The Journal of The royal Canadian MiliTary insTiTuTe

RCMISITREP

founded 1890

September–October 2018 Volume 78, Number 5

www.rcmi.org @rcmiHQ

Inside this IssueThe RCN of today and the Fleet of tomorrow: Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fight by Ron Lloyd �����������������������������������������������������������������������3

The Underappreciated Importance of Naval Logistics to the National Shipbuilding Strategy by Ken Hansen �����������������������������������������������������������������4

Great things underway for the RCN’s people by Michel Thomassin ���������������������������� 16

Chilean Navy frigate CNS Almirante Lynch (FF 07) and Indian Navy stealth multi-role frigate INS Sahyadri (F49) perform a replenishment-at-sea with Royal Canadian Navy supply ship MV Asterix (centre) off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC

—US NAVY / MARQUEZ

The Royal Canadian Navy

royal Canadian MiliTary insTiTuTefounded 1890

Patron

The Governor General of Canada

Vice Patrons

The Honourable Elizabeth Dowdeswell, OC, OOnt Lieutenant Governor of Ontario

General Jonathan Vance, CMM, MSC, CD Chief of Defence Staff

His Worship John Tory Mayor of Toronto

Officers & Directors

LCdr/Dr� Michael J� Hoare, CD (Ret’d)—President and Executive Director

Col Jay B� Claggett, CD (Ret’d)—Vice President Mr� James H� Lutz, MA—Vice President

Capt Rodney W� J� Seyffert, CD (Ret’d)—Secretary BGen Paul A� Hayes, OMM, CD (Ret’d)—Director

Mr� Robert C� Kay, JD—Director Capt Stewart C� Kellock, MOM, CStJ, CD—Director

Ms� Michele Walkau, MEd—DirectorHCol Bryan J� R� Brulotte, CD—Director

Past President

HCol Gilbert W� Taylor

Honoraries

HLGen Richard Rohmer, OC, CMM, DFC, O�Ont, KStJ, OL, Legion d’Honneur, QC

Honorary Vice PresidentDr� J� L� Granatstein, OC, FRSC

Dr� Desmond Morton, OC, CD, FRSC Honorary Historians Mr� Arthur Manvell Honorary Librarian

LCol J� Roy Weir, CD, AdeC, QC (Ret’d) Honorary Solicitor

Honorary Chaplains

LCdr The Rev J� David Mulholland (Ret’d) HLCol The Rev Mark L� Sargent, CD

General Manager

Mr. Michael T. Jones

Controller

Ms. Elena Trouba

Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme, Editor, Sitrep

Maj/Dr Daniel D. Eustace, CD (Ret’d)

Deputy Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme

Mr. Eric S. Morse

An Official Publication of the Royal Canadian Military Institute

426 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1S9

Tel: 416-597-0286/1-800-585-1072 Fax: 416-597-6919Website: www�rcmi�org

Editorial E-Mail: daneustace1@gmail�com

From the Editor

Copyright © 2018 RCMI ISSN 0316-5620 SITREP may be fully reproduced in whole or in part for academic research or institutional purposes, provided that the author’s and the institute’s copyright is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute or its members.

Continued on page 16

Uni-polar, bi-polar, multi-polar, melting polar? Given how power is currently distributed in our

complex international arena, coupled with the effects of globalization and the rise of non-state actors, states are finding it increasingly difficult to set and maintain stable national agendas, and that includes our own� While some would argue that politics is always local, it’s hard to overlook the challenges currently posed to the economy, including very difficult NAFTA negotiations and the building - or not - of a new oil export pipeline and a weakening of so-called traditional international structures and institutions, such as the UN, NATO, WTO and so on� Canada has long main-tained a view that the best approach to solving international challenges is to be a ‘joiner’ and participate in multi-national fora as (in military parlance) a force multiplier� To the extent that these tenets are under stress, long-held Canadian approaches are being increasingly questioned� In many states, the response to national challenges has been to fall back onto a closed mentality which, as we have seen in some cases, has led to virulent forms of populism or nationalism, even within Western states that profess, at least outwardly, a continued commitment to liberal democracy with all of its attendant qualities� We must be cautious not to catch this form of cold in Canada�

The Defence and Security Studies Program Committee has now launched our program for 2018-19, and we have a series of highly-qualified and significant speakers scheduled for Security After Hours in the coming months: please watch for details in Dispatches� At the same time, we have already begun planning for our next Defence and Security conference which is tentatively planned for 24 April, 2019� We are pleased to announce that the focus of this event will be the Arctic, a region which is critically important for Canada in multiple dimensions, but which is increasingly contested by many states, including China, which identifies itself as a ‘near-Arctic ‘ nation� As more details regarding this event become available we will make them public�

Now to SITREP� As promised, the focus of this edition is naval power in general, and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in particular� Given the excellent response we have had from our contributors, we are in position to also produce a follow-on naval-focused issue of SITREP that we will indeed publish in Novem-ber-December� We will complete the environmental triad with an army-themed edition to launch us into 2019�

From the RCN, we are very pleased to have a submission from the Com-mander of the RCN, Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd, who has written specifically for the RCMI and SITREP� His focus, and that of the senior navy leadership team, is the current challenges and future direction for the RCN, not least of which is the largest re-capitalization of the RCN in its peacetime history�

In addition, the RCN has generously provided three additional articles for your consideration that address the vital importance of the RCN’s people to its current and future success (this issue); changes to the RCN’s organizational struc-ture as it prepares to accept its new ships; and an overview of recent deployments of its submarine force�

In our November-December issue, we will have more on Naval affairs in-cluding contributions from geostrategic expert Dr James Boutillier, and Capt (N)

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The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD

and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley

The RCN of today and the Fleet of tomorrow: Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fightby Ron Lloyd

Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd is Commander, Royal Canadian Navy.The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Institute or its members.

As Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), it is with pride that I am able to write for the RCMI on a topic that I, and the senior leadership of the RCN

are seized, the current challenges and future direction of the RCN�  Shortly after the new Defence Policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged was promulgated, the RCN published the RCN Stra-tegic Plan 2017-2022�  This plan, completely aligned with our new Defence Policy, represents the RCN’s commitment to a culture of continual improvement and innovation designed to evolve the RCN as it embarks upon its largest recapitalization in its peacetime history� 

The new vision of the RCN, as detailed in the 2017 Stra-tegic plan, is Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fight. This vision draws inspiration from our motto “Ready Aye Ready,” and is infused with the extraordinary commitment of our sailors to make a difference in the world today, and ensures that we are in all respects prepared for the uncertain challenges that will confront Canada in the future� 

Ready to Help: The RCN envisions a naval force that is ready to enable and support other government departments, to conduct capacity building alongside like-minded nations, Search and Rescue on the high seas, and provides humanitar-ian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad�

Ready to Lead: The RCN envisions a naval force that is ready to lead in an increasingly complex and uncertain world� As the most flexible instrument of national power, the RCN is ideally positioned to allow Canada to lead in times of crisis by deploying a task group or leading a coalition operation�

 Ready to Fight:  The RCN envisions a naval force ready to defend Canada, to fight alongside our allies, to fight for Ca-nadian values, and what Canadians hold to be right and just� The RCN’s balanced, multi-purpose, combat-effective naval forces need to stand ready for combat at sea and from the sea� 

The commitment of our sailors to successfully fulfill this vision is nothing short of inspirational�

In the short time since the plan was released, our sailors have been deployed globally making a difference on behalf of

Canada and Canadians� A few key highlights include the de-ployment of two Victoria class submarines, HMCS Chicoutimi in the Indo Asia Pacific, and HMCS Windsor in the Mediter-ranean�  HMCS Kingston and Summerside were deployed to the Gulf of Guinea contributing to Maritime Security in West Africa� HMCS Whitehorse and Edmonton deployed to the east-ern Pacific and Caribbean to work with the US Coast Guard on Counter Narcotic Operations, and HMCS Vancouver and Calgary have deployed to the Indo Asia Pacific to reinforce a persistent Canadian presence in that important region of the world� HMCS Ville de Quebec is currently deployed in support of NATO with a new and exceptionally capable Cyclone heli-copter as Canada’s ongoing maritime commitment to NATO� It is no small challenge sustaining a globally deployed Navy, and the leadership of the RCN is immensely appreciative of the ONE NAVY team, regular, reserve, and civilian, who enable this success�  More importantly, we can’t thank the families enough for their support and sacrifice of their loved ones who are deployed on behalf of our country�

Although the team is equally busy today supporting operations at sea, we are also in the process of retooling every aspect of the RCN to ensure that we are enabled to leverage the exceptionally advanced technologies and capabilities that will shortly be introduced into the fleet�  Every aspect of our business has been examined to ensure that we adapt to the technologies, as opposed to forcing it to adapt to our “old” processes�  We have enabled a functional command and con-trol construct that enables quicker and more agile decision making� Our occupations are being modernized to provide more depth and breadth in how we employ our exceptionally talented sailors�  New policies, such as our pregnancy policy, are being introduced as our commitment to being an inclusive and diverse organization�  Technologies are being introduced at sea, such as WIFI, to ensure we remain an attractive or-ganization for millennials and netgens� We have expedited reserve enrolment so that Canadians can join their local naval reserve divisions and we are enabling distributed training to ensure that they can train in their local communities�  The only constant in the RCN for the next several years will be

Continued on page 15

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 3

The Underappreciated Importance of Naval Logistics to the National Shipbuilding Strategyby Ken Hansen

Cdr Ken Hansen (ret’d) is the owner of Hansen Maritime Horizons which focuses on maritime operations and analysis, and a researcher at the Dalhousie University Institute for Ocean Research Enterprise in Halifax.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

As Canada moves forward with building plans for ships stemming from the National Shipbuilding Strategy, choices made will shape our maritime capabilities

for decades to come� Assumptions by the score about what type of employments the ships will face are the foundations for their planning and construction� A long history of under appreciating the importance of logistical factors runs up to and includes the most recent of ship class operated by navy, the Halifax-class frigates� Understanding these problems will greatly assist decision makers when they consider the options before them� To be truly sovereign and independent, Canadian maritime forces need adequate logistical capacity to enable maritime commitments made on behalf of the government� As a planner of operations and an educator for students of the art, I have observed how logistics is almost always the factor that dictates the degree of success or the reason for failure in operations� Operational logistics is the science behind modern naval planning� It is vital that its importance influences ship design, or at the very least the ships chosen from the options available, before it threatens their operating capabilities�

Operational logistics has been described as “what really makes a so-called blue water fleet blue,”1 and “a vital under-pinning of a navy’s strategy�”2 It has also been recognized as either “a critical constraining or permissive factor” for the navy in both peacetime and war�3 The ability to deploy naval forces and project national power at varying distances from home waters is the key discriminating feature in the typology used by the Canadian navy�4 Despite being such a critical factor for everything from strategy to tactics, logistics is an underappreciated subject by academics� Jon Sumida called it “a historiographic orphan�”5

The Canadian navy’s own degree of understanding about naval logistics is only slightly better than that of the academics’� A profound lack of general and advanced knowledge about logistics was identified in a needs assessment study during my time at Canadian Forces College, leading to a revamp of the Maritime Component Program curriculum� Getting naval forces to the area of operations in time to take effective action is directly related to the ability to use sustained speed� This capability is founded principally upon the logistical capacity of the deployed force� Regrettably, that program of study is no longer in existence and has not been reinstituted

elsewhere� Meanwhile, the navy’s main stated requirement is for combat-capable warships�

The Canadian professional perspective on naval logis-tical capabilities is based on a profound misunderstanding about their historical origins and the operational concepts related to them� As an example, a commonly stated and wide-ly held myth in Canada is that Auxiliary Oiler-Replenisher ships (AORs) are the product of Canadian conception and planning�6 This is false� The true origins of the AOR concept and credit for the first operational multi-cargo replenishment ships belong to the Kriegsmarine, who used them to dramatic effect demonstrating how even limited operational logistics can act as a profound force multiplier� The true origins of the Canadian concept stem from an American improvised effort to implement fuelling at sea from escort oilers – merchant cargo ships fitted with a simple hose and boom system� This trial system was tested in mid-1942 by the American-Canadi-an escort group A-3, under the direction of Captain(N) Paul Heineman, USN, and was eventually implemented in less than a year with over 100 merchant tankers operating throughout the North Atlantic convoy system�7

The paying off of the last two of three Canadian replen-ishment ships, Protecteur and Preserver, on 19 September 2014 dropped the RCN from a trans-Atlantic navy to an offshore defensive one�8 Moreover, it also represented the end of a style of operations no longer relevant to contemporary defence plans�9 What the future holds for naval operational logistics is far from clear�

Today, the Canadian navy has an improvised sustain-ment ship, MV Asterix, the result of an emergency program to maintain perishable seamanship skills and raise the standing of the navy� The cost of the conversions and a five year lease was “under $700M;”10 the cost of renting the Spanish navy’s replenishment ship Patino in 2016 for 40 days was “approxi-mately $2�18M,”11 and renting a similar ship in 2015 from the Chilean navy, Almirante Montt, for 40 sea days cost $6M�12 This was done to preserve perishable seamanship skills related to replenishment at sea� Meanwhile, a plan is underway to build two German Bonn-class AORs, improved derivatives of the earlier Berlin-class, at the Seaspan shipyard in Vancouver, British Columbia�13 Estimated completion dates for the first ship vary; recently one suggested 2022�14 Cost estimates are increasing for the two Bonn-class ships and the latest widely quoted figure is $3�4B, an increase of $1�1B�15

The interval between the end of service by the two Protecteur-class AORs (Protecteur due to a fire in 2014 and Preserver in 2015 due to advanced corrosion) and the arrival of Asterix in Halifax in late December 2017 left the Canadian

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navy without a critical capability for between two and three years� Obviously, the cost of interim replacements has been significant� What is not so obvious is that a far cheaper and effective short term option could have been implemented in months, not years, but the naval leadership chose to recreate a familiar option at the risk of lost seamanship skills and naval capabilities� The choice of using a modestly converted com-mercial tankship as a stop-gap measure was not considered, even though the Royal Australian Navy has shown that this was a reasonable expedient when they were confronted with an almost identical dilemma�16 Purchased as a temporary pal-liative in 2004, the ship continues in service to this day� Less well known is the fact that Canada has used exactly this type of concept to provide effective sustainment to its operating forces during the Second World War�

The planned costs for the Canadian replenishment ships pales into insignificance when compared to the amount of time, money and effort spent to modernize the Halifax-class frigates and the Victoria-class submarines, or the enormous funds to be spent on the next generation of surface warships under the National Shipbuilding Strategy�17 Logistics, put bluntly, is not ‘sexy’ and is underappreciated by the senior leadership of the navy, who seem only to care for combat vessels and will sacrifice anything to preserve what they view as core capabilities� Operational logistics has been one of those sacrifices, which is a colossal blunder made by leaders who do not understand a key component of their own navy’s capability or its history� This mistake has also been made by other generations of leaders in the RCN�

Operational logistics should be central to any discussion about what type of navy Canada will have in the future, what operations it will be able to undertake, where they could occur and how long they can persist� Understanding the theory of naval operational logistics and the essential nature of mobile sustainment capabilities to naval forces must be integral to future planning and to knowing whether or not joint support requirements will conflict with the very specific needs of the navy�

The Compromise between Size, Speed and Fuel Capacity in Warship Design

The connotation of speed has three distinct meanings in naval strategy, operations and tactics� The close connection between fuel capacity, either internal to a ship or augmented by a dedicated sustainment function, and the ability to use speed to advantage is key to appreciating the operational value of logistics�

In the strategic sense, speed relates to generating and de-ploying force expeditiously so that they can serve either as an effective deterrent, or as an efficient counter to enemy action already launched� Strategically, speed relates mainly to naval readiness to deploy, but it also pertains to the durability and capacity of ships to employ sustained speed over oceanic dis-tances: short ‘sprints’ of very high speed are not important in

the strategic context� Adverse weather conditions can reduce endurance by up to 30 percent, and the need to employ evasive routing for weather avoidance, or for enemy avoidance, can add significantly to the total distance to be travelled� Logistical capabilities are enablers to strategic movement, both from the perspective of volumetric capacity and speed of transit�

In the operational context, speed relates to the ability to concentrate force sufficiently for the attainment of mission aims, or to counter enemy plans of action� Operationally, naval forces are best employed when a high tempo of activity minimizes delay between phases of the campaign plan and between major actions� The speed required is delineated by the operational abilities of the enemy: our force needs only to move marginally faster and sustain that speed a little longer than the opponent for it to be of operational significance�

Naval forces have historically been affected by a dynamic tension between the need to disperse to exert control over operating areas versus the necessity to concentrate for effective offensive and defensive action�18 Increasing ranges in weapons and sensors reduces reaction time and increases the demand for reactive speed in operations� Low endurance and the lack of operational logistics have been the most common causes of naval culmination�

Tactically, naval speed of action relates to the swift and effective delivery of firepower or the avoidance of circum-stances that provide the enemy with that opportunity� The advent of aircraft and missiles in naval warfare has extended the range of interaction between forces and diminished the operational and tactical significance of physical speed, placing emphasis instead on the ability to process information and reach the point of decision about whether or not the time is ripe for engagement�19

The physical need for tactical speed in warships has been diminished greatly by the existence of ship-based aircraft, swift boats, and the advent of unmanned and remotely operated vehicles of all types� Nonetheless, the operational concepts of presence and persistence in maritime operations, which take place in a notoriously hostile operating environment, still place a premium on the operational characteristics of endurance and reach� The tactical consequences of all these features are dictated principally by internal fuel capacity and propulsion efficiency� They can be augmented significantly by operational sustainment�20

The demands warship activities create for an operational logistics adjunct depend on a host of assumptions that went into their design� As early as 1911, American Rear-Admiral Alfred Mahan observed that all warships are the result of a process of compromise:

You cannot have everything� If you attempt it, you will lose everything� On a given tonnage…there cannot be the highest speed and the thickest ar-mor, and the heaviest battery, and the longest coal endurance�21 (Emphasis in original text.)

