THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND TOWNSHIP REVOLT ^ SOUTH AFRICA

MARK SWILLING

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed the revival of organised massopposition to Apartheid. Fighting in the townships, labourunrest, classroom revolts, rent strikes, consumer boycotts,worker stayaways and guerilla warfare - all these have becomefamiliar features of South Africa's political landscape since1976. From the inception of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in1983, though, radical black opposition has assumed anincreasingly organised form thus enhancing its power andeffectiveness. :

This paper will argue that since the inception of the UDF, blackresistance in South Africa has become increasingly effectivebecause of the UDF's capacity to provide a national political andideological centre. However, it will also be argued that thecontemporary:history of township revolt was not due to strategiesformulated And implemented by the. UDF's national leadership.Instead, with the exception of the crucially important electionboycotts of 1984, the driving force of black resistance that haseffectively immobilised the'coercive and reformist actions of thestate has emanated from below as communities responded to theirabsymal urban living conditions. The result was the developmentand expansion of local struggles and organisations throughout thecountry. As these local struggles spread and coalesced, the UDFplayed a critical role in articulating common national demandsfor the dismantling of the Apartheid state. In so doing, theblack communities have been drawn into a movement predicated onthe notion that the transfer of political power to therepresentatives of the majority is a precondition for therealisation of basic economic demands such as decent shelter,cheap transport, proper health care, adequate education, theright to occupy land and the right to a decent and steady income.

The formation of the UDF was the outcome of a range of politicalresponses and struggles in black townships as the contradictionsof South Africa's combined structure of racial oppression andclass exploitation generated new tensions, stresses and conflictsfor the urban communities. The burgeoning trade union movementthat began in Durban in 1973 started flexing its muscles afterblack trade unions were legalised in 1979. Throughout the countryblack workers struggled to force employers to recognise unions aslegitimate representatives of the working class (1). Havingestablished themselves in the workplaces by the late 1970s, theseunions shunned distinctions between economic and political issues

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: Parts of this article are based on a paperco-authored by Tom Lodge and myself due to be published in Frenchin Les Temps Modernes. I am also grateful to Jeremy Seekings forhis criticisms and ideas. The conclusions reached in this paper,however, are my own.

and stric ;ly challenged state policies (2). Some of the moreimportant workplace struggles included the 1979 Ford strikes inPort Elizabeth, food worker strikes in Capetown in 1980, generalstrikes in the East Cape auto factories in 1980-81, theemergeance of militant general unionism in East London during theearly 1980s, and the East Rand general strikes of 1982-3. Thesemilitant struggles frequently connected with community campaignsand in so doing contributed to the development of an oppositionalpolitical environment that helped prepare for the establishmentof community organisations outside the workplace.

In the communities, beginning with the Eastern Cape and Soweto in1979 and spreading throughout the country, local organisationsmushroomed in the african, coloured and Indian areas. They builtup a mass-base by campaigning around such matters as housing,rents, bus fares, education and other urban services. In PortElizabeth the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) wasformed in 1979 as a coordinating body for the emergingneighbourhood, residents associations that were articulatinghousing grievances (3). In 1980 a widespread schools boycottbroke out in Capetown that resulted in coordinated action aroundeducation demands between students under the leadership of theCommittee of 81, teachers organised into Teachers ActionCommittees and parents represented by various area-based ParentsCommittees (4). This boycott spread to the rest of the,country,lasting into 1981 in the Eastern Cape. r-

During 1981r2, mass-based community and factory struggles brokeout in the Transvaal. These included the Anti-South AfricanIndian Council campaign against government created representativeinstitutions in the Indian areas, bus boycotts in the small ruraltowns, anti-Republic Day campaigns, general strikes over wagesand working conditions in the industrial centres of theWitwatersrand, protests against rent increases and inadequatehousing on the Rand (5) and an increasing number of ANC initiatedmilitary attacks. Finally, during 1982 and 1983 new communityorganisations emerged in Natal initially to oppose bus fareincreases but later to resist rent hikes in state-owned housingestates (6). In East London a bus boycott began in mid-1983lasting nearly two years and ended when commuters succeeded inaltering their transport conditions (7).

These struggles, and many similar smaller scale ones, steadilyconsolidated a new political culture that articulated theprinciples of non-collaborationism with government institutions,non-racialism, democracy and mass-based direct action aimed attransforming urban living conditions and challenging whiteminority rule. Contributing to this growing local consciousnessof a shared national political identity was the flowering ofradical community newspapers: Grassroots in Capetown, Speak inJohannesburg, Ilizwe LaseRhini in Grahamstown, Ukusa in Durban,The Eye in Pretoria, National published by the South AfricanStudents Press Union in Johannesburg, and Isizwe published morerecently by the UDF.

Formation and Organisation of the UDF ;i

In January 1983 Reverand Allan Boesak speaking at the finalconference of the Anti-South African Indian Council Campaign made

a call for the formation of a front to oppose > governments'new cohstitutional proposals designed to include che coloured andIndian minorities into two additional houses of parliament. Thisraison d' etre was later expanded to include opposition to newinflux control laws and local government structures for africans- the so-called "Koornhof Bills", in particular the Black LocalAuthorities Act of 1982 which provided for the establishment ofautonomous municipal institutions in the african townships.

A series of regional conferences subsequently took place inNatal, Transvaal and Cape to work out the organisational basisand ideological position of the Front. Finally, a national launchwas convened in Capetown on 20 August 1983. The approximately 600organisations that eventually affiliated to the UDF includedtrade unions, youth organisations, student movements, women'sgroups, religious groups, civic associations, political partiesand a range of support and professional organisations.

The UDF was concieved of as a front, a federation to whichdifferent groups could affiliate and a body which could linkdifferent social interests who shared common short-termobjectives. :It has a national executive and regional executivesfor Natal, .Transvaal, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Border,Northern Cape, Northern Transvaal and. Orange Free State.Affiliates, according to the constitution, have equal votingpowers on the regional and national councils which electofficials despite substantial differences in size. By early 1984the UDF's affiliates were classified as follows:

Region Student Youthorganisa- con-tions gresses,

leagues,etc.

Trade Women Civic Reli- Poli- Othersunions gious tical

TVLNatalW. CapeE. CapeOFS

1282331

1615271*131

8523

83202

3028272

11442

91194

16744

* 235 of these youth organisations wereChurch Youth.

affiliates of Inter-

(Source: Statistics compiled from list of UDF affiliates compiledby the UDF and submitted as exhibit D7 in State vs. MawalalRamgobin and 15 others.)

This list of affiliates, although officially compiled by the UDF,is misleading. Since early 1984, literally hundreds of communityorganisations allied to the UDF have sprung up around thecountry. For example, although only two OFS affiliates arelisted, there are currently six major community/educationalorganisations operating in Bloemfontein alone and about ten moresprung up in several small northern OFS towns during 1984-86. Thesame applies to many small Eastern Transvaal, Eastern Cape andWestern Cape towns.

