to hope that the Romanian government will pay the political cost of the alliance, and will not support or become part to the irredentist movements in Transylvania. The alliance offered Romania a way out from the international isolation, brought solid security guarantees and along with them the opportunity to focus on internal development. As in the case of Italy, the alliance was also an additional guarantee to the efforts of preserving the monarchic regime. Finally, for Germany and for Bismarck, concluding an alliance with Romania was beyond anything else (e.g. strategic reasons like strengthening the southern flank of Austria-Hungary, but also pragmatic ones, like the possibility to offer Austria-Hungary additional security with minimum political and military costs) in the logic of a comprehensive post-unification effort to prevent and avoid any changes to the European

10 DDR, I, vol. 11, no. 421, note 350 (Sturdza to Liteanu, Bucureti, October 5,

1883). 11 Ibidem, no. 412; the treaties were ratified by Carol I on November 6, 1883, by

Wilhelm I on November 11 and by Franz Joseph on November 12, see Alfred F. Pribram, Les traits politiques secrets de lAutriche-Hongrie, 1879-1914, vol. I, Paris, 1923, p. 40-47.

12 Francis Roy Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo. The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914, London and Boston, 1972, p. 144.


status quo, especially in regions with a high revolutionary risk, like France, the Polish areas, Italy, the Balkan states13.

*

The system of alliances to which Romania became part in 1883 was not negotiated in preparation for a war, but as a security arrangement designed to ensure long-term peace and security. Established 30 years before the outbreak of the First World War, the Dreibund covers the era of an entire generation, either actors or decision makers. In all the relevant critical situations which took place in Europe between 1885 and 1914, the Triple Alliance played a fundamental role, from the Bulgarian crisis, 1885-1887, till the Moroccan crisis, the Libyan war and the Balkan wars14. The Triple Alliance was, however paradoxical it may seem at first glance, a reliable and serious tool against war15. The Dreibund, similar to the Franco-Russian alliance or the later Entente, was defined primarily by security guarantees and not by provisions related to territorial acquisitions. Certainly the latter were not absent from the text, but they referred to well defined matters, which did not require a European war. The availability of the states to follow their allied in actions meant to enhance ones power or to conquer new territories was almost zero. The alliance with the Central Powers tempered therefore the Romanian foreign policy, implicitly increasing the degree of stability and security in the area. In almost all regional crises after 1883, from the Rumelian question to the Balkan wars, the

13 Rudolf Dinu, Introducere, in DDR, I, vol. 11, p. XXXII; Idem, Diplomacy in

the Old Kingdom (1878-1914), loc. cit., p. 63-188, 120-125. 14 Holger Afflerbach, La Triplice Alleanza tra politica di Grande Potenza e

politica di alleanza, in Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, anno LXXXVIII, suplemento al fasc. IV, 2001, p. 161-175, 163.

15 Both power alignments established in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century had, as Paul Schroeder argued, such a dual function in international relations. The alliances from the end of the nineteenth century had a managerial potential in international relations, being, at least in part, the key to a lasting peace. The alliances of the Bismarck era and the Weltpolitik period have to be seen suggested the same Paul Schroeder rather as blocking coalitions which did not necessarily divided the continent into two antagonistic blocs. The Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian alliance stood side by side and not face to face, thus decisively contributing to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Cf. Paul Schroeder, The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure, in World Politics, 39, no. 1, October 1986, p. 1-26, 10; Idem, Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management, in Klaus Knorr (ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, Lawrence, Kansas, University of Kansas Press, 1976, p. 227-262, 242-249. With a permanent structure (provided by the foreign diplomatic network), alliances such as the Dreibund and later the Entente, increased the level of cooperation and consultation between partners and carried forward, albeit in a different formulation, the consensual mechanism of the European Concert.

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Triple Alliance shaped, constrained and moderated Romanian foreign policy, transforming the small kingdom based north of the Danube into a factor of stability in South-Eastern Europe. The obligation to consult its alliance partners (for whatever related to international action and security policy), together with an excessive carefulness of King Carol I, were the key elements of a foreign policy that made Romania a guarantor of peace in the Balkans. The Alliance placed Romania on a peaceful path, offered her security, safety, prestige, and thanks to a protective shield, the possibility to prosper. Under the leadership of the Prince of Hohenzollern could be read in a memo from 1898, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs , two decades ago Romanian emerged victorious and full of glory from the dangerous Eastern crisis. It was the first time in the long history of Russian eastern wars when the country was not occupied. In an extremely critical time, the Prince mobilized his young army as an independent and decisive factor in the Balkan war, and won through struggle the independence of the country and his crown. During the peaceful period that followed, due to the steady leadership of its King, Romanias foreign policy operated successfully in connection with the Triple Alliance, and made significant contributions to peace in the East, in opposition to the tumult present in the Balkan states. Hand in hand with this, the economic and technical development of the country took a significant momentum, and the Kingdom reached the position and the importance of today, unexpected 30 years ago16.

*

The alliance with the Central Powers, joined by Italy on May 9, 188817, was the underlying element of Romanias foreign and security policy until the outbreak of the First World War. The initial treaty was renewed in November 1887. The first Austrian-Hungarian-Romanian treaty and with it the accession of Germany and Italy expired on November 1, 1891, the renewal being hindered by the conservative government, whose leaders ignored the existence of the agreements with the Central Powers (the Lascr Catargiu government). A second Austrian-Hungarian-Romanian alliance treaty was signed on July 25, 1892, together with Germanys agreement of unconditional accession. Italy re-joined as well on November 28, 1892, complying ad literam with the terms set in 1888. The second treaty, as well as the related accessions, remained in force until the outbreak of the First World War, due to the subsequent renewals on September 18/30, 1896 (April

16 BAR, fund D. A. Sturdza, S 19(42)/DCCCLIX (Memoriu secret asupra promovrii

mai ample i a importanei relaiilor germano-romne, handed to the Secretary of State of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. von Blow, by the undersigned [Alexandru Beldiman] at May 4, 1898).

17 Rudolf Dinu, Italian-Romanian Relationship Inside of the Triple Alliance. The 1888 Agreement, in Idem, Studi italo-romeni, p. 65-148.


25/May 7, 1899, Germany; June 9, 1899 Italy), April 4/17, 1902 (July 12/25, Germany; December 13, Italy), and January 23/February 5, 1913. The text underwent only minor changes during this period: in 1902, at the request of Austria-Hungary, was introduced a clause for automatic renewal every three years, as long as no party to the treaty would ask for its termination; in 1913, at the suggestion of Austria-Hungary and Germany, there were made provisions so that the validity of the Austrian-Romanian basic treaty and the German and Italian accession agreements to coincide with the treaty of the Triple Alliance.

The political agreement was never completed with a formal military convention. In 1883 this had not been a subject of negotiations, as Austria-Hungary was primarily interested in Romanias neutrality and not to involve the five Romanian infantry divisions in a war with Russia. The question of a possible military cooperation with the Romanian army became of an immediate interest in the winter of 1887-1888, as relations between the Central Powers and Russia reached a critical point18.

