21st bomber command tactical mission report 37

8/6/2019 21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 37

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U I S S I O N . N O . 37F L O W N ] 9 F E B 1 9 . 1 5

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HEADQUARTERSX X I B O M B E R X O M M A N D

.APO 234

T A C T I C A L M I S S I O N R E P O R TField Order No. 30 M1.ssionNo. 37Tal'get: Musashino Plant 0 1 : the Nakajima Aircraft Engine Wor~s

T OK YO , JA PA Nl~ February 1945Tab1e of COOLents

Tactical Narrative ReportExhi'bi t: Photo - Target Areaithibit: Target ChartA n n e x A - Operations

Part I-UavigatianPart II - BombingPart III- Flight EngineeringPart IV - RadarPart V - GunneryPart VI _ Air-Bea Rescue

AnneX B - WeatherAnnex C - Communications

Part I - Radar ao~ter MeasuresPart II _ Communications (Redio)

A n n e x ~ - Intelligence


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.H EA Dr"u J\R T EF tSXXI BClLlBERGOMM.ND.lIF O 2 '3 4

SUBJECT : Report of O p eratione, }9 February 19~Corumafld ing Genera.1 'I Twent iath Air For ce, .lashington 2 .5 1 D.C.

I dent ifieat ion of Mis s ion:e.. Field Order Number 30 H ddated: 12 Februfiry' ~'9 '5 di, .' ,e,aque.rters XXI Bomber Co-::me.nd. "'.... " "rectedth 73 d ' to partleipate in a coord i " e r ~nd '313th Bombardment "mes.001" 1nated attack age.1nst a target on Honshu. -

TO:

b.Ta1"gets Specified:

A" _.......E .. , " (1) Primary Target: i

2. Strategy and Plan or Ooe.rations:a. Reasons for Selection of Target:

(1) The weather forecast prese!1ted waS 1/10 to 2/10cloud coverage in the target area. '

(2) An attaok waS pI anned to coordinate .,.,1h a NavalTask Force attacking lwo Jima. The attack against the l"usashino Plantin Tokyo would serve e . twof~ld purpose: first, itwould ereate adi.. "ion that wouldt,nd to hold th' Jap fight'" .t thOir b... ..J,pan1 and,ond, itwodd .'" the Boob.r "_ond .0'th.r opp ortunityto a.'ctaok a high pr 10ri ty target.

b. ~port'nee of Target:(1) It 1s estimated that Vusash1no-T.-a .aDUfaoturea

nearlY 40 p.ro.nt of the tot.l produotion of J.. _bet .,mratt ..-. as Furthermore, the recent expansions ot engine-t8stiDS taoUl-g).n ' --_ ......... ,nd,oote that the overoll eutput of ... pl will ... ,-,111 fortbr .lxmajor "roro.ft ... _17 pla - _,'''' aU8 of trbe1r angina req_ulr8lllea.ta by IIWI~


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!,. 'Th@ir better ,stowage character isticsfor B~29 aircraft._ .. S".The fact t~at although the 500~pound

general~purpose bomb may be less effect:1ve than b.rger size bombsa.ga1ns~ ~he multi-story reinforced concrete units of theTama plant(QOmpr:1Slng one-third of the target) the as 5ume,o.larger number of hitsfrom the SOO..pound 5he predicted a better chance of interruption ofopecl'atiol'ls of this factory, The mission was committed to an attackon the tarKet as a whole and the SOO-pound bomb 1'19. .5 considered ase.f! ect iva as the 1ar' ge r s izesage. lnst the Mu.sa.shino comp1ex (compr is-ing the ether two-thirds of the to.rget area).

. 'The fact that !Ml.xil]lumonnage per air-craft cou Ld n.ot be carried v,ith bombs smaller than the SOO-pound sh.e,

.& . bN-M17~,1SOO-pound incendiary clusteTS 'Hereselected as the mGlst effective incendiary bomb bec aus e of:

.2;. 'The To.rget. including; building;s and con-tents. Vias est imat 6dto be 30 per ce ot ir:tflDJIW\cbe,

S. Th:e number of ex -e c'te d hits would be muchhigher than with other incendtary bombs due to the 110 bombs in encbcluster and the fact that the target was only 40 percent roof ccnver ed,

,. Increased chance of igniting widely dis-persed bif1 ammabLemater lal.

~, The bombs cont~ined delay-explosive he~dsthat delay rire fighting. thereby increasing the possibility for spread-ing fire 0 t e r - bombing has ceased.

NOTE: Due to relatively large fire divi-sions, i,N-~~47.h2bombs may have been desirable, but they were net r-ecora-mended at this time, pending final approval of multiple suspensi:ln. dueto lc~ck of suitable stowage characteristics,

~, Fusings as indicated were selected because:A. High-explosive bombs armed with Tail ~8es

to detonate by inertia are believed to be passing through light-weightfactory roofs without be ing initiated, This cause s bombs 80 armed todetano.te below the fleor level. resulting in failure to obtain thefun blast effect on buildings and contents.

b The nose fuse employed would usure deto-na~ion of th& bomb in the ;~ent that the tail fuse ta11e4 t o tttaot1~~nly U5~S with delay setting of 1/ 10 sscond were a..tlable

;. 25 tobecause


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100% high Explosive - approximately 19%100% incand la.des - approx.imately 25%26-75% (opt imum) rat io upproxima.te 1y 30%(b) Bombing Pl.anning:

~. Since bombinj!; :1. 'cur!l;cy increc.ses rapid-ly Witha deereaSe in alt iude it WaS ho-ped that the pLanned 0.1itudeof 25,000 fee.t would pl'oduceexcellent resu l,ts. A n axis or attack of85 degrees wa s believed to be satl.sfo.ctory' since only I 1/2 degr.e~drift was expected .

$a Kofu was selected as th", initia.1 pointbecause it is known by th" ~rews on this app roach and st:mds out via-uall, as well as on ths radar scope .

