21st bomber command tactical mission report 126

8/6/2019 21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 126

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S T R ! C T E D

I ~ , I

M IS S IO N N O . 12C

F L O W N 30 A P R 1 9 4 5

C O p y J i ' O . J 9

HEADQUARTERS

XXI BOMBER COMMANDAPO IS4



B E A D Q U J . R T E l R S

X XI BOM Bm CO llM AN !)

APO 234

TlCTICIJL M ISSIO N R EPO RT

Field Order N o . . 67 Mission No. 126

Primary Visual Taf@;etl 2008 - T.aohikawa Ar.myAil' Arsenal j Taohika1ll'a,

JaplUl.

Primary Radar Target: City of Hwnomatsu. JaplUl.

30 April 1945,

Table o r Contents

'l:aottcal ll'arrative • .. . . . . . . . . . . . .

JJU\ex A ..Operations • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 10Part I .. Navigation Chart • • • • • • •• 11Part II .. AimingPoints ••••••••••• 12

Part III .. Flight Engineering Charts 14 .

Part IV _ blr-Sea Rescue Chart • • • • • • 16

Annex B , " "" \Yea.t·her • .. • • .. • • • • .. • • • 4 1 1 • . . •

Part I .. WeatherSummory • • • •• • • '0 • •

Part II .. Chart ... Fo1'ecast Weather vaObserved. Weather ••••

Part II I .. 1'1' ogno $t10 Map •••••• • •

Part IV .. Synoptic Map.• • • • • • • • •

.Anne.xC .. Communications • • • • • • • • • • •Por t I .. Rader Counter Measure s

Part ,II .. Radio ••• • • • • • • •

J.nne,x' D _ , Intelligenoe • • • • • • • • • • • • .'Part I -Enemy J"ir Oppositio.n •••Part II .. Enemy·Antiail'cra.ft and

Air-to-Ait Bombing • • • • •

Po.rt III .. Bombing Results and De.mage

AsseBs.ment " • • • ~ • • •

. . '. .

. . .1.nnex E • Consolide.ted Statistical Summary •• . ..Anrnx F • XX I Bomber CommandField Order . . . . . .

Distribution. ~. .., .. • • .' ..E..nnex G . . . . • •

A- 2 Seotion

X l 1 Bomber Commnnd

, Pag, Ho.

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IIIIIIIIIIII:II,:II:ItIt

:I SECRET II

: IBy Auth. of the G. G. t III XXI Bomber Command II

n : 1 - r v " " II:I8 Jun 45 3'0# t •• 4 • IIIDate Initialsl:

:: I: I:::: = 1:It z::: t I:: I:

HEADQUARTERS

XXI BCliBERCOMMAND

A P O 234

8 June 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations. 30 April 1945

TO: Commanding General. Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION~

a. Field Order Number 67, Headquarters XXI Bomber Command,

dated 29 April 1945, d1.rected the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings to

partiCipate in C l. coordinnted o.ttack (XXI Bomber Command !Uuion No.

126) O;gai.nst targeta on Honshu with fighter escort to be provided.

b. Iar~ets Specified:

(1) PrimarY Visual: Target 2008 (as shown on XXI Bomber

Cooonand Litho-MosaiC 90.17-2009) Tachiknwa Army Air Ars~nal. To.chikawn.

(2) SecondarY Visual: Target 1219 (as shown on XXI

Bomber Comm:l..ndLitho-Moso.ic 90.21-1219) ·Jnpa.n Musico.l Instrument Comp-

any o.t Hrunrunaau.

(3) Pr imp,ry Rudnr: City of Ho.mo.matsu.

2. STRATEGYANDPLAN OF OPERATON:

(

a. Selection of DoDny: On the basis of fnvorable visuo.1

bombing wenther predictions in the Tokyo Area presented 29 April. firm

decision was made to str~ke on 30 April.

b. Importp,nce of Torgets:

(1) TnchikClwa A rmy Air j.rsenal is the principal A rmy Air

Ar ,s6no.l in J o.pan proper, wi th some airframe and engine pro due ti on in

addition to resellrch, experimentlltion. repllir, nod modifioation facil-

ities. NQ slmil cr fnc ili ties ure known to exist elsewhere in Jupnn.

(2) Japnn Musical Instrwnent Company is. with Sumitomo

at Amo.gasaki. one of the two major producers of'propellers for Japnn-

ese combat aircraft. The Hamomatisu plant. originally devoted to the

manufacture of MusiCal instruments. was converted to propeller pro-

duction before the wnr , It is now the lurgest plant opernted by Japo.n

Musical Instrument Company, and is credited with npproximntely 20 per

cent of the total Japanese propel]er production.

(3) City of Hwna.mll.tsu:: Humrunlltsu. City (pop. 1940, 167,000)is im,portant becnuae of the Jnpan Mus1cDl Instrument Company (a.ircraft

:!;rep'"l1el' s) t t.he No.kllj i m l l AiroW()f't G 4 : 0 m p r c t n y { : t n o r , ' ~ Ill!' go lV ~smovo d),

rmd tho, IJ'hCporo.1:·GCilVIOrl'llllent R - w H ! I f O W ShC!pl$'. I-t 11s ·b.Ql:d.!i!Wii,Mt. .valrio).$ lQQl:l.,,,-ndmQOhlnsry shop;s MJIm be en co!tvl4~tM. to wnr ind-us-;

tries. There are also less importnnt Instnllntions, such us wood-

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woZfldng'f voneer, and cdrplo.ne dope plants. Textile ml1chinery, ootton

spinning, and h~t m~nufacture were runong prew~ notivities I1nd are

probably continuing to a limited degree. Two airfields are i~ the

vicInity. The City oontains o .n 1mport~nt ra1l junotion on the 'l'oko.14o

main line, which orosses vit~l bridges both to the oust and weat att;ho city. The o.re~ is inf'lllllllllable and closely bu.11t-up, having an

average densl ty of 9115 persons per squo.re m11e.

c. Detnlls of Planning--Operg;tioQ\ll

(1) Bombing Plan81

(a) DeterminAtion of Bomb Londl

l.. Munitions I

. n o lP.m)a: Pive hundred pound high-explo-

sive general-purpose bombs were seleoted.

nose nnd non-del~y tail.