On this occasion, the Romanian government showed its willingness to support Austria-Hungary and Germany in a possible war against Russia19. In early 1888, Romanian officials expressed their desire to reach with the allies a clearly defined agreement regarding the alignment of troops (organized in four army corps, the equivalent of eight divisions, or 17 brigades, whereby 32 infantry regiments and 12 horsemen regiments20). Former Minister of Foreign Affairs D. A. Sturdza was sent to Vienna and Berlin to discuss the matter with the chiefs of general staff of the two great powers. At the same time, Sturdza had to negotiate with Berlin banks for a loan necessary to build the fortified line in southern Moldova, which was to defend Romania from a Russian invasion21. Issues related to a possible cooperation of the Romanian army in the event of a war with Russia were discussed by Sturdza with General Baron von Beck, in Vienna on January 9, 1888, and subsequently with Field Marshal von Moltke, in Berlin on January 26, 188822. Similar talks were also held by King Carol I in March the same

18 W. Medlicott, Austria-Hungary and the war danger of 1887, in The Slavonic

Review, year VI, no. 17, December 1927, p. 437-441. 19 On December 21, 1887, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucharest, Goluchowski,

informed the government in Vienna that Romania was discretely preparing for war (a reference to the USD 30 million loan voted by the Chamber on February 7, 1887, to complete the armament and to defense the countrys neutrality) as Carol I and Prime Minister Ion C. Brtianu were convinced that Russia was planning to invade the Romanian territory without a declaration of war.

20 ABNR, fund Koglniceanu, file 759 (Reprezentaiune grafic a Comandamentelor Armatei 1888).

21 Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 119 (De Launay to Crispi, Berlin, January 27, 1888).

22 BAR, fund D. A. Sturdza, S 31(2)/DCCCLXXXVI (Klnoky to Sturdza, Vienna, January 8, 1888); Alfred Graf von Waldersee, Denkwrdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, vol. I, auf

Rudolf DinuEvidenziatoRomanian Lei

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year, during a visit to Berlin. The Chief of the Austrian-Hungarian General Staff, General von Beck, was sceptical of the combat capacity of the Romanian army, and did not hesitate to point the fact that Romanias neutrality would be preferable, rather than dangerously extending a front that Romanians would not be able to defend themselves. In his operational plans, von Beck was counting on the Austrian-Hungarian troops from Transylvania to take part in the offensive in Galicia, and therefore he was not agreeable to the prospect of dispensing with these troops in order to aid the Romanian army23. In the talks had with the German decision makers, King Carol I clearly indicated that the Romanian army was not capable to independently lead offensive campaigns and that it needed the Austrian-Hungarian cooperation to make a real contribution to the joint effort of war. This opinion was shared by German officials, but as von Beck refused to change the operational plans, the discussions opened in January 1888 remained without any practical result24. About a possible Romanian military offensive in the Crimea, backed up by an Italian expeditionary corps of at least 100,000 soldiers, was discussed purely theoretical in the winter of 1887-1888 without involving the Romanian side when Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi proposed to Austrian-Hungarian government to send an expeditionary army corps on the Eastern front in Galicia, in exchange for a naval agreement (the concrete result of the negotiations employed by the Italian side was the countrys accession to the Austrian-Romanian treaty, on May 9, 1888, and the disorientation of Russian general staff, which in 1892 was estimating that there were going to be as many as three Italian army corps on the Romanian front!)25.

The conclusion of the military talks held in late eighties (to be also found in a study by the German General Staff in mid-January 1888) indicated therefore that without support, the four Romanian armies were too weak and ethereal to initiate an offensive in Bessarabia or towards Odessa26. A direct connection of these armies with the right wing of the Austrian troops in Galicia and Bukovina or a joint operation were not options to be considered since the Romanian army would have found itself too far from its logistic bases. She was supposed to march to southern Moldova to expect a Russian attack on a defensive alignment including Galai Nmoloasa Focani (with the 4th Army deployed between Focani Tecuci Adjud Brlad). Therefore, Romanias military value for her allies depended, at least up to 1901, on

Veranlassung des Generalleutnants Georg Grafen von Waldersee bearb. und hrsg. von Heinrich Otto Meisner, Stuttgart, 1922, p. 355.

23 Scott W. Lackey, op. cit., p. 145. 24 Ibidem. 25 Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 141-142. 26 General Feldmareal von Moltke, Promemoria pentru Ministerul german de

Externe, Berlin, January 14, 1888, quoted in Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 115-116.


her ability to divert as many Russian troops as possible (even beyond the 7th and 8th Army, stationed in Bessarabia and Odessa), to block them in Bessarabia and thus prevent their movement to the front in Galicia or even to the border with Germany.

After 1896-1897, in the context of a negative evolution of the Romanian-Bulgarian relations, the operational plans required a gradual adjustment in order to enable to defend the country in the event of a Bulgarian aggression, hitherto unstudied. Part of the Romanian armed forces was relocated in the military plans so they could react quickly in the event of a Bulgarian attack in Dobrudja. According to a memorandum on mobilization written in July 1900, the 1st Army Corps was to be stationed in Rmnicul Srat, and according to the situation, to be deployed either to Moldova or Dobrudja27. In fact, the wish of the Romanian decision makers to reserve one of the four armies in the event of a Bulgarian aggression manifested much earlier, since 1897. The decision on the new layout of the Romanian armed forces became official in April 1900, when King Carol I announced the allied governments in Vienna, Berlin and Rome, that in the event of European complications (i.e. a war with Russia and France), the Triple Alliance had to rely only on three Romanian army corps, as the forth one was intended to defend the border with Bulgaria regardless of the situation28.

It is unclear whether this provision was subject to change a year later, in the context of the new military arrangements made by Romania and Austria-Hungary after talks in Sinaia, in June 1901. What can be said after analyzing the Austrian-Hungarian military plans is that, since 1901, the operational plans of the dual monarchy favoured a joint Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian offensive, which implied the Romanian troops were to be massed in the Iai area, in order to connect with the right wing of the Austrian-Hungarian troops and advance towards east-northeast (Mogilev)29. Eight Romanian infantry divisions, supported by a cavalry division, would have had to attack and neutralize the 5th Russian Army (5 divisions plus one reserve) in Bessarabia, and then help the Austrian-Hungarians by shrouding and then engaging the 4th Russian Army (which operated in the Kamerica-Proskurov area) in its southern and rear flank. Such an option was the

27 ANIC, fund Casa Regal, file 29/1900 (Memoriu asupra concentrrii armatei

n Ipoteza A, Bucureti, July 1900). 28 35 anni di relazioni italo-romene, 1879-1914. Documenti Diplomatici Italiani

[35 anni], a cura di Rudolf Dinu, Ion Bulei, Bucureti, 2001, no. 381, p. 415-416 (Beccaria to Visconti Venosta, Bucharest, April 15, 1900); Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 51.

29 Graydon A. Tunstall Jr., Planning for War against Russia and Serbia. Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871-1914, East European Monographs, no. CCCLXXIV, Boulder Colorado, 1993, p. 51.