.]. If radar had to bo employed. tho c.xiaof a.ttaok wae des:igned so that only a small turn would be neeesSB.TY.'Thus,the ro.dar operator would have oonple time ;:or his ouero,ticn sincethe radar ta rg et (t hesec .o nd ll ry) was l oc o.te ed but 0115 nnd a half minutesbeyond the visup.l (primary) target.

(2) Navigation Planning:Rogte Reasons fo~ Choice

Base tol?/OON - 14$/15Eto26/00N - 143/00Eto27/16N .- 140/53Eto29/00N - 137/37Eto34/47N - 13'7/371l:to

35/40N - 13S/34Eto

'This point would utilize the Northern knri0D48as ~ radar and visual check point.lwo Jima opero.tions were to be :l.volded by 75miles.Mishino-Shima was to be used as wing aas_b1ypoint and Bomber Command departure point.Climb Point. A due north heading woula &yo14excess iv,!! head ...nds oa.l1sed by westerly w1D4a .L4 nd fall at Bamana Laka - A s o o d radar ...visual c heok point. Ita prozia~ to ~would Cause anEIIY contUaioa o o a a . e .r . .. .objeotive.


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.2. This command assigned 2 Su.per-Dumbo air-planes (B-29' s ) to orb it submarine position 33/02N _ 140/26E fr190430Z ti~l end of mission in order to assist in spotting, reC~~Vinl"distress s~gnals. drop emer~e~cy equipment, and d1rGlct the submarinesin event all' sea rescue fnclllties were required.

d. Details of Planning - Intell igetlce ~(1) Enemy Air Opposition: Although the Japanese Air

Force had 0. capability of opposing this mission with a force of over400 fighters. it was estimated that the mnximum opposition Ylould beapproximately 200. This estimate was bo.sed on n study or Pc.st opera-tions and an assumed operational strength of 70 percent of ave.ih.bleaircraft. If adverse weIIIther cond i tiona Vlot'e to exist at tc.rget time,the ground and icing c0nditions below formo.tion nltituda would probablyreduce air opposition to minoF ~roportions.

(2) Anti-Aircraft Opposition:(n) Planning for the b:,st :lcis of att


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c Ov.",r Tg,l' get:(1 ) PE imerv Tar get: 010u.d cover age at the tar get

nee e 1 0 S ita ted I'ad~r bombLng;or the seconde.:ry tar get.(2) Sa condary Tar ::et : One hundre d n inete en a1r cr oft

bembed the secondary tox~et. dropplng a.pproximate1y457."1 tons of bombs.(3) Last Resort TragstSIon Toyohashi and Kawasaki.

Seven aircraft dropped bombs

(4). 'hq:;et Sof Opp~r tun it y : . Five e. irer aft droppe dbombS on the Ccllovllng tar!,;'" ts : Shu;uoka; Nlshio 4re a; Mais!lk:l. o.ndArai. The teta l weight of bombs dropped on Last Resort and Opp~rtunityTargets was 33.2 tons.

d. Route Back: Navigr;.,tion to the OMS was without inci-dent. Navigutors reported maximwn r'S.nges of Loran up to 1400 milesand obto.ined avsrag!'l readings up to 850 miles.

A.ircre.f't landed at home bases as fol10''1s:Numb er of A/G First 1andine: last Lutding

73:rd 95* 191106Z 191428Z

313th 191111Z 191343,Z

TQT , h .L 1 4 6 191106Z 1914:?BZFour aircr3i't failed to return to base 0.5 follOlt'SI(a) One ditched as Ii I'sult ofeXhe.ustad fuel

supply.(b) One was lost over the to.rget to anomy f'1!;h-

tel'S either by ramming or an aCCidental collision. Its right wingcollapsed aa d its fuselo.ge broke apart when the aircr:li't attemptedto turn bo.ck into for'mlltion.

(C) One, rammed or hit accidentally by an ~fighter, brake apart just back of the wings with its ront seCtiono. f ire.

(d) One Cram which no word baa beeD ..n. s . .believed to have been shot down over the target.

e, .Qper9.t1ops ,Sump1plY:


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decide at the initial paint the type bombing run tha.t will be used.(3) Flight Engineering: (See Annex A, Part III,

for details.) The 5l3th Wing returned to base using a constant letdown procedure from the target. This reaul ted in a saving ,of an aver-age of approximately 150 gallons of fuel per aircraft.

(4) Rc.d!l.r: (See Annex A, Po.rt IV. for details.)AN/APQ-13 equ Ipmerrt WM used for ta.rget ar eu navigntion, wind deter-mination, ~nd appronch for visual nnd radar bombing. Employma1t ofSOR-7l8 radio nl timeter and SCR-595 IFF equipment VillE normal.

(5) Gunnery: (Se6 Annex A, Purt V, for details.)Newly adopted fl:ring techniques developed to meet nose tl.ttncks weresuccessfully used 011 this mission. Enemy aircrllft ware not Il.wessiveagainst tight formations.

(6) Air-Sea Rescue: (See Annex ~, Part VI, for de-One B-29 ditChed o:pproximately 9 1/2 mi19s north of ;.grihanFive crew members were picked up by air sen rescue f~cilities.tails. )Island.g. Wen.ther: (See Annex. B. Part I, for detc.ils.) Over

the target, planes encountered a haze C'irl'u8 deck which reduced' slantvisibility considerably. Foreco,st for winds Was excellent but posi-tions of fron-ts were poo:rly foreCast.

h. COmmunications:(1) Rg,dar Co.unter Measures ~ (See _~nnex C. Part I,

for details.) Three R O M aeo.r ch aircraft, each with one R O M observer,completed this mission. Search wns made for enemy e a r l y w:l.rning radarequipment until the mainland was reached, where search was made forGel and GL radar and enemy fighter communications chc..nnels. ... toto.lof 28 enemy radar signals ~s intercepted.

(2) Communications (Radio): See Annex C, Po.rt II.for details.) Slight interference was received on all strike frequen-cies on this mission. The percentage brerukdown of traffio per fre-quency follows: 31 percent on 3 megacycle frequenoies; 22 percent on6 megacycle rrequen.cies i and 47 percent on 11 megaoyc1:.l frequenciet.

