the effect of animal agriculture housing conditions on the emergence of the avian influenza virus

THE EFFECT OF ANIMAL AGRICULTURE HOUSING CONDITIONS ON THE RECENT AVIAN INFLUENZA

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The Effect of Animal Agriculture Housing Conditions on the Recent Avian Influenza Outbreak

Carrie Ducote

Canisius College

ANZO 501: Introduction to Anthrozoology

December 15th, 2015


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Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza has spread quickly to birds throughout the world. Millions of

birds, mainly on large-scale, industrial poultry farms, in the United States alone have been

depopulated as a result of the recent pandemic. Hundreds of people have also lost their lives

from this deadly virus. This paper examines the effect of the animal agriculture industry,

specifically the living conditions of the animals, on the emergence and spread of this virus. A

large amount of animals living in cramped, high stress and unclean conditions on these farms

cause viruses to have many chances to reproduce and therefore, mutate. These mutations result in

viruses that are highly contagious and highly deadly. Research and opinions from leaders in the

animal protection movement and public health fields are examined in addition to information

from the United States Department of Agriculture. The possibility of the virus becoming more

deadly to humans as a result of the animal agriculture industry is examined as well.


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Introduction

Humans and other animals have a long history of interactions. Nowhere is that history

more evident or more deeply rooted than in our eating habits. Meat eating has been slowly

increasing over the last century (Barclay). The average American is now expected to eat 21,000

animals in their lifetime (Akhtar, 2012, p87). But this increase in meat consumption has not

come without consequences. In addition to ethical and environmental concerns, the production of

large quantities of meat comes with several public health concerns (Akhtar 2012). In her book,

Aysha Aktar, MD, MPH, a double board certified neurologist and public health specialist says

“The industrialization and mass production of animals for food is now among the biggest

contributing factors to emerging infectious diseases over the past few decades.”

Most humans interact infrequently with live cows, chickens or pigs yet they depend on

their meat or by-products for food (Akhtar, 2012, p 93). How can it be that our food choices have

such a large impact on the success of infectious diseases? The answer is not a simple one but

one this paper will use the following framework to explain. To break it down very simply, the

progression of meat consumption to public health concerns flows something like this:

Humans want to eat meat and eggs from birds. To generate the most profit for the

producers of these products, the birds are raised in overcrowded conditions.

These conditions lead the birds to be stressed.

This stress causes the birds’ immune system to weaken.

Lots of immunocompromised birds living together causes the avian influenza virus to

mutate into a highly contagious and highly deadly strand.


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The avian influenza virus is spreading quickly via wild birds and infecting lots of poultry

on egg or meat farms.

The more the virus reproduces and spreads, the more opportunity for it to mutate to

become highly contagious among humans.

If it becomes able to transmit from humans to humans easily, the virus is likely to kill

millions of people

How large of a health risk is Avian Influenza to humans? In 1918, a strand of influenza

described as “an entirely avian-like virus that adapted to humans” (Taubenberger, Reid, Lourens,

Wang, Jin, & Fanning, 2006, abstract) swept through the world and killed 30-50 million people

(The Pandemic). Pandemic experts of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the National

Institutes of Health in the USA caution,

Even with modern antiviral and antibacterial drugs, vaccines, and prevention knowledge,

the return of a pandemic virus equivalent in pathogenicity to the virus of 1918 would

likely kill >100 million people worldwide. A pandemic virus with the (alleged)

pathogenic potential of some recent H5N1 outbreaks could cause substantially more

deaths. (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006, abstract)

Public health experts are paying attention to the Avian Influenza outbreak, yet it appears

the average person is still unaware of the recent outbreak or the way that it is connected to their

food choices. This paper draws a clear connection between the housing conditions of animals

raised for human consumption and the contribution of these conditions to the recent outbreak of

Avian Influenza in the United States.


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The Life of Commercial Poultry

To understand the effect that housing conditions of commercial poultry has had

on the development of Avian Influenza, one must first understand what those basic housing

conditions are. Turkeys and chickens raised for meat, are usually housed in large grower houses,

devoid of sunlight and stimulation, and containing thousands or even millions of birds living

together (Akhtar, 2012, p 89). The birds are frequently fed antibiotics and growth hormones,

causing them to grow unnaturally large at a young age (Akhtar, 2012, p 89). These medications,

in combination with selective breeding, result in chickens and turkeys who grow much larger,

much faster than is natural (Akhtar, 2012, p89). Chickens are unable to use their legs due to their

staggering weight and are frequently immobile (Akhtar, 2012, p 89). Egg laying hens usually

have the end of their beaks amputated at a young age and are frequently housed in battery cages

so small they are unable to stretch their wings (Akhtar 2012, p 89,).

Besides the cramped conditions, the animals’ environments are pathogen laden. With

such a large number of animals concentrated together, their waste piles up quickly and they are

continuously inhaling the recirculating aerosolized fecal matter, methane and ammonia (Akhtar,

2012, p90). The last step before slaughter is transport on a crowded truck through all weather

conditions and usually the most distressing part of a food animal’s short life (Akhtar, 2012, p

90).

