19 mistake proofing techniques
TRANSCRIPT
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Mistake Proofing Techniques
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Learning Objectives
At the end of this section delegates will be able to:
Explain the role of Mistake Proofing within Lean Six Sigma
Recognise that defects can be eliminated (100% of thetime)
Understand that Mistake Proofing should be focused onprocess steps that rely on operator vigilance andconcentration
Recognise that simple, low cost devices can be the mosteffective solutions
Use a simple process for implementing a Mistake Proofingsystem
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History of Error Proofing
Dr Shigeo Shingo attributed with developing the methods
Originally called Idiot Proofing but recognised that this label
could offend workers so changed to Mistake Proofing (Poka
Yoke in Japanese)
Literally translated
Yokeru: to avoid
Poka: inadvertent errors
Target of Zero Defects and elimination of QC Inspection
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Human Error
Humans make mistakes (errors) because of
- Forgetfulness - Misunderstanding
- Lack of experience/skills - Lack of concentration
- Laziness - Lack of standards
- Rushing - Taking short cuts
- Malicious intent (deliberate action)
Errors (can) lead to defects
Defects are not inevitable and can be eliminated by the useof simple, low cost methods zero defects
Mistake Proofing should take over repetitive tasks thatdepend on vigilance or memory
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Types of Error
Four main types of error:
Processing
1. Omitted Processing - Step in process not carried out
Eg form not checked, discount not included, invoice not sent, hole not drilled,part not cleaned
2. Processing Errors - step in process carried out incorrectly
Eg wrong discount included, invoice sent to wrong address, hole drilled in wrongplace
Materials
3. Missing materials/information
Eg form not filled out completely, order not complete, screw left out4. Wrong materials/information
Eg wrong form filled out, wrong information supplied, wrong screw used
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SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Shutdown Process
Control Process
Warn Operator
Shutdown Process
Control Flow
Warn Operator
Functions of Poka Yoke
EliminateDefects
Predict Defect(about to occur)
Detect Defect(occurred)
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ABC Fix Explanation Scenario
The Problem:
Automobiles are crossing the
train tracks and getting hit by
a train.
The C Fix:
Place flashing cross signs at
the crossing to alert vehicles.
Dilemma: Vehicles are alerted
of oncoming trains but can still
cross. Problem not solved.
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SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
ABC Fix Explanation Scenario
The B Fix:
Place cross gates at crossing to furtherdeter crossing of vehicles.
Dilemma: Vehicles are alerted and have
limited crossing ability; however doesnot prevent those who arbitrarily want tocross. Problem deterred but not solved.
The A Fix:
Build overpass for vehicles to crosstrain tracks without incident.
Dilemma: None. Problem solved.
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Blade can stay outwithout operatortouching it
Sharp point
Rounded point
Spring loaded--when operatorlets go, the bladegoes back in
Guard protecting bladeonly releases when
button is pushed
Extra safety guardsmake it difficult toaccidentally contact blade
Original Box Cutter
Safety Example
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Elevators
Some common safety features are listed below:
Doors sensors detect if an object/person is blocking
entrance, if so they automatically open
2 separate braking systems used. The first is opened by
electrical current, if power is lost the brake closes underhigh spring tension. The second is a centrifugal brake
governing the maximum speed
A host of switches and sensors control the positioning of
the elevator
Acceleration/deceleration alters with weight in carriage
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Medicine (Bottles)
Up to one in five toddlers canopen medicine bottles andchemical containers, even if theyhave child-resistant tops
Every year 25,000 under-fives aretaken to casualty, suspected ofswallowing substances rangingfrom medicines to householdcleaning products
One in five are admitted tohospital for treatment
Child-resistant tops are nowcommonplace on most medicinebottles and household chemicals -but they are child-resistant, notchild-proof
Source BBC News
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Electrical (Household)
RCD (Residual Current Device)
Automatically cuts off power supply if a leakage current to ground isdetected
Mains Socket
Earth pin first to make and last to break contact
Earth pin has to enter socket to move protective shields from Live andNEUTRAL connections
Shape prevents incorrect fitment
3 Pin Plug
Only fits one way round
Ergonomically designed so it is picked up by the case
Insulation on Live and Neutral to prevent accidental touching of pins
If wired correctly and plug pulled out by cable, Live first to pull out,Neutral second, Earth last
Fuse standard for plug no other fuses will fit. Maximum fuse size 13 amp
If cover is not in place pins push back and cannot enter socket
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Electrical (General) Shapes and colours extensively used to prevent equipment
being incorrectly connected
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Appliances
Microwave
Will not work until the door is shut
Washing machine
Will not start until door is closed
Will not allow door to be opened until cycle is
complete
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Low Brake Pad WarningIndicators Brake pad wear indicators are fitted to
most modern cars. They are made upof 2 insulated wires which fit in a holeinside the brake pad
As brake pads wear the insulatedcables become exposed and themetal brake disk connects them like aswitch
An electrical signal then lights up awarning lamp on the cars dashboardalerting the driver before the brakesfail
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Using Shapes and Colours
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Software Warnings andReminders
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Using Dialogue Boxes andSoftware Checks
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Using Switches and AutomaticBraking Safety switches need to be pressed and held before the start
levers will operate.