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basis for discussions between Conrad-Averescu30 in 1908-1909 and Conrad-Criniceanu in 1910-1911. Its not less true that all these plans indicated the maintenance of secondary Romanian units (reserve) on the Danube, in order to prevent a Serbian or Bulgarian attack31. The R-scenario of a war with Russia in the Austrian-Hungarian military planning continued to consider the cooperation of Romanian armies until the winter of 191232.

30 The strategic concept stated in the Conrad-Averescu talks in January 1908 is

to be found in an autographic note addressed to the Operational Office of the General Staff on January 11, published by Michael Behnen, Rstung Bndnis Sicherheit. Dreibund und informeller Imperialismus, 1900-1908, Tubingen, 1985, p. 351, footnote 49: a). Concentration of the bulk of Romanian army (the 4th, 3rd and 2nd corps, plus the cavalry division) in the Iasi-Roman area. Aim: vigorous offensive on all lines towards Zmerinka. Joining in the offensive phase with the 4th Austro-Hungarian army. b). Defensive group below Siret for direct support (Romanian 1st corps and Division Dobrogea). On the plans of military cooperation on the Danube, in event of a conflict with the Balkan States and Italy, see Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 173-174.

31 Graydon A. Tunstall Jr., op. cit., p. 68-70, 72, 84; Norman Stone, Moltke-Conrad: Relations between the Austro-Hungarian and German General Staffs, 1909-14, in The Historical Journal, IX, 2, 1966, p. 201-208, 209, 210-212; Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 172-174.

32 Cf. Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Htzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse, Boston Leiden Kln, 2000, p. 119-120. Conrad also asked in 1912 for an arrangement of the Romanian troops in the Iai-Botoani area for an offensive action towards Chiinu-Kiev. In the absence of the Italian divisions promised in 1888, or of the Austro-Hungarian ones, meant to support a possible Romanian offensive, Carol I initially inclined for a defensive alignment, behind the fortified line of Brlad-Galai-Nmoloasa-Focani. In the end, the verbal agreements accepted by the two parties (after the Conrad-Averescu talk), seamed to contain compromise: one army corps (IV) was to be concentrated in the Roman area, while the other four (I, II, III, V) were to be located in southern Moldova, in the Brlad-Focani-Tecuci area. The Romanian armies were to initiate a general offensive towards Chiinu in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian army from Bucovina. Cf. Franz Conrad von Htzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1918, 5 vol., Vienna-Berlin-Leipzig-Mnchen, 1921-1925, vol. 2, p. 351-370; Claudiu Lucian Topor, Romnia, Austro-Ungaria i Rzboiul din Balcani. Vizita la Bucureti a generalului Conrad von Htzendorf (28-30 noiembrie 1912), in Analele tiinifice ale Universitii Alexandru Ioan Cuza din Iai, Istorie, LI, 2005, p. 189-200, 194-195. Regarding the Russian pre-war military planning and the attention paid to the Romanian front, see Bruce W. Menning, War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context, in Richard F. Hamilton, Holger H. Herwig, War Planning 1914, 2009, p. 80-142, 88-90, 109-110; David G. Hermann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p. 13, 61, 207. The indicative of the Russian troops meant to stop a Romanian attack differs in the studies about the Russian and Austrian-Hungarian military planning: Menning refers to the 7th Army in the Odessa-Crimea region (possible confusion with the 7th army corps indicated in the German memorandum in 1888), while Tunstall


*

The security instrument created in 1883 was far from perfect. Without being from the beginning a critical issue in Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian relations, the situation of the Romanians in Hungary, the original defect of the alliance, evolved over time to such a stage that the agreement between the two states finally came to depend only on the will of an ethereal decision making group, the same that decided it33. The secret character of the treaty, stated in art. 6 and obstinately assumed with every renewal, was equally a fundamental flaw, as it made its impact on the public opinion (in Romania and Hungary) almost zero. Due to this secrecy, the partnership with the Triple Alliance remained for the real Romania a superficial experience, as the Romanian society, unlike the Italian one, was not subject to the consequences derived from this relationship. The arcane character of the treaty and the political-military elite of the Old Kingdom, predominantly francophone and gradually contaminated by natio-nalism, made managing this alliance a nightmare for Romanian decision makers and fuelled an incompatibility in relation to Austria-Hungary (envisioned by some even since 1883-188434) which would lead, through a continuous erosion, to a blockage of the security mechanism.

In particular the national problem, whenever was activated prior to the First World War, brought tension in relation with the main ally. And due to the fact that it acted systemically, shaking the entire system of alliances, this issue tested Romanias relations with the dualist Monarchy as well as with Germany, and inevitably influenced the security strategy. At the beginning of the tenth decade, the aggravating situation of the Romanian population in Transylvania and the repression of the Memorandum movement (June 9, 1892 May 1894) brought such a critical time in Romanias relations with the allied empires. The nationalist policy of the Wekerle government in Hungary towards Romanians and non-Hungarians in general, served at least partially as a catalyst. On the other side of the Carpathians, representatives of the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, motivated by personal interest or by matters of international politics, took to the streets the debate on the problems faced by the Romanians from Transylvania, making it a political issue and taking the public hysteria to a level unseen before. Stimulated mainly by the Liberal campaign, at that moment the opposition party, but with sufficient freedom of movement, the national unrest took extremely violent

indicates the 5th Army as operating in Bessarabia (which includes the 7th army corps).

33 Keith Hitchins, Romnia, 1866-1947, Bucureti, 1994, p. 158. 34 Carol I, Corespondena privat, Sorin Cristescu (ed.), Bucureti, 2005, p. 172-174

(Carol I to Karl Anton von Hohenzollern, Bucharest, January 24/February 5, 1884).

220 RUDOLF DINU

forms in 1894, thus testing the relations between Romania and Austria-Hungary35.

Thanks to the fervour with which the Romanian political elite instrumentalized it for electoral purposes, the Transylvanian issue certainly managed to influence in a larger degree the active and informed public opinion in Romania. However, the Memorandum issue of the mid 90s did not structurally change Romanian foreign policy, nor condition the alliance with the Central Empires. The security strategy continued to rely also due to the fact that it represented the product of a small decision group firmly and unilaterally on the collaboration with the Central Powers. From this point of view, redefining the foreign policy was rather a matter of nuance, i.e. return to the old fixed idea of preferential relations with Germany. Otherwise, the principles remained the same, as they belonged to a generation primarily preoccupied with preserving the newly created state and not with territorial acquisitions, a generation that was actually aware of Romanias fragile geopolitical position and the necessity of a protective shield.