Furthermore, the table gives a misleading picture of the

organisat lal strength of the UDF in various regions. Forexample, whereas only 33 affiliates are recorded for the EasternCape, the UDF is strongest in this region and relatively weak inthe Western Cape and Natal. The strength of the Eastern Capeorganisations has to do with the relatively small contained sizeof the communities, the existence of a single language group, theparticularly depressed economic conditions, a strong politicalresistance tradition, the absence of a viable state supported"moderate" group and the existence of a particularly skilful andenergetic group of contemporary leaders such as Mkhuseli Jack(Port Elizabeth), Weza Made (Uitenhage) , Gugil.e Nkwinti (PortAlfred), Mafa Goci (East London) and the late Matthew Goniwe fromCradock (8)

The table also gives a misleading impression of the UDF's tradeunion support. Although the major trade union federations havenot formally affiliated, they have developed strong workingrelationships with the UDF over the years. For example, both theFederation of South African Trade Unions and the Council ofUnions of South Africa collaborated with UDF affiliates duringthe Transvaal regional stayaway in November 1984 which wassupported by over one million people who stayed away from workand school in protest against army occupation of the townships,poor educational conditions and declining living standards (9).During 1986, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)worked closely with the UDF to coordinate nation-wide stayawayson Mayday and June 16 (10)) and in early October, theseorganisations committed themselves to a joint campaign of"National United Action" against"the State of Emergency.

A common combination of organisations in each community is acivic, youth congress, students organisation (a branch of theCongress of South African Students until its banning in 1985),women's organisation and in the metropolitan areas a trade unionlocal that acts more independently. There is no doubt thatalthough church and youth groups predominate on the UDF's list ofaffiliates, the civics, youth congresses and studentorganisations in that order are the the UDF's most importantorganisational bases. The leadership of these localorganisations varies from region to region. However, a commonpattern is that civics tend to be led by older residents,workers, professionals and clergymen regarded by the community ascapable and respected leaders. Contrary to a common view, thecivic leaders are rarely traders and businesspeople, the SowetoCivic Association being an a-typical example. The youthcongresses are often led by fairly well-educated unemployedyouths or young employed skilled workers who count as theirconstituency those young township dwellers who have been excludedfrom the job market by the recession and from school by age-limitrestrictions (11) . The student organisations are led by school-going political activists and the women's groups are frequentlyled by young and middle-aged women who have either graduated fromtrade union movements or educational organisations.

In addition, there are also a range of ad-hoc and constituency-based committees established to handle specific campaigns orrepresent particular'groups with special grievances. The mostwell-known organisations of the ad-hoc variety include theConsumer Boycott Committees and burial committees. Examples of

groups represented by constituency committees i 'ude squatters,commun'ities threatened with and opposed to wrced removals,commuters opposed to their transport conditions, hostel dwellers,traders, detainees, unemployed groups, professionals (e.g.journalists, clergymen) and the various Crisis Committees whichdeal with issues ranging from educational problems, housinggrievances and crime.

The strength and organisational coherence of the UDF's localaffiliates varies from region to region. By mid-1986 (i.e. priorto the 1986 State of Emergency) the Eastern Cape localorganisations were by far the strongest in the country due to theskill and energy of the leaders, the level of support theorganisations enjoyed, and the extent to which the communitieshad been drawn into the various structures of the UDF's localaffiliates. In the Western Cape, on the other hand, the localaffiliates are relatively weak, especially in the africancommunities. During 1985-6 the leadership of the africanorganisations split along class lines resulting in open violentconfrontation between Ngxobungwana, the corrupt slumlord "Mayor"of Crossroads and chairperson of the Western Cape Civic, andyouth congress activists. The result was the destruction ofCrossroads and defeat of the youth congress activists aftersecurity fotces exploited the division by actively supportingNgxobungwana's faction. In coloured areas, the grassrootsresidents associations that grew out of student-parentcooperative structures established during the 1980 schoolsboycott, split along ideological lines between UDF affiliates andthose supportive of a Trotskyite position associated with theUnity Movement.

Deep divisions in Natal's african areas have plagued UDFcommunity organisations in this region preventing them fromconsolidating the grassroots organisational gains made during the1982-3 period of agitation and mobilisation around transport andhousing issues. Instead, Zulu nationalism has been cultivated andexploited by Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkhata movement with the aim ofbuilding a reactionary alternative to mainstream nationaldemocratic and trade union organisations. Inkhata's localleadership, rooted in powerful petty bourgois political networks,have not hesitated to use violence to ensure the elimination ofUDF affiliates from Natal's african townships.

The Transvaal is too large and complex to allow forgeneralisations. Nevertheless, the UDF's local affiliates in thisregion are much stronger than in Natal or Capetown, but not ascoherent or effective as those in the Eastern Cape. In recentyears sophisticated local organisations mobilised around urbanissues have emerged in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging(PWV) region. By the end of 1986, these organisations wereparticularly strong and well organised in most areas surroundingJohannesburg/Pretoria (e.g. Soweto, Tembisa, Mamelodi and partsof Lenasia) and in many small towns in the Eastern Transvaal(e.g. Warmbaths, Witbank and Nelspruit). However, in other areas,UDF affiliates enjoyed considerable legitimacy despite relativelyweak and incoherent organisational structures at grassroots level(e.g. some Vaal and East Rand towships). In general, Transvaalorganisations have not been faced with paralysing ideologicaldivisions as in the Western Cape or an aggressive reactionary

alternati like Inkhata in Natal. The massive size, steadydeterioration and bankruptcy of the PWV's black townships havecombined to facilitate the building of fairly strong localorganisations committed to articulating community demands.

There are also important regional variations in the relationshipbetween regional executives and local affiliates. As far as theEastern Cape and Border regional executives are concerned, theyare based in Port Elizabeth and East London respectively and havehad very weak links with organisations outside these centres. Inboth these areas, the strength of the UDF has been located at thelocal level. The same does not apply to the Western Cape.Relatively weak local organisations coupled to ideologicaldivision has increased the importance of the Western Caperegional executive as an ideological and organisational centre.In Natal, the impact of Inkhata repression in African areas hasenhanced the importance of the relatively protected Indianactivists who have organised successful local organisationsaffiliated to the Durban Housing Action Committee. This helpsexplain why the NIC leadership plays such an important role inUDF politics at a regional level in Natal.

The combination of extensive repression (that hit the Transvaalexecutive particularly badly during 1984-6) and sheargeographical size of the region (with twenty-nine majortownships), made it impossible for the Transvaal leadership toconsolidate strong linkages between local and regionalstructures. It is not uncommon for local organisations to havehad absolutely no contact with regional leaders. Instead of theregional executive acting as the regional coordinators ofoppositional actitivities in the Transvaal, local leaders emergedto take responsibility for particular areas, e.g. Pretoria, EastRand, Soweto, Vaal/N.OFS and Eastern Transvaal.