A lot of stressed animals in close quarters with unclean conditions is a perfect storm for

pathogen strengthening and emergence. Stress is known to increase animal’s vulnerability to

disease and the close quarters and circulation of waste creates an environment where pathogens

are frequently reproducing and gaining opportunities for mutation (Akhtar, 2012, p 91). The


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more a virus mutates, the more opportunity for it to become highly infectious among humans

(Akhtar, 2012, p91)

What is Avian Influenza?

Influenza viruses are categorized as either type A, B or C and there are multiple subtypes

within each category (Akhtar, 2012, p 103). Influenza C viruses cause a mild respiratory illness

and are not thought to cause epidemics (Types of Influenza Viruses). Influenza B viruses only

infect humans and cause relatively mild, seasonal flu infections in the winter months (Akhtar,

2012, p103). Influenza A viruses can also cause seasonal pandemics and are divided into

subtypes based on two protons on the surface of the virus: the hemagglutinin (H) and the

neuraminidase (N) (Types of Influenza Viruses). There are 18 different hemagglutinin subtypes

and 11 different neuraminidase subtypes (Types of Influenza Viruses). Avian Influenza strains

H5N1, H5N8 and H5N2 have been found in the United States in the last year (Coston, 2015).

Avian Influenza is a virus that infects several types of birds including chicken, turkey,

quail, geese and some wild birds (Protect Your Birds from Avian Influenza). It is transmitted by

direct bird to bird contact as well as via aerosol (Romich, 2008). Most Avian Influenza virus

strands are classified as Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) and produce mild respiratory

infections (Romich, 2008). All Avian Influenzas start off as mild, LPAI viruses but once they

enter domestic bird populations, they can rapidly mutate into highly pathogenic influenza viruses

(HPAI) (Akhtar, 2012, p106). HPAI causes a much more severe infection with a mortality rate of

close to 100% among infected birds. (Romich, 2008).

The disease is frequently spread to commercial flocks via the droppings of migratory

waterfowl, who are typically asymptomatic, flying over commercial poultry operations (Coston,


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2015). The virus can also travel on manure, egg flats, crates, other farming materials/equipment,

and people who have picked up the virus on their clothing, shoes, or hands (Protect your Birds

from Avian Influenza).

Avian Influenza affects the bird’s nervous, respiratory and gastrointestinal systems and

has an incubation period of 3 to 14 days (Romich, 2008). Clinical signs of infected birds include

lack of energy and appetite, decreased egg production and/or soft-shelled or misshapen eggs,

swelling of the head, eyelids, comb, wattles, and hocks, purple discoloration of the wattles,

combs, and legs, runny nose, coughing, sneezing, stumbling or falling down, diarrhea, and

sudden death without any clinical signs (Protect your Bird from Avian Influenza).

A Brief History of Influenza Infections

It would be impossible to discuss the history of influenza infections without studying the

1918 pandemic, commonly referred to as “the mother of all pandemics” because it was one of

the deadliest natural disasters in human history (Akhtar, 2012, p 104). In May of 1918, healthy

men in Europe began to fall ill, and the virus spread quickly throughout the world from there

(The Pandemic). The outbreak of 1918 left about twenty million people dead worldwide (The

Pandemic). In the United States alone, about 675,000 people in a population of 105 million died

from the influenza virus outbreak of 1918 (The Pandemic). What made this virus particularly

lethal was the fact that it was likely an Avian Influenza A virus that most humans had not

encountered before (Akhtar, 2012, p 104).

Since 1918, there have been three other influenza pandemics: in 1957, 1968, and 2009

(Akhtar, 2012, p104). The 2009 outbreak was caused by another influenza A virus, and the same

virus that caused the 1918 pandemic, H1N1, commonly referred to as “swine flu” (Akhtar, 2012,


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p109). The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic was the mildest of the four recorded human

influenza pandemics (Akhtar, 2012, p 108).

Timeline of Infection

The following is a timeline of events concerning the most recent worldwide outbreak of

HPAI affecting several species:

1996 – 2014, Timeline information provided by The World Health Oranization’s 1-H5N1 avian

influenza: Timeline of major events, 2012.

1996 – HPAI H5N1 first isolated from a farmed goose in the Guangdong province of China.

1997 – H5N1 continues to spread throughout poultry farms in Hong Kong. First reports of

humans becoming infected by H5N1; 18 confirmed cases including 6 fatalities.

2003 – China reports 4 more cases of H5N1 in humans including two fatalities.

2003-2004 – Republic of Korea reports H5N1 is spreading to their poultry. Two tigers and two

leopards at a zoo in Thailand die of H5N1 infection after being fed infected chicken.

January 2004 – Vietnam, Thailand and Japan, Cambodia and Lao confirm H5N1 is moving

through their poultry. Sporadic human cases, including fatalities, are reported in Vietnam and

Thailand. Hong Kong confirms H5N1 in wild bird.