In fact wrote the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandru Lahovari, in December 1894, shortly after the quasi synchronous manifestation of Romanian irredentism in Transylvania and Italian one in Istria all these are a ridiculous story. Im not too upset that Hungarians receive a lesson; but I think these excellent Italians are looking rather to annoy Crispi and to shatter the Triple Alliance, and less to be useful and pleasant to us. But the Triple Alliance guarantees our security more seriously than would Imbrianis policy36 be able to do. Before taking Transylvania we should think about keeping Moldova and Dobrudja, as such a policy would undoubtedly expose them to what happened with Bessarabia. Neither Mr. Imbriani, nor the morons from here who applaud, are not the ones able to defend us against such a misfortune, that no Transylvania, assuming that they would want to give it to us as a gift, could compensate for37.

*

To sum up, in the late decade of the 19th century a serious of regional (the Transylvanian issue) and systemic developments (the Franco-Russian alliance, the change in the British policy in East Europe etc.) began to exert increasing pressure on the scaffolding of Romanias

35 Keith Hitchins, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and the Nationality Problem in

Transylvania, 1894-1897, in Rumanian Studies, vol. IV (1976-1979), Leiden, 1979, p. 75-87, 75.

36 Renato Matteo Imbriani (1843-1901), Italian politician, founder of the Italia irredenta Association (1877), deputy since 1889.

37 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandru Lahovari, to Romanian Minister in Rome, Al. Emanuel Lahovari, Bucharest, December 29, 1894, published in Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 60-61.


foreign policy, forcing the government in Bucharest to look for remedies for saving the mechanism which ensured the Kingdoms long-term security. The Romanian decision makers and the artisans of the alliance, King Carol I, D. A. Sturdza, P. P. Carp, Alexandru Beldiman, seemed to understand that the original defects of the alliance required being somehow fade away, or even removed. The secrecy of the alliance remained however. In his excessive carefulness, Carol I tool this decision, motivated by a possible negative reaction of the elite, predominantly anti-Hungarian.

The solutions for the problems appeared in the relation with Austria-Hungary were varied and they were gradually activated as the whole picture became clear to the Romanian decision makers. On the short-term, the measure taken by the government with regard to the deteriorating Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian relations meant diverting the public attention with the help of an alternative national program saving the national identity of Romanians living in the Balkans which was to be promoted through a vigorous foreign policy.

The long-term remedies were based on two essential elements of the Romanian foreign policy. The first one focused on maintaining the alliance with Austria-Hungary and defending the territorial integrity of the dualist monarchy, seen as a vital and indispensable element of the security system to which Romania was part. The second one postulated developing a special partnership with Germany, seen as the only safe and strong support [s. R. D.]38.

To keep Austria-Hungary exist as a Great Power was written in a memo prepared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza, in collaboration with the Minister in Berlin, Al. Beldiman is a necessity. On this essential premise is based Romanias foreign policy; and it will unconditionally follow it, despite frictions with the neighbouring empire, which sometimes can not be avoided because of many divergent national and economic interests39. Conceptually therefore, the Romanian decision making group managed to pass, even after the mid-decade nationalistic boom, beyond the simple logic of the Romanian-Hungarian antagonism. The diplomatic action revealed that the stake of changing

38 BAR, fund D. A. Sturdza, S 19(42)/DCCCLIX (Memoriu secret asupra promovrii

mai ample i a importanei relaiilor germano-romne, handed to the Secretary of State of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. von Blow, by the undersigned [Alexandru Beldiman] at May 4, 1898, after in the previous talk it was discussed in detail the basic content of the memorandum and was approved by the Secretary of State). [] In Romanias relations with the Triple Alliance is a priority to cultivate absolutely extraordinary relations with Germany. It is not in the interest of Romanians neither of Germans that the center of gravity of our relations with the Triple Alliance to move from Berlin, where they were established, to Vienna. Nor is it desirable; rather would be a disadvantage for Romania to be regarded as belonging to the so-called spheres of influence of Austria-Hungary.

39 Ibidem.

222 RUDOLF DINU

the Hungarian policy by using German pressure was not the fate of the Romanian-Austro-Hungarian relations per se, but rather to save the security system as a whole. According to D. A. Sturdza and Alexandru Beldiman, Romanias diplomatic discourse, at least in her dialogue with Berlin (or even with Vienna), should have repeatedly pointed out, after the old principle of gutta cavat lapidem, that the weak point of the alliance system was Hungary and that the same Hungary was responsible for the pressure the Triple Alliance had to face in the East, risking the collapse of the entire scaffolding40. This was of course what was preached by a small group of His Majestys own advisors, because otherwise, the fact that Austria-Hungary was an essential part of the system that protected Romania was a reality which the core of the Romanian irredentism Ionel Brtianu, Take Ionescu &Co , together with most of the Romanian political elite, failed to understand.

At least partially, the reconciliation efforts made by Romania after 1895, given the above mentioned considerations, had as a result at the end of the nineteenth century the disappearance for a few years of the Transylvanian issue from the official agenda of the Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian relations. The structural conditions, which actually caused the problems faced by Transylvanian Romanians, remained nevertheless unchanged. They were only shadowed for a short time by other issues.

*

The aversion against Hungarians, however, was deeply rooted among the Romanian elite, and the future evolution of internal relations in Austria-Hungary could not be calculated41, or foreseen with certainty. The main task of Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy at Bucharest seemed to actually resume to a single objective: to prevent a change of perception that would have made the hate of Romanians towards Hungarians much stronger than the fear of Russia! For this matter, Aehrenthal was estimating in 1896, more cynical than Roma-nian decision-makers, that without a radical change of the Hungarian policy in Transylvania, the monarchy risked losing its last outpost in the East42. This was the reason why a special partnership with Germany, together with the systematic Germanization of Romanian military elite thanks to the acceptance at the Prussian military academies was supposed to be the alternative solution for the government in Bucharest to save the link with the Triple Alliance. It was to compensate for what

40 Ibidem, S 19(41)/DCCCLIX (Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman,

to the President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza SP, Berlin, May 2/14, 1898).

41 Ibidem, S 19(42)/DCCCLIX (Memoriu secret asupra promovrii mai ample i a importanei relaiilor germano-romne, handed in on May 4, 1898).

42 Solomon Wank, In the Twilight of Empire. Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal (1854-1912), Imperial Habsburg Patriot and Statesman, vol. I, Wien Kln Weimar, 2009, p. 156.


was not functioning in the relation with Austria-Hungary and to maintain Romanias position as a western sentinel on the Lower Danube43.

Restoring the partnership with Germany meant, in fact, its fabrication, as until then it had been more an ideal than a real one. Just like in the early 80s, such a partnership seemed favoured by the existence of special dynastic links, similar strategic interests, the lack of antagonism etc. In other words, it was favoured by a complex of circumstances that suggested that the centre of gravity for the Romanian foreign policy should have been on the axis Berlin-Bucharest. The German side generally ignored Romanias proposals, due to various reasons, from political-strategic (political complications with Austria-Hungary, additional material-military responsibilities, managing its relation with Russia) to personal, dynastic one. In particular the attempt to give substance to the dynastic alliance already existing between the two royal houses failed from the beginning. The animosity that prevailed between the two monarchs, Carol I and Wilhelm II, turned the dynastic link from a potential advantage for the Romanian-German relations into a weakness. In May 1898, Romanian Minister in Berlin noted bitterly that the two sovereigns havent personally meat for the last six years, too long for the relations that should have been between the two princes of Hohenzollern. The meetings in 1891 in Potsdam and in 1892 in Sigmaringen were also the last ones, as the second voyage of Emperor Wilhelm II in the Middle East, in 1898, avoided Romania again44. As with regard to the Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian relations, the German ally, although correctly assessed the seriousness of the Transylvanian issue in the over all dynamic of the Triple Alliance, was inclined, in spite of formal interventions at Vienna and Budapest, to leave things flow, the business being sensitive and difficult to handle45.

