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ISMATU ROPI
RELIGION
AND
REGULATION
IN
INDONESIA
ISBN 978-981-10-2826-7 ISBN 978-981-10-2827-4 (eBook)DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2827-4
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016956540
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017This book was advertised with a copyright holder in the name of the publisher in error, whereas the author holds the copyright.This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
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Ismatu RopiUIN Jakarta Indonesia South Tangerang, Indonesia
v
This book analyses the state regulation on religious affairs in modern Indonesia, focusing on understanding its history and consequences to citizen’s religious life.
Indonesian constitutions have preserved religious freedom, but by the same token have also tended to construct wide-ranging discretion-ary powers in the government to control religious life and to oversee religious freedom. Consequently, during more than four decades, as the Indonesian government has constructed a variety of policies on religion based on those constitutional legacies that have mostly been interpreted in the light of norms and values of the existing religious majority group. At the heart of this issue is then a tension between ensuring religious order and harmony on the one hand, and protecting religious freedom for all on another. This book discusses at length that while successive govern-ments have grappled with the problems of religious life, they have indeed increasingly prioritized order and harmony over the rights of all citizens’ religious freedom.
Overall this book also argues that the history of the politics of regulat-ing religion has been about “the constant negotiation” for the boundaries of authority in regulating religious affairs between the state and the major-ity. In this vein the government is eager to oversee and strictly control religious activities, but at the same time the majority group is interested to steer the direction of state policies to be closer to their norms and values.
AbstrAct
vii
All references in this book will be fully quoted the first time used in the footnote, followed by the page number. In referencing the book, the example is as follows: Peter W. Edge, Religion and Law (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 6–10. Later references will use a shortened form of the work, followed by the page number such as Edge, Religion and Law, 25. An example of referencing article from academic journal is as follows: Neil A. Englehart, “Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument: The Rise and Fall of Confucian Ethic in Singapore,” Human Rights Quarterly 22, 3 (2000): 548–568. Later references for journal will use a shortened form of the work, followed by the page number such as Englehart, “Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument,” 559. Reference to works in languages other than English, like Indonesian, will also follow the above pattern.
In this book, all Indonesian terms are written according to their mod-ern spellings as they are used in today’s Indonesian language. Instead of using, for example, oesaha (effort), I have given its modern spelling, usaha. In spelling some Indonesian names especially from the older gener-ation, I follow the most common way those names are spelt at the current time. For instances, I prefer to write Hasyim Asy’ari, not Hasjim Asj’ari, or Sukarno and Suharto, not Soekarno and Soeharto respectively. In most cases I keep Indonesian wording instead of translating them into English. The examples are the word Pancasila and the phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (with italics). However in those cases generic translation of the word or phrase will be supplied in its first usage.
referencing And trAnsliterAtion
viii REFERENCING AND TRANSLITERATION
Considering the strong Arabic influence on Indonesian terms and names, I have opted to employ their Indonesian spellings. Instead of sharî‘a, kitâb, ‘ulamâ’ and fatwâ for example, I employ the terms sha-riah, kitab, ulama and fatwa without italics. Likewise, the plural forms of Arabic-influenced terms are indicated by adding the letter “s” to the word in its singular form, as in kitabs or fatwas rather than kutub or fatawa. For Arabic terms and names which are not part of Indonesian language, I use the international standard of Arabic transliteration.
ix
This book is a revised version of my PhD thesis submitted to The Australian National University (ANU) in 2012 and completed during my honorary fellowship at ANU from September to November 2015. Many people and institutions greatly contributed to the completion of this book. Chief among them is Associate Professor Greg Fealy, without whose guidance and constant encouragement the book could not possibly have been fin-ished. His passionate commitment particularly to Indonesian studies, his refreshing intellectual honesty, constructive criticism, advice and support have been my model for academic excellence. Terima kasih banyak Pak Greg! I would also gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and advice I received from Professor Edward Aspinall in PSC ANU.
I am grateful to Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (Universitas Islam Negeri/UIN) Jakarta through the Office of Institute for Research and Community Outreach (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian pada Masyarakat/LP2M) for providing me with research grant to undertake my fellowship in Australia as part of the 2015 UIN Jakarta’s International Collaborative Research Program. Professor Dede Rosyada, the current Rector of UIN Jakarta, Professor M Arskal Salim GP and Imam Subhi are among who deserve my acknowledgements for their kind help.
It is a great pleasure to acknowledge the tremendous support from the research centre where I have been working as a researcher for more than twelve years, the Center for Studying Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat/PPIM) UIN Jakarta. Among them are Professor Azyumardi Azra, Professor Komaruddin Hidayat and Professor Jamhari for always helping me in many different ways. I thank all my research
Acknowledgements
x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
colleagues in this institution, especially Professor Murodi, Dadi Darmadi, Saiful Umam, Ali Munhanif, Oman Fathurahman, Din Wahid, Fuad Jabali, Jajang Jahroni, Arief Subhan, Idris Thaha, Tasman and Didin Syafruddin as I have benefited much from intellectual exchanges and friendship. To those who are not mentioned by name, I wish to express my sincere appre-ciation for all their beneficial contributions.
I would like also to record my gratitude to my mother, Hj. Siti Rohila, who always prays for my success. She is the continuous light of my life. My special sincere prayers go to my late father, H.M. Ropi Machmud, who passed away during my first month of my graduate study at ANU in 2006. My gratitude is also due to my parents-in-law in Rangkasbitung Banten as well as my extended family in Jakarta for their support and care.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to my family. My deepest thanks are due to my wife, Eka Indrawati, for her pure affection, caring, honesty and constant love. Words are not enough to thank her adequately for all the sacrifices she has made to accompany my life journey. My sweet beloved daughters, Alefa Passadhya Raihani and Qisthi Vinaya Mahathira, also deserve special appreciation and gratitude. They have always proven to be my steady inspiration, happiness and joy.
At the very last, I have to mention that none of the above people is responsible for any inadequacy or inaccuracy in this book. I alone take responsibility for all those failings and errors.
xi
1 Introduction 1About This Book 7Scholarly Studies on the State–Religion Relationship in Indonesia 8The Structure of the Book 10
2 The State and Religion: An Overview 15The Patterns of Relationship 15The Nature of the Relationship 18
3 Theorizing Regulation of Religion 29Regulating Religion and Religious Freedom 30
4 Religion and Religious Life in Indonesia: Legacies from the Past 43Agama: From Tradition to Political Identity 44The Dutch and Religious Affairs 46
5 Negotiating Boundaries of Religion Roles in the State System 57Religiously-Motivated Struggle for Independence? 58Debating the Dasar Negara 61The Phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa 73
contents
xii CONTENTS
6 Religion and the Intrusive Constitutions 79Religion in the Indonesian Constitutions 80
7 Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa: Contests of Meaning and Interpretation 89The Politics of Interpreting Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa 89
8 The Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Muslim Community and the Administration of Religious Life 101The Establishment of MORA 102Bureaucratizing Islam 103Opposing the Heterodoxies 108
9 Regulating Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in Public Life 117Defining Religion and Religious Group 118Religious Vilification Act and the Nation-State Religious Character 120
10 Suharto New Order’s Regime, Development Programme and Religion 127The Regime, Development and Religion 128
11 Governmentalization of Religious Policies 139Governing Religious Life 139The De-politicization of Religion and New Roles for MORA 143Prohibition of Aliran Sesat 147Politics of Religious Identity 152
12 Managing Religious Tension 161The 1969 Joint Decree on Places of Worship 162Decrees on Mission Aid and Overseas Missionaries 166The Ahmadiyah Case 170
xiiiCONTENTS
13 Islamic Populism over Minority Rights 183From Concession and Accommodation to Islamization 184Islamic Symbols to Centre Stage 185Decentralization and Shariah By-Laws 187
14 Old Issues New Controversies: Cases of the Places of Worship, the Ahmadiyah Group and the Judicial Review of the Vilification Law 199The New Joint Decree on Places of Worship 200Recent Ahmadiyah Controversies 205Judicial Review of the Vilification Law and the Rise of Legal jihad? 211
15 Conclusion 219
Appendix 1 227
Appendix 2 231
Bibliographies 235
Index 257
xv
abangan nominal Muslims, usually referring to Javanese religiosity
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) in the New Order era, cur-rently known as TNI Tentara National Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
Adat Arabic-derived term referring to a region’s manners, tastes, customs, traditions and beliefs, see hukum adat
Ahmadiyah a heterodox religious movement in Islam, based on the life and teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, ca. 1889 in North India, see also JAI or Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia
aliran kepercayaan local Java religious groups with strongly mystical tendencies; often interchangeably called aliran kebatinan or kejawen
aliran sempalan a small new (religious) group believed to promote any teaching or doctrine that are allegedly deviant from the teachings or doctrines of mainstreaming religious groups
glossAry And AbbreviAtion
xvi xvi GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATION
Azas Tunggal “Sole Base,” unifying principle imposed by the New Order regime to pledge Pancasila as the only ideological basis of all Indonesian organizations and institutions
BAKIN Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (Coordinating Body of State Intelligence)
BAKORPAKEM Badan Kordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan di Masyarakat (Coordinating Body for Monitoring and Supervising Local Religious Beliefs in Society)
BAPPENAS Badan Perencana Pembangunan Nasional (National Body for Development Planning)
BPUPK(I) Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Indonesia) ([Indonesian] Investigating Body for the Preparation of Independence).
dakwah Islamic mission or propagation; preaching an appeal for a deeper performance of faith among the Muslim community
Darul Islam Islamic polity or society where Islamic doc-trines and law are well-implemented. Also a separatist political movement in approx. 1950–1980
Dasar Negara Philosophical foundations of the state, later referring to Pancasila
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation)
DEPAG Departeman Agama (Department of Religious Affairs), the state office for administering religious affairs. Currently known as KEMENAG (Kementerian Agama or Ministry of Religious Affairs). Also see MORA
DGI Dewan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia (Indonesian Council of [Protestant] Churches)
xviiGLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATION xvii
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Assembly), the Indonesian Parliament
DPRGR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong (Peoples’ Representative Council of Cooperation); refers to the Indonesian Parliament during Sukarno’s Guided Democracy
Dwi Fungsi dual security and socio-political functions of the Indonesian armed forces
fatwa religious opinion or edict issued by an Islamic scholar or Islamic organization in response to particular issue or problem in the Muslim community
FKUB Forum Komunikasi Umat Beragama (Forum for Inter-Faith Communication)
GBHN Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (The Mainlines of State Policies)
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Group), powerful government political party in the New Order era
haji Title given to Muslims who have per-formed pilgrimage to the holy site of the Kabah at Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The hajj is one of the Five Islamic Pillars as a once-in-a lifetime obligation of religious devotion
hukum adat customary law, see adatIAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State
Institute for Islamic Studies), referring to state-run Islamic higher education institu-tions, see UIN and STAIN
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indo-nesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association)
JAI Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Ahmadiyah Community of Indonesia), see Ahmadiyah
xviii xviii GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATION
jihad “struggle” or “exertion.” The meaning can range from personal struggle against sinful tendencies to assisting the community in holy war
jilbab or hijab an outer garment, a long gown covering the whole body or a cloak covering the neck and bosom, worn by Muslim women
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa The First Principle of Pancasila literally means the Oneness of God denoting the belief in God
KNIP Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central National Committee of Indonesia)
KOPKAMTIB Komando Operasi Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command of Security and Order Operations)
KUA Kantor Urusan Agama (District Office for Religious Affairs in particular deal-ing with marriage and divorce of Muslim community)
KWI Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia (Conference of [Catholic] Indonesian Bishops)
kyai Muslim religious leader or scholar of Islamic studies, see ulama
MAWI Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia (High Council of Indonesian Bishops)
MORA Ministry of Religious Affairs, see DEPAGMPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s
Consultative Assembly)MPRS Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
Sementara (Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly)
Muhammadiyah Indonesian modernist Muslim organiza-tion founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars)
NAD Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam or Aceh is a province located in Sumatera island
xixGLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATION xix
NASAKOM Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis (Nationalism, Religion and Communism), a political slogan created by Sukarno to fuse three intentional political and social powers in Indonesia
Negara Ketuhanan “Religious-based State,” in which reli-gion plays an important part; often the term interchangeably called Negara ber-Ketuhanan
New Order 1969–1998, the regime under the Presidency of Suharto
NKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
NU Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of Religious Scholars), the largest traditionalist Muslim organization in Indonesia established by Hasyim Ashari in 1926
Old Order the term used by the Suharto regime to point out the previous regime under the Presidency of Sukarno from 1945 to 1969
P4 Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila (Guidelines for the Internalization and Application of Pancasila)
Pancasila The “Five Principles” constituting the national ideology of the Indonesian state. They are: belief in one supreme God; just and civilized humanity; national unity; democracy led by wisdom and prudence through consultation and representation; and social justice
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesian (Indonesian Democratic Party), a political party cre-ated by the New Order regime in 1970s to merge some nationalist and Christian political parties
Permesta/PRRI Perjuangan Semesta/Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Universal Struggle/the Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia), a
xx GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATION
so-called rebel movement declared by civil and military leaders in 1957 against the Central Government in Jakarta
Persis Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union), reform-ist organization founded in 1923 by Ahmad Hasan
Pesantren Islamic boarding-school system in Indonesia
PGI Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia (Communion of Indonesian Churches)
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia)
PMP Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moral Education)
PPKI Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (The Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence)
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party), a political party created by the New Order regime in the 1970s to merge some existing Islamic political parties
priyayi Javanese feudal aristocracy; in many cases the term also refers to employees of the Indonesian civil service
Reformasi 1998–present, era of democratic reformREPELITA Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five
Year Development Plan)Salafism Term used to describe movements that seek
to return to the teachings and example of the early generations of Muslims; recently denoting the most strictly puritanical of Islamic movements
santri students in an Islamic boarding school (see pesantren) or in some cases referring to pious Muslims vis-à-vis abangan
SARA Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar-golongan (Ethnicity, Religion, Race and Inter-class), prohibitions on unfavourable mention of these sensitive issues in public
xxiGLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATION
“Seven Words” (of 1945 Jakarta Charter) is a controver-sial phrase containing seven words (dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi para penganutnya or “with the obliga-tion for [Muslim] adherents to carry out Islamic shariah”). This phrase for many was regarded as the main element of the enshrinement of Islamic shariah in the Indonesian Constitution.
syariah or shariah Islamic law or jurisprudenceSKB Surat Keputusan Bersama (Joint Decree of
two or more Ministerial Offices)STAIN Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (State
College for Islamic Studies), see UIN and IAIN
UIN Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University), see IAIN and STAIN
ulama Muslim scholar, see kyaiUndang-Undang Haji the Law of PilgrimageUndang-Undang Wakaf the Law of EndowmentUndang-Undang Zakat the Law of Philanthropy or Alms-Giving
xxiii
Ismatu Ropi is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Religious Studies Faculty of Theology and Philosophy (Ushuluddin) State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, and Director of Research at the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta.
He obtained his MA from McGill University on Muslim–Christian rela-tions in Indonesia, and his PhD from the Australian National University on the politics of regulating religion in Indonesia.
He has written widely on inter-religious relations in Indonesia, pub-lished in scholarly journals and articles. He is the author of Fragile Relation: Muslims and Christians in Modern Indonesia (2000), and has co-edited books on Islamic studies such as Women’s Images in Islam (2002), Islamic Social Institution in Indonesia (2002) and Studying Islam in Middle Eastern University (2001).
His main research interests are on religious studies particularly Christianity and Judaism, new religious movements and minorities in Indonesia, religious education in Indonesia, Islam and issues of democ-racy in Indonesia.
About the Author
xxvii
Table 4.1 Subsidies to religious groupings 53Table 6.1 Articles on religion in Indonesian constitutions 81Table 13.1 List of regional regulations on Shariah By-Laws
(based on year of issuance) 189
list of tAbles
1© The Author(s) 2017I. Ropi, Religion and Regulation in Indonesia, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2827-4_1
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Various incidents and cases related to religious life during the last ten years have posed a severe test for the Indonesian government’s policies on religion. In addition to serious tensions over the prolonged contro-versial contestation on permits for the building of places of worship in many cities throughout the country, rampage attacks to properties that belonged to minority groups, and the savage killing of three members of the Ahmadis in Banten following the prolonged controversy and hostility towards the Ahmadiyah movement in Indonesia, have marked a milestone in the cloudy history of the acclaimed Indonesian religious tolerance.
Levels of religious violence have risen significantly since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998 indeed, but in the past few years, the govern-ment’s handling of religious conflict has drawn increasing criticism, both domestically and internationally. Within Indonesia, this issue has sparked debate not only regarding the role of the state in upholding the rule of law and protection of minorities, but also on deeper questions regarding the relationship between the state and religion.
State–religion relations in Indonesia have a long and troubled his-tory, which predates the nation’s independence in 1945. The debate on the issue continued among the Founding Fathers and took place in the meetings of the BPUPK[I] (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Indonesia)/Investigating Body for the Preparation of Independence [of Indonesia]) in mid-1945. Suffice to say that after
2
long and heated argumentation a political compromise was reached among the Indonesian Founding Fathers. It rested upon the foremost principle acknowledging the belief in Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (the belief in the “Almighty God”). With the acceptance of this principle, Indonesia would be neither a “secular” country in which religion was absolutely separated from the state, nor a religious one where the state was organized on one particular faith.
Taking a close look at the phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is impor-tant for understanding the nature of the state–religion relationship, and the intrusive government’s regulation of religion as its consequence. As discussed in Chap. 7 of this book, despite its vagueness in the beginning, the inclusion of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in the Pancasila and subse-quently the constitution eventually became the normative basis for the role of the state in matters of religion. In this vein, the phrase implied not only philosophical acknowledgement of God, but also the fundamental norm of the social, political and legal constructions of the state.
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is a persuasive phrase but almost impossible to define in a single meaning. In the lack of clear definition and conceptu-alization of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), the state ministerial institution established in 1946 to manage matters of religion, sorted out this constitutional legacy as the foundation of the government’s role to manage matters of religion in Indonesia. At first glance, one might think that MORA was at work appearing to be the most appropriate state institution emphasizing “neutrality” in dealing with religious affairs for all citizens. Nevertheless, the history of MORA’s establishment did not take place in an empty political environment. It has, almost in its inception, been a bastion for Muslim activists after their defeat in their Islamic state proposal in 1945.
For those who are not familiar with the history of Indonesian nation- state formation, we would perhaps point out the debates between the Founding Fathers in the BPUPK[I] Assembly in mid-1945 as the most important milestone defining the best model of the Indonesian nation whether or not based on nationalism or Islam. In this Assembly the dis-agreement between the two parties, the Muslims and the Nationalists, on the issue of the future state model was profound. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, they finally came into a compromise to insert Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa confirming religiosity in the future state system. While on the surface this compromise fixed the tension and became the common denominator uniting the Muslims with nationalist activists, in the minds
I. ROPI
3
of Muslim activists ideas about making Islamic teachings the foundation of the state were likely still on the way. Thus following their defeat in the struggle to establish an Islamic state in the Assembly, a new struggle to make the state system in line with Islamic teachings was pursued. This took momentum with the establishment of MORA, the state-initiated institution designed likely to “relieve the wound” of many Muslim activ-ists in their proposal of Islamic state.
Discussed later at some length in Chap. 8, as far as the phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is concerned, this book will argue that the contest over interpreting the phrase became a battlefield for the Muslim activists in MORA signifying the shift in their new strategy from the creation of an Indonesian “Islamic state” to the “Islamization of the state.” Thus MORA successfully endorsed the insertion of an “Islamic interpretation” of the phrase to be based on the wholly Islamic-derived understanding of tawhid or Islamic monotheism. In turn MORA consequently reinforced its roles in regulating religious life by intentionally using particular expressions and forms taken from Islamic doctrines.
Bearing this Islamic interpretation in mind, MORA from the late 1940s for example, served as the institutional watchdog for “the realization of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” in public life. It was also responsible for “watching over individual freedom, giving guidance and support” so as to “promote healthy religious movements.”1 In turn MORA placed increas-ingly strict conditions on the freedom of religious expression. It ruled that religious freedom was only preserved under circumstances such as “aware-ness and full responsibility” (kesadaran dan penuh tanggung jawab). Unsurprisingly in this instance MORA relied heavily on upon wholly Islamic teachings for its understanding of how to realize Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in public and how to preserve this religious freedom.
In turn, the above Islamized concepts of the realization of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, and religious freedom with “awareness and full responsi-bility,” proved to be an effective tool for successive governments to justify limits on religious expression and to take action against those accused of exceeding the bounds of acceptable religious freedom. At the same time those concept implicitly signified that someone who holds minority or dif-ferent religious views must be “aware” of majority sensitivities in practis-ing the faith, as is later be found in some cases related to minorities groups such as aliran kebatinan or Javanese local religious beliefs.
Thus, within this framework of MORA’s determinant roles on reli-gious policies, the government issued many statutes and regulations that
INTRODUCTION
4
applied to all religious communities in the country, thereby unsurprisingly undermining the founding principle of state religious neutrality. In this vein, MORA, with assistance from other departments such as Internal Affairs and the Attorney-General’s, proved critical to determining the character of state–religion relations in Indonesia.
This book will argue later in Chaps. 11 and 12 that following the coming to power of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1967, MORA’s existing regu-lations on religious affairs were wielded heavy-handedly to help “restore and maintain” social and political order. Nevertheless strict control of this Ministry evolved during the political consolidation of this regime, particu-larly after 1970. As discussed at length in those chapters, this strategy was followed for at least two reasons. First, the new regime was able to control and restrict any potential opposition from Muslim activists. Second, the regime began to transform MORA’s image from being a political repre-sentative of Islam within the state into a fully-fledged institution obedient solely to the Suharto regime. For the latter, the regime began to put some prominent scholars and active army officers in positions where they could steer a new direction for this ministry.
Following this, the new regime was successful in dictating the new role of MORA as one of disseminating religious piety within society which was totally apart from political activism. The new MORA position was also visible as playing a major role in translating a variety of regime policies on social and economic development using religious language. This was par-ticularly important in order to disseminate the ideology of development among the Muslim community.
As far as the notion of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is concerned, under the new regime the meaning of the phrase was gradually rede-fined and transformed into a new epithet to express and characterize Indonesian cultural identity. Hence the phrase was then disassociated from any Islamic origin and was understood simply as believing in God or acknowledging the God. In this stance, the phrase became an important element in the New Order’s prescription of “proper” cultural identity. Defending this regime-sanctioned definition of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa meant defending Indonesian identity. In turn, subscribing to “true” Indonesian identity meant accepting the official view of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. In practice, while the regime took away Islamic inter-pretation as promulgated by many Muslim activists in its first stance, it nevertheless used the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa principle to require all religious groups in Indonesia to accept monotheism, and to endorse a
I. ROPI
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model of orthodoxy. Following this, the regime also limited the number of “legally” recognized religious groups to have legal rights for their religion’s mission and call in the country.2 All citizens had to choose and affiliate with one of these religions when obtaining their identity cards and when filling in their census forms.
So, the combination of MORA’s religious regulation and the New Order regime’s obsession with socio-political and economic stabilities, brought into existence new unprecedented restrictions on religious life in Indonesia. Moreover, the regime increasingly used coercive approaches, often enforced by the military and the state’s extensive intelligence appara-tus. It regulated almost all aspects of the religiosity of the citizens, includ-ing halting the activities of religious groups that were judged either to not comply with the state’s ever-narrower religio-political principles or to threaten social harmony and order. For the latter, the regime enacted the new law No. 5/PnPs/1969 on the Prevention or Misuse and/or Religious Vilification.3
This Law, usually referred to as the Indonesian Law on Blasphemy, was chiefly a means of forbidding communism and at the same time of controlling any religious activities allegedly deviant from mainstream tra-ditions. Thus as far as this Law was concerned, the regime preserved the doctrines of the established mainstream groups as the models to fol-low. The regime was also vigilant in its monitoring of any group seen as “different” from the mainstream and set up an inter-departmental body known as the BAKORPAKEM (Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan di Masyarakat/Coordinating Body for the Supervision of Local Beliefs in Society).
It is worth mentioning that the exact extent of the regulation of reli-gion during this period has not been precisely documented. Nevertheless it is likely that from the 1980s Indonesia’s religious sphere was one of the most heavily-regulated in the world. Even a preliminary examination of books published by the Ministry of Religious Affairs reveals some-thing of the vast number of regulations and codes.4 From 1965 to 1995, more than 110 regulations concerning religion were issued. These regu-lations took many forms, ranging from statutes passed by parliament, to decrees, instructions, circulars and guidelines issued by the President, Ministers, the Attorney-General, as well as Governors. Most of the regu-lations are national in scope while others cater to religious problems at the provincial and district levels.
INTRODUCTION
6
During the New Order period alone, there were at least fifty decrees dealing with prohibitions on such matters as sects or doctrines that alleg-edly deviated from the state-endorsed orthodoxy of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, or relating to the circulation of books, pamphlets and other printed materials deemed to be religiously problematic. In all probability, the actual number of religious regulations is much greater than stated above, but it is difficult to compile accurate figures due to poor documen-tation and cataloguing by government authorities.
The downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998 ushered in the Era Reformasi, which saw a rapid transition to democracy and the lifting of many political restrictions. The problematic nature of religious regulation has become all the more challenging following this Indonesia’s transition to democracy. Reform has led to freedom of expression, the emergence of a diversity of political forces, as well as a shift from a centralized to decen-tralized governance.
With reform also came the re-emergence of Muslim religio-political activism after some three decades of repression. All sorts of new Islamic groups were formed, ranging from the highly conservative to the progres-sive and liberal. In addition to this, sweeping decentralization since 2001 has added greatly to the complexity of new state–religion relations. A case in point was that although the central government formally retained authority in religious affairs, in reality many local administrations intro-duced new religious-based regulations, commonly known as perda syariah (shariah by-laws).
The new shariah by-laws in tandem with the pre-existing regulations on religious affairs from the Sukarno and Suharto presidencies form the main features of Indonesia’s contemporary state–religion relations. Suffice to conclude that with these new developments, although religious rights are now more comprehensively defended, the fundamental pattern of reli-gious authoritarianism is little altered since the eras of the Sukarno and Suharto presidencies.
Overall, this book argues that regulations on religious affairs are insepa-rable from various political and social factors, and often part of political bar-gains between the government, major parties and dominant religious groups. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that incumbent governments mostly belong to or seek the support of such groups, and thus are vulnerable to pressure on social and religious issues. The second reason is that govern-ments seek political legitimacy from dominant groups and for that reason often neglect minority rights and interests in favour of those of the majority.
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In this sense it is clear that some government regulations are mostly based on the values standard of the majority group. In many cases those regulations are also used as a means of legal control and also of entrench-ing Muslim hegemony and ability to define religious “truth.” Hence, while many studies have focused on the tense relations between Muslim groups and the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, it was in fact the majority religious community which gained the most benefit from the regulations introduced by the authoritarian regimes from the late 1950s till the late 1990s. As discussed in Chaps. 10 and 11 in this book, among the exam-ples of this are regulations on the establishment of new places of worship, on missionary activities and overseas predication aid, and the restriction of the Ahmadiyah group in Indonesia.
In conclusion, the book would strongly argue that government in a mature democracy should pursue policies that protect religious freedoms where all religious groups should be free from the spectre of threat and persecution. Repeatedly, Indonesian governments have, in the name of maintaining social order, trampled on or failed to uphold minority reli-gious rights. It is the fact that in many cases that government’s policies have not approached religious issues in a manner that is impartial, fair and consistent to all of the nation’s many faith communities. In this instance, it has unfortunately tended to serve to majority interests and preferences rather than to respect individual freedom and equality in religious expres-sion for all religious groups.
About this book
This book is not primarily a legal study and does not seek to examine how particular laws should be or are applied on religious issues. It considers nevertheless in some detail case studies in which statutes and administra-tive regulations have impacted adversely on the freedom to hold particular faiths and to worship in particular ways.
In essence, this book is a historical survey which seeks to uncover the socio-political dynamics that produce the policies and laws governing reli-gious life in Indonesia. It focuses mainly on contests over the state–reli-gion relationship on how and why the government regulates religious life, and in turn, how religious groups cope with such regulations in the light of the “secular” nature of the nation state. Thus this study attempts to address several specific questions. To what extent should the state inter-vene in religious affairs? What is the nature of the politics of regulation
INTRODUCTION
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in Indonesia? Why and how does the state justify the close regulation of religion? How do religious groups respond to the state’s politics of regula-tion of religion?
This book combines historical and political analyses in understand-ing the context of particular state regulations on religion. It mainly uses qualitative approaches employing two types of sources: documentary and interview. The documentary method or literature review has focused chiefly on collecting and analysing the contents and context of govern-ment policies on religious life. It traces back the history of each policy and its specific social and political background as well as examining the influence of those policies within religious communities. The second group of source material, that of interviews, aims at exploring the opin-ions and views as well as responses toward government policies and prac-tices from the officers of various ministries as well as academics, religious leaders and civil society groups.
This book also examines various state regulations on a number of important issues and employ two different approaches in presenting analy-sis: thematic and chronological. In the thematic approach, the discussion focuses on close interpretation of texts in order to uncover the meaning of key terms and concepts, the philosophy or rationale behind them, and the practical consequences of the regulations for religious communities. One important example of this thematic approach is the discussion of the philo-sophical discourse on the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, which underpins the very foundation of state policies on religion. In other cases, the chronological approach is used to analyse the development of certain regulations in a particular period of time, as in the cases of the policies on houses of worship and the Ahmadiyah community. Here this book explores and compares differences in these cases to measure the state’s consistency in delivering its policies on particular religious groups. The documentation of these regulations is supplied in the Appendix of this book.
scholArly studies on the stAte–religion relAtionship in indonesiA
There are two main models in studies on the state–religion relationship in Indonesia. The first model emphasizes how religious values influence the state system, such as in constituting state ideology, or how a particular religious movement or doctrine (traditional, moderate, radical) is used
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or developed to respond, accept or oppose the model and concept of statehood. In this model, religious groups are the main actors in shaping or responding to state policies.
Examples of the first model deal mainly with studies on the Muslim community, such as those by Endang Saifuddin Anshari, B.J. Boland, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Bahtiar Effendy and Faisal Ismail.5 These have anal-ysed how Muslims in Indonesia have negotiated their religious values and identity vis-à-vis the “secular” state ideology. Excellent examples of similar studies on how other religious groupings in Indonesia, such as Christians and Hindus, have coped with the issue are found in the works of Bonar Sidjabat, Eka Darmaputera, Gerry van Klinken and Martin Ramstedt.6
The second model puts emphasis on the state as the actor, in terms of how it maintains its relations with the religious communities. In this model various studies deal with the way governments adopt or reject par-ticular religious symbols or values. One of the ways of measuring this is to examine various regulations and policies issued by government agen-cies and, among other things, scrutinize the use of terms and concepts and their specific religious derivation. Also included in this model is the way in which the government deals with religious instruction within the education system and with various religious practices and symbols in the political and legal system. While some scholars such as Aqib Suminto, for instance,7 have given considerable attention to these issues, nevertheless no comprehensive study has appeared to date. Many are partial studies, focusing exclusively on one single policy or on one given period; none seek to take a longer historical view or consider the broader gamut of state policies on religion.
The present study in this book mainly deals with the second model that focuses on the state, rather than societal actors. For background, the book draws on previous works dealing with the issue: an article by Harry J. Benda and a book by Suminto, both examining Dutch colonial poli-cies on religious affairs.8 While Benda explores the foundations of overall Dutch policy, Suminto examines quite comprehensively the role of the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken (Office of Native Affairs) on religious mat-ters in the archipelago. However, both of these studies are limited in scope to the colonial period and to exploring policies exclusively with regard to the Muslim community. Nevertheless, much of their analysis is important because there are some similarities in policy patterns between those of the colonial government and of the New Order regime.
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Some scholars have also discussed particular government policies in the Sukarno and Suharto eras, such as in the articles by Justus M. van der Kroef, Ahmad von Denffer, Heriyanto Yang, Semuel Agustinus Patty, Anne Schiller, and Mujiburrahman.9 While van der Kroef discusses conflict of interest in the issuance of certain policies on religion in the Guided Democracy era, Denffer, Yang and Schiller analyse particular cases of government policies on missionary activities, Confucianism and the exis-tence of local religious groups respectively. Mujiburrahman offers a quite comprehensive account of the relationship between Muslim and Christian groups related to their efforts to protect their interests within the state. Again, these studies provide only partial discussions covering particular issues in a specific period of time, for example, on how the Chinese deal with the government policies on their religion and culture or on Muslim–Christian relations in the New Order regime.
To fill the gaps in the literature described above, this book surveys and examines state regulation of religious life in modern Indonesian history. It strives to present a comprehensive picture of the overall policy of the state toward religion and the various ways in which religious groups have dealt with state intrusions into their spiritual lives.
the structure of the book
The book comprises fifteen chapters including the Introduction and Conclusion. This Introduction makes general observations on the state–religion relationship in Indonesia. Chaps. 2 and 3 will discuss different approaches to examining religion and state relations in various nations, examining constitutional models, type of regime and the religious compo-sition of society. These perspectives will provide a framework for theoriz-ing on the politics of regulation.
The nature of agama in Indonesian culture and how state policies on religion has paved the foundation of more complex problem of the state–religion relationship in modern Indonesia is the focus of Chap. 4. Following this, Chaps. 5 and 6 will explore the debates in the lead up to independence in 1945 on the Dasar Negara (Foundations of the State), including the political compromise which resulted in the concept of Ketuhanan Yang Esa becoming a key part of the constitution’s provi-sions on religion. Arguments against the establishment of an Islamic state and ideas on Negara Ketuhanan will be also presented in detail. Chapter 7 will examine the contests over the concept of Ketuhanan Yang Maha
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Esa, exploring the development of this concept which underpinned state policies on religion from the Sukarno period onward. Chapters 8 and 9 will discuss the main basis for the state to intervene and maintain order in religious life. It focuses on the role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in administering Islamic affairs as well as observing other religious groups, and the enactment of the controversial policy in regard to religious blas-phemy will also be analysed in this chapter.
Chapters 10, 11 and 12 will examine government policies on reli-gion in the New Order era. Those consecutive chapters will present pro-longed discussion on the formation of agama (religion) as an essential part of the Indonesian political and legal identity, as well as a number of controversial cases, such as the prohibition of various religious sects, restrictions on proselytization/mission and the state administration of Islamic institutions.
Chapters 13 and 14 will discuss developments in the state’s regulation of religious life in the post-1998 Reformasi period. The promulgation of shariah-inspired by-laws in a number of districts, the controversy over new policies on the establishment of place of worship and Ahmadiyah will be discussed in detail. A preliminary introduction to future studies on the judicial review of the Indonesian Vilification Law or Blasphemy Law in the light of new battle of legal jihadism in contemporary Indonesia is also discussed in brief in Chap. 14.
In the Conclusion of this book, some highlights and recommendations for improved policies on religious affairs will be supplied.
notes
1. “Government Regulation No. 8/1950 on the Amended Tasks of Ministry of Religious Affairs,” and “Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 5/1951,” in Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama R.I. 3 Januari 1946–3 Januari 1987: Eksistensi dan Derap Langkahnya (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1987).
2. Initially there were six “recognized” religious groups in Indonesia. Nevertheless in the New Order period, one of which (Confucianism) was excluded from the list. I will discuss thoroughly this issue in Chap. 10 of this book.
3. Ichtijanto, Pengamanan Negara Melalui Pengendalian Kegiatan Kerochanian (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI Direktorat Djenderal Bimbingan Masjarakat Islam Projek Pengawasan Kegiatan Keagamaan dan Aliran2/Faham2, 1969), 24–26.
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4. See Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, Peraturan Perundang- Undangan Kehidupan Beragama, (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, Proyek Pembinaan Lembaga Keagamaan, 1998/1999).
5. Endang Saifuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter of June 1945 (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia [ABIM], 1979); B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia,” PhD Dissertation University of Chicago 1983 and published in Indonesian as Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial/LP3ES, 1985); Bahtiar Effendy, “Islam and the State: The Transformation of Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia,” PhD Dissertation the Ohio State University 1994 and published as Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); and Faisal Ismail, “Islam, Politics, and Ideology in Indonesia: A Study of the Process of Muslim Acceptance to the Pancasila,” PhD Dissertation McGill University 1995 and published as Islam and Pancasila: Indonesia Politics 1945–1995 (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama RI, 2001).
6. Bonar Sidjabat, “Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith: A Study Concerning the Concept of Divine Omnipotence in the Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and Christianity,” PhD. Dissertation Princeton University, 1960 and published as Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith: A Study Concerning the Concept of Divine Omnipotence in the Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and Christianity (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1965); Eka Darmaputera, Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988); Gerry van Klinken, Minorities, Modernity and the Emerging Nation: Christians in Indonesia a Biographical Approach (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003); and Martin Ramstedt, Hinduism in Modern Indonesia: Hindu Dharma Indonesia Between Local, National and Global Interest (London: Routledge, 2005).
7. Aqib Suminto, Politik Islam Hindia Belanda: Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche zaken (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985).
8. Harry J. Benda, “Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia,” The Journal of Modern History, 30, 4 (December 1958): 338–347.
9. Justus M. van der Kroef, “Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia,” Far Eastern Survey 22, no. 10 (September 1953): 121–125; Ahmad von Denffer, Indonesia: Government Decrees on Mission and Subsequent Developments
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(Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1979); Heriyanto Yang, “The History and Legal Position of Confucianism in Post-Independence Indonesia,” Marburg Journal of Religion 10, 1 (2005): 1–8; Semuel Agustinus Patty, “Aliran Kepercayaan: A Socio-Religious Movement in Indonesia,” PhD. Dissertation Washington State University, 1986; Anne Schiller, “An ‘Old’ Religion in ‘New Order’ Indonesia: Notes on Ethnicity and Religious Affiliation,” Sociology of Religion 57, 4 (1996): 409–417; and Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: Muslim–Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order (Leiden: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).
INTRODUCTION
15© The Author(s) 2017I. Ropi, Religion and Regulation in Indonesia, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2827-4_2
CHAPTER 2
The State and Religion: An Overview
Regulating religion is a manifestation of the state–religion relationship. Obviously, this relationship bears traces of the historical experiences, philosophical views, cultural settings and political elements of a particular country that may differ from those of another. This relationship is subject to three defining factors: the constitution, the type of government regime and the composition of the religious community.
It seems therefore imperative to review theoretical perspectives on rela-tions between the state and religion as the background of studying how the governments in many countries regulate religious affairs. Within this back-drop, this chapter examines the basis patters of this relationship by discussing the nature of the constitution, the type of governmental regime and the size and influence of specific religious groupings in particular countries.
The PaTTerns of relaTionshiP
Studies use various patterns and models to understand the nature of the state–religion relationship. Among those studies is the work of Paul Weithman. According to Weithman, there are three generalizable mod-els: separation, unification and recognition in the patterns of relationships between state and religion in the world. Weithman argues that in the model of separation both state and religious domains are strictly sepa-rated and therefore it is easy to observe a sharp distinction between secular and sacred, state and church. The opposite tendency to this first model is
16
unification, where the state and religion are an integrated and overlapping system, with no boundary between the two. Finally, he defines the last model, that of recognition, where the state maintains a certain degree of preservation of religion and religious identities or values within its legal and political system.1
The first model, separation, is represented by the United States in which, in theory, the US Constitution has prevented the Federal State from set-ting up a church, adopting, teaching or practising religion in the state’s political system. The US Constitution, and the famous Establishment Clause in particular, clearly outlines the separation of religion from state affairs, as well as the neutrality of the state with respect to religious ideas and practices.2 This has become known as the “anti-establishment prin-ciple” in the Establishment Clause.
The Clause ensures that religious affairs are removed from any attempted state domination, and therefore the state cannot control its citi-zens in matters of religion, either as a belief system or any kind of religious practice. Theoretically, the Clause also guarantees that the state has no means or capacity to involve itself in enforcing, mandating or promoting any particular belief or affiliation.3 Hence the Clause has been the source for the US Supreme Court’s verdicts in treating with “a high degree of suspicion” any perceived attempt by the government to engage in reli-gious intervention. In the end it is quite evident that religion is relegated to the private domain and any religious symbols or influences are absent from the public sphere.4
Other examples of the separation model are Australia and the Republic of the Philippines.5 Australia is worthy of brief discussion as Blackshield finds a different practice of the anti-establishment principle in this coun-try.6 Examining the High Court of Australia, he has discovered that anti- establishment is not “well grounded” in the Australian soil. Suffice to conclude that according to Blackshield the notion of establishment has a very narrow definition in the Australian context. It is simply a “prohibi-tion” against the Federal Government from creating any national church or any state religion. It may imply that, to some degree, the Federal Government is justified in being involved in activities for religious groups, such as giving assistance or exemptions or providing financial and admin-istrative support. In addition to the countries mentioned, China and the former Soviet Union can also be included in this model since in these two countries religion is separated and alienated from the state legal and politi-cal system, due to the adoption of the ideology of communism.7
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The second model, unification, refers mainly to theocratic states where religion and politics are unified, as for example in the Vatican, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It should be noted that the definition of the theocratic state in modern times is not similar to that of the ancient Islamic dynasties or of states of the medieval European period, where a religious leader was most likely the only source of author-ity for both religious and “secular” life. The theocratic state in modern times adopts some principles differentiating the role of religious leaders from that of the executive “secular” leaders. In Iran, for instance, beside the Ayatullah and the group of religious scholars of the mullah in the ahl al-hall wa al-aqd who serve as religious authorities, there is at the same time an appointed President who is in charge of day-to-day governance. However, a profound dominant character in the theocratic state is the fact that religious voices and opinions from religious leaders and scholars are likely to be the most important sources for law making and directing socio-political affairs.8
The last model, recognition, covers states that are secular in nature but maintain a certain degree of preservation of religion or religious tra-dition. This varies. Some states make an explicit constitutional recogni-tion of religion, such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Greece, as mentioned earlier. Others adopt one religious tradition to be the official state religion but, at the same time, acknowledge the existence of other religious traditions, as in Thailand, or adopt a policy that makes reference to God and other religious concepts, as well as recognizing religions as a pivotal element in the state and society. Indonesia is a further example of this third model.
It is worth mentioning that in all of these countries, by and large, the state patronizes and protects religion or religious tradition as cultural heri-tage and expression, a source of virtue, common good, inspiration and moral obligation for the society and the nation. However, the degree of manifesting religious symbols in public or the degree to which the state supports religious activism may vary, since this is deeply rooted in the social, cultural and political histories of each country throughout specific prevailing circumstances and over different time frames.9
In the so-called theocratic states, state intervention in religious affairs is logically more likely to be found than in the states employing the separa-tion or recognition models. It is also evident that generous state support of the established majority religious grouping coupled with practices of dis-crimination and persecution towards minorities has more likely occurred
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in countries following the theocratic model, such as in Iran, as argued solidly by Sanasarian.10 This, however, does not mean that a similar situa-tion will not occur in states that declare a certain distance from religious affairs, or in states under the separation model. The practice of regulating religion is in essence still widespread.
By the same token, the practice of discrimination is also to be found in countries with both other models, the separation and the recognition model. As discussed earlier, it is found that religious groups enjoy generous support and the benefit of various exemptions from their governments in some European countries. This practice may mean discrimination against those who receive no benefit or exemption. The terms “favouritism” and “discrimination” have often been used to explain the psychological experi-ence of the different positions. The same practices of “favouritism” and “discrimination” also occur in states that advocate separation from reli-gion. Here, China and the former Soviet Union are examples to point out, for religion is subject to severe government regulations and restrictions, along with other secular activities in economy and politics.
In all, different models of the state–religion relationship entail differ-ent degrees of involvement in religious affairs. Concomitantly, different degrees of involvement may also imply differences in the regulation of religion. While this relationship is strongly rooted in and influenced by a number of factors, let me call these factors simply the nature of the relationship, while at the same time they are also the main ingredients in forming state regulation of religion.
The naTure of The relaTionshiP
Many scholars in the field of state–religion studies have argued that there are several important factors at play in the nature of the state–religion rela-tionship which in turn shape the enactment of state policies on religious affairs. These are: the constitution; the type of regime; and the composi-tion of religious groupings.
The Constitution
One of the best ways to gain an overall understanding of the nature of a state is to examine its constitution. Theoretically, a constitution is written to limit the power of government in exercising authority over its peo-ple. It also preserves tradition, models of political relations and the basic
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elements of citizens’ rights. It is worth mentioning that the constitution does not give human “rights” since we are all born with rights. However, the constitution may and should protect natural rights, including the right to have a religion.
As legal documents, some constitutions of the world incorporate fundamental principles of the state–religion relationship. Some are very explicit, acknowledging the position of religion within the state system, such as making one tradition the official state religion. This is found in the constitutions of certain European countries, as discussed earlier. Some others are implicit. Different principles in outlining religious influences in the state system may have a great impact on policy-making on religious life in particular and on the preservation of religious freedom in general. At a superficial level, the more explicit the position of religion is in the consti-tution the more explicit the state role on religious life becomes, either in a positive or a negative way.
In the Indonesian context, by and large, the constitutions have adopted a model of recognition placing religion as an important factor in the state system. An example of this is an acknowledgement of the existence of God in the Preamble of each successive Indonesian constitution. To some scholars, it should indicate that not only is belief in God an important principle in the Indonesian state system but that the laws generated from the constitution should also be in accord with religious values and norms. In addition to religious symbolism, Indonesian constitutions have also incorporated specific chapters or articles dealing with religious affairs.
Suffice it to say that there are two important features as far as religion is concerned: the absence of any official state religion and the recognition of religious freedom for citizens. The former feature in particular is worth emphasizing, given the fact that Islam constitutes the majority religion of Indonesia. None of the constitutions have conferred any special privileges to Islam such as making it an official state religion. In the absence of any official religion, these constitutions normatively recognize a plurality of religions, whereby all religious groupings are to be treated equally without preference or privilege.
Some constitutions also include the basic principle of the protection of religious freedom. The insertion of this element varies. Many have included this element even before the global campaign on religious free-dom. Others have inserted it quite recently following their ratification of international legal documents, such as the 1965 International Covenant on Cultural and Political Rights (the ICCPR). This covenant is legally
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binding on the state and comes into force with a mandate given to a special committee to monitor its compliance in every state.
Here it is worth mentioning that the incorporation of the element of religious freedom in the constitution is not always consistent in practice, as argued by Gvosdev.11 It is evident that the provisions of religious freedom in such states
are often modified, redefined or limited, either by other provisions within the constitutions themselves, or by providing for legislation to be passed “clarifying” what is meant by religious freedom, or by setting up the states as the “filter” through which an acceptable “menu” of choice is laid out for the citizenry.12
Hence there may be inherent contradictions among the articles of the same constitution. On the one hand the idea of religious freedom is preserved clearly in particular articles of the constitution, but on the other hand there are others which are inserted intentionally, requiring circumstances which would limit this freedom. Suffice it to say that there is always one way or another for a state to contest the idea of religious freedom accord-ing to its specific interests, such as for political adventure or public order, and Gvosdev outlines four patterns in the practice of this subversion.