February 2004 – H5N1 confirmed in poultry in Indonesia and China. China culls 9 million birds

and begins vaccinating poultry. Thailand confirms a domestic cat was infected with H5N1 after

eating an infected pigeon.

2004- H5N1 continues to spread across Southeast Asia. Chinese researchers report preliminary

findings of H5N1 infection in pigs. Birds, cats, and humans continue to succumb to the virus.


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2005 - Research concludes that a girl in Thailand probably passed H5N1to at least her mother in

September 2004, causing fatal disease. This is the first published account of probable human to

human transmission, resulting in severe disease, of any avian influenza virus. Russia,

Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Turkey, Romania, Croatia, United Kingdom, Kuwait and Ukraine all

report the first outbreaks of H5N1 among birds in their countries.

2006 – HPAI is detected in Iraq, Nigeria, Greece, Italy, Germany, Egypt, France, India,

Australia, Malaysia, Hungary, Georgia, Pakistan, Switzerland, Poland, Austria, Myanmar,

Denmark, Afghanistan, Israel, Sweden, Cambodia, Jordan, Czech Republic, Sudan, Spain and

several other countries across Europe and Asia. HPAI is detected in some wild birds in the

United States. Several fatal cases in humans continue to be reported.

2007 – 2014 – HPAI H5N1 continues to spread around the world, Multiple human fatalities

reported.

A more detailed timeline of the most recent Avian Influenza outbreak of 2014 – 2015 is

as follows:

December 2nd, 2014 – H5N2 HPAI strain detected in two chicken and turkey farms in British

Columbia, Canada. (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

December 19th, 2014 – United States authorities confirm first case of H5N8 HPAI in mixed

poultry flock in Oregon. (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

January 2015 – H5N2 avian influenza reported in Washington State and Idaho (HPAI 2015

Data).


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January 7-9, 2015 – The largest importers of United States Poultry, Mexico, Canada and China

ban imports from affected areas. (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

February 2015 – HPAI confirmed in California. (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

March, 2015 – HPAI confirmed in Minnesota, Arkansas and Kansas (HPAI 2015 Data).

April, 2015 – HPAI confirmed in Wisconsin. North Dakota, South Dakota and Iowa (HPAI

2015 Data).

April 20th, 2015 –Wisconsin declares a state of emergency (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

April 23rd, 2015 - Minnesota declares a state of emergency (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

May 1, 2015 - Iowa declares a state of emergency (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

May 5, 2015 - United States authorities approve $330 million in emergency funds to fight the

spread of bird flu. (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

May 11, 2015 – HPAI confirmed in poultry flock in Indiana. (Timeline of Bird Flu Outbreak)

May 2015 – HPAI confirmed in Nebraska, South Dakota, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska

(HPAI 2015 Data).

June 17th, 2015 – Last reported confirmed case of HPAI in United States (Iowa) (HPAI 2015

Data).

This timeline of events shows the path of a virus that is highly contagious originating in

Asia and swiftly moving across oceans to eventually end up in the United States. There are four

major flyways or routes which wild birds migrate in the United States: The Pacific, Mississippi,

Central and Atlantic (North American Migration Flyways). Therefore, when studying a virus


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likely transmitted by wild birds migrating north in the spring along one of these routes, it makes

sense that we would see infections cluster along these flyways. HPAI moves from the migratory

paths of birds primarily in the Pacific Flyway (Oregon, Idaho, California and Washington) to the

Central Flyway (Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota) and then to the

Mississippi Flyway (Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin).

To date in the United States alone, 48,082,293 birds have succumbed to the disease or

been killed in response to the outbreak (All Findings). Worldwide, nearly 650 cases of humans

contracting avian influenza have been confirmed so far, with 60% of human infections resulting

in death (Flu.Gov). Most human cases of H5N1 virus infection have occurred in people who had

recent close contact with sick or dead poultry (Flu.Gov). Unlike other types of flu which have

resulted in massive human casualties, H5N1 usually does not spread directly from human to

human (Flu.Gov). Most people do not have close contact with sick or dead poultry therefore it is

unlikely that H5N1 will become a large threat to humans unless the virus gains the ability to be

transmitted directly from one human to another.

As mentioned earlier, in 2009, a version of Avian Influenza, H1N1 or Swine Flu, became

infections in humans and spread quickly throughout the United States (Aktar 2012). Luckily, the

symptoms were relatively mild and the 2009 pandemic was not very deadly to humans (Akhtar

2012, p104). However, the 2009 outbreak should serve as a reminder that pigs are highly

susceptible to avian and human influenza A viruses and are commonly referred to as the “mixing

vessels’ in whom avian and human viruses co-mingle (Akhtar, 2012, p109). New influenza

strains frequently emerge from pigs since multiple virus strains can infect pigs and exchange

genes during reproduction (Akhtar, 2012, p 109). Pigs raised for human consumption are kept in

cramped gestation crates while pregnant and housed in small, indoor, feeding houses after being


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separated from their mother (Akhtar, 2012, p 90). These housing conditions prevent the animals

from exhibiting normal behavior and increase their stress (Akhtar 2012, p 90). The housing

cramped and unclean housing conditions of Pigs on factory farms are also likely to provide an

ideal environment for viruses to reproduce and mutate (Akhtar, 2012).