The only notable change in the Romanian-German relations was made by opening the German military Academies to Romanian military staff. In 1898 Emperor Wilhelm II approved Romanian governments

43 BAR, fund D. A. Sturdza, S 19(42)/DCCCLIX (Memoriu secret asupra

promovrii mai ample i a importanei relaiilor germano-romne, handed in May 4, 1898). [] In other words, the position occupied by the Romanian nation, according to its origin and all its cultural endeavors, in the last two decades, as a western European watchdog at the lower Danube, often in very difficult conditions, must be maintained even if now, and maybe for much longer, it seems that the former threatening danger coming from the North no longer exists. The motto toujours en vedette would be in this regard appropriate to characterize Romanias position and mission in the East.

44 Idem, S 19(40)/DCCCLIX (Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, to President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza, SP, Berlin, May 1/13, 1898).

45 Idem, S 19(34)/DCCCLIX (Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, to President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza, SP, Berlin, October 13/25, 1897).

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request for military training of Romanian officer, but this time in a systematic and recurring manner, and on a much larger scale than was possible before. A fixed number of aspiring young officials were going to be seconded to the Royal Prussian Army for several years (a preparatory year for learning the German language, two years of specialized military school, and two years of practical field service in Prussia). Besides military considerations (training the young generation of Romanian officers in the spirit and discipline that reigned in the Prussian officer corps), the request of the Romanian government was based on political reasons, summarized as follows: Most Romanian officers sent abroad and currently active, were trained in France. The spirit brought back from there, as well as the personal relations and sympathies, is not therefore in accordance with the policies set by Romanias national interests and promoted by the King. It is a state necessity that the spirit prevailing among the officers to be consistent with this policy. In our time, this predilection for France manifested by Romanian officers was essentially restricted and eventually almost stopped by the fact that the French government gradually abridged the access of Romanian officers to its educational institutions. If in time it would be able to shift the trainings centre of gravity towards Prussia, then a final break in the military and educational relations with the French Republic would be an essential benefit and a huge progress46.

46 Idem, S 19(46)/DCCCLIX (Copy Memoriu Secret asupra instruirii

ofierilor aspirani romni n armata prusac, edited at the wish of His Exc. State Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prince. v. Blow and based on the prior exchange of ideas on this issue. Handed in on January 14/26, 1898). Chef Cabinet Militaire Gnral H[ahnke] ma communiqu a titre confidentiel et personnel que en principe Empereur a accueillie favorablement votre demande relative a linstruction dofficiers roumains dans larme prussienne dune manire constante et organise. Quant aux dtails pour la mise en pratique de notre proposition, ils seront rgls sous peu et de nouveaux soumis lapprobation de lEmpereur, in Ibidem, S 19(45)/DCCCLIX (Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, to President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza, T cifr. 374, Berlin, June 29, 1898, 12:35 pm). A large proportion of senior officers indeed attended French military schools up to the mid-nineties, establishing preferential relations with French military elite. Only in 1896-1897, following a formal request from Russia, the government in Paris severely limited the access of Romanian officers. The presence of more and more Romanian officers in the French military schools was in fact the main reason that led the Prussian government to block the access of Romanian officers at the German War Academy, in the eighties. The idea of seconding Romanian officers to the German regiments, proposed by the military attach in Bucharest, Captain von Mller, was also dismissed on the same grounds of secrecy on armament and fighting techniques used. F. C. Stahl, Suveranitatea Romniei i dezvoltarea armatei, in File de Istorie Militar a Poporului Romn. Studii, vol. 12, Bucureti, 1984, p. 151-157.


The military elite therefore would have become, thanks to this German educational background, not just the promoter of the Romanian-German friendship (increasing the Romanian-German affinities), but rather a tool to advocate for the Triple Alliance in the Romanian society, and at the same time the mean of educating the population with regard to the geopolitical and strategic realities that Romania had to face.

Since 1898, the year when the agreement became operational47, and until the outbreak of the First World War, aspiring Romanian officers were seconded annually to the Prussian regiments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. After 1900, this action was also extended to the engineering and transport battalions. The followings were also subsequently approved: Romanian General Staff officers to take part at the annual German manoeuvres, access at the military cadet school of the Imperial Navy for a training program of four years, and seconding Romanian officers to the Military Technical Academy48.

This solution, efficient probably on the long term, was imagined and implemented too late to be able to outweigh the calling for Paris of the Romanian society49.

*

Setting the Macedo-Romanian issue as a priority for Romanias foreign policy was, as mentioned, the immediate response of the government from Bucharest regarding the gradually damaging Romania-Austria-Hungary relations. The intellectual origin of the idea to adapt the Romanian foreign policy after 1894-1895 is discussed in the existing historiography. Some scholars give credit to the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy for this voltafaccia of Romanian foreign policy, considering it a Aehrenthal dictum (which seems to confirm that the Romanian officials continued listening without any constrains the verbum coming

47 Ibidem, S 3(1)/DCCCXCII (Miu to Sturdza, Bucharest, July 20/ August 1,

1898). 48 F. C. Stahl, op. cit., p. 156. 49 Military historian Petre Otu argues that, less than a decade away from the

signature, in the context of Sturdzas retirement from the political life (1908), the Romanian government decided to abandon the agreement with Germany and with it the legal framework that provided Romanian officers training in German academies. Reason: the doctrinal disunity existing at the level of the command structures of the Romanian army, due to the fact that young officers, of a lower grade, had a German or Austrian-Hungarian educational background, while senior officers, were trained at the French, Belgian or Italian academies. Cf. Petre Otu, Linfluence de la doctrine militaire franaise sur lvolution de larme roumaine (1878-1940), in Revue historique des armes, t. 244, 2006, p. 38-49. Lattach militaire Ambroise Desprs soulignait en 1912: Elle [la Roumanie] est reste profondment franaise en ce qui concerne le got et la culture, et les efforts de la rendre allemande semblent avoir chou face une mentalit trs latine.

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from Vienna). The new imperial and royal Minister Plenipotentiary to Bucharest, Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, was supposedly the one who, in 1896, suggested to the liberal government to focus their attention and energy to the Balkan region, to the fate of Romanians in Macedonia, in order to reduce the tension raised by the Transylvanian issue50. The President of the Council, D.A. Sturdza obliged to restore his pro Austrian policy after the nationalist points of view expressed while in opposition was the one who presumably embraced the diversion strategy.