1 . Intelligenoe SummarY:(1) Enemy riir Opposition: (See ADDu n . PArt I.

or details.) Enemy nir opposition was strong, 195 e.ircratt .attng57 0 attacks. Ninteen B -29' s ( 14 .~ ) of the effort w ere dDaage4 GD 43 B-291s (2.3%) of the effort w er e d est ro ye d b y en~ t i g h t er Gunners' clo.:l:m.s against enemy o.iror:lft weret destro,.. - 38 pro-bably destroyed - 17, and d~cged - 4 1.


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Torg;et U7Q (;}5/44N - 1:}9i4E) SUljjidg Rinr Br idga. SWI\id;l.RiverRpHroo.d YArd ofJ9hM Lines; Approocimr_tely 2400 squ~e feet offreight warehouse roof ''Was d,estroyed,

~z:{ CtP(tt-V'CUR T IS E . LeMA Y fMajor GenerQ.l, tJ. S. A.

Comm~nding


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."L~t S:E " t ;T J~XI;! B-O.tiI fltfl tM M~ND "'''~1C'''RT I. :O .,A-e:~~C:fl!.l : l


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ANNEXA'O P E R A T I O N S

Exhibit - Trnck Charts

Part II - BombingPart III-Flight .Engine.er.ingPart IV - RadarPa.rt V - GunneryPart VI - Air-Sea Re8~ueExhibit - Air-Sea Rescue ~p


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135'~ElIRu ...lV 1945 CONfiDENTIAL

NO. 37W'NG_~~_GROUP

tIl l


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FEaRU&"Y 1945 CON f iDENT IAL


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P A R T I~A V I G A T I O NJ,. No.vigntion to. the wing nssembly point was as briefed except

for the 498th ond 504th Groups of the 7:3rd o.nd 3l3th Wings respectively,which flew 30 miles west of the briefed course in order to arrive inthe assembly o.rea on time. The time spent in the wing assembly ureo.runged from 5 to 35 minutes, with depo.rture 6 minutes eo.rIy.

2. Loran furnished adequate navigational aid during the flightto the assembly area.3. The climb phase wo.s started at approxim~tely 30/00N on a due

n0rtherly he ad ing. The time in the c1imb to 25, 000 feet ~verc.ged onehour and 15 minutes. A frontal condition 1J/tlS encountered from 3l/11Nto the 1 o.ndf a 11 p a in t, and no.vigo.tor s we re uno.b1e to mo.ke dr ift orpas it :Lonchecks.

4. All groups of the 73rd 'Hing mo.de landfall 15-20 miles west ofHamana Lake.

5. Squadron B of the S04th Group of the 313th l']ing made lo.ndfa.l1as briefed. but Squadron. i...of this Group broke out of the front southof Nagoya end falsely identified Nagoya Bay as Tokyo Bay. I t becamereorientated on Mount Fuji however, tur1led. and ma.de its bombing runon an axis of attack of' 77 degrees. The lead naVigator had no deo.dr sckcn tng procedure in the targ.et area, a mistake in identificationthat indicated the need for increased radar scope study. Steps h:l.vebeen taken to provide this s tudy,

6. Squadron B of the S04th Group had 0. near colliSion eeur sewith another group and was blown beyond the target while turning o.1fay.As a result it w a S necessary for this Squadron to bomb o n an axis of202 degrees rather than the briefed 88 degrees.

7. JUI units of the 73rd 'rHng bombed as briefed.8. The average winds in the target area were 280 degrees at

140 kno'ts.9. Navigation to the base was without incident. Navitiators re~

ported maximum ranges of Loran up to }4.00miles and obtained B.ver~readings up to 850 miles. They also were able to counter check theirLoran a nd celestial fixes with a great degree o r aoouracy.

10. The average time to the target was 08:55 hours as comparedto an estimated time of 08:46 hours. The average mission time flownwas 1 4: 40 hours.

P pR T II ~ BCIIB IN G1. Cloud coverage at the target neoess1tated radar ba.bt.s

the seoondary target. J.nt1airorof't and. anaIIY tighter appoett_not sufficiently strong to 1nte~upt t ba b aa bt as ruaa.

2. The moatfor a. la.teauf'f'loient t


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lieved th~t future results will show great improvement as a resultof tlie adoption of this new pe Li.cy,4 . Since only 1 1 percent of bombs dropped were identified. exactbombing results could not be determined.

P.QRT III - FLIGm' BNGINEgRING1. ~.ssombl1y BInd Low.Uti.tude Cruise :.

a. Group nssemblies Were !IUldeby both the 73rd and 313th \flngsnear their respective bases.

b. The initial cruise Was m~de as plann~d for b o t h -inge,c. ,:. wing assembly by the 73rd ""ing wa.s effected at the des-

ignated assembly poIrrt without incident.d. The 3l3th Wing made the initial cruise in Indivldu&l group

forma.tion ,wi th no attempt of wing assembly.2. Climb to Bombing Altitude: The average time required to climb

to bombing iiI ti tude was as predicted for both '':1ngs.3. High ":.U.itude Cruise to Target i The :ivernge time required At

bomb:i:ng altitude was short, less than one hour for both ''Tings.4. Return to llase:. The 3l3th Wing returned to base using a con-stant letdown proGedure from the t~rget. This procedure resulted ina saving of a n aveFage of approximately 150 gallons of fuel per air-

craft for the 313th Wing as compared to the 73rd '1ing. which used manytypes of returning procedures.

5. Gen~ra1: Se G Consolidated Statistical Summary ror fuel con-sumption and weight data.

P 4 R T IV - R iJ)J .R1. Rndqr Employment!

u, .m /f.PQ 13:(1) The primary target wo.a obscured by olod CGf'V .-all attacks on the aecondo.ry t!lrget were made 81ther oCllplet.el7 b7

rada.r or by radC\l" ?lith visual oorreot1oD8.

mln~1;~ o r


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2. Radar Equipment Performance:a. . J . . N / ;,FQ-13:

(1) 145;JC waNI radar equipped.