So if H5N1 has a high mortality rate among infected humans but does not transmit from

human to human easily and H1N1 transmits from human to human easily but does not have a

high mortality rate, is there a chance the two could exchange genes within the mixing vessel

(pig) and create a super virus capable of both transmitting from human to human easily and also

killing many of those who become infected? Yes. It is becoming increasingly popular in Asia

and the United States to localize pig and chicken farms within the same region proving easy

access for HPAI to be transmitted from chicken to pig farms (Akhtar 2012 p 110). Pigs may

easily become infected with H5N1 by chickens during transport of either species or, as

mentioned before, by migratory waterfowl (Akhtar 2012). In fact, a study published in 2010

found 7.4% of pigs tested on farms in Indonesia already carried H5N1 (Nidom, Takano,

Yamada, Sakai-Tagawa, Daulay, Aswadi, & Kawaoka, 2010). Worse yet, the pigs showed no

clinical signs of infection, “indicating that influenza A (H5N1) viruses can replicate undetected

for prolonged periods, facilitating avian virus adaptation to mammalian hosts (Nidom, et al,

2010, abstract).”

In a recent interview, Michael Blackwell, DVM, MPH, former Assistant Surgeon General

and current Chief Veterinary Officer at the Humane Society of the United States, points out

another interesting aspect of the recent HPAI outbreak as it relates to conditions on factory

farms: most of the infected farms were large scale, egg laying operations (Personal

Communication, 14 December 2015). Not many cage free or backyard flocks were affected


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(Personal Communication, 14 December 2015). What accounts for the difference in infection

rates? Blackwell blames it on a few distinct differences in the way the birds live: cage free birds

have more space, experience more natural temperature variations and have access to direct

sunlight (Personal Communication, 14 December 2015). Blackwell also said the following:

The industrial operations are less natural for the animals. There are some where you’ve

got tens of hundreds of thousands of individuals in fairly crowded conditions, artificial

ventilation pretty much, artificial lighting. It’s an unnatural set of conditions. Avian

Influenza virus, like most influenza viruses, does not survive very long in sunlight. It’s

considered to be maybe a two hour life expectancy when in direct sunlight. When you go

to a facility where the sunlight is not there but also the air is such that an individual

sneezes or coughs, there are a lot of individuals within 10 feet of that, then you have this

whole line of individuals pretty much lined to pick up the viral particles from the

coughing and sneezing which wouldn’t be the same if the birds were in less intensive

conditions. (personal communications, 14 December 2015)

Biosecurity

Although the animals most widely affected by this pandemic are poultry on commercial

farms, this pandemic has had an effect on smaller farms keeping animals as pets also. Farm

Sanctuary operates farm animal shelters in both California and New York where rescued

chickens and turkeys reside (Coston 2015). They have halted visitor access to the bird areas,

stopped rescuing new birds and physically isolated their bird areas using tarps (Coston 2015).

For the staff that must enter and exit these areas, Farm Sanctuary has implemented strict

biosecurity measures (Coston 2015).


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Many different sources cite biosecurity measures such as those implemented by Farm

Sanctuary as the best way to protect a flock from infection (Coston 2015). In their brochure,

Protecting Your Flock from Avian Influenza, The USDA reports the following six biosecurity

measures to keep birds free of disease:

1 – Restrict access to the property housing the flock and to the flock itself.

2- Use proper sanitation, wash hands, wear clean clothes, and sanitize everything.

3- Limit purchasing new birds from an unknown source, quarantine new birds for 30 days.

4- Do not share equipment with other farms.

5- Know the warning signs of HPAI and check the flock regularly.

6- Report sick birds to the USDA.

With farmers following the suggestions listed above from the USDA, it may seem

unlikely that any new flocks could become infected. However, there are still many ways new

birds may become infected, from biosecurity breeches to dander of birds blowing through fans

(Coston 2015). According to Coston, No one really seems to know how the infection continues

to spread in spite of these precautions (personal communication, 10 December 2015).

Response to Infection

When a farmer thinks he may have an infection of HPAI on his farm, he contacts the

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) who respond by visiting the farm and

assigning a caseworker to help the farmer through the process (Highly Pathogenic Avian

Influenza: A Guide To Help You Understand the Response Process). The farm is placed under

quarantine and the birds on the farm as well as birds on nearby farms are tested for HPAI


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(Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Guide to Help You Understand the Response Process).

Testing is done by swabbing the throat of live or dead birds suspected to be infected (Avian

Influenza Diagnostics and Testing). The swab is then sent to one of more than 50 USDA-

approved laboratories that are part of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (Avian

Influenza Diagnostics and Testing). If one of these tests is positive for HPAI, the sample is then

forwarded to the USDA’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa for further

testing and final confirmation (Avian Influenza Diagnostics and Testing). While the samples are

being tested, the USDA works with farmers to get an accurate inventory of their birds including

numbers, ages, and species so that they can reimburse the farmer “100 percent of fair market

value” for their birds (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Guide To Help You Understand the

Response Process).