£. Puzin!!;: Fuzes were. 01 sooond delo.y

~ Reason for Seieetionl

1. ,The primo.ry buildings of this o.rea.

are of long span, steel-fro.me construction, and are subject to sprea.d-

ing collapse. Lnrger size bombs would be more effective against this

type building and they were given serious consideration, but due to

limited time between mission planning and t~e-off. necessary changes

of bomb rucks could not be made. Therefore, the 500 pound genera.l-pur-

pose "B.ombwas selected, as it 'would a.llow maximum tonnage of high-ex-

plosive to be released on the targot. resulting in a multiple number

of bomb hits. and assuring maximum damage to building contents o.nd in-

terrupti on of op ero.t:l,ons.

2~ Inoendiary munitions were not se-

lected since the pr-Imary buildings of this ar-e a tU'9 o.f slight com-

bustibi 1ity.

.h. Fyzing:

1. The .Ol-second delay nose fuze was

selscted ai nc e it would o.llow bomb burst 6 to 10 feet beneath the roof.

thereby giving maximu;n damage to building contents.

2. The non-delay tail fuze was seleot·

ed in order to give ground level bursts to ·neur~nissn bombs.

A . LQflrllngl

A. Aircraft were to be loaded to obtain

mo.x.imumonnage of hi.gh-exploslve over the target area.

l : ! . . Intervalometers were to be set to ob-tc-.in minimum tro..in release. thereby giving a ltl.rge ooncentration of

bomb hits in target area.



(b) Bombing J

.1. Alla.xis of attaok of 46 degrees from an

initial point located :1t 3S/0'7N .. 138/388 at a.ltitudes from 17,000

to 22.000 feet waa chosen for this mission.

following renscne I!. This axis of attack was chosen fo~ the

.!l. Surfo.ce wind was expected to be frOJa330 degr sss. With this axi s ofntto.ck, the tnrget would not be ob-

soured by smokefor o.ircrnft over the target nfter the first.

~. Initio.! Point was most 8uitable form.nking a. radnr turn off Mt. FuJi.

&. The oxis of o.tto.ck 'WOuldkeep t.be for-mations in flr,k defenses for the leo.st amount of time.

~ Initial Point had ~o antlaircrnft de-fenses in its vicinity.

..It. The drift and ground speed would notbe excessive.

f. Ini tinl Point WIl& convenient for as-sembly of Wings end for fighter rendezvous.

1. Drift, nxis of ntta.ck. bombing a.ltitudo,and other pert inent bombing d.o.tn nrs as follows I

than 17,000 feet.A. bltitude: 22,000 feet, but not lower

b Axi.s of' Attg.ck; 46 degrees from Ini-tinl poJ..nt {3S/0?N - 138/38E~

~. Dri.ft: 9 degrees right •

. s . Ground S'Oe_£ld.: 34.0 mUes per hour •

.&. L':!.n[j;;bf RunI 61 Ilt.:ltute miles.

L. Time of Run: 10 minutes,

£. Maq,nPoint of ImpQAt : 059038 (onmBomberCommo.nd L1 tho-Moao.ic·· 90.17-2009) •

.h.!nterV!l.lometer S p nCir: 'M i n i r nwn .

~If the primnry v1su:i,1 to.I'get were obscuredby w0o.ther. bath Wings we,re to o.ttnok the secondoxy v1sunl. If the

secondary visull1 ts.rget were obsoured. the 01ty of HMI.o.mo.su was to

be bombed by t'o.dar.

(2) N9.vlgnt.ion.:

Bo.s:e

toAssembly I Ta.cti cal DoctriM.

to



R I t aJOON - 138/44/30E

to

35/o~I/30N " l~8/:!8/00,'!l(IP)

to

TOJ:'got

t-o

35k28N - I38/35E

to

Ren80D

Departure Point. This Inndf'o.ll point would

be easily identified in tlle bllY.

Eusily ident·if1ed atreOJD 1n upper part of

bay. This polnt would avoid all flak aralle.

Left turn off target.

Point of turn to lwo Jimn in order to avoid

fInk arens. Also to be used tor seoondnry

target initia.l point.

Iwo Jima. to Ba.se

(S) Flight Engineeringl

(0.) Fll gb t P ln n;

.l.. Altltude8 and 8peedst exoept tor tho botllb-

ing run, wore planned for maximum fuel economy !lnd safety. Wing 0.8 ..

86mblies were to be effected. .

(b) LOQ.ding'

1. Fuel reserve data of prevloue similar for-

mation missions at th.e plunned nltitude indlca.ted that the o.vero.ge

o.ircrni't of the 73rd Wing would reqUire tull wing and oenter 'Wing tank:8.Total fuel would be o.pproximo.tely 6750g0.110ns. It was estimated tbo.t

the cveruge o..ircro.ft of the 3lSth Wing would oa.rry. 1n addition to tlUl

wing nnd c'iinter wing tanks, 1 full bomb bay tank for 0. tota.l fuel 100.d

s f a pp r ox i mn te ~ y 6750 to 7300 go.llons.