(2) 114 A le report'ed ro.da..l' satisfactory for bombing.(:;) 27;.1e reported radE!,.ru.nsa.tisfe.ctol'Y for bombing.(4) Ma:dmurn avert\ge for landfall was 65 .miles,

b ';:'N/..:.PN 4: ;,vero.ge range of Lor an tixe s 'Was 850 m11 ae ,Oae nOivigo.tor reported reoeption at 1400 miles,

3, Malf'l.lnctions:a, ; ,N t . APQ ; -1 3 :

(1) 1: Sweep rotation stopped 15 minute s before bnding.

(2) l: j.z i:Jnuth stab iliza.t1on ina.ccurll.te.(3) :3: Lost targets at altitude.(~) 1: Inverter out at take-off; used Loran inverter. On

wny bac~. tra.nsmitter current fluctunted e:xc'6ssively. rendering setinopeTa tive.

(5) 1: Trnnsmitter kicked off ~t a.ltitude.(6) 1: Too much p ressuri z ati on.(7) l~ Targets only- 10 to 30 miles; /.Fe voltc.ge and erys-

to.l current e;rratic.(8) 11 Targets fFlded out. finally diso.ppeared.(9) 2: Inverters out,

b. A N , a > N - 4 :(1) 1 : Inverter volta.ge excessive,( 2) 1: Inverter voltage fluctuc.ting.(3) 1 : Sweep lost.(4.) 11 W ea k si gn al s,(5) ItSet 1noperat~VO.

a .


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50..cul .i.mmuniion ExpendedC F 0 System O]>erativeSO.-cul. machine gu,ns operp.tivaGUllS loaded.

73rd69.204 r-ds,l O O % ,97.7%'Cold

313th57,000. rds.97%98%Hot

PART V '_ GlIN N ERY1. This m'is,sion was noto.ble from the gunnery st,andpoint in that.

it tested me(l"sures developed to meet noseo.ttacks. Due to a lag 1n theoomputer caused by theexcessibely h,igh cLosLng rate of enemy fighterson the no seof the B-29 it \!/


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FEIlllIlART 194~ CONF IO FNT IAL1~5

MISSION NO.llOAT E .....,._.L..X.l ..........".__-jX X I BOMCOM

AIR-SEABUCUE

' < I ; ~-l. .. __ Q/

2 q l;;I> t"!I.~;:: n:.. t:l ~I ,~1 ~~ C ? g E- VI ~~~


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ANNEX

B

' l JEATHER

We!l.ther S I 1 D U 1 1 a r y

Exhib it - Cross Section ChartExh.ibit-Prognostic MapEx hi Mt ...yn op ti C Map

Mission N o . 3719 February 1945


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WEI . THER

I, Basean Take-Off, The 1'8 wer e 4/ 10 cumu1U,8 clouds Viith base so:t 1500 feet and tops o .t 6000 feet o.llowing norma I tam off. V1s.ibilitywg.s 12 mile,s,

2, Route Outg.oing: There were 4/10 cumulus clouds between 1200N1d 6000 feet to 21degrees North. Visib,ility Vias 15 miles. From 21degrees North to 24 degrees North there were 8 to 9/10 cumulus withbases at 1500 feet and tops 6000 to 9000 feet, There were 1l.150 8 to10/10 a,ltoc,umulus with bases at - 10,000 feet and tops at - 14 000 feet'Scattertld ~howera in this zone reduc"d Y.


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r-,. . . .,\: j


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, _ . .. , .r - , _,.,/i""I\ \,-~


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o

cmrn:tmlc.a.nONS

P~t I - Radar Counter Measl1l'esPal't II-CommuniCtttiollB (Radio)


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P_~T I -RADAR COUiIT~ MEASURES1. Genero.l' F i v :e R eM SeD.rch :.ircraft. enc h with nn ROM Observer,

wore schodu.l ed to p.u't ic ip o~tu 1n this l!'.ission. Only throe conplctodtho uission.2. Results of Seurch:a. A total of 28 enemy ra.dar 8i.gno.18 was intercepted"b , The following signt3.ls with Gun.-Lo.ying chlll'act;eristiOswere .intercepted:

(1) 193/4/1100(2) 197/4(1000(3) 78 -79/5--8/1500-3000( 4) 202/711 200

Inte rcep ted at 1.P.Intercepted Ilt I..Int,erceptad in Tokyo o.reo. .Intercap ted in Tokyo ;.reo.

1:'59 me~c. C W 5 igno.1s were 10 f'"ged Ilt 218 me. 58 me. 36.7 me. 'llld.~.11were unmod\ll~ted.

The complete list of radar signQ1s intercepted is ~sfolloY/s:(1) Target Area. (Tokyo):

(2) Other Rad ar Signals interc epted were as fol1o~:'74.S/11/100019/31/S0093/39,5/50096-97/29/S00100/20-22/250-3S0102.5/17/500104:/14/250110/52/250116/9/-12S/10/750140/34/500146-150/14-18/750152-154/ 25-27/500151-157/10-14/400-500160/9/50089.6/31-30/30098.5/31-33/300105/23/350

79/27/100095/15/.-108/10/600167/8-10/1000186189/7/900197/1S/1100

s. Noot' su.i to.ble $ql;IiD~-:.,0.11'01' , ,1"1: Wb&n .~.~1il~!51

TrackingTr:1.ckingTro.ekingTrt\ckingTrncklngTra.cking

Sweep Rate "2 RPMSweepingTraCkingTruckingSweep Eo.te 1/2 RPYSweep Rate 1 RPMTro.okingTraokingSweepingSweep Ro.te 20 RPMSweepi~Tr:.\cki~Tro.okingT r a c k i n g' l ' r n c k i n gSweepinga_apingT r o . c k 1 u . s

34/00N 136/0083VOON - 136/ooE34/ 25H - 136/4.5E3V25W - 136/458C h i c h i J i m o .No.goyo. Areo.I.P. AreaNagoya. Areo.Nc.goyc. Area34/0ON - 136/00sl ' fa .goyn Area.Nagoya Arealfagoya. Jrea=~l.!G.Il"jCiCi


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b , Fig hter s: The enemy fighter Sa tto.ckinv the 1a ......at correct < 1 . 1 ti tude nd tl 0 fl. b'" cup werea . apparen y were given sufficient Ildvance wn....,.ing ef the ('l!ttuck. ..4, Equipment :.