Upon release of start lever, brakes automatically come on stoppingthe cutting blades etc
Safety interlocks or light beams used to automatically shut down orstop processes
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Using Checklists
Backup generator functional6
Generator voltage (Min 220v Max 250V)5
Hydraulic pressure (Min 30 bar Max 40
bar)
4
Ailerons functional3
Altimeter calibration (+50 Metres)2
Fuel level (min 1500 Max 2500)1
Pre-flight Checklist
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Visual Prevention Methods
Some solutions are better
than others
Which signs would be the
most successful in
preventing different
nationalities entering the
incorrect toilet?
Ladies Gents
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Using Lights, Sounds, Signsand Barriers
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Amsterdam Airport: Problem-AirportCleanliness
Target Practice?!
Error Proofing and FMEA Complimentary Techniques?
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SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
History of FMEA
First used in the 1960s in the aerospace industry
during the Apollo missions
In 1974, the US Navy developed MIL-STD-1629
regarding the use of FMEA
In the late 1970s, driven by product liability costs,
FMEA moved into U.S automotive applications
SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
FMEA Inputs and Outputs
Inputs
Process map
Process history
Process technical procedures
Outputs
List of actions to prevent causes or to detect failure
modes
History of actions taken
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SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
FMEA Team
Team approach is necessary
Responsible black/green belt leads the team
Recommended representatives:
Operators/administrators/supervisors
Design
Engineering
Operations
Distribution
Finance
Information Technology
Human Resources
SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Process
Step/InputPotential Failure Mode Potential Failure Effects
S
E
V
Potential Causes
O
C
C
Current Controls
D
E
T
R
P
N
Actions
Recommended
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
What istheinput ?
Whatcan gowrongwiththe
input?
Whatcan bedone?
What isthe
effecton the
output?
What arethe causes?
How
bad?
How
often?
How
well?
(1-10) (1-10) (1-10)
Completing an FMEA
How are
these foundor
prevented?
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Definition of Terms - Failure Mode
Definition
The way a specific process input fails
Will cause the effect to occur if not corrected orremoved
Examples
Temperature too high
Incorrect PO number
Surface contamination
Dropped call (customer service)
Paint too thin
SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Definition of Terms - Effect
Definition
Impact on customer requirements
Generally an external customer focus, but can also includedownstream processes
Examples
Temperature too high: paint cracks
Incorrect PO number: accounts receivable traceability errors
Surface contamination: poor adhesion
Dropped call: customer dissatisfaction
Paint too thin: poor coverage
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Definition of Terms - Cause
Definition
Sources of process variation that cause the failure mode tooccur
Identification of causes starts with failure modes associatedwith the highest severity ratings
Examples
Temperature too high: thermocouple out of calibration
Incorrect PO number: typographical error
Surface contamination: overhead hoist systems Dropped call: insufficient number of CS representatives
Paint too thin: high solvent content
SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Definition of Terms - CurrentControls
Definition
Systematised methods / devices in place to prevent ordetect failure modes or causes (before causing effects)
Prevention consists of failsafing, automated control andsetup verifications
Controls consist of audits, checklists, inspection,laboratory testing, training, SOPs, preventivemaintenance, etc
Which is more important to process:
improvement, prevention or detection?