&. Bomb Load I No mnximum or minimum bomb lond

was specified. It wns estim.ated tho.t theavero.ge aircrnft of the 73rd

al1d 3l3th Wings '[Iould be (:;ble to co.:ny a potentia.l lond of approximo.te-

ly 10~000 to :;'2,000 pounds, J.nununit.ion. load ww. estimated to be approx-

mntely 1500pou.nds.

(n) Th.o route to the target wa.s planned with rndar

checl1;po.ints despite the fnet that the target is not 0. prlmnry radar

to.rget., The Inndfa.ll or dep~..rture point (34/41/00N - 138/44/S0E) would

presl:lnt 0. lo.nd-Wilter contrast with D. sharp Oho,l'noteristic shape, un-

like ,o :ny point naarby, The cour-se from. this point pnrnllels th.o oonst

to the initi::d point o.t the mouth of u river opening 1.n.to Suruga-Wan

Bo .y (35/ (}7N - 1363SE). The river is pbi nly vls:1.b Ie on ra.dnr sOope

phe bogr cphs token by reoOnno.issOOl.oe p l ane s in preparntion for thill'

mission.

(b) On the bomb run ther would be 2 exoellent radar

ref6rence pod rrsa, Mount FUji cou Id be pioked up nt the depo.rtur@ point,

and us otl 0.13 0. reference point throughout th.e bomb run. fhe City of'

Ho.chioji would be a.n eXQellent referenoepolnt for oour8e siooe lt Ilea

directly on the bomb run only four ana one-unlf l;l.nutiolll miles short

of the tnrget. It wile plo.nned to kill drift on Haohiojl d.urlng the

bomb run.

(c) The target selected for visuo.1 bombing was not

0. go od p:rim~y radar to,rget. s inc e it 11es within to . multi tu.de 'of smnll

signnls on the outskirts of Tokyo. Therefore, tho City o.f Hamamc.tsu

Wo.s des ig,nllted r;.s the primllry l'o.dnr ta~get.



(d) The Initi~l Point on the primary radar bomb runwould not be d i stinguiBho.ble by rado.r. However, a.prechion radar

turn c ould be ~ccomplished by using Mount Fuji ns n reference tor th eturn. The Oity of Hamnma.tsu produces a. bright return on the ra.dar

scope nnd it can be eMily identified due to the surrounding land- water

c ontrast. Both drift nnd rnte c ould be kilred on the City,

(5) Radar Counter Ue;suresl There were to be DO Ra.da. r

Oou nter Meo.8ures s ec .rc hes on this mis sio n.

(6) Communica.tionsl This mission inoluded the StandardO per o.t ln g P ro ced ur es p er tni ni ng t o f 19h te r- bo mb er c om mu nlo a.ti on s, tro.n-·missions of strike and conta.ct reports, o.nd IFF operation.

(7) Fighter PlGDning:

(0.) Since this mission called for fighter escort,

N Q.v igC '.t io no .l- 29' s w er e ne ce ss ~_ ry . I t W O, s de oi ded tha .t the N o.v iga. -

tiono.l B-29' s wou_ld be sent to Iwo Jimo. the afternoon before D-day tor

purposes of c oordinating briefIng with fighters.

(b) It was deCided to assign 4 B.29's to no.vlga.tion-

0. 1 esc ort. Three B- 29's were to o.cc ompa.ny the mo.in force of fighters

and 1 B- 29 was to escort 4 fighters and arrive o.t t he ro.lly point o.t

H-hour plus Ifor extending submarino oover.

( 8) Air .See. Reso ue I

(0.) ~: The Nnvy was furnished with details ofthe miasion nnd the following air- sen resoue faoilities were made a~il-o.ble:

1 . Three s ubm o.r ines w er e s tationed du ring the

e nt ir e m is si on nt 34/25N - 138/55E, S2 /00N - 139/S0E, and SO/OON -

140/00E.

~. Three surf~c e oraft wore to be stationed at

2 8/00N - HO/SOE from ·2 922 00Z to 300800Z, nt .2 6/30N - l40/S0E from

2 92 200Z to 300600Z, and at le/OON .. 144/30E during the entire misSion,

A . Four Dumbos were Ilssigned !lS f oll ow s: 30 /0 ON -

HO/OOE from 300215Z to 3-00415Z; 2 8/00N .. HO/30E from S00245Z to

300445Z; 26/S0N - HO/50E from 300Sl5Z to 3005153; and 20/00N - 143/3OB

from 30Q5Z0Z to 300720Z.

!. Crash bonts were a.ss~gned in the immediate

vicinity of So.ipan and Tininn during c ritic al periods of takeoff and1nnding.

(b) Army: T hi s O om ma .n d a ss ig ne d 2 Sup er- Bum bos as

follows: 34/2 5N - l36/55E during the return flight and 32/0CN - 139/30E

f rom 2 92 345Z to 300430Z.

d. ,DetAils of Planning--Inte1l1genoe:

(1) Enemy Fighter Reo.gtlon:

(n) It was estimo.tad that the Tokyo zone defenses

V lo ul d be o om .p o.r ati vel y s tr ong - - ap pr ox im at ely 45 0 a. ir or nf 't . H ow ev er ,

it vms thouglt unlikely thnt the enemy's fighter control, as such, would

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(2) ] j :narnv Anth.irgrnft:

(lJ li'lll.vv Antia.il'orai.'t Defense/!!I In the immediate

vicinity of the target there are a. total of 18 heavy guns (3 ba.tteries).