Il.. The Bcqu1pment employed fUnctioned satisf,.,_ctorlly exc tfOr one ANI APA.6 PRF met.sr which stopped ind'io~ting l m m . d O t- 1 ep .0 " _ .e Lll. e y oi'terteke,off, The eCJ:ULpmenthas been bench checked and is b k -tion. . . . ~o C rn operll.-

5, Conc1usislils:a., The 78 me r".do.r a Igne.Ls intercepted presurn"bly orign"-tedfrom Mark fA Model III type enemy ,equipment.b. The 58 me and 36.? mc 0 11 s 1 . gn .- :. 18 int t"'~J" Eff.'ect -- er cep ed !'.re possiblyJo.prm>se "" Doppler Radars.

. c. Considerp.ble data is being comp.ilsd. on the Jr.pnnese Gun-LayJng Radars, T?e results thus f~r indic~te th~t it oper~tes 1n twof:equencybo.nds. 1"i!i. , 75 nnd ~OO ~c, 0 Although lobe switching er thesesLgnnls was not r


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6. ,.Enemvtl'ansmiss ion,;!I The followi"g' .dd. i' ~ , .. 1o 1,entsor interferencs(len J ammng weI'a' no ted dur ing thism is s ion:

(1) In,effeetive CW tro.nsmiss ions ft ( .om " ' - 1 1 . unknown ,stationon reurn le'g of mission Ground Station).( 2) Ul'l.ideFltif led R/T, inefr eet.ive. at, 04542 (Aerial).

h. 6055 kes =(1) Intent ional C'Njamming t 094 Zness (Ground Stlltion).o, ,'9. slight effective-(2) Jo.p Cw transmis s ion at 2'307Z, ineffective (~erlill),

e. HOBO kes =(I) Heavy J ap C'IFdur ing the r innl hours of the mission _it is questl,onalbs whether it WD - S intention'll ot not. Effectiveness

WaS modero,te (Ground Stl>t ion) ( 2' Vel' y strong ate ~!dy tone 0.t 0330Z (aer 10.1).(3) At 0300Z heavy enemy C " J traff ic , Effectivenesswns 51i ght. (Aer ial ) .

(4) Unidentified R/T at 0336Z we.s ineffeotive.(5) Unideptified ~V over t h e target ~nd neur t h e Bonins.

ral'lging from effectiv0 to ineffective.d. 3410 J:::cs Negligible.a. 7310 ICes: Negligible.f. 11160 kcs: Negligible.

7. Dis:t~ess: Two emergency meesage s indicating possible ditoh-ing were sent by Clircraft. One 6ecu:ted 0. Quddy o.nd ra~ched the bn.sesctfely. The second airord't ditched. Its position and bSClringo.srelo.yed by a . MBuddyn o.ircrnft was received bv the ground station.Five of the dit,ched orewmen were rescued. Four urgent raqu6sts forbearings were received by the ground st~tion. Three of these were9bt~ined. Beo.vy interferenoe prevented ob taining of the other b enrl ~

8. Equipment lialfunctions: AN/AFiT-13r 1 1llopero.tlve. 1O aiMtone; 1 dynamotor noise; 1 fixed antenno. broken; 1 fl~ ~agedy enemy aotion. AN/.ARll-7: 1 loop motor in.""" _Nlililhunting of needle j 2 sense :;ultermas broken, 1 lq.ap x . . a . . ' . . "';1erntivs; 1 intermittent and unreli~ble. SCR -s a at do.mo.geJ 1 tra1l.smitter Uopern.tive 1f tS f t I 1 intennit.t6pt on J: \l l_a,- ' ;OOi. ' ,out and rep lo.oed inbuttClna out; 1 ,qI'Q~stIL1lt'tive. :,,; a .


30/68

D

IN T nJ ..Ic ;lM C E R E E 'O R 'l 'SPart I - Enemy Air OppositionPart II - Anti Aircraft and Air-to-Air hbl.Part III - ~ Aaaesemmt


31/68

PART I - ENDIIYAI.R OProSITION

..1. General; ~emy air opposition was strong. 195 aircraft m.Sl .ng570 attacks. Nl.I1steen B-29s (14.2% of thee.ffort) were damagedand3 B-29s (2.3% of the effort) were destroyed by enemy fighters, B-29sdes troyed 30$. proba.b1y destroyed 17 and damB.6ed41 aircraf t.

2. Sightings and Attacks:

Tokyo area:a. Ratio of attacks to sightinss for four missiOOB in the

MISSION E/AAttacks E i ASightedT HI S M IS Sl ONMiaslGm #29Mission # 2 4 -Mi.ssion. #18

5703509 8 4 -2.001952J O275150

Ratio ofAttacks to Sip,h tinga2.9 to 11 .4 to 13.6 to 11.3 to 1

b. Ratio of enelW airc,raft .sigllted to numb~r of B-29's0ver Japan: . E / A No,. B..29s Ratio of SightingB toMIS .S ION Sighted Over Japan strength of our ForceThIS MIffi ION 195 133 1.5 to 1flUS sion # 2 9 230 101 2.3 to 1Mis.sioll 1 1 2 4 275 63 4.4 to 1Mission # 1 8 150 54 2.8 to 1

c . Ratio of enemy a. reraft attackiIlt:. to number of B-29sover J'apan: Ratio of j,ttacllB toE/A No. B-29sl \ ; ISSION Attacks Over Japan streJlfjth of our lbreeT IlIs M IS SIO N 570 133 4.3 to 1Mission #29 330 101 3.3 to 1Mission # 2 4 964 63 1}.6 to 1Mission #18 200 . 5 4 3.7 to 1