In reality, the idea of transforming the Macedonian issue in an active foreign policy strategy, as a mean to divert the public attention from what was happening in Transylvania, took shape in the minds of Romanian decision makers a bit earlier, while the conservative government led by Lascr Catargiu was still in office. As evidence stands the fact that in the spring of 1895, at the express order of the Sovereign, P. P. Carp requested all authorities part of the Romanian diplomatic lite to state their opinions on the ways by which the issue of the Balkan Romanians could be successfully promoted. The immediate objective of this campaign was going to be the bishop question (la question de lvque), i.e. the appointment of a Romanian metropolitan bishop for the Romanians in Macedonia51. The idea to defend the specificity of this population was, it is true, for some time on the agenda of the Romanian officials, funding schools and churches in Macedonia being the principle way of action. Since 1895 it became however a priority of Romanias foreign policy. As proof stands, among other things, the energy with which D. A. Sturdza embraced the fate of the Macedonian Romanians after 1896, seeking a spectacular success in negotiating with the Ottoman Porte for establishing a Romanian metropolitan bishop for the Balkan Vlachs. As well as the offensive manner in which Ion. I. C. Brtianu endorsed the same policy after 1902, as Minister of Foreign Affairs. For Romania was going to note later in his memoirs Prince Dimitrie I. Gr. Ghica, former General Council of Romania in Thessaloniki, in the early twentieth century the Macedonian issue was noteworthy for the government due to the Macedo-Romanians, a population of Romanian race and language grouped in the Pindus Mountains and in compact communities in the rest of Macedonia, forming a total of over 200,000 souls and driven by very nationalistic feelings. Hard workers, especially endowed for trade, these Romanians from Macedonia, in order to fight the propaganda of the Balkan states, were seeking aid from the other side of the Danube, in Bucharest. The Romanian governments, which unlike Turkeys neighbouring states were not animated by annexation desires, considered it as their duty derived from race solidarity to take interest

50 Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), Istoria politicii externe romneti n date, Bucureti,

2003, p. 199. 51 ANIC, fund Papiniu, file 116, p. 4.

Rudolf DinuEvidenziatoConsul


in the fate of these Romanians. And this issue also gave us a legitimate reason for a diplomatic intervention, a useful platform for foreign policy, detached from claims, and which allowed us a neutral role in the event that Macedonia would have been divided, as the Romanians there not to be assigned to one or another nation without guarantees for the protection of their nationality and rights. This policy was highly favoured by King Carol, eager to see the public attention away from the persecutions suffered by their brothers from the other side of the Carpathians under the yoke of the Hungarians. In the same spirit, Vienna was willing to support our action52.

If the idea of adapting Romanias foreign policy was entirely the product of domestic decision makers or rather it was suggested by the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy matters less. But the fact remains that the Austrian-Hungarian decision makers, inspiring or not such guidelines, were unable to foresee the negative consequences for the monarchy that could have derived from turning Romanian policy to a Balkan objective. Stimulating the Balkan Romanian nationalism and then the inability to control and lead it in the desired direction favoured the development of a deep Romanian-Bulgarian antagonism after 1900. The convergence of the Austrian-Bulgarian interests (in an anti-Serb way) on the background of deteriorating Austrian-Serbian relations and an effervescent Serbian nationalism, gave rise, on the medium term, to an Austrian-Romanian dispute, which turned into conflict in the context of the Balkan crisis from 1912-1913, exposed the monarchy to additional risks and de facto undermined the partnership with Romania, founded in 1883.

Just as certain is the fact that after 1895-1896 Romanian politics came to be necessarily centred on the Balkans, for national geographical, strategic and ethnic reasons. The existence of a significant Romanian population in the peninsula (the Macedo-Romanians) gave the government in Bucharest the ethnic pretext for a Balkan policy of status quo. Romanias foreign strategy, reported Italian Minister Plenipotentiary in Bucharest, baron Fasciotti, in summer 1912, was closely related to the general problem of balance of power in the Balkans: It is a canon, in fact, of the Romanian foreign policy that the three main Balkan states (Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece) should not increase without Romanian having an analogous increase, in such a matter as to retain that prevalence of population, territory and wealth which she currently enjoys53. But the origin of the canon should be searched far back in time, during the Rumelian crisis, Ion C. Brtianu being the one who first raised the issue of territorial compensations due to Romania in the event the Balkan states would benefit from changing the status quo54.

52 Dimitrie Ghyka, Memorii, translated by Vasile Savin, Iai, 2004, p. 57-58. 53 35 anni, no. 456, p. 514. 54 Carol I, Jurnal, vol. I (1881-87), Vasile Docea (ed.), Bucureti, 2007, p. 397.

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In 1903 Take Ionescu summarized this Balkan policy as follows: No Romanian politician aspires to annex Macedonia, nor to found there a Romanian state, but we care that the nationality of the Romanians from Macedonia be held and they have the guarantee that they will be free to get educated in their own language55. And a great deal of the Romanian political elite supported without reserve this policy, at different emotional levels, depending on the circumstances of the internal political struggle or other interest. Less emotionally engaged, or simply more pragmatic, the Sovereign viewed this issue strictly from a strategic perspective, as a subterfuge meant to ensure Romanias continuous involvement in the Balkans in order to freeze the status quo.

The policy of supporting the Romanians in Macedonia inevitably caused a direct collision with the more substantial and aggressive Balkan Slavic nationalisms, aggravated and damaged the relations with these countries, evolving from a lethargic neighbourhood to an active but negative interaction. Romanias main concern in the Balkans was in all these years, until around the First World War, Bulgaria. Especially the actions of the Bulgarian Komitadji in Macedonia caused considerable irritation in Bucharest, where concern for Macedo-Romanians became very popular. Foreign diplomats believed even that, in the mind of Romanians, especially after 1905, the fear of Russia which always dominated their thinking after the Congress of Berlin was replaced following the results of the Russo-Japanese War by a growing anxiety about a possible expansion of Bulgaria56. Even the arming policy seemed to be decided at one time according to Bulgarias moves: When Bulgaria orders 50 cannons King Carol I said to German Minister Kiderlen, in March 1905 we have to order 6057!

In reality, the way Romanian decision makers were thinking was determined, following the Bulgarian-Russian reconciliation in 1896, by a combined fear of Russia and Bulgaria. The government in Bucharest strongly believed in a complete main mise of Russia in Bulgaria and assessed that the country reverted, due to this development, to the dangerous situation of a possible avenue between the two Russias. Therefore, at the turn of the two centuries, King Carol I and his advisors looked with great apprehension to both Russia and Bulgaria.