The first, to quote Gvosdev’s words precisely, is “the insertion of the state’s provision into the constitution which grants to the government the power to proscribe groups and practices deemed to be in conflict with state goals.”13 This practice is the most common, where on the sur-face the position of articles on state interest and religious freedom seem equal (primus inter pares). In fact, the former is likely to be more impor-tant than the latter. Gvosdev points to the constitutions of Vietnam and China for this model.
The constitutions of both Vietnam and China contain articles to guar-antee religious freedom. However, at the same time there are other articles stating, for example, that “no one can misuse belief and religions to contra-vene the law and the state policies (Article 70, Vietnamese Constitution),” and “the exercise of citizens of the People’s Republic of China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedom and rights of other citizens (Article 51, Chinese Constitution),” or “no one may make use of religion to engage in activities that … interfere with the educational system of the state (Article 36, Chinese Constitution).”14
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Another example is found in the Turkish Constitution. In Article 24 (2) it is stated that “acts of worship, religious services and ceremonies shall be conducted freely.” However, this right is granted as long as it is not “violating the indivisibility of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic,” as stated in Article 13. If it does so “the government has at its disposal powerful legal tools for diminishing religious freedom.”15
The second means is by putting religious freedom under special cat-egories, such as part of religion or culture. This is found, for example, in the constitutions of Pakistan and Egypt respectively. In Article 20 of the Constitution of Pakistan it is stated that “every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion,” but this right should be in accord with the condition outlined in Article 27 that “all existing laws shall be brought into conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.” This model of subordination is also evident in Egypt where Article 46 of the constitution confirms the protection of religious freedom, but this right is contrasted to the fact that Egypt is an Islamic country declaring “Islam as the Religion of the State … and the principal source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Article 2).”16
In Turkmenistan and Jordan, national culture and the culture of the king-dom respectively become prerequisites for religious freedom. Therefore “the exercise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from fulfilment by per-sons and citizens of their obligations before society and the government. Everyone living in or located on the territory of Turkmenistan is required to obey the Constitution and laws and respect the national traditions of Turkmenistan (Article 37).” In Jordan, the Constitution states that “the State shall safeguard the free exercise of all forms of worship and religious rites in accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom (Article 2).” Christian missions in particular are the main targets, for the reason that Islam is held to be part of culture and identity. Missionary activities are seen as a threat not only to Islam but also to culture and identity.17
The third means, according to Gvosdev, is the infringement of reli-gious freedom “by redefining ‘religious freedom’ in a narrower or more restrictive fashion than the general understanding of the term.”18 The case in point here is Indonesia. The 1945 Indonesian Constitution declares that the state is based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (monotheism) and therefore the state guarantees its citizens the practice of a religion if it is in line with the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. I will discuss this premise more thoroughly in the next chapter.
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The last means involves constitutions which are “vague and undefined with regard to mandating limitations on the right of religious freedom,”19 but justify the practice of limitation on the grounds of international human rights law such as the 1965 ICCPR. The main reason for such a limitation is usually for the sake of public order. Most modern European constitutions, such as that of Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany fall into this category.
Suffice to conclude that there is a variety of ways of inserting religious aspects into the state system as well as in understanding the position of religious freedom in the world’s constitutions. As a corollary, there is also a substantial discrepancy among the nation-states with regard to the ques-tions of the right of the state to regulate and control religious activities.
Types of Regime
Arguing that regulation is a product of the state’s need to control soci-ety is a common feature in political discourse. Many political scholars see the reason behind this as lying in the fundamental character of the state vis- à-vis society. Following Migdal’s theory on the origin of the state, the basic institutional capacity of state power is to penetrate and regulate soci-ety without too many compromises or concessions to other social forces, such as ethnic and religious groupings. This capacity is designated in the form of rules, norms and resources, and in their appropriation in a vari-ety of ways. As state power is dependent on the mode of domination over social forces, the main feature of this domination is the presence of a strong bureaucracy as its political machinery. Therefore, by definition, the stronger a state becomes, the more domination there is, and the weaker a state becomes, the less domination it exerts over other social forces. Thus, based on such capacities and modes of domination, for Migdal, the basic character of the state is either strong or weak.20
However, in practice, it does not mean that the state (even a strong one) is always successful in applying its own values, or in exercising political authority and in the delivery of “good governance.” This is due to the fact that often the state and civil society have equal power and equal position, although com-petition between them may have nevertheless demanded constant negotia-tions, compromises and concessions. Thus, the extent of state power would differ markedly, operating within various (or combinations of) models of statehood, notably: (1) pluralist, (2) elitist, (3) Marxist and (4) corporatist. Regime systems may also be typologically grouped into (a) liberal democratic, (b) communist and post-communist and (c) authoritarian, as noted by Ball.21
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The above observations attempt to provide the basic characteristics of the state, while models of statehood and systems of governance, in one way or another, are not necessarily in line. In practice, this does not always mean that a pluralist liberal democratic model of government is always the best model in the delivery of “political good” in the array of govern-ment services to its citizens, such as security, social order, freedom and economic welfare. To a certain extent, however, a strongly participating pluralist state with a liberal democratic regime (1+a) will be better in gov-ernance terms serving the society than that of a weak corporatist state with an authoritarian regime (4+c). The theory holds true in general observa-tions of political systems of the world.
As far as the regulation of religion is concerned, similar tendencies may easily be found. There is a strong link between state regimes and the estab-lishment of religious liberty on one hand, and between religious liberty and the enactment of the regulation of religious life on another. The more democratic the regime, the more religious liberty is preserved. As a corol-lary, the more religious liberty exists, the lower the level of regulation of religion. Logically speaking, the more authoritarian the regime, the less religious liberty exists within it, while the less religious liberty exists within a society, the higher the level of regulation is to be found.
This elucidates why many states labelled “authoritarian” remain determined to maintain control over religious groups by means of an increasing number of laws and regulations on religious affairs. This is apparent, for example, in China, as mentioned earlier, or in the old regimes of Bulgaria and Slovenia, according to Krussteff22 and Šturm23 respectively. It is also the case in some predominantly Muslim countries, as examined in the works of Means24 for Malaysia, Haddad25 for Jordan and Erdodan for Turkey.26
Modern Indonesia has experienced different models of state (strong and weak) and political regimes (authoritarian or democratic). In any given period of time, the state may be strong or weak and the regime may be democratic or authoritarian. Following independence, the period of parliamentary democracy might be seen as an example of a weak state, yet genuinely democratic in nature. A lack of bureaucratic capacity on the part of the new state, as well as a lack of autonomy in society, were apparent in the newly born republic. When the democratic system was chosen to bridge deep cultural and ideological cleavages in Indonesia, successive gov-ernments had to make to make various concessions and compromises to competing social forces in order to accommodate their different interests.
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The collapse of constitutional democracy led to President Sukarno and the Army introducing a more autocratic system known as Guided Democracy. This took effect with Sukarno’s Dekrit Presiden (Presidential Decree) in 1959 to return to the 1945 Constitution and dissolve the Constituent Assembly. Some scholars have seen this as a manifestation of a weak state with a more authoritarian regime.
In contrast to Sukarno, from the beginning, the New Order regime under Suharto was characterized by the presence of a strong bureaucracy, a corporatist political machinery and a large network of officials equipped with far-reaching infrastructures. This network enabled the regime to pen-etrate society, reaching down to the smallest units of society. This capacity also became a regulating power, with the help of such institutions as the police, military and the courts. And unsurprisingly, the state with these characteristics was substantially undemocratic.
Religious Group Composition
Another factor is religious composition, in terms of dominance and minor-ity,27 as suggested in particular by Beaman and Beyer.28 Beaman provides a persuasive argument to link the existence of a dominant group to the shape of the overall legal system. Examining legal cases in the United States and Canada related to religious disputes, she concludes that both legal systems reinforce the hegemony of Protestantism, by making it “an implicit model of what constitutes a legitimate religion and thereby main-taining the marginalization and restricting the freedom of other religions in so far as they do not fit that model.”29
In addition to Beaman, Beyer notes that political and legal efforts for hegemony (using particular expressions and forms of discourse taken from existing dominant religious groups) are indeed a common phenomenon all across the world. He also observes that in some extreme cases, or at times when rulers or regimes are politically weak, such as in periods of political transition, the values and norms of dominant groups often appear as alternative systems. There is also evidence that in times of turmoil the dominant groups, mostly religious, may dominate public decisions and even serve as quasi-governing institutions, as has occurred in some Eastern European countries and Asia, such as post-1998 Indonesia.
Thus religious composition is an important element in the state practice of regulating religion. In fact, regulations or policies often form part of political bargains struck between the government and dominant religious
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groups. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that the incumbent regimes themselves mostly belong to or are attached to these dominant groups which are likely to ask for favours over others, or at least for playing an important role in the process of legal and political decision making.30
In the Indonesian context, the majority of Indonesians profess an adherence to Islam and Muslim activists played important roles in shaping the state system. As far as religious freedom is concerned, the existence of this dominant grouping is correlative to the practice of the reinforcement of hegemony, making the teachings of Islam the model of a “legitimate” religion and thereby maintaining the “marginalization” and “restriction” of other faiths, in so far as they do not fit that model. An example is how Muslims interpreted the meaning of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in Pancasila and the Constitution. Muslim activists, particularly in the 1950s, insisted on interpreting the phrase as Islamic monotheism (tawhid). The admission of this notion into the Indonesian political vocabulary signified the central position of Islam in the overall state system. To emphasize tawhid in the legal texts meant that the legal instruments would then incorporate some standards drawn from Islamic law or teaching as sources for legislation, policies and so on.
This was evident as well in the Indonesian case during the first years of the Reform Era in the early 2000s, when Muslim politicians and activ-ists kept pressuring the new government to maintain Islamic norms and interests intact within state political and legal systems as later discussed in Chap. 13 of this book.
The second reason is that rulers seek their political legitimacy from the dominant groups. The patronage and legitimacy they gain is essential, not only for the sake of a credible reputation for their further political survival, but also for the maintenance of an appropriately stabilized atmosphere in the delivery of the political good.
Thus the contest for hegemonic control over law-making is often about serving the interests of dominant groups and it is clear that some govern-ment regulations are based on the values and standards of those groups rather than upon universal principles or norms.31 This may explain why dominant groups favour a high level of regulation of religious life while minorities prefer a lower level, as noted by Gill.32 For the dominant groups, although every regulation potentially impinges upon their private domain, it may accord with a long-term projection of power, either explicit or implicit. In many cases regulations are also used as a means of legal control and restriction, enhancing hegemony and monopolizing “the truth.”
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In practice, although rhetorically in favour of freedom for religious activities, it is notable that they support particular policies on the minori-ties, such as restrictions on proselytizing a religious message or disseminat-ing their ideas in the wider society. When it comes to special circumstance like protecting the hegemonic view in the “free market” of religiosity, the situation seems even worse. Dominant groups put demands on the rulers to heavy-handedly prohibit the dissemination of ideas and practices by the minorities, alleging that they are “deviant” and “alien” to the mainstream way of understanding religion.
noTes
1. See Paul J. Weithman, Religion and Contemporary Liberalism (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997).
2. Among the important works on the issue are Arlin M. Adams and Charles J. Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty: The Constitutional Heritage of the Religion Clauses (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1990); Francis Graham Lee, All Imaginable Liberty: The Religious Liberty Clauses of the First Amendment (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994); Frank Lambert, The Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003) and David L. Holmes, The Religion of the Founding Fathers (Ann Arbor: Clement Library, University of Michigan, 2003).
3. Ronald F. Thiemann, Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1996); Forrest Church, The Separation of Church and State (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004); Philip A. Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); and John Witte Jr., “Facts and Fictions about the History of Separation of Church and State,” Journal of Church and State 48, 1 (2006): 15–45. These studies are useful for not only depicting the prolonged history of the so-called American origin of religious liberty that led to consensual acceptance of the wall of separation but also the recent development of the rise of reli-gion in American life.
4. Russell L. Weaver, “The Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution,” in Peter Radan, Denise Meyerson and Rosalind F. Croucher (eds.), Law and Religion: God, the State and the Common Law (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 28–59.
5. See the Australia case for example in Roger C. Thompson, Religion in Australia: A History (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002); and
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Reid Mortensen, “The Unfinished Experiment: A Report on Religious Freedom in Australia,” Emory International Law Review 21 (Spring 2007): 167–204.
6. Tony Blackshield, “Religion and Australian Constitutional Law,” in Radan, Meyerson and Croucher, (eds.), Law and Religion, 81–115.
7. For the Soviet Union context see Dennis J. Dunn (ed.), Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977).
8. Harry P. Reynolds, The Church of Rome in Society and Politics (Sydney: Current Book Distributors, 1943); Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival (London, New York: Routledge, 2006); Mehran Kamrava, The Political History of Modern Iran: From Tribalism to Theocracy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992).
9. See Derek H. Davis and Gerhard Besier (eds.), International Perspectives on Freedom and Equality of Religious Belief (Waco, Texas: J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies Baylor University, 2002).
10. Eliz Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
11. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink, Managed Pluralism and Freedom of Religion,” Religion, State and Society 29, 2 (2001): 81–90.
12. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink,” 82. 13. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink,” 83. 14. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink,” 82. 15. See more detail on Turkish in Mostafa Erdodan, “Religious Freedom in
the Turkish Constitution,” Muslim World 89, 3–4 (1999): 377–388. 16. Stahnke and Blitt, “The Religion-State Relationship,” 947–1078. 17. Mohanna Haddad, “Culture and State in Jordan: Religious Freedom and
Citizenship,” The Ecumenical Review 50, 4 (1998): 460–463. 18. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink,” 84. 19. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink,” 85. 20. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1988); and Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds.), State Power and Social Forces, Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
21. Alan R. Ball, Modern Politics and Government (London: Macmillan, 1994), 31–36.
22. See Atanas Krussteff, “An Attempt at Modernization: The New Bulgarian Legislation in the Field of Religious Freedom,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2 (2001): 575–602.
23. See Lovro Šturm, “Church-State Relations and the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Slovenia,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2 (2004): 607–650.
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24. Gordon P. Means, “Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia,” Pacific Affairs 51, 3 (1978): 384–405.
25. Haddad, “Culture and State in Jordan,” 460–463. 26. Erdodan, “Religious Freedom in the Turkish Constitution,” 377–388. 27. The degree of particular group considered dominant or minor varies
accordingly. It may be seen from (1) its membership and affiliation, or (2) the state recognition to the existence of official religious groups, or (3) perspective of new religious movement (NRM) vis-à-vis the mainstream. An example of a well- documented study on this issue can be found in Richardson, Regulating Religion as mentioned in earlier footnote.
28. See Lori G. Beaman, “The Myth of Pluralism, Diversity and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege of Protestantism in the United States and Canada,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42, 3 (September 2003): 311–325; and Peter Beyer, “Constitutional Privilege and Constituting Pluralism: Religious Freedom in National, Global, and Legal Context,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42, 3 (2003): 333–339.
29. Beyer, “Constitutional Privilege and Constituting Pluralism,” 334–336. 30. There are indeed the or regimes or rulers who come to power with coer-
cion and gain no legitimacy from the dominant groups or those who belong to one of the minority groups but gain approval from the domi-nants, but those cases are very costly and therefore exceptional.
31. Beaman, “The Myth of Pluralism, Diversity and Vigor,” 118–126. 32. See Gill, “The Political Origins of Religious Liberty,” 15.
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CHAPTER 3
Theorizing Regulation of Religion
Regulating religion is still a common phenomenon in the world, though the ways in which governments or regimes intervene in religious matters varies widely. It is by nature a complex and multi-dimensional subject and is closely related to the legal, political and social dynamics of each country.
Understanding this nature of relationship is of importance since there is a common assumption, particularly among human rights activists and groups, that state regulation of religion constitutes a threat to religious freedom. The state is seen to commit an “atrocity” if it involves itself in managing the religious life of its citizens. One of the basic arguments of this is clear: for some human rights activists in many liberal states in particular, religion is a private and personal matter for each individual. Therefore a “modern” government in a “modern” state should accord-ingly maintain zero or at least minimal involvement in religious life if it is not to be seen as violating the humanity and freedom of its citizens.1
It is argued in this chapter that the state regulation of religion is not always contrary to the principles of religious freedom. In many cases, government intervention on religious activities may prevent or at least minimize the conflicts between religious groups. Some cases also shown that due to government involvement, freedom of religion, particularly for minority groups, is preserved and protected. Nevertheless it is also a fact that so often policies on religion are shaped by the opinion of major-ity groups rather than respect for basic rights, including that of religious
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freedom. Consequently, some policies on religion in many countries tend to be far from “fair.” In the extreme case they are “discriminative,” par-ticularly against minorities or non-mainstream groupings.
Regulating Religion and Religious FReedom
As stated earlier, for many scholars and activists regulating religious life threatens religious freedom, and therefore the government in any modern state should minimize its involvement in religious life. While this assump-tion might hold some truths, it is also a fact that many regulations have proved effective in easing tension between religious groups. Regulating religion is not new phenomenon as it can be traced back as far as the his-tory of human civilization itself. Rulers in ancient times or governments in the modern age always exercise authority and power over their citizens, including their religious affairs. This is the nature of governance itself. Some measures are implicit in the form of spoken decrees while others are explicit in written legal texts. The latter usually equates with the word “regulation” in modern times. Spoken and written orders mean interven-tion, either in a positive or a negative way.
Since there is no fixed meaning of the term “regulation” in legal and social literatures, the word is usually associated with service, efficiency and, importantly, public order. Hertog, for example, defines regulation as “the employment of legal instruments compelled by particular regime or government agencies or officials to comply with prescribed behaviour and rules, and accompanied by a mechanism of monitoring and enforce-ment to achieve particular one or a set of goals.”2 Regulation is aimed “to secure compliance with laws directed at achieving the orderly, safe and efficient conduct of desirable and legal activities,” as argued by Mazerolle and Ransley.3 In short, following the rise of the nation-state particularly since the seventeenth century, regulations or laws (including those regard-ing religion) are normatively part of a government’s services to its own citizens in order to maintain social order, to solve disputes between indi-viduals and/or groups, to respond to social problems and to control state power itself, as stated by Edge.4
Nevertheless it is a fact that the state regulation of religion may to some degrees crimp religious freedom since there is no “clear boundary” on the extent of the state involvement in religious life, and on how particular treatment of religious groups is to be pursued by any given government.5 Even so there are no clear guiding principles on how to govern religion in
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international law to be found in some international documents relating to religious freedom, such as the 1965 International Covenant on Cultural and Political Rights (the ICCPR) and the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination. For some observ-ers in this field, this is one of the main gaps in existing regulatory frame-works and discourses on the extent of the state involvement in religious life.
The Ambiguities of the Terms
One of the problems in discussing the relationship between freedom and regulation of religion is the meaning of the word “religion” itself. The concept of “religion” is important to explore as different cultures and societies can have vastly different understandings of its meaning. These may range from a very minimalist definition, such as to denote the accep-tance of the sacred into secular human life, to a broader one that includes one or all ideas of ritual, behaviour, pietism, membership of a faith com-munity and institutional affiliations.
In his famous book, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim devoted considerable space to discussing the nature of reli-gion, arguing that religion is a product of society, and therefore impacts on the lives of all within a given society. Recognizing this social origin of religion, he furthermore underscored the potential of religion to act as a source of solidarity and identification for individuals within a society, especially as “a part of mechanical solidarity systems,” and to provide a meaning for life and basis for authority figures in reinforcing moral and social norms. Thus, for Durkheim, religion and religious groups under-gird traditional or charismatic power vis-à-vis “the state,” particularly if the latter is based on “rational” solidarity systems and “secular” sover-eignty.6 Religion nevertheless has become a determinant of personal and group identity in human history.
Thus, given the range of meaning and perceived essence of religion, precise definition is impossible and, as Gunn has opined, there is no definition of the term to be found in international documents. This is especially so when these texts consider how governments can preserve reli-gious freedom on one hand but ensure religious harmony on the other.7 What has been stated in these international documents is so general as to mention solely the differing nature of religious tendencies consisted of “theistic,” “non-theistic” and “atheistic” beliefs. Within this general notion of a model in religiosity, many international documents dealing
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with religion only take into account monotheism, polytheism, atheism, agnosticism, free thought and animistic beliefs in the meaning of religion itself without pointing to clearly generic names of religious groups like Islam, Christianity and Hinduism.8
At this level, the above general “definition” of what constitutes reli-gion has opened unintended controversy, particularly when the notion of “theistic” is put side by side with “non-theistic” and “atheistic.” In many countries, a theistic tendency is part and parcel of entrenched established religious belief, and it is a fact that even today most nations of the world still, in one way or another, embrace certain models of theistic tradition in their constitutional writings. Thus, accepting non-theistic and atheis-tic groups under the same blanket with theistic not only would be seen as distorting “the truth of religion” but may also be seen as a threat to morality. This is why in many countries the meaning of religion provided in those international documents gained limited acceptance and endorse-ment among religious groups.
Apart from the above problem on defining religion, it should be borne in mind that under special circumstances, the “limitation” of religious affairs exists and is acknowledged in those international documents. In turn, it is one of the entry gates into the divisive discussion of state regula-tion of religion, particularly when it comes to the idea of “social order.” Many states have acknowledged the need to limit individual rights in order to safeguard community stability. Nevertheless it is worth underlining that the concept of order or social stability itself has had a loose and fluid definition due to myriad legal, cultural, political and social settings. The contest over government authority on religious life often goes far beyond this loose definition. In many cases it is in the interests of social order that a particular government issues various regulations against splinter or heterodox groups.
Another point of contention in discussing the extent of regulating reli-gion by the state in relation with freedom comes from within religious tra-dition itself, particularly in understanding the external and internal aspects of religion.9 In some religious groups, Islam for instance, in fact there is no clear division between both aspects of religion, and therefore a grey area in the definition of public and private spheres exists.
The French controversial case forbidding young Muslim women to wear the hijab (the headscarf) in public schools is an example of the differ-ent understanding of the definition in both external and internal aspects of religious life. Amid whatever political manoeuvring behind the issue, there
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is unbridged disagreement among observers and legalists on whether the hijab is to be considered an external aspect of religion in the public sphere or whether it is an internal one as part of personal belief in Islamic society. Given this fact, differences on internal and external aspects of religion, particularly in Islam in this case, seem thin and easily interchangeable. Consequently, when a government regulates hegemonic norms on moral-ity, like proper clothing and behaviour, it has plunged into regulating the internal dimension of religion.
By contrast, the trend to separate these two domains of external and internal aspects of religion has been clearly made in other countries, even though they are traditionally rooted in particular religious traditions and evidently regulated in religious affairs. Examples of this trend are particu-larly visible in some European countries. According to some studies, this difference was the result of the secularization in Europe since the mid- seventeenth century where the dramatic separation between, as Lechner puts it, “civil and ecclesiastical” spheres was unavoidable.10 While seculariza-tion, and modernization as its tandem, are currently re-debated following the rise of world religious revivalism, there is still a clear dichotomy between the two spheres in the practice of modern governance in some countries.
However, this is not the case in most Muslim countries where long- standing relations between the state and religion clearly exist.11 As a corollary, there is a clear tendency in Muslim countries to continuously reassert traditional Islamic values within the state system. Hence the separation between the private and public is far from complete or suc-cessful, given the pervasive nature of Islamic teachings in regulating both aspects of Muslim life.
Apart from the above discussion of private and public spheres, it is a fact that even today many Muslim countries are still resistant to the uni-versal idea of religious freedom, for a variety of reasons. One of the main obstacles is the notion of the right of religious conversion, as stated for example in the 1945 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).12 For Muslims, this clause goes against the teaching of the Quran forbid-ding them to convert to any other religion.13 In this vein, some Muslim activists are likely to be suspicious of the intention of the clause of religious freedom stated in many international documents. This issue will be dis-cussed in Chap. 6 of this book
To sum up, there are ambiguities in the practice of religious regulation when facing the principle of freedom. Nevertheless, to some extent, they are not always negative to religious freedom.
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Levels of State Regulation on Religion
The second reason why the state regulation of religion is not always incon-sistent with religious freedom is due to the different leverages in the prac-tice which result from different historical and cultural settings in various countries. Towards a better understanding of the issue, a general definition of what the phrase “the state regulation of religion” means is required.
Regulating religion means as any treatment and practice from the state apparatus toward religious groups, or religious beliefs, or religious symbolism in a particular given nation-state based on the prescribed system of laws. It is about policy or action by government agencies in acknowledging, man-aging and administering religious life as a part of services in the delivery of good governance. The regulation of religion is in many cases “condi-tional” and, to quote Gill, it is “the product of specific laws by specific people to respond to a specific time in history,”14 with a variety of models. Grim and Finke suggest five basic leverages operating in the state regu-lation of religion: neutrality, favouritism, discrimination, restriction and persecution.15 Discussion of the meaning of these terms follows below.
NeutralityTo some observers, the concept of neutrality on religious affairs has vari-ous meanings. On the one hand it may denote that the state explicitly (or implicitly) gives religion full autonomy and leaves religious groups to manage themselves alone. On the other hand, neutrality can mean that the state treats all religious groups on an equal basis. Thus when a particular government acts as a “neutral,” it does not mean that the government regulates nothing. In fact, neutrality is a part of the means of government regulation.
A good example of neutrality is implicit in the concept of laïcité as the core foundation of the French Constitution. In French, the word laïcité evokes the absence of religion in government affairs and conversely, the absence of government in religious affairs. It is the essence of neutrality. Here, as Troper has examined, different understandings of laïcité have resulted in different choices of policies that can be equally advanced by the government. Thus on the basis of neutrality, he observes, the govern-ment may not subsidize the establishment of mosques, for instance, or, on the contrary, encourage such construction on the basis that other reli-gious groupings like Catholics, Protestants and Jews have already enjoyed government support on the matter.
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By the same token, the state may refuse religious instruction in public schools, or may encourage it on the grounds that all religions enjoy the same rights and same opportunities in a non-discriminatory way.16 The principle of laïcité may permit the government to allow young Muslim women to wear the hijab in public schools, but equally it may be used to ban any appearance of religious symbols from any religious groups. Consequently it seems clear that different emphases in the meaning of neutrality may result in different policies on religious affairs. Even in an extreme case where the government adopts a “hands off” approach to reli-gious affairs, it does not mean that the state will not interfere in religion.
Governments that claim to be neutral in the sense that they support all faiths in the public sphere are often better disposed, however, to those established and powerful religious groups rather than non-traditional or smaller faith communities, such as Scientology or new forms of Evangelism. Atheism can also reveal the limits of government religious neutrality. In many countries, atheists are without constitutional rights (though in some countries, like China and North Korea, where communism is the state ideology, rejection of religious belief does not pose a problem). This is due mainly to a “traditional” understanding of religion in the constitution, which emphasizes theistic principles.
Hence, any group which is seen as “un-theistic” is without legal basis and may not be entitled to state protection and support. This is what Garvey called “the split-level character” of constitutional writing, in which government support would only be applicable to particular established conventional believer groups per se but not to non-believers.17
Another example of this is the practice of the Free Exercise Clause of the US Constitution. This Clause is the “benchmark” for legally pro-tecting all American citizens’ rights to practise and exercise their own religious beliefs. It is due to this Clause that the Amish community (an ultra- traditional sub-grouping of the Mennonite church, who are well known for their simple life style, plain dress and reluctance to adopt mod-ern conveniences) may request government exemption for their children from attending state schooling. And it is due to this Clause that exemption from compulsory military service may be granted on the basis of religious belief. However, agnostics or atheists have no grounds for seeking the same exemption for their children’s schooling, or to avoid military service. Again, the exemption is indeed given to those who would practise and exercise religious beliefs in a “conventional” way.18
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Hence the principle of neutrality may denote different meanings under different circumstances, and those differences may have an impact on dif-ferent government policies or actions on matters of religious affairs. In practice it may not always be in line with the basic definition of religion found in international documents related to religious freedom.
FavouritismAnother term associated with state principles in the regulation of reli-gion is “favouritism.” In a very broad sense the word means “to put one group over others.” In practice this may take various forms, such as state subsidies, privileges, moral support or administrative procedures favourable towards a particular religion or religions. Grim and Finke have summarised the process of favouritism in regulating religion as follows: “the most obvious are specific constitutional privileges and the financial subsidies that directly support religious institutions. Less obvious are the supports of state institutions and administrators for such things as the teaching of religion in state-supported schools and the subsidy of service institutions run by religious groups.”19
Favouritism may also mean that the state establishes privileges to one or some religious traditions as official state religion(s) as in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Norway, Greece, Denmark and Sweden. Or it may be quite “mild” in nature, taking the form of support for or exemptions granted to recognized religious groups, as is to be found in other coun-tries in Europe. Blandine Chelini-Pont argues this attitude of favouritism stemming from particular religious groups being considered as part of long-standing social traditions and their legacies remains “influential” in society.20 Therefore they have the “right” to claim state support and other benefits like tax exemption. In the case of France, she notes that, in prac-tice, the government provides financial assistance for “religious” schools and organizes “religious” activities by means of Catholic, Protestant and Jewish chaplaincies in prisons, hospitals and the military. The reason for this is that these groups, based on a 1905 law, are listed as being in the French cultuelle (tradition). Thus they are entitled by law to receive this state sponsorship.21 There are many similar cases, either connoting the state’s (passive or active) involvement in religious activities or express-ing some degree of “favouritism.” The same is also apparent, not only in Spain, according to Motilla, but also in the Netherlands and Germany, as noted by Monsma and Soper.22
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In these countries, while the state respects freedom in the matter of religious belief as part of preserving personal rights in the private sphere, it also regulates religious affairs as part of preserving traditions in the public arena. The public sphere is the domain where the state may exercise its sovereignty. “The true public sphere … is the space where the state exerts its authority for the benefit of all and at the service of all,” wrote Chelini- Pont. The state, in this instance, is the primary intermediary between society and citizens, and therefore “the state is responsible for legal and practical civil society,” including on matters of religion.23
It is not within the purview of this study to consider whether or not the practice of favouritism is justified under any circumstance. The above cases serve to point out that favouritism to one or many groups over others is a common phenomenon in the practice of the state–religion relationship. Even today, after the ratification of a number of international instruments which have come into force in various state constitutions and the signing of international declarations and conventions on religious freedom, the tendency to favouritism in these countries is still widespread. As argued by Ahdar and Leigh, it is also a fact that in some European cases the prac-tice of favouritism in the form of stipulating one religious tradition as the official state religion is deemed to be consistent with religious freedom. It does not always equate with inequalities for the others.24
Discrimination, Restriction and PersecutionThese three categorical words are “pejorative” or negative and no coun-try in the world would acknowledge that any practice of discrimination, restriction or persecution has occurred within its territory. There are, how-ever, differences in the definition of the terms. The first, discrimination, is the attitude to exclude one group from others. It is prejudice that under-lies most discriminatory practices in society, according to Krishnaswami.25 However, discrimination is often mistakenly assumed to be an act with a “certain intention” to demonstrate the superiority of one group over another, and there are various reports on acts of religious discrimina-tion against minorities under the authorization, intention and consent of the state. Moreover, certain cases have also indicated that discrimination occurs due to the absence or lack of legal standards in the definition of religion itself on the side of the state system, as discussed by Richardson.
Richardson’s assessment of official government reports of the rise of new religious movements (NRM) reveals discriminating tenden-cies in some countries. He notes that state acceptance of definitions of
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religion emanating from dominant religious groups has contributed to the enactment of discriminative policies and treatment of minority groups.26 In addition to this, Musalo puts forward a persuasive argument linking the state officers’ knowledge of religion (such as what is religion, what are its elements and how may it differ from another definition) to prejudicial and unfair treatment in cases dealing with refugees.27 Asylum seekers have escaped, seeking a safe haven because of prior religious perse-cution in their countries of origin. Unfortunately their entitlement to pro-tection is denied on the grounds of unsympathetic assessment by officers in the country of destination due to a different understanding of what con-stitutes the meaning and variety of religion. What might have happened to the asylum seekers becomes clear following their deportation to their countries of origin. Some of them have faced severe punishment, impris-onment or even the death penalty from their respective governments.
The second term in this category is restriction. This refers to limita-tions “placed on the practices, profession or selection of religion by offi-cial laws, policies or administrative actions of the state.”28 It also means any treatment that puts boundaries on individual or group behaviour and rights, such as the wearing of certain types of clothes.29 Examples for this are found quite easily in many authoritarian countries around the world. Saudi Arabia, for example, has put severe restrictions on any school of thought contradictory to Wahabi teachings.
Some policies of the Indonesian government are also included in this category. Indonesian Law No. 1/1969 on anti-vilification or anti- blasphemy has been the chief source of legal action against minorities who are seen as deviating from the teachings of existing mainstream groups, or who are accused of breaching public order. For this reason, more than one hundred “splinter” or heterodox groups (according to one unofficial tally) have been prohibited. I will discuss the case thoroughly in Chap. 10.
The last category is persecution, often implying pervasive physical vio-lence. Persecution refers to acts of harassment towards other groups and beliefs, and again it is the minorities in particular who are subject to this violence. In some cases persecution may involve the use of security forces like the military or the police. Some observers note that no region in the world is immune from the practice of persecution. Not surprisingly, states of a repressive and authoritarian nature would be most likely to commit such violence. Potter, Leung and Carlson point to China as an example in its dealings with the Falun Gong movement and Tibetan Buddhist groups.30
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At a glance, we would expect that one category would be applicable to one regime or government. However, there are many cases where govern-ments adopt most (or, in extreme cases, all) of the above categories in their practice of religious policies at the same time. I will take the Indonesian government during the New Order period as an example. This regime intentionally showed favouritism towards established groups, in so far as it “recognized” the existence of six religious groupings under Indonesian law. It has also discriminated, restricted and persecuted groups seen as threatening social or political order. The regime’s treatment towards vari-ous small sects such as Ahmadiyah, the Shiah and Jehovah’s Witnesses are cases in point. The regime did also not hesitate to control other minorities outside the established groupings if they were seen as contradictory to the regime’s political or religious interests, for instance in the practice of the “assimilation” policy in regard to Confucianism and local beliefs like in the Ngaju (or Kaharingan) religion of Kalimantan.
To sum up, the state regulation of religion is not always the opposite of religious freedom. There are some notable examples where such policies are intended to secure freedoms in society. However, it is also a fact that some policies result in discrimination, limitation and repression under the same banner of freedom. Positive and negative are sides of the same coin of regulation. Such are the complexities of the regulation of religion.
notes
1. See Robert F. Drinan, Can God and Caesar Coexist? Balancing Religious Freedom and International Law (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 1–9 particularly on Chapter I “A New Global Right: Religious Freedom.”
2. See Johan den Hertog, “General Theories of Regulation,” in B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar, 1999), 223–225.
3. Lorraine Mazerolle and Janet Ransley, Third Party Policing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 23–29 as they review the work of Robert Baldwin (et al.), A Reader on Regulation: Oxford Readings in Socio-Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
4. Peter W. Edge, Religion and Law (Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 4–6.
5. See the discussion on the issue for example in M. Searle Bates, Religious Liberty: An Inquiry (New York: International Missionary Council, 1945), 295 as quoted by Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, “Is Establishment Consistent
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with Religious Freedom?” McGill Law Journal 29 (2004): 649. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. “Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promise,” American Journal of Sociology 100, 5 (2005): 1373–1411; Linda Camp Keith, “The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?” Journal of Peace Research 36 (1999): 95–118; and Neil A. Englehart, “Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument: The Rise and Fall of Confucian Ethic in Singapore,” Human Rights Quarterly 22, 3 (2000): 548–568.
6. See comprehensive account of Durkheim works on Robert N. Bellah (ed.), Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society, Selected Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); and Kenneth Thompson, Emile Durkheim (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
7. T. Jeremy Gunn, “The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International Law,” Harvard Human Right Journal 16 (2003): 189–215.
8. Donna J. Sullivan, “Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination,” The American Journal of International Law 82 (1988): 487–520.
9. Religion accordingly consists of two aspects: internal (forum internum) and external (forum externum). The internal aspect of religion is what con-stitutes personal belief in private life. The external aspect is where religion is manifested in the public sphere.
10. F.J. Lechner, “The Case against Secularization: a Rebuttal,” Social Forces 69, 4 (1991): 1104.
11. Tad Stahnke and Robert C Blitt, “The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitution of Predominantly Muslim Countries,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 36, 4 (2005): 947–1078.
12. The Article 18 of 1945 UDHR states that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
13. Christina M. Cerna, “Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio- Cultural Contexts,” Human Rights Quarterly 16, 4 (1994): 740–752.
14. Anthony Gill, “The Political Origins of Religious Liberty: A Theoretical Outline,” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 1 (2005): 9.
15. Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, “International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation
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of Religion,” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 2 (2006): 3–40.
16. Michel Troper, “Religion and the State,” article available from http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/TroperMichel(France).pdf. Accessed on 16 September 2009. See also T. Jeremy Gunn, “Founding Myths: Religious Freedom in the United States and Laïcité in the French Republic,” Fide et Libertas: The Journal of International Religious Liberty Association (2004): 62–65, and “Under God but Not the Scarf: The Founding Myths of Religious Freedom in the United States and Laïcité in France,” Journal of Church and State 46, 1 (2004): 7–24.
17. John H. Garvey, “An Anti-Liberal Arguments for Religious Freedom,” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 7 (1996): 276–291.
18. Garvey, “An Anti-Liberal Arguments,” 281–283; and also Noah Feldman, “The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause,” New York University Law Review 77 (2002): 424–425.
19. See Grim and Finke, “International Religion Indexes,” 4–5. 20. Blandine Chelini-Pont, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges and
Opportunities,” Brigham Young University Law Review 3 (2005): 614–615.
21. According to Chelini-Pont, other religious traditions like Islam, Buddhism and other groups would also receive similar benefits from the state if, after a very strict and complex process of authorization, they are listed in the cultuelle. See Chelini-Pont, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 615.
22. Augustín Motilla, “Religious Pluralism in Spain: Striking the Balance between Religious Freedom and Constitutional Rights,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2 (2004): 575–606; and Stephen V. Monsma and J. Christopher Soper, The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five Democracies (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992).
23. Chelini-Pont, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 615–616. 24. Ahdar and Leigh, “Is Establishment Consistent,” 635–681. 25. See Arcot Krishnaswami, “Study of Discrimination in the Matter of
Religious Rights and Practices,” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 60. XIV.2. Reprinted in Tad Stahnke dan J. Paul Martin (eds.), Religion and Human Rights: Basic Documents (New York: Center for the Study of Human Rights Columbia University, 1998), 2–54.
26. James T. Richardson, “Governmental Reports on Minority Religions: An Assessment,” Fides Et Libertas: the Journal of the International Religious Liberty Association (2004): 87–98. See also his book on the issue, Regulating Religion: Case Studies from around the Globe (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publisher, 2004).
27. See more information Karen Musalo, “Claims for Protection Based on Religion or Belief,” International Journal of Refugee Law 16, 2 (2002): 165–225.
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28. Grim and Finke, “International Religion Indexes,” 5. 29. See Ragnhild Nordås, “Regulating Religious Minorities: For Better or
Worse?” paper presented for the 45th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Montreal Quebec Canada 17–20 March 2004.
30. Pitman B. Potter, “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,” The China Quarterly (2003): 317–337; Beatrice Leung, “China”*s*s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity,” The China Quarterly (2005): 894–913; and Eric R. Carlson, “China”*s*s New Regulation on Religion: A Small Step, Not a Great Leap, Forward,” Brigham Young University Law Review 3 (2005): 747–797.
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CHAPTER 4
Religion and Religious Life in Indonesia: Legacies from the Past
Contemporary Indonesia is one of the most pluralist societies in the world, with its four hundred or so ethnic and linguistic groups and a correspond-ing variety of systems of religions and beliefs. The word “Indonesia” emerged as a term at the beginning of the twentieth century, following the rise of the concept of the nation-state.1 The history of “ancient” Indonesia is a history of fragmentation, continuity (and discontinuity) in a variety of largely ethically based kingdoms and dynasties. What we call “Indonesian civilization” in most of the writing on ancient Indonesian history often begins with the arrival of Hindu and Buddhist cultures in the archipelago, probably in the early first or second century of the common era. This was a time when the archipelago served as one of the important stations along trading networks maintained by Chinese, Indian and Middle Eastern mer-chants. These groups brought new religious traditions which replaced a variety of local beliefs like animism and dynamism, and to different degrees changed the nature of the local identity. There was a shift in the face of ancient Indonesia from fragmented, plural ethnic entities into a new one based on religious affiliation, or agama in the Indo-Malay vocabulary.2
It seems then important to understand the concept of agama as gen-eral background in studying the state and religion relationship in modern Indonesia. Agama does not simply mean a belief in and an obedience to God, but it is also a communal identity or tradition as well as a source of power, legitimacy and wealth.
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AgAmA: From TradiTion To PoliTical idenTiTy
In the writings of Indonesian historiography, the concept of civilization in the archipelago (“Nusantara”) began following the arrival of numbers of people who introduced the new model of religiosities, particularly Buddhism and Hinduism.3 In this stance, the development of the new concept of civilization based on religious identity reached its peak with the establishment of powerful kingdoms in the archipelago: chiefly the Buddhist Sriwijaya in Sumatera, from the eighth to the thirteenth centu-ries and Hindu Java from the twelfth to the fourteenth. It was in those kingdoms that agama was adopted as a new source of political legitimacy and social status. In turn, adopting agama, together with other Indic symbols and elements, such as models of kingship and philosophy, soon became a new “expression of pre-eminence” associated with literacy and earning a strong association with power, wealth and sophistication.4
Being beragama (religious) was for the first time identical with being modern, powerful and wealthy. It should be borne in mind, however, that beragama could simply mean adopting certain practical guidance and cus-tomary law from India, quite apart from entertaining the philosophical complexities of the ideas of deities or gods.
Agama as a new practice and source of status took on subtleties in the following phase in the East Javanese Majapahit era to become a rich Javanese culture. The term agama expanded to connote a tendency to spiritualism and the cultivation of an inner life. This may be found in the Old Javanese manuscripts of the Nagarakrtagama. This fourteenth- century collection of law texts of Majapahit was an effort to reconcile traditional Javanese principles with elements from Indian sources: that is, the Sanskrit Laws of Manu. The book of the Nagarakrtagama functioned as a source of legal laws and rules that bound communal interaction in society. It consisted of not only general regulations and punishments for crimes but dealt with trading and social arrangements like marriage and land ownership,5 in addition to, as Hooker puts it, “man’s view of himself in relation to the natural world.”6
Here agama was transformed to regulate human behaviour as part of the nature of things. It served on one hand as a set of rules for individual relations with others in the physical world, and on another for the indi-vidual in relation to a personal inner search into the non-physical world. Agama, as in India, constituted two reciprocal relations: the worldly and metaphysical aspects; the micro- and the macro- cosmoses.
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The decline of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, following the emergence of Islamic kingdoms, reshaped the significance of agama. While the essence of agama as closely parallel to the Islamic concept of din was pursued by those Muslims, at the same time popular associations of agama with power and wealth, inherited from the earlier system, were maintained. In the hands of Muslim missionaries, the worship of God as “the way of salvation” and Islam as the basis of brotherhood were the main ingredients of the new agama.
The strategy was effective and attracted a number of local rulers to convert to Islam. Islam became politically dominant in parts of the archipelago from the thirteenth century onwards, and beragama Islam (being an adherent of Islam) also became the identity by which local cultures and ethnic groups were bound. There was a thin dichotomy between a kingdom’s politics and its religion. In Java, for example, a king still held the position of mang-kubumi (Holder of the Earth) connoting his interest in mundane affairs, but at the same time he was the khalifatulardhi (God’s Representative on the Earth) in charge of the religious affairs of his citizens. In the Islamic king-dom of Aceh, while Sultans held sway as kings or queens, they would always be assisted by a mufti to give advice on religious matters.
The arrival of the Portuguese and the Dutch in the archipelago and the consolidation of colonialism in the following centuries halted the develop-ment of the concept of agama as religio-political identity. Affiliation based on ethnicity was reintroduced, mainly to serve the policy of “divide and rule.” Colonial authorities found it easier to maintain power over large populations once religio-political identity based on agama had been broken up.
Perhaps one of best ways to explain this rested on the premise that it was easier to defeat a small group of different identities rather than different groups with the same identity. It is understandable that since the earliest settlement of European traders and the initial phase of colonial administra-tion, the focus was on gaining economic benefit from the archipelago and any hindrance to this was carefully monitored and, if need be, suppressed.
It is however a misjudgement to say that colonial administrations were not interested in the concept of agama. In fact, they maintained it for fear of negative economic repercussions and greater social opposition. Instead they reshaped its meaning by dissociating it from the affairs of state. Agama was redefined from a European-Christian perspective as a personal matter. Most importantly, it should be kept far away from politics. It was an identity in nature but not a political one. Agama was not to be an affair of the elite and the wealthy. Rather it was the affair of the grass-roots and should fulfil the needs of this group.
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Following the wave of arrivals of Christian missionaries in the archipelago to seek new followers, the meaning of agama was transformed to encom-pass social progress, and education became the main goal to introduce to native society. This idea, according to Atkinson, was greatly influenced by the prolonged history of Calvinism and Eurocentric notions of advance-ment in European culture of the time.7 As a corollary, it would be clear later that Indonesians adopting European systems of education and legal administration would foster a new definition of being progressively minded, wealthy and powerful, distinguishing them from the rest of the so-called “backward” population.
This may explain the shift in the meanings of agama from the time of the Islamic kingdoms to that of the colonial administrations. The discrepancy between the two has had direct and indirect impact on the ways of treating and regulating religious affairs. It is also evident that the shift created tensions in society, particularly for Muslims, who had been the majority and benefited most from the client–patron relation-ship of “the kingdom” and religion. When the colonial administration consolidated its power, it appeared to adopt a policy of a certain degree of distance from assisting any religious group. This problem might have never, or rarely, arisen when the Muslim kingdoms controlled the major part of the archipelago.
Thus the contest over the extent of regime involvement in religious life is an inherent part of the Indonesian political system.8 The problem became evident following the establishment of the modern Indonesian nation-state, as will be discussed later in this book.
The duTch and religious aFFairs
The Dutch involvement in religious affairs was more complex a matter than simply an intention to maintain order or to serve the churches’ or the Netherlands’ economic interests, as argued by many scholars and observers. It was also about economics and politics and took place under a variety of historical circumstances. Nevertheless, it was evident that the way the Dutch Colonial government treated the Muslim community in particular tended towards repression and discrimination particularly from the 1900s onwards, and that this has been one of the major factors con-tributing to the rise of the Indonesian independence movement as well the prolonged intention to steer the direction of the state system into accommodating Islamic interests.
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There were at least three general trends in how the Dutch dealt with religious affairs in the archipelago: the first was neutrality or maintaining a certain distance from religion from the mid-1500s to the mid-1700s; the second was to be accommodative but at the same time to monitor reli-gious activities in the 1800s, and the last was to be repressive and maintain strict control of Islamic activism in particular from the mid-1800s to the 1900s onward.