What sort of people lead the UDF? The men and women who haveserved as its patrons, spokespeople and office-holders span fourgenerations of black political protest. There are the veterans ofthe mass campaigns of the 1950s, old ex-ANC stalwarts like ArchieGumede from Natal, Oscar Mpetha from Capetown, Henry Fazzie andEdgar Ngoyi from Port Elizabeth, and some of the Federation ofSouth African Women leaders like Albertina Sisulu and HelenJoseph from Johannesburg and Frances Baard from Pretoria.

Then there are the survivors of the first Umkonto We Sizweguerilla offensive of 1961-65. The present national chairperson,Curnick Ndhlovu is one of these and the ex-chairperson of theBorder regional executive Steve Tshwete who was recently forcedinto exile, is another. A surprising number of less well-knownmembers of this generation of political activists who have servedlengthy prison sentences are very active in many Eastern Capecommunity organisations, e.g. Mike Nzotoi and Anthony Malgas ofPort Elizabeth and Joe Mati of East London.

A considerable proportion of the UDF leadership comes from IndianCongress politics and particularly those responsible for revivingthe Natal Indian Congress in 1971. Mewa Ramgobin and GeorgeSewpershad from Natal'are two of the best known of such figures.

Probably the most important and politically sophisticated leaders

in the UDF graduated from the ranks of the Bis Consciousnessmovement of the early and mid-1970s. These inc.-de people likeMkhuseli Jack from Port Elizabeth, Curtis Nkondo, Terror Lekota,Popo Molefe and Aubrey Mokoena - all from Johannesburg. It isimpossible to calculate how many current UDF activists werepoliticised by the Black Consciousness movement of the 1970s.Throughout the country in the youth congresses, civics and tradeunions, there are such people working diligently to organise theworkplaces and communities. It is significant that many haveserved prison terms during which time they came into contact withprominent political leaders who persuaded them to drop theexclusivist black nationalism of Black Consciousness and adoptthe non-racial class-based framework of the "Charterist"tradition - i.e. the tradition espoused by the ANC and UDF.

Finally, there are political activists whose first politicalexperiences derives from the construction of community, youth,trade union and student organisations during the later 1970s andearly 1980s. These people became increasingly important during1985-6 because after the security forces detained the morewell-known seasoned activists, they found themselves responsiblefor ensuring the continuation of organisations under extremelydifficult conditions. These people span a number of generationsand are most evident in the street and area committees that haveemerged since 1985. Less articulate ordinary working class peopletend to be more at home in these decentralised bodies than inthe high profile mass meetings that have traditionally beenmeeting points for black political movements.

The heterodox social and class composition of the UDF leadershipbelies attempts to explain its ideological position usingsimplistic class categories. In particular, some writers makeunsubstantiated claims about its "petty bourgois leadership"(12). Unfortunately, the meaning of these terms is never defined.One implication is that the UDF is dominated by people withbourgois class origins and therefore they cannot be expected toadopt a proletarian ideology. Leaving aside for the moment thequestionable assumption that ideological affiliation is reducibleto class origins, these writers have misrepresented the classorigins of the UDF leadership. Although the UDF is undoubtedlymulti-class, a high proportion of the UDF's leadership either areor have come from poor working class backgrounds. The EasternCape regional executive is a good example. The President, EdgarNgoyi, is a building painter by profession. After beingpolitically active in the ANC in the 1950s he was charged andsentenced to 17 years on Robben Island. Henry Fazzie, Vice-President, was a full-time trade unionist in the 1940s-50s. Hewas also charged in the early 1960s and sentenced to 20 years onthe Island. Stone Sizani, publicity secretary, is a skilledworker in a chemical factory and Michael Dube, recordingsecretary, is a factory worker at Nova Board. Only Derek Swartz,general secretary, and the late Matthew Goniwe, regionalorganiser, are not workers. Swartz is a teacher and Goniwe was aheadmaster in Cradock.

The western cape regional executive has a slightly differentprofile. The president, who used to be a petrol pump attendant,was subsequently imprisoned for his political activities andafter his release has remained unemployed. The vice-president

started h adult life as a mine worker in the Transvaal. He thenworked ii. Capetown on a migrant labour contract where he becamean oraniser for the ANC linked South African Congress of TradeUnions (SACTU) during the 1950s. He was later imprisoned for hispolitical activities and has remained unemployed since hisrelease due to police harassment. The second vice president was aclothing worker but is now unemployed because of policeharassment. The remaining nine members of the executive areteachers, lecturers and students - four of whom have workingclass origins and the rest come from middle class backgrounds(13).

An analysis of the political biographies of UDF leaders revealsthree important trends: 1. a high proportion have beenpolitically active for substantial periods ranging from about 30years in the case of some of the older activists to nearly ten inthe case of the former Black Consciousness activists; 2. mosthave experienced long periods of detention and imprisonment (somefor twenty years) ; and 3. most are or have come from workingclass backgrounds. Significantly, their political careersdemonstrate that most? of the leaders have expended enormousamounts of energy conducting their political activities and, moreimportantly, they have been prepared to suffer long prisonsentences that have not prevented them from re-involvingthemselves after their release. It is also arguable that thelevel of repression these people have experienced has made itextremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to find thespace to become petty accumulators. Dr. Motlana of the SowetoCivic is the obvious exception. However, like his contemporaryMike Bea of the Alexandra Civic Association, he has beenincreasingly marginalised by more radical elements in the Civic,Youth and Student Congresses.

Reflecting the heterogeneity of its class composition, the UDF'sideological make-up is equally complex. The major affiliatessubscibe to the national democratic programme of the FreedomCharter (adopted by the ANC in 1956). The basic ingredients ofthis programme involve firstly a commitment to the dismantling ofwhite minority rule and the establishment of a non-racial unitarydemocratic state based on the fundamental principles of the ruleof law, constitutional equality, freedom of association andother democratic liberties. Secondly, this programme involves thedismantling of the white capitalist power-structures through acombination of nationalisation, land redistribution and welfarism(14). UDF ideologues have been careful to demonstrate thatalthough the Freedom Charter is basically anti-capitalist in thesense that if implemented it will dislodge the basic foundationsof South African capitalism, this does not make it asocialist document. Instead, their depiction of the FreedomCharter and hence the "national democratic struggle" as "anti-capitalist", reflects a concern to present the ideology of theUDF in a way that mirrors its multi-class character (15). At the.same time, however, UDF publications and speakers maintain thatthe extent to which the South African revolution culminates in asocialist order will depend to a large extent on whether theworking class manages to establish its hegemony within the Frontand in so doing gear the struggle towards attaining socialistgoals (16).