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Definition of Terms - Risk PriorityNumber (RPN)
Definition
The output of an FMEA
A calculated number based on information you provide, regarding:
Potential failure modes,
Effects, and
Current ability of the process to detect the failures before reaching the
customer
Calculated as the product of three quantitative ratings, each one
related to the effects, causes, and controls:
RPN = Severity X Occurrence X Detection
Effects
Effects Causes
Causes Controls
Controls
SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Risk Priority Number
Risk Priority Number is not absolute
Scaling for severity, occurrence and detection can
be locally developed
Be aware of customer requirements
Other categories can be added
For example, one engineer added an impact score to
the RPN calculation to estimate the overall impact of the
failure mode on the process
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Definition of Terms
Severity (of Effect)(1 = Not Severe, 10 = Very Severe)
Importance of effect on customer requirements
Could also be concerned with safety and other risks if failure occurs
Occurrence (of Cause)(1 = Not Likely, 10 = Very Likely)
Frequency with which a given cause occurs and creates failuremode(s)
Can sometimes refer to the frequency of a failure mode
Detection (Capability of Current Controls) (1 = Likely to Detect,
10 = Not Likely at all to Detect) Ability of current control scheme to detect or prevent:
The causes before creating failure mode
The failure modes before causing effect
SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Example Rating Scale
Rating Severity of Effect Likelihood of Occurrence Ability to Detect
10 Haz ardous without warningVery high:
Cannot detect
9 Hazardous with warningFailure is almost inevitable
Very remote chance of detection
8 Loss of primary functionHigh:
Remote chance of detection
7Reduced primary function
performance
Repeated failuresVery low chance of detection
6 Loss of secondary functionModerate:
Low chance of detection
5Reduced secondary function
performance
Occasional failuresModerate chance of detection
4Minor defect noticed by most
customers
Moderately high chance of
detection
3Minor defect noticed by some
customers Low:High chance of detection
2Minor defect noticed by
discriminating customers
Relatively few failuresVery high chance of detection
1 No effect Remote: Failure is unlikely Almost certain detection
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Process
Step
Key Process
Input
Failure Modes -What can go
wrong? Effects Causes
Current
Controls
Pour into
glassBeer volume Overflow
Wasted Beer/
Wet LapDrunk None
Glass too small Visual
Not paying
attentionNone
Too much foam
Bad Taste /
Don't get as
drunk
No tilt Visual
Pouring too highVisual and operator
training
Pouring too fastVisual and operator
training
No Foam
No beer
mustache/ Poor
taste
Fla t beer Expiration date
Tilted glass Visual
S low Pour Ope ra tor tra ining
Empty glass No drink Too drunk None
Broken Glass Visual
No Money
Job / Process
Excellence - big
bonus
No Friends Personality
A Well-Loved Process FMEA
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FMEA Hints
Keep it simple; not complex (no wall charts)
Must involve a team, no lone ranger
development
Update it as you move through the roadmap
Make sure the FMEA is an action tool, not just a
document; use the right half of the tool
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POKA YOKE Connection to the FMEA
Process
Step/InputPotential Failure Mode Potential Failure Effects
S
E
V
Potential Causes
O
C
C
Current Controls
D
E
T
R
P
N
Actions
Recommended
What is the
process step/
Input under
investigation?
In what ways does the Key
Input go wrong?
What is the impact on the Key
Output Variables (Customer
Requirements) or internal
requirements?
How
Severeisthe
effecttothe
cusotmer?What causes the Key Input to
go wrong?
How
oftendoescause
orFMo
ccur?What are the existing controls and
procedures (inspection and test)
that prevent eith the cause or the
Failure Mode? Should include an
SOP number.
How
wellcanyou
detectcauseorFM? What are the actions
for reducing the
occurrance of the
Cause, or improving
detection? Should
have actions only on
high RPN's or easy
fixes.
0
0
0
Good POKA YOKE devices drive down
occurrence and detection rankings.
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Poka Yoke Workshop 1Process: Tightening nuts
Problem: Washers left out before tightening
Description of process: Operator adds washer and nut, then tightens usingan automatic nut driver.
Prevent Error/Detect Error
Shutdown/Control/Warn
Before improvement: It is possible
to tighten the nuts even if washersare missing.