3 . Loc at io n o f A tt ac ks:a. Eighty-three per cent of'all Bttaokabombs away, ~ compared to 65%. 4n. and ljS. rAfIDltaU:_~r!l,""~~,,at tacks prior to bombsaway OIl th6 .3 pravioaa , I I Q . . . . , . - ~ . '~I8-I"1PI!I


32/68

4. Type of Ene!DAircrat't,A.ttacldng:Enelll,YAircraft Number o.f Attacks Percent of al l Attacks

'.ronyIrving'l'OjozekeNickTiE U/ISl E U/ lOscarType ABCJackH8 .mpValJillFrancesTOTJlL

125117807764 ,282822l7'7211''I.570 100

22211 41411.55431

5" .Direction of Attl:l.~ks: Fifty~two per cent of all attacks ..erenose attacks. as compared to 50% . 6 0% . and 4 8% . respectively. on tbBlast 3 missions in the Tokyo area.. Sixteen pej: cent of the attackawere from left quarter. 20,% from right quarter. and 12}( from the tail.

6. Level of .Attacks: The percentage of high attacka (28%)droilped considerablY from those experienced on the last 3 missionsin the 'Ibkyo area (39% . 39% . 49% ) . Thirty ..seven per cent of theattacks came from level and 35% came from belo'll; both figures areslightly above averaee.7. Direction and Level of Attack: High. level. and low nose

attacks were the most numerous. comprising 1.5%.20%. and 16;%,res-pectively, of all attacks.


33/68

1 0 5 .% ~III ;> -'< .::~t.g o~I z Q " e 20%> - t"l~ ~ or'", tJ . . . . , ; ; > -.l: rn~ \J1 rn'" %~g- - - V I . @~

. FR OM A BOV E16% 5%FROM LEVEL 37%". . FR OM BE LO W :35

Direction and Level of Approachof E ne m y A . i rc ra l' t% 1%'Total Numbero f A tt a c k s

8. E i J . e m y Aircraft Seen But Not Attaeltin.s=s.. OneFrank sighted. No further information.b. Two unidentified twinooengineaircratt si&htea. Ittfurther information.c . O J ::.e unidentified siJ'lgleooeag.t.nea~~]u.with 6 guns well out on wings. radial etl8Ue,. ctl.~R

very thick. slight taper on le~ ~.


34/68

(1) ,J~tt.ae~ were general fly~throu8h attacks.... . .. (2) . An effee tive type of at tack ~aB employed. byBevera~ ToJoS wtl1cb approached. very high .and. dove straight into

formahons at a 6 r : P angle. opening fire at about 600 yards andpressing to l'iith:i,n 50 yard.s. firing. continuously~

ll. Coordinated J.ttacks IThe fo 110>'ling coordinat ed at tacks "I.ere reported:a.. Nine aircraft reported about 8 Nicks, I Tojo and 6 .

Tanya attacking from head on so closely tog,ether that tt.ey allapPeared to be att.acking at once. HOl'1f;Ver,it ..as determined thattli.ey were attacki.ng in t,..os and tr:.rees from 11 to I o'clock levelto belo'l. They. opened fire betueen 1000 and 800 yards and generallypressed a.ttacks to 300 yards bero~e breaking a:.a:y in a dive.

b. Thre e Tonys attacked at 2 :3 0 and J = 30 frOl;l be10";; They opened fire at 700 yards at tlhi.ch time our aircraft also firedandenelllY aircraft broke in a dive at 500 yards.

c. Thre .. pairs of Tojo,s attacked one aircraft, one at atime, from la o'clock level. They opened fire 1000 to 900 yardsan.d broke arlay at about 400 yards. Our aircraft opened fire at1000 yards.

d. TUo Irvings came in from 8 :00 level and 4:00 highi thefirst broke left at 500 yards "d o th steep climb and out at 9;00high; the otner broke ~iih rii,ht turn at 400 yards and out at 3100level ..

e. Two zekes came in at 10 o'clock level. line astern; at100 yards broke to ri~ht with sharp diving turn and do~n.

f.Two Nicks at 1;00 high in trail broke left at 100 yardsand then zigz86~ed right and out at 7:00 high.

g. Seven unidentified tf.in~engine aircraft in a ~quadrOllformation peeled off and attacked one at a time about 1/4 ~uteapart. .All came in from 12:00 level. No. 1 and No. 2 broke at.300yards up over "ing and out at 4100; No. 3 broke at 400 ~ ~~'up and out at 2:00; lib. 4 broke at 32 5 yariJS over lett nIlS -out at 9 :00; No. 5 broke at about 400 yardS over left dollS ... OIllat 9 :00; NJ. 6 broke at 300 yards ooyer .zl&ht ..1Dg - ou. ! . . . . . . > l : ihigh; No. 7 broke at 300 yarda over riFt willS - 00 at ,--All were firing 1.7-mm and 2O-Um weapons.

out at 4100otber.


35/68

hi.gh all..d the other letand out at 5;00 high.k.. Seven. enemy aircraf't--3 Tojas: and 4 Tonys--all came' in

from 12 ;.00 level.. All broke about400 yar dB; th.e fir5t To jo to leftand out at 3 ;00; the .second to rigi:it and out at 9 :00 10'11i the thirdr~ght and out s,t 9 :00 low. The four Tanya broke left and out at3 ;00 level.