Common adherence to the national democratic pro' mme and multi-class- strategies by UDF affiliates, however, joes not meandifferences of emphasis and interpretation are absent. Some UDF.leaders - particularly those close to the trade union movement -openly depict the.anti-apartheid struggle in terms of a "historyof class struggles" of "the boer struggle against the workers"(17). This emphasis, which is common in the Eastern Cape althoughby no means absent in other regions, was most graphicallyreflected in March 1986 when a prominent Eastern Cape youthcongress leader greeted a crowd of 60 000 people in Uitenhage inthe name of the most prominent international and South Africancommunists, starting with Karl Marx and Lenin and ending with JoeSlovo and Moses Mabhida. This socialist position is alsofrequently coupled to sophisticated criticisms of "petty bourgoisnationalist" regimes in Africa and the practices of similarelements in the South African liberation movement (18). When itcomes to strategy, socialists have emphasised the linkagesbetween oppression in the communities and exploitation in thefactories (19). This theme was emphasised by Transvaal activistsduring the 1986 rent boycotts.

The rhetoric of the imams and clergymen involved in the UDF ismore conservative than many of the radical working class leaders.They refer to divinely ordained human rights and liberalconceptions of individual liberty. Some of the Indian Congressleaders take their Ghandist philosophical heritage veryseriously. However, for socialists within the UDF, this marriageof proletarian and liberal political ideologies is a reflectionof the objective reality of racial oppression and classexploitation which has made it necessary for all oppressedclasses to unite against the common enemy of white rule. This"popular democratic struggle", they argue, "is a fight of bothworkers and non-workers against racism and the anti-democraticand militaristic nature of the apartheid state" (20). In thisthey find themselves in conflict with some trade unionists andthe Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) (21). whereas the formerobject to class-alliances on the grounds that workers invariablyfind themselves subordinated to "petty bourgois" interests, thelatter has adopted a virulent black marxist-leninism of the northAmerican variety that depicts the black working class as arevolutionary vanguard capable of fighting "racial capitalism"untainted by the "populist" "petty bourgois" influences of non-workers, particularly if they are white.

To conclude: the organisational foundation of the movement theUDF has emerged to represent is rooted most firmly in localcommunities throughout the country. Beyond its local affiliates,the UDF's regional and national executives have provided a set ofnational leaders, symbols, spokespeople and ideas that haveprovided discreet local organisations with a national identity.The UDF as such, i.e. its regional and national structures, wasimportant largely at a political and ideological level becauselocal struggles have been presented by UDF leaders as componentparts of a national movement with common objectives. This meansthat although the UDF's organisational power is reducible to thecapacities of its affiliates, its regional and nationalstructures have a political and ideological autonomy that has hadsubstantial influence on political relations in local communitiesand on South African and international perceptions of township

leadership It is, therefore, both the sum of its parts and anautonomous national political force.

Periodisation of UDF Politics

The UDF is a front, not a centrally coordinated party. This makesit impossible to ascribe the wide range of mass protests since1983 to initiatives originating from within the front.Nevertheless, it is possible to periodise the general orientationof the activities of the UDF and its affiliates into four phases.

As has already been pointed out, the first phase of the UDF'sactivities began when it was formed to organise nation-wideopposition to the new constitution and "Koornhof Bills". Thecentral thrust of this campaign was to use the inadequacy ofthese forms of political representation to demand substantivepolitical rights. The subsequent successful election boycottdealt a severe blow to the state's reformist initiatives. Moreimportantly, the success of the boycott tactic established theUDF as a viable extra-parliamentary alternative. The UDF sloganthat expressed this ^objective was "Apartheid Divides, UDFUnites".

The significance of this phase was that the UDF was operatingprimarily on terrain determined by the state and hence itspolitics can be described as reactive. The objective, therefore,was not to pose alternatives to Apartheid or seriously establishorganisational structures designed to sustain a long-termstruggle for social transformation. Rather, the UDF was keen tocounter the divisive tactics of state reforms by calling for themaximum unity of the oppressed people and urging them to rejectApartheid simply by refusing to vote. The concern to build thisconsensus was reflected, for example, in the decision not to makethe Freedom Charter the formal statement of principles of the UDFbecause at that stage, the UDF still wanted to draw in non-Charterist groups like Black Consciousness and the major tradeunion federations.

The reactive phase of UDF politics ended with the MillionSignature Campaign which aimed at collecting a million signaturesfor a petition against Apartheid. Although the objective of thecampaign was to challenge the legitimacy of the Apartheid stateat an ideological level, it did, for the first time, providetownship activists with a vehicle for some solid door-to-doororganising. For example, in a number of Eastern Cape towns, theorganisational infrastructure for what later became strongcommunity organisations was laid during this period of grassrootsorganising. However, in some areas in the Transvaal, particularlyin Soweto, activists refused to collect signatures because theybelieved the campaign was a weak futile form of protest politicsthat could achieve very little. In the event, the campaign failedto get a million signatures.

The second phase of UDF politics began after the tri-cameralparliament elections in August 1984. Soon after they were over,political struggles initiated by local community organisationsbegan to centre around more basic issues affecting everydaytownship life. The result was a series of bus boycotts, rentboycotts, squatter revolts, housing movements, labor strikes,

10

school protests and communal stayaways. The dep and geographicextent of these actions coalesced into an urban uprising thattook place largely beyond the organisational controls of theUDF's national and regional leadership and culminated in thedeclaration of a State of Emergency in July 1985.

This shift from national anti-constitutional campaigns to localcommunity struggles was not due to changes in national UDFpolicy. On the contrary, the shift was the product of theactivities of local community organisations and activistsmobilised around concrete urban and daily life issues. Some ofthese organisations had been active since 1979 (e.g. PEBCO andthe Soweto Civic) while others were only formed in 1984-5 (e.g.Vaal Civic Association and many youth congresses). These localorganisations exploited the contradiction between the state'sattempts to improve urban living conditions and the fiscalbankruptcy and political illegitimacy of black local government(22). They managed to ride a wave of anger and protest thattransformed political relations in the communities so rapidlythat the UDF's local, regional and national leaders foundthemselves unable to build organisational structures to keep pacewith these levels of mobilisation and politicisation.

The deepening recession and the illegitimacy of state reformswere the underlying causes of this urban uprising. The recession- which began to set in during the first quarter of 1982 - notonly undermined real wage levels, but also limited the state'scapacity to subsidise transport and bread prices, finance housingconstruction and the provision of urban services and upgradeeducational and health facilities. The illegitimacy of statereforms and in particular the failure of the new Black LocalAuthorities to attract support from the afrlcan communities,meant that economic grievances were rapidly politicised and thestruggles that resulted articulated both economic (i.e.collective consumption) and political demands, namely the need tore-constitute the structure of political power as a pre-condition for resolving the crisis of urban living.

There were four decisive moments during the uprising. Firstly,the Vaal Uprising which took place in September 1984. It wassparked off by a rent increase announced by the Lekoa TownCouncil. The uprising led to the death of at least 31 people andthe beginning of a rent boycott in the region which has continuedinto 1987. Secondly, the nation-wide schools boycott. This beganin Cradock in late 1983 where students protested the dismissal ofMathew Goniwe - a local headmaster and UDF leader (subsequentlyassassinated in 1985). The boycott then spread to Pretoria inearly 1984 and to the rest of the country by the end of the year.The demands of the schools movement included recognition ofelected Student Representative Councils, an end to sexualharassment of female students and corporal punishment, release ofdetained students, and upgrading of educational facilities.