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 5

The implication of this compromise is that all ships will have special abilities best suited to certain purposes: the so-called general-purpose warship is, and has always been, a myth� These characteristics are the results of perceived needs that stem from the strategic setting of the era or from the dimly perceptible future� With the choice to focus on certain capabilities comes the consequence of having lesser abilities in other areas� The Canadian navy has suffered significantly from warship choices that placed a greater premium on speed and manoeuvrability than on capacity and endurance�22 Rec-ognition that this deficiency has played a major part in the navy’s developmental history is central to understanding the importance of operational logistics�

Compromise is the natural consequence of the phys-ical limitations within which naval architects must function: ships designed or built during periods of war, or in the lead up to them, will lean towards specialization in one or another type of combat operations, but none will excel in all of them� This means that difficult choices will have to be made in a wide variety of capability areas� The demand for operational logistics is determined in large part by that process of compromise and its consequences�

The naval re-quirements for speed and manoeuvrability also compete direct-ly against the design principles that promote seakindliness�23 Generally, longer and larger ships, because of their greater mass, have more inertia that gives them higher resistance to both linear and angular acceleration� They are, therefore, more seakindly� A less obvious consequence of size is the fact that greater length makes a ship more fuel-efficient� Its greater mass also allows a greater capacity for fuel�

Many complex hydrodynamic effects affect the movement of water around a ship�24 Generally, frictional resistance is proportional to the total wetted surface of the hull and approximately to the square of the ship’s speed�25 Speed, therefore, quickly becomes the most significant factor in determining frictional interaction between a ship’s hull and the surrounding water� Severe weather can also significantly increase fuel consumption by as much as 30 percent, and the combination of high speed in heavy seas can imperil the ship itself�

The type of endurance needed to sustain distant and long-duration operations seldom entered into Canadian naval planning� It is an underlying assumption that it will simply be available, either from national sources or from allied navies� The integration of sustainment into Canadian naval force

structures and operational plans is central to how the whole system functions, and yet few understand this aspect of our naval history or the reasons why it happens to be so today�

Several factors played major parts in determining the endurance characteristic of the Canadian navy� Three major ones included: the cultural loyalty of the RCN’s leadership to British patterns of short-range designs, a focus on battlefleet operations vice the protection of trade, and a Europe-centric focus that emphasised operations in the North Sea and eastern Atlantic vice the Pacific Ocean� Canadian warships leading up to the Second World War were typically short-range and low-endurance vessels optimised for limited tactical en-gagements associated with the battlefleet engagements� This general classification is shown in Table 1�

Canadian naval planners selected destroyers over high endurance cruisers and sloops in order to remain relevant to Royal Navy (RN) battlefleet surface operations, albeit at virtually the lowest level of combat capability�26

Low fleet endur-ance was not viewed as a major disadvan-tage by the RCN� The great equalizing effect of operational logis-tics was provided first by the fleet resources of the RN and, later, by the even greater ca-pacities of the United States Navy (USN)� So long as a threat could be identified that menaced

Canadian interests, all considerations in the design of warships favoured the enhancement of combat capabilities and the diminution of their other characteristics� Internal spaces were turned to more powerful machinery, longer-range weapons, magazines, and sensors, rather than greater fuel capacity, stores or accommodations� The combat logic upon which naval battles in the ‘gun era’ turned demanded awareness, speed of reaction and concentration of firepower to provide the greatest chance of success�27 As the range and accuracy of weapon systems increased, the imperative to sacrifice all un-necessary attributes for the sake of increased combat efficiency grew stronger� Eventually, however, the changing dynamics of the global security environment revealed a profound require-ment for operational logistics�

Operational Logistics—Its Functional Elements and their Applications

The three functional elements of the operational logistics system (supply, support and sustainment) are often confused and the terms are incorrectly used interchangeably�28 The first two, supply and support, are intrinsically connected with sustainment in major naval logistics systems� The design of

Warship Types Battlefleet Engagement (Low Endurance)

Trade Warfare (High Endurance)

Scouts Fleet Carriers (heavy & light)

Escort Carriers

Main Battle Units Battleships Battlecruisers

Leaders/Patrollers Light Cruisers Heavy Cruisers

Screeners/Escorts Destroyers Frigates

Flotilla Craft Torpedo Boats Sloops

(Civil designs) (Corvettes) (Cutters)

Skirmishers Fleet Submarines Trade Attack Submarines

Table 1 – General Division of Warship Types by Fleet Function and Endurance.

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these systems is a complex process of estimating demand and generating capacity to meet it� For the purposes of this paper, however, I will focus on sustainment�

In the naval context, the ‘supply chain’ is not a continu-ous connection at all, but a series of packets of various sizes and volumes that move along a flexible route at various and varying speeds� The constrictions on loading and unloading and the constraints on the size, speed and volume of loads are all vitally important considerations when planning the scope, intensity and duration of naval operations� Opera-tional pauses are usually euphemisms for period of enforced inaction when problems in the naval supply organization result in demand that cannot be met� This most often occurs when vital commodities were misdirected, arrived late or in insufficient quantity� The assessment of demand by operational planners is frequently underestimated, which leads inevitably to shortage� The most commonly underestimated supply item in naval warfare is fuel�

The sustainment function replaces items consumed during the course of operations� Fuel, food and ammunition are the most commonly discussed commodities, but any other

items of supply that are periodically replenished all fall under this category� Sustainment can be carried out while underway, at anchor or alongside� Any point of distribution represents the end of the supply chain� That terminal point of issue will itself be a unit that has replenishment needs due to its own consumption plus the outlays that it provides to clients�

Operational sustainment to naval units while under-way requires that the providing unit be designed in a way that facilitates ease of access to its reserves of stores� This is an important point of distinction from the supply element of the system, which is organized for volumetric efficiency� The flexible arrangement enhances the transfer process but reduces the volumetric capacity of the sustaining unit� The high density loading of the supply element represents a mobile reserve of materiel that compensates for variation in demand or imprecision in the estimation of need� Liquid cargoes are the easiest to arrange for efficiency while solids require space for access, handling, delivery and replenishment� The imperative for the sustaining unit is to function in such a way that it only impedes the tactical efficiency of the group to the absolute minimum, which has emphasized the value

- Family and friends cheer on the arrival of Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship HMCS Charlottetown at NB Jetty, Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Halifax, on September 2, 2018. Charlottetown is returning after six months away following OP MOBILE—its deployment to the Mediterranean Sea

where the ship operated with a multinational formation of surface vessels and submarines under NATO command and their response to the conflict in Libya.