Eight oi IGS due"west of ~hi!.s tnrget· 16 tho Nako.jiEm..uroraft Comp~with 48 additional heavy guns in its immed.ia.tevioinity. 'lbe entiredefenses of Tokyo proper total 46 8 heavy guns, including those listed

for the Naka.jimnAircraft Company.

(b) R2utes and Axi s of Attaek I

send :-.gro~.t amount of these fighters nwa.yfrom Tokyo to detendh-wnntsu or other tnrgets outside the Tokyo Aren.

(b) It WD.S reoommendedthat fighter esoort be 0 . ' -signed to hand Ie any furce that would be dispo.tehod to interoept the

B-29' s, •

.1 . In order to avoid the tr8lllendouB CO :DC lu ,1 . .. a~",'.tion of guns in the Tokyo area, In order to bring the airorai't ".LWIoI~,

range of the defenses of the Nakajima.Aircraft O o m p a n y for the

possible time, and in order to take a.dvantnge of the predioted W8,mat.r~

ly rnnds. an a.xi s of atta.ck between 30 degrees o . n d 60 degrees trueWOosecommended.

. !. In view of the antia.irGroi't enoountered G o t

Numnzu on the prior missien to this area., the a.ppronohwas .electedso. ~a to avoid this are~.

A . Abreaka.we.yto the nerth a.nd then west outof the heavily defended aren wna recommendedif the Ilirornft should

have righter support. A break~wo.yto the norrbh and tbEl'l east, avoiding

the Tekyo and Ghosi Peint defenses, was recommendedif no fightercover were avo.ilo.ble.

(c) Altitude: Based on the antiaircraft encount~r-

ad and damuged susta1ned on the pr lor mlaa ion to . thi s area. 0. base

CLltitude of 18,000 feet w o . s recommended.

3. EXECUTION OFT HE M IS SI ON :

0.. Toke-Off:

(1) Take-off ~s accomplished ~s follOWS:

Y.iJl.g No, Aircroft First TiOlke-cff Last Te.k8-01'1'

73rd 66 29l650Z" 29l739Z

313th JQ 291706Z 2917S0Z

TOTAL 106 29l550Z 291750Z

The above does not include 1 Super-Dumboand 3 no.vigptiono.l escort o.ir~oroft frcm the 73rd Wing and 1 Super-Dwnbofrom':the 3l3th Wing.

e 2) One hundred fOllr P-51' s of the VII Fighter Commandware airborne fr6m 292l3lZ to 292152Z.

b. li2~te ~: Assemblies and route to the targets presented

no diffioulties.

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Si nce To yohas hi o ould be aeen visually, a run w as made on it a. at ar ge t o f o ppo rtu ni ty.

(d) Wind in the gener al target ar ea was from 300degrees at 38 knots.

(8) There were? Oases of B-10 s h ac k lo m a lf u no t io n s.A great deal o f trouble has been experienced wi th this shackle. A s

~ result, the B-7 s hackle has been o rder ed to replnce ~ll B - t O . b a O k -les now in use.

( 2 ) Flight Engi neer ingl ( See Annex A , P Q r t I I I , fo r

Ca) I niti al Clim bl The in1ti~1 climb to o ruisi ngaltitude at 5000 and 6000 feet w as effected without diff iculty.

olimb was acoo mpli shed by indi vidual air craf t.

( b) I niti al Crui se anA Ass emblY'5000 nnd 8000 feet Was eff ected by indi vidual airoraft without .d'l.1r.f1.",

cul ty. Squadr on assemblies were made 1n the viCinity ot Ao g o . OII.lUIIII.~·

(e) Climb to Bo mbing Altitude I The climb to

and 2 2 ,000 feet required an average of 35 m inutes.

(d) Cr uise to t h e Target:

mllds at bombi ng a1tit ud e w i. th ou t d ir rl cu 1 t y.

countered on the bomb run.

Group assemblies were

No diffi culty was en-

1. Perform ance o f AN/APQ - l3 was as follows =

95 ( 89.6 %) o per ati ve o n- tak e- of f, 88 (92 .6~) operativ e over target.

and 88 (92 .6%) o perati.ve on r eturn •

.& . The aver age maxim um r ange o r M J/ APQ - l3 was

70 nauti cal mlla~ at 17,500 feet altitude.

(e) Return to B a s e : The individual returns were

made ei ther by a long desc ent or a lo ng cruis e at bombing altitude

and then a rapi d desoent. The major ity of the returns used 1~8s than2 00 0 g al lo ns .

Ca) E qu ip me nt P er i' o: nn ~n ceI

A. The average IJlB.xim umange of radar beaoonr aoeption was 133 naut.Lca'I m iles at 11,000 feet altitude.

~. The aver age maxim um r ange o f AN/APQ- l3 o nlandfall point was 57 ~Utdoal miles.

~: There wer e no f ailures o f AN/~Q - 13 repo rt-

ad by lead air oraft.

§. SCR- 695. SCR- 7l8, and AN/AP N- 9 were 100

p er o e rr t o pe ra ti ve .

( b ) Navigation: There w ere 790 Lo ra.n fi xe s reported

vdth an average maxi mum range o f 663 nautioal miles for ground waves

and 900 nautical miles fo r s ky waves .