Neutrality and Maintaining Distance from the Mid-1500s to the Mid-1700s
For many scholars, pragmatism for the sake of economics was the chief rea-son why the Dutch, in particular the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC or United East Indian Company, referred to by the British as the Dutch East India Company), paid little attention to religion in the early years of colonial rule. This economic argument holds some truth. It was the desire to pursue economic fortune that had driven the Dutch to come to the archipelago since from 1595. The Dutch government in the Netherlands, through this VOC, employed their monopoly trading on nutmeg, mace spice, cloves and cinnamon, and also introduced new cash crops like coffee, tea, cacao, tobacco, rubber, sugar and opium, particu-larly in Java and Sumatera. The VOC also safeguarded their commercial interests by conquering surrounding territories but, as far as religion was concerned, still maintaining a larger degree of involvement in the inhabit-ants’ religious activities.
Thus conflicts with the locals were mainly motivated by this trading competition. According to Steenbrink,9 the VOC regarded the local inhab-itants (and Muslims in particular) as “respected heretics,” a view charac-terized by a mixture of conflicting feelings between curiosity and a lack of respect; and a selective admiration as well as a wish to keep a distance from the Muslims. This pattern continued for much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during which the Dutch paid little attention to religious affairs and gave the “native” inhabitants, most particularly the Muslims, autonomous space to govern themselves, or placed authority in the hands of local leaders like the wedanas (the district chieftains). Within this binary hostile environment, Muslims also developed certain percep-tions of the Dutch, raising little considerable religious or theological argu-ment to oppose their existence in the region, but seeing them nevertheless as “untrustworthy allies” due to their unfair competition in trading.
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Accommodation and Oversight of Religious Activities in the 1800s
The shift in the way the Dutch dealt with religious activities in the archi-pelago began in the 1800s as an unintended consequence of an economic crisis in the Netherlands and the bankruptcy of the VOC due to mis-management, illegal smuggling and corruption. Following this period of economic crisis, the Cultivation System, or the Cultuurstelsel, which had been introduced earlier, was re-examined.10 While initially this policy was designed for the voluntary participation of local inhabitants in setting aside agrarian land for the farming of certain plantation crops and selling to the government, also voluntarily, in time it became a compulsory scheme for land acquisition and product marketing. In short, as Furnivall has pointed out, this state-monopoly sponsored policy generated immense profits and supplied a surplus which was sent to the Netherlands and used for public expenditures, allowing the Netherlands government to repay all its debts, as well as to balance the state budget.11
Nevertheless, critics of the above policy emerged in the Netherlands itself and pressure to revoke the policy gained momentum in the inaugu-ration of a Liberal Policy followed in the 1860s. This new policy allowed private enterprise the same opportunities to enter the market and do busi-ness in the archipelago. Dutch and other European entrepreneurs were encouraged to come in large numbers. Along with those entrepreneurs came religious activists (evangelists and missionaries), either for the sake of meeting the religious needs of the new settlers or preaching the gospel in the new land. It should be noted that this period was one of the peak eras for evangelization and mission ventures in Asia and Africa.12
It came as no surprise that the government should then favour the churches, not only for the service of government officers but also for eco-nomic reasons, since many churches channelled generous support and aid through the government itself. As a result, government involvement in Christian missions began to manifest itself clearly. Financial subsidies, to Protestant and Catholics churches alike, became part of government policy and were taken from the colonial budget, some of which had origi-nated from overseas churches.
Hence the colonial government’s position on religious life shifted from neutrality, in terms of separating religious affairs from the state domain, to favouritism. And to manage the administration of religious affairs, most particularly churches, a special department called the Departement van Onderwijs, Eerdienst en Nijverheid (Department of Education, Worship
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and Industry) was established in 1866. According to Knaap and van der Heiden, the main reason for the establishment of this department was to address religious issues.13
It is worth mentioning here that while the government involved itself in financial subsidies (including distributing overseas aid) and provided direct or indirect support to the local churches, it also played a watchdog role, since competition between the churches in seeking new followers was becoming more intense, particularly in Java, as Sumartana has argued.14 It is logical to say that not only did this competition weaken social stability, but it also disrupted the political consolidation of colonialism in the archi-pelago. So the churches also became subject to a variety of regulations and instructions as part of the way to maintain order in society.15
Thus, while the 1855 Dutch Constitution stating the government’s neutrality on religious affairs was also applicable to any Dutch colonial ter-ritory, including the Netherland East Indies, in practice there was ample evidence of a strong inclination to favour a particular religious group, the Christians. This tendency shaped the nature of the colonial service’s treatment of religious affairs in the archipelago.16 The way some colonial officers’ perceptions toward the Muslim community in this period also shifted is discussed by Steenbrink. He says that Muslims were perceived as “detestable heretics,” particularly by Dutch missionaries who were reli-giously biased, branding Islam a heretical religion, superstitious and even a religion of evil with “a complete denial of the true God and the covenant of the gospel, a denial of the theological doctrine of redemption and the doctrine of morality.”17 Muslims were also viewed as the “natural enemy” of Christianity, an attitude built upon Dutch political consolidation, where Muslims were identified as people who could not be trusted, even as uncivilized fanatics, and Islam was seen a potential catalyst for change and a threat to the very existence of Dutch colonial rule in the region.
On the other hand, Muslims also began to see the existence of the Dutch in the archipelago negatively and to label Christianity as a religion of the Dutch (agama wong Londo). Thus the Dutch were then viewed as the “corruptors of Holy Scripture” or the “infidels.” In turn, this theo-logical viewpoint played an important role in the violent resistance against Dutch colonialism. Islam was used as a political identity, as mentioned ear-lier, when Muslims enmity against the Dutch shifted into enmity against Christianity as the religion of the Dutch.
This may explain why Islam became the symbol of opposition against colonial authority. In Java, for example, as early as 1825, Prince Diponegoro
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declared war against colonial rule. This was followed by various uprisings in Sumatra and other regions. It is clear that religion was not the sole motive behind such unrest, but religious epithets from Islam like jihad fi sabilillah (war in the path of God) against the kafirs (infidels) proved effective as symbols of the struggle. And while most uprisings were easily suppressed, there were new growing concerns among government officers to administer Islamic affairs within the colonial system and to oversee the latent militancy of political Islam.
Given the persistent threat of Islamic militancy to disrupt order and to challenge colonial authority, efforts to dissociate Islam from politics became a priority in the government services, although seemingly still ad hoc and sporadic in nature at the time. Benda, for one, argued with justi-fication that the overall Dutch policies on Islam in the archipelago rested on the premise that “the enemy then was not Islam as a religion but Islam as a political doctrine, both in the shape of agitation by local fanatics and in the shape of Pan-Islam.”18
Repression and Strict Control from the Mid-1800s to the 1900s Onward
As far as regulating religion is concerned, the Dutch colonial government intervention on religious affairs was strongly related to the rise of Islamic political activism. The colonial government especially turned their atten-tion to the pilgrimage, the hajj, to Mecca, seeing it as the most important means of shaping Muslim political thought and reducing militant activism in the archipelago.
This may explain why the pilgrimage was one of the earliest targets of regulations by the colonial government. Pilgrimage was not only an annual religious gathering, the fifth of the Five Pillars of Islamic obser-vance, but also an effective opportunity for returning pilgrims to introduce new thought on politics as well as building worldwide Muslim solidarity, learned in the Middle East. As is pointed out by Ichwan, the first govern-ment resolution on the pilgrimage was issued in 1825, charging pilgrims certain costs for a passport and imposing an expensive fine if they went to Mecca without this document. A number of consecutive resolutions and Staatbladens (legislations) in regard to administrative impediments against Muslims performing their religious duty of visiting Mecca fol-lowed. Issued in 1831, 1852, 1859, 1902, 1905 and 1922 respectively, they imposed different requirements on the pilgrims.
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Further restrictions on pilgrimages came with the issuance of a resolution in 1928 in which it was stated that the government would reject the applica-tion of any “suspected person” seen to have been “contaminated” with the likes of Pan-Islamism. Indeed, as Ichwan wrote, pilgrimage was viewed by the colonial government as “the source of political trouble and revolts.”19 It is easy to conclude that those regulations were not simply an administra-tive matter; rather, those were aimed at limiting the number of pilgrims, so that any possible political networks or influences from the ideology of Pan-Islamism would be easily monitored.20
It was also in the interests of limiting the influence of political Islam that the Regulation on Teaching Licences, known as the Guru Ordinates, was issued in 1905. This policy required Muslim teachers to obtain a spe-cial government licence to teach and to submit the names of all their stu-dents, as well as details of their curriculum. Although on the surface this policy seemed a noble intention to improve the quality of Islamic educa-tion, it too was in fact a tool for the government to control the activi-ties of Muslim teachers, most of whom had graduated from educational institutions in the Middle East, as well as to hamper Islamic education in the archipelago.21 Another influential institution for religious control was the semi-official body known as Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken (Office for Native and Islamic Affairs), which was established in 1899 to advise the government on policies for Islamic society and to administer Muslim affairs. The prominent figure Snouck Hurgronje played a major role in this office.22
Thus from the eighteenth century onwards “stability and order” were the main concerns of Dutch colonial political and economic consolida-tion in most parts of the Indonesian archipelago. The role of the gov-ernment vis-à-vis religion laid chiefly in dealing with Islamic matters. As recorded by Knaap and van der Heiden, a variety of Besluiten (Governor General’s Decisions), Staatsbladen (Legislations), reports in the form of Mailrapporten (Notes from the Governor-General to the Minister of the Colonies) and Verbalen (Files of the Ministry of Colonies) were issued. Of about 4000 Besluiten on religion issued over the period from 1869 to 1940, 800 dealt with Islamic matters. They included decisions of the Governor-General to grant subsidies for the building of mosques, to appoint penghulus (religious advisors), to arrange administrative assistance for Islamic marriage and divorce, and importantly, to take action against Islamic uprisings or any supposed planning for “holy war.” Knaap and van der Heiden’s further examination of the Mailrapporten has also brought
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to light more evidence on the practices of regulating and monitoring reli-gion by the colonial government, either in a negative or a positive vein.23
Hence, the colonial government was deeply involved in religious affairs in the Indies, and a common perception then was that colonial govern-ment favoured Christianity and discriminated against Islam. At a superfi-cial level, this perception holds some truth. There was much evidence to prove that the government generously supported the churches and that many colonial administrators played a dual role by also serving as Christian religious preachers. For some Muslims, this attitude was apparent follow-ing the unprecedented political shifts in the Netherlands itself resulting from the leading roles of politicians from the conservative Christian wing (the Gereformeerde Kerk or breakaway church) over the moderate and established one (the Hervormde Kerk).24
The breakaway church increased its political power by winning a major-ity in the parliamentary elections of 1901. This triumph enabled it to put Abraham Kuyper into the seat of the Prime Minister and Alexander Idenburg into that of Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. Many observers, like Deliar Noer for example, noted his religio-political position signified a shift in regard to the new relationship between the state and religion. In his inauguration ceremony Idenburg asserted his position on missions in the archipelago, stating that
as a Christian nation the Netherlands have a duty to improve the conditions of the native Christians in the archipelago, to give Christian missionary activ-ity more aid, and to inform the entire administration that the Netherlands have moral obligations to fulfil as regards the population of those regions.25 [emphasis added]
While the origin of the above quotation was debatable among many scholars given its untrustworthy sources, many Muslim activists neverthe-less held a strong belief that the close and cordial relationship between the government and the churches had paved the way for many policies of the colonial government to be coloured by Christian interests. They also saw that the Dutch government and the colonial administration “officially” became sponsors of the churches in the archipelago.26 Consequently, there was a gradual stereotypical perception among Muslims that missionaries in the archipelago were in effect an arm of colonialism, and members of the colonial government services were seen as the active representatives of a “Christian nation.”27
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By the turn of the twentieth century, Muslim activists were increasingly critical of what they saw as the colonial authorities’ clear preference for Christianity and pursuit of policies that were unfair and discriminatory towards the Muslim populace. Moenawar Chalil was the first to point out, based on his study of the Staatsblaad, how unequal financial subsidies to different religious groups were (Table 4.1).28
Moreover, a similar tendency to “marginalize” Muslims in politics was evident in the Volksraad, a semi-parliamentary council in the archipel-ago, in which four seats were available for Catholic parties (three for the Dutch Catholic Party and one for Partai Katolik Jawi [Javanese Catholic Party]), while several seats went to Protestant representatives on the basis of appointment by the Governor-General.29 There were also some seats for Javanese aristocrat parties like the Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya), but only one seat given to a small party with limited influences but associ-ated to Islam, the Partai Arab Indonesia (Indonesian Arab Party).30
Within this backdrop of prolonged experiences of discrimination and limitation on religious life, one should consider that the struggle for inde-pendence for many devout Muslims was not simply about fighting the Dutch in the archipelago. In fact it was also about reaffirming the mean-ing of beragama according to its initial sense as making the future state responsible for the welfare of religion in the country.
In this instance, while one of the arguments reiterated by Muslim activ-ists on why they had engaged in the prolonged fight against the Dutch was for the sake of “religious freedom,” as once argued by Tjokroaminoto for example, so that they could practise religion freely, it was also about the intention to reaffirm identity as well as to seek a political and legal legiti-macy for the place of religion, Islam in this case, in the future state system.
Henceforth, a close combination of reasserting an Islamic identity and an intention to make agama part of the state service responsibilities
Table 4.1 Subsidies to religious groupings
No Staatsblads (Legislations) Number/Year Group recipients
Protestants Catholics Muslims
1. Staatsblad No. 355/1936 f. 686,100 f. 286,500 f. 75002. Staatsblad No. 355/1937 f. 683,200 f. 290,700 f. 75003. Staatsblad No. 355/1938 f. 696,100 f. 296.400 f. 75004. Staatsblad No. 355/1939 f. 844.000 f. 335.700 f. 7600
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became the dominant factor in shaping the struggle of Muslim activists. And this was not an easy task, given the strong objections of nominal Muslims and leaders of the minority groups who did not subscribe to the same idea. While the latter also agreed that agama was still an impor-tant element of the state, for them the basic character of the future state should be equal service and treatment for all religious groupings. Contest between them on the issue will be discussed in the following chapter.
noTes
1. Before the introduction of the word “Indonesia,” the word “Nusantara” (“Archipelago”) was more commonly used to indicate the entity that con-sisted of Java, Madura, Sumatera, the Malay peninsula, some parts of Borneo (Kalimantan) and Celebes (Sulawesi).
2. At the beginning, there were at least two meanings for agama in Sanskrit literature: as any fixed traditional instruction, doctrine or collection of doc-trines handed down from earlier generations; and as a name for the “scrip-tures” referring to the worship of Siva, Çakti and Vishnu in the Hindu tradition. See Gonda, Sanskrit in Indonesia (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1973 [1952]) as quoted by Jane Monnig Atkinson, “Religion in Dialogue: the Construction of an Indonesian Minority Religion,” American Ethnologist 10, 4 (1983): 686–687.
3. See an example of this model of writing in one of the government funded-textbooks on Indonesian historiography such as Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, (ed.), Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1984), v. I.
4. See Atkinson, “Religion in Dialogue,” 688. 5. Gonda, Sankrit in Indonesia, 449 in Atkinson, “Religion in Dialogue,”
687. 6. M.B. Hooker, “The Indian-Derived Law Texts of Southeast Asia,” Journal
of Asian Studies XXXVII, 2 (1978): 210–215. 7. Atkinson, “Religion in Dialogue,” 687. 8. Lorraine V. Aragon, “Missions and Omissions of the Supernatural:
Indigenous Cosmologies and the Legitimisation of “Religion” in Indonesia,” Anthropological Forum 13, 2 (2003): 136.
9. See Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596–1950 (Amsterdam: Rodopy, 1993), 25–97. In line with the Dutch perception toward the Muslim counterparts in this phase, Muslims saw them.
10. J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 117–118.
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Even more importantly, as Aziz has argued, with their arrival in the archipelago, the Japanese ended the separation of Islam from the state. He says:
[T]he separation between church and state came practically to an end. Islam obtained a privileged position in the political system in which, next to a secular administration, a religious apparatus had been created. The Japanese thus brought about a new fundamental change in the traditional method of governing, by an increase of power for Islam.8
This marked a phase where the contest for political Islam was drawn onto centre stage and in which Muslims became the actors, not the audience as they used to be. It was also the time to see the vision of an Islamic state come into reality.
However, the warm relationship was short-lived. The Japanese changed policy direction at the last minute in favour of the secular Nationalists, for reasons that are still not certain. This became evident in the meetings of the advisory council, Sanyo Kaigi and the BPUPK. In fact, it was in the former forum that the ideological contest between the two groups first reappeared, when a Muslim-sponsored move to set up a system of Islamic courts (peradilan agama) failed due to opposition from the Nationalists and the Japanese administration. But the Nationalists and the Japanese wanted the future state to separate religious affairs from the state.
Apparently the contest over Islamic courts was an early litmus test to determine the depth of feeling on the idea of a state based upon Islamic principles and symbolism. It became obvious that the road to an Islamic state in Indonesia would be a difficult one.
debating the Dasar Negara
As mentioned earlier, the idea of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia was based on a variety of reasons, chiefly for the sake of affirming Muslim identity following the consolidation of colonialism. It was also about pro-viding space for Muslims to practise their religion, including in the politi-cal arena, “freely.” This was criticized by the secular nationalist factions on the grounds that such a state would justify a new model of discrimina-tion and would be contradictory to the basic principle of providing equal treatment for all religious and ethnic groups. A variety of arguments as justification were put forward in the speeches of a number of activists,
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particularly in meetings of the BPUPK (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan/the Investigating Body for the Preparation of Independence), an assembly established on 28 April 1945, consisting of 60 appointed members, with an additional 2 chairmen and 6 Japanese extraordinary members making up the official Japanese delegation.
There were two important issues in the discussions of the BPUPK which relate to this study: the form of government (bentuk negara) and the basis of the state (dasar negara). Decisions on both issues were made by the means of direct voting. Regarding the former issue, bentuk neg-ara, both nationalist and Muslim groups agreed that the future Indonesia should be democratic, carrying out the “procedures” of democracy, such as the election of the state leader and representation in the parliament. Discrepancies arose when it came to a discussion of the second issue, dasar negara, between the two poles of nationalism and Islam in which the rift between the Nationalists and the Muslims on the issue of the basis of the state was deepening.9
The argument of the nationalist group on the need for the future Indonesia to take nationalism as the basis of the state were mainly for the sake of equality, given the heterogeneity of Indonesian society. It was for this reason that the state could not be based on one particular religion, and importantly, the powers of the state should also be separate from reli-gion. It is likely that a European state system was taken as a prototype, since many of the Nationalists like Hatta and Supomo had had practical experience of living under such a system. They saw the incompatibility of Islam as the basis of the state, and at the same time, the incompatibility of an Islamic state in Indonesia’s future. This was set out in the speech deliv-ered by Supomo on 31 May 1945 in the BPUPK Assembly.10
Supomo’s arguments were clear cut, linear and logical. He rejected the notion of Islam as the basis of the state outright as he believed that the state should not dictate on religion, and each religion should be managed and maintained by its own faith group. The citizens would be free to pro-fess any religion and to express any religious belief freely, and this would not be possible if an Islamic state were chosen.11
Supomo nevertheless admitted the nobility of the principles of the teaching of Islam, which paralleled an ideal state system based on nationalism. He believed that Islam encouraged its adherents to love the motherland (cinta kepada tanah air) with due sincerity (ikhlas). Devotion to the motherland (suka berbakti kepada tanah air) should be in tandem with devotion to God, in a continual remembrance (mencintai kepada
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Tuhan supaya tiap-tiap waktu ingat kepada Tuhan). Hence, as long as these principles were met and upheld, the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia was not compulsory.12
Supomo went on to observe the facts of Islamic states in other parts of the world, taking Turkey as a case in point to defend his position against an Islamic state in Indonesia. He reminded the Assembly not to imitate Turkey’s experience, where the Islamic state had shifted into a secular one. The best way forward for Indonesians was to seek a model based on the true Indonesian cultural heritage. He said:
Indeed, the religion of the Turks is Islam, but as far as the state system is concerned, Turkey is no more an Islamic state… Should we create an Islamic state [after noting the case of Turkey]? I have reminded you of the advice of the [current Japanese] Government that we should not simply imi-tate the examples of other states, but be aware of the real distinctive identity of Indonesian society.13
Furthermore, in Supomo’s view there was no uniformity among Muslim scholars on whether or not the Islamic state was compulsory under Islamic law and so the question was debatable within Islamic society itself. There were many Muslim scholars, like Ali Abdul Raziq, who held different opinions.14 Supomo said that there was no need for Indonesians to take any side on the issue and so there was no need to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.
He also questioned if an Islamic state in the future Indonesia would be concordant with surrounding Asian countries, whose fundamental systems were simply not Islamic. He asked for further consideration as follows:
Indonesia is situated in East Asia and will be a member of the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere which includes Japan, China, Manchukuo, the Philippines, Thailand and Burma. These are not Islamic countries. Of course, this fact would not be sufficient reason to reject the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. However, it is an important factor to consider.15
In another part of his speech, Supomo rejected an Islamic state for fear that it would bring envy and division among the people, noting explicitly that Islam had not originated in Indonesian soil.16 Finally and most impor-tantly, he foresaw that should an Islamic state be established in Indonesia, there would be immediate dissension and unrest among the minorities.
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An Islamic state was identical with hegemony of the Muslim majority. He conceded that an Islamic state might preserve the interests of minorities, but he was convinced that in practice the minorities would not be maxi-mally involved in state affairs. He concluded that “the idea of an Islamic state is not suitable to the idea of the unitary state which we are all think-ing about.”17
It is worth mentioning in this instance that there was no clear pic-ture of how the Muslims responded to the strong arguments oppos-ing Islamic statehood put by the Nationalists. This was due to the fact that precise records of Muslim speeches responding to the issue in the first plenary meetings of BPUPK appear not to have survived. Yamin’s compilation, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, which has become the most frequently quoted source on the debates, has unfortu-nately “excluded” (whether intentionally or not) all documentation of the Muslim arguments or the responses they presented in the Assembly.18
If we use the scattered information available so far, however, it appears that the Muslim leaders’ arguments were normative and very broad. They did not supply a clear picture of what an Islamic state in Indonesia would look like. It is certain that they did not refer to the historical Islamic king-doms in the archipelago as a model for a proto-Islamic state. It was highly rare to find any record in which the Muslims of that period paid admira-tion to the way the kingdoms in the pre-colonial and in the colonial period managed their affairs.
The Muslim activists were likely to have been aware that the monar-chic model of the kingdom or sultanate was “out of date”; for example, the way in which the ruler took the crown through blood lineage alone. This would be contradictory to the modern principles of democracy. Nor did they refer to Saudi Arabia as the model of an Islamic state, being well aware that this country justified dictatorship, absolutism and authoritari-anism under the banner of the religion of Islam. Poles apart from this was Turkey, whose religious composition was similar to that of Indonesia yet it was seen as far from protecting Islamic interests, since it exercised pure secularism. While the Muslims of Indonesia nursed a dream for a modern Islamic state based on democracy, their vision in fact lacked any empirical example within the Islamic world itself.
Thus in the lack of a conceptual and practical basis for Islamic statehood, the Muslims became defensive to the challenges of their counterparts. Their arguments turned apologetic in nature, challenging the Nationalists’ proposals that would keep religion out of the state domain. The Muslims
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argued strongly that Islamic teachings recognize no separation between religion and the state and it was this separation of two realms, as they claimed occurred in Western political systems, which caused the ills of world society. They firmly believed, as quoted by Noer, that only “Islam and its teachings could alleviate the ills of society, not only in Indonesia, but also in what they thought was a morally declining world.”19 Islamic norms were not only the best choice but also the “panacea” of good gov-ernance. Hadikusumo argued in the Assembly that:
If you wish to establish a just and wise government in our state, based on noble moral conduct, democratic deliberation and tolerance, without any compulsion in religion, then establish a government based on Islam, because Islam provides all of this.
20
The Muslim faction also argued that Islam had long shaped the iden-tity of the people of the archipelago, and that they were committed to it before being “uprooted” by the colonial government through political deceit. The establishment of an Islamic state was necessary in order to regain this identity and to return the freedom to live out Islam’s teachings and to practise it freely and fully. Again Hadikusumo argued:
Very often we have been exposed to the opinion that Islamic shariah is obso-lete and incompatible with the spirit of modern times. This has been wors-ened by the fact that Islamic shariah has not functioned in full, albeit the majority of Indonesians are Muslims. This is all true. However, you must remember there are many impediments against the full implementation of shariah in Indonesia and the major constraint is that of the deceitful trickery of the Dutch East Indies government which has colonialized our country and always tried to uproot Muslims from their religion. The Dutch knew that as long as the Indonesians were fully committed to Islam they would gain no advantage over their colony. And for this reason, therefore, the sha-riah once operating in Indonesia was gradually abolished by the Dutch and substituted by other laws which the Dutch preferred.21
Moreover, the Muslims insisted, an Islamic state was not contradictory to democracy. For them, democracy meant majority rule. It was “demo-cratic” if the Islamic community, as the majority, determined the form and the basis of the state. It was democratic to choose an Islamic state as the future model. The Muslims also responded to the nationalist argument
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that saw an Islamic state as contradictory to nationalism. For the Muslims, it was Islam that was the seed of Indonesian nationalism and the Muslims in Indonesia were the true nationalists (nationalisten Islam) for their role in the fight against colonialism.22 Nationalism, as the spirit to free the country from colonialism, was one of the pillars and a steady inspiration of an Indonesian Islamic state.
The positions of the two sides were hard to reconcile. The more one group pressed their arguments, the more their opponents disagreed. In this vein, one of the main concerns of the Muslims was that if nationalism were to be taken as the basis of the state, then religion would be neglected. From this two questions arise. Were the Nationalists advocating a pure secularism? Would the future Indonesia be an irreligious state under nationalism?
Arguments for Negara Ber-Ketuhanan
The Nationalists were adamant in their stance: they did not intend that religion would be put aside nor did they want the state to be totally “secu-lar.” In fact, some nationalist figures like Supomo, Yamin and Sukarno did recognize the overall importance of religion in the state system.
On many occasions Supomo reiterated his view that the unitary national state (negara nasional yang bersatu) was not anti-religion or irreligious. For him the noble essence of all religions, not least Islam, was beneficial to the state. He stated clearly:
The unitary national state does not mean that the state would be irreligious. It does not. A national unitary state would maintain the best character of humanity, as well as uphold the noble aspirations of the community. The Indonesian state should be based upon noble moral foundations and these are also taught by Islam.23
Adhering to kejawen (Javanese mysticism), Supomo felt that semangat kebatinan (the inner spiritual dimension) was the true religious identity of Indonesians. This semangat kebatinan was the source of social and political activism. As the essence of religion, he believed that the noble character of humanity would bring tolerance and respect towards differ-ences among them. Later Supomo was to develop further his argument on Indonesian identity, so that semangat kebatinan should become the driving force of the Indonesian people, because it was the true expression of Indonesian religion. Islam, he pointed out, did not have its origins in Indonesian soil.24
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Another Nationalist who spoke of the importance of religion in the future Indonesia was Muhammad Yamin, by means of tracing Indonesia’s historical evolution from ancient times. In a speech delivered in the first plenary session of the BPUPK Assembly on 29 May 1945, he made fre-quent reference to God, using terms such as Ketuhanan (the Divinity). Like Sukarno later, he also put Prinsip Ketuhanan in his version of the Pancasila. And when arguing for nationalism as the first principle of his Pancasila, Yamin foresaw that the future state would be a national state (nationale staat) which was in accord with “our familial way of life” (susu-nan dunia sekeluarga) and based on berke-Tuhanan.25
For Yamin, nationalism and berke-Tuhanan, belief in divinity, were complementary. He believed that both these values were intact in the long evolution of the concept of Indonesia as a nation-state and as a religious entity. They had already existed for many centuries. For him, the current concept of Indonesia was not only a continuation and a reconstruction, but also an enlargement and refinement of origins present in the glorious ancient kingdoms in the archipelago. This was an attitude of “expansion-ism incipiency,” to borrow a phrase from Weatherbee,26 denoting on-going evolution in the long history of Indonesia. It had evolved on the one hand from royalty (kedatuan) and lordship (keperabuan) to nationalism within its political structure and on the other from magic and Tantrism to belief in God within its religious structure. As Yamin said:
There is a clear distinction between the current Indonesian nationalism and what the Indonesian people achieved when they established the Indonesian state of the Syailendra-Srivijaya Kingdoms (600–1400) for hundreds of years. There is a difference between our current efforts from those of the Indonesian people who established the second Indonesian state during the Majapahit Kingdom (1293–1525). The first Indonesian state was based on royalty (kedatuan) and on ancient belief (magic) and Mahayana Buddhism. The second state was under a lordship system (keperabuan) and Tantrism, a combination of Sivaism and Buddhism. The third Indonesian state will be a state based upon nationalism and the belief in God (berke-Tuhanan)… Religion has shifted, thoughts have been transformed and the world’s struc-ture will always change.27
Elsewhere, Yamin considered religious teachings as essential for democ-racy. In developing his argument on the necessity of deliberation (per-musyawatan) as the fourth principle of democracy in the Pancasila, he claimed that the seeds of deliberation were also found in the teachings and
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practices of religions existing in the archipelago like Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. He later came to the conclusion that “[i]f the future state neglects deliberation, it means the state is ignorant of belief in God, and this is contradictory to the nature of Indonesian civilization.”28
Later Yamin argued that deliberation, as the chief procedure of modern democracy, was in accord with an ancient traditional model of decision making, mufakat or consensus, and he believed that mufakat was rooted in religious traditions. Therefore the combination of deliberation and con-sensus would be the perfect model for Indonesia to solve problems in the governmental system, and one based on its own cultural legacies.29
In another speech in the Assembly, on 11 June 1945, Yamin insisted that the constitution of the future Indonesia should preserve an accep-tance of the existence of Almighty God. Indonesia would not be an athe-istic state. With the emphasis on God, he claimed that the Indonesian constitution would be above other ordinary laws (or constitutions) in the world because it would be under the protection of Almighty God:
This Republic of Indonesia is not an atheistic republic (satu republik anti- Tuhan) but a theistic one. We would guarantee this matter in the preamble and in the body of the text of the constitution… We put the constitution higher than ordinary laws, because the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is under the protection of Almighty God (Tuhan Yang Maha Kuasa).30
Sukarno, the most prominent nationalist leader and the first President of Indonesia, also included a religious dimension in his speeches. When he proposed the Pancasila, comprising the principles of Nationalism, Humanitarianism, Democracy, Social Justice and Ketuhanan, he elabo-rated in quite some detail his position on religious affairs within the future state. He used a variety of expressions, such as belief in God (ketuhanan), belief in God but one’s own God (bertuhan Tuhannya sendiri), worship of God without any restraint (menyembah Tuhan dengan cara leluasa), belief in God in a civilized manner (bertuhan secara kebudayaan or ketu-hanan yang berkebudayaan) and without religious egoism, belief in God with a noble character (ketuhanan yang berbudi pekerti luhur) and belief in God and mutual respect (ketuhanan yang hormat-menghormati satu sama lain).
He concluded that there was a strong connection between believing in God and civility, nobility of character, respect towards others and tolerance.
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Because of this, the future state should guarantee freedom of religion, so that these noble qualities would flourish. According to Sukarno, this was the essence of being a religious person and at the same time being part of a wider society. His speech on Ketuhanan is as follows:
The Fifth Principle of Free Indonesia should be based on Tuhan Yang Maha Esa. Prinsip Ketuhanan! Not only should the Indonesian people believe in God but everyone should believe in God, his own God. Christians would worship God according to Jesus“ teaching, Muslims would have their God according to Muhammad’s teaching, and Buddhists would practise their religion in accord with their own Holy Books. But let all of us have God. The Indonesian state should be a state in which every citizen may worship God without any restraint. All citizens should believe in God in a civilized manner (secara kebudayaan) without “religious egoism” (egoisme-agama). Let Indonesia be a state with a belief in God! Let’s practise religion, whether Islam or Christianity with solemnity (berkeadaban)! What is solemnity? It is respecting one another… The Prophet Muhammad has given sufficient evi-dence of tolerance, on how to respect other religions. Jesus also showed this tolerance. In this Independent Indonesia that we design, we declare that the fifth principle of the state shall be based on Ketuhanan yang berkebudayaan, Ketuhanan yang berbudi pekerti yang luhur, Ketuhanan of mutual respect… My heart will be filled with happiness if you all, gentlemen, agree that the Independent Indonesian state will be based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. Within this Fifth Principle, my brothers, all religions present in Indonesia will have their appropriate place. In this state, we do believe in God!31
The nationalist arguments on negara berketuhanan did not mean they intended religion to be paramount, as in a theocratic system. Rather, the term seemed to carry a notion that the state did not endorse homogene-ity but considered all religious groupings equal. Nevertheless, in the end, the nationalist arguments about assuring the appropriate positioning of religion in the future state did not deter the Muslims from demanding their own clear and visible religious symbols. Therefore, they remained adamant. The differences between the two sides appeared intractable.
The Compromises
Given the fear of delaying independence or worse, political disintegration, if the antagonism persisted, efforts to find a point of convergence between the two factions were pursued in the early sessions of the BPUPK Assembly
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in July 1945. This led to the establishment of the Panitia Sembilan (the Committee of Nine) consisting of Sukarno (chair), Hatta, Yamin, Ahmad Subardjo, Maramis, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Wahid Hasjim, Abikoesno Tjokrosujoso and Agus Salim. The first five represented the Nationalists with one of them, Maramis, a Christian, while the last four were devout Muslims, or to be precise “Islamists.”
This small committee was important for two main reasons. It provided a forum in which to resolve ideological differences, as has been argued by many scholars, but more importantly, it gave an “emergency exit” to the Muslims to avoid direct voting if debates on an Islamic state became bogged down and a resolution proved difficult to achieve. It was likely that if voting had actually taken place Muslims could not rely on their own camp for a majority vote since they were “politically” a minority in this Assembly. Therefore any aspiration such as on an Islamic state would certainly be easily defeated.
The small committee agreed after several meetings on draft preamble to the constitution. This draft was later named by Yamin the “Jakarta Charter.” Its central theme was a philosophical affirmation of the exis-tence of a united, just and prosperous Indonesian state. It opened with the statement that not only was political independence the right of all people in the world but also the right of Indonesians in particular. The draft also affirmed that Indonesian independence would be made possible because Allah Yang Maha Kuasa, or Almighty God, bestowed it.
In its final paragraph the draft included a statement of the Pancasila (Five Principles) as the foundation of the future Indonesian state, with slight modifications by Yamin and Sukarno. In the Yamin and Sukarno versions, Ketuhanan had appeared as third and fifth principle respec-tively, while in the Charter it was elevated to the first position. On the suggestion of Muzakkir, extra words were appended. Signed by all nine members of the Committee on 22 June 1945, the first prin-ciple of Pancasila in this document read as follows: Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya (“Belief in God” with the obligation to carry out Islamic shariah for Muslim adherents).32 This clause later became known as “the seven words” of the Jakarta Charter.
The Jakarta Charter was seen as a “win-win” solution to reduce the tension between the two groups. But for the Muslims, with the acceptance of the Jakarta Charter the struggle for an Islamic state de jure indeed lost its momentum since the Charter made no mention of an “Islamic state.”
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It only preserved the rights of Muslims to follow Islamic teachings. Who would oversee this practice? Was it individual Muslims themselves, or the state? Such matters remained unclear.
Apart from ambiguities inherent in the clause, it came as no surprise that when the committee’s decision became public, objections were imme-diately raised. Latuharhary, a leading Christian politician, for example, objected to the seven words of the clause, describing them as an impedi-ment to the rights of minorities and as contradicting the customary laws (adat istiadat) of the country. Others, like Wongsonegoro, were also con-cerned that it would create religious fanaticism from within the Islamic community. Hoesein Djajadiningrat also warned that it would “force” all Muslims to practise the shariah.
As the debates became more intense the decision was put to an Assembly plenary meeting.33 Again, a number of debates flared up in the forum and a variety of arguments flew back and forth to defend the respective posi-tions of the parties. The themes of the debate expanded not only around the “seven words” in the preamble and the article on religion in the con-stitution, but also to other issues such as whether Islam should be adopted as the official state religion and whether the president should be a Muslim. In this situation, the Muslim group were quite adamant in the face of what to them seemed a hostile attitude towards Islam.
Wahid Hasjim, for example, insisted that Islam should be the official state religion in the interests of maintaining social and political order, since Islam was the majority faith. He reasoned that if Islam were the state religion and Indonesia were to come under attack, then this would become a matter of not just defending the nation but also defending Islam. For him, “according to religious teaching, only for religion can the soul be sacrificed.” Coupled with this suggestion, he expressed his concern about the religious affiliation of the future president. He argued that “if the president is a Muslim, policies will take Islam into account (perintah- perintahnya berbau Islam) and so these will have a great influence [within society].”34
Yet not all of the Muslim members unanimously agreed to place the future constitution unequivocally behind this “Islamic symbolism.” Agus Salim, for instance, thought that Hasjim’s proposal would undermine the compromise reached between the Nationalists and the Muslims. However, when the same concern was raised by the nationalist side, by Sukarno in this case, the Muslim response was negative.
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The overall differences between the factions became more and more divisive. The meeting closed without reaching a decision, particularly after Muzakkir offered the choice to the Assembly to “take Islam or leave it.”35 Only after an appeal from Sukarno the following day did the tension began to calm down. The Nationalists seemed to retreat from their earlier position and both groups entered new negotiations. The Assembly finally agreed to accept the “seven words” in the preamble and the article of the future con-stitution on religion. It also accepted the Muslim proposal to place Islam as the state religion and the condition that the President should be a Muslim in the draft of the constitution. Thus compromise was finally reached.
However, it soon became evident that commitment to the compro-mise on the nationalist side was tenuous and the agreement lasted only a month. On the day following the declaration of Indonesian indepen-dence on 17 August 1945, the draft constitution was discussed in a meet-ing of the PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/Preparatory Committee of Indonesian Independence), and a decision was taken to omit the “seven words” from the Preamble. This had a domino effect, leading to the removal of all “Islamic” terms and articles from the constitution.
Muhammad Hatta was the figure behind these “deconfessionalizing” amendments. In his book of memoirs, published four decades later, he revealed why he regarded it as important. He had had an earlier meet-ing with a middle-ranking Japanese naval officer who told him that cer-tain Protestant and Catholic communities in eastern Indonesia felt very uneasy about the “seven words” and had indicated they would not join the newly established state if the “seven words” were included in the con-stitution. Hatta said that he conveyed this information to four Muslim leaders (Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo, Wahid Hasjim and Teuku Hasan) and also discussed his proposed amendments with them in an informal meeting several hours before the opening PPKI session.36
From this account by Hatta, there were two controversies emanating from the omission of the “seven words” and the substitution of Islamic terminology in the Indonesian Constitution. The first regarded his meeting with the Japanese officer, and the second related to his meet-ing with the four Muslim leaders. In the first case, it seemed debatable whether or not the meeting between him and the Japanese officer actually took place. Even if there had been a meeting, the question arises as to why it was a Japanese naval officer who conveyed this news to Hatta rather one of the eastern Indonesian Christian leaders such as Latuharhary or Sam Ratulangie, both of whom were PPKI members.
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The second issue concerns Hatta’s meeting with his four fellow Muslims as he reported in his book. It is unclear if he actually met with these Muslim leaders and what they discussed. Mangkusasmito, for exam-ple, doubted that Hatta really met and conferred with Wahid Hasjim. Mangkusasmito discovered that Hasjim was travelling out of town at the time and could not have been involved in this informal lobbying.37 Hasjim was the only one of the four Muslims whom Hatta claimed to have met, who had been a member of the Panitia Sembilan and privy to every stage of the Jakarta Charter compromise. Teuku Hasan was not in this sense a “Muslim activist” and so his later endorsement of Hatta’s proposal was politically unsurprising. Singodimedjo, on the other hand, according to Mangkusasmito, received the invitation from Hatta only minutes before the meeting and was not au fait with the details of the issues under discus-sion. The critical discussants seem indeed to have been Hadikusumo and Hatta, presumably with Singodimedjo on Hadikusomo’s side and Hasan on Hatta’s. In this two-on-two meeting on 18 August 1945, and the Muslim participants’ lack of direct knowledge of the Jakarta Charter com-mittee discussions, it is logical that Hadikusumo and Singodimedjo were easily persuaded by Hatta’s arguments.
Issues around the contents of their discussion are also worthy of exami-nation. It seems that it was Hatta who offered the substitution of the “seven words” by the new Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa clause. However, what also remains unclear is whether the meeting agreed to omit all Islamic terms from the constitution. Given the limited documentation surround-ing the event, speculation has arisen as to whether Hatta’s initiative was based on a “genuine” political motive to ensure the unity of the new Indonesian state, or it was one of the nationalist strategies to reverse the previous compromise and to block Islamic confessionalization of the con-stitution and the state system. Some scholars have, moreover, asked why the “seven words” and other “Islamic” articles which had been approved by the BPUPK could later be nullified by the PPKI given that the compo-sition of each body differed markedly.
the phRase KetuhaNaN YaNg Maha esa
Apart from the above controversies, the phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa also deserves closer scrutiny. Despite the fact that it became a common idiom used since Indonesian independence, there were few references to Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in any political debates and discussions
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between the Muslims and the nationalist activists prior to the informal lobby or the PPKI meeting. It was mentioned only once in Yamin’s com-pilation, without any specified meaning, in speeches by Muhammad Yamin and Sukarno in the BPUPK. Overall, Yamin and Sukarno preferred to use the broader term Ketuhanan (without any following descriptor of Yang Maha Esa). On a number of occasions both leaders used Ketuhanan Yang Maha Kuasa or the Arabic phrase Allah swt. (subhana wa ta'ala) instead. Interestingly, the phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is not to be found in any of the speeches of the Muslim activists. Muslim activists, on the other hand, like Natsir and Hadikusumo, also used the word Ketuhanan as well but mostly preferred the Islamic expression Allah swt.
Unarguably therefore the idiom Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was inten-tionally chosen as a substitute for the “seven words” in order to avoid any possible opposition from the Muslims, if other idioms had been cho-sen. This idiom was probably introduced for the first time by Hatta as a response to Hadikusumo’s inquiry regarding the substitution of the “seven words” clause. The new clause was “persuasive,” but at the same time “loose” and “multi-interpretative.” It is clear from the beginning that the Muslims and the Nationalists were both aware that each had a different understanding of the idiom but they could not require their counterparts to accept their preferred meaning. Nonetheless, Hatta’s strategy was in fact effective. While this substitution (and certainly the omission of certain constitution articles relating to Islam) left Muslims dissatisfied, at least Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa could be seen to be a pivotal principle, signifying a substantial acknowledgement of God in the state system, so that the state would not be closed to the use of Islamic principles. In other words, although the state system gave a “secular” appearance, the inclusion of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa held the pros-pect of becoming the normative basis for steering the state toward a more Islamized form.
For Muslims the Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa was identical with and a translation of the notion of tawhid (monotheism) in Islam; and Hatta, from whom it had come, agreed with this perception.38 It seemed under-standable if, after all, the Muslims could accept the shift in the constitution as part of new political negotiations. As an example, Hadikusumo, one of the four Muslim leaders in Hatta’s informal meeting, went on to be active in refining the wording of the constitution.39 Perhaps many Muslim activ-ists believed that this constitution was temporary and far from perfect, as also did Sukarno, the newly appointed President of the Republic. The
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production of another constitution would be possible when the political atmosphere following independence became more stable and democratic election of a Constituent Assembly could take place.40
This may explain why there is no substantial evidence to show any polit-ical opposition against the compromise made by the Muslims. It was only some five years later that negative Muslim discourse which portrayed the substitution as part of the “underhanded tricks” of the Nationalists or of an act of deceit perpetrated upon the Muslims developed and fired new debates on an Islamic state in the Constituent Assembly in the late 1950s.
notes
1. See for example Hasnul Arifin Melayu, “Islam as an Ideology: The Political Thought of Tjokroaminoto,” Studia Islamika 9, 3 (2002): 62.
2. Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 26.
3. Robert van Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 32; 36–38. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, 227.
4. Kuru outlines two different categories of secularism: the “passive” and the “assertive.” The first covers those who believed that the state should not establish any religious grouping as the official religion of the state system, but at the same time should allow the appearance of religious influence in the state system, as long as the state can maintain its neutrality to all. The second, the “assertive” applies where the any appearance of religion in the state system is prohibited and the state plays an assertive role in the public sphere. Ahmet T. Kuru, “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion,” World Politics 59 (July 2007), 571–572.
5. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900–1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), 279–295.
6. Sukarno, “Mengapa Turkey Memisahkan Agama,” Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi (Djakarta: Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), 403–404.
7. Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 27–29. 8. M.A. Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1955), 206 as quoted by Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 28. 9. It should be mentioned from the beginning that there are limited sources
to confirm whether the vote in regard to either issue had really taken place in the BPUPK. The main source for this is a report by Abdul Kahar Muzakkir to the Constituent Assembly in the mid-1950s (documented in
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the third volume of the Assembly proceedings). According to Muzakkir, for the issue of bentuk negara (the form of state), out of 60 members, 53 voted for a republic while 7 were for a kingdom. Muzzakir also reported a vote on the second issue (the foundation of the state). Some 45 out of 60 members preferred nationalism while the rest, 15 members, chose an Islamic. These results represented the fact that the majority of members of the BPUPK did not give preference to the idea of an Islamic state. Given the unfair compo-sition in the BPUPK which did not represent demographics population of the country, as was repeatedly argued by many Muslim activists, from this turnout the Muslims were forced to accept this “defeat” as the political reality of the democratic system. See Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante (Bandung: Konstituante, 1958), III, 35–36 as also quoted by Endang Saifuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter of June 1945 (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia [ABIM], 1979), 17–18; and also in Prowoto Mangkusasmito, Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara (Jakarta: Hudaya, 1970), 12; and compared with Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 3 vols. (Jakarta: Prapantja, 1960), particularly volume I.
10. See B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 19–21.
11. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 117. 12. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 118. 13. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 115–116. 14. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 116–117. 15. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 116. 16. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 113. 17. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 117. 18. Some records on Muslim activists’ speeches on the Assembly can be found
separately on the books published solely by those activists. The example of this is Bagus Hadikusumo’s Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Rahayu, n.d.) which included his speech in the Assembly.
19. Deliar Noer, Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1978), 2–3.
20. Hadikusumo, Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, 13 as also quoted by Faisal Ismail, Islam and Pancasila: Indonesia Politics 1945–1995 (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama RI, 2001), 47–48.
21. Hadikusumo, Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, 17; and Ismail, Islam and Pancasila, 48.
22. See Anshari, The Jakarta Charter, 2–5. 23. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 117. 24. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 113. 25. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 90.
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26. Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution (Yale: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1966), 5–6.
27. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 90. 28. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 95. 29. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 96. 30. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 240. 31. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 77–78. 32. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan: I: 152–154; and Ismaun, Tindjauan Pantjasila:
Dasar Filsafat Negara Republik Indonesia (Bandung: Carya Remadja, 1970), 168–169.