— MCPL LEONA CHAISSON, FORMATION IMAGING SERVICES, NOVA SCOTIA

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 7

of underway replenishment over even temporary detachment of operating units to a resupply point� Creating a tactical vulnerability due to the need for sustainment is an anathema in a style of warfare that demands the utmost in awareness and reactiveness�29

The demarcation between the three functional elements in the operational logistics system has become blurred due to the innovation of combining the three components of the system into a variety of multi-purpose shore facilities and fleet units�30 Additionally, it has become a standard feature for mod-ern naval units to incorporate a degree of self-support through the development of technical tradesmen among sailors and the inclusion of workshops into ship designs� Storerooms, fuel bunkers and munitions magazines are all built according to estimates of the normal and wartime operating demands of service� Increased endurance through conversion of such spaces as water ballast tanks and engineering spaces to tankage have been used often to enhance fuel capacity� History has innumerable examples of ships being ‘crammed to the deck-heads’ with stores of all sorts to increase the human endurance of the ship� The same can generally not be said of munitions, which require safe stowage that prohibits casual arrangements� The space and resources needed for such logistical features are all tradeoffs in ship design�

Despite the almost purely tactical nature of the tasks undertaken by Canada’s naval forces, the key issue for anal-ysis is the provision of outsides resources at the local scene of action to extend the endurance or to enhance the effec-tiveness of deployed forces� These outside assets constitute an operational resource that higher authority offers to the tactical commander, or upon which the local commander can call when the need arises� Therefore, the logistical means under consideration are not purely tactical resources as they can also be subject to the calls of other nearby local tactical commanders, or can be withdrawn due to higher strategic or operational demands�

Key Examples of Operational Logistics from Canadian Naval History

The Battle of the Atlantic—the time when the Canadian navy reputedly ‘came of age’—contains many examples of the importance of operational logistics from both sides of the con-flict� The ineffectiveness of the RCN and the RN in early escort of ocean convoy operations in the Atlantic is seldom related to the endurance shortcoming of their warships� Likewise, German proficiency is not often attributed to their generally superior endurance and operational logistics system� This history has not been adequately mined for the operational lessons learned that inform doctrine development� Here are just a few and these only pertain to fuel, which is and will always be the primary requirement of warships in action�

The concentration of merchant shipping into convoys to provide the strongest possible escort increased round-trip voyage times� Diversion around known danger areas also

added transit time� The British Ministry of War Transport reported that return voyage times to the U�K� increased from about 90 days before France fell to about 122 days afterwards (+35�5%)�31 The one-way reduction in carrying capacity asso-ciated with the implementation of convoying was, therefore, between 15 and 20 percent even before problems of cargo un-loading and handling ashore plus losses due to enemy action or marine accident were taken into account� The weakness of British and Canadian escort forces compounded the problem of reduced volumetric carrying capacity of the merchant fleet by raising the likelihood of serious losses�

By prosecuting a widely dispersed anti-mercantile war, which was enabled by the superior endurance of their war-ships and their employment of operational sustainment, the Germans intended to dilute Allied escort forces by creating ‘danger areas’ over vast portions of the world’s oceans�32 Ger-man warship endurance, on average, was more than double that of the First World War�33 The invention of multi-cargo sus-tainment and support ships by the Kriegsmarine began with trials during 1928 with the chartered tanker Hansa and was perfected in the spring and fall fleet exercises of 1934 and 1935� Although a demanding seamanship evolution, the Germans found they could be ready to transfer fuel 20 minutes after the receiving ship began its approach to the supplying ship� During the Spanish Civil War, German warships frequently replenished at sea, achieving fuel transfer rates of 120 tons per hour under operational conditions�34 By the beginning of the Second World War, the Kriegsmarine included a mature operational logistics force that included seven distinct types of auxiliary naval logistics ships�35

The most impressive German logistics ships were the Dithmarschen-class multi-cargo and multi-purpose vessels� Dithmarschen and her five sisters could each carry nearly 9,000 tons of fuel oil, 400 tons of lubricating oil, ammunition, spare parts, provisions, and water� They were equipped with repair shops, hospital facilities, and accommodations for prisoners of war� They were also quite well armed with three 150-mm, two 37-mm and four 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, plus eight ma-chine guns� All of these extra features reduced the liquid cargo that could be carried but added significantly to the diversity of support they could provide to German naval operations� Their twin-shaft arrangement produced a top speed of 22 knots, giving them the capability to accompanying warships on high-speed transits or to outrun small patrol craft� At 582 feet, they were the longest and fastest oilers in service with any navy of that era� Their length was necessary to get their hull lines fine enough to achieve higher speed� A coincident benefit of streamlined shape was exceptional fuel economy� An impressive endurance of 12,500 miles at a brisk 15 knots was achieved without resorting to expending cargo fuel�36

The penultimate example of the effectiveness of Ger-man operational logistics was the sortie by the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on Operation Berlin, which took place between 25 January and 22 March 1941� The patrol

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lasted 60 days; it travelled over 17,800 miles� The raiders were replenished with 30,355 tons of fuel (245% of the combined capacity of both battlecruisers) and resupplied on six occa-sions by not less than six supply ships�37 In total, 22 Allied cargo ships, amounting to 115,622 tons, were lost and trans-Atlantic shipping cycles were completely disrupted� The shipping sunk in this operation exceeded that lost by the Allies in any of the great wolf pack convoy battles or due to any of the most successful cruises by a single U-boat�38

An equally innovative German development was the provision of logistical support by three submarine tankers (two improvised types and one purpose-built boat) during Operation Drumbeat in early 1942�39 Although the fuel trans-ferred average only 30 tons per delivery (27% of a standard Type VII medium-range u-boat’s capacity), the net result more than doubled the offensive power of the attack by allowing a continuous, multi-phased plan� By the end of the fifth phase of the campaign in mid-July, German U-boats had sunk 460 ships, which represented 83�3 percent of the 552 ships sunk in the North Atlantic that year� Fifty-seven percent of these losses were tankers, which were already in short supply and were more costly and slower to build than dry cargo ships� The net operational effect of at sea sustainment made torpedo capacity, rather than fuel, the limiting factor for U-boat op-erations�40 The tactical effect of this new methodology was to extend the length of a patrol by a Type VII boat by as much as four weeks�41 The purpose-built Type XIV U-tanker also carried four torpedoes that further enhanced their sustain-ing value� Effectively, there was no longer a distinction to be made based on endurance between the long-range Type IX and medium-range Type VII German submarines�42 These and other German initiatives forced Allied escort forces into a reactive posture�

In response to widening German surface and subsur-face trade warfare operations, the Admiralty extended convoy escort in progressive steps until a trans-Atlantic system was established in June 1941� From this point onwards, the lim-ited tactical endurance of most British and Canadian escorts played a major role in the conduct of convoy operations� To accommodate for this endurance shortcoming, and to shorten the distance traveled by escorts into and out of Iceland for fuel, convoy routes were shifted 600 miles northwards from the Great Circle path� A complicated series of ‘meeting points’ between escort groups was also required� While these adjust-ments saved fuel, it also added several days of extra steaming to a convoy’s total traveling time, reduced the effective car-rying capacity of the cargo ships, and limited flexibility for evasive routing� The combination of added distance and overly aggressive British escort tactics soon created an operational fuel shortage crisis that made convoys more vulnerable ev-erywhere� This was the exact opposite of the intended effect of extending escort coverage�

The Admiralty’s reaction to the worsening situation in the mid-Atlantic was the creation of the Newfoundland

Escort Force (NEF) based at St� John’s�43 The logistical expe-riences there spanned all levels of activity, from the strategic to the tactical, and involved all three of the elements of an operational logistics system�44

The first seven Canadian corvettes assigned arrived at St� John’s on 27 May 1941 and the first three-ship escort group sailed on 2 June to join the 57-ship Halifax to Liver-pool convoy HX-129� The convoy, which left Halifax on 27 May, was the first to have continuous close escort across the Atlantic� The RCN corvettes detached from the convoy and proceeded to Iceland for fuel while a RN group took up the continuing escort duty to the point where the eastern local escort group was met�

The lack of naval logistical capacity at St� John’s and the limitations of the support ships stationed there quickly caused a severe drop in operational effectiveness� Fully one-third of the entire British-Canadian force was normally out of service due to mechanical defects requiring major repair or refit in either the U�K or Halifax, where facilities were already over-burdened�45 By September 1941, the ten NEF groups each averaged just four effective ships from the sixty available�46 A standard American escort group was a squadron of eight de-stroyers� The USN commander of Task Force 4 (later renamed Task Force 24) operating at Argentia, Rear-Admiral Arthur L� Bristol, quickly became concerned over the weakness of the NEF� Captain Morton L� Deyo, Bristol’s destroyer commander in Iceland, observed the RCN ships arriving “tired out and just barely making it�” He anticipated greater problems during winter weather, including “break downs and ships running out of oil at sea�”47 In a letter dated 20 December 1941, Ad-miral Bristol wrote to Admiral Ernest King, then Command-er-in-Chief, U�S� Atlantic Fleet, and described the RCN as “a paper strength force” and that their difficulties in maintaining escort groups was primarily due to “the inadequacy of their maintenance ideas and facilities�”48 Convoy escort operations were being jeopardized by the limitations of the inadequate support arm of the operational logistics system�

Fuel for convoy escorts was the most immediate and persistent problem� Existing oil storage was only 4,500 tons at the Imperial Oil Company tank farm, which was considered only enough to meet merchant ship bunkering requirements� Two merchant tankers were assigned to serve as station oilers and to run a shuttle fuel service from Halifax or Montreal, each carrying about 10,000 tons of fuel oil� However, by early March 1942, the weekly outlay of naval fuels rose to 5,800 tons�49 By late March 1942, stocks of naval fuels in St� John’s had already declined to under 3,000 tons, which amounted to only three days of supply� By late April, all fuels at Halifax totalled only 45,000 tons, which was the equivalent of only 15 days of supply for all purposes�50 The continued viability of the trans-Atlantic convoy system was in serious jeopardy due to the inability of the naval supply system to provide and dispense sufficient fuel�

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 9

The timely advent of fuelling at sea by operational sus-tainment prevented the complete collapse of the trans-Atlantic escort system� From June 1942 onward, a small unit of RCN and USN forces began conducting operational experiments with refuelling at sea from commercial tankers in convoy� Captain Paul R� Heinemann, USN, commander of Task Unit 24�1�3 (Escort Group A-3) adapted the standard USN abeam refuelling method and trained RCN and some RN escorts in the practice� Simple canvas ‘deck wash’ hoses were passed from the tanker to the escort via a messenger line connected to the hose suspended from a side-facing cargo boom� He also brought the potential of underway refuelling to the attention of the British commander, North-Western Approaches, Admiral Sir Max Horton� Over the strenuous objections of his senior staff, Horton ordered the adoption of this practice by RN escort groups�51 An Admiralty signal directed fundamental changes to escort of convoy operations:

It has been decided that tankers fitted with oiling at sea gear for service as escort oilers are to be rec-ognised as forming an integral part of the convoy escort system in the proportion 2 escort oilers to each escort group�52

Even the basic definition of an escort group was changed: “The composition of an Escort Group is thus, in effect, the vessels forming the Group plus two Escort Oilers�”53 (Emphasis in original text�) Operational logistics had finally become an integrated concept in Allied convoy doctrine� This is the true origin of the Canadian task group concept; one that included a mix of combat vessels and dedicated logistical sustainment�

Once Allied force levels increased, aggressive anti-sub-marine hunting plans, known as ‘Swamp Tactics’, became the norm� Hunting the submarine to the limits of its submerged endurance with a saturation of air and surface units was made possible primarily by the luxury of unlimited fuel supplies for the extent of the engagement, which could last as much as 60 hours� This form of high-intensity anti-submarine operational planning and tactical execution became the pattern for post-war Canadian naval operations, but the linkage to operational sustainment was not clearly understood until long after the war’s end�

Despite the ‘lessons’ of the Battle of the Atlantic, when planning began in July 1943 for Canadian for participation in the war in Pacific the complete absence of sustainment ships in force plans was glaringly obvious� In contradiction to doctrinal guidance that the basic composition of an escort group contained a minimum of two oilers, the RCN assumed that the RN would provide all necessary logistical sustainment, supply and support�54 The wish of Prime Minister Mackenzie King for the RCN to be “wholly and exclusively Canadian, fighting as such but under American command in the same way that the British forces will be fighting [but] not however, as subsidiaries of the British Navy, as Churchill had expressed it,

but as a Canadian unit,”55 could never be accomplish because of its complete lack of logistical capabilities� The distances were double to triple those of the Atlantic war� Wherever the ‘parent’ navy went, so too would the RCN go� Without op-erational logistics, the Canadian Pacific Fleet might not even have been able to go home�

The war’s end brought a return to a defensive strategic posture for the navy� Fleets on both coasts were drastically reduced, with the force structure emphasis on light fleet carri-ers, light cruisers and fleet destroyers� Tactically, however, the emphasis remained on a high-intensity anti-submarine plan of action that was to be maintained for 90 days�56 The advent of nuclear weapons and the Cold War actually increased the importance of these tactics due to the consequences for Ca-nadian cities and citizens should the navy fail� By mid-1957, the basic operational assumption was that the fleet would take up hunting areas approximately 250 miles from a sustaining base� At that distance, warships would lose 14 percent of their operating time while in transit to replenish� This lost time could be made up either by the construction of six ex-tra anti-submarine ships, costing $25 million each or three replenishment ships, costing $15 million each� Based on such simple math, the naval staff agreed to recommend in principal the construction of three replenishment ships at an estimated approximate cost of 45�75 million�57

The assumptions behind the recommendation to acquire a sustainment capability made it possible to ignore, for the moment, the need for a supply capability� The replenishment ships would provide the most important commodities, in-cluding fuel, ammunition, naval and victualling stores, and helicopter spares� The small distance offshore would allow for temporary absence of the replenishment ships while they de-parted to replenish themselves while the warships functioned on their own reserves� The nuclear threat, which by the time of the 1959 RCN Defence Plan, included Russian submarines capable of launching missiles and torpedoes with nuclear war-heads intended to attack “the retaliatory capacity of the United States, centres of industry government and population, and sea lines of communication together with harbour facilities�”58 Part 4 of the plan, Personnel and Logistics, made provisions for stocks of material to be maintained as high as possible due to the assumed high rates of usage in combat operations� The support, supply and sustainment elements were devised to work at distances that were less than half the 531 miles from Halifax to St� Johns during the Battle of the Atlantic, when the system so nearly collapsed due to logistical insufficiency�

Files detailing initial analysis for HMCS Provider,59 the first Canadian AOR, clearly identify USS Concuh (ex-German Dithmarschen) as the origin of the concept�60 The archival records include detailed assessments of Concuh (AOR 110) during her evaluation with US 6th Fleet, including the final report of Commander 6th Fleet Service Force to Commander U�S� Atlantic Fleet, and interview notes with Commander Bruce Kroeger, Assistant Operations Officer for Commander

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Atlantic Service Forces, where the term “one-stop replenish-ment” appears for the first time� The RCN’s Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Plans) sent all of these files to the naval staff in Ottawa on 23 May 1956� Canadian naval liaison officers were quickly attached to a number of USN logistics ships� In short order they sent a steady stream of reports back to the naval staff in Ottawa detailing the latest technical improvements and procedural practices�61 Eventually, the deluge of information resulted in instructions to the officers to suspend reporting to allow designs for Provider to be finalized�

As the range of Soviet submarine weapon systems in-creased, the calculation of where the defence stations would have be located resulted in ever greater numbers of escorts to maintain the required level of tactical activity� By late-1958, the distance from base for anti-submarine operating areas had increased to 1000 miles, the loss in time while in transit for replenishment in port had climbed to 37 percent, and the number of anti-submarine ships needed to make up the deficiency had risen to 16�62 Typically, this did not, however, provoke a recalculation of the number of sustainment ships required�

The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, which transpired over 37 days between 14 October and 20 November, put the logistical inadequacy of the RCN under an intense light� (Provider did not join the fleet until 28 September 1963�) The Chief of Naval Staff wrote to the Minister of National De-fence and detailed how the aircraft carrier HMCS Bonaventure and her five escorts were recalled from the U�K� at the height of the crisis and were compelled to “pass through their oper-ational area to enter port, refuel and replenished before they could be given assignments�” He used the obvious threat and embarrassment caused by such “uneconomical expenditures in both time and fuel” to press for the building of the second and third AORs, as the government had not yet approved the funding�63 The necessary permission was eventually granted, but the total number of ships remained three�

The geostrategic environment caused the navy to focus first on local defence and to assume that they would be able to function at longer ranges with the support of NATO navies if the need arose� The main operating concept was still focused on sustained high-intensity tactical activity as a counter to the submarine threat� The sustainment ships were recognized as the key to achieving the level of operational activity needed for tactical success� Fleet supply ships, although recognized as valuable, were considered too expensive for the gain in capa-bility they would provide�64 The operational logistics system shrank at first to two elements (sustainment and support) and then to one element (sustainment) when the two escort maintenance ships were taken out of active service (the first in 1964, the second in 1970)�

The notion of a maximum 6-month rotation for deploy-ment on operations eliminated the need for mobile supply and support, while a limited sustainment capability could meet the demands of very irregular group deployments� The

concept of ‘repair by replacement’ reduced support activity to a supply problem, so long as inventories of spare parts were maintained� This supply dimension of a support problem was dealt with by having the replenishment ship carry stocks of critical items, just as the German Dithmarschen-class AORs had done� The introduction of ‘field service representatives’ from industry and the creation of temporary ‘forward logistics sites’ further reduced the need for a more capacious afloat capability� Planning operational activities and management of supply items became a matter of high skill accompanied by more than a little luck as the fleet aged and increased the demand for logistical support� Fortunately, the inherent flex-ibility of the group concept and the resilience of individual warships ensured the necessary minimum capacity to meet the tactical demands of the Cold War era� Whether any actual surge capacity existed is doubtful�

Has the Canadian Navy leaned anything from its past experiences with naval logistics?