Thirdly, the mass worker stayaway in the Transvaal in November1984 marked the beginning of strong working relationships betweencommunity organisations, student movements and trade unions. Thestayaway was suppported by 800 000 workers and 400 000 studentsand was called to protest against army occupation of thetownships and the students' educational demands. This was

11

followed the equally successful but organisationally morecomplex stayawayg in Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage in March 1985 insupport of the demand for a reduction in the petrol price and inprotest against security force action that resulted in the deathof at least 43 people in Langa on 21st March (23). It was theLanga massacre that triggered the Eastern Cape's participation inthe countrywide revolts.

These mass actions successfully mobilised unprecedented numbersof people. They had new features which signalled a turning pointin the recent history of black protest: they managed to mobiliseall sectors of the township population including both youth andolder residents; they involved coordinated action between tradeunions and political organisations; they were called in supportof demands that challenged the coercive, urban and educationalpolicies of the Aparheid state; and they gave rise toungovernable areas as state authority collapsed in many townshipsin the wake of the resignation of mayors and councillors who hadbeen "elected" onto the new Black Local Authorities.

Recognising the UDF's\ failure to cope with this level of massmobilisation, an internal discussion document circulated by theUDF's Transvaal Education Forum in May 1985, noted "that we havebeen unable to respond effectively to the spontaneous waves ofmilitancy around the country" (24). The UDF's 1985 theme, "FromProtest to Challenge. Mobilisation to Organisation", was part ofthe UDF leadership's attempt to find ways of transforming "massmobilisation" into coherent "mass organisation". To achieve this,UDF documents and speakers began emphasising the need to createstrong organisational structures on the local, regional andnational levels built according to more traditional party-typemethods: accountability, direct representation, ideologicalcohesion, national rather than localised campaigns, disciplinedlegal rather than illegal forms of struggle.

The state's coercive response to the rising levels ofmobilisation during the last few months of 1984 and early 1985prevented the UDF leadership from consolidating the Front'sstructures. After the army occupied the townships in late 1984,community struggles became increasingly militarist as largegroups of youths began engaging the security forces in runningstreet battles that claimed hundreds of lives (25). The militantvoluntarism of the youths eclipsed the organisational concerns ofthe activists making it even more difficult for the latter toestablish durable long-term structures. The first few months of1985 were the most intense period of what amounted to urban civilwarfare, leading eventually to the declaration of a State ofEmergency in July 1985 as the state was forced to admit that ithad lost control of many townships. This marks the beginning ofthe third phase of UDF politics.

The third phase was marked on the one hand by an attempt by thestate to crush the organisations that were at the core of thenational uprising, and on the other hand by the development ofungovernable areas. Ungovernability referred primarily to thosesituations where the organs of civil government had eithercollapsed or had effectively been rendered inoperable by massand/or violent opposition. The State of Emergency was part of thestate's attempt to buttress the powers and extend the utilisation

12

of the security forces in the townships. The responsibility forre-establishing civil government in the townships fell largely onthe shoulders of over-extended police forces and relativelyinexperienced military personnel. In the end, the State ofEmergency failed to restore civil government largely because thepermanent prescence of the security forces in the townshipsfueled rather than quelled resistance. The militant youth,organised into quasi-military action squads, were able to usecrude guerilla tactics to harass the security forces sufficientlyto prevent them from being more proactive than merely defendingthemselves and detaining prominent community leaders. It is alsoclear, in the light of the later 1986-87 Emergency, that thestate was not committing itself to a full-frontal coerciveassault against opposition groups, a policy that was probably dueto its belief that Western support was still a possibility.

During this period the activists found themselves sandwhicedbetween the militarism of the youths and the terror tactics ofthe security forces. Whereas the youths were criticising them forbeing too moderate, the security forces were hunting them downand detaining them. It was this uneviable position that forcedgrassroots activists to organise new • durable decentralisedorganisational structures strong enough to withstand the effectsof repression and bring the militant youths under control. Theresult was the establishment of what many activists refer to asthe "alternative organs of peoples' power".

The process of creating these "organs of people's power" began inearnest towards the end of 1985 and marks the beginning of thefourth - and probably the most important - phase of UDF politics.The structures of "people's power" involve sophisticated forms oforganisation based on street and area committees. Each streetelects a street committee, which in turn elects representativesto an area committee. The larger the township the more areacommittees there tend to be. These structures have developed mosteffectively in the Eastern Cape and parts of the Transvaal. Theyhave, however, spread to some small western cape and Nataltownships. Significantly, street and area committees have helpedactivists bring the militant youths under control by dividingyouth squads into smaller more disciplined units attachable to astreet or area committee and they have proved reasonablyeffective in countering repression. Tight local-levelorganisation has helped to lessen the damaging effect whichdetention, disappearance or death of leaders might otherwise havehad. Obviously they are not invulnerable. There is evidence thatmany Eastern Cape street committees ceased to operates towardsthe end of 1986 as security forces began detaining the entiremembership.

One dimension of 'the attempt to establish organs of "people'spower" was the consumer boycott movement in the Eastern Cape.Consumer boycotts began as early as March 1985 and proved mostsuccessful when they were called in support of local communitygrievances. These demands included rent reductions, improvedhousing, instalment of proper services, deracialisation oftrading facilities, withdrawal of troops and the establishment oEnon-racial municipalities. At one time fifteen East Cape townswere affected by the boycott. High levels of unity and solidaritysustained over long periods of time (in some cases 6 months),

13

helped consolidate and strengthen community organisations.

The success of the East Cape consumer boycott movement helped itspread to other regions. However, unlike in the Eastern Cape, theinitiative in other regions came from UDF regional leaders whoattempted to call consumer boycotts without the necessaryorganisational infrastructure and in support of general politicalrather than specific local demands. Additional problems includedprofiteering by township businessmen and the difficultiesinvolved in organising the huge Natal and Transvaal townships.The result was a much patchier response in the Transvaal, WesternCape and Natal.

Although local activists organised the most successful consumerboycotts around basic community grievances, the regional andnational UDF leadership tended to present the objectives asfirstly, the unification of all sectors of the community around acommon set of short and lpng-term demands; and secondly, the needto put sufficient pressure on the white middle class shopkeepersto support these demands and in so doing detach their supportfrom the white state (26). Accordingly, the local Chambers ofCommerce, reflecting the anxiety of near bankrupt retailers, werethe first to capitulate, in some cases actually negotiating thewithdrawal of troops from the townships as well as promising todesegregate central business district facilities and undertakeother reforms.

The consumer boycott worked best where organisation was mosthighly developed. In the small towns like Port Alfred or Cradocka quite remarkable consensus existed within the community with avirtually total participation, few reports of intimidation, and aunited leadership exercising a high degree of control anddiscipline. In Cradock, for example, at the behest of theleadership, youthful activists refrained from trying to kill thediscredited community councillors. In Port Elizabeth boycottorganisers managed to ensure that township businesspeople did notraise their prices and in Uitenhage organisers decided not toboycott shops owned by Cheeky Watson, a well-known whitesupporter of the black political organisations.