If the infected birds are left alone, their death from HPAI will be certain and gruesome: a

chicken’s eyes and head will swell, it will bleed from its nostrils, lose the ability to walk, get

diarrhea and struggle to breathe (Rogers 2015). Given this consideration, once the final positive

HPAI result is confirmed, depopulation begins on the farm immediately with the goal of having

the entire farm depopulated within 24 hours (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Guide To

Help You Understand the Response Process). The American Veterinary Medical Association

Guidelines for the Euthanasia of Animals defines depopulation in the following way:

The killing of animals in large numbers in response to an animal health emergency (eg,

catastrophic infectious disease, mass intoxication, natural disaster) where all due

consideration is given to the terminal experience of the animal, but the circumstances

surrounding the event are understood to be exigent and extenuating. Depopulation may

not meet the requirements of euthanasia due to situational constraints.


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In the document “HPAI Outbreak 2014-2015: Stamping-Out & Depopulation Policy”,

The USDA says the following about depopulation:

Mass depopulation and euthanasia are not synonymous, and APHIS recognizes a clear

distinction. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as painlessly and stress-

free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method by which large numbers of animals must

be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of

animals as practicable, given extenuating circumstances. Mass depopulation is employed

in an HPAI response to prevent or mitigate the spread of HPAI through elimination of

infected or potentially infected poultry.

Depopulation techniques include spraying a water-based foam into the houses to

suffocate the chickens or placing them in a chamber with carbon dioxide gas (Rogers 2015).

Neither method is particularly kind to the birds but the USDA recently began recommending a

third method of depopulation that is more controversial (Rogers 2015). The USDA’s Fall 2015

HPAI Preparedness and Response Plan says the following regarding approved depopulation

methods for commercial poultry:

Standard methods (foaming, CO2) are preferred, as they are the most humane and

effective methods to depopulate large poultry flocks. However, if standard methods

cannot achieve the 24-hour goal, the APHIS National Incident Commander will

approve—on a case-by-case basis—the use of ventilation shutdown for depopulation.

While not a preferred method, it could save the lives of thousands of birds by reducing

the risk of disease spread. Ventilation shutdown requires no specialized equipment or

personnel, and can be implemented immediately upon recommendation by Federal, State

and industry participants at the affected flock to the National Incident Commander that


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all other options have been considered and that no other option will achieve the 24 hour

depopulation goal.

Ventilation shutdown is the name of a process whereby all of the air systems providing

ventilation to the poultry houses are shut off resulting in death by asphyxiation and hyperthermia

(Rogers 2015). Once the ventilation systems are shut off, temperatures slowly rise and the birds’

internal organs start to fail, the small amount of oxygen in the house is quickly inhaled and

without a way to replenish the supply, the birds suffocate (Rogers 2015). According to Michael

Blackwell, ventilation shutdown can take anywhere from 20 minutes to several hours and “it can

be pretty horrible” (Rogers, 2015).

After all of the confirmed infected birds are depopulated, the USDA Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service (APHIS) sets up a 10 km control zone around the perimeter of the

known infection which is monitored closely for signs of infection (HPAI Outbreak 2014-2015:

Stamping-Out & Depopulation Policy). To decrease the population density of susceptible

poultry, “certain circumstances” may warrant accelerating the depopulation of birds not

confirmed to be infected with HPAI in the control zone (HPAI Outbreak 2014-2015: Stamping

out & Depopulation Policy). Once the birds have been depopulated, disposal, cleaning and

disinfecting begins (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Guide to Help You Understand the

Response Process). Disposal methods include composting, burial, incineration, rendering, or

landfilling (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Guide to Help You Understand the Response

Process). The USDA recommends sanitizing the barn, equipment, and all affected areas of the

farm and helps farms with the cleaning and disinfecting process. (Highly Pathogenic Avian

Influenza: A Guide To Help You Understand the Response Process). After cleanup and a 21 day

waiting period, the USDA returns to the farm to test for any traces of HPAI left in the


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environment (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Guide To Help You Understand the

Response Process). Once cleared, the farm may restock with a new flock of birds and begin

production again (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Guide to Help You Understand the

Response Process).

The poultry industry is a large contributor to the United States economy. According to

one study by the National Chicken Council and the US Poultry and Egg Association, the chicken

industry directly and indirectly provides 1,010,250 jobs, $47 billion in wages, $197.5 billion in

economic activity and $17.2 billion in government revenue (National Chicken Council).