33. See Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 259; and Boland, The Struggle of Islam, 28–29.
34. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 261; Boland, The Struggle of Islam, 30–31. 35. Muzzakir said with an emotional tone: “I seek refuge in Allah from the
accursed Satan. Honorable gentlemen, it has been explained here several times that Islam includes the state ideology. Hence, the state is not sepa-rated from Islam due to the nature of Islam in relation with the state and religion. That’s the only meaning of this wording. If the statement (voor-stel) is rejected, it may clearly mean that the state would be neutral vis-a-vis religion. My voorstel is: please make a choice… I agree with Abdul Kahar Muzakkir’s suggestion; if Islamic ideology is to be rejected, please reject it! So that it is clear the state would not stand on Islam and the state would be neutral [i.e. secular]. Please be frank and do not make a small compro-mise as Sukarno has suggested. For justice and duty, there should be no compromise at all. Be frank if there are any objections to accepting the ideology of the Islamic community or if there is consensus in accord with Islam to establish an Islamic state. Honestly and clearly. If it is clear [the state would be] neutral, do not take any argument from Islam as justifica-tion… Or as there are many religions here, take a vote whether this state should or not be based on religion. If it is decided that [the state is] not based on religion, the case is then over (habis perkara)!” See Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 386–387.
36. Muhammad Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 (Jakarta: Penerbit Tintamas, 1969), 57–59.
37. Mangkusasmito, Pertumbuhan Historis, 38–39; see Anshari, The Jakarta Charter, 33.
38. As mentioned by Hosen the context of this is that Hatta answered a ques-tion from Hadikusumo who asked what the meaning of the idiom. See Nadirsyah Hosen, Shari’a & Constititional Reform in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), 63–64.
39. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 404–405. 40. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 116.
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CHAPTER 6
Religion and the Intrusive Constitutions
As discussed in the previous chapter, the debates on the foundation of the future state in Indonesia were divisive, particularly regarding the place of religion in the state system. While the compromise reached did not solve all disputes or satisfy all the wishes of the two groups, at least both came to the conclusion that religious values were to be the fundamental norms of the social, political and legal construction of the state. Implicit in the compromise was the role of the state in matters of religion. However, to what extent the government, as the practical manifestation of the state, might exercise its political power over religious affairs was not always “lin-ear” since steady changes in the legal text of the constitution itself justified certain roles for the government.
To understand the role of the government in religious affairs, it is important therefore to highlight the position of religion in the Indonesian constitution. For those who are not familiar with Indonesian constitu-tionalism we would underline that since independence there have been three different constitutions enacted in Indonesia, namely: the 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 or the UUD 1945) in the first phase from 18 August 1945 to 27 December 1949; the second, the 1949 Federal Constitution (Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Serikat 1949 or the Konstitusi RIS 1949) from 27 December 1949 to 17 August 1950; and the last, the 1950 Provisional Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara 1950 or the UUDS 1950) which remained in force from 17 August 1950 to 5 July 1959. Throughout this book, they are referred
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to as “the 1945 Constitution,” “the 1949 Constitution” and “the 1950 Constitution” respectively. As far as religion is concerned, each constitu-tion provides a different character and model of governance in religious life in Indonesia.
Religion in the indonesian Constitutions
In theory, a constitution serves as a guideline for the governance of cit-izens, to limit a government’s exercise of power, to protect the rights of citizens and as the basis from which laws and regulations are gener-ated. However, it is also evident that in many cases the constitution acts as a “mirror” to reflect provisional political negotiations between inter-est groups at the time to preserve particular values in the state system. Indonesian constitutions are the case to point out, and this is particularly obvious in the 1949 and 1950 Constitutions. A closer look at the 1945 Constitution would also find similarity as it was not immune from inher-ent ambiguity in its article on religion.
It is a matter of fact to emphasize from the beginning that there is no official state religion recognized in any of the Indonesian constitutions, and so the state is theoretically removed from the possibility of confer-ring privilege to any particular religious grouping. However, it is also true that the same constitution has justified an intrusive government role, where the norms and values of the majority, implicitly and explicitly, have underwritten the government’s role. Hence, this negotiation concerned the interests of the state to play a role in religion and the interests of the majority to influence the state in exercising this role. This is what in this book is called “negotiation of the boundaries of authority” where both parties, the government and the majority group, are involved in negotiat-ing their own roles. Consequently, while the Indonesian constitution has preserved religious freedom, by the same token it has also tended to con-struct wide-ranging discretionary powers which the government can use to control religion and to circumscribe religious freedom that are all based on the values taken from the majority group.
As a background for understanding why and how the government has issued laws, policies and regulations on religion, it is apposite to examine how successive constitutions have dealt with religion. The following table (Table 6.1) gives a list of articles on religion in each constitution.
From the above table it is obvious that there has been a steady devel-opment in the articles on religion. However, there are some important
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features in those constitutions: the absence of an official state religion, the preservation of religious freedom of the citizens “with conditions” and, importantly, the expanding role of the government. Despite the fact that Islam is adhered to by the majority of the population, the above consti-tutions are far from conferring any explicit privilege to Islam, at least in theory. In the absence of any official religion, the constitutions recognized de facto and de jure a plurality of religions in which all religious groups are to be treated equally. These are important grounds for the protection of the right of religious freedom. However, preserving this right is not always easy in practice, particularly when the role of government is on
Table 6.1 Articles on religion in Indonesian constitutions
The 1945 Constitution The 1949 Constitution The 1950 Constitution
Article 29 1. The state is based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa 2. The state shall guarantee freedom for every citizen to embrace any religion or belief and to practise religious duties in conformity with that religion or belief
Article 18Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change one’s religion or belief, and the freedom to manifest his religion or belief either alone or in community with others, in public or private, in teaching, practice, worship and observance, and in the education of children in accord with the parents’ religion and beliefArticle 41 1. The government shall provide equal protection to all recognized religious groups and affiliations 2. The government shall supervise all religious groups and affiliations so that they obey the laws, including the unwritten laws of custom
Article 18Everyone has the right to freedom of religion, conscience and thoughtArticle 43 1. The state is based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa 2. The state shall guarantee freedom for every citizen to adhere to any religion and belief and to practise religious duties in conformity with that religion and belief 3. The government shall provide equal protection to all recognized religious groups and affiliations 4. Any support of any means by the government to the leaders or representatives of religious groups and affiliations is given on the basis of equality 5. The government shall supervise all religious groups and affiliations so that they obey the laws, including the unwritten laws of custom
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public display. Tensions between the “rights” of citizens regarding religion and the “roles” of government in religious affairs have become evident. Analysis of each article in each constitution is essential for understanding the policies on religion at any particular given period.
Articles on Religion in the 1945 Constitution
As shown in Table 6.1, Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution consists of two sections: the first is “the state is based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” and the second is “the state shall guarantee freedom for every citi-zen to embrace any religion or belief and to practise religious duties in conformity with that religion or belief.” As discussed earlier, the first sec-tion came into being in substitution for the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter, in order to minimize overt Islamic symbolism in the state system. Being part of this political compromise, it seems safe to say that from the beginning this section was not designed comprehensively as the basic guideline for acknowledging all beliefs within the variety of religious sys-tems in the archipelago.
Analysis of this first section reveals an inherent theoretical difficulty in the meaning of the phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. While the meaning could come close to “monotheism” or belief in “One God,” there were many different ways in which to interpret it. The larger religious group-ings, particularly the Muslims and the Christians, argued repeatedly for their own interpretation to be accepted by the government and laws to be drafted accordingly. This is called in this book the “politics of interpreting Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” as discussed at length in the next chapter.
Another issue is the structural limitation upon freedom of religion that appears in the second section of Article 29. This section only offers a specific kind of freedom, the freedom of embracing and practising a religion. One may argue that it does not deal with “freedom of religion” as an inalienable individual right per se, as found for example in international documents on human rights.1 As a matter of comparison, in Article 18 of the United Nations Charter or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) it is stated: “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and obser-vance.” The above definition of religious freedom in this international char-ter seems to be in opposition to the definition of religious freedom in the
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Indonesian context. In fact the state guarantees limited religious freedom as much depends on how the state itself defines the meaning of the words “religion” and “religious practices.” This section is an example of what Gvosdev called a “redefinition of religious freedom where the legal right of religious freedom is put intentionally in a narrower or more restrictive fashion than the general understanding of the term.”2
It is important to emphasize as well that both sections of the article begin with the word negara (“the state”) . One may wonder: has this word (“the state”) kept the same meaning? It seems dubious and debat-able as Muhammad Yamin, for example, has suggested. According to Yamin, when the word “the state” is placed in conjunction with the par-ticular concept of God as Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, one may argue that it implies that the state itself is the subject. Whereas the concept of nation-state was “attached” to this concept exclusively, this “state reli-gious attitude” could not be imposed upon the entire Indonesian society if individuals believed in some other conception of God. The citizens were free to believe in whatever they preferred, as long as they still held “a belief in God,” and the state could not restrict or punish the citizens if they did so, as once argued by Yamin.3
In addition to this ambiguity, there is also uncertainty on how the article on religion should be understood as a whole. In other words, should the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in the first section become an essen-tial condition in preserving the contours of “limited” religious freedom as stated in the second section? Or should each section be treated separately? This remains obscure, since there is no additional explanation given, either in the constitution itself or in any other official legal documents.
The lack of any sufficient explanation of the article is understandable, however, given the very nature of this article as a compromise between the Founding Fathers to replace the previous draft containing the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter. Within this backdrop, this article from the beginning seems precipitous and ad hoc with no philosophical underpinning. A politi-cal atmosphere caused by mild tension over the possibility of another armed struggle against an attempt by the Dutch colonial authority to reinstall polit-ical power in the country, and fear of reinstating another debate on the foun-dation of the state seemed to be a possible explanation of why the Indonesia Founding Fathers avoided discussion of the meaning of this constitution article as its might have further divided rather than united the community. In such circumstances, ambiguity in this article of the Indonesian constitution served to limit, for the time being, ongoing disputes on religious matters.
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Articles on Religion in the 1949 Constitution
The second constitution to point out is the 1949 Federal Constitution which was in force for only one year. This version of the constitution resulted from long negotiations between the Republicans, the Federalists and Dutch representatives concerned with the management of the Federal States of Indonesia.4 It was enacted only in the established federal states and not in all areas and provinces acclaimed as part of the Indonesian nation-state.
While this 1949 Constitution had certain limitations, in terms of time and coverage, this did not mean that this legal document had little impact on the overall foundation of state policies on religious affairs. In fact, it paved the way for the state’s intrusive role in religious affairs, since all arti-cles on religion from the 1949 Constitution also reappeared, with slight modifications, in the 1950 Constitution.
Compared to that of 1945, the 1949 Constitution was more general, offering apparent features on the protection of human rights taken from the United Nations Charter. Likely under the influence of Dutch repre-sentatives and the leading role taken by nationalist activists like Supomo and Hatta, the 1949 Constitution incorporated principles of the rights in a more general sense and in accord with international human rights docu-ments. In fact, Article 18 of this constitution was a literal translation of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
A close look would find that the 1949 Constitution prescribed the role of the government in maintaining religious order, which led to certain “impedi-ments” in applying Article 18 in its entirety. It is clear that Article 41 stated the precise role of the executive body in which penguasa (the government or the ruler) offered protection and supervision of religious groups and religious affairs. It was not extended, however, to all religious groups in Indonesia but solely to those officially recognized (diakui). It is worth mentioning in this instance that this was the first time that the idiom “recognized religions” (agama yang diakui) appeared in the Indonesian legal lexicon.
Who were the “recognized religions” mentioned in the 1949 Constitution? There was no specific explanation given in this case. Given the lack of any clear definition, it came as no surprise that existing religious groups would be competing with each other to claim the official recognition status which would guarantee them government protection. It would later become clear as well that “protection” did not simply mean legal recognition. Rather, it would involve government support in material and financial terms.
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Particular conditions were applied to this “protection,” however, as those religions would be subject to obey the laws of the land, including the “unwritten laws.” Here, the concept of “the unwritten laws” remain obscure, as to whether it denoted specific customary law (adat law) given the fact that a large number were in force in the archipelago or it denoted any specific culture. Nevertheless, while the articles on religion in the 1949 Constitution were much “better constructed” than those of the pre-vious constitution, they nonetheless paved the way for the future role of the government regarding religious affairs.
Articles on Religion in the 1950 Constitution
The third constitution, that of 1950, deserves closer analysis because, technically speaking, it “blended” together the articles on religion of both previous constitutions. At a glance, and as many scholars have argued, the 1950 Constitution was comprehensive, with a strong emphasis on the freedom and rights of citizens, together with the adoption of a lib-eral Western-style form of government. However, as far as religious affairs are concerned, this constitution went in the opposite direction. It was authoritarian in nature and set up limitations on citizens embracing and practising religion freely. More importantly, it should be borne in mind that MORA effectively used the articles of this Constitution as legal basis in issuing strict regulations and policies on religious affairs.
The 1950 Constitution acknowledged the right of religious freedom but with reservations undoubtedly. Unlike previous texts, this version lim-ited the right solely to the “freedom of religion, conscience and thought.” More importantly, it excluded the freedom to change religion. The omis-sion of this right for changing religious affiliation in this constitution was a result of compromise after heated debates in the parliament when some Muslim members of parliament voiced strong objection to any religious conversion. For Muslim activists at that time, conversion (stated in the clause “this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief” in Article 18 of the 1949 Constitution) went against Islamic teaching. Such objections against this right were raised not only in Indonesia but also in other Muslim countries, as reported by Cerna.5 Negative Islamic senti-ment over the issue of conversion was evident in the parliamentary dis-cussions and it was due to strong pressure from Muslim parties that the clauses, particularly on the right for conversion (together with remaining clauses such as the right to manifest religious/belief expression in public
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and the right of religious education for children previously found in the 1949 Federal Constitution) were removed in the drafting of the 1950 Constitution.6
What is more, the Provisional Constitution of 1950 included more detailed notions on how the state and the government should deal with religious affairs. It is worth mentioning that Article 43 used the overlap-ping terms of negara (“the state”) and penguasa (“the government” or “the ruler”). Arguably this use of two different words (“the state” in the first two sections of the article and “the government” in the following three sections) was neither coincidental nor simply a matter of choice of words. It is more likely that they were used to constitute different degrees of proposition between the sections. The sections with the word “the state” were likely aimed to point out the position of the state on the mat-ter of religion, while the word “the government” in later sections was for the practical role of the executive in managing religious affairs.
Hence it is believed that the sections in Article 43 headed with the word “the state” were the central element of the article, above other sections with the word “the government.” Thus the sentences, in sec-tion 1: “the state is based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” and in sec-tion 2: “the state guarantees freedom for every citizen to embrace any religion and belief and to practise religious duties in conformity with that religion and belief,” would be the foundations for overall govern-ment practices in managing religious affairs, as stated in the remaining parts of the same article.
Regardless of whether or not this assumption holds true, the fact remains that overall Article 43 invests excessive powers in the government over matters of religious life. The citizens’ rights of freedom of religion were to an extent dispensable to state interests and dependent upon a particular set of standards enforced by the state itself. This is an example of what Gvosdev calls “the subversion of religious freedom,” where the entitlement of the right of religious freedom in one constitution article is overtly or covertly compromised in another.7 Within the overwhelming role of the government as mentioned in Article 43, the earlier Article 18 preserving the right of limited religious freedom appears very artificial.
Later, the tendency to undermine this formulation of the fundamental right would become obvious in practice, when the argument that “the state is based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” would be treated as the most important point of departure for the state in its management of reli-gious affairs and preservation of religious freedom. As discussed in the next
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chapter of this book, following the enactment of the 1950 Constitution, the prolonged contest among religious thinkers in understanding and interpreting the clause proved to be one of the most important features of government in the early 1950s. Yet up to now there have been few stud-ies that have comprehensively examined this contestation in the writing of Indonesian history, although the impact of this constitution remains at work until today.
notes
1. See the documents for example in Tad Stahnke and J. Paul Martin (eds.), Religion and Human Rights: Basic Documents (New York: Centre for the Study of Human Rights Columbia University, 1998).
2. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink, Managed Pluralism and Freedom of Religion,” Religion, State and Society 29, 2 (2001): 82–83.
3. An example of this interesting interpretation is found in Muhammad Yamin, Proklamasi dan Konstitusi (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1958), 61.
4. See P.J. Drooglever, “The Genesis of the Indonesian Constitution of 1949,” BKI 153, 1 (1997).
5. For more information see Christina M. Cerna, “Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts,” Human Rights Quarterly 16, 4 (1994): 746.
6. See Yamin, Proklamasi dan Konstitusi, 88. 7. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink, Managed Pluralism,” 82–83.
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CHAPTER 7
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa: Contests of Meaning and Interpretation
As mentioned earlier, the idiom Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is found chiefly in the Constitutions of 1945 and 1950, as well as serving as the First Principle of Pancasila, the Indonesian state ideology. This idiom was employed to bridge the gap between the Nationalists who were in favour of a “secular” state and the Muslims who preferred a more Islamic official symbolism. While it was a common perception that it denoted monotheism, in fact there was no unanimity on its possible wider signification. Initially, in line with the enactment of the 1945 Constitution, it was not contested or debated, and received limited attention in discussions from 1945 to 1949. It was only after the enactment of the 1950 Constitution that the prob-lem of the meaning of the idiom drew public scrutiny. This was particularly noticeable since this constitution included the idiom in tandem with the role of the government in religious affairs. It will also become obvious later in the discussion of this chapter that the sorting out of these constitutional legacies was rigorously adopted as the main task of the Ministry of Religious Affairs as the state institution to manage matters of religion in Indonesia.
The PoliTics of inTerPreTing Ketuhanan Yang Maha esa
The phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, as stated previously, was too “vague” to be entered into a legal text like the constitution, from which state laws and policies were chiefly generated. It was accidentally
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“invented” to bridge the differences between the Founding Fathers in the discussions of the place of religion in the state system. Due to this nature of invention, it is also clear that there was not sufficient documentation to explain how the idiom should be properly understood. With this paucity and its lack of clear conceptualization, various interpretations of its mean-ing and its context unsurprisingly came to the surface. In turn, the contest of interpretation of this phrase became a battlefield on which all religious groups had to compete with each other.
It is therefore important to examine how religious group such as the Muslims interpreted Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa and to what extent they were consistent in their interpretation. This is of crucial importance due to the fact that within a certain time of the formative period of the Indonesian nation-state, the government embraced the interpretation of the Muslims, and this led to partisan government policies and neglectful policies towards other religious groupings. In turn, how the state gradu-ally perceived the phrase paving the way to the enactment of a politics of identity for Indonesian citizen is also important for further discussion.
The Muslims and Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa
Among the earliest Indonesian Muslims to “interpret” Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was Hamka, a prominent activist and scholar, in his book Urat Tunggang Pantjasila, which was published in 1952.1 Perhaps the main motive behind this publication was to justify Muslim acceptance of Pancasila as the state ideology. Hamka argued in detail how Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was the very backbone (urat tunggang) of the wider principles of the Pancasila. For Hamka and other Muslim intellectuals, like Agus Salim, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was nothing other than the translation of the concept of tawhid or monotheism, which is the central tenet of all Islamic teaching.2
There are at least two main reasons why the Muslim activists in this period were insistent on interpreting the idiom as identical to Islamic monotheism. The first was to rebuild the psychological confidence of the Muslims them-selves, following their major defeat in the struggle to establish an Islamic state and to retain Islamic symbolism intact in the state system. In Muslim understanding, the concept of Islamic monotheism in the Pancasila was the primary source of humanism, unity, nationalism and the social welfare of the Indonesian people. It was Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, according to another Muslim intellectual, Muhammad Natsir, which became “the spiri-tual, moral and ethical foundation of the state and the nation.”3
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The second reason, more importantly, signified Islamic influence in the state system. Once the idiom (within the Pancasila and within the Constitution) was “Islamized,” any law, regulation or policy generated from it should be in accord with the values and interests of Muslims. To a certain degree, this strategy of associating Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa with Islamic monothe-ism was effective in easing a wider public perception that some Muslims had always been “hostile” to the Pancasila. In this period, however, relations between the Muslims and the Nationalists were in fact particularly cordial. Not only did the Muslims win opportunities to develop their social institu-tions, like education and the administration of marriage, autonomously at the expense of state influence, but Islamic values were also absorbed in the standards of the state in regulating religious affairs. This may explain why, for example, during the 1950s, one of the important roles of government, through MORA, was to “supervise” religious groups who were “deviant” from the “Islamic” understanding of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.
It was not only for the above reasons that Hamka insisted on monothe-ism as the meaning of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in the Pancasila, the lodestar of all of his arguments on Islamic influences in the state system. The book was also intended to refute arguments published earlier by Christian figures like Rosin, who saw the idiom as a syncretic compromise between Islamic, Javanese and modern assumptions of religion, and therefore open to any interpretation or meaning.4 Rosin furthermore believed that the idiom itself was not about the belief in “God” in persona, rather it was to signify the abstract idea of “sacredness” since the word used was not the absolutive proper noun, Tuhan but the derived form, Ketuhanan. Rosin’s understanding was shared by many Indonesian Christians. Simatupang, for example, at a later time, agreed particularly with Rosin, stating that:
The first principle of the Pancasila does not speak about God, but about a Godhead; it speaks of the concept of the divine. Even people who do not believe in a personal God, as many Buddhists do not, can accept it. It is the belief in One Supreme Transcendence, a Supreme and Unitary Being. This may appear to be a very vague concept, but it is all-embracing. Even the Communists once declared they had no final objection to it. All people can recognize something vital to themselves within it. All of us, Christians and others could accept it.5
Responses to Hamka’s publication followed. One was made by Subagya (or J.M.W. Bakker). Like Rosin, Subagya also argued that Ketuhanan “is the best word that opens the opportunity for various interpretations according
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3. Muhammad Natsir, “Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs: An Address Originally Made before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs with Subsequent Elucidatory Additions,” Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1954, 1–2.
4. Helmut Rosin, Pantja-Sila (Djakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1951), 43. 5. T.B. Simatupang, “This is My Country,” International Review of Mission
62, 251 (July 1974): 317. 6. Rahmat Subagya, Pantja Sila Dasar Negara Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Basis,
1955), 64. 7. Subagya, Pantja Sila Dasar Negara, 65–66. 8. W.B. Sidjabat, Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith: A Study of the
Concept of Divine Omnipotent in the Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and Christianity (Djakarta: BPK, 1965), 43, 74.
9. Eka Darmaputera, Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 153.
10. It is interesting to point out how the idiom was variously rendered into English: the Department of Information (Departemen Penerangan) trans-lated the phrase as “the belief in the One Supreme God,” while the Department of Religious Affairs put it as “the belief in God, the One.” It is translated as “the belief in the All- Embracing God” by Muhammad Yamin; or “the belief in the Divine Omnipotence” by Sidjabat; or “the belief in the Absolute Lordship” by Harun Hadiwijono; or “the belief in the Being of Supreme Deity of Oneness” by Kafrawi; or “the belief in the One and Only God” by Boland; or “the belief in the Absolute Unity of God” by van Kroef; or “the Overlordship of God Who is Absolutely One” by van Niewenhijze; or “the belief in God Who is Absolutely One” by Anshari. In addition to this, according to Mujiburrahman, Simatupang and Darmaputera, prominent Christian scholars, preferred to translate the phrase as “the belief in One Godhead” and “the belief in One Lordship” respectively. See Endang Saifuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter of June 1945 (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia [ABIM], 1979),47, fn. 8; and also Darmaputera, Pancasila and the Search for Identity, 153, fn. 16; and Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: Muslim–Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order (Leiden: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 118–122.
11. Subagya, Pantja Sila Dasar Negara, 66. 12. Konstituate Republik Indonesia, Tentang Dasar Negara Republik
Indonesia dalam Konstitutante (Bandung: Konstituate Republik Indonesia, 1958), III: 127; see also Muhammad Natsir, Islam sebagai Dasar Negara (Bandung: Pimpinan Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1975), 5–6.
13. Tentang Dasar Negara, III: 46.
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14. Tentang Dasar Negara, I: 29–30. 15. Prowoto Mangkusasmito, Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara
(Jakarta: Hudaya, 1970), 31, 38; and Anshari, The Jakarta Charter, 34. 16. Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945
(Jakarta: Prapantja, 1960), I: 44. 17. Simandjuntak, Pandangan Negara Integralistik, 78; and Yamin, Naskah
Persiapan, I: 113. 18. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, I: 113. 19. Tafsiran CXXXV, see Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, III: 523. 20. Tafsiran CXXXVII, CXXXVIII, CXL. See Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, III:
524. 21. Tafsiran CXXXIX and CXL. See Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, III: 524. 22. Tafsiran CXXXIX and CXL. See Yamin, Naskah Persiapan, III: 524. 23. Muhammad Yamin, Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Républik
Indonesia (Jakarta: Prapantja, 1960), 461–463. 24. Yamin, Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Républik Indonesia, 461–463. 25. Yamin, Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Républik Indonesia, 461–463.
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CHAPTER 8
The Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Muslim Community
and the Administration of Religious Life
Previous chapters have discussed in considerable detail the compromises made by the Indonesian political Founding Fathers regarding the place of religion in the state system. These compromises were later made evident in the writing of the successive Indonesian constitutions in which the roles of the government in religious affairs were maintained in the state legal system. How those roles were exercised by the government, particularly through the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) in the period from 1945 to 1965, are of importance for further analysis.
As a government institution, theoretically the main task of MORA would be to administer religious affairs in the country for the betterment of all religious groups. Nevertheless how this administration of religious life was performed would also be much dependent on who took the initiative and what was to be done as a priority. In its beginning, one might think that this Ministry was at work appearing to be the most appropriate state institution to administer religious affairs by emphasizing “neutrality” and “fairness” for all religious groups. Nevertheless, the history of the establishment of MORA did not take place in an empty political environment. It was, from the beginning, a safe haven for Muslim activists to channel their Islamic aspirations following their defeat in their Islamic state proposal in 1945. To this end, this chapter will examine the initial years of MORA’s role in steering government policies on religion into the service of Islamic affairs and making Islamic values influential within those policies.
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The esTablishmenT of moRaMany observers believed that the establishment of MORA on 3 January 1946, based on Presidential Decree No. 1/SD/1946, was aimed at satisfying disgruntled Muslims following the deletion of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter and the omission of Islamic terms from the 1945 Constitution.1 This assumption might seem to hold some truth, but in fact the matter was far more complex.2 As a matter of historical fact, the initiative to establish a state institution to cater for Muslim affairs was raised by Muhammad Yamin, in the second session of the BPUPK on 11 June 1945.3 It was Yamin who proposed an institution whose functions were similar to those of the Dutch colonial Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken (Advisory Office for Native and Islamic Affairs) in advising the government on policies for Islamic society.4 However, this proposal vanished as debates on the basis of the state occupied a larger part of the Assembly.
Soon after the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter were dropped from the Constitution on 18 August 1945 as discussed in the previous chapter, the proposal to established MORA seemed to be compensation for Muslims. It was Ahmad Subardjo who voiced the idea of the creation of MORA in the meeting of the PPKI on 19 August 1945, with the emphasis that the institution would serve as a liaison body between the government and Muslim community. Nevertheless, this proposal met with fierce opposition from other PPKI members, like Latuharhary, Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Kusumasumantri, for a variety of reasons, and it failed to gain support from the majority of the PPKI members.5
Yet a further attempt to float the MORA concept came in late November 1945, in the meeting of the KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat/Central Indonesian National Committee), a proto-national legislature consisting of 60 members from various groups and regional representatives which had been established to replace the PPKI. This time, Muslim efforts gained a positive result when the government lent its support to the establishment of MORA.
It was not coincidental that internal political contests within the government, following the shift in political systems from presidential to parliamentary, influenced the regime’s decision to support the establishment of MORA in late 1945. Within the new system of government, the executive body or the President was required to share power with the legislation, embodied in the KNIP (the Prime Ministership). Indeed, with the new legislative functions, some responsibilities of governance were transferred from the Presidential office to the KNIP. As a consequence, the latter was more powerful than the former.
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It should be noted that the KNIP itself consisted of various political parties with diverse concerns, resulting from the issuance of the Maklumat Pemerintah (Government Statement) on 3 and 14 November 1945 stipulating the formation of new political parties. Given the diversity of ideologies and interests, compromises and bargains among the parties were common and concessions made to a particular party were depen-dent upon how strong its influence was in the formation of particular cabinets.
Consequently, as far as Muslim political interests were concerned, the new pervasive role of the KNIP within the parliamentary system also opened up wide opportunities for bargains to be made. Islamic parties like the Masyumi, a leading party in the 1950s and the Perti, a political party of Sumatran origin, that attempted to articulate Muslim interests, found their forum. A new appeal made by Muslim parliamentary members in the KNIP for the establishment of the Ministry was then fortuitous. It seemed reasonable if the first parliamentary Cabinet led by Sjahrir needed support from Muslim politicians for its survival. This may explain why, with endorsement from the Prime Minister, the President finally signed the decree to establish MORA.
Perhaps because of the political nature of MORA’s establishment, the precise status of this institution was “unclear.” On the one hand, it served to represent Muslim interests within the state system. From the begin-ning, according to some documents, its mission was close to the portfolios of Masjumi such as to help “realizing Islamic aspirations on statehood.”6 MORA seemed to be more an instrument for achieving “Islam in the state” rather than “the Islamic state.” On the other hand, it served as the government institution for delivering religious services and to promote the state ideology in society. MORA’s official task was to fulfil consti-tutional requirements as stated in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution accordingly.7
buReaucRaTizing islam
It should be mentioned in this instance that “bureaucratization” in this sense does not mean that the government has employed rationality and neutrality in its decision making on religious affairs, as is argued in the field of the social sciences. Rather, it denotes the intrusive nature of the government in putting religion under its control. What I mean by “bureaucratizing” Islam is the way in which the government has subordi-nated Islamic affairs. MORA exemplifies this process.
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Within the political background in its establishment as mentioned above and the lack of clarity in its roles in the beginning, the main function of MORA, particularly in its first phase from 1946 to 1949, tended to prioritize the consolidation of the administration of Islamic affairs within the state system. This tendency was possible since there was no clear explanation in the Constitution as to how the state should play a role in religion. Consequently, in line with the opinion of Boland, it seemed safe to conclude that MORA was “primarily set up on behalf of Islam.”
Many other observers saw that from the beginning MORA’s role for the Muslim community represented, to a certain degree, the continuity of embedded patron–client relations. This relationship was based on two intertwined factors: the religious and the cultural. First, the “religious” factor was dominant, particularly due to the Islamic principle that recognizes no clear dichotomy between matters of religion and affairs of state (din wa dawlah). MORA services over Muslim affairs in Indonesia obeyed this principle denoting how the state was not separated from religion.
Second, this patron–client relation was grounded in the model of “political culture” found in Indonesian society in particular and in Southeast Asia in general which aimed at maintaining harmony and unity, as was once examined by Lucian Pye.8 In this model, according to Pye, the state or its bureaucratic machinery dispensed patronage to society and acted as the holder of commands, rewards and punishments. This was manifested in the role of MORA as this institution has acted as a patron, bestowing generous support, both material and technical, to the Muslim population. In sum, MORA’s role was chiefly directed at catering to the needs of the Muslim community, and this in many respects continues to be the case until today.9
MORA’s contribution to the Muslim cause was considerable after the appointment of Muhammad Rasjidi as its first Minister in 1946. Rasjidi was a PhD graduate from the Sorbonne University, Paris, and one of the founders of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University, Montreal. Under his leadership a range of Islamic affairs were assumed under the administration of MORA when it became a central bureaucratic office, based on a Government Decree of March 1946.
Among Rasjidi’s priorities was to take control of administration related to Islam which had previously been carried out by different ministerial offices: from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MORA took over the administration of Islamic marriage, the Islamic courts, mosques and the pilgrimage; from the Ministry of Justice it took on the Islamic High Court
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and from the Ministry of Education it oversaw the teaching of religious subjects in public schools.10 This was a model of management inherited from the colonial government in managing religion. Furthermore, Rasjidi also issued a Ministerial Statement (Maklumat Menteri) in April 1946 to assume authority previously in the hands of local governing officers (Karesidenan) and to put it in the hands of the new heads of regional ministry offices (Jawatan Agama Daerah or Kantor Wilayah Agama) particularly in the selecting and appointing of Muslim judges (penghulu) to conduct ceremonies like marriages and divorces.11
MORA also began to enlarge its authority by enacting the Law No. 22/1946 on Islamic marriage. It was under Fathurrahman Kafrawi, the first Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, a traditionalist Muslim group) Minister, that MORA enacted the first Islamic law issued after Indonesian Independence. The law required Muslims to register their marriages, divorces and reconciliations under a single administrative system. Subsequent to this Law, Kafrawi signed the first Joint Ministerial Regulation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs to employ the kaums (religious leaders in the marriage ceremony) as state officers with regular incomes from government expenditure.12
In education, MORA’s role was also visible not only in supervising the teaching of religious subjects in the public schools (as one of the policies in a Joint Regulation between MORA with the Ministry of Education), but also in overseeing religious education for public schools. MORA issued a regulation requiring the schools to give students (in fourth grade and above) two hours per week for religious subject as stated in the 1951 Government Decree.13 From this time, by law, religious subjects (pelajaran agama) were compulsory for all students in the state schooling system. And heeding a suggestion from Ki Hajar Dewantara, who served as Minister of Education at the time, Kafrawi issued a policy requiring all Islamic schools (the madrasahs) to teach “modern” and secular sciences.
The roles carried out by MORA in religious affairs expanded rapidly after the enactment of the 1950 Constitution. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this constitution outlined extensive roles for the state in religious affairs and the tasks of MORA in this period were no less than a practical elaboration of that constitutional legacy. As far as Islamic affairs were concerned, the long list of MORA’s roles in Islam became more visible, ranging from maintaining Islamic institutions like marriage and pilgrimage, supervising religious schools and providing advice to the government on religion to safeguarding the state ideology based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.
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Regardless of its lack of institutional capacity to implement those policies in practice, MORA’s involvement in the Muslim community affairs grew more evident. This was particularly so with the appointment of Muhammad Ilyas in 1958.14 Among 34 tasks carried out by MORA, 22 were concerned with maintaining and facilitating Muslim institution building. MORA dealt, for example, not only with Islamic educational institutions but also with the practical administration of mosque assets and cash-flows. It regulated the collection of formal almsgiving (zakat) and other religious charities. It also acted as mediator in disputes between internal religious groups (most likely between the traditionalists and modernists). It also managed the large pilgrimage (hajj) operation. At the same time MORA also served as the state’s mufti, providing fatwas (religious opinions) to the government as well as giving general religious advice (nasehat or tausiyah) to any institution that required it.15
Perhaps the above roles led to severe criticism of the existence of MORA, particularly in the early 1960s. MORA’s expanding roles polarized attitudes among religious groups in Indonesia. In the view of its detractors the existence of the Ministry was a means “to make the care of Islamic religious institutions the essential duty of the state,”16 or to promote Islam as the state’s sole religion.17 Van der Kroef once pointed out as well that “it is clear that many [people] view the state and the Ummat Islam as one,”18 due to the abundant concessions given to the Muslim community above the other religious groupings. Moreover, criticism also arose toward MORA due to the lack of capacity in managing its roles on religious affairs and the cases of corruption by the MORA elites.
In contrast to these opinions, many Muslim activists defended MORA, arguing the importance of the ministry to serve as “a middle way between the theory of the separation of religion from the state and the theory of the unity of religion and the state.”19 Yet others argued that the ministry also gave appropriate attention to other religious groups, pointing to the establishment of two different desks for Protestant and Catholic affairs within the ministry. According to them, if MORA concentrated on Muslims in the first place, this was due to the fact that they were the vast majority. Agus Salim, for example, stated that:
As a nation with more than ninety percent of its people born and living under Islamic customs for many generations, the government’s policies should give maximum attention and support to any effort to advance
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Islamic teaching, to endorse and to maintain the progress and development of Islam, with all its attributes and fates, for the sake of righteousness and the betterment of the nation and the state.20
However, criticism of MORA continued, and as Subagya was to point out, the political consequence of the establishment of this state institution was segregation in society between the majority and the minorities.21 Bonar Sidjabat later described the Ministry in the following terms:
Closer examination shows that the contradiction is in the application of Divine Omnipotence (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa). As the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs is an attempt to apply this principle of Divine Omnipotence, a valid question may be raised, namely, whether the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs basically is not a deviation from the general concept of the Deity as contained in the Constitution of the Indonesian Republic… Any administrative organ which gives room in the society for the prevailing influence of one single social group will ultimately be a tool that helps foster social pressure upon other groups in the society. Therefore, if the government itself helps to create an atmosphere of this kind through a government scheme, this way of working…will eventually be a definite scheme to contradict the religious tolerance that government wants to preserve as the main pillar of the State… These facts lead us to an observation that the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs conditions the majority of the people in Indonesia to a way of life in which Islam is considered to be the religion of the State, even if it is not specifically so mentioned in the Constitution.22
It would be understandable if some observers concluded that in this sense MORA became a large bureaucratic machine for Islamizing the state and at the same time for drawing Islamic affairs into the state budgets. Lev, for one, has argued that the role of MORA in this period was
to consolidate the entire administration of Islamic affairs into a single national authority controlled by Islamic groups… [that] gained a critical foothold pending the further Islamization of Indonesia.23
As mentioned elsewhere, many have seen that this role is still apparent today.
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opposing The heTeRodoxies
Apart from its services to the Muslim community, MORA also steadily involved itself in managing religious life in Indonesia and functioned as the state institution to implement the articles on religion in the 1950 Constitution. Such a role became entrenched following the appointment of Wahid Hasjim as the Minister in the early 1950s.24 Ever since there have been two chief tasks carried out by MORA (regardless of who was appointed as the Minister during the instalment of the parliamentary model in Indonesia).
The first task was as the institutional watchdog for “the realization of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” in public life; and the second was its responsibility for “watching over individual freedom, giving guidance and support” so as to “promote healthy religious movements.”25 MORA’s attention to these tasks was inseparable from the political and socio- religious circumstances of the early 1950s. Many Islamic activists noted the growing political influence of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesia Communist Party) and the steady development of Javanese religious movements (aliran kebatinan) in society.
The rise of communism in Indonesia was one of the main concerns of Muslim activists including those who held positions in MORA. Tension between Muslim and communist groups led to bloodshed in September 1948 when radical communist activists mounted an abortive armed movement in Madiun East Java. Following this violence, Islamic parties like Masyumi denounced communism, not only out of political rivalry but also for the religious reason that communism was atheistic and hostile to religion. At the grassroots level, the religio-political campaign against communism gained momentum with the establishment of the FKD (Front Ketuhanan dan Demokrasi or the Front of God and Democracy) in 1951. This Front, which in the following year became known as the Front Anti Komunis (the Anti-Communism Front) aimed at countering the communists’ Front Demokrasi Rakyat (People’s Democratic Front).26
In the heat of this religio-political rivalry it was inevitable that MORA saw the ideology of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa as a counter to communism, and regarded this as part of its role as the custodian of Islamic values and the guardian of state ideology. The campaign to use Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in this respect evoked a set of standards for “political correctness” to determine whether or not the ideology of any organization or party was in line with this First Principle of the Pancasila and the constitution. One
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might expect that, with these standards, communism was automatically excluded from being “legitimate” as its principles denied or neglected the importance of God and religion, and therefore could be seen as deviant from the first principle of the state itself.
However, it should be noted here that there were no explicit policies issued by MORA with regard to communism in this period. One way to explain this is that it was due to communism’s strong political influence in parliament. One might even speculate that the insertion of the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa had been done as an early warning signal by the Muslims themselves, so that they would be fully aware of the future dangers posed by the political Left.
While there are few accounts of MORA’s policies vis-à-vis communism, a number were issued to respond to the unprecedented growth of aliran kebatinan (Javanese beliefs) which later became better known as aliran kepercayaan. It has been reported that the number of these groups rose to approximately 360 in Java in 1953, whereas there had been only 29 groups in 1952.27 This may explain why successive Ministers (like Faqih Usman, Masjkur and Mohammad Ilyas) tightened oversight of these “quasi-religious” sects, making this one of MORA’s priorities. Following the expansion of aliran kebatinan, a task “to make contact with [or to monitor] movements or religious groups and local religious sects which are not the part of Islam and Christianity” entered the list of MORA’s responsibilities.28 MORA’s policies on this issue aimed at bringing the members of such into adopting established religious affiliations in society.
For this reason, therefore, the Minister established a “new desk” responsible in particular for the supervision of such beliefs.29 This working desk was later known as the PAKEM (Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat/Supervisory Body of Local Beliefs in Society).30 Although in effect this desk has functioned to provide an internal database for MORA rather than acted as a supervisory body to oversee those local movements, the establishment of PAKEM became a milestone for further state scrutiny of religious beliefs in Indonesia. This desk later became an autonomous unit in 1954, based on Government Decree No. 167/Promosi/1954 at the time when Ali Sastroamidjojo served as Prime Minister.
Following the elevation of the PAKEM to be an autonomous unit under the auspices of two ministerial offices (the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General) a year later, the BKKI (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia/Indonesian Kebatinan Congress Body) was founded at the First National Congress held on 19 and 20 December 1955 in Semarang,
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Central Java.31 Chaired by a prominent politician and a former BPUPK member, Mr. Wongsonegoro, the BKKI became the sole institution through which kebatinan activists might conduct negotiations with the government as well as with political parties.
It was not coincidental that the establishment of the BKKI was linked to the heightened political temperature following the first Indonesian general parliamentary election in September 1955. This general election made the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI/Indonesian Nationalist Party) first of the big four leading political parties, with 57 parliamentary seats (or 22.2% of the total vote). This was followed by Masjumi (57 seats and 20.9% of the total vote), NU (45 seats and 18.4% of the total vote) and the PKI (38 seats and 16.4% of the total vote) respectively.32 While there are admittedly no convincing sources available so far, it is highly likely that one of the key factors of the PNI victory, particularly in Central Java, was the mobilization of kebatinan followers into voting PNI instead of for parties with an Islamic background.
For many Muslim activists in the political parties and MORA, aliran kebatinan became such “threat” that the BKKI soon articulated their “religious” position, declaring that it was from kebatinan teaching that the First Principle of Pancasila, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, originated. In its second convention in 1956 the BKKI stated that kebatinan was “the source of the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa to achieve good character for the perfection of life.”33 Having defined kebatinan as the source of the First Principle of the Pancasila, in its Third Congress in 1957 the BKKI formally requested President Sukarno to recognize the position of kebatinan as having equal status side by side with the other established religions. The BKKI also asked the President to appoint kebatinan representatives in the Dewan Nasional (National Council).
To these activists, state recognition of their existence was justified, since the 1945 Constitution itself included the provision to protect and preserve agama/kepercayaan. In their view the insertion of these two words (separated by a slash mark “/”) would indicate that there were two different domains of religiosity acceptable—agama as the established religions and kepercayaan as local beliefs—within the Indonesian constitution.
With this bold statement of their position by the BKKI, it was understandable if Muslim activists unsurprisingly became more attentive to and curious about new developments in aliran kebatinan. While the role of PAKEM under two other ministerial offices in this period was limited
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to preventing excesses threatening social order and the abuse of power by some of its charismatic leaders,34 in fact the role played by MORA in monitoring the aliran kebatinan continued.
MORA’s concern to oversee this religious movement was understandable. For MORA, monitoring aliran kebatinan was not undertaken simply for the sake of social order. More importantly, it was for maintaining Islamic norms intact in society. The new augmented tasks in MORA became the more apparent, scrutinizing the aliran kebatinan and overseeing any organization or religious group to ensure they would be obedient to the state and subservient to the law, including the “un-written laws” (hukum tak tertulis). MORA maintained a watch over speeches or publications of kebatinan activists which tended to “denigrate” the teachings of established religions (Islam in particular), such as questioning the nature of God and his relationship with humanity as in cases that occurred in Central Java. By the same token, MORA also paid extra attention to kebatinan adherents who became communist cells.35 This is what lay beneath the directives of MORA in 1958 in monitoring developments in religious affairs and their further “initiatives” [possibly “tough” decisions] when any such matters could be seen to harm the common good, harmony and security.36
MORA’s growing attention to aliran kebatinan was also a response to the BKKI itself as the BKKI hardened its stance on kebatinan and agama, stating that there were no significant differences between the two. Due to this, a new recommendation from the BKKI’s Fourth Congress in 1960 was issued demanding that kebatinan activists lobbied the government to acknowledge kebatinan as a fully-fledged official religion in Indonesia.
From the above development of aliran kebatinan, one may argue that this religious local belief was a “challenging task” for MORA. Even the controversy over aliran kebatinan or aliran kepercayaan was to continue, following the consolidation of the New Order regime in the mid-1970s. The discussion of this issue returns in the following chapter when examining the regime’s regulation of aliran kepercayaan.
Apart from kebatinan affairs as previously discussed, MORA also paved the foundations for regulating religion in Indonesia, which later became the character of the state–religion relationship. Under the policy of the realization of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, MORA has promoted the protection of freedom of religion and expression, but with conditions. Religious freedom is preserved under circumstances such as “awareness” and “thoughtfulness” (kesadaran dan penuh tanggung jawab). This concept
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of “religious freedom with awareness and thoughtfulness” (kebebasan beragama dengan kesadaran dan penuh tanggung jawab) later proved to be an effective tool under the New Order to mute critics who accused the regime of violating religious freedom. Another significant development of MORA since 1960 has been its judiciary role in scrutinizing religious publications in Indonesia and at the same time monitoring incoming foreign publications on religion.37
Beside these above tasks, MORA’s various roles in maintaining other general matters of religion also deserve attention. It has been involved in supporting and supervising the establishment and maintenance of houses of worship. It has provided religious chaplaincy for police or army officers and for criminals. MORA has also served as an advisory body for the government in the organization of state ceremonies (upacara kenegaraan) as well as deciding on religious holidays and monitoring the process of the swearing in (pengambilan sumpah) of newly appointed state officers.38
To sum up, it is obvious that MORA played a leading role not only in steering the direction of state policies to be in favour of the Muslim community but also in disseminating a hegemonic interpretation of the state principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, based on Muslim norms and values. The case to point to is the restriction and control of the development of aliran kebatinan as discussed above. In turn MORA also paved the foundation for the state to initiate a project of Indonesian identity based on religion. It helped transform the meaning of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa not only into an Islamic epithet but also into a new political one serving as part of a “national identity” of Indonesian society.
With this new emphasis on the idiom, it did not mean, however, that Muslim activists played reduced roles as far as religion was concerned, in fact they still continued to influence state policies. This influence was embodied in the enactment of the Presidential Stipulation on Religious Vilification or Religious Blasphemy in the mid-1960s. This new policy was in essence seeing the state as not only “preserving” the national identity but also “protecting” Islam. The policy, discussed in some length in the following chapter, was not only one of the most important regulations issued by the Guided Democracy regime of President Sukarno but has had a far-reaching impact on the practices of state management of religious affairs, particularly in Suharto’s New Order regime.
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noTes
1. The Decree for establishment of this Ministry was simple and short, stating that “President of Republic of Indonesian in accordance with suggestion from the Prime Minister and the Working Group of the KNIP has decided to establish the Ministry of Religious Affairs.”
2. See for examples this opinion in B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); and Deliar Noer, Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, 1978), 11–13, 33.
3. As Yamin said, “[i]t would not be sufficient to establish a Supreme Court for Islam. We should establish an organ for the Muslim interests, due to the demand from society. Islamic religious affairs such as its social institutions, philanthropy, mosques and missions should be managed by a special min-istry which we named the Ministry of Religious Affairs.” See Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Jakarta: Prapantja, 1960), I: 457–458, 462.