1. 'I\'l0 J~O. one at 10: 00 high breaking at 150 yards andOllt at 7:00 bigh; the 0 tnercame in at 12 :00' high. made left turn at150 yards and. out a.t 5 :00' high. .

m. Two :z,ekes 'iing to VIing from. 9:00 10'.7. broke rie,.ht at100 yards and out at 7:00 loVi.

n. T\70 Irvings. one at 5 :00 10 .. and other at 6 :00 level.First broke at 200 yards and out at 7:00 10Vi.

o , T v / O Irvings. one at 5:00 10,; and other at 6;00 level.The first broke at 200 yards to right and under and out at 12;00 low;the other broke at 150 witb left turn and aut at 9:00 10;;-.

i"Two To JOB came in wiDog on r. i l l@, at 7 :00 1o" i broke at400 yards and out at 9100 loVi

.ql Three _lbnys and 3IrviilgS made successive _passes frcm7 :00 high. and out at .5 ; 00 hig)l. _Circl'ed pack across tail for aIlOtllerpass but could not eaten up for second PaBS 7.ith this B-29 rueB-29 was crippled. .

r. Two Irvings at 1 :00 high. line astern. Broke at 1000yards over B-29 and ou tat 7:00 high.

12. Stragglers: Stragglers were particularlY siDgled out forattention by the fighto:.rs. The tl-70 B-2


36/68

c. 16.5% of B~29s over Japan wer damaged and/or destroyedb y enemy urcraft as. compe..:ed.wHO , 22.8%. 53.9%, and 132%. respect~ive1y. on the 3 prevJ.OUSml.ssJ.ons over tbe Tokyo area.

15 EnemYJt.ircraf tMarkj,n/?A:6 z;eke5 n1 . II'1 + I!'112 u1 u8 0 1172 Nic k2211 n1

1 'II35 "211.5 ,I


37/68

:5 'Fojo7 "612 MII1 Zeko6 321

1Type ABC1 ~ ft5 ft a], a:351 Frances1 Jill

-Dark ueen with red roundels,..Or",y,-Dark.,-Silver.-Olive drab,-All silver .-Striped 111s:ea zebra.-Black .-Grey with dark stripe on wings diagonal fromCuselage.-Red spots and stripes on wings..Silver.-Dark.-Brown.-CamOUflaged.-BI!'\'cls:with yellow stripes around wings,-OUve drab .-Light.

16, Results of H ih on Enemy Aircraft:D2WllFlwnin~ -and Sf/en to Cruh

4 . Nick5 Tony3 Zeke5 Irving1 H o.mp1S/E t T / I

Seen to Explode1 NiCk 1Tojo1 ek e2 Nick1Tony

2 IrvingA f l a m e a n d Out of Control Tail Assembly Shot O f r

and Out of Control1 Zea1Osoar

Wing Shot off and Out ofControl1ojon Fire: and Smoking

~ Irving4 . Tojo4, Zeke2 ABO2 Nick2 Osoar1 TOI I1 T . / E t1/I

Smokipg


38/68

Tre.oer.s1n Fuselage(No. Obutved Rs,sults)

1 Tony1 Irving (p Uot P.e.raChuted)1rving4 Tony:5 Tojo4 Nick1.ABC

17. C1e.t!1lsby Aircraft 'ItS %n Po~iti9AI__De.stroyed Probably Destroyed I?a.maged G u n Position4 Irving3 Irving1 Irving1 Irving:5 Nick2 Nick.2 Niok1 Nic k2:1'ojo2 Tejo1 Tojo1rojo3 Zeke2 Zeke1 Zeke:5 lony1 Tony1 Tony1 Oscar1 T/E Ujl1 T/E U/!1 T/E U/l

R SG, W os.Nose. RBa s oLBBoseRSOBoseIBIonRSGIonRSG , IloaeRSGLBBB. . . . .. .

RSGtaNoaeTailRBRSGNotleRSG, ROHRSGNose

2 Irving2 Irving1 Irving1 Zek:e1 Zeke1Zaka1Zen sa1 Tony1 T o n y1.0&1"10...1


39/68

Destroyed Probably Destroyed Damaged1 Ni.ck1 Nick4 - 'Tojo:3 TOjo2 Tojo1 Taja3 Zeke2 Zeke2 Zeke1 Zeke1 Zeb2 Tolzy2 Tony1 Tony1 Tony:>Oscar1 A BC1 TI E U/I

Gun.Pos~tionR aNoseRSGNoseU!Nose, UllioseRSGII IR BTaUNoseItaRSGIIINoseL BR Bt T aU

1 NQTE: Figures' for claims aga,inst enemy aircraft are at variance withthose published 1n the Consolidated Statistical SW!IIllary. Theabove sta,tistics are based on later inf'ormat ion and are believ-ed to be more, accurate. However, both sets of .figurlls are pre-liminary in that they do not represent the claims actually al-lowed.1. Ene my A A Fire:

P.ART n-AA AND Am.-TO-Am BO l lBDm

a. T h e secondary target was a t t a c k e d by 9 squadrons of the73rd: Wing and 4 squadrons of the 31:>th ',ing. The formatioZUI bambedfro.m24,500 - 30,000 feet from 0550Z to 0630Z. Sq1l8.drons attackedon headings ranging from 770 - 1300 with the exception or ODe _quad-ron Q f the 313th (3rd) with made a second rIlD on Tokyo OD a hDa41Df;of 2020 The winds over the target were repor1oed &II 2'70 0 - 21900at135 - 160 knots. TJ:i& undercut \ftI.S 6/10 to 9/10, a1tbough .caecrews r~orted that they were able to see land through oirrae b a s eand br eak s in the IGWer cloud cover.

b. The first flak encountered was reported 1 t 7 a .....A l O at 26,000 feet over Bamamatsu. It was .~.tinuouBly pointed fire and generally 1'ollow!ng, 1~right,

c. At thewaa enoountered.


40/68

.. e. Ove'r the. target the fle.k was mod.6ra.te to intense and gen-erally accurate. Aga.ln all types of fire were encourtte.t"ad, mos.tlybarrage and predicted concentre,tions.. The sacond tactical squadron ofthe 313th l'fing reported only moderate fire which was Very inaccurate.Ie ad ing by 2 miles. high. low. 1eveland r igh-t. Th1.s squadr on sutf ar ~ed no i'1ak drunage.

f. After the turn from the target and at IUd's end the flakwas meager and inaccurate , 'Twophosphorous bursts were Seen at land'8a,nd.

g. The third squadron of the 3I3th Wing which made a secondrun on the target from the ea.st encount~ed meager' and inaccura.te flakwhen first approaching the city" but the flak beca:me moderate and ac-curate, the majority of the fire being barrage type.

h. A total of 36 A,'C: was damaged by flak. At least 8 ofthis number sufiered major d.amage. The break. down of the damage wasas follows:

Looation No of A lQ Altitude (feet>'731'd Wg Eofu 1 ~.ooo

t way fromIP to tar get) 11 26.00029.0002334 .