Regional differences in the effectiveness of the boycottsreflected the varying quality of UDF organisation and influencein 1985. It is relatively weak in Natal. Here the often bloodyantipathy which exists between it and Inkhata has seriousiyweakened UDF organisation in the black townships (27). However,where trade unions initiated consumer boycotts in Natal thecampaign was relatively successful because the factories providedimportant spaces for organisation to take place protected fromInkhata intimidation. However, even the trade union innitiatedconsumer boycotts had to eventually be called off after Inkhatabusinesspeople threatened violent retaliation.

In the Transvaal, Pretoria and the East Rand were betterorganised than Soweto. But it is in the Eastern Cape communitieswhere the UDF seems most deeply entrenched through its variousaffiliates. Where street and area committees were stronglydeveloped, the consumer boycott was most effective.

Notwithstanding the deaths, dlssappearances and detentions which

14

decimated the leadership of the UDF since it inception, theroots of the movement for national liberation ii. represents beganto penetrate certain communities too profoundly for its influence'to be eradicated coercively. And with this democraticentrenchment in many working class communities, the UDF is likelyto generate an increasingly radical conception of a liberatedsociety. The concept of "people's power", for example, is morethan a mobilising slogan. The new forms of organisation whichhave developed during the revolt in the townships are inthemselves rudimentary organs of self-government. The collapse of.state authority and the legitimacy of the UDF-affillatedcommunity organsations has enabled these organisations to takeresponsibility for administering a number of township services.

Evidence that political consciousness in the townships has becomeincreasingly combative emerged during 1986 with the spread of therent boycott to 54 townships countrywide involving about 500 000households and costing the state at least R40 million per month.Significantly, most of the townships hit by rent boycotts are inthe Transvaal because since 1985 these communities have beenrapidly organised, in some cases on a street committee basis(e.g. Soweto).

The rent boycotts are a response to both, economic and politicalgrievances. Economic grievances are directly related to the leveland quality of urban subsistence: declining real wages asinflation increases the costs of basic foodstuffs and transportby 20%; overcrowding with a national average of 12- people perhousehold; massive housing shortages (conservative estimates arethat there is a shortage of 600 000 housing units); rising rentand service charges (sometimes by 100%), and a growing number ofunemployed people as the unemployment rate moves beyond the 40%mark. Political grievances are directly linked to the state'sfailure to give blacks substantive political rights in generaland the persistent inadequacy and illegitimacy of the Black LocalAuthorities in particular. A UDF information pamphlet issued inAugust 1986 starts by pointing out that rents are not being paidbecause "people are simply unable t'S Tt" and proceeds to linkthe boycott to political demands:

"The [rent] boycott is also part of an attempt to make allthe structures of apartheid unworkable. The black localauthorities are structures designed to make apartheid work -to make people participate in their own domination by awhite minority government. The rent boycott weakens thesestructures and demonstrates to the government that there canbe no taxation without representation and that the peoplewill accept nothing less than majority rule."

In most cases the rent boycott began in response to a suddenchange in the relationship between the communities and the state:the shooting of 30 people in Mamelodi, the declaration of the1986 State of Emergency in Port Elizabeth, the forced removal ofpeople in Uitenhage and the failure of a local official to keephis promise to meet the community in Parys. The cumulativeeffect, however, of all the rent boycotts is that they haveunited people around a strategy which has the potential tosustain itself for a considerable length of time. Once people donot pay rent for two or three months, the chances of them

15

resuming th payments are low because the state expects them topay their arrears as well. The rent boycotts are a goodindication of the extent to which the black majority are preparedto cease supporting the state system in a very practical way.

More importantly, however, unlike the consumer boycotts whichaimed at pressurising the state via the efforts of middle classwhite commercial interests, the rent boycott challenges the statedirectly. It undermines the fiscal foundations of townshipadministration and has recieved the full support of both tradeunion and community organisations. One result of this unity isthat trade unions succeeded in preventing employers from agreeingto a State Security Council recommendation that rents be deductedfrom pay packets through stoporders.

It is unlikely that the 1986-7 State of Emergency will"normalise" local government and "restore law and order" in thetownships as long as the rent boycott persists. Nor is it likelythe rent boycott will end before the State of Emergency has beenlifted. In short, through the rent boycott, the communities aredirectly confronting the?state over a sustained period of time.The stakes, therefore, are getting higher. Who wins this roundmay well be critical for the long-term future of black politics.The central role played by the black working class - with thefull support of all the major trade unions - in sustaining therent boycotts to defend their already declining living standardsfrom further erosion, makes it imperative the interests of thisclass become the central focus of oppositional organisations inthe future.

The UDF and Black Politics

A recent article by Alex Callinicos writes off the UDF as a"populist" organisation whose local affiliates are, 1) weak andsmall, 2) limited by a failure to make connections betweenoppression in the community and exploitation in the workplace, 3)reluctant to identify class distinctions, and 4) dominated by anintellectual petty bourgois leadership that subscribes to areformist ideology (28).

There are very few black communities in South Africa where no UDFaffiliate exists. From the small rural and urban villages in theNorthern Transvaal, to the metropolitan agglomerations of theWitwatersrand, to the towns and metropolises of the Cape, thereare UDF affiliates. The strength of the UDF derives primarilyfrom the popularity and organisational capacity of itsaffiliates, even though these differ considerably in size andeffectiveness. The national executive in and of itself does notconstitute a significant political force mainly because most ofthe leadership has spent much of the last three years indetention. Some regional executives are more active because theyinteract more intimately with the local community organisations.The UDF's primary organising activities are appropriately rootedin South Africa's oppressed and exploited communities.

This does not mean that national initiatives are non-existent. Ithas already been menti/bned that the UDF played a crucial role innational campaigns against the new constitution and the BlackLocal Authorities. Other national campaigns included boycotts of

16

international sports teams, opposition to the State of Emergencyand the so-called "Legrange Bills" in early 1986 (i.e. amendmentsto the Internal Security Act and Public Safety Act to provide foradditional powers for the security forces) and more recently theNational United Action campaign which involves joint action withthe Congress of South African Trade Unions and the NationalEducation crisis Committee.

Although the UDF's support is best judged in terms of itsorganisational practices and structures, some recent surveys intoblack political attitudes also suggest that the UDF andorganisations, personalities and political traditions it isidentified with are the roost widely supported in the africantownships (29). The HSRC survey points out that "Mandeladefinitely enjoys greater support than any other black leader"and that organisations like the ANC and other related extra-parliamentary groups enjoy about three times more support thanpro-government black leaders and organisations.