It has been claimed that the two “resounding lessons” of the Second World War internalised by the naval staff were “the necessity of being technologically proficient” and “having vessels capable of trans-oceanic operations�”65 The fuel capacity characteristics of Canadian warships over the past 100 years show that the original trend of relying on low endurance war-ships has persisted until the very latest stages of the Cold War� Table 2 (next page) shows the relationship between bunkerage (fuel capacity) and the size of Canadian warships�

The ships built during the fuel and endurance crisis phase of the Second World War (identified by the inset box in the table) show a remarkable increase in fuel capacity, whether compared to their displacement or length� The average fuel capacity of all types in the table is �23 tons of fuel per ton of displacement, or 1�21 tons of fuel per foot of length� The average fuel capacity for the high endurance escorts built during the war are �45 tons of fuel per ton of displacement, or 2�07 tons of fuel per foot of length� These figures indicate an extraordinary 95�6 percent increase in fuel capacity per ton of displacement, or an equally impressive 71�1 percent increase per foot of length� The under appreciated requirement for speed and endurance at the war’s start was corrected by a dramatic rebalancing of the characteristics resulting from a peacetime predilection for combat capabilities�

However, once the fuel crisis was over, the naval bias in design emphasising combat capability over logistical capacity took hold again� The very low fuel capacity of the St� Laurent-class, and their multiple derivatives which had comparable characteristics, resulted in endurance and fuel capacity that was actually significantly lower than many of the warships that proved to be so deficient in this regard during the war� This fact demonstrates that one of the two “resounding lessons” was, in fact, not learned in Canada� Only the advent of more efficient combined diesel-gas turbine propulsion technologies allows today’s Halifax-class frigates to achieve

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 11

higher endurance on a proportionally smaller fuel load� When the strategic, operational or tactical circumstances dictate that higher speed will be required, the frigates will have to resort to their gas turbines and their endurance will drop substantially�

The continuing low endurance of Canadian naval vessels and the abandonment of the concept of local defensive operations as the basis for plans of action suggest two things� First, the trends underscore the absolutely critical need for sustainment ships in sufficient numbers; and second, they show that the same types of low-endurance combat ships are being built that resulted from the process of compromise leading up to the greats conflicts of the past� They will just as likely not have sufficient endurance if and when they are put to the acid test of high-intensity operations� The diesel engines of the Halifax-class were not included in the recently completed life extension and modernization program�

Limited operational logistics, particularly sustain-ment, represents a critical vulnerability� As the German expe-rienced in the Second World War showed, a perceptive enemy will target sustainment units in order to reduce the scope and intensity of operations that can be mounted� While impro-vised logistical arrangements will never have the capacity or effectiveness of purpose-built systems, even small changes in capacity can have a profound operational effect, sometimes with strategic consequences�

The era of threat-based planning is over� The military role of the navy does not envision defensive high intensity operations close to the homeland as there is generally ac-cepted to be no direct military threat� Globalization and the need to keep the economic system stable have reduced the likelihood of state-on-state warfare�66 The concept of engaged internationalism means that Canada wishes to participate in operations to alleviate suffering, uphold the rule of law and

promote human rights in the “four corners” of the globe� Yet, the Canadian navy has been left with the notion that a limited, single-armed operational logistics system originally designed for operations just off the Canadian coast is appropriate for its fleet of limited endurance ships� Worse, the three original replenishment ships have been replaced by a single interim ship of limited utility� Worse still is the notion that the next generation of sustainment ships will be a joint asset that can simultaneously act in a number of supply, support and sustainment roles for the other services� The potential for a conflict over priorities is bound to arise� Whose priorities are liable to take precedence?

Building logistical capacity into future plans

The first step in a corrective plan should be to dispense with the overarching bias toward combat capabilities in the design of warships� All ships should have enhanced stores and fuel capacities for achieving the highest endurance possible� Beyond this, reserve capacity should also be included in ma-jor and minor warship designs to facilitate supporting other government departments and non-governmental agencies�67 Plans to reduce the size and capacity of the Arctic and Off-shore Patrol Ships as an economy measure were particularly short-sighted in this regard� The demands upon the support, sustainment and supply elements of the operational logistics system can be reduced substantially by making adequate provision for the first users of naval capabilities�

The second step must be to recognize the current limitations of the sustainment element of the operational lo-gistics system� The Bonn-class replenishment ships will have less capacity for naval and aviation fuels than their predeces-sors� Naval tasks in the military, constabulary and diplomatic roles could require deployment to the furthest reaches of the

Class Type Tonnage Length Bunkerage Fuel/Ton Fuel/Foot Endurance

Thornycroft S DD 905 276 300 .33/1 1.09/1 2,300@10A-class DD 1,320 322 380 .29/1 1.18/1 5,040@10C-class DD 1,375 329 473 .34/1 1.44/1 5,775@10Bangor MS 670 180 160 .24/1 .89/1 2,800@10Algerine MS 990 225 260 .26/1 1.02/1 5,000@10Flower CVT 940 205 230 .24/1 1.12/1 3,450@12IE Flower CVT 976 208 440 .45/1 2.12/1 4,830@15Castle CVT 1,010 252 480 .48/1 1.90/1 9,400@10River FF 1,570 301 646 .41/1 2.15/1 7,500@15Tribal DD 1,927 377 520 .27/1 1.38/1 5,700@15Valentine DD 1,710 363 615 .36/1 1.69/1 6,680@20St. Laurent DE 2,860 366 455 .16/1 1.24/1 4,570@14Halifax FFH 4,750 442 460 .10/1 1.04/1 7,100@15

Table 2 – Fuel Capacity of Canadian Surface Warships under 450 feet and 5,000 tons

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planet� While the sustainment ships have demonstrated their flexibility on numerous occasions, they are limited in capacity by design� The demand for operational sustainment increases dramatically with the distance, size of forces involved and the tempo of the operations undertaken� As shown in the case study of the NEF, a relatively small increase in the resources available to the operational commander can make an extraor-dinary difference in the options and the effectiveness of the force� The liberty to use speed, whether for responsiveness or elusiveness, can make the difference between success and failure, between life and death�

The third step must be to recognize that joint de-mands could remove what the navy regards as essential ser-vice-specific logistical needs at a critical juncture� It will be grossly inadequate to plan for multi-role ships that can meet only one service’s demands while those of the other services go unsatisfied� Multi-purpose designs are acceptable so long as their flexibility allows both rapid conversion from one role to another, and the numbers provided allow for simultane-ous tasking to different missions� A “transformational fleet” of eight upgraded frigates, ten multi-role support vessels, four submarines and twelve coastal patrol craft has been proposed�68 This idea does not seem so out-of-place once the combat bias of the past is dispensed with and a clean-slate approach to future requirements is adopted� Associated with all of these considerations is the essential need to retain the design of future ships in Canada� This will ensure that our

estimates of logistical need will shape the future, rather than that of foreign engineers or planners�

Volumetrics is an important dimension of naval sci-ence that has yet to receive appropriate attention in Canada� Future missions will almost certainly demand distant opera-tions in any one of the three roles of the navy� The enormous size of the Canadian maritime seascape means that even a domestic mission could demand operations at ranges far in excess of anything planned for in the past 100 years of the navy� Whether a domestic or foreign operation, be it military, diplo-matic or constabulary, the new security environment will put a premium on an effective operational logistics system that is able to sustain, support and supply both the navy and its sister services, plus the various branches of the federal government, in addition to whatever other non-governmental agencies may be partnered in a coalition effort to achieve mission success� The logistical component is the unifying dimension of all three roles of the navy� Improvements in logistical capacity will enhance all service, government and alliance operations�

The current Canadian conception of naval operational logistics stems from its history of trans-Atlantic operations during the Second World War and the Cold War� Canada’s specialized and geographically limited naval forces led to a truncated version of a complete operational logistics system� With the end of the period of threat-based planning, a more complete operational logistics system is required to enable a truly flexible and globally useful Canadian navy�

- HMCS Windsor returns to its home port of Halifax after an historic deployment to the Mediterranean Sea.