Therefore, a blow like HPAI infection to the industry could mean a blow to the entire United

States economy. To avoid repercussions, shortly after the initial positive HPAI test is confirmed,

the USDA begins a step of HPAI response labeled as “compensate”, meaning they provide

indemnity payment for fair market value of lost birds as well as costs of disposal, cleaning and

disinfecting to the farmer (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Guide To Help You

Understand the Response Process). These payments are to encourage the early, voluntary

identification and destruction of diseased birds (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza USDA

Indemnity Program Fact Sheet). Michael Greger, Director of Public Health and Agriculture for

the Humane Society for the United States says, “We need this as transparent as possible and the

only way we get that is by writing checks. Unfortunately, you don’t get much of an incentive for

industry to change (Carr 2015).”

To date, the HPAI outbreak has cost United States taxpayers $950 million (Fall 2015

HPAI Preparedness and Response Plan). Although some argue that these payments are

necessary, some taxpayers are unhappy about them. Judy Bradberry, PhD, RN (personal

communication, 10 December 2015) says “From many perspectives, I am deeply concerned that


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the USDA repopulated the poultry farms directly affected by HPAI. As a vegan… I have strong

feelings against use of my tax dollars as an investment in the poultry industry.”

Reaction to the Pandemic from outside the USDA

When discussing the onset of a virus pandemic as likely to have originated from the

farms where our food is raised, one may assume the governmental agencies to be the authority

on identifying sources of the outbreak as well as working towards identifying the cause of the

pandemic and taking steps to prevent similar, future outbreaks. Dr. Aktar told me in a recent

interview that this is not the case:

I work at the FDA in the office of Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats. And

emerging threats are things like Ebola, SARS, swine flu and bird flu and not once do we

ever discuss how and why these viruses are emerging. It’s all focused on what vaccines,

antibiotics, what drugs can we come up with. It’s never on the prevention. So no, I don’t

see any kind of solution coming from our government in the near term. The majority of

people eat meat and they eat these chickens so I think the same blinders are on these folks

that there are with just the average person out on the street. When you think back to when

our governmental agencies attacked the tobacco industry, it happened at a time when it

was much easier because most public health folks, most of the governmental agencies,

were not smoking tobacco. So it was very easy for them to see tobacco as being

unhealthy and being a public health problem. But here, most people eat meat so it’s like

having most people smoke tobacco and then asking them to go on an anti-tobacco

campaign. It’s just not going to happen until these people take their blinders off.

A few reactions to HPAI from other agencies:


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CDC – Influenza A viruses circulating among poultry have the potential to recombine

with human influenza A viruses and become more transmissible among humans. If HPAI

Asian H5N1 viruses gain the ability for efficient and sustained transmission among

humans, an influenza pandemic could result, with potentially high rates of illness and

death worldwide. Therefore, the HPAI H5N1 epizootic continues to pose an important

public health threat. (Public Health Threat of Highly Pathogenic Asian Avian Influenza A

(H5N1) Virus)

Farm Sanctuary - Some diseases, like H1N1 (Swine Flu) and Avian Flu, are

communicable from animals to humans. These “zoonotic” diseases have the potential to

become pandemics. Experts believe that the outbreak of H1N1 was likely caused by the

overcrowding of pigs on factory farms and the storage of their waste in giant manure

lagoons (Factory Farming and Human Health).

The Humane Society of the United States - It’s important to recall that bird flu is in

many ways caused and exacerbated by the intensive confinement of farm animals that’s

rampant in egg factories. (HSUS Statement on Outbreak of Bird Flu at Baer Poultry Co.

in Minnesota)

World Health Organization – Avian Influenza (AI) viruses can sometimes spread to

domestic poultry and cause large-scale outbreaks of serious disease. Some of these AI

viruses have also been reported to cross the species barrier and cause disease or

subclinical infections in humans and other mammals. The A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) AI

viruses remain two of the influenza viruses with pandemic potential, because they

continue to circulate widely in some poultry populations, most humans likely have no


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immunity to them, and they can cause severe disease and death in humans.( Avian

influenza, World Health Organization).

The Poultry Federation - There is no immediate public health concern with either of

these avian influenza viruses (Avian Flu – No Threat to Food Supply or Public Health).

American Egg Board - The strains of this disease are not transmissible to humans, and

no human infections with these viruses have been detected (Avian Influenza & Eggs:

FAQs).

National Turkey Federation - The modern type of animal production used in the

United States is actually more protective of birds and their health than more traditional

systems. In the United States, chickens and turkeys are usually raised in enclosed

buildings called growout houses. More than 20,000 chickens or 4,000 turkeys are placed

in a single building. Yet the health of the poultry flocks today is probably better than it

has ever been. This is because of improvements in poultry housing, selective breeding for

disease resistance, protection from potential disease carriers such as wild birds and

continuous health oversight by poultry veterinarians. (Questions and Answers On Avian

Influenza)

Looking to the Future: What happens next?