The results of two surveys (30) into support among urban blacksfor various political groups are listed in the table below:

Political group HSRC survey Schlemmer survey

ANC/Mandela 20,0% 27,0%UDF 19,8% 11,0%AZAPO 19,6% 5,0%Inkhata/Buthelezi 18,9% 14,0%Other/none 55,0% 43,0%

If it is assumed that ANC supporters are also UDF supporters byvirtue of the fact that both organisations subscibe to theFreedom Charter and that the only major difference between themis the ANC's commitment to armed struggle, then it becomesapparent that support amongst urban africans for the ANC/UDFpolitical movement far outstrips support for AZAPO and Inkhata.The fact that both these surveys were done in 1984 means thatthey do not reflect how the UDF's support base has expandedsince then. The UDF had only been in existence for less than ayear at that stage and since 1984 nation-wide township rebellionhas been oriented around UDF affiliates.

It is also interesting to note why UDF supporters said theysupported the UDF. The HSRC identified the following reasons(31):

Reason for supporting the UDF %

Fights for democracy 35,6Solves our problems 17,1Represents all groups 12,7Makes people aware of their rights 8,6Helps people fight for their rights 5,8Will help blacks 5,8Does nothing wrong 2,4Will bring peace to South Africa 2,4Unites blacks 1,4Represents students 0,7

17

Other reasons 6,2No reason 1,4

Total 100,1

In short, the overwhelming majority of respondents who said theysupported the UDF did so because in one way or another they seethe UDF as an organisation that will help black people achievepolitical rights and resolve their social problems. This conformspretty closely to how the UDF's national leaders have attemptedagainst all odds to present the aim of the Front.

If we take into account the mass campaigns, organisationalnetworks and (less reliable) attitudinal survey data discussedabove, it is difficult to see how Callinicos can conclude thatthe UDF is not supported by a sound organisational base. Althoughno doubt this base is regionally uneven, he is incorrect to makejudgements about the'UDF'purely on the basis of an assessment ofits Western Cape structures as they were in 1983.

There are enough examples of struggles and campaigns conductedunder the auspices of UDF affiliates to confirm that theconnection between exploitation in the workplace and oppressionin the community has not been ignored. The most outstandingexamples are the numerous transport struggles in East London,Durban, Capetown, Port Elizabeth, Kirkwood and Soweto. Strugglesover transport revolve primarily around working class commutersbecause they feel most acutely the relationship betweenoppression in outlying townships and exploitation in their city-based workplaces located between 15 and 200 kms from home (32).The same connection has been made in the rent boycotts. AlthoughCivic leaders quoted in the press refer to rent boycotts largelyin terms of a struggle against Apartheid local government, thepamphlets distributed and speeches made by the youth and workingclass activists on the ground constantly make the link betweeneconomic exploitation and the abysmal deeply resented livingconditions in the townships. It was these types of connections,forged during painful violent struggles (beyond the abode of theintellectuals), that gradually became the foundations for unitedaction between trade unions, community organisations and studentmovements - action which culminated in the dramatic nationwidestayaways of 1986 (33).

Finally, the UDF is presented as a multi-class organisationdominated by a petty bourgeois leadership (34). The empiricalinaccuracy of this view has already been demonstrated. At local,regional and national level the class character of the UDF issuch that it cannot be defined as the property of any one class.Instead, as the critics admit, the UDF is widely supported by arange of classes. However, this paper has attempted to show thatas levels of conflict between the oppressed communities and statehave escalated outside the workplace, the UDF's local affiliateshave become progressively more entrenched in the poor workingclass communities. During 1986 this led to a radicalisation ofits ideology and democratisation of its structures as workingclass people asserted tHeir right to control their organisationsboth in and outside the workplaces. This is why the state, afterthe 1986 Emergency was declared in June, decided to launch a full

18

frontal assault to head-off this radicalis: movement. Notsurprisingly, the state has pursued this objective moresystematically and ruthlessly in the Eastern Cape than in anyother region.

As far as lessons for the future are concerned, two issues willbecome important when the space for open legal organisation isregained. Firstly, to what extent will a Front-type structure beappropriate in the future? Although a structure of this kind hasproven to be appropriate in most authoritarian societies, the twooutstanding features about the democratic movement is thestrength of the trade unions and the resilience of the local-level community organisations. Depending on the terrain ofstruggle that will arise in the future, a structure may benecessary founded more coherently on the democratic structures ofthese community and workplace organisations. Secondly, how can anorganisational infrastructure be developed capable of coping withthe rapid radicalisatlon and politicisation of the masses thatinevitably occurs during periods of rebellion? A critical problemfaced by political activists since the uprising began in 1984 washow to hold back political mobilisation in order to build uporganisations to guide and direct the oppositional movements. Acombination of repression and . organisational inexperienceprevented them from resolving this problem. In the end, thecommunities - particularly the youth - moved too quickly to takeon the full might of the state unprotected, despite the streetcommittee system, by sound organisation.

Conclusion

The UDF has been shaped by pressures and processes largely beyondits control as the dynamics of black resistance have shifted fromreactive politics to the attempt to establish proactive organs ofdemocracy in the communities, schools and factories. Whereas theformer involved reactive strategies to contest the legitimacy ofstate reforms on terrain determined largely by the state, thelatter has evolved as the reforms have to all intents andpurposes failed. Today the mass-based community organisations canplay a crucial role in shaping the political terrain in a waythey have never been able to in the past. Despite the UDF'sseverly weakened national organisational structures due to theimpact of successive repressive assaults, its "affiliates andleaders will nevertheless remain crucial representatives of SouthAfrica's black majority in the future.

When considering, the future of South African black politics, itwould be mistake to accept in part or in full the state'spropaganda that has attempted to depict the UDF as a minoritygroup located on the radical left-wing fringe. Nor is it theunproblematic vehicle for a reformist petty bourgoisie bent oncapturing state power to use against big white capital and blackworking class. It is not a pressure-group, nor is it a politicalparty. It is essentially what its architects had always intendedit to be: a Front representative of a very broad spectrum ofSouth African political opinion. Beneath this formal level ofpublic appearances, however, is a highly complex network of localorganisations that have mounted campaigns and struggles that havebegun to generate an increasingly radical conception of aliberated society and the road that should be adopted to achieve

19

this goa

No matter how far South Africa's rulers go to crush theorganisational capacities of the UDF and its affiliates, theideas, aspirations and struggles that have made it what it is,will continue to inspire present and future generations tocontinue the struggle for political and economic justice. We maybe in for a prolonged period of extremely harsh repression thatmight succeed in anlhilating the organisational structures builtup over the past few years, but the state is clearly making afatal mistake by thinking this will facilitate the success of areform programme that excludes the demands, interests andideologies of constituencies represented by the UDF until now.

Footnotes

1. Lambert, R. & L. ,

2. Webster, E.,

"State Reform and Working ClassResistance", South African Review,vol. 1, edited by South AfricanResearch Services, (Johannesburg:Ravan Press, 1983).

"Social Movement Unionism in SouthAfrica", in Frankel, P., Pines, N.6 Swilling, M. (eds.), State,Resistance and Change in SouthAfrica) TLondon: Croom Helm, 1987) .