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(c) Cgmment.:,

1. T h e r e w e r e 9 lea4 a ir cr af t r ad ar

w i t h 4 7 a i r o r a f t d r o p p i n g o n t h e s e l e a d p l a n e s .

l. The l a n d f a l l . i n i ~ i a l , and o.imlhg point.

w e r e a l l c o n s i d e r e d a. S good t o e x c e l l e n t for r a d a r .

(4) A i r - S o o , R e s o l l!I ( Se e A n n ex At P ( U ' t I V , t o ~ o h a r t ) .

T h e r e w e r e n o d1t c h i ng s o n thismission.

h. Weather r (See A n n e x B, P a r t It tor deto.U •• ) .11012181'

wtUI generally 0.8 p r e d i c ' t e d e x c e p t f o r t h e to,rget a r e a .weo.thel' w h i o h

linS l o l i d u n c i e r o a s t w i t h f e w b r e a k s i n s t e a d o t t h e f o r e o 0. 8 t . tl O

low c l o u ~

(1 ) Rg,4Qt COMnter Measure, t No Seo.rche. were Dalft1lllC".III'~,.

on thh miss ion.

(2) ~: (See Annex Ct P o r t II. for detdla.)

usual c a m n u n l c a ti o n a p r o b l e m s w e r e e n o o u n t e r e d .

j . Intelligenoe Summnry:

(l) EnemyA i r O p p o s i t i o n : ( S e e A n n e x D , P a r t I , tor d e -

t a i l s , ) A p p r o x i m a . t e l y 4 5 e n e m y a i r c r a f t m a d e 5 9 a t t a c k s a n d d . . a g e d

6 B - 2 9 ' s . C l a i m s w e r e 1 d e s t r o y e d a n d , d a m a g e d .

ta.ils. )

m i s s i o n .

aged.

(2) @nemy A n t i Q . 1 t c ro t tt ( S e b A n n e x D , P a . % ' tII. f o r d e -

H e a v y antiaircraft w a . s menger a n d mostly I n l l o o U Z ' o . U e n thi'No o . i r c r Qf t w e r e lost t o ~ t i Q , i r c r a . r t n n d o n l y 2 were d w n -

( 3 ) Dnmage A s s e s s m e n t ; ( S e e A n n e x D . P a r t I I I , f o r d e -tnils.) Oity area d es tr o y ed o n thi. attack ~ s 7,'25,000 s q u a r e feet,

a . p p r o x 1 m o . t e l y 1 5 p e r c e n t o f t h e e n t i r e c i t y . T n e S u z u ~ L o o l I I .o r k s

a n d the I m p e r i a l G o v e r n m e n t R a i l r o a d & h o p s w e r e s l i g h t l y d n m ~ e d .

" t f / t / l w t Z c yduaT IS E .. u, l lAY

M a j o r O e n ( l l ' l l I l ,.S.A.

O o m m ~ i n g

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Po.rt I II- Plight Engin6er1~ Wfi"P'liiIl'''.

Part IV - Air-Sep. Resoue Chart

M1s,ion.l'J~

30 Ap:r'll 1945



M I

DATE~:....cJ~..... . . .IolL-jXXI B OM CO M'

I

KEY

-----, 73rd.Wing(500 thoa 497ft1.Gps.)------73rd. Wing (499th. a 498'th.Gps.)---313th.Wing (6th.Gp.). . . M . . . . . . . .. . . . . (9th.S 505th.Gps.)

II-'X-X-X (504th. GD.

II' ;CHICHI JIMA I

II

--+--II

III

"

LANDFALL TARGET LAND'S END

Isf. Losl lst, Los! 1st. Lost.

73" 3000472 3001022 300122~ 3QOl52Z 300140Z 300157~313 = 300101z 300107r 3001222 3001562 300153Z 300200Z!

- -+----1----fI i f l : A M

I

II

TAKE OFF LAND

1st73- 291650,Z!

313"291706Z!

II

Los!

2917392

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3007172

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300815r

135'

REPRODUCED 35th.1? T . U.OMMAND



SECRET

MISSION NO. 126PRIMARY VISUAL TARGET

2008

AIM'G POINT

X

W I N G S

73rd. a 313th.



S E C R E T

MISSION NO. 126

SECONDARY VISUAL TARGET

P RIM ARY RAD AR1219

AIM'G POINT

Secondary Vtsucl . XPrimary Radar • Cent e? ' of · T own "

WINGS

73rd. & 313th.73rd.8 313th.



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APRIL 1945

a

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Vicinity SAIPAN a TINIAN

During Takeoff a Landing,

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TRACK CHART XX I BOM BER COMMAND SECRET

,'CIiICHI JIMA

--,-+--JIM A I

II

II

o

1 < + 5 "

r""PRODUCED 35th f! I'U



c

B

Part III - Procnoatic Dlp

inrt IV - Synoptic !lap

Miaston No. l26

30J~prll 1945



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c

Mission No. 126

,30April 1945

-23-

§ . & : . ! '- 5 . !l



PART I - R A D A R COONI 'm M F A S 1 . l R E ?

1. There were no ROMsearohes conducted on this mission.

oj < 1 1 0 • ' " ' " ' "

PA R T II - R A D IO

1. Strike Reports: Fourteen s.trike-reporl o.esBaGoswere receivedby the ground stations.

2. Fox 'Il'llnsmission!: Ucopac 'Jeather and Time Signals lIare trans-mitted f:rom the around .stations.

3. Frequencies: En( . -my transtUseions caused Sale contusion on tta

73rd 'Jingle strike frequencies. The 313th 1 1 : 1 . n s repcrted no unusUBltransmissions. Atmospherio interference was sliGht throUGhout;eion. Followine; is aperoeItto.ae ' l lL"eakdown of trattlc per ,tz~eg~~rt'20 per cent on 3 megaoyc1os. ,30per cent on 7 memc:yclea;on 11 megacyoles.