After Improvement:
Solution:
(Delete as appropriate)
(Delete as appropriate)
Nut, tightened withno washer
Nut driver
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Poka Yoke Workshop 2Pprocess: Parts Transport LineProblem: Parts supplied upside down toautomatic machinery
Description of Process: A transportation chute feeds parts from a press into the nextprocess. in the next process parts are mounted in the same position as they arrive.
Prevent Error/Detect Error
Shutdown/Control/Warn
Before Improvement: Operators watchincoming work pieces carefully and removeupside down parts. some are alwaysoverlooked.
After Improvement:
Solution:
(Delete as appropriate)
(Delete as appropriate)
Upside DownCorrect Work piece
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SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Poka Yoke Workshop 3Process: Inspecting Cassette Tape Decks
Problem: Inspection Tapes out of Sequence
Description of Process: When a cassette deck is inspected, the inspector uses a series of cassettesto check the performance of the unit. It is important that the tests are performed in the correct order andthat all tests are done.
Prevent Error/Detect Error
shutdown/control/warn
Before Improvement: A slotted rack wasused to store tapes. If a tape was placed onworkbench or carried off then inspector couldlose track and make errors.
After Improvement:
Solution:
(Delete as appropriate)
(Delete as appropriate)
1 2 3 4 5 67
Storage Rack
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Poka Yoke Workshop 4
The inspectors foundmedical notes wereconfusing written upwith the same RRinitials for womenneeding a routine recalland those needing arecall recall, an urgent
reassessment!!!
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SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Poka Yoke Workshop 5
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Poka Yoke Workshop 6
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Poka Yoke Workshop 7
City Trader buys $1000000000 worth of shares
instead of $10,000,000.00!
Accounts pays supplier twice
Failure to invoice customer for services provided
Miscalculation in currency exchange
Your experiences..?
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Poka Yoke Summary
Defects can be eliminated
Target process steps that are repetitive and rely
on operator vigilance and checking
Use simple, low cost devices
Involve the operator in identifying, developing and
implementing devices
Devices should be challenge tested by
introducing error (defect)
Solutions
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Poka Yoke Workshop 1Process: Tightening Nuts
Problem: Washers left out before tightening
Description of Process: Operator adds washer and nut, then tightensusing an automatic nut driver.
Prevent Error/Detect Error
Shutdown/Control/Warn
Before Improvement: It is possibleto tighten the nuts even if washersare missing.
After Improvement:
Solution:
(Delete as appropriate)
(Delete as appropriate)
Nut, tightened withno washer
Nut driver Nut driverStopper
Washerthickness
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SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Poka Yoke Workshop 2Process: Parts transport lineProblem: Parts supplied upside down toautomatic machinery
Description of Process: A transportation chute feeds parts from a press into the nextprocess. In the next process parts are mounted in the same position as they arrive.
Prevent Error/Detect Error
Shutdown/Control/Warn
Before improvement: Operators watchincoming work pieces carefully and removeupside down parts. Some are alwaysoverlooked.
After Improvement:
Solution:
(Delete as appropriate)
(Delete as appropriate)
Upside downCorrect Work piece
Notch
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Poka Yoke Workshop 3Process: Inspecting Cassette Tape Decks
Problem: Inspection tapes out of sequence
Description of Process: When a cassette deck is inspected, the inspector uses a series of cassettesto check the performance of the unit. It is important that the tests are performed in the correct order andthat all tests are done.
Prevent Error/Detect Error
Shutdown/Control/Warn
Before Improvement: A slotted rack wasused to store tapes. If a tape was placed onworkbench or carried off then inspector couldlose track and make errors.
After Improvement:
Solution:
(Delete as appropriate)
(Delete as appropriate)
1 2 3 4 5 67
Storage rack
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SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
Poka Yoke Workshop 4
The inspectors foundmedical notes wereconfusing written upwith the same RR
initials for womenneeding a routine recalland those needing arecall recall, an urgentreassessment!!!
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Poka Yoke Workshop 5
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Poka Yoke Workshop 6
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Poka Yoke Workshop 7
City Trader buys $1000000000 worth of shares
instead of $10,000,000.00!
Accounts pays supplier twice
Failure to invoice customer for services provided
Miscalculation in currency exchange
Your experiences..?