—DND CANADA

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 13

Notes

1 James L� George, History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 213�2 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 174�3 Ibid�4 Chief of Maritime Staff, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa, ON: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2001), 44�5 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, “British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914-1918� The Journal of Military History, Vol� 57 (July 1993), 447-480�6 For one such view, see: Duncan E� Miller and Sharon Hobson, The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War (Toronto, ON: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 225 – 226�7 For a fuller description, see: Kenneth P� Hansen, “Escort Oilers: The untold story of the Battle of the Atlantic�” New Interpretations in Na-val History: Selected Papers from the sixteenth Naval History Symposium held at the United States Naval Academy, 10-11 September 2009 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press) pp� 99-114�8 Scott Gilmour, “The sinking of the Canadian navy,” MacLean’s, 4 August 2015, https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-sink-ing-of-the-canadian-navy/ Accessed 12 September 2018�9 For a history of the force structure implications of the AORs, see: Ken Reynolds, “One Stop Shopping: Replenishment at Sea and the Royal Canadian Navy, 1945-1961” in Richard H� Gimblett & Richard O� Mayne (eds�) People, Policy and Programmes: Proceedings of the 7th Maritime Command (MARCOM) Historical Conference (2005) (Winnipeg, MN: 17 Wing Publishing Office for the Canadian Naval Heritage Press, 2008), 229 – 250�10 Michael MacDonald, “Navy welcomes interim supply ship while awaiting military replacements�” Globe and Mail, 6 March 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/navy-welcomes-interim-re-supply-ship-while-awaiting-military-replacements/article38220436/ Accessed 12 September 2018�11 Paul Withers, “Spanish ship arrives in Halifax to help Canada’s naval supply ship gap�” CBC News https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/sps-patino-supply-ship-royal-canadian-navy-1.3446219 Accessed 12 September 2018�12 David Pugliese, “Canada’s Navy ‘Rents’ Chilean Supply Ship�” Defense News�Com, 11 July 2015, https://www�defensenews�com/na-val/2015/07/11/canada-s-navy-rents-chilean-resupply-ship/ Accessed 12 Septembewwr 2018�13 “Canada’s Next Generation of Non-Combat Vessels” Seaspan Ship-yards website, undated, https://www.seaspan.com/building Accessed, 12 September 2018�14 Lee Berthiaume, “Construction of new supply ships gets the green light from Ottawa,” Times Colonist, 17 May 2018, https://www.timescol-onist.com/business/construction-of-new-supply-ships-gets-the-green-light-from-ottawa-1.23306730 Accessed 12 September 2018�15 David Pugliese, “Joint Support Ship costs up by $1�1B – taxpayers will spent $3�4B on project�” Ottawa Citizen, 5 June 2018, https://ottawac-itizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/joint-support-ship-cost-up-by-1-1-billion-taxpayers-will-now-spend-3-4-billion-on-project Accessed on 12 September 2018�16 HMAS Sirius, Royal Australian Navy webpage, http://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-sirius Accessed on 14 September 2018�17 For an overview, see: National Shipbuilding Strategy, Public Ser-vices and Procurement Canada Website, https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/index-eng.html Accessed 12 Septem-ber 2018�18 Kenneth Hansen, “The History and Theory of Naval Effects-Based Operations,” in Allan English and Howard Coombs (eds�) Effects-Based Approaches to Operations: Canadian Perspectives (Ottawa, ON: Depart-ment of National Defence, 2008), 95 – 102�19 For a detailed explanation, see: Wayne P� Hughes, Jr�, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, (Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2000)� See especially,

Chapter 7, “The Great Trends,” 169-227�20 For the purposes of this paper: replenishment is the tactical activ-ity that pertains to the operational concept of sustainment; maintenance or repair pertain to support; and storing, ammunition and bunkering (more commonly, fuelling) pertains to supply�21 Alfred T� Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston, 1911), p� 44, cited in John B� Hattendorf and Wayne P� Hughes, Jr�, (eds�) Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1991), xxxi�22 For an examination of the low endurance of RCN destroyers during the Second World War, see: Kenneth Hansen, “The “Destroyer Myth” in Canadian Naval History,” Canadian Naval Review, Vol� 2, No� 3 (Fall 206), 5 – 9�23 Seakindliness is that property in a ship [or boat] which produces a comparatively slow, small and easy motion in spite of rough seas and weather� C�A� Marchaj, Seaworthiness: The Forgotten Factor, (London, UK: Adlard Coles Ltd, 1986), 6�24 Aerodynamic effects can also be important but are not considered here in the interests of brevity� 25 R�S� Crenshaw, Naval Shiphandling, Annapolis, MD: 1975, 4th ed� (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955), 30� Thomas C� Gillmer, Modern Ship Design, 1975 ed� (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1970), 106-108�26 Torpedo boats had been dropped from the RN fleet plan by the end of the 1920s, when RCN fleet plans were being formulated, frigates did not appear until after the start of the war: George, History of War-ships, 248�27 Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat� See especially, Chapter 6, “Evolution of Tactics in the Age of Missile Warfare,”145-168�28 Vice-Admiral George C� Dyer (ret�), USN, Naval Logistics, 2nd ed� (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1960, 1962), 128-141�29 This logic is the reason that replenishment of minor warships from major ones was, in large part, eliminated from standard practice�30 Tim Fish, “Multipurpose Ships: logical solutions for the small navy�” Jane’s Navy International (December 2009), 12-19�31 Catherine B�A� Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, (London, UK: HMSO and Longmans, Green and Co�, 1955), 109, n� 3�32 Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War� Vol� I�, The Hunters, 1939-1942, (New York, NY: Random House, 1996), 39-40�33 Kenneth Hansen, “Raeder versus Wegener: Conflict in German Naval Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol� 58, No� 4 (Autumn 2005), 81 – 108�34 Paul Zieb, Logistische Probleme der Marine, (Neckargemünd: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft, 1961), 83-85�35 The seven types were: fleet supply ships (Dithmarschen-class); auxiliary fleet supply ships; escort tankers; ‘V’ stores ships for the surface fleet; ‘Z’ stores ships for the submarine fleet; plus port tankers and port supply ships that served as ‘station ships’� Jak P� Mallmann Showell, (Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton, 1999), 116-126�36 Dithmarschen Technical Data Website, http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/auxships/dithmarschen/tech.html, accessed 3 July 2010�37 Peter Handel-Mazzetti, “The Scharnhorst-Gneisenau Team at its Peak,” Proceedings, Vol� 82, No� 8 (August 1956): 852-860� See also: Stephen W� Roskill, The War at Sea� Vol I�, (London, UK: HMSO, 1956), 373; and Graham Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 40-70� Roskill indicated “at least five ships” while Handel-Mazzetti said “no fewer than nine supply ships” were employed� Rhys-Jones tends to confirm Han-del-Mazzetti� It seems likely that six different ships (Adria, Schlettstadt, Esso-Hamburg, Friedrich Breme, Ermland, and Uckermark) conducted a total of nine refuelling operations at six different positions�38 In March 1943 convoy ON-166 lost 14 ships totaling 87,901 tons to attacks by 19 U-boat� The U-boat Net website, “Greatest Convoy