& Ensor, L., PEBCO; A Black Mass Movement,980); Evans,

See Cooper, C. _(Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations;M., "The Emergeance and Decline of a Community Organisation:An Assessment of PEBCO", South African Labour Bulletin, vol.6, no.s 2 & 3, 1980.

See Molteno, F., "Students Take Control: The 1980 Boycott ofColoured Education in the Cape Peninsula", paper presentedto the Sixteenth Annual Congress of the Association forSociology in Southern Africa, University of Capetown, 1-4July, 1985; Swilling, M., "The 1980 Capetown SchoolsBoycott", unpublished research paper, Department ofPolitical Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1981.

See Keenan, J., "Migrants Awake: The 1980 JohannesburgMunicipality Strike", South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 6,no.7, May 1981; Swilling, M., "The Politics of Working ClassStruggles in Germiston, 1979-1980", paper presented toHistory Workshop Conference, University of theWitwatersrand, February 1984; Seekings, J., "PoliticalMobilisation in the Black Townships of the Transvaal", inFrankel, P. et. al., op. cit.; and the various articles inSouth African Labour Bulletin, vol. 7, no.8, 1982.

Reintges, J., "An Analysis of the OppositionPolitics of JORAC", AnnualConference of the Association ofSociology of Southern Africa,Durban, July 1986.

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7. Swilling, H, "The Buses Sme.' Df Blood": The• 1983 East London Bus Boycott",

South African Labour Bulletin, vol.9, no. 5, 1984.

8. These arguments will be developed in Swilling, M., "UrbanControl and Changing Forms of Political Conflict in theEastern Cape, 1979-1986", MA'dissertation. University of theWitwafcersrand, forthcoming. .

9. Labour Monitoring Group, "Report: The Transvaal RegionalStayaway", South African Labour

..;, Bulletin, vol. 10, no. 5, 1985.

10. See Labour Monitoring Group, "May Day Stayaway 1986", SouthAfrican Labour Bulletin, 11, 6, June-July 1986; LabourMonitoring Group^ "June 16th Stayaway", South African LabourBulletin, 11, 7, August 1986.

11. Lodge, T. S Swilling, M., "The Year of the Amabutho",Africa Report, March-April1986.

12. See Callinicos, A., "Marxism and Revolution in SouthAfrica", International Socialism, 31, 1986; Alexander, N.,Sow the Wind,. (Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1985); Friedman,S., "The Real Lessons from that Mayday Stayaway", WeeklyMail; 9-15 May 1986.

13. "Sowing Confusion", New Era, 1, 1, March-April 1986, pp. 37-38.

14. See Hudson, P., "The Freedom Charter and Socialist Strategyin South Africa", Politikon, vol. 13, no. 1, June 1986;Swilling, M., "Living in the Interregnum: Crisis, Reform andthe Socialist Alternative in South Africa", Third WorldQuarterly, April 1987.

15. See Suttner, R., The Freedom Charter ^ The Peoples' Charteriji the Nineteen-Eighties, 26th T.B. Davies Memorial Lecture,University of Capetown, 1984.

16. Njikelana, S., "The Unions and the Front: AResponse to David Lewis",South African Labour Bulletin,vol. 9, no. 7, June 1984.

17. Thozamile Gqweta, president of the South African AlliedWorkers Union, speaking at a UDF meeting in Natal, 18 July1984, Page 61 of transcript of meeting proceedings, exhibitM44 in State vs. Mawala Ramgobin and 15 Others.

18. The conflict between nationalist and socialist positions inthe UDF cannot be reduced to differences betweenprotagonists of the "internal colonialist" and "racialcapitalist" theses. The parochialism of white studentpolitics is responsible for this simplification.

19. See pamphlet appended to article by Labour Monitoring Group,

21

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

"Repc ; The Transvaal Regional Stayaway", op. cit.;interview with Cape Youth Congress activist quoted in"Building Working Class Power - The Role of the Youth",Inqaba, Nos. 20/21, September 1986; interview with MosesMayekiso in Socialist Worker Review, 80, October 1985; andvarious articles in Isizwe, 1, 2, March 1986.

"Why we cannot participate in an election referendum relatedto Botha's constitutional proposals", internal discussionpaper circulated within the Transvaal Anti-President'sCouncil movement.

The Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) is the main bearerof the Black Consciousness ideological tradition previouslyrepresented by the South African Students Organisation andthe Black Peoples Convention both banned in October 1977.Founded in 1978 in the course of the next two years itincorporated class analysis into its political discourse. Itnow occupies a position which in rhetorical terms at leastis to the left of the UDF in terms of its socialist andanti-imperialist sentiment. AZAPO is conspicuously reportedin the English language press largely because many blackjournalists are sympathisers. AZAPO, however, is not a massmovement and though it claims a following distributed innearly a hundred branches, its membership seems to belargely middle class and concentrated in Durban andJohannesburg. It has not played a significant role in thepopular unrislngs since September 1984 (except possibly inSharpevilletowns).

near Vereeniging and in some northern Transvaal

For a detailed explanation and account of thesesee Seekings, J., op. cit.

processes,

See Labour Monitoring Group, "Report: The Transvaal RegionalStayaway", op. cit.; Labour Monitoring Group, "Report: TheMarch Stayaways in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage", SouthAfrican Labour Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 1, September 1985;Swilling, M., "Stayaways, Urban Protest and the State", inSouth African Research Services, South African Review 2'(Johannesburg; Ravan Press, 1986).

"From Protest to Challenge. Mobilisation to Organisation",Johannesburg, mimeo, 1985, p.6.

Lodge, T. & Swilling, M.,

White, R.,

27. Sitas, A.,

op. cit.

"A Tide Has Risen. A BreachHas Occurred: Towards anAssessment of the StrategicValue of the ConsumerBoycotts", South AfricanLabour Bulletin, vol. 11, no.5, April-May 1986.

"Inanda, August 1985: 'Where Wealthand Power and Blood ReignWorshipped Gods'", South AfricanLabour Bulletin, 11, 4, February-

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28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

March 1986.t

Callinicos, A., op, cit., pp.6-7.

See surveys conducted by the Human Science Research Council(HSRC) compiled by de Kock, C.P., Rhoodie, N. & Couper, M.P.,"Black Views on Socio-Political Change in South Africa", inVan Vuuren, D.J. et. al. (eds.), South Africa: A PluralSociety in Transition, (Durban: Butterworths; 1<F85); andSchlemmer, L., Black Workers' Attitudes, (Durban: Universityof Natal; 1984) .

de Kock, C.P.

Ibid., p.353.

McCarthy, J.

op. cit., p. 356.

& Swilling, M., "Transport and PoliticalResistance: Bus Boycottsin 1983", South AfricanReview, vo____^ 2, edited bySouth African ResearchServices, (Johannesburg:Ravan Press, 1984).

Labour Monitoring Group, "May Day Stayaway 1986", op. cit.,and "June 16th Stayaway", op. cit.

See Callinicos, A., op. cit; Alexander, N., op, cit.,Friedman, S., op. cit.

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