4. For more information on the issue see M. Fuad Nasar, Transformasi dari Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken ke Kementerian dan Departemen Agama: Documenta Historica (Jakarta: UI Press, 2007).
5. Boland, The Struggles, 106–108. 6. See Kementerian Penerangan RI, “Partai Masjumi,” in Kepartaian di
Indonesia (Jakarta: Kementrian Penerangan RI, 1950), 9–10 as referred by Samsuri, Politik Islam Anti Komunis: Pergumulan Masyumi dan PKI di Arena Demokrasi Liberal (Yogyakarta: Safiria Insania Press, 2004), 3–32.
7. Kementerian Agama RI, Kementerian Agama 10 Tahun 3 Djanuari 1946–3 Djanuari 1956 (Jakarta: Kementerian Agama, 1956), 6.
8. See Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
9. For current discussion on MORA and Islam, see Moch Nur Ichwan, “Official Reform of Islam: State, Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia 1966–2004,” PhD Dissertation Universiteit van Tilburg 2006.
10. Noer, Administration of Islam, 8–11. 11. Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam (eds.), Menteri-Menteri Agama RI:
Biografi Sosial-Politik (Jakarta: INIS, PPIM, Litbang Depag, 1998), 8–10; and Departemen Agama RI, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama R.I. 3 Januari 1946 – 3 Januari 1987: Eksistensi dan Derap Langkahnya (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1987), 7–8.
12. Azra and Umam, Menteri-Menteri Agama RI, 42–51.
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13. It should be noted however that under Kafrawi, MORA also issued a policy to include new sections for the Protestant and Catholic groups in the Ministerial office, based on Ministerial Decree No. 2/1185.K.J./1946 on 20 November 1946. It was since the Kafrawi era that the management of Indonesian Christian affairs was put under the auspices of separate bureaus: the section for Protestantism and the section for Catholicism. Later, in 1963 under Saifuddin Zuhri, both then became separate Directorates and this continues up to the present day.
14. Departemen Agama RI, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama, 20–40. See also Sismono, Sejarah dan Amal Bakti Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia (Bandung: Penerbit Bina Siswa, 1991).
15. Later it would also be apparent that when Saifuddin Zuhri became the Minister in 1962 there were even more tasks undertaken by MORA. During his period, among 46 tasks of the ministry, more than half were in essence in the service of the Muslim community. See Departemen Agama RI, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama, 41–58.
16. Bonar Sidjabat, “Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith: A Study Concerning the Concept of Divine Omnipotence in the Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and Christianity,” PhD. Dissertation Princeton Theological Seminary 1962. In the writing of this book, it is used the publication under the same title, Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith: A Study Concerning the Concept of Divine Omnipotence in the Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and Christianity (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1965), 50.
17. von Wendelin Wawer, Muslime und Christien in der Republik Indonesia (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1974), 144–146; and Rahmat Subagya, Pantja Sila Dasar Negara Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Basis, 1955), 60.
18. Justus M. Van der Kroef, “Pantjasila: the National Ideology of the New Indonesia,” Philosophy East and West 4, 3 (1954): 240.
19. See Wahid Hasjim, “Sekitar Pembentukan Kementerian Agama RIS,” Mimbar Agama 1, 1 (1950): 5 as quoted by R.E. Elson, “Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945,” Indonesia 88 (October 2009): 129.
20. See Agus Salim, “Kementrian Agama dalam Republik Indonesia,” in Departemen Agama RI, Almanak Departemen Agama (Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 1951), 127.
21. Subagya, Pantja Sila Dasar Negara, 60. 22. Sidjabat, Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith, 60. 23. Daniel S. Lew, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of
Legal Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 44 and 47. 24. Azra and Umam, Menteri-Menteri Agama RI, 81–114; and see also analy-
sis of C.A.O van Nieuwenhuijze in his Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague and Bandung, EJ Brill, 1958), 226–243; and Departemen Agama RI, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama, 41–58.
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25. “Government Regulation No. 8/1950 on the Amended Tasks of Ministry of Religious Affairs,” and “Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 5/1951.”
26. Samsuri, Politik Islam Anti Komunis: Pergumulan Masyumi dan PKI di Arena Demokrasi Liberal (Yogyakarta: Safiria Insania Press, 2004), 3–32. This forum was led by one of the most notable Masyumi activists, Muhammad Isa Anshary. Despite its autonomous nature, this militant organization was clearly attached to Masyumi political activism.
27. See for example in Semuel Agustinus Patty, “Aliran Kepercayaan: A Socio-Religious Movement in Indonesia,” PhD Dissertation Washington State University 1986, 69.
28. “Government Regulation No. 20 Year 1952,” and “Regulation of Ministry of Religious Affairs No. 9 Year 1952 on the Tasks of Ministry of Religious Affairs.”
29. “Regulation of Ministry of Religious Affairs No. 10 Year 1952 on the New Tasks and New Structure of Ministry of Religious Affairs.”
30. This desk, established on the basis of “Regulation of Ministry of Religious Affairs No. 10 Year 1952,” was under the Section of Religious Information (Jawatan Penerangan Agama) and subsection of Supervision for Religion and Culture (Penyuluhan Masyarakat Agama dan Kebudayaan). See Departemen Agama, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama, 49–50.
31. See also J.A. Niels Mulder, “Aliran Kebatinan as an Expression of the Javanese Worldview,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1, 1 (1970): 105–114.
32. See for example M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 1300 to the Present (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1981), 238.
33. As stated in Indonesian that kebatinan adalah sumber azas dari Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa untuk mencapai budi luhur guna kesempurnaan hidup. See Rahmat Subagya, Kepercayaan, Kebatinan, Kerochanian Kejiwaan dan Agama (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Kanisius, 1976), 76 as also quoted by Patty, “Aliran Kepercayaan,” 69–70. See also Soetoko Djojosoebroto, Pantja-Sila dalam Pendidikan dan Pengadjaran (Djakarta: Harapan Masa, 1953), 19–23; and Niels Mulder, Mysticism and Everyday Life in Contemporary Java: Cultural Persistence and Change (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978), 4–9.
34. In a later period, following the consolidation of the New Order regime under Suharto, this new inter-departmental body under the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General enjoyed an extended authority, not only supervising and monitoring, but also controlling, limiting and prohibiting any groups in spreading their message into society if they were suspected of threatening order or insulting particular teachings of the established religions. The PAKEM then played the intrusive role of deciding whether or not any religious group or doctrine could be considered deviant from the mainstream religious traditions.
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35. Mulder, “Aliran Kebatinan,” 108. 36. “Regulation of Ministry of Religious Affairs No. 2 Year 1958 regarding the
Tasks of Ministry of Religious Affairs.” 37. Later in 1963, this task was separately formalized through the issuance of
“the President Stipulation No. 4/1963 on the Scrutiny to Printed Matters (Pengamanan Barang Cetakan).”
38. Departemen Agama, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama, 52–55.
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CHAPTER 9
Regulating Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in Public Life
As shown in the previous chapter, due to its vagueness, the phrase Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa lacked the conceptual basis to serve as a guideline for managing religious affairs in Indonesia, and in turn the contest over the meaning of the idiom did not abate in the formative period of the Indonesian state. However, as mentioned earlier, it is clear that in the beginning this idiom was understood as containing the wholly Islamic- derived proposition of tawhid, Islamic monotheism. This meaning was then transformed, and it became one of the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ (MORA) immediate tasks to decide whether or not a particular religious group could be included under its definition of an “acceptable and healthy religious movement.”
Within this context, MORA in this period began to produce definitions and criteria as to whether or not any particular doctrines were acceptable and to be considered as religious, and whether or not any group ought to be listed as a religious community. Following this development, this Ministry office was also supportive in endorsing and preserving religious orthodoxy by playing a role in the issuance of a controversial Presidential Stipulation. This stipulation, or the Vilification Act, was later known as the Indonesian Blasphemy Law. A closer look at this Act would show that it served the interests of both the state and the regime. While for the regime,
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this Act was aimed at protecting political and social order and at the same time also at preserving the national project of nation character-building and self-identity, for the Muslims in this Ministry, it would help in protecting their religion from any act of defamation and at the same time limiting the growth of kebatinan (and later communism).
Defining Religion anD Religious gRoup
As far as formal definition of religion was concerned, it is worth mentioning from the beginning that there was, however, no written document containing a clear definition of religion put out by MORA. Such a “definition” remained implicit in MORA’s role for “the realization of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” in public life and for “watching over individual freedom and giving guidance and support” so as “to promote healthy religious movements,” as already discussed in the previous chapter.
And this “implicit definition” has constituted the way in which MORA has perceived “acceptable” religious groups in Indonesia worthy of its protection and services. The leaders and organizations of groups which did not meet this definition became subject to monitoring and supervision by any means necessary to achieve a healthy and vigorous religious life as mentioned in MORA’s tasks.1
Implicit as well in the policy of mainstreaming Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was a set of standards to measure the model of an “acceptable” God, and this model was later developed in the writings of many contemporary Indonesian Muslims.2 These standards in turn were used against any idea of God which contradicted the “pure” and “strict” monotheism of Islamic teaching.
Those who are familiar with religious studies in Indonesia will find that in many Indonesian Muslim writings there are different categories of religion or agama. Agama is accordingly divided into two categories: agama samawi (the revealed religion comprised of the Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and agama ardhi or agama budaya (the non-revealed religions denoting all religious tradition outside the Abrahamic).3 Following this different categorization of religion, Muslims in Indonesia also made use of different words to denote God (Tuhan). Tuhan is usually used in agama wahyu (revealed religion) while Dewa or “the Deity” is for agama budaya (the non-revealed). Tuhan is referred to as the “Sacred” and Dewa is to larger extent the “Profane,” or at least serving as an agent of the “Sacred.”
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Within this context, unsurprisingly, there have been far reaching effects in perceiving and treating other established religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism and communal tribal belief systems, whose conceptions were the divine triad, impersonality and polytheism-animism respectively. When Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa became “compulsory” to adopt into all religious traditions, the concept became more subtle, particularly in those religions whose conception was not strictly monotheistic.
Indonesian Hindus, for example, used the phrase Sang Hyang Widi to refer to their monotheistic tendency and sacredness as part of their engagement with Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. At the same time, they also still displayed a polytheistic tendency, referring to Dewas or the Deities: Brahma, Visnu and Shiva. These Deities were defined as different attributive functions of the abstract Sang Hyang Widi. Indonesian Buddhists also developed a concept of God as the prerequisite for state acceptance of their existence, whereas in general Buddhism makes no strong attachment between actions and the world to a God. For them, Sang Adhi Buddha (the Original and Eternal Buddha) is the sacred Tuhan and this is in accord with the concept of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.
The above complexities of trying to show that a concept of God was in accord with the state-sanctioned principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is only one example of how this principle had a far reaching impact on the way citizens perceived their own God. It even worsened when the state begin to define what constituted religion.
This can be seen in the case of Balinese Hinduism. As noted by van der Kroef, to secure state acknowledgement, in 1952 MORA required of the Hindus that “the religion in question would have to enjoy recognized standing abroad and would have to constitute a unit.” Moreover, it should possess a “designated Holy Book and a founder [the Prophet] of their religion,” as both are elements in the definition of religion in Islam.4
Thus, broadly speaking, the way MORA viewed religious groups was based on the perception that religion should have at least the three essential elements of God, Prophet and the Scriptures, and this outlook unsurprisingly was mostly taken from Islamic scholarship. In the absence of any one of these, a belief failed to be recognized as a religion. In the case of Balinese Hinduism, it was only in 1963 under Saifuddin Zuhri that the administration of MORA granted a separate bureau called Biro Urusan Hindu Bali (Bureau of Balinese Hindu Affairs) after Balinese Hindus provided such a “theological adjustment” that fitted with the definition imposed by MORA.
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Perundang-undangan Kehidupan Beragama (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI Proyek Pembinaan Lembaga Keagamaan, 1998), 5–6.
10. See Karel Steenbrink in Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam (Amsterdam: Rodopy B.V., 1993), 118–119.
11. See for example Howard M. Federspiel in Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), 107–108.
12. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, 108. 13. Muhammad Natsir, “Islam, Katholiek, Pemerintah,” Pembela Islam 33
(1931): 2–7, and republished in his book, Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia (Bandung: CV Bulan Sabit & CV Peladjar, 1969), 37–43.
14. Mujiburahman, “State Policies of Religious Diversity in Indonesia,” Al-Jami’ah 46, 1 (2008): 105; and Weinata Sairin, Himpunan Peraturan di Bidang Keagamaan (Jakarta: BPK, 1994), 265.
15. It should be noted that the association of this Act with the anti- communist movement only occurred after 1969, following the political shift to the New Order in Indonesia.
16. See more information in “The Elucidation,” in Departemen Agama RI, Peraturan Perundang-undangan, 8–9.
17. See “The Elucidation,” in Departemen Agama RI, Peraturan Perundang-undangan, 9.
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CHAPTER 10
Suharto New Order’s Regime, Development Programme and Religion
As seen in the previous chapter of the book, the roles of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), provoked criticism as it mainly directed state policies on religion in the interests of the Muslim community above all others as well as addressing iteslf to regulate religious activities based on Islamic precepts and values rather than those of other major faith communities in Indonesia.
This chapter will observe that while the roles of this Ministry as an instrument of the New Order’s political and social agenda evolved from the late 1960s, in fact the new regime employed a strategy to steer the direction of policing religious affairs by putting them strictly under its own control in line with the regime’s socio-economic agenda. In turn, as discussed later in depth in the following chapter, the regime was able to transform MORA from being a so-called political representative of Islam within the state to a compliant institution allowed the Ministry to be used to promote the New Order’s developmentalism policies. Following this development, the regime was able to dictate the new role of MORA as one of disseminating religious piety within society but without the political activism of the past.
As the background for further analysis on religious policies, this chapter examines in brief the New Order’s general policies on religious affairs. This approach is useful in order to understand gradual shifts in policies and directions, and to produce an overall picture of its social and
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political contexts. For this reason, this chapter will highlight, first, how the regime placed religious affairs in the blueprint of its overall development programme. It will be clear that while the regime recognized the important place of religion in national development and the construction of an Indonesian identity, religious activities were also seen as a possible source of social unrest.
Consequently, as discussed later, control of religious activities and regulation of religious affairs in accordance with strict regime standards were justified in the name of restoring or maintaining stability and order. As a result, the regime issued a number of policies to maintain harmony between religious groups and to preserve orthodoxy within particular religious denominations as well as to prohibit the activities of particular religious groups or promotion of doctrines.
The Regime, DevelopmenT anD Religion
The New Order regime emerged after a failed coup d’état by leftist elements of the Indonesian military and sections of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia/the Indonesian Communist Party) on 1 October 1965. Following this coup, anti-communist sentiment, already present since the early 1960s, developed in intensity and became the chief element in the formation of a political alliance which unified military factions and many elements of civil society (religious organizations, political activists and student circles) against the PKI.1
The alliance ran a brutal anti-PKI campaign and proved successful in vilifying communism. The alliance was also behind the creation of an intense public distrust of President Sukarno and his regime. Public demonstrations demanded that he dissolve the PKI, purge his cabinet of communist and leftist elements and improve economic life, by for example, reducing food prices. This agitation was later transformed into a new political movement demanding Sukarno’s resignation. Eventually the PKI and communist ideology were banned from Indonesia and Sukarno was forced to step down.
Suharto was installed as Indonesia’s acting president in 1967 and assumed the presidency in 1968, eventually leading the New Order regime for the next 30 years. His main policies were to overcome Indonesia’s economic crisis and restore social order. In dealing with these, and with the help of a team of university-trained economists and technocrats, he pursued a pragmatic market-oriented approach aimed at reducing
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rampant inflation, cutting debt and attracting international loans and investment.2 The beneficial impact of these measures was soon apparent as capital flows, per capita income and calorie intake, and industrial and agricultural production began to rise steadily.
While the success of the regime’s economic policies was widely acknowledged and applauded, Suharto’s approach to socio-political issues was more controversial. American Indonesianist John MacDougall was one of many scholars who wrote about the regime’s linking of economic development and depoliticization. He stated that New Order policy
functions as a goal for [domestic] political reform, for it is expected not only to help unify and stabilize a divided and uncertain polity but also to free the masses from domination by religious-political provocateurs by relieving the economic misery that supports their appeals.3 [emphasis added]
He also observed that modernization in this period mainly connoted three key principles: a preference for modern values as opposed to traditional values; heavy state direction in the promotion of public interests; and open state patronage in guiding Indonesian society.4
This goal seemed noble but unlikely to be attained in practice as the regime sought to achieve modernization by maximizing its control over society, dominating the delivery of services and standardizing regulations and ideology across Indonesia. In effect, the New Order regime became highly authoritarian in nature with the military, and especially the Army, predominant over their civilian allies.5
The Muslims and Modernization
The New Order’s modernization programme, whose main element in the beginning was economic progress, at the end stressed stringent control over civil society and political activities. This was reflected in the Decree of the MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara/the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly) No. XXII/MPRS/1966 that limited the scope of Islamic political aspirations and activism.6 In 1967, the regime rejected the rehabilitation of the Muslim political party, the Masyumi, and forbade the return to politics of prominent Muslim activists who had been jailed by Sukarno. It justified its ban on these politicians on the grounds that they had been involved in regional rebellions, but clearly the New Order saw Masyumi and other Islamic political organizations as a potential
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threat to its own pre-eminence. The regime also flatly rejected the Muslim parties’ demand for the re-insertion of the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution on the grounds that this would be destabilizing. A more likely reason is that it wanted to prevent contentious debates on the position of Islam within the Indonesian legal system. Many scholars have observed that the New Order’s restrictive policies led to strained relations between the regime and Muslim groups.7
Indeed the regime came to consider any Islamic political activism as a threat to their programme of modernization. In the late 1960s and early 1970s persuading Muslims to accept the plan became one of the regime’s toughest challenges. There were cogent reasons why Muslims were reluctant to support it. The first, as described earlier, were political issues due to the fraught relationship between them. A sense of disappointment among the Muslims was exacerbated by the regime’s preference to work with non-Muslims, providing privileges and allowing them to hold important positions in the government and the armed forces.
The second reason was a fear of the nature of the ideology behind the modernization programme. Many Muslims at that time strongly believed that modernization was aimed at transforming the Indonesian way of life in accordance with Western values and lifestyles.
Hasan, for instance, was right in pointing out that many activists saw modernization as a threat to their religious identity.8 In their minds, the plan was identical with westernization and secularization, as also argued by Omar Hashem and Saadoeddin Djambek.9 Hamka, a prominent public intellectual, said that it was “camouflage for a big plan aimed at removing Islamic influences from our heart so that we shall willingly become the tail- end of nations which are considered advanced.”10 Given the fact that many non-Muslims held strategic positions in the government, some Muslim activists also saw a relationship between modernization and religious missionaries as part of a strategy to convert Indonesians to Christianity. This claim appeared, for example, in the works of Mohammad Rasjidi, among other scholars.11
Such religious sentiments to preserve an Indonesian Islamic identity deeply motivated activists to oppose the modernization programme in this very phase. Mutual hostility and mistrust between them and the regime grew. In the view of some leaders, the regime was showing itself “hostile” to Islam and the Muslim community, and was moving further towards “secularizing” Indonesia. For its part, the regime saw the Muslim activists as “fanatics,” always eager to establish an Islamic state and waiting for any political moment to realize their goal.
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It is worth noting that in this earliest phase of the modernization programme, the highest priority was given to economic recovery and political stability. There was no clear blueprint on how the regime should deal with religious affairs in the country. The regime itself gave close attention to religious based-political parties but lacked a philosophical position on how to include religious aspects into the overall modernization blueprint. Only after concerted resistance from Muslim leaders did the regime turn to the more intellectual and doctrinal aspects of making religiosity a part of the national modernization plan. Religion served two “functions” for the regime at this point. The first was to aid capital mobilization and the second was to harness religious groups’ anti-communist sentiment for the purpose of eradicating all traces of the PKI.
An example of how the regime sought to use religion for economic purposes was the initiative to fund development projects by regulating zakat (prescribed alms-giving).12 On 26 October 1968 Suharto announced a plan to control the collection and distribution of the religious wealth tax. Several days after the speech he issued Presidential Decree No. 07/PRIN/10/1968 on zakat and a Circular Letter to government offices requiring them to establish mechanisms to collect the zakat in their workplaces. This policy was the first regulation on religious affairs issued by the New Order regime. However, it was not successful due to resistance from within the Muslim community. It is easy to conclude that the political hostility between Muslim activists and the regime was one of the contributing factors for this. Furthermore, Muslims were reluctant to support the policy for religious reasons and this, according to Hasan, was due mainly to a “lack of confidence in the ability of the government to adhere faithfully to religious requirements regarding the utilization of the zakat collected.”13
Another example of how the regime tried to raise capital from the Muslim community was the case of the hajj, or the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The regime decided to cut the subsidies and required those undertaking the hajj to pay the full cost. At the same time, it took over the administration of pilgrimage affairs from private enterprise and placed it under MORA’s management.
It was the beginning of the state’s monopoly over hajj administration which remains in place until today. Many scholars, such as Noer, argued that this monopoly was politically motivated in order to limit the role of ex-Masyumi activists in the Muslim community.14 Yet, it was also clear that the regime earned considerable economic benefit from hajj affairs, not only from budget savings after the subsidy was removed but also from the revenue and patronage opportunities that arose from this practice of monopoly.
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The second function of religion in supporting the modernization programme during the early years of the New Order was political, that is, by tapping into and manipulating anti-PKI sentiment in society in order to combat communism and leftist groups. The regime pushed through MPRS Decree No. XXVI/1966 requiring the government to guide (memberikan bimbingan), administer (pengurusan) and control (pengawasan) all religious activities. It took practical effect with the elevation of Presidential Stipulation No. 1/1965 on the Prevention or Misuse and/or Religious Vilification (Penetapan Presiden No. 1/1965 tentang Pencegahan, Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama) to a higher level as Statute/Law (Undang-undang) No. 5/PnPs/1969.15
While initially this regulation mainly targeted the aliran kebatinan (spiritualist groups), as discussed in an earlier chapter of this book, following the legal repositioning, the new Statute also served as the main instrument to limit the spread of communism. One of the ways of doing this was by using the clause preventing people from not having a religion (supaya orang tidak menganut agama apapun juga) as an explicit measure against communists whose ideology was anti-religious. Consequently, communism was strictly prohibited for the reason that not only was it seen as a political threat, but also its teaching was also contradictory to the Indonesian character (jati diri bangsa), which was one based on religiosity. In turn, the regime employed an anti-communist strategy by re- emphasizing the importance of religion to combat the spread of communism and making this mission the main task and short-term plan of MORA at that time.16 Hence, one of its important strategies to eliminate communism was by recruiting 60,000 new religious teachers under MORA to be posted into the ex-communist regions.17
Following its initial success in curbing communism and in limiting Islamic political activism, the regime intensified its efforts in convincing the Muslim community to support the modernization programme. When some Muslim activists had critically objected to the term “modernization” as seen as part of the so-called westernization and secularization, the regime replaced it with “development” instead. It is argued that one of reasons for the change in New Order terminology was the desire to allay Muslims’ fears that modernization was anti-Islamic. While there was no essential difference between the terms, it can be argued that the strategy to use this different idiom was successful in winning Muslim support.
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From Modernization to Development
Tangible acceptance of the regime’s development programme that would include religion began to reach solid ground as many religious leaders, including the Muslims, gradually showed their support. From that time, more attention to the religious aspects of Indonesian life appeared in the regime’s development concepts and programmes as it expanded not merely economic interests but also to cover all aspects of societal activities, including religion. This may explain why the new trajectory of national development had aspects that would cover economic and societal welfare. This principle, embodied later for example in the REPELITA (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun/Five-Year Development Plan) aimed to achieve complete human advancement (pembangunan manusia seutuh-nya) in both the material and spiritual (lahir dan batin) aspects of human life. Accordingly, development was not just for material progress but also aimed to improve spiritual life.18 As Suharto often said: “it [development] was not just an instrument but also an end in itself.”
Klopfer has rightly concluded that this model of development was the true ideology of the New Order.19 This expanded meaning of development appeared publicly in 1970 under the rubric of “developing religion.” Hence, development did not simply mean material advancement, such as providing physical infrastructure like building houses, schools, hospitals and roads, but also meant using religion to change mental attitudes and values, the way of thinking, working habit, logics, aesthetics and ethics (sikap mental, nilai hidup, cara berpikir, cara kerja, logika, estetika dan etika).
References to this can be found frequently in Suharto’s speeches as he saw religion as guiding development to the right direction, and at the same time serving as a means of control to prevent socio-economic inequalities. He said, for example, that
development and religion are like one breath. Development will bring us to [economic] progress while religion will bring us to happiness. Progress and happiness are the objectives of Indonesian development.20
Suharto made effective use of various religious celebrations like the Idul Fitri (the End of the Fasting Month) or the Nuzulul Quran (the Descent of the Quran) to convey this message. On those occasions he appealed to the Muslim community to support government programmes
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and argued that developing religion would mean developing the Muslim community. He repeatedly stated that Islam and development were inex-tricably connected. In turn he also emphasized that religion and develop-ment should not be placed against each other but should equally support each other. He stated that religion was both the actor or subject (pelaku) and the object (obyek) of development.21 He asserted that religion was not only a driving force for development but also a precursor to advancement (kemajuan), and that without religion a person would lose his or her goal in life and feel emptiness in the noise of material advancement.22
The above prescriptions on the new meaning of development had far- reaching consequences, and justified the government intervening in religious communities in order to deliver services and direct public discourse. This was done in the name of ensuring stability, order and advancement. Consequently it required the regime to pursue and demand standardization and uniformity in religious affairs. As with so much of the New Order period, religion was supposed to conform to specified templates and deviation from these earned disapproval or worse. Given the heterogeneous nature of Indonesia’s religious communities and the fact that there was not any official state religion, the regime developed two important premises on which its policies on religious life were based.
The first premise is that Indonesia is not a theocratic or a secular state, but rather a religious state (Indonesia bukan negara agama dan bukan negara sekular. Indonesia adalah negara beragama). Indonesia does not have a state ideology based on a particular religious conception. It is not a secular state in which the government refrains from interfering with religious affairs. Indonesia is clearly a religious state in the sense that the state concerns itself with religious activities and behaviour.
The second premise was that while the 1945 Constitution guaranteed the right of freedom of religion, religious freedom in Indonesia was not unlimited. It required “responsibility” (kebebasan beragama yang bertanggungjawab) and allowed for the possibility of government action if religious freedom led to conflict that threatened the unity and oneness of the nation (persatuan and kesatuan bangsa).23
Indonesia bukan negara agama dan bukan negara sekular. Indonesia adalah negara beragama) and kebebasan beragama yang bertanggungjawab were the newly invented expressions introduced by the regime in the early 1970s and were frequently reiterated by Suharto and his senior officials. Both idioms became a powerful rationalization for intervention in religious life.
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Within this context, the regime developed religious policies but extended strict control at the same time. Policies issued were measured not only in the growing number of places for worship, for example, or the introduction of compulsory religious subjects in public schools, or the improvement of state and private religious education and institutions, but also by endeavours to standardize religious attitudes and regulate religious communities. While giving support to religious festivals in public, at the same time the regime tightly controlled overseas funding for religious missions and was highly restrictive in allowing missionaries to preach on Indonesian soil. It supported the publication and distribution of kitab suci (holy books) of all denominations but oversaw the contents of religious texts and monitored incoming books from overseas. It claimed to guarantee and promote religious freedom for all citizens but at the same time banned or limited the activities of particular religious groups in public, or fused minor “problematic” religious groups into larger established “orthodox” ones. Within such a framework it was clear that the impact of the government on religious activism was pervasive.
noTes
1. See for example on this formative period of the New Order, Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1978); Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth McVey, Preliminary Analysis of the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971); and Robert Cribb (ed.), The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Paper on Southeast Asia, 1990).
2. Radius Prawiro, Indonesia’s Struggle for Economic Development: Pragmatism in Action (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), 60–61.
3. John James MacDougall, “The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia’s New Order,” Asian Survey 16, 12 (1976): 1171.
4. MacDougall, “The Technocratic Model of Modernization,” 1168. 5. Michael R.J. Vatikotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto (New York:
Routledge, 1994), 70–71. It was also militaristic, as the regime developed a reaching-out structure to govern society which was a replica of that of the military. Bureaucratic agency operated right down the line from the highest to the lowest levels. Within this pervasive militaristic model, the regime introduced vertical patronage in promoting, persuading, controlling and compelling the people’s loyalty and obedience. See Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror (London: Zed
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Press, 1983), 195–196 and Hans Antlöv, Exemplary Centre, Administrative Periphery: Rural Leadership and the New Order in Java (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), 7, 43.
6. See Ali Moertopo, Strategi Politik Nasional (Jakarta: Jajasan Proklamasi and Centre for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 1974), 13–28.
7. See also books and articles dealing with the issue such as Nawaz B. Mody, Indonesia under Soeharto (New York: Apt Books, 1987); and Alan A. Samson, “Army and Islam in Indonesia,” Asian Survey 4, 4 (Winter 1971–1972): 545–547.
8. Mohammed Kamal Hasan, “Contemporary Muslim Religio- Political Thought in Indonesia: The Response to New Order Modernization,” PhD Dissertation Columbia University, 1975, 96. The Muslim response to modernization was not monolithic. Other leaders also saw the importance of development and modernization for the Muslim community as a way to raise their confidence. Nurcholish Madjid and Sidi Gazalba, for example, were among the proponents of this idea. However, their views on the necessity of modernization in Islam were vehemently criticized by older fellow Muslims like Rasjidi. The debate on this issue between the younger Muslim generation and the old was the main feature of Islam in Indonesia in the early and mid-1970s.
9. See Omar Hashem, “Sekali Lagi Modernisasi,” Pembina (1968): 8–10; Saadoeddin Djambek, “Ilmu Pengetahuan, Modernisasi dan Sekularisme,” Mertju Suar (1968).
10. Hamka in Panji Masyarakat 125 (1973): 6–8 as examined by Hasan, “Contemporary Muslim Religio-Political Thought,” 20–30.
11. Mohammad Rasjidi, “Usaha Mengkristenkan Indonesia dan Dunia,” Suara Muhammadiyah 1–2 (January 1968); his books covering the same issue in later decades were also consistent with his view in regard with relationship between modernization and Christian missions. See for example Sikap Umat Islam Terhadap Ekspansi Kristen (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1975); and his Sidang Raya Dewan Gereja Sedunia di Jakarta 1975 Merupakan Tantangan Terhadap Dunia Islam (Jakarta: Dewan Da‘wah Islamiyah Indonesia, 1974).
12. See Ali Moertopo, Strategi Pembangunan Nasional (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi, Centre for Strategic and International Studies/CSIS, 1981), 68.
13. See Hasan, “Contemporary Muslim Religio-Political Thought in Indonesia,” 93–96.
14. Deliar Noer, Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, 1978).
15. Ichtijanto, Pengamanan Negara Melalui Pengendalian Kegiatan Kerochanian (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI Direktorat Djenderal Bimbingan Masjarakat Islam Projek Pengawasan Kegiatan Keagamaan dan Aliran2/Faham2, 1969), 24–26.
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16. See Departemen Agama RI, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama R.I. 3 Januari 1946 – 3 Januari 1987: Eksistensi dan Derap Langkahnya (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1987), 69–75.
17. It should be noted that this policy of recruitment in turn created unintended consequences for the regime itself, as it involved additional expenses for paying the new MORA employees. It was also due to this policy that MORA became the nation’s biggest ministry, edging out other ministries like the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Information in terms of employee numbers. See Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 95–96. Moreover, given the nature of MORA in this period as a “haven” for Muslim activists this strategy might have created an unintended “political blunder,” paving the way for Muslim activists working at the grassroots under state expense in combating communism to possibly consolidate their political power against the regime itself. This would explain why in the early 1970s one of the first steps taken was to “modernize” the leadership of MORA away from conservative Muslims and to “rationalize” the number of employees in its offices. For more information on the modernization of MORA under Mukti Ali as the Minister, see Ali Munhanif, “Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: A Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali,” Studia Islamika 3, no. 1 (1996): 79–125.
18. Ali Moertopo, Strategi Kebudayaan (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi and Centre for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 1978), 44.
19. Lisa Klopfer, Confronting Modernity in a Rice-Producing Community: Contemporary Values and Identity among the Highland Minangkabau of West Sumatra Indonesia (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1994), 92–93 as quoted by Jonathan Rigg, Anna Allott, Rachel Harrison and Ulrich Kratz, “Understanding Languages of Modernization: a Southeast Asian View,” Modern Asian Studies 33, 3 (1999): 587.
20. Krissantono (ed.), Pandangan Presiden Soeharto tentang Pancasila (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 1976), 36–37 and Djohan Effendi (ed.), Agama dalam Pembangunan Nasional: Himpunan Sambutan Presiden Soeharto (Jakarta: Pustaka Biru, 1981), 45–49.
21. Effendi, Agama dalam Pembangunan Nasional, 45–48. 22. Effendi, Agama dalam Pembangunan Nasional, 47. 23. Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, Kompilasi Peraturan Perundang-
Undangan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, Balai Penelitian Pengembangan Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Proyek Peningkatan Pengkajian Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama, 2002), 9–14.
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CHAPTER 11
Governmentalization of Religious Policies
As discussed in the previous chapter, following its success in introducing its development blueprint, including on religious affairs, the New Order regime began to closely manage citizens’ religious life to ensure people were subject to state domination not only for the sake of national devel-opment but also for the construction of an Indonesian identity. In turn, the regime became obsessive in regulating and controlling its citizens’ behaviour, including in all aspects of religious life: from the model of God to its practices in daily religious activities. Within this context, the chapter will make use of Foucault’s model of “governmentalization,” particularly to examine how political consolidation of the New Order regime in the mid-1970s had an immediate effect on the religious life of citizens.
GoverninG reliGious life
In discussing post-World War II governance, Michel Foucault identified the emergence of an increasingly complicated model of government concerned with the correct management of individuals, people and goods.1 He referred to this new model as “the govermentalization of the state,” in which the regime constructed the logic of governmental power by which the citizens were subject to state domination by means of policies to regulate their behaviour in detail. Regulation within this model of “governmentalization of the state” sought the realization of certain aims, desires and goals in order to construct the governed as a productive, regulated, controlled and adapted citizenry.
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In the Indonesian context, Foucault’s model of governmentalization was visible following the political consolidation of the New Order regime in the mid-1970s. As mentioned earlier, after the fusion of political parties in 1973 that undermined Islamic political activism, it was the Suharto regime alone which exercised actual political power in the country and dominated political processes and successfully limited most forms of dissent and opposition. Yet there was always an underlying political threat at the grassroots level where groups of different ethnicity, race and religion interacted. Bearing this in mind, the regime became obsessive in regulat-ing and controlling its citizens’ behaviour, in both the private and public spheres, and ranging over almost all aspects of social life, including reli-gion. It is reasonable to conclude that its excessive regulation of religious activities was aimed at maintaining political and social stability for the sake of securing its development programme. Often this was accomplished by resort to heavy-handed intervention by the security forces.
The regime displayed certain typologies or principles in its policies. The first was to encourage tolerance among religions through dialogue and discussion and by prohibiting members of society from discussing or expressing unacceptable views related to the topics of SARA (suku, agama, ras dan antar-golongan/ethnicity, religion, race and class) in pub-lic. SARA, according to the regime, contained sources of conflict and thus presented potential causes for socio-political instability.2 The second principle was to endorse religious piety by supporting religious ceremo-nies, or providing technical assistance and guidance in the performance of other religious activities. The third was to oversee heterodox groups. The fourth was to require all citizens to embrace one of the state’s recognized religions.
Following these principles, as mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, the regime’s controlling and developing of religion was measured not only in the growing number of places of worship or in efficiencies in the management of the hajj pilgrimage, for example, or the introduction of compulsory religious subjects in public schools, or the improvement of state and private religious education and institutions, but also by its endeavours to standardize religious groups and religious attitudes. While giving support to religious festivals in public, at the same time it tightly controlled overseas funding for religious missions and was highly restrictive in allowing missionaries to preach on Indonesian soil. It supported the publication and distribution of kitab suci (holy books) of all denominations but oversaw the contents of religious texts and monitored
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incoming books from overseas. It guaranteed and promoted the principle of religious freedom for all citizens but at the same time banned or limited the activities of particular religious groups in public, or fused one minor religious group into another established one.
Within such a framework it was clear that the role of the government in regard to religious activism was central and pervasive. It is safe to say that the regime’s determination to standardize religion was similar to what it sought to do across society. It abolished all the regional differences in local administration and sought to regulate cultural differences in the name of national identity and culture.
Furthermore, in practice, New Order intervention into religious affairs was, as Federspiel has noted, based on five main principles. The govern-ment should: first, encourage worship and the ceremonial practice of religion; second, continue to control the administration of the system of religious affairs and provide a mechanism for protecting the general stan-dards of religious orthodoxy; third, be vigilant towards any use of religion expressed in political terms especially for opposition to the regime and its policies; fourth, treat any religious group and imposed severe sanctions if they operated “outside the required system” or if they tended to devi-ate from orthodoxy; and last, endorse the appointment of religious lead-ers, scholars and intellectuals who supported the government’s national development plan.3 These five principles became the basis for the regime’s many subsequent regulations on religious matters. In practice, regulations on religion took different forms from Statutes to policy at the lower lev-els, such as Ministerial Decrees or Stipulations as found in the Indonesian legal system.4
The following section provides a diagram as a summary of the state’s main principles on regulating religious affairs. It constitutes seven models of government policies in maintaining religious harmony and order par-ticularly in New Order’s Suharto era (Fig. 11.1).5
Thus following the consolidation of the New Order, Indonesia was became one of the most heavily regulated countries in the world with regard to religious observance. A book published by MORA revealed the extent of regime control over religious life. From 1965 to 1995 more than 110 regulations related to religion were issued.6 The real numbers of regulations may actually be greater than this. These regulations took various forms and they have a hierarchy of precedence, which is as follows: Statutes (Undang-Undang), Decrees (Keputusan), Joint Decrees (Surat Keputusan or Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri), Instructions (Instruksi),
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DECREES OF MPRS1. On the Principle Religious Freedom in the Decree No. II/1978;2. On the Principle of Religious Tolerance in the Decree No. II/1978; P43. On the principle of Maintaining Religious Harmony in GBHN in the Decree No.
II/1993
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES ONRELIGION
THE 1945 CONSTITUTION(Article 29 Section 1 and 2)
Indonesia is not Theocratic or Secular Religious Freedom with FullResponsibility
Pancasila State is not‘secular state’
Pancasila State is not‘religious’ state
Government and religiousgroups are responsible for
religious life
Government supports andendorses a healthy
religious life
7 MODELS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS AND POLICIES INMAINTAINING RELIGIOUS HARMONY
III. ON THEESTABLISHMENTAND USE OFPLACES OFWORSHIP
1. The Establishment ofPlaces of Worship
2.
3.
II. ON REGULATINGMISSION AND
1. On Religious Mission Guideline
2. On Missionaries Activities
I. ON REGULATINGRELIGIOUSINSTITUTION
1. The Establishment ofReligious Organizationand ReligiousInstitution
2. The Establishment ofReligious GroupRepresentatives (MUI,KWI, MAWI andWALUBI)
V. ON MONITORINGOVER PRINTEDMATERIALS
1. Prohibition of theDistribution of PrintedMaterials
2. Import of ReligiousBooks
3. Overseeing of the Printof Quran (Mushaf al-Qur’an)
VI. OATH AND VOWING
VII. PROHIBITION OFRELIGIOUSVILIFICATIONAND BLASPHEMY
1. The Dissolution ofSplinter Groups
2. Tasks andResponsibilities ofGeneral A�orney
4. Institution to dissolvethe Splinter Groups
5. Sanctions toBlasphemous Acts
IV. ON RELATIONBETWEENRELIGIOUSGROUPS ONEDUCATION,MARRIAGE,BURIAL ANDRELIGIOUSCEREMONIES
1. On Education2. On Marriage3. On Burial4. On Ceremonies
The use of Places ofWorshipThe Provision of Landfor the Public Interest
MISSIONARIES
Fig. 11.1 Religion in the Pancasila State
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Circulars (Surat Edaran), Radiograms or Telegrams, Guidances (Pedoman Dasar) signed by the President, Ministers, the Attorney General, as well as Provincial Governors. Some of these applied nationally while others catered for religious problems at the provincial and district levels. Looking at those regulations, their typology and quantity can be summarized as follows (Table 11.1):
The De-poliTicizaTion of reliGion anD new roles for Mora
As described earlier in a previous chapter, the New Order regime trans-formed MORA from a quasi-Muslim institution within the state system into a full-fledged state institution to administer religious affairs that oper-ated in line with its economic development programme. Strict control of this Ministry evolved during the political consolidation of the New Order regime, particularly after 1970, and one of the strategies taken by the New Order was to shift the leadership of MORA away from traditional Muslims to military officers and Muslim technocrats who had no attachment to any political Islamic activism. This strategy proved to be effective for at least two reasons. First, the regime was able to control and restrict any potential opposition from Muslim activists. Second, the regime began to transform MORA’s image from being a political representative of Islam within the state into an institution obedient solely to the Suharto regime.
Table 11.1 Types of regulations
No. Types of regulations ItemsTotal
1 Religious Harmony Houses of worship 5 Guidelines for foreign missionaries 7 Guidelines for religious missions (dakwah agama) 11 Guidelines for maintaining religious harmony 16 39
2 Prohibitions Religious sects or doctrines deviating from the organized religious
mainstream31
Book/printed material/monographs/symbols/comics/pictures 15 Other prohibitions, e.g. inter-religious marriage 4 50
3 Restrictions on Chinese and Aliran Kepercayaan 20
Total 110
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To this end, it was Mukti Ali, a leading Muslim scholar with limited attachment to any Islamic political party, who was appointed Minister of Religious Affairs from 1971 to mid-1978 with the task of “modernizing” MORA and distancing it from Islamic political activism.7 In terms of pol-icy, there were two main agendas which he initiated. The first was to foster harmony and tolerance among religious groups.8 A graduate from McGill University, Montreal, Canada, with a keen interest in comparative studies of religion, Ali pushed his agenda of “religious dialogue,” believing that an understanding of the “other” was beneficial to the pursuit of justice and peace. For Ali, any hostility expressed by one group towards another religious tradition resulted from a lack of appreciation of the legacy of religious doctrine itself.9
Ali characterized “religious dialogue” as an encounter among people and groups with different ideologies in order to come to a common understand-ing on important issues, to agree or to disagree with mutual respect and therefore to work with others to discover the secret of the higher meaning of life.10 For Ali, religious dialogue would be fruitful if guided by the prin-ciples of frank witness for the worth of one’s own religion, mutual respect for differences and religious freedom.11 He took religious dialogue to be:
A process in which individuals and groups learn to wipe out fear and dis-trust of one another and develop new relations based on mutual trust. A dialogue is a dynamic contact between life and life—not only between one rational view and another—which is directed towards building the world anew together.12
Judging from Ali’s arguments on the importance of religious dialogue in Indonesia, one can conclude that the messages of his programme were in fact about overcoming the intense rivalry between religious groups, in particular between Islam and Christianity in its drive to gain new converts. Nevertheless, within the context of the regime’s hostility toward Muslim activists as well as the acrimonious relationship between religious groups, Ali’s programme on religious dialogue was misunderstood in its initial stage and drew both criticism as well as half-hearted support. In some circles Ali’s project for dialogue and harmony either masked less benign state interests or was superficial in nature. Some even said it lacked sound philosophical underpinning.
Munhanif has rightly pointed out that Ali’s policy on religious dia-logue was admirable but depended heavily on the political will and good
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intentions of the different communities and more importantly on how each group understood their own religious doctrine.13 Nevertheless, despite its weaknesses, Ali’s contribution on this issue paved the way for the popularizing of discourses on religious harmony in Indonesia.
Ali’s second legacy was his role in helping to transform religion in Indonesia, particularly Islam, from a source of political activism into that of facilitator of socio-economic development. His appointment to MORA was to change it from being a bastion of Islamic activism to being a ser-vant of the state’s programmes. To quote Ali Murtopo in this context, religious ideology was seen as a “threatening power, which may disturb the process of national development.”14 As Minister, Mukti Ali began to create policies aimed at encouraging religious communities to involve themselves in social and cultural development, while at the same time remaining committed to their respective religious duties.15 In his Agama dan Pembangunan di Indonesia (Religion and Development in Indonesia) a collection of his speeches as the Minister of Religious Affairs, Ali drew general guidelines to justify the regime’s development programme to the religious communities of Indonesia.
There is little doubt that MORA began to play new roles in manag-ing religious affairs and it was in the era of Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara, the Minister replacing Mukti Ali, that MORA formulated and took on even more roles. Alamsjah, as he was commonly called, was an active Lieutenant-General in the Army who served as Minister in the Suharto Cabinet from 1978 to 1983, and was known to be among Suharto’s clos-est allies. Many observers believed that one of his main tasks as Minister at that time was to convince the Muslim leaders to establish better relations with the regime. On many occasions he put himself forward as represent-ing the Muslim community on a number of sensitive issues, such as the relationship between Islam and the Pancasila.
In the case of the aliran kepercayaan, Alamsjah’s position was similar to that of the Muslims, arguing that aliran kepercayaan would not be recognized as a new religion in Indonesia but as a culture, and there-fore its administration should come under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and Culture. Alamsjah was also an advocate for loosening the strict controls on dakwah, particularly dispensing with the previous system requiring all dakwah activities to gain prior written permission from state authorities and the military officer in charge.
Alamsjah made his mark as the Minister who for the first time described the omission of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter as both “the
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biggest sacrifice” (pengorbanan terbesar) and “the biggest gift” (hadiah terbesar) from the Muslims to the state, asserting that Muslims in Indonesia were not opposed to the Pancasila in any fundamental way.16 This, to a large degree, paved the way for them to gradually accept the enactment of Decree of MPR No. 11/1983 on the making of the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties and mass organizations in Indonesia.17
During Alamsjah’s time in the ministry, MORA began to further tighten its control over religious groups and to supervise them more closely. For this reason, he signed the Decree on Missions, as discussed in the earlier section of this chapter. He was the first Minister of Religious Affairs to develop the model of religious harmony in practice. For decades his model, better known as the Trilogy Kerukunan (Trilogy of Religious Harmony), promoted harmonious relations among the religious communities (keru-kunan antar umat beragama), within a particular community (kerukunan intern umat beragama) and between the religious communities and the government (kerukunan antar umat beragama dan Pemerintah).18 And based on this three-part model of harmony, he developed a variety of poli-cies increasingly intrusive in nature. He exerted his influence not only on controversial issues but also on technical aspects of religious performance; for example, the regime regulated how the kuliah subuh (sermon follow-ing the dawn prayer) should be presented through radio broadcasts.19 It also made rules on the allowable terms, methods and contents of dakwah in sermons to audiences.20
Moreover, certain technicalities on delivering dakwah or preaching were also tightly regulated. For example, the instructions of the Directorate- General of Islamic Guidance contained guidelines for the use of loudspeakers in mosques, and other smaller Islamic places of worship like mushalla and langgar. The guidelines also presented the advantages and disadvantages of using loudspeakers in mosques, including their function, maintenance and manner of installation and the direction they should face.