4. NO.viaotiono.l Aids. Six requests far R P ' / D F bearags W E t r E l i ; .. i 1 D I ! & Q ' tM I !

Fiv" of tbese w...re obtained. A weak aircraf't siSDlll nas the' .........n.

sixtb bear inG W:lS not obtained. Five VHF/DFbearinBs ",ere

All \1Grefurnished by Coildor Bose t Saipan. The 313th Vi%ltl"reportedcessful usee! air-to-air homing.. Other llBviaationnl aids, haners ..r~naes. and l:a:'eadcllst etations were used ef1'ectively ..

5. Net Dieciplineanl securitYI Several instances of aircraft

not listenina before transmittinr;" thereby hindtorina nttempts to con-tact SuperdUl!l.bosn reaard to Air-8en Rescue •.'lVerereported. CorI'ective

notion has hS-SD tak&n in each ease , '!he 313th reported. one case of anoperator mixing plain 1nlli,'Uag.;and code in violation ~ seourity. Stepshave been taken to prevent recurrence of this type of violation.

6. Enell)Y transmissions: The follOl1iDGincidents of jruD.ing orimerference ~Iere reported during this mission;

a • 3145ltes: Nealigei ble.

b. 6 0 5 5 kcs:

(1) Steady tone and VI,S \1hUe cround station Tle.s trans~

mittlnc to aircraft on retlll'nfrap tarCet were partially et'fecti-re.

(2) Unkncnnate.tion sending daShes durin;; time tick: at1957Zwas effective.

c. 11080 kcsI OtTf'X}QIll 0100 to 040~'I1o.s. inetfective. Bearing

frooSa ipun 6!'ound station wa.a3 55 0• n Ip V ln s rode ...ih Ju\CSSGR-291

equipment •.

7. .01str:ess I No dis tress messacre,swere. received ..



A N N I C t

D

M is si o n N o~ 126

.30Apr,il 1945

..25-

§.ldUl.l :t



PA R T I • E m M ¥ .AIR O pp OO IT IO N •

1. i.pproximlltely 4 5 enemyfieb-tars intercepted the B-29's.

The enemy ms.de59 attacks and dBmaged6 B-29's. Claims were 1 des-

troyed. none probably'"destroyed , and 4 dannged.

2. 'l'Wenty.three min~te3 elapsed between the time o r banbs etlf&7of the first and last forllllition •

.3 . The 8-29'8 first encountered enemyfigbters on tne Bouthwel5t

corner of Shiinoda peninBula~ meeting 1 twin-engine and 4 single-engine

aircraft. .Four other enemyfighters were enoountered on the way to thetarget. Forty-seven of the 59 attacks took place after bombsaway.

4. Tojos and Zekes made 15 attacks each, Nicka aDi IrY1nga tosetllet

mad.e13 attacks. The breaktioprnl

Z e k e . - - . - - - - 1 5Tojo- ... -- .... 1 5N i o k - - - - - - - - . .7Irving- •• _.--6Unidentified-.5

O a c a r - - - . . .· . .-4

A B J - - - - - - - - - . . .TODY---------3;reck-------·--lTOl'AL 59

5. 'Approximately half of the 59 attacks were made tran level ap-

proaches, with the front and lett quarters favored. Following is achart showing directiol).. am level of the attacks:

"'This report is based on evaluated figures avail.able atter the pre-

paration of the Consolidated ste:Ustioal SUmnary.



Direoti on a.nd Level o r Approa.cho r EnemyAircraft

Tota.l N u m b e r

o r Attaoks.~

5

9 12

FaO!! . ABOVE 119

F R O M LEVEL 2Q

F R O M BBlDW 22"

6 • Details of claims: .

a. Destroyed (1) 1 Zeke by RG.

1 Jack byTail" 2 Nick b7 Tail. 1Unidentifiedby Tail.

7. Additiooal data onenwy tactics:

a. Three separate fly-through attacks by single-engine a.ircr££t'Were reported ooming in from 12 o'clock low, ievel •. a;ld. sliBht1y above.

These aircraft would pull up in a. stall about 800 yards in tront of thefO::("mEl.tion,hang on the:ir prO'p.8, and fire at the formation as they passed

over· ..

b. Twin-engine aircra:t't made fly-through attaelal 1m at the nose.This .maneuverhaa been used by thi.s type· of aircraft on recent missionsto this area. Attacks Tlere moderately a~ess.i'le; •

. . 7 -



8.. oneeoordinated nooeattaelc: by 2 Tojos t. 1 by' 2 NieD intr.afran the nose. 1 by 2 Zekea tegetherat 11.G1dcck slightly lar. and

1 by .3 Zekea in trail at 12 o'clock level were reparted.

PAR T II - :Em:MY ANl ' lAIRCRAl iT .AN) A IR -T O ..A 1 R B C ».fB Im

,

1. :Q 1 emy Antiail:.'craft Firet

a. As indica1led~ Tachikawa Air Depat was the pl'ilIl8r1 vieuaI

target and the City of Hamamatau the prjJnary radar target ..

b ; Because af the hoavy underoast" only 7 aircraft of the31.3th Wing banbed Tachiknwa. This att.ack toek ;place between Ol22Z ..012320fran 20,000 feet o n a true eourse of 410 throush 8/10 Wldercaat.