Currently, the outbreak of HPAI in the United States has died down, there has not been a

confirmed case since June 17th, 2015 (All Findings). On December 11th, 2015, North Dakota’s

Board of Animal Health lifted a ban on bird movements to shows, exhibitions and public sales

which was implemented in April as a response to the HPAI outbreak (Ban on bird movements

due to bird flu lifted in North Dakota). However, Avian Influenza continues to spread throughout


OUTBREAK 22

other parts of the world. On December 7th, 2015, France reported at least 5 new outbreaks

although they did not specify the strand (Schnirring 2015). French Polynesia banned poultry

imports from France as a result of the reported outbreaks (Fearing influenza, French Polynesia

bans poultry from France). Germany and Italy both recently reported outbreaks of Low

Pathogenic Avian Influenza, H5N2 (Schnirring 2015). In November, A duck shot in Oregon

(Schnirring 2015) and one shot in British Columbia (Flu Scan for Nov 30, 2015) both tested

positive for Avian Influenza strains. However, the avian influenza virus is expected to begin

spreading again once the birds fly from the north to the south, sometime from January to March

(Rogers 2015). Health officials are unable to predict the path or the scale of the second wave of

avian influenza infections expected to hit in the coming months.

According to the CDC, the United States Federal government maintains a stockpile of

H5N1 vaccines for humans which could be used the case of an HPAI pandemic in humans

(Prevention and Treatment of Avian Influenza A Viruses in People). The USDA is also

considering the use of a vaccine to protect poultry flocks in the United States from avian

influenza, but has not approved one (HPAI and Vaccine Use). According to the USDA, before

they approve the use of a vaccine, they would consider the following: the extent and rate of the

outbreak, the type of poultry affected, the impact on domestic and international markets, the

impact of American producers to export their poultry, and the effectiveness and availability of

the vaccine (HPAI and Vaccine Use). However, vaccines have proved to be ineffective in

preventing the spread of HPAI in the past (Amen, Vemula, Zhao, Ibrahim, Hussein, Hewlett,

Moussa & Mittal, 2015). Researchers studied a large poultry farm in Egypt, where avian

influenza is endemic and a vaccination policy is in place, but found the vaccine offered little

protection (Amen et al, 2015).


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In a recent interview, Dr. Akhtar offers an explanation about how a vaccine could fail to

offer protection:

The virus is constantly mutating when so many animals are confined in these factory

farms. There’s so much ability for these viruses to spread and each time [they reproduce],

another virus is created and there are likely some mutations in its DNA that could cause it

to be more resistant to those products. The more you use vaccines the more likely you’re

going to get viruses that are resistant to those vaccines and those viruses will continue to

thrive whereas the other viruses will not so then, those vaccines will no longer work or

not work as effectively. Vaccines and antibiotics are, at most, a temporary fix even if they

do work. I think we would see a large number of deaths before we even able to produce

such medicines that would be able to help us.

Generally, the public seems unconcerned with the recent avian influenza outbreak. Barry

(2011) contributes that to past outbreaks, stating “Because H5N1 has not become pandemic and

H1N1 turned out to be mild, the idea that influenza is no longer a threat has become pervasive.”

The experts I spoke to, Akhtar, Blackwell and Warren all agreed that, although this outbreak is

clearly tied to conditions within the agriculture industry, those conditions are not likely to change

anytime soon. Melissa Warren, Senior Specialist – Influenza at the Association of Public Health

Laboratories (Personal Communication, 10 December 2015) did say in a recent interview that

she sees the public health sector and the animal agriculture industry beginning to recognize that

connection and work together more frequently.


OUTBREAK 24

Other Threats to Public Health

This paper draws a connection between animal agriculture and public health as it pertains

to the emergence of new, pandemic, viral threats to humans. There are, however, many more

threats to public health emerging from the animal agriculture industry. One of the most

frequently discussed of these threats pertains to routine antibiotic usage in these farms (Akhtar,

2012). Although banned in the European Union, factory farms in the United States and China

continue to routinely administer a wide range of antibiotics to animals (Akhtar, 2015, p. 100).

The antibiotics are able to fight off most bacterial infections but the bacteria are constantly

reproducing and mutating in these farms (Akhtar 2012). Similar to vaccine usage, the occasional,

mutated bacteria strand not affected by the antibiotics is then able to thrive thereby creating

widespread antibiotic resistant bacterial pathogens (Akhtar 2012). Since humans usually rely on

the same antibiotics widely used in these farms, the emergence of zoonotic, antibiotic resistant

pathogen could have pandemic potential (Akhtar 2012).

In addition to the threat posed by factory farms of antibiotic and vaccine resistant

pathogens, there are a few other public health concerns to mention. The first is the waste

produced by these farms. Most hog farms funnel their waste into large lagoons and then spray it

onto nearby cropland (Pollution from Giant Livestock Farms Threatens Public Health). This

spray makes these farms an unpleasant neighbor resulting in the lowest income residents living

nearby and having their health threated (Pollution from Giant Livestock Farms Threatens Public

Health). The effect on human health of being exposed to these sprays include seizures, comas,

headaches, shortness of breath, wheezing, excessive coughing and diarrhea (Pollution from Giant

Livestock Farms Threatens Public Health).