In addition the guidelines also regulated when the technology could be used for the call to prayers (adzan) and reciting the Koran. It is also inter-esting to mention that there were instructions on how and under what conditions cassette recordings could be used for the adzan.21
Religious holidays were another issue where MORA, under Alamsjah, regulated the ways in which celebrations were to be held, including the requirement that a state officer give speeches on such occasions. MORA also enforced previous policies such as that on places of worship which it
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strictly oversaw in practice, while in a policy to promote religious harmony it created a new semi-formal organization for consultation among reli-gious groups known as Wadah Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama).22
It was in his term, as Porter has rightly shown, that Alamsjah effectively employed corporatist strategies. He employed the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) for the Muslims, the Representatives of the Indonesian Buddhist Community (Walubi) for the Buddhists, the Communion of Indonesian Churches (PGI) for the Protestants, the Indonesian Council of Bishops (MAWI) for the Catholics and the Parisada Hindu Dharma for the Hindus as official state-sponsored religious consultative assemblies. These assemblies functioned as intermediaries through which the state communicated policies to society through their own religious language and monitored religious activism.23 Finally, under Alamsjah, in the face of the prolonged resistance from religious groups, the adoption of the Pancasila as the sole ideology for all religious organizations was success-fully achieved.
To sum up, one can conclude that while Mukti Ali has paved the foun-dation of the state to involve itself in religious affairs, it was under Alamsjah that numerous policies in controlling religious affairs came into force.
prohibiTion of AlirAn SeSAt
The groups termed aliran sesat or aliran sempalan or aliran menyimpang (lit. breakaway or ‘splinter” groups) allegedly preached and disseminated teachings at variance from those of the religious mainstream. They made their public appearance as early as the 1950s but were paid more serious attention by the New Order regime and the established religious com-munities from the early 1970s. For many, the unprecedented rise of these non-mainstream groups was seen as a potential source of social disorder, national disintegration and religious “confusion” in society.
To the general public, the major problem with such groups was their perceived misuse or misinterpretation of particular teachings from estab-lished religions for their own purposes, while at the same time attack-ing other professed doctrines in an offensive manner. It should be noted that as early as 1962, Sukarno issued a Presidential Decree to prohibit six religious bodies from Indonesia.24 Many saw that the presence of these bodies had created unrest among the established religious communities. However, it was only in 1971 that the New Order regime began to take decisive steps to deal with the problem.
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There were substantial differences between the Old Order and the New Order in handling the issue. In the Old Order era it was MORA that served as the institutional watchdog for all religious movements, in the name of “the realization of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” (the First Principle of Pancasila) in public life. MORA was responsible for watching over individual freedom to “promote healthy religious movements” as the main argument for overseeing the aliran kebatinan. Thus monitoring the aliran kebatinan was not undertaken simply for the sake of social order; it was a way for keeping Islamic norms intact in society. It is worth mention-ing that only once during Sukarno’s Old Order regime was a regulation issued to prohibit any particular religious group in the country.
In the New Order era, by contrast, it was the regime itself which served as the custodian of religious orthodoxy. As discussed in the earlier section of this chapter, the regime was charged to give guidance (memberikan bimbingan), to administer (pengurusan) and to control (pengawasan) religious activities in Indonesia as mandated by the MPRS Decree No. XXVI/1966. This mandate was later embodied in the enactment of a new Statute No. 5/PnPs/1969 on the Prevention or Misuse and/or Religious Vilification.25
This Statute, usually referred to as the Indonesian Law on Blasphemy, was chiefly a means of forbidding communism and at the same time of controlling any religious activities allegedly deviant from mainstream tra-ditions. Thus as far as this Statute was concerned, the regime preserved the doctrines of the established mainstream groups as the models to follow. The regime was vigilant in its monitoring of any group seen as “different” from the mainstream and set up an inter-departmental body known as the BAKORPAKEM (Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan di Masyarakat/Coordinating Body for the Supervision of Local Beliefs in Society).
It was under the auspices of BAKORPAKEM that further steps were to be taken if a group harmed the common good, harmony or security. Yet the way this inter-department institution worked to ban the so-called devi-ant groups were in fact problematic. The regime lacked any clear and fea-sible measurement for what constituted a “deviant teaching” except in the matters of security and order. As a result, not only were certain teachings or doctrines banned, but also books, pamphlets and other printed mate-rials such as calendars, comics or parodies. One such case, for instance, was a shortened version of Guitierrez’s Theology of Liberation. In other circumstances of social significance, the regime withheld permission to
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Table 11.2 List of prohibitions and restrictions toward religious activities (based on year of issuance)
No. Names of regulations
1. Presidential Decree No. 264/1962 on prohibition against Organisasi Liga Demokrasi (Democracy League Organization), Rotary Club, Divine Life Society, Vrijmetselaren- Loge (Indonesian Great Lodge), Moral Rearmament Movement, Ancient Mystical Organization of Rosi Crucians (AMORC) and Bahaism
2. Presidential Stipulation No. 1/1965 on the prevention or misuse and/or religious vilification
3. Decree of Attorney General (Kejaksaan Agung) No. Kep. 089/D-A/10/1971 on prohibition of Darul Hadits, Jemaah Qur’an and Hadits, Islam Jamaah, JPID, Yappenas and other similar organizations
4. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 006/B.2/7/1976 on prohibition of Aliran Kepercayaan “Manunggal”
5. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 129/J.A./12/1976 on prohibition of Jehovah Witnesses
6. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 089/J.A./9/78 on prohibition of marriage certificate circulated by Yayasan Pusat Srati Darma Yogyakarta
7. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 095/J.A./10/78 on prohibition of book entitled “Azan Panggilan dari Menara Mesjid (Praying Calls from Mosque Minaret)” by Kenneth Cragg
8. Decree of Regional Attorney (Kejaksaan Tinggi) of Central Java No. Skep. 002/K.3/2/1979 on prohibition of activities of “Agama Jowo Sanyoto” headed by Ki Kere Klaten
9. Decree of Regional Attorney of West Java No. Kep. 5/K.23/2/12/1979 on prohibition of “Aliran Keperibadian”
10. Decree of Regional Attorney of West Java No. Kep. 33/K.2/10/1980 on prohibition of circulation of printed book entitled “Nabi Isa Cinta Masjid dan Gereja (Jesus Loves Mosque and Church)”
11. Decree of Regional Attorney of North Sumatera Utara No. Kep. 239/H.21/11/1980 on prohibition of teachings of “Sidang Jemaat Kristus” taught by Raja Dame Jona Sihotang
12. Radiogram/Telegram of Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Internal Affairs to All Governors and All Heads of Regional MORA Offices No. 470.071/6380/SJ.MA/610/1980 on guideline in monitoring and documenting the adherents of local beliefs and Javanese Kejawen
13. Decree of Regional Attorney of Central Java No. Kep. 012/K.3/4/1981 on prohibition of sect of “Agama Islam Alim-Adil” and its book “Ri’ayatul Muhimmah” by KH.Ahmad Rivai
14. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 169/J.A./1983 on prohibition of teachings developed by Abdul Rahman and disciples (Aliran Inkarussunah) and prohibition of distribution of book by Moch. Ircham Sutarto
(continued)
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Table 11.2 (continued)
No. Names of regulations
15. Decree of Regional Attorney of DI Aceh No. Kep. 018/J-1.3/1/1983 on prohibition of teachings of Abdul Majid Abdullah
16. Decree of Regional Attorney of DI Aceh No. Kep. 158/J-1.3/1/1983 on prohibition of teachings of Islamic mystics of “Saufiah Samaniyah” by Haji Ibrahim Bonjol
17. Letter/Circular from Attorney General to Regional Attorney of West Nusa Tenggara No. Kep.167/D.1/2/84 in regard with circular entitled “Allah menyatakan sifatnya kepada Mezbah Awam (God shows his Attribute through Common Mezbah)”
18. Letter/Circular from Attorney General to Regional Attorney of North Sumatera No. Kep. 168./D.1/2/84 in regard with calendar containing Koranic verses that disrupted order among religious groups
19. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 058/J.A./3/84 on prohibition of circulation and distribution of printed matters containing teachings of Children of God
20. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 059/J.A./3/84 on prohibition of circulation and distribution of cassette produced by PT. Ghalia Indonesia recording containing teachings of Inkarussunah
21. Letter/Circular from Regional Attorney to District Attorney in Central Kalimantan No. B.335/M2.3/3/1984 in regard with calendar containing Koranic verses that disrupted order among religious groups
22. Letter/Circular from Regional Attorney to District Attorney in East Java No. R.206/IPK: 1-12.1/K.5.3 KB/3/1984 in regard Circular entitled “Allah menyatakan sifatnya kepada Mezbah Awam”
23. Letter/Circular from Regional Attorney to District Attorney in East Java No. R207/IPK: 1 -12.2/K.5.3 KN/3/1984 in regard with calendar containing Koranic verses that disrupted order among religious groups
24. Letter/Circular from Directorate General Protestant Guidance to Synods/Churches Leaders/Protestant Foundation No. F/26/930/1984 in regard with circulation and distribution of printed matters containing teachings of Children of God
25. Letter/Circular from Regional Office of MORA East Java to Heads of District Offices of MORA in East Java No. WM.01.04/274/R/1984 in regard with circular entitled “Allah menyatakan sifatnya kepada Mezbah Awam” and calendar containing Koranic verses that disrupted order among religious groups
26. Decree of Regional Attorney of Central Java No. Kep. 017/M-4/7/1985 on prohibition of any activities relating to teachings of sect of “Bibit Sri Basuki”
27. Decree of District Attorney (Kejaksaan Negeri) of Marabahan No Kep. 35/M.3.16/11/1985 on prohibition of sect of “Aliran Kepercayan Ilmu Sejati”
28. Decree of Regional Attorney of West Java No. Kep. 037/K.2/11/1986 on prohibition of teachings of “Teguh Slamet Hidayat Adrai” or “Teguh Esha” taught by Slamet Hidayat Adrai or Teguh Esha
(continued)
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Table 11.2 (continued)
No. Names of regulations
29. Decree of Regional Attorney of West Java No. Kep. 077/K.2/90/1987 on prohibition of teachings by Buki Syahidin bin Syamsudin who declared himself as the Messiah (Imam Mahdi)
30. Decree of Regional Attorney of Aceh No. Kep. 030 /JJ/DKS3/5/ 1987 on prohibition of teachings of “Bantaqiyah”
31. Decree of Regional Attorney of West Java No Kep. 092/K-2/12/1987 on prohibition of teaching of “Pasrah” taught by Bets Wartaman Sado
32. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 081/JA/8/1988 on prohibition of books and its circulation of (1) “Gadis Pantai (Sea Girl)” by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, edited by Joesoef Isak published by Hasta Mitra Jakarta; (2) “Siti Mariah (Mary)” by H. Mukti, edited by Pramoedya Ananta Toer published by Hasta Mitra Jakarta
33. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 082/JA/8/1988 on prohibition of book and circulation of “Theologi Pernbebasan. Sejarah, Metode, Praksis and Isinya (Liberation Theology: History, Praxis and Contents)” by Fr. Wahono Niti Prawiro
34. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 020/JA/ 2/1988 on prohibition of book and its circulation of “Ritual Jahiliyyah Yang Haram (Forbidden Jahiliya Rites)” by Haxikaff
35. Decree of District Attorney of Ciamis West Java No. Kep. 00I/K-2.11.2/DKS.3/05/1988 on prohibition and dissolution of sect “Aliran Sunni Rajeh Tasik Miring”
36. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep.021/JA/3/1989 on prohibition of book/novel entitled “The Satanic Verses” by Salman Rushdie published by Viking Penguin London
37. Decree of District Attorney of Tanjung of South Kalimantan No. Kep. 0l/M/3.17/1/1989 on prohibition of teachings in regard with the nature of universe, Adam, Shahadat Sifat Dua Satu and Science taught by Mustafa Bin Muksin
38. Decree of District Attorney of Pandeglang West Java No. Kep.01/K.2.19.2/DKS3/ 1/1989 on prohibition of teachings taught by Sadam Rosid and his Disciples
39. Decree of District Attorney of Marabahan of South Kalimantan No. Kep. 02/M.3.16/DKS.3/2/1989 on prohibition of deviant teachings by Sani bin Tukacil from Village Patih Selena Belawang Barito Kuala
40. Decree of District Attorney of Bulukumba South Sulawesi No. Kep. 001/N.3.27/2/1989 on prohibition of teachings and sect of Achmad Bin Aziz Lutong Gelar P Jatta Imma Daud
41. Decree of District Attorney of Maros South Sulawesi No. Kep. 13/N.3.9/3/1989 on mission activities and preaching of Nuh Hasbi Nur
42. Decree of District Attorney of Sungai Penuh and Kerinci West Sumatera No. Kep. Ol/J.6.12.3/DKS.3/4/1989 on prohibition of mission of Jamaah Ahmadyah Qodian di Sungai Penuh and Kerinci
(continued)
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marry from those individuals who neglected to declare and register their religious affiliation before the ceremony.
There were more than fifty cases of prohibitions on deviant religious groups and doctrines according to MORA’s publication Peraturan Perundangan-undangan Kehidupan Beragama.26 The number listed in the book, though large, is not comprehensive, and arguably the real num-ber is likely to have been much higher due to poor documentation of the cases (Table 11.2).
poliTics of reliGious iDenTiTy
As noted earlier, part of Suharto’s anti-communism agenda was the introduction of a religio-political policy requiring all Indonesians to adhere to one of the state recognized religions, as set out in the 1965 Presidential Stipulation No. 1/PNPS/1965 on the Prevention or Misuse and/or Religious Vilification. This policy proved effective in creating
Table 11.2 (continued)
No. Names of regulations
43. Decree of District Attorney of Palopo South Suawesi No. Kep. 01/N.319/DKS.3/S/1989 on prohibition of mission activities of Mansur, SH and MT. Taufik in Luwu
44. Decree of District Attorney of Makale South Sulawesi No. Kep. 293/N.3.18/DS.3/5/1989 on prohibition of activities of Jehovah Witnesses in Tana Toraja South Sulawesi
45. Decree of District Attorney of Makale South Sulawesi No. Kep. 06/N.3.18/DKS.3/08/1989 on prohibition of activities of Kathrina Batu Pirri who declared herself as the Apostle of Jesus that disrupted order among established religious groups in Tana Toraja
46. Decree of District Attorney of Cirebon West Java No Kep. 05/DKS.3/K2.12/l0/1989 on prohibition of preaching/discussion of teachings Darul Al-Quran that deviated from the mainstreaming of Islamic doctrines by Masruri Bin Haji Muhidin
47. Decree of District Attorney of Batusangkar West Sumatera No. Kep.01/3.3.14/DKS.3/10/1989 on prohibition of teachings by Zaini Gelar Datuk Rangkayo Bestir
48. Decree of District Attorney of Subang West Java No. Kep.004/K2.24/DKS.3/12/ 1989 on prohibition of teachings of “Ilmu Sejati” by Rianto Rilo Legowo
49. Decree of District Attorney of Subang West Java No. Kep.005/K2.24/DKS.3/12/ 1989 on prohibition of teachings of “Islam Wiwitan” or “Hakekat” by Ismail Rochman and brought by Husen bin Soma
50. Decree of Attorney General No. Kep. 016/ 180 J.A/1/1993 on prohibition of book entitled “Aurad Muhammadiyah Pegangan Darul Arqam” by Ustadz Ashaari Muhammad published by Al-Arqam Malaysia
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the perception that communism was identical with atheism. By the same token, this policy was used for to promote notions of religious piety and Indonesian identity as part of a strategy of broader social control. This section examines two further cases: the question of Confucianism and that of local indigenous beliefs, the agama suku, which the regime forced to join larger, established state-recognized religions.
Confucianism
The Chinese of Indonesia became the target of this policy as many of them, according to the regime, were suspected communist sympathizers. As a large number of Chinese were Confucianists, any policy restricting Chinese activities would have a far reaching effect on the practice of this religion. Indeed, successive regime measures on the “Chinese issue” between 1967 and 1988, were in nature restrictive, discriminatory and covered almost all aspects of Chinese affairs, ranging from economics, culture and identity to religion as well.
The Instruksi Presidium Kabinet (Cabinet Presidium Instructions) No.37/U/IN/6/1967 on the Policy for Resolving Chinese Affairs, for example, stated that there should be no legal extension for residency or work given to new Chinese immigrants and their wives or children. The Instructions also prohibited the immigrants from transferring their capi-tal abroad. Furthermore, educational facilities catering for immigrants’ children should also be closed down. They could enrol in any national schools run by the government, but “the number of Indonesian students must exceed that of the ‘foreigners’.”27 The regime also dropped the use of term Tionghoa, as many ethnic Chinese preferred to refer to them-selves, in accordance with the Surat Edaran Presidium Kabinet (Cabinet Presidium Circular) No. SE-06/Pres-Kab/6/1967, and replaced it with the formerly derogatory term Cina.
Stricter policies on Chinese identity were issued in the following years. For example, in 1977 the regime authorized special codes in the KTP (Kartu Tanda Penduduk/Identity Card) to indicate if someone was of ethnic Chinese origin. In addition to this, a Circular from the Ministry of Information No.02/SE/Ditjen-PPGK/1988 also put more stringent limitations on Chinese by banning publications and any printing using Chinese characters or a Chinese language. Any use of Chinese charac-ters in books, calendars, almanacs, food labels, medicines, greeting cards, clothing, decorations or other logos and signs was strictly forbidden. The Circular also oversaw the Chinese newspaper, Harian Indonesia, on the
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grounds that it disseminated materials in a Chinese language and using Chinese characters, thus obstructing national unity and the process of their assimilation into national life.28
The way in which the regime regulated the Chinese religion of Confucianism is worth examining. There was a gradual shift from offi-cial acceptance to restriction. In the first stage in 1967, at the National Confucian Convention, Suharto stated that “the Confucian religion deserves a decent place in this country (agama Konghucu mendapat-kan tempat yang layak di negeri ini).” He upheld this in the Presidential Stipulation No. 1/PNPS/1965 which included recognition of Confucianism as one of six established religions of Indonesia. However, in the following months, he issued an Instruksi Presiden quite contradictory in nature to his previous position.
Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967 on Chinese Religion, Beliefs and Traditions stated that religion, beliefs and Chinese culture had exerted an “undesirable” psychological, mental and moral influence upon Indonesian citizens. According to the regime, they would obstruct the process of assimilation. Chinese affairs should be regulated to function in a “proper manner.” Their religious and cultural celebrations were not to be held in public but rather to be confined within the family circle.29
Consequently, it was unclear whether Confucianism remained one of six the recognized religions.30 This was clarified in 1978 when Ministerial Home Affairs Directive No. 4777/74054/BA.01.2/4683/95 removed Confucianism from the list. It was stated in this regulation that there were only five religions in Indonesia, namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism, and this lower-level law has become the sole legal argument for why in the New Order era all Indonesians should embrace one of five, instead of six, religions.
Following this policy, therefore, not only did the New Order come to consider Confucianism as legally prohibited, but also in practice the regime put severe restrictions on this faith’s development in Indonesia. For example, the policy issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs Ministry No.455.2-360/1988 on the Regulation of Religious Worship, forbade the construction of new Chinese temples (klenteng) and renovation of existing ones. This regulation also banned the Chinese from using any other building for their religious services.
For decades the regime discriminated against the followers of Confucius and forced them to embrace one of the five official religions. Most chose Buddhism, regarding it as the closest to their preferred faith,
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but many quietly remained Confucians and continued to practise their religious teachings behind closed doors. Only after the appointment of Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999 as the fourth President of Indonesia were such policies abolished. It is a fact nevertheless that some of the discriminatory regulations against the Chinese remain in force until today.
The Regime and the “People with No Religion”
How Suharto’s New Order regime enforced the politics of religious identity upon local indigenous beliefs (agama suku or agama murba) was closely related to the way in which the regime directed the goals of its development programme. It was also strongly related to the way the regime obsessively perceived “national identity” (jatidiri bangsa) and “national culture” (kebudayaan bangsa)31 in which religion served as one of the main pillars.
As noted earlier, national development in the Indonesian context was a coin with two sides. It catered for the improvement of material life and at the same time the betterment of spiritual life. Within this framework the regime regulated religious affairs, not only in terms of the performance of particular religious activities, such as in the case of missions, but also within the main structures of the religious systems such as the way the people perceived their God. The regime believed that Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was the character of Indonesian religiosity and the chief element in all Indonesian religious belief. At the same time it also enforced the necessity for all Indonesians to subscribe to one of recognized religious denominations.
This way of thinking crafted a framework in which being an Indonesian citizen should be identical with believing in Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa and being a follower of one of the mainstream religious traditions. Both were mutually defining. Those who fell outside this definition were con-sidered belum beragama (“not yet possessing a religion”).
The “people with no religion” (orang yang belum beragama) were those who either had “not yet” received the concept of divinity as embod-ied in the concept of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa or were “not yet” a member of one of the state recognized religions. It was the duty of the regime to “civilize” them in order for them to be fully recognized as Indonesian citizens. For the regime, their integration into the mainstream was important to prevent social unrest (keresahan) as well as to improve the quality of their lives.
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Broadly conceived, this way of thinking was mainly directed towards the peripheral ethnic and tribal groups in the mountainous interior regions—the remote hinterlands of Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. They had been labelled “isolated communities” or suku terasing and their systems of belief called “pagan” or “ethnic” religions (agama murba or agama suku). In the popular mind, their systems of religion were strongly associated with superstition, shamanism and other traditional animistic practices.32 Most of those groups were nomadic in nature, gaining their livelihood by hunting and gathering and shifting cultivation.
They were regarded as isolated communities not merely due to geographical inaccessibility but also, as stated by Soebandio, for the sense of “absolute asymmetry between the socio-cultural level of the tribes in question and the situation of the Indonesian nation generally,”33 and “[having] a limited capacity to communicate with other more advanced groups, resulting from their having backward attitudes, and being left out of economic, political, socio-cultural, religious and ideological development.”34 As stated in the GBHN (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara/the Major Outlines of State Direction) of 1998:
In the attempt to achieve social justice, various efforts will be made to pro-vide more opportunities for improving the social welfare of disadvantaged people, including those who live in isolated areas and are considered as backward. Improvement initiatives for social services will also be conducted for the purpose of increasing people’s consciousness and responsibility and the ability of every Indonesian citizen to participate in the national develop-ment process. In order to provide much better service to the society and reach society at large, a variety of social institutions which are already in existence and operating in the social services need to be developed further.
As far as religious affairs were concerned, regulations on religions had for decades been addressed to those groups whose religious systems were placed in opposition to the “legitimate” model endorsed by the regime. Once the regime tightened the policies on religious identity, followers of these local systems of belief were forced to adopt the state definition of religion. The systems of their deities, inherited from their ancestors, were reclassified in accordance with the official category or definition of God.
Moreover, the regime also forced them to fuse with one of the five recognized religious groups and to downgrade their adat to the status of a “local art and culture” (kesenian/kebudayaan daerah) which enriched the
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Indonesian national cultural complex. Examples of this can be seen in the cases of the well-known statue crafting of the Asmat people in Papua and the funerary ceremonies in Toraja, South Sulawesi. Both have lost their supernatural and religious significance because of the regime’s policy on cultural identity and religion.
Ann Schiller’s study is worth mentioning here. She describes at some length how such groups dealt with the policy, taking the Ngaju people in the hinterland of Kalimantan as her case study. The Ngajus tacitly tried to adjust their system of deities, as well as worshipping, in the way of an official state definition of religion in order to survive the intrusive power of the regime. However, she concludes their adoption of the new model of belief and practice led to severe “confusion” and generated heated ten-sion, dividing the Ngajus themselves between those who had voluntarily “converted” to one of the state recognized religions and those who tried to keep their traditional model of religiosity.35
The Ngaju experience was only one case among many local beliefs that suffered from this hegemonic policy.36 It is worth mentioning as well that these local beliefs also became the target of aggressive mission by a number of established religious groups. The regime had endorsed this religious outreach through its regulation on missions allowing the established pros-elytizing religions, particularly Islam and Christianity, to seek new converts.
It is clear from the experience of the Confucians and that of the adherents to local beliefs that the regime’s policy on religious identity marginalized them and was discriminative in nature. It also tended to violate the individual’s free right to hold a particular religious belief, as guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution.
It is pertinent to ask who has really benefited from this state regulation of religion? There has been a widespread conviction among observers and scholars that some regulations aided the regime in maintaining political and social order. This impression has been common and widespread, and to some extent is true. However, there is also much alternative evidence that the regime’s tightening of its control has made room for the majority professions to “invest authority and power” within the state system.
Finally, it is argued that in the New Order era, while Muslim activists were politically marginalized, in fact some policies proved to be very favourable to Muslim norms, prescriptions and interests by the exclusion of minority religious adherence. In the end it was the Muslim community that would reap the benefit from the abundant applications of policy in their favour, as will be shown in the next chapter.
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noTes
1. See Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies of Governmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 87–104.
2. Donald K. Emmerson, Indonesia’s Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics (Cornell University Press, London, 1976), 224.
3. See Howard M. Federspiel, “The Endurance of Muslim Traditionalist Scholarship: An Analysis of the Writings of the Indonesian Scholar Sirajuddin Abbas,” in Mark Woodward (ed.), Toward a New Paradigm in Indonesian Islamic Thought (Tempe: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 192–194.
4. It should be mentioned that following the instalment of the New Order, the regime established a new order of Indonesian law as one of the mandates of MPRS Decree No. XX/MPRS/ 1966 on the hierarchy of the law. This new structure determined the Pancasila as the source of all laws (sumber dari segala hukum). The hierarchical order was as follows: (1) Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar) of 1945; (2) Decrees of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Ketetapan MPR); (3) Statutes (Undang-Undang); (4) Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah); (5) Presidential Decisions (Ketetapan Presiden) and (6) other implementing regulations such as that of Ministries. See for instance C.S.T. Kansil, Pengantar Ilmu Hukum dan Tata Hukum Indonesia (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1986), 50–59.
5. See for the detail discussion and explanation on the principle in Departemen Agama RI, Kompilasi Peraturan Perundangan- undangan Kehidupan Beragama (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1995), 7–75.
6. Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, Peraturan Perundang- Undangan Kehidupan Beragama (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, Proyek Pembinaan Lembaga Keagamaan, 1998/1999).
7. See Departemen Agama RI, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama R.I. 3 Januari 1946 – 3 Januari 1996: Eksistensi dan Derap Langkahnya (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1996).
8. Karel Steenbrink, “Indonesia Politics and a Muslim Theology of Religion 1965–1990,” Islam Christian Muslim Relations 4, no. 2 (December 1993): 233–234.
9. Mukti Ali, Agama dan Pembangunan di Indonesia (Jakarta: Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, 1973), 30–31.
10. Mukti Ali, Memahami Beberapa Aspek Ajaran Islam (Bandung: Mizan, 1989), 56–58; and his Agama dan Pembangunan, 145. See Munhanif, “Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia,” 108–109.
11. Ali, Agama dan Pembangunan, 32–33. 12. Mukti Ali, “Dialogue Between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia,” in
Dialogue Antar Agama, ed. Mukti Ali (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Nida, 1971), 37.
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13. Ali Munhanif, “Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: A Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali,” Studia Islamika 3, no. 1 (1996): 109.
14. Ali Moertopo, Strategi Pembangunan Nasional (Jakarta: CSIS, 1980), 68 as quoted by Munhanif, “Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism,” 108–109.
15. Mukti Ali, Ilmu Perbandingan Agama (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Al- Falah, 1965), 15–38 and Ali, Agama dan Pembangunan, 42–43.
16. See Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara, Islam dan Pembangunan Politik di Indonesia (Jakarta: CV Masagung, 1987), 287–288.
17. Prawiranegara, Islam dan Pembangunan Politik di Indonesia, 288. 18. Departemen Agama RI, Amal Bakti Departemen Agama R.I, 79–88. 19. “Keputusan Menteri Agama No. 44 Tahun 1978 tentang Pelaksanaan
Dakwah Agama dan Kuliah Subuh Melalui Radio, tanggal 23 Mei 1978”; “Instruksi Menteri Agama No. 9 Tahun 1978 tentang Pelaksanaan Dakwah Agama dan Kuliah Subuh Melalui Radio, tanggal 23 Mei 1978”; ‘surat Edaran Menteri Agama No. 3 Tahun 1978 tentang Dakwah dan Kuliah Subuh Melalui Radio, tanggal 29 Juni 1978.” See Departemen Agama RI, Peraturan Perundangan- undangan Kehidupan Beragama, 183–194.
20. See “Instruksi Menteri Agama No. 5 Tahun 1981 tentang Bimbingan Pelaksanaan Dakwah/Khotbah/Ceramah Agama tanggal 11 Maret 1981,” in Departemen Agama RI, Peraturan Perundangan- undangan Kehidupan Beragama, 197–202.
21. “Instruksi Direktur Jenderal Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam No. KEP/D/101/1978 tentang Tuntunan Penggunaan Pengeras Suara di Masjid dan Musholla, tanggal 17 Juli 1978,” in Departemen Agama RI, Kumpulan Peraturan Perundang-undangan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI Balai Penelitian Pengembangan Agama dan Dilat Keagamaan Proyek Peningkatan Pengkajian Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama, 2002).
22. “Keputusan Menteri Agama RI No. 35 Tahun 1980 tentang Wadah Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama, tanggal 30 Juni 1980,” in Departemen Agama RI, Peraturan Perundangan- undangan Kehidupan Beragama, 318–320.
23. See for more information Donald J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 62–63.
24. See “Keputusan Presiden No. 264 Year 1962 tentang Larangan Organisasi Liga Demokrasi: Rotary Club, Divine Life Society, Vrijmetselaren- Loge (Indonesian Lodge of Free Masons), Moral Rearmament Movement, the Ancient Mystical Organization of Rosi Crucians (AMORC) dan Baha”isme,” in Departemen Agama RI, Kumpulan Peraturan Perundang-undangan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama.
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25. Ichtijanto, Pengamanan Negara Melalui Pengendalian Kegiatan Kerochanian (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI Direktorat Djenderal Bimbingan Masjarakat Islam Projek Pengawasan Kegiatan Keagamaan dan Aliran2/Faham2, 1969), 24–26.
26. Departemen Agama RI, Peraturan Perundangan-undangan Kehidupan Beragama, 13–180.
27. “Discriminatory Laws and Regulations against Chinese Indonesians by the Indonesia Government,” circular found at http://library.thinkquest.org/26477/indon3.htm. Accessed on 4 July 2009.
28. For a more detailed analysis see Leo Suryadinata, “Indonesian Policies toward the Chinese Minority under the New Order,” Asian Survey 16, 8 (1976): 770–787; and his “Chinese Politics in Post- Suharto’s Indonesia,” Asian Survey 41, 3 (2000): 504–524.
29. “Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 14 Tahun 1967 tentang Agama, Kepercayaan dan Adat istiadat Cina.” See Departemen Agama RI, Kompilasi Peraturan Perundangan-undangan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI Badan Penelitian Pengambangan Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Proyek Peningkatan Pengkajian Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama, 2004), 99–101.
30. See Heriyanto Yang, “The History and Legal Position of Confucianism in Post-Independence Indonesia,” Marburg Journal of Religion 10, 1 (2005): 1–8.
31. See Greg Acciaioli, ““Archipelagic Culture” as an Exclusionary Government Discourse in Indonesia,” The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 2, 1 (2001): 15.
32. Harun Hadiwijono, Agama Suku Murba di Indonesia (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1980).
33. H. Soebandio, Cultural Policy in Indonesia (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), vii as quoted by Acciaioli, “Archipelagic Culture,” 15.
34. Alberto Gomes, “Modernity and Indigenous Minorities in Malaysia and Indonesia,” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs (RIMA) 33, 1 (1999): 8. See also a new comprehensive account on government policies towards the indigenous by Christopher R. Duncan, “From Development to Empowerment: Changing Indonesian Government Policies toward Indigenous Minorities,” in Ileen A. Devoult and Christopher R. Duncan (eds.), Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 116–149.
35. Anne Schiller, “An “Old” Religion in “New Order” Indonesia: Notes on Ethnicity and Religious Affiliation,” Sociology of Religion 57, 4 (1996): 409–417.
36. See also the book dealing with the issue: Heru Prasetia and Ingwuri Handayani (eds.), Agama dan Kebudayaan: Pergulatan di Tengah Komunitas (Jakarta: Desantara Foundation, 2010).
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CHAPTER 12
Managing Religious Tension
The New Order’s interference in religious affairs, although driven by a desire to maintain social harmony, paradoxically ended up exacerbating tensions between and within religious communities. Much of this tension revolved around two interconnected issues: missionary activities, particularly to convert people from one established religion to another, and the building of new places of worship. Relations between Muslims and Christians on these two issues were especially strained. A contributing factor to this was the government policy requiring all Indonesian citizens to embrace one of the (five) recognized religions as part of the strategy to combat “atheistic” communism. For the regime, it was obligatory to believe in one God (bertuhan) and to follow one established religion (beragama), and those without religious beliefs ran the risk of imprisonment or even being killed.1
As a result of this policy, many ex-communists sought protection by joining mainstream faiths, especially Christianity.2 Some of them embraced Christianity while others treated the churches as a safe haven against the regime and society’s anti-communist prejudice. The choice to become Christian was, in many ways, not surprising. Many of them were aware that Muslims and the military had worked together to hunt down and kill hundreds of thousands of communists, and thus as Geertz noted, there was “a fairly deep anti-Muslim reaction, which had been strengthened by the fact that Muslim youth groups had been so active, whether autonomously or as agents of the army, in the killing.”3 This was exacerbated by the fact
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that many Islamic organizations, including NU, prohibited ex-communists from taking shelter in or joining their organizations. Inexplicably, many Muslim activists viewed the conversion of communists to Christianity as “fishing in troubled water,” meaning that churches took advantage of the political turmoil at the expense of Islam.4
To address these Muslim–Christian tensions, the regime called leaders of the five religious groups to an inter-religious conference held in November 1968. Although the conference agreed to form a religious forum called Wadah Musyawarah Antar Agama (forum on inter-religious consultation) to foster cooperation and understanding, the draft resolution of this conference stated that missionaries’ activities conducted by any religion should be confined to its own adherents or to those who had not yet followed any recognized religion. Christian leaders, however, refused to agree to the draft, arguing that it violated the principles of freedom of religion.5
Following the failure to establish consensus among religious communi-ties regarding limits on missionary activities, the regime chose not to try and force a consensus on religious leaders. It was believed that the regime felt itself to be in a no-win position on the missionary issue: if it supported the Christian churches’ policy of unrestricted proselytizing then there would be an outcry in the Muslim community and a greater risk of social disturbance; if it endorsed the Muslim view opposing preaching outside one’s own faith community then the Christians would react badly. While the regime could not afford further to alienate Muslim groups, it was also sensitive to Christian criticism given that many senior regime figures were Christians or at least close to church communities.
The regime decided to calm this heated atmosphere not by regulating any missionary activity but rather by focusing on controlling the construc-tion of houses of worship, as this issue was also triggering social unrest at the grassroots level. There had been a number of incidents of church burning in some regions in the country and the government was also under pressure to address the problem of where and how new places of worship were to be built, as discussed in the following section.
The 1969 JoinT Decree on Places of WorshiP
One of the earliest violent incidents relating to a place of worship in post- independence Indonesian history occurred in Meulaboh in Aceh in July 1967, where a Muslim mob burned down a church.6 The regime
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paid considerable attention to this as its impact was far reaching, both politically and socially. In the national Parliament, spirited debate broke out when Christian party representative, J.C.T. Simorangkir, asked the government to investigate the incident. Simorangkir’s request drew a sharp response from a Muslim MP, Lukman Harun, who demanded the government to take decisive measures to control the activities of foreign missionaries and to regulate external aid to Indonesian churches.7 Three months later, another incident occurred in Makassar in October 1967 in which several churches and Christian schools were burnt. Similar events took place in Central Java and Jakarta. Inflammatory pamphlets from both communities were widely distributed; and strongly worded commentar-ies by Muslim and Christian leaders flooded the pages of newspapers and magazines.8
The regime was concerned to defuse the issue before it triggered more widespread conflict and controversy. Following its failed attempt to achieve consensus on proselytization at the Wadah Musyawarah Antar Agama, the government issued a Joint Decree of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry Internal Affairs No 01/BER/mdn-mag/1969 dated 13 September 1969 regarding the Rule of the State Officials in Maintaining Order and Stipulating Harmonious Religious Life and Worship among Adherents. This regulation was later known as the Joint Decree on Places of Worship.9
Much of this Joint Decree was devoted to strengthening the power of regional administrations, particularly governors, to control religious activities in their territories with special focus upon the content and the manner of religious predication and the permit process for establishing new places of worship. It stated that dakwah would be encouraged provided it fulfilled three main conditions: first, its content should not lead to religious conflict; second, it should not use intimidation, deception or threats; and last, it should not break the law or disrupt security and public order.
Another aspect of the Joint Decree related to the authority of local governments to control the construction of places of worship. Religious communities would not be able to build new places of worship unless they gained written permission from local government authorities. Before giving approval, governors were required to consult with the regional head of MORA and city planners to ascertain the situation at the location of the proposed house of worship. Moreover the decree set out that the local government may ask opinions from religious leaders and social organizations only “if needed” (apabila perlu).
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It should be noted that during this period the regime employed large numbers of active military officers to serve in various positions from the central to the lowest bureaucratic levels throughout the country, and often these officers lacked a close understanding of the regions they served. Their minimal local knowledge made them more reliant on advice from religious leaders, particularly on contentious matters such as approving new places of worship. As a result, opinions from local religious leaders became, in practice, the most important element in the issuing of building permits. In regions where a particular religious group dominated, it was easy for objections to a proposed construction of a house of worship for minority communities to be rejected. In many cases, plans to establish a church in a strongly Muslim area, for example, could take years to gain approval, and some were never successful. Thus, while the Joint Decree gave legal authority to the local government to regulate the establishment of houses of worship, in reality it was local religious leaders who often decided the matter.
Not surprisingly, many Christian leaders regarded these regulations as breaching religious freedoms.10 A joint memorandum of the DGI and MAWI criticizing the Joint Decree is worth quoting:
Having examined the stipulations and articles of the Joint Decree, and discerning the voices from the regions on their confusion and anxieties about the possible effects of the enactment of the regulation, we are of the opinion that the Joint Decree of the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Home Affairs could open the possibility that the freedom of every citizen to follow a religion, to perform the rituals based on their respective religions and beliefs, and to develop religion in accordance with the teachings of one’s religion will not be guaranteed. In other words, it would open the possibility of prohibiting or refusing permission for something [the establishment of house of worship], and that relates to the issue of human rights.11
Another issue arising from this Joint Decree was the lack of any clear procedure for the establishment of new places of worship. As a result, there were many administrative obstacles that the Christians had to deal with, particularly in getting approval from other religious communities. The lack of guidelines and frustration at the drawn-out process forced Christians in some areas to use their private houses for religious services, which in turn, ignited new tensions and sometimes conflict with other local faith groups. To ease the problem, on 5 May 1975, the Minister of Home Affairs sent a telegram to all governors instructing them to ensure that people in their regions not use their residences as temporary churches.12
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Unfortunately, the wording of the Ministerial telegram was unclear and it was interpreted and applied in a variety of ways in different regions. The somewhat vague wording allowed conservative or sectarian local officials to apply the instruction in a more restrictive manner in their areas. Even within MORA itself, different interpretations arose. Some Muslim officials saw it as a strict prohibition on the use of private homes for worship, while their Christian counterparts in the General Directorate of Protestantism understood the telegram to be simply a warning rather than a ban. A later telegram to all governors from the Minister of Home Affairs sought to clarify the matter by explaining that it was illegal “to make use of a house as a church” but gatherings of Christians at a house for familial liturgical purposes was permitted.13 These instructions showed that the regime was eager not only to administer how the places of worship could be built but also to govern where religious services could be conducted.
Some regional authorities used the Joint Decree as the basis for more wide-ranging regulations. For example, the Governor of Jakarta issued Decrees No. 648/1979 and No. 649/1979 stipulating that any request for building a house of worship should include a list of adherents who would use that building as well as detailed information about the distance of the location from any other houses of worship and places of entertainment and recreation. Four years later, the Jakarta Governor ordered that monitoring and supervision teams should be formed to oversee the establishment of a place of worship.14 The Central Java government took a similar approach, demanding evidence that at least 90 families from the same village supported the proposed house of worship before a building licence could be given.15
The above problems regarding the enactment of houses of worship regulations show how poorly planned this policy was. It lacked precision in its wording and offered plenty of room for “activist” local authorities to intervene in local religious life in the name of keeping order. It was also common for this regulation to be applied to minorities much more than it was to majority religious communities. In most areas, it was easy to establish mosques (masjid) or mushalla as the administrative procedures were either straightforward or simply bypassed, but Christians, Buddhists and Hindus encountered great difficulty in building their places of worship.16 By the late New Order era, this regulation had even come to be used by some militant Islamic groups as a legal justification for vigilante action to close or attack and destroy churches.17 As discuss in an earlier chapter of this book, this 1969 regulation was revised in 2000, and while the modifications gave greater protection to religious rights, some basic problems on the issue remained.
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Decrees on Mission aiD anD overseas Missionaries
It has been mentioned earlier that the controversy over religious mission had been left unsolved by the regime in the late 1960s. During the 1970s, however, tensions between religious groups grew as they continued and in some cases intensified their missionary activities. Eventually, in mid- 1978, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Lieutenant-General Alamsjah Prawiranegara, was forced to act, issuing Decree No. 70/1978 on religious missions18 and Decree No. 77/1978 on overseas mission aid in Indonesia.19 Six months after the issuance of the above Decrees to govern the administration of mission and overseas aid in all religious groups, a Joint Decree by the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Internal Affairs No. 1 Year 1979 on the Procedure for Missions and Overseas aid in Indonesia was issued. Pursuant to the above regulations, in 1979 and 1980, there were at least four other regulations on the guidelines for overseas missions in Indonesia particularly dealing with the administration of foreign missionaries working on Indonesian soil.20
It could be argued that the issuance of these regulations signified the regime’s anxiety over the controversial mission issue. Indeed, its con-cern was not without substance. From 1967, numerous publications by Muslim activists focused on Christian missionary activity and were filled with stories of “aggressive” proselytizing by evangelical churches among Muslim communities.21 They also fulminated against cases of Muslims converting to Christianity and demanded that the regime prevent preach-ers from working within faith communities different to their own. They also sought tighter restrictions on religious groups from outside the five recognized faiths.22 However, up to 1977 the regime was reluctant to give a clear-cut response, particularly when it risked causing social disturbance. It is therefore important to examine why at this time the regime seemed to side with the Muslim community’s demands.23
Political Context of the Regulations
There were at least three important religio-political contestations between Muslim activists and the regime in 1973. The first was the heavy-handed policy to fuse the nine non-regime political parties into two umbrella parties, the PPP and the PDI. The second was the heated debate over the draft Marriage Law (Undang-Undang Perkawinan). The last was the strong objection against the inclusion of aliran kepercayaan (Javanese local beliefs) in the GBHN (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara/the Main Guidelines of State’s Policies).24
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In the first case, the policy to amalgamate “opposition” parties based on their ideological orientation forced the four Muslim parties (Nahdlatul Ulama, Parmusi, Sarekat Islam and Perti) into the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/the United Development Party) as the sole non-Golkar political vehicle for channelling Muslim aspirations. Over time, this gradually weakened Islamic political activism, at least in the public sphere, and was thus regarded by the regime as a successful strategy.
By contrast, the controversies surrounding the Marriage bill and the acknowledgement of aliran kepercayaan forced the regime to compromise on their preferred policy and eventually accommodate Muslim aspirations. In both cases Muslim politicians in the newly fused party of the PPP became militant activists to defend Muslim aspirations in the Parliament meetings. The strong criticism of Muslim MPs, together with vocal protests of Muslim organizations outside the Parliament, finally pushed the government to revise the Marriage bill, omitting some of the articles most objected to by the Muslim community. The bill eventually passed into law in 1974.25 Similarly, pressure from Islamic groups led the government to back down on the aliran kepercayaan issue and delete all reference to the movement from the GBHN. Thus, the regime failed in its bid to give aliran kepercayaan de facto legal status similar, if not equal, to that enjoyed by “recognized” mainstream religious groups in Indonesia.
Not surprisingly, the controversy over these three issues further strained relations between Muslims and the regime, deepening the sense of mutual distrust and resentment. It was perhaps no coincidence that from 1976 Suharto began his long campaign to make Pancasila the sole ideological foundation for all organizations and the basis of a massive education and indoctrination programme called P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila/Guideline of Internalization and Implementation of the Pancasila). P4 was intended to inculcate “Pancasila values and teachings” into daily life and became an obligatory part of state education and training.26
Bearing in mind this political context, I argue that the issuance of these Ministerial regulations on missions served multiple purposes and I will discuss these in the following pages. In short, the regulations were part of a political bargain offered by the regime to the Muslim community, by which the regime acceded to Muslim demands for controls on proselyti-zation and in return Muslims were expected to support particular regime agendas.27
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The Contents of the Regulations
Ministerial Decree No. 70/1978 on Guidelines on Missions consisted of three main elements. The first concerned the ethics of religious missions, the second was a warning of sanctions on those who disobeyed the ethics and the last was an order to all MORA offices to monitor the implemen-tation of the Decree in the field. Among important points raised in the Decree were that religious missions should not be directed to people who already practised a recognized religion; nor should it be conducted by providing money, clothing, food, medicine or other goods as a means of rewarding new converts; nor should it be conducted by the dissemination of pamphlets, bulletins, journals, books and the like in the regions and/or to houses of adherents of other religions; nor should it be conducted by door-to-door visitation for any reason to the houses of those who had embraced a recognized religion.
Decree No. 77/1978 dealt with the administration and procedures for channelling aid to religious institutions in Indonesia. It required foreign aid in the form of expertise, materials and/or finance to be channelled through government bodies in order to minimize any negative impact to national unity, religious harmony or national stability. The Decree also stated that prior permission from the Ministry of Religious Affairs was required for any religious organization in Indonesia to accept foreign aid.
With regard to missionaries working in Indonesia, the Decree stated that the use of missionaries from overseas countries would be limited, while permission for overseas citizens to work as missionaries must be obtained from the Ministry of Religious Affairs or its regional representative officers. Recipient organizations in Indonesia were, according to the Decree, obliged to conduct training of Indonesian citizens as a means of preparing for the replacement of the foreign missionaries when they left the country. In addition to this, the Decree stated that legal sanctions on the recipient organizations and on foreign missionaries would be applied if they did not comply or were unable to meet the requirements and procedures included in the regulation.