The wind at banbing altitude was fran 2500 at 4SL

c.. Flak over Taehlkawa was heavy ..meager" and mostly inaocur ..

ate. However, 1 aircraft BUStained minor flak damage;

d. Fifty-five aircraft of the 7,3rdWing and twenty-four air ..

craft 0 , 1 ' the '13th banbed varieus targets in Hemamatsu between 0122Z -

0159Z. fran 17.800 .. 23,400 feet en an axis o£ attack 0 , 1 ' about 2:300t,hrough 4/10 -10/10 underaast • The w in4a t banbing al tiude was :traD2900 .. 3050, at 35 -45 K. .

e. Heavy flak eVer Hatna!!8tsu was meager and inaccurate. One

aircraft received minor :t'lak: damage..

,f • Five aircraft 0 , 1 ' the 313th Wing banbed Toyohashi. encount-

er1ng meager end inao.eurate beavy tl,ak. causi~ no,damage. Twoaircraft0,1' the 73rd Wing bombed Tori Shima, and one aircraft of the 313 th bombed

H!lchijo Jime..

g. En route to, target., various a,ircraf't reported heavy flak

at each of' the follOl7ing points; ~ZU. Gotemba"Wlu. OlIliya, Shjmiz.u.and Wi. All O !' this AlA fire was. meager a .nd inac ewe te. causi.ng nod8.lUl.ge.

2. Aj.r.,to...Air Bombil¥! end Beckets: Noneuas repcrted •

.3 . Evasive Act.iont Nonel1a.a ·employed.



Mission No.: :; F R5 M 1 98

1. StMfARY:

P A R i ' n - D A M A G E AS§l!B1l!MOO R E P gR '. l ' •

HAMAMATSUITY

a. '!his report assesses damage to Hamamatsu Clty relNlt1Jlg

from XXI BJ Mission 126 of 30 April 1945.

b. City area destroyed on th18 raid totals 7.425.000 sq. fl..

(180 aeres or .24 sq. mi.). about 6% at the entire city.

c. Damage is scattered throughout two rather large areas.nu:qiberedtargets, 1227 and 1230, were slightly 4amaged.

d. Total damage to HamamatsuCity to date 18 8.8~.00CI _!..,-",!!~(200 acres or .31 sq. mi.).

2. S U M M A R y OF STATISTICSOFl l A M A . G E 1

a. S1llDl!lU"yf damage resulting trCDDc\l1'l!8Jlt strike •

.Sq, MilescresArea of City 123,200.0PO

w ." destroyed 7.42 5 ,000 6

b.. S\l I I I IJa .1"y of damage resulting fran all strikes: ..

2.816

200 7 . 2

Acres Sq. MilesArea of City 123,200,000

W " destroyed 8,815.000

"'''Old damage (XXI B e 5M3 4 ) 1.390,000 sq•. ft. (20 acres). '!his figurediffers considerably fran that given in c ru Damage Assessment Report No.

8 (which was in error).

:3 . IT EM IZA TIO N O F. D A M A G E :

AnnotationNo.

Description of area. destroyed square teet

1

2

345

Target 1227

Target 1230

Resid ent ial~eBident iel

Industrial

Residential

Industrial - Residentia.l

Suzuki Loan WorksImperial Gov·t., 1m Shops

3.,300,000

2,185,000690,000 .480,000no,ooo

5 % structural damage

15%8tructura1 damage

4. References:

a. CIU Damage Al!lseasment .Report No.8.

b. . J . J . l I ' 90.21 15 J!.UgIlst1944.

5. Inclosures: Annotated mosaic (3m.5J451) uncontrolled.

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MISSlON,_____;;1:..=2..:,.6._

Dl.TE 30April 1945

FU GHT DATA & F U EL C O IiS U M PT ID N.. . _ , _ - - _ . ---

73 IHng .313 'i,ing 21 B.O •- - -

0 COMPLE I ' I NG MISSION * 43 36 79

'GHT DJiT11

••vs- Time L,t Low ;.1 titude 6;21 6:33 6:27i.vg. Time Of Climb To BOl!1b- :22 148 :34

ing J.ltitude

i~vg.Time'l ..t BonbingAl titude :39 :35 : 4 5

A:~G· Flying Ti:'18 14:44 14:13 14:30

1.vg. D is ta nc e F lo 1i i l1 Na ut ic al 2856 2697 27841.ir Miles)

L E L ~ION

Consumed To Target:I

Averag,e 4·24f 4246 4247

Maximum 4725 4455 4725~Minimum 3814 3880 3814

Oonsumed From Target To Buse:

(A/e llithout Malfunction)

No. Of i.ircreft 41 32 73

il,verage 1956 2030 1988

Maximum 2131 2375 2375

Minimum 1794- , 178Q 1780

Consumed From Target To Base:

(,l,./C ~ith Malfunction)

No. Of i,ircraft 2 4- 6

Average 2174 2072 2106

Mo-ximum 2 248 2423 2423

Minimum 2100 1884- 1884-

Fuel Used:

Average 6185 6255 6217

Maximum 6395 6760 6760

Minitlum 5706 5886 5706

Total Fuel Rel1lSining I

1.varoge

563 945 737Maximum 927 1291 1291

M i- - 316 6 l i O 316UI!lUl1l

vg. Gala. Consumed Per Hour 419.9 439.8 428.8

.vg. Gula. Consumed Fer iJil. .- 2.17 2.12 2.2<1-

IUEL llSED O N A IR B OR N E A le 395763 21).0185 : 6 _ 3 _ 5 9 ! . J . 8

U

Ale for which fuel data are availub1e (Excludes ;./e landing at Im Jima).