*

The crisis which progressively appeared in relation with Bulgaria introduced new elements in the security equation and determined the Romanians to seek the transformation of the alliance (calling for a

55 Ion Bulei, Atunci cnd veacul se ntea. Lumea romneasc, 1900-1908,

Bucureti, 1990, p. 286-287. 56 35 anni, no. 431, p. 485-486; Ernest Jckh (ed.), Kiderlen Waechter intime

(daprs ses notes et sa correspondance), Paris, 1926, p. 114-124. 57 Michael Behnen, op. cit., p. 351.


different definition of the casus foederis), as well as a inter pares partnership with the members of the Dreibund, which would have become according to the Romanian plan the Vierbund or the Quadruple Alliance58. On several occasions, in the fall of 1900 and during 1901, the Italian representative in Bucharest referred in his reports to the dangers arising from infiltrating in the minds of the Romanians the idea that in matters of international politics the small kingdom could no longer rely on the actual assistance of the Triple Alliance59. This, apparently, accredited the idea that in Bucharest existed doubts on the efficiency and, especially, adequacy (in terms of security) of the partnership with the Triple Alliance. In reality, in the minds of some Romanian officials actually arise the (wrong) idea that the treaty of 1883 was concentrated only on the Russian threat, while others supported the dangerous idea that the treaty should have been amended in order to allow Romania a preventive war against Bulgaria, in the event of incorporating Macedonian territories. Such perceptions explain the attempt of the Romanian government in 1901 to adapt the alliance, as well as the change of military operational plans, the reassessment of the military capabilities and the arming program after 1901.

On April 20, 1901, through a memorandum presented to the German Chancellor von Blow by the Romanian Minister Plenipotentiary in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, the Romanian government tried to amend the substance of the alliance treaty, requesting the extension of the casus foederis conditions also for the event of an armed conflict between Romania and Bulgaria (second point of the memorandum). But the answer was negative and the German government pointed out that such a possibility was already implied in the treaty, but of course, in the event of an unprovoked attack from Bulgaria. The same memo requested that in the future Romania be able to close separated treaties of alliance with Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy (first point), which would have practically meant transforming the Triple Alliance into a Quadruple Alliance: 1. Based on the relations set by the existing treaty was shown in the memorandum Romania is indeed allied with Germany and Italy exactly in the same way as it is with Austria-Hungary. The rights and duties of the allies were established by the treaty the same for everyone. However, formally Romania signed only with Austria-Hungary an actual treaty of alliance, while the other two powers expressed their adherence to it in special documents. Factually and politically, there are no more reasons to keep the current difference. Moreover, the royal government yearns that the future

58 Ibidem, p. 338 sqq.; Rudolf Dinu, Raporturi romno-italiene n cadrul Triplei

Aliane, 1888-1914, PhD thesis, University of Bucharest, 2003, p. 166 sqq. 59 ASDMAE, Roma, Serie P. Politica, 1891-1916, Rumania, pacco 286, R

2703/199 (Beccaria to Visconti Venosta, Bucharest, October 28, 1900); 35 anni, no. 386, p. 426-427, October 21, 1901.

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shape of the new treaty concluded with the powers of the Triple Alliance will match the actual realities60. However, the German Chancellor rejected this request also, considering that to establish a new form of agreement between Romania and the Triple Alliance could give rise to unnecessary difficulties and talks, which had to be avoided at the time, and that the existing form perfectly met Germanys indirect, derived interest in the alliance with Romania. Regarding the first point in the answer given to the Romanian Minister, Beldiman the German government favours the idea that it might be preferable that in the current form which stipulates Romanias membership to the Triple Alliance does not take place any change. This treaty of alliance between Austria-Hungary and Romania, which the other two powers joined through a declaration of accession, caused a few problems at the time Romania became part of the Triple Alliance, in 1883. The solution agreed then in order to solve these problems made Romania virtually covered as if it would have signed a treaty of alliance directly with Germany and Italy, and it should remain so still61.

This episode, and in particular the subject of the second request made by the Romanian government (second point of the memorandum), can only lead, despite the confusion that still reigns over the real intentions of the government in Bucharest, to negative remarks regarding the objective negotiated in 1901. Whether it was wanted to repair an apparent gap of the treaty of 1883 by inserting an explicit reference to a Bulgarian aggression or, even worse, to change the casus foederis so as to make possible a preventive war against Bulgaria (if it would have occupied Macedonia), it is to be mentioned that false reasoning on behalf of the Romanian diplomacy was behind both of the two hypothesis.

1) Because, the treaty of 1883, as it was written, guaranteed assistance to Romania in the event of any unprovoked aggression (thus including against a Bulgarian attack). Therefore, explicit references to possible aggressor would have only served to limit the potential coverage of the alliance at the expense of Romanian interests.

2) Because, if we accept the other idea, namely that it was desired a different definition of the casus foederis, turns out that the Romanians request was aimed at transforming the alliance with the Central Powers from a strictly defensive alliance to an offensive one. This, clearly, was unacceptable to the allies even for the simple reason that it would have given Romania the power to open the whole Eastern question whenever would have thought it necessary and appropriate to do so.

The refusal given by the German government to the first demand (point 1) was due, in my opinion, mostly to the fear that it could have

60 GPEK, 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswrtigen

Amtes, im auftrage des Auswrtigen Amtes, vol. XVIII/2, Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme (ed.), Berlin, 1926, no. 5797, p. 651-654.

61 Ibidem, no. 5798, p. 655-656.


become a pretext and at the same time a support for future Italian requests of transforming the alliance. Besides, in 1901, the German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mhlberg, backed up his attitude in a note to the Reich Chancellor, Blow, stating that: For Germany and Austria-Hungary the current situation is totally inappropriate for referring to a changed and extended alliance with Romania. Because in such case we would have no choice, we would have to involve Italy in the discussion and then Italy could count on the idea that in the future, in her expansionist policy in the Balkans, she can rely on the protection of the Triple Alliance. She would accept this with enthusiasm [changing the agreement with Romania] and in turn introduce in the treaty of the Triple Alliance a clause in respect of Albania. But Austria would hardly accept such a clause and thus would be put into question the existence of the Triple Alliance62. The Austrian-Romanian Alliance therefore remained unchanged, being once again renewed on April 4/17, 1902, based on a text similar to the old treaty. At the request of Austria-Hungary, was introduced on this occasion a clause stating the automatic renewal of the treaty every three years, unless it was denounced by one or more parties. Germany joined the extended treaty on July 12/25, 1902, while Italy on November 12/ December 30, 190263.

*

In her relation with the Central Powers, at least until the Bosnian Crisis, Romania remained, largely, a loyal second to Austria-Hungary and Germany, raising few question marks and little circumspection. Sure, the original sins of the alliance were far from being solved, on the contrary. Romanian public opinion continued to be hostile to Hungary and this hostility was growing, just as the defense treaty of 1883 was still being kept secret, largely encompassing an artificial connection. However, the governments in Vienna and Berlin regarded Romania as a satellite certainly revolving in their orbits. Moreover, with D. A. Sturdza, one of the last visceral Russophobes64, still as head of the government and with Carol tightly controlling Romanias foreign policy, it could have hardly been otherwise. The lack of concern and the belief in the intact loyalty of Romania were quite obvious during the Bosnian Crisis (1908-1909). The Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Aehrenthal, was sincerely willing to consider the interests of all the states affected by the annexation, of Russia, the

62 Ibidem, no. 5800, p. 660-661. 63 35 anni, no. 392, p. 438. 64 The term belongs to P. P. Carp: substituez au mot daustrophile celui de

russophobe et vous serez dans le vrai!, in BAR, Coresponden diplomatic austriac, mapa XLIII, Acte 445-960, 1888, no. 16B (Goluchowski to Klnoky, Bucharest, April 4, 1888).