Numerous positive comments on and expressions of appreciation for the Decrees appeared in public, in particular and unsurprisingly from the Muslim side. HAMKA, for example, who at that time was Chairman of the MUI (Indonesian Council of Ulama), stated that this regulation on (Christian) religious propagation was important to limit radical tendencies
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within the Islamic community. He reasoned that missions carried out through door-to-door visits could lead to fatal results because “for a fanatical Muslim, it is permitted to kill such a missionary.”28 It is worth mentioning as well that in 1979, so that the Ministerial Decrees were enforced in the wider community, the regime elevated their legal status to a Joint Decree signed by the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Internal Affairs, in addition to other policies of details on missions issued by either the Minister of Justice or MORA, as mentioned earlier.29
These regulations may indeed have prevented possible conflict between the religious communities at the grassroots by bringing such activity under proper supervision and management. It is true, as stated by Hyung-Jun Kim, that the regulations were a victory for the Muslims in their long struggle to bring Islamic ideas of religious freedom into the state system.30 The regime did adopt Muslim precepts on how a religious message could be delivered in public. This in turn helped to relieve temporarily the hostility between the Muslims and the regime which had festered over several years.
Nevertheless, as may be discerned from their contents, it would become clear also that the regime used the regulations related to mis-sions for at least two purposes. The first was to win Muslim support for the regime’s political agendas, particularly regarding the P4. The second was to control and oversee the Muslims themselves, in particular by overseeing foreign aid to the Indonesian Muslim community which was coming especially from Middle Eastern countries. Nurdin Lubis, for instance, stated that while the regulation was beneficial, in fact it would primarily be used by the regime to monitor aid to Islamic educational institutions in the country.31
Some observers have noted that linkages between Indonesian Muslim activists with their Middle Eastern co-religionists intensified following the appointment of Mohammad Natsir, the former Masyumi leader and respected Muslim politician, as Secretary of the Rabithah ‘Alam al-Islami (Islamic World Union). Numerous Middle Eastern preachers were operating freely in Indonesia, and generous financial aid was flowing in from various Islamic countries, some of which could possibly be used for political action against the regime itself. Hence the regulations would serve to control any possible rise of radicalism or conservatism in Indonesia. It is safe to sum up by saying that in essence these regulations were used to tighten control over all religious communities.
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41. See for examples Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), Tidak Ada Nabi Sesudah Muhammad SAW: Laporan Debat Pembela Islam dengan Ahmadiyah Qadian (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1979) and Laporan Dokumen-dokumen Resmi dan Keputusan Konperensi Islam Internasional tentang Ahmadiyah (Jakarta: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, 1981); and books like Abu al-Husayn Ali al-Husni al-Nadwi, Ahmadiyah (Yogyakarta: Horison Press, n.d.); Abdullah Hasan Alhadar, Ahmadiyah Telanjang Bulat di Panggung Sejarah (Bandung: Alma’arif, 1980); Hamka Haq Al-Badry, Koreksi Total terhadap Ahmadiyah (Jakarta: Yayasan Nurul Islam, 1981); Fawzy Saied Thaha, Ahmadiyah dalam Persoalan (Bandung: Alma’arif, 1981); and Ahmad Hariadi, Mengapa Saya Keluar dari Ahmadiyah Qadiani (Bandung: Yayasan Kebangkitan Kaum Muslimin, 1984).
42. “Surat Edaran Dirjen Bimas Islam dan Urusan Haji No. D/BA/01/3099/1984 tentang Ahmadiyah.” See also Departemen Agama’s publication a year after this circular in Faham Ahmadiyah: Hasil Telaah Kasus (Jakarta: Puslitbang Kehidupan Beragama Departemen Agama RI, 1985).
43. See “Surat Edaran Dirjen Bimas Islam dan Urusan Haji.”
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CHAPTER 13
Islamic Populism over Minority Rights
Previous chapters have discussed at some length how the New Order regime perceived the development programme as the primary way to achieve a total human advancement (pembangunan manusia seutuhnya), meaning in both material and spiritual (lahir dan batin) aspects. For that reason it strictly regulated almost all aspects of religious affairs in order to promote piety and at the same time maintain its domination in society.
While the above principles on regulating religion remained in place for two decades, from the late 1980s Indonesia’s political landscape shifted gradually. The regime became more accommodative to Islamic demands and symbols and in turn systematically incorporated them in the state system. This shift was mostly due to the roles of young moderate Muslim intellectuals and activists who introduced a new perspective on Islam that was more cultural than political. Although critical of the regime’s methods and some of its policies, they were usually not confrontational or oppositional towards Suharto and were broadly supportive of the New Order’s developmentalist agenda. Over time, they persuaded the government that their type of activism did not challenge the regime’s legitimacy.
This chapter will firstly examine the late New Order change of policy toward the Islamic community in order to provide a context for analysing the rise of more visible Islamic symbols in Indonesia following the downfall of Suharto in 1998. It will discuss how “Islamization” in the state system took a variety of forms, including efforts to insert the seven-word
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“syariah” clause into the Indonesian Constitution during parliamentary meetings in the 2000s, the enactment of the Laws on Alms-Giving in 1999, on Pilgrimage in 2002, on National Education in 2003 as well as on Religious Endowment in 2004 and the promulgation of shariah by-laws in some regions since 2001.
From ConCession and aCCommodation to islamization
At the end of the 1980s, many observers saw that the Suharto regime’s treatment of the Islamic community begin to change, and this was marked particularly by the growing accentuation of Islamic symbolism in the public sphere. I will discuss in brief the ways in which the regime loosened its grip on Islamic groups and began altering policies to accommodate Muslim interests and sentiment.
Evidence for this took various forms. In the field of social and education policy, the Directorate General of Elementary and Secondary Education of the Ministry of Education and Culture issued a new regulation on student uniforms, lifting previous restrictions on female students wear-ing headscarves (jilbab) in public schools. Islamic education institutions such as madrasahs and pesantrens also received more generous financial and infrastructure support, and began to be integrated into Indonesia’s national education system. Suharto himself demonstrated his religious piety by going to Mecca for the first time to perform the hajj in 1991. Upon his return, he began using the Islamic salutation, assalamualaikum, in his speeches, a move imitated by many of his cabinet members and senior bureaucrats.
Moreover, Suharto initiated the establishment of the Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila, a new foundation specially aimed at establishing new mosques and renovating older existing ones. He also participated more frequently in various Muslim festivals and celebrations as well as served as patron of the new national Muslim exhibition in the grand mosque of Istiqlal, known as the Istiqlal Festival. In addition, he approved the establishment of a new Islamic bank, The Bank Muamalat Indonesia, of which the slogan was pertama sesuai syariah (the first [bank in Indonesia] in accordance with the shariah). This Islamic economic initiative eventually led to the founding of dozens of new shariah banks and insurance companies.
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In politics, Suharto’s more accommodative approach toward Islam was visible as he endorsed the establishment of the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia/the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) led by his closest ally, B.J. Habibie. His party, the Golkar, also gave new opportunities for Muslim politicians and intellectuals to articulate their ideas and pursue political careers. At the same time, Suharto appointed a number of new “Muslim” generals, such as Feisal Tanjung and Fahrul Razi, to hold strategic positions within the military.
In the legal system, Suharto supported the enactment of new state policies related to Islamic affairs. He endorsed the new law on the Peradilan Agama (Islamic Courts) in 1989 which elevated this court to an equal position with that of the civil, military and administrative courts. He also signed the Decree on the Kompilasi Hukum Islam (the Compilation of Islamic Law) in 1991 that provided a unified reference for judges in the Islamic courts in dealing with the cases brought to them.
For some observers, such as Liddle, Suharto’s rapprochement with the Islam community was part of a new political strategy to subordinate the Muslim community under his control.1 Therefore his gestures to the Muslim community were not a sincere response to its needs and interests but rather were politically motivated. It was about maintaining the political status quo accordingly. Moreover, others saw this as a way to arrest Suharto’s declining popularity vis-à-vis Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of former President Sukarno, who became the new opposition symbol. Megawati at that time had attracted an alliance of oppositional forces that would become a breeding ground for a new political movement.2
Robert Hefner described Suharto as paving the way for the creation of “the regimist Muslim” which resulted in the re-policitization of Islam.3 This accommodative attitude allowed many Muslim activists to enter politics and to begin to change structures and policies based largely on Islamic prescripts. Thus, the processes of “Islamization of the state” and “Islamization of society” became intertwined and more systematic. It reached their peak after the downfall of Suharto in 1998.
islamiC symbols to Centre stage
Many Muslim conservatives saw the demise of the New Order regime as opening up opportunities for the reshaping of the state’s legal and political structures. For them, the “Islamization” supported by the previous
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regime was artificial in the sense that the system was “secular” and was not making Islamic doctrines fundamental to the state’s orientation. Arskal Salim coined the term “pseudo Islamization,” because those Islamists viewed the previous regime as only adopting certain select elements of Islamic teachings while it continued to show “un-Islamic attributes such as corruption and denial of citizens’ rights.”4 These activists demanded that the new government be clearly grounded in Islamic principles, and that the post-New Order society to be wholeheartedly committed to following Islamic shariah in all aspects of life.
For that reason, Islamization from 1998 took on different forms from previously and now became a more wide-ranging campaign to change polit-ical institutions, the legal system, social relations and individual behaviour in accordance with Islamic norms. Following the Habibie government’s abolition of Asas Tunggal that made the Pancasila the sole ideological foundation of all organizations in Indonesia, more than forty new Islamic political parties were formed. These included the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang/the Crescent and Moon Party) and the PK (Partai Keadilan/the Justice Party). Those parties were very active in endorsing Islamization of the state in which Islamic law and symbols were to feature prominently.5
Politicians in those Islamist parties were the main advocates for the rein-sertion into the constitution of the seven-word “shariah clause” from the Jakarta Charter in order to have official recognition of Islamic law within the Indonesian legal system. Their efforts focused on the three consecu-tive annual sessions of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/the People Consultative Assembly) from 2000 to 2002 that were, inter alia, intended for the amendment of the constitution. The debates in those sessions widened as some Muslim politicians articulated their intention to make Islam the foundation of the state as well. Ultimately, the MPR decided against changing any of the “religion” articles in the constitution and not to reopen discussion on the foundation of the state.
A second path for Islamization was the attempted enactment of new statutes aimed at catering for the interests of the Islamic community. Included in this were the passing of the Undang-Undang Zakat (the Law of Alms-Giving or Philanthropy) in 1999, the Undang-Undang Haji (the Law of Pilgrimage) in 2002 as well as the Undang-Undang Wakaf (the Law of Endowment) in 2004. Salim rightly pointed out that the enactment of these national laws created a “dissonance” in the Indonesian legal system. Salim defined the term as “a spectrum between mild tension in meanings on one hand and a direct contradiction in terms on the other hand.”6
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In short, there were inherent contradictions and inconsistencies in these religious-based regulations since they emphasized the roles of the state to regulate someone’s behaviour over his or her own rights as a citizen. Moreover, for some observers like Hosen for example, those laws tended to be “discriminatory” toward other religious groups since the laws privileged government services toward Muslims but paid little atten-tion to other religious groups.7
Therefore, Islamization and Islamic symbolism did not simply refer to attempts to produce an Islamic-based constitution or national laws that catered for Muslim interests like pilgrimage and alms-giving. As examined in the following pages, it also included efforts to introduce shariah by- laws into the national and regional legal systems, or to defend all existing state laws and regulations that clearly preserved Islamic interests such as the regulations on places of worship and the Law No. 5/PNPS/1969 on Religious Vilification on one hand, but also to press the government to limit or prohibit the dissemination of ideas and practices by other groups that were considered “deviant” to the Islamic mainstream teachings on the other. A case in point in this regard is the regulations regarding Ahmadiyah.
Hence campaigns for Islamization did not only occur among the Muslim elite politicians in Jakarta but resonated across the country. This movement gained momentum following the enactment of the new law of regional autonomy in 2001 as discussed in the next section.
deCentralization and shariah by-laws
In 1999, the Habibie government issued a new Law No. 22/1999 on Local Government and Decentralization that changed the relationship between central and local governments. This Law in essence initiated the devolution of authority and power from the central to local governments, providing them with a larger degree of control and autonomy except in the matters of security and defence, foreign affairs, monetary and fiscal, justice and religion. Thus the Law gave substantial legislative authority to the kabupaten (district) or the kota (municipalities) instead of to the propinsi (province) to manage their governance affairs and to issue policies for their own areas. Unlike in the New Order era, this Law held that the bupati (the head of districts) or the walikota (the head of municipalities) were directly accountable to their DPRD II (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat II/People Representative Assembly in Region or Municipality) rather than to the governor as the head of province.
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Having said that, the relationship between the districts or municipalities and the province changed. With increasing power in the hands of the bupati and walikota as well as the members of the DPRD II, it was expected that local governments would act in accordance with the needs of their communities, To that end, this Law seemed to be beneficial to the local community since their representatives in the DPRD II and their leaders who were the bupati or walikota would be more familiar and accessible.
However, this policy had an unintended consequence. It created a new local political dynamics in which particular powerful ethnic or religious groups were often able to dominate district affairs and play an important role in stipulating any local regulation aimed at securing their own interests based on the values and norm of the majority group.8
Thus, as far as regulating religion was concerned, the enactment of shariah by-laws in some regions could also be understood within this context of the rise of new powerful groups based on religious affiliation in particular regions. This was exacerbated by the fact that historically most of those regions had a strong inclination to Darul Islam or other conservative movements, as argued by Robin Bush.9
Moreover, the emergence of the new model of religious segregation with strong historical inclinations towards Islamism would in turn attract many local politicians to ride the tide by way of manipulation in order to gain political support from the people of that region. In short, it is undeniable that the interlocking combination of the rise of the new religio- political development resulted from the new law of regional autonomy, the existing conservative movement in that region, and political opportunism by those local politicians became the main elements for the issuance of many shariah by-laws in Indonesia’s post-New Order era.
According to Bush, up to 2005 there were at least 78 Perdas (Peraturan Daerah/Regional Regulation) or shariah by-laws in 470 districts and municipalities throughout Indonesia.10 This number did not include some regional Renstras (Rencana Strategis/the Strategic Planning), the Instruksis (Instruction) or the Surat Edarans (Circulation) by the heads of districts and municipalities that contained shariah-inspired rules.11 Arskal rightly categorized those perdas or shariah by-laws into three models. The first is the perdas relating to public order and social problems such as prostitution, gambling and alcohol consumption; the second is perdas requiring religious skills such as the ability to read the Quran and enforcing Islamic obligations like the zakat; and the last is those relating to the obligation of wearing religious clothes such as the jilbab for Muslim women.12 In this instance, Arskal also saw the shariah by-laws as more
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Table 13.1 List of regional regulations on Shariah By-Laws (based on year of issuance)
No. Names of regulations
1 Indramayu District West Java no. 7/1999 on anti-prostitution2 Hulu Sungai Utara District South Kalimantan No. 6/1999
on prohibition of alcohol liquor3 Kupang Municipality East Nusa Tenggara No. 39/1999
on prohibition of prostitution4 Aceh Province Regulation (Qanun) No. 5/2000 on anti-gambling5 Aceh Province Regulation (Qanun) No. 7/2000 on local custom (adat) regulation6 Bengkulu Municipality No. 24/2000 on prohibition of prostitution7 Tasikmalaya District West Java No. 28/2000 on anti-prostitution8 Garut District West Java No. 6/2000 on pornography and morality9 Cirebon District West Java No. 4/2000 on prohibition of gambling,
prostitution and alcohol liquor10 Hulu Sungai Utara District South Kalimantan No. 7/2000
on prohibition of gambling11 Tanah Datar District No. 451.4/556/Kesra-2001 on circular
for wearing Islamic clothes at schools and work places12 West Sumatera Province Regulation No. 11/2001 on eradicating
and preventing of prostitution, pornography and adultery13 Solok District West Sumatera No. 10/2001 on compulsory to have competency
in reading the Koran for students and prospective groom/bride14 Way Kanan District No. 7/2001 on prohibition of prostitution
and becoming prostitutes15 Bandung District West Java No. 6/2001 on eradicating prostitution16 Tasikmalaya District West Java on Circulation No. 451/SE/04/Sos/2001
on efforts to increase quality of faith and religious observance17 Tasikmalaya District West Java No. 3/2001 on reviving security
and order based on morality, religion, ethics and local values18 Tasikmalaya District West Java No. 421.2/Kep.326 A/Sos/2001 on new
requirements for student enrolment in elementary school (SD/MI), junior high school (SMP/MTs) and high school (SMU/MA)
19 Tasikmalaya District West Java No. 556.3/SP/03/Sos/2001 on supervision and management of swimming pool attendants
20 Indramayu District West Java No. 5/2001 on obligation to wear Islamic clothing and reading the Koran for students
21 Cianjur District West Java No. 451/2712/ASSDA.I/2001 on Islamic dressing codes
22 Cianjur District West Java No. 451/2719/ASSDA I on noble character for government officers/apparatus and society (berahlaqul karimah dan masyarakat marhamah)
23 Cianjur District West Java No. 36/2001 on the establishment of Institute for Studying and Developing Islam (Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Islam [LPPI])
(continued)
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Table 13.1 (continued)
No. Names of regulations
24 Cianjur District West Java No. 551/2717/ASSDA on public service based on Islamic shariah and morality
25 Indramayu District West Java No. 4/2001 on amendment of regional regulation based on Islamic principles
26 Jember District East Java No. 12/2001 on eradication of prostitution and other social pathologies
27 Pasuruan District East Java No. 10/2001 on eradication of prostitution28 South Kalimantan Province of Governor Circular No. 065/02292/ORG
on Islamic uniforms29 Banjar District South Kalimantan No. 10/2001 on regulation
of working hours of restaurants in the month of Ramadhan30 Maros District South Sulawesi No. 9/2001 on prohibition of distribution,
production and consumption of alcohol liquor, narcotics and drugs31 Solok District West Sumatra Barat No. 6/2002 on obligation
to wear Islamic clothing32 Lahat District South Sumatera No. 12/2002 on prohibition
of prostitution and pornography33 Batam District Riau No. 6/2002 on social order34 Bandar Lampung Municipality Lampung No. 15/2002
on prohibition of prostitution in Bandar Lampung35 Bekasi Municipality West Java No. 10/2002 on prohibition of prostitution36 Cianjur District West Java No. 08/2002 on strategic planning
of the district for year 2001–2005 based on Islamic norms37 Sumenep District East Java No. 3/2002 on prohibition of prostitution38 Gresik District East Java No. 07/2002 on prohibition
of prostitution and pornography39 Pamekasan District East Java No. 450/2002 on the enactment of Islamic Shariah40 Palangkaraya Municipality Central Kalimantan No. 26/2002
on rehabilitation of prostitution in Palangkaraya41 Bulukumba District South Sulawesi No. 3/2002 on prohibition of alcohol liquor42 East Lombok District West Nusa Tenggara No. 8/2002
on prohibition of alcohol liquor43 East Lombok District West Nusa Tenggara No. 9/2002 on alms-giving44 Bima Municipality West Nusa Tenggara No. 2/2002 on Friday observance45 Bima Municipality West Nusa Tenggara No. 3/2002 on management of alms-giving46 Aceh Province No. 12/2003 on prohibition of alcohol liquor47 Aceh Province No. 13/2003 on prohibition of gambling48 Aceh Province No. 14/2003 on obscene acts and pornography49 Medan Municipality North Sumatera No. 6/2003 on prohibition
of homeless, street beggars and prostitution in Medan50 Padang Municipality West Sumatera No. 6/2003 on compulsory
to have competency in reading and writing Arabic scripts
(continued)
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Table 13.1 (continued)
No. Names of regulations
51 Padang Municipality West Java No. 3/2003 on compulsory to have competency in reading the Koran
52 Solok District West Sumatera No. 13/2003 on management of alms-giving, charities and donation
53 Bukittinggi District West Sumatera No. 20/2003 (as revision to previous regional regulation No. 3/2000) on eradicating societal pathology
54 Sawahlunto District West Sumatera No. 1/2003 on compulsory to have competency in reading the Koran
55 Sawahlunto/Sijunjung District West Sumatera No. 2/2003 on Islamic dressing codes
56 Pasaman District West Sumatera No. 21/2003 on compulsory to have competency in reading the Koran
57 Pasaman District West Sumatera No. 22/2003 on Islamic dressing codes for students, university students and government officers
58 South Pesisir District West Sumatera No. 31/2003 on management of alms-giving, charities and donation
59 Limapuluh Kota District West Sumatera No. 6/2003 on compulsory to have competency in reading the Koran
60 Tasikmalaya District West Java No. 13/2003 on revision to regional strategic planning with Islamic vision
61 Indramayu District West Java No. 2/2003 on obligation to study Islamic sciences studies in elementary schooling system (madrasah diniyah awaliyah)
62 Garut District West Java No. 1/2003 on management of alms-giving, charities and donation
63 Cilacap Municipality Central Java No. 21/2003 (as revision to previous regulation no. 13/1989) on eradicating prostitution
64 Ketapang District West Kalimantan Barat No. 11/2003 on prohibition of prostitution
65 Banjar Municipality South Kalimantan No. 9/2003 on management of alms-giving66 Hulu Sungai Utara District South Kalimantan No. 23/2003
on holy month of Ramadhan67 Bulukumba District South Sulawesi No. 5/2003 on Islamic dressing codes68 Bulukumba District South Sulawesi No. 6/2003 on compulsory to have
competency of reading the Koran for students and bride/groom before their marriage
69 Bulukumba District South Sulawesi No. 02/2003 on management of alms-giving, charities and donation
70 Makasar City South Sulawesi No. 2/2003 on special alms-giving for employers, charities and donation
71 Gowa District South Sulawesi No. 7/2003 on compulsory to have competency in reading the Koran for those graduates from elementary school as a prerequisite to pursue further education
(continued)
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Table 13.1 (continued)
No. Names of regulations
72 Gorontalo Province No. 10/2003 on prevention of pornography73 East Lombok District West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) Instruction No. 4/2003
on additional monthly 2.5% income tax of alms-giving for all government officers and teachers
74 Dompu District West Nusa Tenggara Circular No. 451.12/016/SOS/2003 on charities and donation for all government officers in Dompu
75 NAD Aceh Province No. 7/2004 on management of alms-giving76 Padang Pariaman District West Sumatera No. 02/2004
on prevention and eradication of pornography77 Padang Panjang District West Sumatera No. 3/2004 on prevention
and eradication of social pathology like pornography and prostitution78 Bukittinggi District West Sumatera No. 29/2004
on management alms-giving, charities and donation79 Pesisir Selatan District West Sumatera No. 8/2004
on competency in reading/writing the Koran80 Bengkulu City Bengkulu No. 3/2004 on programme for improving religious life81 South Lampung District Lampung No. 4/2004 on prohibition
of prostitution, pornography and gambling in South Lampung82 Banten Province No. 4/2004 on management of alms-giving83 Pandeglang District Banten No. 09/2004 on Islamic dressing codes for students84 Sukabumi Municipality West Java Instruction No. 4/2004 on Islamic
dressing codes for students in schools and university in Sukabumi85 Cirebon City West java No. 77/2004 on Islamic sciences education
(madrasah diniyah awaliyah)86 Banjarmasin Municipality South Kalimantan No. 31/2004
on management of alms-giving87 Banjarmasin Municipality South Kalimantan No. 5/2004 on Ramadhan observance88 Banjarmasin Municipality South Kalimantan No. 065.2/00023/ORG/2004 on
Islamic dressing codes for Muslim women in government offices of Banjarmasin89 Banjar District South Kalimantan No. 4/2004 on reading Koran (khatam
al-qur’an) for elementary and secondary school students90 Dompu District West Nusa Tenggara No. Kd.19.05./HM.00/1330/2004 on (1)
compulsory to have competency in reading the Koran for government officers as a prerequisite for obtaining job promotion and for prospective bride/groom, and for prospective students of (junior and senior) secondary schools, and for the graduate as a prerequisite for obtaining school certificate (ijazah); (2) Islamic dressing code; (3) compulsory to develop Islamic culture
91 Dompu District West Nusa Tenggara No. Kd.19./HM.00/527/2004 on compulsory to have competency in reading Koran for government officers and for guests who intend to meet the district head (Bupati) in Dompu.
92 Dompu District West Nusa Tenggara No. 11/2004 on rules in selecting village chiefs based on competency in reading Koran
(continued)
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Table 13.1 (continued)
No. Names of regulations
93 Pesisir Selatan District West Sumatera No. 4/2005 on Islamic dressing codes94 Agam District West Sumatera No. 6/2005 on Islamic dressing codes95 Agam District West Sumatera No. 5/2005 on competency
in reading/writing the Koran96 West Sumatera Province No. 7/2005 on competency in reading/writing the Koran97 West Sumatera Province Circular No. 260/421/X/PPr-05/2005 on Islamic
dressing codes for all office heads in West Sumatera98 Padang Municipality West Sumatera Instruction No. 451.422/Binsos-III/2005
on reciting Koran in dawn prayer, anti-gambling, anti-drugs and Islamic dressing codes for students in Padang
99 Padang Municipality West Sumatera Instruction on Islamic dressing codes100 Tangerang City Banten No. 7/2005 on prohibition of selling and consuming
alcohol liquor101 Tangerang City Banten No. 8/2005 on prohibition of prostitution in Tangerang102 West Java Province No. 9/2005 on management of alms-giving, charities and
donation103 Sukabumi Municipality West Java No. 11/2005 on prohibition of alcohol liquor104 Sukabumi Municipality West Java No. 12/2005 on management alms-giving105 Probolinggo District East Java No. 5/2005 on eradicating prostitution in
Probolinggo106 Malang Municipality East Java No. 8/2005 on prohibition
of providing places for prostitution and pornography107 Sidoarjo District East Java No. 4/2005 on management alms-giving,
charities and donation108 Banjarmasin City South Kalimantan No. 8/2005 on Friday observance109 Hulu Sungai Utara District South Kalimantan No. 19/2005 on management
alms-giving, charities and donation110 Banjarmasin City South Kalimantan No. 4/2005 (as revision to previous regulation
No. 13/2003) on prohibition of some activities in month of Ramadhan111 Maros District South Sulawesi No. 16/2005 on Islamic dressing codes112 Maros District South Sulawesi No.15/2005 on competency in reading the Koran113 Maros District South Sulawesi No. 17/2005 on management alms-giving114 Enrekang District South Sulawesi No. 6/2005 on Islamic dressing codes115 Gorontalo Province No. 22/2005 on compulsory to have competency
in reading the Koran for students in Gorontalo116 Kendari City South East Sulawesi No. 17/2005 on competency in reading
the Koran for student and society in Kendari117 Dompu District West Nusa Tenggara No. 140/2005 on compulsory
to have competency in reading the Koran for government officers118 Sawahlunto District West Sumatera No. 19/2006 on prevention
and elimination of pornography and prostitution
(continued)
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Table 13.1 (continued)
No. Names of regulations
119 Kampar District Riau No. 2/2006 on management of alms-giving, charities and donation
120 Bangka Municipality Bangka Belitung No. 4/2006 on Management of Alms- Giving, Charities and Donation
121 Serang Municipality Banten No.1/2006 on Islamic sciences education (madrasah diniyah awaliyah)
122 Cianjur District West Java No. 15/2006 on Islamic dress codes for government officers
123 Pasuruan Municipality East Java No. 4/2006 on Working hours for restaurant in the month of Ramadhan
124 Banjar Municipality South Kalimantan No. 5/2006 on writing identity card with Arab-Malay script
125 Banjarbaru District South Kalimantan No. 5/on prohibition of alcohol liquor126 Makassar City South Sulawesi No. 5/2006 on alms-giving127 Pangkep District South Sulawesi No. 11/2006 on prohibition of alcohol liquor127 Polewali Mandar District South Sulawesi No. 14/2006 on societal
movement to have competency in reading Koran129 South Sulawesi Province No. 4/2006 on Koran education130 Muslim Padang Region of Gantarang District Bulukumba
South Sulawesi No. 05/2006 on Islamic lashing punishment131 Bantul Municipality Jogjakarta No. 5/2007 on prohibition
of prostitution in Bantul132 Lamongan District Eat Java No. 5/2007 on eradicating prostitution in Lamongan133 Banjarmasin Municipality South Kalimantan No. 10/2007 on social order134 Padang Panjang District West Sumatra No. 7/2008 on alms-giving135 Riau Province Decree of Governor No. 003.1/UM/08.1/2008
on the use of Arab-Malay script136 Tangerang City Banten Circular No. 12/2008 on temporary closing
for amusement centres during the month of Ramadhan137 Semarang City Central Java Circular No.435/4687/2008 on limitation of working
hour of bars, billiard premises, karaoke, massage parlours, nite clubs and cafes138 Bone District South Sulawesi Circular No. 44/1857/VIII/2008
on prohibition to restaurants, cafes and food corners to be opened and prohibition to hotels and motels to accept any couple without marriage certificates
139 Majalengka District West Java No. 13/2009 on prostitution
political in nature than religious, since in many regions the enactment of those regulations provided a basis for the political legitimacy of local regional leaders.13
The table below shows the varieties of regulations on shariah by-laws that emphasized different aspects of religiosity in daily life (Table 13.1).
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According to Bush, the trend to enact shariah by-laws has declined sharply since 2005 however. Many reason as to why the enactment of those shariah by-laws gained more critical, not to say negative, responses from Muslim communities themselves, as argued at some length by Bush.14 Blackburn, for example, concluded that the implementation of shariah by-laws in Aceh was an effective tool for many Muslim conservatives and Islamists to impose the agenda of putting back women to the domestic sphere.15 Another case to point to was one in Tangerang Banten where a woman was taken into custody by local authorities and charged with the allegation of being a prostitute only because she was alone in the street waiting for public transport at night.
Thus, many cases signified that not only were those regional regulations in practice discriminatory particularly toward women, regional jurisdiction often overlapped with national jurisdictions, including those of penal and civil laws. In addition to this, it is important to point out as well that many shariah by-laws lacked any comprehensive philosophical underpinning as they were made largely by “copying and pasting” from other regions’ by-laws. All of these developments held back the implementation of those shariah by-laws.
Nevertheless, although the enactment of shariah by-laws gained little success in practice,16 as far as regulating religion was concerned, efforts to make Islamic symbols and Muslim interests remain in the state system persisted, and in some cases adopted another model. Conservative Muslims began to campaign on apostasy and heresy issues, particularly from 2004. In practice, this campaign targeted restrictions on the building of places of worship and the activities of Ahmadiyah as discussed in the following chapter.
notes
1. William R. Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, 3 (August 1996): 621–622.
2. See for example Stefan Eklöf, Power and Political Culture in Suharto’s Indonesia: The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the Decline of the New Order (1986–98) (Copenhagen: NIASS Press, 2004). See more info on the opposition to Suharto regime in Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005). See also Noorhaidi Hasan, “Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Suharto,” Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities 1 (2008): 23–51.
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3. Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
4. Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia (Honolulu, Hawai’i: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008), 50.
5. In addition to those Islamist parties, other parties like the PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional/National Mandate Party) and the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/the Nation Awakening Party) that were strongly associated with Muhammadiyah and NU respectively, and a revamped PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/the United Development Party), a party previously formed by the New Order to be the sole Islamic party, were also at display in new Indonesian political party system. See Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (eds.), Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2003).
6. Salim, Challenging the Secular State, 4, 24–32. 7. Nadirsyah Hosen, Sharia & Constitutional Reform in Indonesia (Singapore:
Institute of South East Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2007). 8. See discussion on the issue of autonomy and minority in Gary F. Bell,
“Minority Rights and Regionalism in Indonesia: Will Constitutional Recognition Lead to Disintegration and Discrimination?” Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 5 (2001): 793–794.
9. Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulation in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2008), 183–188.
10. Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulation in Indonesia,” 176. 11. The list all of perdas of shariah by-laws and all other regulations containing
shariah-based rules in many regions from 2002 to 2009 is provided in the Appendix 2 of this book.
12. Arskal Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratisation: The Religious Majority and the Rights of Minorities in the Post- New Order Era,” in R.H. McLeod and A. MacIntyre (eds.), Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2007), 126; as quoted also in Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulation in Indonesia,” 176.
13. Salim, Challenging the Secular State, 24–32. 14. See more discussion in Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulation in Indonesia,”
182–190. 15. See Susan Blackburn Women and the State in Modern Indonesia (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13–15; see also her article “Indonesian Women and Political Islam,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39, 1 (2008): 83–105.
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16. It should be noted, however, that in fact after 2005 there werenew shariah by-laws enacted in some regions. It signifies that although receiving negative responses, the trend to enact these religious- based regulations in the local context continues and does not decrease sharply, as once argued by Bush. Given this new development, agreed with Arskal, that the shariah by-laws are more political in nature than religious, and therefore these laws are still attractive to become an important basis for political legitimacy for local regional leaders in attracting sympathy and support from the community.
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CHAPTER 14
Old Issues New Controversies: Cases of the Places of Worship, the Ahmadiyah
Group and the Judicial Review of the Vilification Law
Earlier chapters of this book have discussed the gradual shift of Indonesia’s political landscape since the 1990s where the regime became more accommodative to Islam and in turn systematically incorporated Islamic values and symbolism into the state system. This shift reached its peak with the promulgation of shariah by-laws in some regions, particuarly from 2001. Many scholars have argued that the regime’s incorporation of Islamic values into the state system have to some degree paved the foundation of religious conservativism among the Muslim community. In addition to this, some scholars have also linked this regime’s political shift to Islam as one triggering factor for the rise of religious intolerance toward other religious groups and minorities at the expense of the principle of preserving religious orthodoxy endorsed by the government.
Given to the rise of this new phenomenon of religious intolerance within the community particularly in the post-Suharto New Order regime, the following chapter will examine the possible link between current religious conservatism and intolerance with controversies surrounding the enactment of the new Joint Ministerial Decree on Houses of Worship and the Joint Ministerial Decree on the Ahmadiyah and the rise of legal jihadism in the case of judicial review of the Law of Vilification.
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The New JoiNT Decree oN Places of worshiP
As argued in one of the chapters in this book, Islamization took different forms, one of which was conservative Muslims defending existing laws and regulations that furthered Islamic interests. A case in point was the new regulation on places of worship. As discussed in Chap. 12, the New Order regime issued a Joint Decree to administer the procedure for the establishment of places of worship in 1969. Among the most important points raised in that Decree was the role of local authorities in guiding and supervising religious missions to divide conflict in the community. The Decree also set out some administrative requirements that had to be fulfilled before approval for the establishment of places of worship could be given.
It seems easy to conclude that, in tandem with other stricter regulations issued by some provinces, this Decree put severe impediments in the path of minority groups establishing places of worship. Consequently those regulations obliged these groups to use private houses or build places of worship without permits. In turn, the practice of using private houses or “illegal” places of worship became the main reason some conservative Muslim groups took vigilante action, including sealing off and in some cases destroying those places of worship. As recorded, up to 1997 there were more than three hundred cases where churches were destroyed or closed down.1
Increasing pressure was brought to bear on successive post-Suharto governments to revise the Decree on the grounds that it was seen as wors-ening prejudices and escalating socio-religious conflicts.2 On 21 March 2006 the government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a new Joint Decree by the Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Internal Affairs No. 9 Year 2006 and No. 8 Year 2006.
In general this 2006 Decree, as far as reducing possible religious conflict was concerned, was better constructed if compared with the previous one. Consisting of 30 main articles, the new 2006 Decree has five major areas: the establishment of the new small committee named FKUB (Forum Komunikasi Umat Beragama/The Interreligious Communication Forum); the requirement for permits to establish places of worship; the procedure for resolution if disputes occur, the procedure of reporting; and the procedure of Decree implementation.3
Nevertheless there are some requirements in the Decree that in practice might be unlikely to be fulfilled in particular remote areas outside Java.4 An example of this is found in the requirement to specify the religious
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composition of the area in which the proposed place of worship was to be built (Article 13). This Article also asked for a list of names and copies of identity cards of at least 90 residents from that area and those of another 60 people from other religious groups who agreed to the establishment of this place of worship. Those requirements had to be included in the proposal of building the house of worship before permission would be granted.
Another requirement was for applications for new houses of worship to be accompanied by recommendations from the district office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and from the FKUB, a newly created forum following this Decree at the province and district levels to foster religious dialogue (Article 14).
One important point in the 2006 Decree was the role of the government in resolving any problems that arose. According to this Decree, it was the government’s obligation to provide a temporary place for religious services if the group proposing the place or worship could not meet any of the requirements listed in the Decree (such as gaining the approval of local residents). It also stated that if all requirements to establish the place of worship were fulfilled, the local government should issue the permit within six months.
This Decree thus sought to provide a temporary solution to deadlocks in the approval process but not surprisingly this drew criticism and objections. For many, it created more impediments for small religious groups to estab-lish their religious places.5 For them, this policy would potentially violate the right of religious freedom.
Weinata Sairin, for example, who once served as the PGI chairman, stated that the minimum number of people needed to gain approval was a violation of religious freedom as guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution. He was also doubtful that this Decree could be fairly implemented as differences in religious composition or education between regions in Indonesia were clearly visible.6
Others, like Franz Magnis-Suseno, a prominent Indonesian Catholic scholar, also criticized the Decree as contrary to the Constitution and individual rights to practise religion.7 He worried that the new regulations would lead to local authorities issuing other policies that might result to new impediments for minority religious activities. As he said:
The decree goes against the amended 1945 Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion. What I regret is that it does not protect human rights and the people’s constitutional right to exercise their freedom to worship.
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To be consistent with the Constitution, the government should allow all religious communities, including minority to build their own houses of worship without restriction…We hope the campaign will educate the people about religious tolerance and eliminate the prevailing prejudice toward the minority… [as] part of learning process for the majority to respect the minority and their rights. Of the most importance is that regional administrations should not issue any new policies to enforce the decree, which might pose new hurdles to the minority to obtain permits to build their house of worship.8
Many moderate Muslims also raised similar criticisms towards the 2006 Decree. One example was Hasyim Muzadi, who at that time served as chairman of the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the largest traditional Muslim organization in Indonesia.9 For him the Decree was more restrictive than its 1969 predecessor given to its strict requirements on building the place of worship. He warned the government to execute it impartially and in a fair manner.10 In line with this, some others saw the potential detrimental consequence of the Decree as it could be used to justify stricter monitor-ing of religious activities to that which occurred in the New Order era. Abd Moqsith Ghazali, in addition to this, once stated that “it is the right for individuals to practise religion, and this intrinsically includes the right to build the place of worship. The state intervenes too far if it regulates the place of worship.”11
Ghazali also insisted that there were articles in the Decree that needed more elaboration. He took as an example Article 13 stipulating that a place of worship may be built on the basis of urgency. He questioned the meaning of “urgency” since in practice the approval from the majority group that resided in the surrounding area where the place of worship would be built was in fact the most important requirement among others.
Other moderate Muslim activists, such as Rumadi, also regarded the Decree as part of the state’s efforts to “bureaucratize” religious affairs when he examined the nature of the FKUB.12 He noted that the struc-ture of the FKUB consisted of a number of representatives from state apparatuses including the Ministries of Religious Affairs and Internal Affairs, Attorney-General’s Office, the police as well as the military.13 To Rumadi, with this extended structure, it would be unlikely for the FKUB to carry out its main task to examine the feasibility of proposals for the establishment of place of worship. He therefore contended that this Decree would segregate and polarize society. In turn it risked triggering
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violence. In addition to Rumadi, Novriantoni also saw the composition of the FKUB as creating a new battleground in which different elements would compete. He said:
This forum would be then flooded by the representatives from ultra- conservative wings from religious groups. It would become a new battleground for them which in turn put severe impediments to the proposal of the establishment of place of worship. Re-bureaucratization and re- politization of place of worship would reappear in this forum.14
Moreover, Novrianto also outlined that the bill would be ineffective as its requirement of a certain minimum number of assenting residents to the proposal would be very difficult to achieve. This was particularly likely to occur in areas where the relation between religious groups was tense, such as in Maluku and Poso Central Sulawesi. He said: “[can we imagine that a minority of Christians living in the Muslim majority area would easily garner at least 60 Muslim signatures to gain the permission [and also vice-versa]?”15
Others argued that the Decree could also have unintended consequences for the Muslim community. Mohammad Guntur Romli, for example, pointed out that a fair implementation of this Decree would result in limitations on or prohibition of the existing Muslim places of worship, such as those in hotels, restaurants, malls and other public places. He believed that those small Muslim places of worship (mushalla) should be closed down as they did not meet the requirements stated in the Decree to cater for more than 90 people. In this sense, the Muslims would also face difficulties if this policy was practised in an even-handed manner.16
Romli’s concern with regard to Muslim places of worship has some basis. It is true that the Decree lacked any clear definition of the words “place of worship.” When applied to the Muslim community, those words have a looser meaning since there were different names used to denote places the Muslim community used for worship. For them the masjid (mosque) and other kinds of places such as mushalla, langgar or surau are in fact places of worship with different sizes and functions.
Given the above responses to this new Decree, it is argued by many observers that the issue of place of worship is not simply about managing sites for religious activities. It is also about the campaign against apostasy or at least a way to limit the unprecedented growing mission of other reli-gious groups in the country. For the proponents of the new Decree, while
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the previous regulation led to severe restrictions, in reality the number of new places of worship had steadily increased. The argument put forward by Maftuh Basyuni, the former Minister of Religious Affairs, on 17 April 2006 is worth discussing in this instance.
Basyuni stated that one of the main reasons for this new Decree was to respond to the “unbalanced” increase in the numbers of houses of worship established from 1997 to 2004. He mentioned that the number of Muslim mosques only increased 64% in that period. For Basyuni, this number was far behind that of the increase in the numbers of new places of worship for other religious groups. He noted that Protestant churches increased 131%; Catholics 153%; Buddhist 368%; and Hindu 368% respectively. He believed there was something “inconsistent” in the practices of the previous 1969 Decree, and therefore it warranted revision.17 Basyuni believed that the figures he presented were accurate and valid as they were verified by representative officers from each religious directorate in his Ministry.18 For him, therefore, non-Muslim groups, “benefited a lot” from the Decree.
Implicit from Basuni was that Muslims suffered from this 1969 Decree. Implicit in this argument as well was an assumption that the increasing number of places of worship was indicative of increasing numbers of adherents for each religious community. Thus, faster growth in non- Muslim places of worship suggested increasing numbers of Muslims who converted to other faiths. Within this context, it was hoped that the new stricter regulation on places of worship would minimize the number of Muslim conversions to other religious groups. Hence, for many, supporting the new regulation that in nature preserved the aqidah of the Muslim community became an element in a wider campaign of Islamization in Indonesia.
Recent amendments of the 2010 Decree signified the government’s continuing inability to regulate places of worship in an impartial manner. Cases shown that in practice a permit to establish a place of worship could easily be suspended if there was community unrest, particularly after particular militant vigilante groups staged demonstrations at the sites in order to force revocation of their approval. Cases in point include Cikeuting Bekasi, West Java where protests halted indefinitely the building of churches in 2009. It also happened in Bogor West Java in 2011 and in some other provinces during five consecutive years. Hence, as far as regulating places of worship is concerned, in many cases the government shown its inability to enforce its law in an impartial manner as it allowed militant civil society actors to dictate terms on whether or not buildings for worship could be established in any given place.
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to the Constitutional Court.40 This sparked widespread debate about the pros and cons of the Law. It was not simply about how the state preserved religious freedom for all citizens, but also about whether or not the state could undertake legal action to prevent any religious teachings, which in this case were those of Islam, from being abused or debased by so-called deviant groups.
Argument from the MUI in the Constitutional Court session on this is worth mentioning in brief. Accordingly to the MUI, freedom of religion in Indonesia was not unlimited. The Law did not contradict the right of religious freedom as stated in the Constitution. It did not restrict interpretations of faith and religious activities in general, but addressed interpretations that deviated from fundamental religious teachings. For this reason, according to the MUI, the Law was important for the sake of maintaining order in society, the nation and the state as well as protecting religion itself. Thus restrictions in this Law were consistent with Article 28J of the Indonesian Constitution, and consequently the revocation of this Law would result in uncertainty, and would destroy ketentraman beragama (religious harmony) as well as lead to chaos and turmoil in society.
In the context of this judicial review, the MUI played a role as the representative for all Muslim organizations in Indonesia. It also signified a shifting paradigm for the MUI, namely from merely serving the interests of the government in managing Islamic affairs, particularly in the New Order era, to a more autonomous position negotiating with the state on behalf of the Muslim community. To some extent this new role of the MUI seemed to serve as a quasi-governing institution in protecting and preserving the so-called ummah’s interests and values.
After many months of public hearings, in April 2010 the Constitutional Court released its decision on the judicial review, stating that this Law in essence did not contradict the right of religious freedom. The Court also held that any interpretation of whether or not a particular teaching was considered deviant should be based on the opinion of relevant religious authorities. The Court concluded that the state was responsible for main-taining security and order, and therefore has legal authority to prohibit any interpretation that was different from mainstream teaching.41
Apart from the Court conclusion in this case, it is apparent that the majority group would consistently use any law or produce more laws and regulations as a means of legal control. And if it is carefully discerned, it is clear that there is a new tendency of “particular militant and ultra conservative small groups” within this majority group in Indonesia that are very keen and well trained to make use of the existing legal gaps in particular
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regulations for entrenching hegemony and for mobilizing opinion. This may occur because some regulations are open-textured in nature or there are conflicting rules inherent in those regulations. This situation in turn has proved a fertile ground for particular groups or parties to steer its direction into their own interests. This legal strategy is relatively new in the literature that studies regulations and laws in Indonesia and is very effective in getting moral support from the public.
A case surrounding the prolonged controversy over the Vilification Law is one example of this strategy. This Law has been successfully steered closer to Islamic values, and therefore those who oppose this Law may be seen as opposing Islamic values and teachings. In turn, any person or group or organization showing explicit opposition or objection to that Law would be labelled and stigmatized as being liberalists, secularists or even Western agents implanted in Indonesia to denigrate religious teachings.
This strategy some scholars called the “legal jihad.” In this sense, legal jihad is defined as using and defending the existing regulations that have been “Islamized” to obtain moral support over those against it in court or in public opinion. It is an effective way to intimidate a group who have opposed any existing law or regulation, making them lose their moral or social legitimacy.42
Within the framework of legal jihad, the strategy is very clear and used in endorsing the enforcement of the regulations for the public and at the same time serving as the frontline in defending the status quo of particular government regulations or laws. It tends to be very effective, usually through mass mobilization, in influencing opinions in the subsequent decision-making process. And at the end, if the decision made by the Court for example is not in accordance with what was desired, the alternative way is then to mobilize the masses even by way of demonstrations or violence. What occurred in Temanggung, Central Java is an example of this in which a mob destroyed some churches as a way to express their dissatisfaction with the judge’s decision on a case of alleged blasphemy against Islamic teaching.
Legal jihad could have some leverage in some cases and existing controversies. The prolonged contestation on the place of worship serves as another example of how a particular controversial issue may create a fertile ground to seed radicalism, extremism and violence if the government is unable to act fairly and is seemingly taking a position in favour of one group above another. Hence, if it is carefully anticipated, this legal jihad strategy may become an effective tool for conservative groups in complex legal battles on issues relating to religious life.43
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NoTes
1. It has been argued that more than 374 churches were destroyed by mobs up to 1997. See “Penutupan, Perusakan, dan atau Pembakaran 374 Gereja di Indonesia pada Tahun 1945–1997,” available at http://www.fica.org/persecution/374/html. Accessed 29 June 2006. See also Roger L Dixon, “Initiatives by the Soeharto Government Leading up to Present Persecution of Christians in Indonesia – 1999,” available at http://www.sunda.org/situation/situation.htm. Accessed 29 June 2006. Discussion and responses about the difficulties in establishing churches due to this regulation and data on the number of churches closed in the New Order era can be also seen in Paul Tahalele and Thomas Santoso (eds.), Beginikah Kemerdekaan Kita? (Surabaya: Forum Komunikasi Kristiani Indonesia, 1997).