OUTBREAK 25

The health of the workers employed by the farm is also worsened by the harsh conditions

on the farm. According to the CDC, the majority the humans who have contracted HPAI are

farm workers who came into close contact with the virus in birds (Highly Pathogenic Asian

Avian Influenza A (H5N1) in People). The health of the workers on these farms, usually

immigrants, is also poor due to frequent exposure to high concentrations of animal waste

(Akhtar, 2012 p 92). The side effects include a wide array of airway and other diseases such as

asthma, bronchitis, mucus membrane irritation, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and acute

toxicity from high-dose gas exposure (Akhtar, 2012 p 92).

Conclusion

The reaction to the HPAI pandemic has mostly come from those within the animal

agriculture or public health communities. Given that millions of birds have become infected and

been killed, sometimes via gruesome methods, one may assume that the public is aware of the

outbreak and appalled to learn of these deaths. The average person, however, seems to be

unaware of the Avian Influenza pandemic. Dr. Akhtar said the following:

We had a major outbreak occurring among the chicken farms here in the US and millions

of animals were killed. They were foamed to death and no one really seemed to care. The

whole process for those poor chickens is miserable. But no one seemed to really care.

People aren’t going to care about it until it affects us (personal communication, 10

December 2015).

Perhaps it is because birds can be difficult to care about; they are not as warm and

snuggly as dogs, cats or even pigs. Akhtar pointed out that the United States culture has not been

kind to them as is evident by the use of the word “chicken” as an insult to mean cowardly


OUTBREAK 26

(personal communication, 10 December 2015). In fact, the only federal legislation mandating the

treatment of food animals, The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, does not cover poultry

(Humane Methods of Slaughter Act).

When I began my research, I reached out to several industry experts. As mentioned, I was

able to interview Aysha Akhtar, Michael Blackwell, and Melissa Warren. In addition to those

three, Nathan Nobis, a professor of animal ethics, responded and assisted me with additional

resources. I also reached out to Rick Meinersmann, Bacterial Epidemiology and Antimicrobial

Resistance Research Microbiologist at the USDA and Robert Cobb, State Veterinarian with the

Georgia Department of Agriculture. I did not hear back from either party affiliated with the

Department of Agriculture. I am unsure if that is due to me communicating my own bias in my

emails to them or for some other extenuating circumstance. The one person I was able to connect

with outside of the animal protection movement, Warren, is a personal friend. When asked if

given the outbreak of influenza, the animal agriculture industry would change their practices, she

responded with:

I don’t know what your experience has been, if it’s difficult to find information about

that. But, my own personal perception, this is certainly not a view of my organization or

anything like that, just a personal view, that, in general, agricultural groups tend to be

pretty secretive. So it can be difficult to find out information about their plans for the

future and any kind of big changes they would make… They have these pretty powerful

industry groups and associations and what not and they can be very protective of any

kind of information. They’re not very transparent from what I’ve seen. As a consumer,

sure, that concerns me, but I think the public health community has seen more

engagement with those partners which is encouraging.


OUTBREAK 27

This paper draws a clear connection between the housing conditions of animals raised for

human consumption and the contribution of these conditions to the recent outbreak of Avian

Influenza in the United States. Since housing conditions of poultry on factory farms are ideal for

a virus to reproduce and mutate, HPAI has had an easy time moving from farm to farm. Some

public health experts predict HPAI will then jump from a poultry farm to a nearby hog farm

where it will combine with swine flu, H1N1, or some other strand of influenza which easily

effects humans. The result would be a virus which humans have no immunity to that is both

highly contagious and highly deadly. The exact consequences of a virus like this reaching the

general human population are unable to be accurately predicted. Dr. Akhtar, however, was able

to offer a few predictions in a recent interview regarding the scale of an HPAI outbreak, were it

to mutate to a form where it could be transmitted from humans to humans easily:

I don’t know how many people we had on the planet at that time, maybe 2 billion? Now,

we have close to 8 billion? We have more than 10 times that number of animals in farms

now. So the chances of producing another virus in pigs or in birds, and that includes

chickens or turkeys, is extremely high and the chances are that we will produce a virus

that will be not only lethal in us, deadly like the 1918 virus, but also very contagious

among humans like the 1918 virus. It’s also extremely high given the fact that there are

more people now, so many more people that are traveling around the world. If and when

such a pandemic occurs, it’s going to be far worse than what it was in 1918. That’s what I

predict.

If the government is not working on preventing similar future outbreaks, what will it take

to prevent pandemics from emerging out of the animal agriculture industry in the future? Akhtar

(personal communication, 10 December 2015) offers the following suggestion:


OUTBREAK 28

Honestly, the only way we can do it is that we have to significantly reduce the number of

animals we eat. Every other fix that people think about is a band-aid. Nothing really gets to the

heart of the problem. And the heart of the problem is that there is simply too many animals

confined in too small spaces, living in miserable conditions so it’s so easy for viruses and

bacteria to run amuck in these farms. The most significant measure we can take to prevent a

pandemic coming from these farms is by reducing significantly the number of animals we eat so

that we have far fewer animals in the first place on these farms.


OUTBREAK 29

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the effect of animal agriculture housing conditions on the emergence of the avian influenza virus

Documents