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Ottoman Empire, Italy, even those of Serbia, except those of Romania, who was not given attention.

The only notable change that took place in Romania in late 1908 was the retirement from the government and the political life of the Liberal leader, D. A. Sturdza, and his replacement with Ionel Brtianu, about whom it was said he intended to promote a more independent policy towards Austria-Hungary, despite the fact he considered the alliance with the Central Empires to be still necessary. It should be stressed that the event occurred as a result of an accident namely Sturdzas mental illness65 and not as a result of the Bosnian Crisis (or of the deterioration of the Austrian-Romanian relations). It is true that the change in the structure of the ultimate decision unit, which virtually had the responsibility for the management of the foreign policy, favored on the medium-term the development of the nationalist trend, which eventually also had inherent effects on the security options. Likewise, the Bosnian crisis pointed out with great clarity the existing friction between the Balkan policy of Austria and that of Romania (pro-Serbian, or more accurately anti-Bulgarian). This divergence became chronic in the context of the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913, amid unprecedented urban public hysteria urban, and brought with it the storm in the Austrian-Hungarian-Romanian relations.

In the context of the Balkan wars, following an initial phase of confused expectation, the entire political spectrum moved slowly but surely towards a position of strength in relation to Bulgaria, despite the moderating efforts of King Carol I and the Great Powers attempts to solve the Romanian-Bulgarian dispute over Silistra. The correction of border in the south part of Dobrudja was strongly requested as to strategically compensate for Bulgarias territorial growth. The politicians and the party press took this view in the street; the street embraced it and made its fulfillment a sine qua non condition for any government, regardless of its political orientation66. If we do not get Silistra declared Ionel Brtianu to the Austrian-Hungarian Minister, in February 1913, offering a sample of the bandwagoning policy he will so successfully practice after August 1914 means that Entente is stronger than the Triple Alliance and we will turn to the most powerful ones67!

The Romanian government requested the Austrian-Hungarian ally total and unconditional support in the dispute with Bulgaria, a support understood as naturally deriving from the alliance agreement. However, the government in Vienna holed on to its pro-Bulgarian policy and in

65 Carol I, Corespondena privat, p. 456 (Carol I to Maria de Flandra,

Bucharest, January 2/15, 1909). 66 ASDMAE, Roma, Telegrammi di Gabinetto in arrivo, registro 368, T 16

(Fasciotti to San Giuliano, Bucharest, February 22, 1913, 2:50 am). 67 35 anni, no. 481 p. 537 (Fasciotti to San Giuliano, Bucharest, (R 372/102)

February 22, 1913).


the early summer of 1913 ended up losing control of the actions of the Romanian government. The attempt to revise the Treaty of Bucharest increased the fracture occurred in the relations between the two countries and led to a widespread sense of hostility within the urban public opinion. Vienna wasnt completely passive to the rapidly deteriorating situation. She tried to find remedies and the Czernin mission, respectively the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations opened in early 1914, were a step in this direction. But both have completely failed in the spring of 1914 and their failure had the same effect upon the Romanian irredentism68.

A slightly nationalist delirium became noticeable in Bucharest, at the end of 1913, at least in certain circles, visibly encouraged by the success obtained in the summer and currently intoxicated by the idea Romania far da se69. However, as also observed by the Austrian-Hungarian military attach, Hranilovi, in the fall of 1913, Romanian irredentism did not pose a military threat as long as the Romanian government was not encouraging the agitation in Transylvania70. The government, at least as long as King Carol I lived, maintained its option for alliance with the Central Powers. Deterioration of relations with Austria-Hungary was compensated by Romanian decision makers through an almost exclusively orientation towards Germany71 and Italy.

68 Samuel R. Williamson Jr., Austria-Hungary ant the Origins of the First

World War, London, 1991, p. 143-150, 160-163; Gerald Volkmer, Die Siebenbrgische Frage, 1878-1900. Der Einfluss der Rumnischen Nationalbewegung auf die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen sterreich-Ungarn und Rumnien, Kln, Weimar, Wien, 2004, p. 345.

69 1918 la romni. Desvrirea unitii naional-statale a poporului romn. Documente externe, 1879-1916, vol. I, Bucureti, 1983, no. 69, p. 383 sqq. (memorandum of count Haymerle, counselor at the Austrian-Hungarian delegation in Bucharest, December 16, 1913).

70 Paul W. Schroeder, Romania and the Great Powers before 1914, in Revue Roumaine dHistoire, XIV, 1, 1975, p. 43.

71 Ibidem, p. 41; Gabriel Hanotaux, Carnets (1907-1925), Paris, 1982, p. 96-97 (February 12, 1914 Jy ai vu Lahovary, le ministre de Roumanie, qui est venu me mettre au courant des grandes volutions qui se prparent actuellement en Europe. [] Lahovary ma dit quil y avait notamment un rapprochement entre la Roumanie et la Russie, mais que cela nimpliquant nullement une rupture avec lAllemagne, que, tout au contraire, il pouvait maffirmer que le roi de Roumanie, dans cette circonstance, comme antrieurement, navait rien fait sans se mettre daccord avec Berlin, et que, jamais, les relations entre la Russie et lAllemagne navaient t plus confiantes et plus troites. Il ajoutait (prenant peut-tre ses dsirs pour des ralits) que lAllemagne envisageait ds maintenant une combinaison politique ayant pour objet final la dislocation de lAutriche-Hongrie, elle-mme y participant toute premire. Il disait encore que la Roumanie tait linstrument cach de lAllemagne dans la pression quelle exerce, en ce moment, sur la Turquie, pour amener la Sublime Porte cder les les la Grce et renoncer toute hostilit avec les peuples des Balkans sous peine dune dclaration de guerre de la part de la Roumanie. []); Antony di Iorio,

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The relation with Russia has gradually improved since 1913, but working with Petersburg did not become, not even for Brtianu, an alternative in the security policy or the way to fulfill the national ideal. Romania was ready and willing to cooperate with Serbia and Greece in order to preserve the status quo which had resulted from the Treaty of Bucharest and to control Bulgaria, which, of course, harmonized quite well with Russia's desire to postpone for a few years the final decision on the Eastern question by freezing the situation which had arisen from the Balkan wars. However, the government was not at all prepared to completely break away from the Triple Alliance and much less to change camps by moving towards Russia and the Entente Cordiale72. King Carol I, even after the much celebrated visit of the Tsar in Constana, in June 1914, continued to see Romania as the mediator that had to bring reconciliation between Austria-Hungary and Russia73!

Brtianus return to power in January 1914, the most nationalistic political character and with an educational, political and ideological profile significantly different from that of His Majestys advisors, did not change, contrary to appearances, the realities of the foreign policy. Moreover, Brtianu

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