2. See documentation surrounding the enactment of the Decree in Soefyanto, Pengaturan Pendirian Ruman Ibadah dan Catatan Perkembangan Pembahasannya (Jakarta: Universitas Islam Jakarta, 2009).
3. See “Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 9 Tahun 2006/Nomor 8 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Dearah Dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat,” available at http://www.depdagri.go.id and also http://www.depag.or.id.
4. See for more comprehensive discussion and analysis on the issue in Melissa Crouch, “Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: New Problem, Local Politics and Court Action,” Asian Studies Review 34, 4 (Dec 2010): 403–419.
5. “42 Anggota DPR Tolak SKB Rumah Ibadah,” available at http://www.kapanlagi.com/h/0000108651.html. Accessed 29 June 2006.
6. “Law on Houses of Worship,” available at http://www.indonesian.matters.com/196/law-on-houses-of-worship-law. Accessed 29 June 2006. See also “Weinata Sairin: NKRI Terbuka bagi Semua.” Kristiani Pos 5 October 2005. Available also at http://www/christianpos.co.id/dbase.php?cat=society&id=467. Accessed 29 June 2006.
7. A similar view is also shared by Widyatmadja. See Josef Widyatmadja, “Rumah Ibadah dalam Negara Pancasila.” Kristiani Pos 1 February 2006, avail-able also at http://www.christianpos.co.id/dbase.php?cat=editorial&id. Accessed 29 June 2006.
8. “Catholic Vies on Houses of Worship Law,” available also at http://www.indonesianmatters.com/221/catholic-view-on- houses-of-worship-law. Accessed 29 June 2006.
9. See for example reports on the appeals such as “Izin Bangun Rumah Ibadah Seharusnya Dicabut,” available at http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/
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nasional/2004/08/12/brk,20040812- 30,id.html. Accessed 29 June 2006, and also “Revisi SKB Pendirian Rumah Ibadah Harus Lindungi Tiap Warga Negara,” available at http://www.kapanlagi.com/h/0000084085.html. Accessed 29 June 2006. “ACRP Minta Pemerintah Cabut SKB Menag dan Mendagri.” Available at http://www.kapanlagi.com/h/0000103675.html. Accessed 29 June 2006.
10. Nazri Bahrawi, “New Decree on Houses of Worship” Bangkok Post 6 May 2006, available also at http://www.thepersecution.org/world/indone-sia/06/05/bp06.html. Accessed 29 June 2006. See also “Pernyataan Bersama NU, PGI, KWI Tentang Kerukunan Umat Beragama di Indonesia,” available at http://www.pgi.or.id/isi-berita.php?news_id=221. Accessed 29 June 2006.
11. Abd Moqsith Ghazali, “Perihal Pendirian Rumah Ibadat,” Koran Tempo 12 December 2005, available at http://islamlib.com/id/index.php as well as http://www.wahidinsititute.org/indonesia/content/view/202/52/. Accessed 29 June 2006.
12. See Rumadi, “Birokratisasi Tempat Ibadah,” Kompas 16 December 2006, available at http://www.wahidinsititute.org/indonesia/content/view/203/52. Accessed 29 June 2006.
13. The FKUB was a forum designed for discussion and consultation among the elites of religious communities, and consisted of representatives from various faiths. In the Alamsjah period, who served as the Minister of Religious Affairs in the 1980s, such a forum had existed but had no clear task and real programme.
14. Novriantoni, “Revisi SKB dan Intoleransi Beragama,” available at http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=1023. Accessed 29 June 2006.
15. Novriantoni, “Revisi SKB dan Intoleransi Beragama.” 16. Mohamad Guntur Romli, “Apa Alasan Mereka Menutup Gereja?” Suara
Pembaruan 28 August 2005, available at http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/08/09/Editor/edit03.htm. Accessed 29 June 2006.
17. See Muhammad Maftuh Basyuni, “The Policy and Strategy in Fostering Harmony among Religious Groups,” Lecture presented in Short Course of Indonesian National Resilience Institute (LEMHANAS) in Jakarta 29 May 2006 (Jakarta: Ministry of Religious Affairs, Office of Research and Development and Training, 2006), 18–22; and “Supplement by the Speech of H.E. Minister of Religious Affairs and H.E. Minister of Home Affairs on the Event of Socialization of the Joint Regulation at the Ministry of Home Affairs, April 17, 2006,” Booklet on the Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs Number 9 of 2006/Number 8 of 2006 (Jakarta: Ministry of Religious Affairs, Office of Research and Development and Training, 2006), 5–22.
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18. To depend on this official figure from the Ministry on the number of the house of worship would be misleading, however. In practice it is a fact that Muslims can easilyestablish places for worship by following (or not) simple administrative procedures. This is not the case for other religious groups. Thus, it was likely therefore that there was no accurate documentation of the precise number of Muslim places of worship in the country.
19. Some attacks on and destruction of Ahmadiyah properties occurred in Cianjur West Java on 6 August 2005, in Majalengka West Java on 19 August 2005, in four locations of South Cianjur (West Java) on 19 October 2005 and 4 February 2006, in West Lombok West Nusa Tenggara between October 2005 and September 2006, and in Leuwisadeng Bogor West Java on 6 January 2006. Numerous hostile demonstrations against the Ahmadiyah group and mass protests by closing and burning some Ahmadiyah mosques in many regions occurred between 2005 and 2007.
20. See more in Muryadi, Ahmadiyah: Keyakinan yang Digugat, 1–33. 21. See “Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia No. 11/MUNAS
VII/15/2005 tentang Aliran Ahmadiyah,” available at http://www.mui.id/mui_in/fatwa.php?id=131. Accessed 26 May 2008.
22. Djohan Effendi, “Solusi Masalah Ahmadiyah Indonesia,” Koran Tempo 12 January 2008.
23. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Masih Tentang Ahmadiyah,” article posted on 9 May 2008, available at http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=1044. Accessed 15 May 2008; and Luthfi Assyaukanie, “Fatwa dan Kekerasan,” arti-cle available at http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=1220. Accessed 16 May 2008.
24. Achmad Munjid, “Mencegat Kebebasan, Memaksa Keyakinan,” Harian Tempo 17 January 2008.
25. Basyir Ahmad Suwarto, “Potret Minoritas Ahmadiyah Manislor yang Didiskriminasi,” article available at http://wahidinstitute.org. Accessed 17 May 2008.
26. “Penjelasan Kepala Badan Litbang dan Diklat Departemen Agama tentang Perkembangan dan Penanganan Masalah Ahmadiyah di Indonesia,” 1–2, available also at www.depag.web.id/doc/get/10. Accessed 20 May 2008.
27. “Penjelasan Kepala Badan Litbang,” 2. The dialogues were held on 7 September , 2 October, 8 and 29 November, 6 and 19 December 2007 and 24 January 2008. All dialogues were in the Office of Badan Litbang in Jakarta, expect one (19 December 2007), which was in the Central Police Office (Mabes Polri).
28. Pengurus Besar Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, “12 Butir Penjelasan Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia,” available at http://www.ahmadiyya.or.id/index.php?option= com. Accessed 14 May 2008.
29. “Penjelasan Kepala Badan Litbang,” 11.
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30. See official notes on “Rakor Pakem,” in Aula Jaksa Agung Muda Intelijen Jakarta 16 April 2008, private circulation.
31. “Surat Terbuka Forum Umat Islam Kepada Presiden RI Untuk Pembubaran Ahmadiyah,” available at http://forum.syabab.com/index.ph. Accessed 15 May 2008; “Surat Terbuka Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) kepada Presiden tentang Pembubaran Ahmadiyah,” available at http://muslimin-suffer.wordpress.com. Accessed 15 May 2008; “Pandangan Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia terhadap Ahmadiyah,” available at http://hidayatul-lacom/index.php?option=com_content&taskview&id=6192&Itemid=65. Accessed 15 May 2008.
32. See for example recent books on the Ahmadiyah such as. M. Amin Djamaludin, Ahmadiyah dan Pembajakan Al-Quran (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam [LPPI]2002); Ahmadiyah Menodai Islam: Kumpulan Fakta dan Data (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam [LPPI], 2004; Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Aliran and Paham Sesat di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Al- Kautsar, 2002); Ahmad Lutfi Fathullah, Menguak Kesesatan Aliran Ahmadiyah (Jakarta: Pustaka Array, 2004); and M. Yuanda Zara, Aliran-aliran Sesat di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Banyu Media, 2007); or numerous article like M. Amin Jamaluddin, “Menjawab Kebohongan Ahmadiyah,” article posted on 16 January 2008, available at http://salafy.wordpress.com/2008/01/16/menjawab- kebohongan-ahmadiya. Accessed 15 May 2008.
33. As is well documented, this regulation was issued only a week after the incident of Monas on 1 June 2008. In this incident, some human rights activists who held a peaceful demonstration in support of religious freedom in Indonesia were attacked by a radical Muslim wing, the FPI (Forum Pembela Islam/the Islamic Defender Forum). Some of those activists were badly injured, and the echo of this attack was far-reaching and widely cov-ered in the national and international media.
34. “Keputusan Bersama Menteri Agama, Jaksa Agung, dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia No. 3 Tahun 2008; No. KEP- 033/A/JA/6/2008; No. 199 Tahun 2008 tentang Peringatan dan Perintah kepada Penganut, Anggota, dan/atau Anggota Pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) dan Warga Masyarakat,” available at http://www.depag.or.id. Accessed 11 June 2008.
35. Ahmad Suaedy, “Ahmadiyah dan Pemerintahan yang Panik, Koran Tempo 12 June 2008.
36. Rumadi, “SKB Setengah Hati,” Kompas 11 June 2008. 37. See Ismatu Ropi, “SKB yang Cacat Hukum,” Koran Jakarta 13 June
2008. 38. For current studies on the MUI see Nadirsyah Hosen, “Behind the Scenes:
Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975–1998),” Journal of Islamic
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Studies 15, 2 (2004): 147–179; and Moc Nur Ichwan, “Ulama, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia after Suharto,” Islamic Law and Society 12, 1 (2005): 45–72.
39. John Olle, “The Campaign Against ‘Heresy’: State and Society in Negotiation in Indonesia,” paper presented to the 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Wollongong, 26–29 June 2006.
40. See “Permohonan Uji Materil UU No. 1/PNPS/1965 by Tim Advokasi Kebebasan Beragama,” document from Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia 2010.
41. See for more information on the decision on the case in “Putusan Nomor 140/PUU-VII/2009 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia,” docu-ment from Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia 2009.
42. Brooke Goldstein and Aaron Eitan Meyer, “‘Legal Jihad’: How Islamist Lawfare Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech,” ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 15, 2 (2009): 395–410.
43. See more information on this issue in Ismatu Ropi, “Minoritas, Legal Jihad dan Peran Negara,” Jurnal Maarif Arus Pemikiran Islam dam Sosial 7, 1 (2012): 12–26.
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219© The Author(s) 2017I. Ropi, Religion and Regulation in Indonesia, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2827-4_15
CHAPTER 15
Conclusion
This book has focused on the intrusive role of the state in religious affairs in modern Indonesia and the problems that have arisen from the ever- greater regulation of faith communities, particularly minorities. It has shown that for much of the last century, religion’s place in the state system has been more complex and problematic than portrayed in many of the scholarly works on this subject.
It is argued in this book that the seeming unexceptional concept of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa as one of five foundational principles in Indonesia’s political system was central to the state’s inexorable encroachment on religious life. The concept itself was the consequence of a political compromise between the Nationalists and Islamists among Indonesia’s Founding Fathers. Precisely because it was a compromise, the term Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was vague in meaning and open to multiple interpretations. Indeed, the Nationalists and Islamists in 1945 had different understandings of the clause, but both sides decided against pressing for a detailed “official definition,” lest it become a sticking point for agreement on a constitution for the soon-to-be independent Indonesia. Despite its vagueness and contested meaning, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa over time came to form the basis of an increasing number of laws, regulations and policies to control religious affairs.
220
Freedom of religion was enshrined in all of Indonesia’s constitutions (that is, the original 1945 document and its various amended forms, as well as the 1949 Federal Constitution and 1950 Provisional Constitution), but at the same time the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa clause served as the justification for the government having wide-ranging discretionary powers to regulate religion and, in certain circumstances, limit religious freedom. This discretionary power became manifest with the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), the primary purpose of which was managing matters of religion, and particularly serving the interests of the Islamic community.
This book has discussed in detail how, in the 1950s and 1960s, MORA disseminated a hegemonic interpretation of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. From the beginning MORA viewed Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa as based wholly on an Islamic-derived understanding of tawhid or monotheism, and this consequently reinforced the Ministry’s role in regulating religious affairs using an Islamic framework rather than a more universalistic or multi-religious set of principles. For the Islamists in MORA, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa had political as well as religious significance, and it became an alternative means for Islamizing the state and society after the defeat of their Islamic state proposal in 1945 and 1959. In effect, their strategy shifted from creating an “Indonesian Islamic state” to “Islamizing the state and society.” This latter objective has been an ongoing process which has taken on both legal and political forms. Thus the projection of an “Islamic interpretation” of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa into legal texts on religious affairs became a means to assert Islamic norms and values into the putatively “religiously neutral” state system. This Islamic interpreta-tion has influenced many statutes and regulations that apply to all religious communities, thereby undermining the founding principle that the state privileges no particular religion.
Considerable attention has been paid in this book to the manifold ways in which MORA intruded into communities’ spiritual activities and placed increasingly strict conditions on religious expression. Ironically, these limitations were often justified in the name of protecting freedom of religion, with the Ministry casting itself as the guardian of “the realization of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” in public life. From the 1950s to early 1960 it proudly stated that it was “watching over individual freedom,” giving guidance and support so as to “promote healthy religious movements.” MORA ruled that religious freedom could only be preserved under circumstances where religious groups
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showed “awareness” and “full- responsibility” (kesadaran dan penuh tanggung jawab), implicitly signifying that someone who holds minority religious views must be mindful of and circumspect towards majority sensitivities in practising their faith. This concept of religious freedom with “awareness and full responsibility” proved to be an effective tool for successive governments to justify limits on religious expression and to act against those accused of exceeding the bounds of “acceptable” religious freedom.
This book also revealed that following the coming to power of Suharto’s authoritarian New Order in 1967, MORA’s independence and domination of religious agendas was gradually curtailed as the Ministry came under tighter regime direction. The regime dictated a new role for MORA, that of disseminating apolitical religious pietism and promoting the New Order’s policies on social and economic development using reli-gious language. Thus, the Ministry was an instrument both to undermine Islamic political activism, especially in opposition to the regime, and to popularize the New Order’s developmentalist programmes among the Muslim community.
The Suharto government also heavy-handedly used MORA’s existing regulations on religious affairs to help “restore and maintain” social and political order. The meaning of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was gradually reinterpreted and transformed into a new epithet to express and define Indonesian cultural identity. Hence Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, which was originally understood simply as “belief in one God,” became an important element in the New Order’s prescription of “proper” cultural identity. Defending this regime-sanctioned definition of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa meant defending Indonesian identity, and in turn, subscribing to “true” Indonesian identity meant accepting the official view of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. In practice, the regime used the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa principle to require all religious groups to accept monotheism and it also limited the number of legally recognized religious groups.
This model of interpretation was embodied in the elevation of the previous “Presidential Stipulation” on religious blasphemy in the mid-1960s into a new Law on Religious Vilification in 1969, which claimed to “preserve” the national identity and religious orthodoxy based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. This policy has had a far-reaching impact on the practices of state management of religious affairs throughout Suharto’s 32-year rule. While the regime considered religion as impor-tant in national development and the construction of Indonesian identity,
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religious activities were also seen as a possible source of social unrest and political dissent. Controlling religious activities and regulating religious affairs in accordance with strict regime standards was justified on the grounds of maintaining stability and order. The regime’s many regulations on religious matters were portrayed as upholding community harmony or safeguarding orthodoxy by prohibiting particular groups or practices offensive to the majority.
Thus, it was the combination of MORA’s religious regulation agenda and the New Order regime’s obsession with socio-political and economic control that brought into existence unprecedented and often excessive restrictions on religious life in Indonesia. Evidence of this can be found in the sheer number of regulations issued and also from their content, which gave authority to the state to interfere extensively in religious activities as part of its monitoring and supervisory functions. The Suharto regime at its height regulated almost all aspects of the religiosity of its citizens, including halting the activities of religious groups that were judged either to not comply with the state’s ever-narrower religio-political principles or to threaten social harmony and public order. Moreover, the New Order increasingly resorted to coercive approaches, often using the military and the state’s ubiquitous intelligence apparatus.
While such intrusive regulations remained in place for two decades, by the late 1980s the regime’s attitude to the Islamic community and in particular to its political activism began to change. The book has set out the ways in which the regime became more accommodating of Islamic aspirations and symbols. This shift was due in large part to the role played by a rising generation of moderate Muslim activists, who introduced new Islamic agendas focusing on intellectual, cultural and educational activism rather than anti-regime politics. These emergent Muslim thinkers and activists convinced Suharto that Islamic activism was no longer antithetical to the regime’s development agenda, nor a threat to his political leadership.
This thawing in relations between the regime and Islamic groups in turn led to the appearance of more overtly Islamic values and symbolism in the state system and the issuance of some policies that catered predominantly to the wishes and interests of Muslim society. The establishment of Bank Muamalat Indonesia, as the first Islamic bank in Indonesia, in 1992 was a prime example of how the regime began adopting Islamic initiatives. It also issued a succession of new pro-Islamic policies, such as allowing headcovings (jilbab) in state schools, founding a new Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) and increasing the funding for Islamic educational institutions.
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After the downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998, the Era Reformasi that followed led to a rapid transition to democracy and the lifting of many political restrictions. With this political reform, also came the re- emergence of Muslim political activism after some three decades of repression. All sorts of new Islamic groups were formed, ranging from the highly conservative to the progressive and liberal. In addition to this, sweeping decentralization since 2001 added greatly to the complexity of state–religion relations; although the central government formally retained authority in religious affairs, in reality many provincial and district administrations introduced new religious-based regulations, commonly known as perda syariah (shariah by-laws).
The book has contended that the new shariah by-laws in tandem with the pre-existing regulations on religious affairs from the Sukarno and Suharto presidencies form the main features of Indonesia’s contemporary state–religion relations. As in the past, the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa has provided the philosophical basis. It is also true that religious regulations are inseparable from various political and social factors, and are often part of political bargains between the government, major parties and dominant Islamic groups. The rise of the shariah by-laws signified the re-awakening of conservatism within the Indonesian Muslim community and, with it, a renewed push to Islamize the statutory system and moral norms of society. It also gave expression to a revival of ethno-religious identity politics as an unintended consequence of the enactment of the new law on regional autonomy.
This study nevertheless found an inherent and ongoing tension in the regulation of religion in Indonesia, with the interests of the executive and the majority Islamic community often at cross purposes. On one hand, the need to maintain social and political order requires government to regulate religious affairs, as this can easily become a major source of conflict. Tight regulation is possible when the regime is strong, as was the case with the New Order. On the other hand, the majority seeks to steer the direction of the state religious regulation, often believing their numerical superiority entitles them to influence over government policy. Even during the New Order, Suharto was wary about antagonizing the Muslim majority, and, as we have seen in Chap. 13, made many concessions to Islamic sentiment.
But the post-1998 democratic system has seen successive governments catering to the interests of the Muslim community, even when this is at the cost of minority rights. The shariah by-laws and failure to act against vigi-lantes that intimidate or attack unpopular minorities, such as the Ahmadis,
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are but two examples of this. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that incumbent governments usually have strong links to these dominant groups. Consequently the groups are likely to press for favours or insist on playing an important role in the process of legal and political decision-making. The second reason is that governments strive to maximize their political legitimacy, particularly by seeking support from the dominant groups. Given this, it is not surprising that government regulations are mostly based on the values of those powerful groups.
The paradox of post-Suharto Indonesia is that democracy, with its supposed emphasis upon rights, has proven to be no better and in some ways worse at defending minority religious rights than the political systems that preceded it. In fact, the fundamental pattern of religious authoritarianism is little altered since the Sukarno and Suharto presidencies, which is contradictory to the spirit of reform.
A central conclusion of this book is that for a country like Indonesia, with all its ethnic and religious heterogeneity, government involvement in managing religious life is inevitable, albeit with some conditions. Regulations should be judicious, impartial, fair, consistent, practical and beneficial to all religious communities, without discriminating against or privileging any particular group. Unfortunately, the record of many Indonesian governments shows them to have neglected minority rights and to have not upheld the constitutional principle of religious freedom. The incidents in early 2011 in which three Ahmadis were killed posed a severe test for the current government’s policies on religious freedom and tolerance. In addition to this, serious tensions have emerged over the building of places of worship in cities such as Bogor, Bekasi and Bandung in West Java. In the past few years, the government’s handling of religious conflict has drawn increasing criticism as levels of religious violence have risen significantly.
For many activists, the above cases regarding Ahmadiyah and attacks on other minorities like Shiah indicate the government’s reluctance to preserve a neutral position in managing religious affairs in Indonesia. Some argue that the government has wavered in the face of pressure from Islamist groups that demand the application of their own particular reli-gious values in community. For many, this has been an apt example of democratic governments bowing to pressure rather than preserving the rights of all. This suggests that when the state is weak and sections of civil society strong, the interests of minorities are vulnerable.
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In the case of the Ahmadiyah controversy for example, the Joint Ministerial Decree was never designed for proper implementation because it was legally “defective” and could not form the basis of prosecution. More importantly, developments in the Ahmadiyah case since 2009 revealed that there were an increasing number of regional regulations designed to limit or ban the group. Thus, this Decree was political in the sense that it served to minimize the controversy at the national level but enabled even more onerous restrictions on Ahmadiyah at the local level.
Ideally, government in a mature democracy should pursue policies that protect religious freedoms. All religious groups should be free from the spectre of threat and persecution. Repeatedly, Indonesian governments have, in the name of maintaining social order, trampled on or failed to uphold minority religious rights. Governments have tended to argue that the common good was a matter of majority preference rather than respect for individual freedom and equality in religious expression. Sadly, successive administrations in Indonesia have not approached religious issues in a manner that is impartial and just to all of the nation’s many faith communities.
Of relevance here is the case of the judicial review in the Constitutional Court (MK) of the 1965 Blasphemy Law. The court ruled that this Law in essence did not contradict the right of religious freedom and concluded that the state was responsible for maintaining security and order, and therefore has legal authority to prohibit any interpretation that was different from mainstream teachings. Widely seen as a victory for conservative groups, the court decision will probably ensure the continuation of existing state intervention in religious affairs. Given Indonesia’s political dynamics and the attitude of its judiciary, the state’s commitment to protect religious freedoms is now in considerable doubt. Muslim organizations and Islamist activists are unlikely to ease their pressure on elected officials to continue to issue policies which reflect their religious preferences, which will likely result in intensifying state supervision of spiritual activities and governments asserting their authority to define what is proper and improper with regard to religious beliefs and behaviour. Thus Indonesia’s constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion has every prospect of being further undermined in the future.
CONCLUSION
227© The Author(s) 2017I. Ropi, Religion and Regulation in Indonesia, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2827-4
No Names of regulations
1. Government Decree No. 12/1946 on taking control of administration related to Islam previously carried out by different ministerial offices
2. Ministerial Decree No. 2/1185.K.J./1946 on new sections for the Protestant and Catholic groups in the Ministerial office
3. Statue No. 22 Year 1946 the Law No. 22/1946 on Islamic marriage4. Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 1185/KJ/1946 on the Structure of
Ministry of Religious Affairs5. Joint Decree of Minister of Religious Affair and Minister of Education No. 1142.
BHGA/1946 on Islamic education6. Joint Circular of Minister of Internal and Minister of Religious Affairs No. 3/1947
on 3 roles of kaum [government-paid religious leader] (modin, koyim, lebe and amil)7. Presidential Stipulation No. 4/1963 on the prevention and control to printed
materials potentially disturbing public order8. Presidential Stipulation No. 1/1965 on the prevention or misuse and/or religious
vilification9. Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967 on Religion, Belief and Chinese Culture
10. Presidential Instruction No. 10/1968 on Control and Surveillance of activities of foreigner who work in Indonesia
11. Statute No. 5/1969 on Elevating President Stipulations and President Decrees as Statute
12. Joint Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Internal Affairs No. 01/Ber/Mdn-Mag/1969 on roles of state officials in maintaining order and stipulating harmonious religious life and worship among the adherents
Appendix 1
List of ReguLAtions on ReLigion in indonesiA RefeRRed in the Book (BAsed on YeAR of issuAnce)
228 228 APPENDIX 1
No Names of regulations
13. Decree of Minister of Internal Affairs No. 221/1975 on the documentation of marriage and divorce in civil registrar office as part of the enactment of Marriage Law
14. Telex of Minister of Internal Affairs No. 264/KWT/DITPUH/DV/V/1975 on the use of private houses as public places of worship (churches)
15. Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 44/1978 on Islamic preaching through radio broadcast
16. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 9/1978 in regards with Islamic preaching (dakwah) through radio broadcast
17. Circular of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 3/1978 on Islamic preaching (dakwah) through radio broadcast
18. Decree of Minister of Internal Affairs No. 97/1978 on Christian marriage in Indonesia in accord with Staatblad 1933 – 75 Jo Staatblad 1936 – 607 for Hindu and Buddhist marriages
19. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 4/1978 on polices to aliran-aliran Kepercayaan (Javanese religious beliefs and local beliefs)
20. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 14/1978 on follow-up to Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 4/1978 on polices to aliran-aliran Kepercayaan (Javanese religious beliefs and local beliefs)
21. Letter/Circular of Minister of Religious Affairs to Governor of East Java No. B/5943/78 on aliran kepercayaan
22. Letter/Circular of Minister of Religious Affairs to all Governors in Indonesia No. B.VI/11215/1978 on religious grouping, marriage, vowing and funeral service for the adherent of aliran kepercayaan
23. Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 70/1978 on guideline for religious mission
24. Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 77/1978 on foreign aid to religious organisations in Indonesia
25. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 8/1979 on guidance, supervision and control to Islamic organisations and sects that contradict to Islamic teachings
26. Letter of Minister of Religious Affairs RI to Minister of Internal Affairs No. MA/650/1979 on marriage documentation of the adherent of aliran kepercayaan
27. Letter/Circular of Minister of Internal Affairs No. 477/74054/1975 on practical guideline in inputting data about religious affiliation as stated in Decree of Minister of Internal Affairs No. 221a/1975
28. Joint Decree Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Internal Affairs No. 1/1979 on guideline for religious mission and foreign aid to religious organisations in Indonesia
29. Letter/Circular of Minister of Justice to heads of provincial courts No. JM/2/23/1979 on the enactment of immigration form of KIM-S as prerequisite in applying Indonesian citizenship for foreign missionaries
30. Decree of Governor of Jakarta No. 648/1979 on re-enactment of administrative procedures in establishing places of worship and places of religious activities in Jakarta
229APPENDIX 1
No Names of regulations
31. Decree of Governor of Jakarta No. 649/1979 on rules in establishing places of worship and places of religious activities in Jakarta
32. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 13/1980 on guidance for Muslim community in preserving environment
33. Joint Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs, Minister of Internal Affairs and Attorney General No. 67/1980; No. 224/1980; No. Kep.III/JA/10/1980 on practical guideline for Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967 on religion, belief and Chinese culture
34. Letter/Circular of Minister of Internal Affairs to all Indonesian Governors and Heads of Districts No. 477/286/SJ/1980 on guideline of administrative documentation for marriages of the adherents of aliran kepercayaan
35. Letter/Circular of Minister of Religious Affairs to the Head of MORA office in Central Kalimantan No. MA/203/1980 on the fusion of Kaharingan (local belief in Kalimantan) into Hinduism
36. Letter/Circular of Attorney General to Minister of Religious Affairs (up. Directorate General Islamic Guidance and Pilgrimage) No. B-397/D.I/1980 on marriage among the adherents of Sapto Darmo (aliran kepercayaan) in Bojonegoro East Java
37. Letter/Circular of Minister of Religious Affairs to Minister of Internal Affairs No. B. VI/5996/1980 on marriage, identity card and funeral ceremony for the adherents of aliran kepercayaan
38. Radiogram/Telegram of Minister of Religious Affairs to all Provincial Head of MORA No. MA/610/1980 on procedure to fill in form in census for the adherents of aliran kepercayaan
39. Radiogram/Telegram of Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Internal Affairs to all Governors and all Provincial Head of MORA No. 470.071/6380/SJ.MA/610/1980 on practical guideline of procedure to fill in form in census for the adherents of aliran kepercayaan
40. Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 35/1980 on consultative forum for religious groups
41. Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 49/1980 on recommendation in regard with the application of foreign missionaries to do activities in Indonesia
42. Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 50/1980 on recommendation for naturalization of some foreign missionaries
43. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 5/1981 on guideline for religious preaching
44. Instruction Minister of Religious Affairs RI No. 4/1981 on the documentation of foreign missionaries in Indonesia
45. Decree Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Semarang No. MK.03/1-a/0385/1983 on Roles and Requirement for Establishing Places of Worship
46. Letter/Circular of General Secretary of Ministry of Religious Affairs No. SJ/6631/1985 on celebration and commemoration of religious festive days
230 APPENDIX 1
No Names of regulations
47. Joint Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Health No. 294/1986; No. 788/Men.Kes/SKB/XI/1986 on comprehensive guideline on health program through religion
48. Circular of Governor of Jakarta No. 4/1987 on controlling activities on religious charities in Jakarta
49. Letter/Circular of Minister of Cooperation No. 03/M/l/1987 on developing cooperation/small business in religious organisations and education
50. Joint Decree of Minister of Transmigration and Minister of Religious Affairs No. SKB.02/Men/89; No. 22/1989 on improving religious life for prospective transmigrants
51. Instruction of Governor Jakarta No. 39/1991 on managing the places of worship52. Presidential Decree No. 75/1995 on the activities of foreigners on religion field53. Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs RI No. 84/1996 on practical guideline in
eliminating unrest among religious adherents54. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 6/1996 on maintaining religious
harmony among the adherents55. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 1/1997 on appeal to increase
awareness to various issues that may disturb Indonesian unity particularly on religious matters
56. Instruction of Minister of Religious Affairs No. 2/1997 on campaign in eliminating the latent influence of communism through religion
231
pResidentiAL stipuLAtion no. 1/pnps/1965 jo. LAw no. 1/1969 on pRevention oR Misuse And/oR
ReLigious viLificAtion
President of the Republic of Indonesia
Considering:
a. that to secure the state and society, national revolutionary aspira-tions and national development leading to a just and prosperous society, there is a need to enact regulation to prevent the misuse or religion vilification;
b. that to secure revolution and public order, this issue should be regu-lated by Presidential Stipulation;
Given:
1. Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution; 2. Article IV of the Transitional Provisions of the 1945 Constitution; 3. Presidential Decree No. 2/1962 (as mentioned in state gazette No.
34/ 1962); 4. Article 2, paragraph (1) Decree of MPRS No. II/MPRS/1960;
Appendix 2
© The Author(s) 2017I. Ropi, Religion and Regulation in Indonesia, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2827-4
232 APPENDIX 2
decided
Assign: PRESIDENTIAL STIPULATION NO. 1/PNPS/1965 ON THE PREVENTION OR MISUSE AND/OR RELIGIOUS VILIFICATION
Article 1Each person is prohibited to deliberately in public communicate persuade, or solicit public support for an interpretation of a religion or a form or religious activity that is similar to the interpretations or activities of an Indonesian religion but deviates from the tenets of that religion.
Article 2 1. Any person who violates the provisions mentioned in Article 1 will
be given an order and a stern warning to stop the offense in form of a joint decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, Minister/Attorney General and Minister of the Internal Affairs.
2. If the offense under subsection (1) is conducted by an organization or religious sect, then President of the Republic of Indonesia may dissolve the organization, and may declare the organization or the sect as deviant after the President received recommendation from the Minister of Religious Affairs, Minister/ Attorney General and Minister of the Internal Affairs.
Article 3If, after any action taken jointly by the Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister/Attorney General and Minister of the Internal Affairs or by the President of the Republic of Indonesia as stated in provision of Article 2 to any person, organization or sect, they still continue to violate the provision of Article 1, then that person, the follower, the member and/or board of member of the organization may be punished with five years’ imprisonment.
Article 4In the [Indonesian] Book of Penal Law will be inserted a new article as follows:
Article 156a
233APPENDIX 2
Sentenced to imprisonment for five years anyone who deliberately shows the feelings or acts in public:
a. that is fundamentally hostile, misuse or vilify a religion observed in Indonesia;
b. with the intention to prevent others from observing any religion which is based on Ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa (lit. the belief in God Almighty).
Article 5This stipulation of President of the Republic of Indonesia shall come into force on the day of enactment.
So for the sake that everyone will aware of [this stipulation], it is ordered to insert this Stipulation of President of the Republic of Indonesia in by State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia.
Stipulated in: JakartaOn: January 27, 1965.
President of the Republic of Indonesia,SUKARNO
235
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257© The Author(s) 2017I. Ropi, Religion and Regulation in Indonesia, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2827-4
Index1
1 Note: Page number followed by ‘n’ refers to footnotes.
AAdji, Oemar Seno, 120, 125n8agama ardhii, 118agama samawi, 118agama suku, 153, 155, 156, 160n32Ahmadis, 223, 224Ahmadiyah, 1, 7, 8, 11Ahmad, Mirza Ghulam, 173,
174, 179n32Ali, A. Mukti, 144, 145, 147,
158n9–12, 159n13, 159n15aliran kebatinan, 121–4, 132, 148aliran kepercayaan, 143, 145, 148,
149, 166, 167aliran sesat (or aliran sempalan or
aliran menyimpang), 147al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, 211Aminuddin, Lia, 211Amish community, 35Anshari, Endang Saifuddin, 9, 12n5Anshary, Muhammad Isa, 93, 115n26anti-establishmentism clause, 16Article 18 of the United Nations
Charter or the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 82
‘atheistic’, 31, 32Atkinson, 46, 54n2, 54n4,
54n5, 54n7Ayyub, Abubakar, 171
BBAKORPAKEM (Badan Koordinasi
Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan di Masyarakat/Coordinating Body for the Supervision of Local Beliefs in Society), 148, 206, 208
Balinese Hinduism, 119Ball, Alan R., 22, 27n21Basyuni, Muhammad Maftuh,
204, 215n17Beaman, Lori G., 24, 28n28, 28n31belum beragama (‘not yet possessing a
religion’), 155Benda, Harry J., 9, 12n8Besluiten (Governor General’s
Decisions), 51
258 INDEX
Biro Urusan Hindu Bali (Bureau of Balinese Hindu Affairs), 119
BKKI (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia/Indonesian Kebatinan Congress Body), 109–11
Blandine Chelini-Pont, 36, 37, 41n20, 41n21, 41n23
Boland, B.J., 9, 12n5BPUPK[I] (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-
Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Indonesia), 1, 2
‘bureaucratizing’ Islam, 103–7Bush, Robin, 188, 195, 196n9,
196n10, 196n12, 196n14, 197n16
CChalil, Moenawar, 53, 56n28Chinese temples (kelenteng), 154Cina or Chinese, 143, 153–5,
160n27, 160n28‘civil and ecclesiastical’, 33Cokroaminoto, Umar Said, 170complete human advancement
(pembangunan manusia seutuhnya), 133
Confucianism, 153–5, 160n30Constitutional Court, 212Cultivation System or Cultuurstelse, 48cultuelle (tradition), 36, 41n21cultural identity, 4customary laws (adat istiadat), 71, 85
Ddakwah, 143, 145, 146, 159n19, 159n20Darmaputera, Eka, 9, 12n6, 92,
98n9, 98n10Dasar Negara, 10DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah
Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Mission Council), 172, 173, 181n41
a dead God (Tuhan Mati), 93Dekrit Presiden (Presidential Decree), 24Departement van Onderwijs, Eerdienst
en Nijverheid (Department of Education, Worship and Industry), 48–9
developmentalism, 127developmentalist programs, 221Dewan Nasional (National Council), 110Dewantara, Ki Hadjar, 102, 105Dewas or the Deities, 119discrimination, 17, 18, 34, 37–9, 40n8divine triad, impersonality and
polytheism-animism, 119Djajadiningrat, Hoesein, 71Djambek, Saadoeddin, 130, 136n9Durkheim, Emile, 31, 40n6
EEdge, Peter W., 30, 39n4Effendi, Djohan, 137n20–22,
205, 216n22Effendy, Bahtiar, 9, 12n5Erdodan, 23, 27n15, 28n26Establishment Clause, 16, 26n4Ethical Policy, 59
FFaisal Ismail, 9, 12n5Falun Gong movement, 38fatwa (religious edict), 171–4favouritism, 18, 34, 36–7, 39Federspiel, Howard, 141, 158n3FKD (Front Ketuhanan dan
Demokrasi or the Front of God and Democracy), 108
FKUB (Forum Komunikasi Umat Beragama/The Interreligious Communication Forum), 200–3, 215n13
259INDEX
Foucault, Michel, 139, 140, 158n1Founding Fathers, 1, 2Front Anti Komunis (the Anti-
Communism Front), 108Front Demokrasi Rakyat (People’s
Democratic Front), 108
GGBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan
Negara/the Main Guidelines of State’s Policies), 166, 167
Geertz, Clifford, 161, 176n1, 176n3Gill, 25, 28n32governmentalization, 139–60Guided Democracy, 24, 94Gunn, T. Jeremy, 31, 40n7, 41n16Gvosdev, Nikolas K., 20, 21,
27n11–14, 27n18, 27n19
HHabibie, B.J., 185–7Haddad, 23, 27n17, 28n25Hadikusumo, 65, 72–4, 76n18,
76n20, 76n21, 77n38hajj (pilgrimage), 50, 55n19, 55n20,
131, 140, 184Hamka, 90, 91, 93, 97n1, 168,
171, 181n41Harun, Lukman, 163, 176n7Hasan, Teuku, 72, 73Hashem, Omar, 130, 136n9Hasjim, Wahid, 70–3, 108, 114n19Hatta, 59, 62, 70, 72–4, 77n36, 77n38headscarves (jilbab), 184Hefner, Robert W., 185, 196n3Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken
(Advisory Office for Native and Islamic Affairs), 51, 55n22, 102
hijab (the headscarf), 32, 33, 35Hooker, M.B., 44, 54n6HOS Tjokroaminoto, 53
IICCPR. See International Covenant on
Cultural and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Ichwan, 50, 51, 55n19, 55n20ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim
se-Indonesia/the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association), 185, 222
Idenburg, Alexander, 52Ilyas, Muhammad, 106, 109Indonesia is not a theocratic or a
secular state, but rather a religious state (Indonesia bukan negara agama dan bukan negara sekular), 134
Indonesian character (jati diri bangsa), 132
the Indonesian criminal code (the KUHP), 120
International Covenant on Cultural and Political Rights (ICCPR), 19, 22, 31
Islamization of the society, 185Islamization of the state, 185, 186isolated communities (suku
terasing), 156
JJAI (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia/
Indonesian Ahmadiyah Council), 205–9, 217n34
Jakarta Charter, 70, 73, 76n9, 76n22, 77n37, 82, 83, 130, 145
Jamiah al-Mubashirin, 175Judaism, 118, 124
KKafrawi, Fathurrahman, 105, 114n13Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken (Office
of Native Affairs), 9, 12n7
260 INDEX
kebangsaan (nationalism), 60kebatinan, 118, 121, 122, 124, 125kejawen (Javanese mysticism), 66khalifatulfilardhi, 45Knaap, Gerrit, 49, 51, 55n13, 55n23KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia
Pusat/Central Indonesian National Committee), 102, 103, 113n1
Kompilasi Hukum Islam (the Compilation of Islamic Law), 185
Krishnaswami, Arcot, 37, 41n25Krussteff, Atanas, 23, 27n22Kuru, Ahmet T., 59, 75n4Kusumasumantri, 102Kuyper, Abraham, 52
Llaïcité, 34, 35, 41n16Latuharhary, 71, 72, 102legal jihad, 211–13, 218n42, 218n43Liberal Policy, 48Liddle, William, 185, 195n1local indigenous beliefs (agama suku
or agama murba), 153, 155
MMaarif, Ahmad Syafii, 9, 12n5MacDougall, John James, 129,
135n3, 135n4Magnis-Suseno, Franz, 201Mailrapporten (Notes from the
Governor-General to the Minister of the Colonies), 51
Majapahit, 44Maklumat Pemerintah (Government
Statement), 103mangkubumi, 45Maramis, 70Margaret Blood, 170, 179n33Marriage Law (Undang-Undang
Perkawinan), 166
Masyumi (Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia/Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council), 60
Means, Gordon P., 28n24Media Dakwah, 173, 174, 176n5,
176n8, 178n21, 181n41Migdal, John, 22Ministerial Statement (Maklumat
Menteri), 105Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA),
101–20, 123Mujiburrahman, 10, 13n9Murtopo, Ali, 145Muzadi, Hasyim, 202Muzakkir, Abdul Kahar, 70, 72, 75n9,
76n9, 77n35
NNagarakrtagama, 44national culture (kebudayaan bangsa),
141, 155national identity or character (jati diri
bangsa), 122, 141, 155Natsir, Muhammad, 59, 60, 74, 90,
93, 98n3, 98n12negara berketuhanan, 57, 69negara Islam, 57neutrality, 34–6Ngaju (or Kaharingan), 39Ngaju people, 1571950 Provisional Constitution
(Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara 1950 or the UUDS 1950), 79
1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 or the UUD 1945), 79–83
1949 Federal Constitution (Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Serikat 1949 or the Konstitusi RIS 1949), 79, 84, 86
Noer, Deliar, 60, 65, 75n5, 76n19
261INDEX
nominal Muslims (abangan), 54, 58‘non-theistic’, 31, 32Nusantara, 44, 54n1
Oorthodoxy, 128
PP4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan
Pengamalan Pancasila/Guideline of Internalization and Implementation of the Pancasila), 167, 169
paham negara integralistik (the concept of the integralistic state), 95
PAKEM (Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat/Supervisory Body of Local Beliefs in Society), 109, 110, 115n34
Pan-Islamism, 51Panitia Sembilan (the Committee of
Nine), 70, 73Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya), 53Partai Arab Indonesia (Indonesian
Arab Party), 53Partai Katolik Jawi [Javanese Catholic
Party]), 53Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI/
Indonesian Nationalist Party), 110passive secularism, 59penghulus (religious advisor), 51penguasa (the government or the
ruler), 84, 86perda syariah (shariah by-laws)., 6persecution, 17, 34, 37–9PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia/the
Indonesian Communist Party), 108, 110, 113n6, 115n26, 128, 131, 132
political regimes (authoritarian or democratic), 23
PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/Preparatory Committee of Indonesian Independence), 72–4
Prawiranegara, Alamsjah Ratu, 145, 159n16, 159n17, 166
Prince Diponegoro, 49‘pseudo Islamization’, 186Pye, Lucian, 104
QQadiani, Ahmadiyah, 205Qadiani group, 171, 173
RRabithah ‘Alam al-Islami (Islamic
World Union), 169Ramstedt, Martin, 9, 12n6Rangkuti, Bahrum, 175Rasjidi, Mohammad, 104, 105, 130,
136n8, 136n11Ratulangie, Sam, 72recognition15recognized religions’ (agama yang
diakui), 84Reformasi, 6, 11Regulation on Teaching Licences or
Guru Ordinates, 51religion and affairs of state (din wa
dawlah), 104religious dialogue, 144religious subjects (pelajaran
agama), 105REPELITA (Rencana Pembangunan
Lima Tahun/Five-Year Development Plan), 133
the Republicans and the Federalists, 84restriction, 34, 37–9Rosin, Helmut, 91, 98n4Roy, Yusman, 211
262 INDEX
SSairin, Weinata, 201, 214n6Salim, Agus, 70, 71, 90, 97n2, 106,
114n20, 170Sanasarian, Eliz, 18, 27n10Sang Adhi Buddha (the Original and
Eternal Buddha), 119Sang Hyang Widi, 119SARA (suku, agama, ras dan antar-
golongan/ethnicity, religion, race and class), 140
Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), 56n30, 58
Schiller, Anne, 10, 13n9Scientology, 35secularization, 130, 132semangat kebatinan, 66Semuel Agustinus Patty, 10, 13n9,
115n27separation, 15Shiah, 224Shintoism, 124Shumubu (Office of Religious
Affairs), 60Sidjabat, Bonar, 9, 12n6, 92,
97n8, 97n10Simatupang, T.B., 91, 98n5, 98n10Simorangkir, J.C.T., 163Sjahrir, 59, 103Sriwijaya, 44Staatbladens (legislations), 50Steenbrink, Karel, 47, 49,
54n9, 55n17Subagya, Rahmat (J.M.W. Bakker), 91,
92, 98n6, 98n7, 98n11, 107, 114n17, 114n21, 115n33
Subardjo, Ahmad, 70Sukarno, 59, 60, 66–72, 74, 75n6,
77n35Sumartana, 49, 55n12, 55n14, 55n15Suminto, Aqib, 9, 12n7
Supomo, 62, 63, 66, 84, 94, 95, 97Šturm, Lovro, 23, 27n23
TTaoism, 124tawhid or monotheism, 220, 221Ten Berge controversy, 121theistic, 31, 32, 35theocratic, 17, 18Theology of Liberation, 148Tibetan Buddhist, 38Tjokrosujoso, Abikoesno, 70Tony Blackshield, 16, 27n6total human advancement
(pembangunan manusia seutuhnya), 183
Trilogy Kerukunan (Trilogy of Religious Harmony), 146
UUN Declaration on the Elimination of
Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 31, 40n8
unification, 15Urat Tunggang Pantjasila, 90, 97n1
Vvan der Heiden, Isabel, 49, 51,
55n13, 55n23van der Kroef, Justus M., 10, 12n9van Klinken, Gerry, 9, 12n6Verbalen (Files of the Ministry of
Colonies), 51VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische
Compagnie), 47, 48Volksraad (a semi-parliamentary
council), 53, 56n30von Denffer, Ahmad, 10, 12n9
263INDEX
WWadah Musyawarah Antar
Agama (forum on inter-religious consultation), 162, 163
Wadah Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama, 147, 159n22
Wahabi teachings, 38Wahid, Abdurrahman, 155Weithman, Paul, 15, 26n1westernization, 130, 132Wongsonegoro, 71, 110
YYamin, Muhammad, 64, 66–8, 70, 74,
76n9–17, 76n23–25, 77n27–n35, 77n39, 77n40
Yang, Heriyanto, 10, 13n9Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim
Pancasila, 184Yudhoyono, Susolo Bambang, 200
ZZoroastrianism, 124Zuhri, Saifuddin, 119, 120