Fuel remaining on aircraft landinc clt Iwo Jima dUG! to fu.el shortagClI

73 r d ;ting - 12 A/C .. 4.55, 624, 679. 688. 725. 728. 489. 1015. 835. 1048.• 1.126 gnlB.

~'tI'1j.~~.tl idng - 2 1./C - 21. 1239 gals.



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DISTRIBUTION

T ACTI CAL M ISSI ON REPO RTS

Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force

C om ma nd in g G en er il , XXI B o mb er C O mD ll ll ld

Deputy Commander. Twentieth Air Force

Chief of Staff. Twentieth Air Force

Chief of Staff, mB om be r C om ml ll 1dDeputy cis. Opns, XXI B om be r C om ll lM dDeputy CiS. Sup &M aint, XX I'B omber Co mmand

AC of S. A- 2 , X X I B om be r C Om Dl lU ld

Commanding General. Army .Ur Foroes

ATTN: AC/AS. Intelligence

Commander in Chief. Paoific Ocean A r e a s (Adv Hq)

Commander in Chief. Pacifio Ocean A r e a s (Rear Hq)Chief of Naval Operations, a P - 1 6 - V

Jo Int Intelli gence Center , Pacifi c Ocean Areas

Commander AIr Force, PacifiO Fleet

C om ma nd er . F 1! 't h F le et

Commander. First Carrier Task Force

~ om man der . M ar ia nas

Comm~ing General.-U.S. A r m y Forces 1n F a r E a s t

C om ma nd in g G en er al . U , S . Army Forces. Pacific Ocean AreasCommanding General. Allied Air ForcesSouthwest P acitic Areas

Commanding General. Southwest Pacific Areas, ATTN: 0.2

(For ~ection 2 2 , ROM)Commanding General, Far East Air Forces

Commanding General. U.S. Strategic Air Forces. in Europe

Commanding General, Eighth Air For¢6

Commanding General. Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

Commanding General. Fifteenth Air Farce

Commanding General. Seventh Air Force

. Oommanding Generah VII Bomber Comman~

Commanding General~ VII Fighter Command

Commanding General. Eleventh Air Foroe

Commanding General. XX Bomb~r Command

Commanding General~ 38th Flying Training ~ingCanmandlng General. 58th Bombardment W'ing

C om mand ing Gen er al. 7 3n :l.B om dar dm ent W i_ ngCo mmllndlhg General. 313th Bom bar dment W in~

Co mmanding General. 314th B ombo .rdment Wing

Commanding General. 315th Bombardment Wing

Commanding Officer, 3rd Photo Recon Squadron

Commanding Of r icer. 33rd Statistical Control Unit

Chemical Warfare Offioer, XXI Bomber Oommand

Tactics and Tra1ni.ng Se6tions. A-5, XXI Bomber CommandO rdn anc e o rr i cer , mB om be r C om rn .: md

C om ma nd in g O fr ic er , mB OR lb er C om ma n. d, O om ba t S ta gi ng

C en te r ( Pr ov ls !e na l)

HistorIcal Orficer. xiI B9mber CommandCommanding General. Army Air ForcesATTN: AC/AS Intelltgence, Collection Deivision

Comm.! IlldiingEllne.ral,A rm y A ir F or ce s P Il .. ci fi .oc ea n A re asATTN; AAF Evaluation Board



ljQlL~J

COPY N o .

79 Comma.nd.1ng General. J . rmy Air Forcos Po.cifia Ooeoll.ArOIUl

ATTN: Director of CommunloQ.tloDe

For. Counter YeQ.sures ./,ir Analysis Center

80 Commanding Officer, 6th B omb Group (VH)

Sl Commanding Officer, 9th Bomb Group (VH)

82 Commanding Officer, 16th Bomb Group (va)

83 GommQ;llding Offioer, 19th Bomb Group ( VB )8,4 G omm lln d ing Of fi eel', 29th B Q!I b Group ( VH )

85 Commanding Officer, 39th Bomb Group (va)

86 C.omrnand1 .ng Officer, 40th Bomb Group (VR)

87 Commanding Officer, z:50th Bomb Group (VB)

88 Commanding Offioer. 331st Bomb Group ( VR )

89 Commanding O£ficsr, 444th Bomb Group (va)

90 Commanding Offioer, 462nd Bomb Group ( VB )

91 COll l lD. t l l ld i ng Offioer, 468th Bomb Group (VB)

9~ Commo.ndlng Offioer., 497th Bomb Group (Vii)

93 Commanding Officer. 498th Bomb Group ( VB )

94 Commanding Offioer. 499th Bomb Group (VB)

95 COIIlwo.ncU.ngOfficer, SOOth Bo.mb Group ( VR )

96 Commanding Oi'fice.r, 501st Bomb Group (VB)

97 Gommo.ndi.ng Officer. 502nd Bomb Group (VIi)

98 C'olnmandihg Off'icet, 504th B.omb Group (VH)99 Commanding Offioer. S05th Bomb Group (VB)

100 Commandi.ng Oi'f'iMr, S55th .Bomb Group (H) (:'Itt)

101 Commandi.ng Officer. Twentieth J o i r Force Lead Crew School

102 Comnlmlding Offioer, 15th Fighter Group

103 Commo.nd1n.g Officer. 21st Fighte.r Group

104 Commanding Officer, 506th Fighter Group

lOS- Retlortlng Unit, 1;.-2, mBomber Commo.nd (Fne 'Copy)

106 - 115 Reportin,g Unit. A-2. XXI Bomber Command

21st bomber command tactical mission report 126

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