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Battles,” http://uboat.net/ops/convoys/battles.htm, accessed 07 July 2019� U-107, commanded by KptLt� Günther Hessler, sank 14 ships totalling 86,699 tons on a single patrol conducted between March and July 1941� The U-boat Net Website, “The Most Successful Patrols,” http://uboat.net/ops/top_patrols.htm, accessed 07 July 2010�39 For complete details, see: John F� White, U-Boat Tankers, 1941-45: Submarine Suppliers to Atlantic Wolf Packs, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998)�40 Roskill, The War at Sea, I�, 100�41 U-boat�net website, “Operations – Drumbeat”, URL: http://uboat.net/ops/drumbeat.htm� Accessed 31 July 2010�42 Kenneth Hansen, “King, Canada, and the Convoys: A Reappraisal of Adm� Ernest King’s Role in Operations Drumbeat,” Maochun M� Yu (ed�), New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Fif-teenth Naval History Symposium, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 57 – 80�43 Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History, Vol� II (Ottawa, ON: King’s Printer, 1952), 193�44 For a more detailed analysis of the importance of fuel in convoy operations, see: Kenneth Hansen, “Escort Oilers: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Atlantic,” Craig C� Felker, (ed�), New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy 10-11 September 2009, (Gainesville, FL, University Press of Florida, 2010), 162-186�45 W�A�B� Douglas, Roger Sarty & Michael Whitby; with Robert H� Caldwell, William Johnston & William G�P� Rawling, A Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1943-1945, Volume II Part2 (St� Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2007), 228�46 Douglas, et al, A Blue Water Navy, 223� Tucker, II�, 198�47 United States Navy, Administrative History of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in World War II, Vol. II, Commander Task Force Twenty-Four, (Washing-ton, DC: Commander in Chief, United State Atlantic Fleet, 1946), 91�48 United States Navy, Administrative History of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in World War II, 105�49 Tucker, II�, 194�50 Robert C� Fisher, “We’ll Get Our Own: Canada and the Oil Ship-ping Crisis of 1942,” The Northern Mariner, Vol� III, No� 2 (April 1993), 33-39�51 Hansen, “Escort Oilers,” 162-186�52 Message, Admiralty to CINC CA NWA, 7 June 1943, RG 24, Series D-1-b, Box 3960, File 1044-1-26, Pt� 1, Library and Archive of Canada (hereafter, LAC)�53 Memorandum, “Notes for Escort Oiler Supervising Officers, New York and Halifax – Duties and Responsibilities,” 22 May 1943, RG 24, Series D-1-b, Box 3960, File 1044-1-26, Pt� 1, LAC�54 Tucker, II., 99-104, 464-465�55 King Diary, 14 September 1944, cited in Hennessy, The Rise and Fall of a Canadian Maritime Policy, 1939-1965, 128�56 Memorandum, DNPO to ACNS (P), “RCN Logistics Support Policy,” 20 January 1958, File NSTS 1650-42, DHH�57 Minutes of the 19/57 Meeting of the Naval Staff held on 16 August 1957� Canadian Forces College Information Resource Centre collection�58 RCN Defence Plan CBCN 6904(59) RG 24, Accession 83-4/167, Vol� 11, 147, File 1400-1 (Vol� 1), 7 – 8, LAC�59 “Construction of Ships - Oiler/Tanker Replenishment,” 1957, Vols 1 – 9, RG 24, Accession: 1983-84/167, Box 3752, File S-NSS-8200-AOR-508, LAC� 60 For a detailed history of Dithmarschen’s career as USS Concuh, See: Thomas Wildenberg, Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replen-

ishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912-1992, “Under Two Flags” (Chapter 19), (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 204 – 216�61 “Ships and Shipping – General Information – Replenishment at Sea,” RG 24, File 8000-24-1 (Volumes 1 & 2), Box 3540, LAC�62 Memorandum, MND to Cabinet Defence Committee, “Tanker Supply Ships,” 3 September 1958, File 79/246, Folder 60, DHH�63 Memorandum, CNS to MND, “Tanker/Supply Ships,” 19 Novem-ber 1962, File 79/246, “Project H-1, Tanker Supply Ships,” Folder 60, DHH�64 Minutes of the 142nd Meeting of the Policy and Projects Coordi-nating Committee, 16 June 1958, File 27/246, “Project H-2, Underway Stores Replenishment – Fleet Issue Ships,” Folder 60, DHH�65 Margaret Shepherd and Michael Hennessy, “Naval Shipbuilding in Canada: An Introductory Review of a Century,” Ann Griffiths and Eric Lerhe (eds�), Naval Gazing: The Canadian Navy Contemplates its Future, (Halifax, NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2010), 193 – 205�66 Chief of Force Development, The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030: Part 1, Current and Emerging Trends (Ottawa, ON: 17 Wing Publishing Office, 2009), 3-5� The section on “Military and Security Trends” has been relegated to the last third of the book�67 These capacities can include storage for unique equipments, hotel services, spaces for planning and work activities, and the commodities needed to sustain their operations, which can include communications capabilities of a wide variety of types�68 Richard H� Gimblett, “A ‘Transformational’ Fleet for Canada in The 21st Century,” Maritime Affairs (Spring/Summer 2000), 42-46�

change and our timing could not be better, as the Future Fleet is arriving now� 

The future- HMCS Harry DeWolf, will be launched in the middle of September and officially named in October� Steel is being cut for the future HMCS Protecteur, the Vic-toria Class submarines will commence their modernization program shortly and the selection of the future backbone of the RCN, the Canadian Surface Combatant, is anticipated by the spring of 2019�  The RCN looks forward to the challenges of introducing these new platforms into service�

The RCN’s success, no matter how it is defined or mea-sured, lies in our people� People First, Mission Always is the core principle that underpins how the RCN approaches all that it must do moving forward� The RCN prides itself on being a bold, diverse, and inclusive team that is ready to meet the challenges of the 21st century� The RCN is continually evolving as an innovative and youthful organization that welcomes and attracts Canadians, young and old, from all demographics across the land, from coast, to coast to coast� The future of the RCN as outlined in Strong Secure and Engaged is bright� We have a detailed plan to deliver that future and we look forward to welcoming any and all Canadians who want to see the world a make a difference as a member of the One Navy Team�

Lloyd—continued from page 3

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 15

Great things underway for the RCN’s peopleby Michel Thomassin

Lt Michel Thomassin is a member of the Public Affairs Branch, Royal Ca-nadian Navy.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is changing, and to do that, it has a new vision: Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fight� The RCN provides assistance at home

and abroad in times of major crises, such as the flooding that occurred in Canada or the devastating hurricanes in the Ca-ribbean� It demonstrates outstanding leadership in domestic and international operations by playing its part in the defence of Canada and by participating in major operations with our allies� It supports NATO operations by conducting anti-sub-marine warfare patrols in Europe and deploys its submarines around the world�

Canada’s defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged de-scribes the role of the RCN in defending Canadian sovereignty in its territorial waters, as well as Canadian strategic interests that depend on stable international maritime order based on international law� To do this, the RCN is committed to maintaining its excellence at sea, modernizing its business management practices, transitioning to its future fleet, and motivating and supporting its Regular and Reserve Force sailors, its civilian employees, and their families� The motto “People First, Mission Always” reflects the unequivocal im-portance of the team to the organization’s success�

Recognizing the importance of our personnel, the RCN has undertaken major changes starting with its recruitment strategies� As in Canada itself, the principles of diversity and inclusion are core Royal Canadian Navy values� Diversity and Inclusion help contribute to the well-being of our One Navy Team and help ensure our forces reflect Canadian society� Everyone has a place within the organization and can pursue a career in over 80 jobs that will take them aboard the ships and submarines of the RCN� The Navy has set ambitious goals to attract: 25�1% women, 11�8% members of visible minorities and 3�5% First Nations people�

There are a number of entry programs, some of which provide funding for the full costs of the member’s college or university studies� The RAVEN program is for indigenous Canadians interested in military and/or civilian career op-portunities within the Canadian Armed Forces and Depart-ment of National Defence� The benefits for potential recruits and their families are substantial and include competitive wages, recruiting bonuses for some jobs, a pension plan after 25 years of service, parental leave benefits at 93% of regular salary, as well as a number of personalized financial services for members�

Knowing that a career with the RCN is very demanding and requires sailors to be away from their families for long

periods of time, families will be able to rely on the many resources available at either one of the home ports in Hali-fax, Nova Scotia, or Esquimalt, British Columbia� These two beautiful regions, located on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts respectively, provide all the support members and their families need� Personalized assistance is offered to families to identify their needs and guide them through the range of services, including childcare, second language training, arts and sports activities, and more�

Life aboard has improved significantly as we embrace many innovations� For example, the RCN has installed Wi-Fi connections on its fleet of Halifax-class frigates and its Kings-ton-class maritime coastal defence vessels� As a result of this project, sailors now have access to an Internet connection and can communicate with their families and friends, reducing the hardship and isolation inherent in the life of a sailor� It is a way for members to stay in contact with their loved ones and be connected on social networks� For the chain of command, it is also a new way to communicate directives internally�

The RCN recognizes that its sailors are the foundation of its many successes, whether exercises or missions, at home or abroad� That is why it continues to innovate by improving conditions at sea� It provides members with unparalleled benefits: stability for their families, pension after 25 years of service, competitive parental leave, Wi-Fi aboard its ships, and exceptional physical training facilities� Finally, the RCN is committed to respecting the principles of equity, diversity and inclusion and strives to draw on all this country’s strengths so that it is representative of the Canada of today�

Ian Parker of the Naval Association of CanadaKen Hansen, a leading Canadian maritime expert,

explores in some detail the importance of logistics to the Canadian ship building program – a frequent topic of his at-tention� Ken argues that “logistics is almost always the factor that dictates the degree of success or the reason for failure in operations” and “despite being such a critical factor for everything from strategy to tactics, logistics is an underap-preciated subject�”

So to all of our former, current and future sailors (and those who wish they were), we hope that you enjoy the next two editions of SITREP� Parati vero parati!

Maj Daniel D. Eustace, CD, PhD (Ret’d) Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme

Editor’s Desk—continued from page 2

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