29.00028.00027.00026,000

313th Wg Target u13_22 26,500 to28.000

One A le of the 73rd Wing was hit twice; once Oll bomb run andonce at target,** Engineer and Flight Engineer SpeCialist Report from 3l3th '!'Vlnglists 13 A la damaged by flak. Ste.tistioo.l Summe.ry 313th lI1nglists 22 A l e damaged by flak.

1. An apparent horse-shoe shaped barrage .... reported b J "on squadron o~er the target.j. B~sts were predominantly b la Ck,and one yellow burst were reported.k. Tbr'ee white balloonsserved at 26,000 feet over Tokyo.

at 20,000 feet. Piotures of tbDWing ~eport, oloselyreaembl.in War Depari;ml!lnt ll.1.D. p":bl~~Free Balloons and. - R < ; ' . . ., .. .. . .. ~ ,a report O f a Da.L"'~'_orew, . it 1s MIW~~i"


41/68

m, Signe.ls rrom 2 Merk "TA" model :3 ro.darsand. sever al200me radar signals were intercepted in the Tokyo area.

n. J ap~ne ae picket 0oats "Were s ightsd between th .. b1d 1" b "t . di ti t.h . . e aBS6m yan c 1m pOl,J1 S. rn eta. ng at the enemy had cons 1d r 01of the approach of' our !r/e. - '.- . e a e warning

2. Oy,r Tactios VB AA . :a . The Second Group of the 513th ':!1ng reported that mild

evasive tactlcs on the approach proved effective in evnding flak.b. Both win gs employed 51 ight t~rns EU1dlos s of aItiude

upon withdrawal.

a. Airto..A it Bombs;

-to > . - J .< c13 5-< > - ~_ . ' = '

I . ~ - < .'l'1::0 ~I"" l:... < :;) rr 0 .-.1t.'" .!: ~~ .~ .g ~. .- UI t ; > : ji1 . . 0

(1) Two 1I./G reported a red-painted Val wbieh fle'll" par-~llel nnd to the left of the formation about; 2000 yards a'll"o.y. Afteran unspecified time, the Val made a 1800 turn into the formation anddropped or fired Q. projectile which burst as a phosphorous bomb,Burst was lOW and inaccurate.

(2) One J;./C rep orted a nose at tack by a Tony or Tojowhich r.eleased ~ phosphorous bomb 1000 feat- above and 500 yards ::theadof the forma.tion. The bomb burst imme,dately. Co.using no do.mo.,lte.

(3) Between IP and "har&et. an Irving, approximately2000 feet above ancl to the left of a .t:ormation, dropped one phospbor-eus bomb whieh elq)loded 75 to 100 yards to the left and level witboutd0ing any, damage, The c ha ra ct er ist ic b ur st was "large-.

(4) Five OSCara, 500 feet or more above a B29 formation, drqpped 3 phosphorous bombs. One exploded 10'11'and aheadl OIU Jslightly above nnd tp rightj und the third low, behind, Rone or theaeeaused damage, Bursts were estimated to be 30 feat in di_ster DOtcounting strenmers.

(5) A gunner in the ir st ~r ou p over the target report-ed t~t jUBt bei'o:re bombs awo.y. 2 Zekes were observed attackln& aB.29 with one of the Zekes d r o p p i n g !l. p h os p h o r o us bo.b. the ~fu.rther reports tho.t the bomb exploded with !l. whIte tl ....... 87have torn off' part of' the B-2918 wing. The 8-29 was Dot i4a~Damage of the tn'e raterred to bAs not boen rapOZ""cI. r_ ...,.",Wing's BM29's (73rd Wing).

(6) O n e 73rd W1DgB-" ... ~ W3l3th Wing aircraft, l'epOl'te4 ... ~ 1d..celles, dropped one ph.QFo" bQbleft. Uter f'ly1.ag par.uet ..ing turn to tbe lett u4__ III-l~l.by a.bou,t 1000 yaJ'P.


42/68

b. Rockets:(1) Pes s i.ble rocketa were encountered shortly e1'ter

b0!!lb s away. A n un rden tif ied s ingl e-engi ne enemy alrcraf't fr om901 clook level .fired 4pl'oject iles s imu1taneous ly, B.pparently 2 fromunder each wing, at about 3000 yard.s. The projectiles fell shortby about 400 yards without exploding. They wentdowu at that pointand bUl"n~d out".

(2) Shortlye1'ter landfall a. red "ball of fire" wassee):).halow the forma:tiontraveling at very high speed. It hurstahout400 ya:rds behind the oba er-ving aircraft without causing dam-age. No trail was seen and it was Rot observed to have Comefroman . enemy Edrcrat.

(3) Near the IP two red ~'balls of fire", without trail,were seen descending v.ery rapidly through the formati.on without 6Jt-ploding. The 1aanching aircraft, if any. was not observed. No dam-age was reported.

PA R T III - D AMAGE A SSE SSMEN T R EPO RTTokyo Area

This rep'o1't covers damage in the eastern section of Tokyo Cityfol1owimg the bomb strike of 19 February 1945.

Ref erenC6 Photography:Pre-strike: 3ffi4M 4-2:40Pre-strike: 3PR4M 20-2:37-40Post-stl' ike: 3l"RSM54-3L::3 t9.13, 19Po.st ..str ike:, 3FRsM 54-3R: 12,,13

7 November 194426 November 194421 February 19-4521 February 1945

SUMMARY

Included is inc end iary d amage to resid ential areas. an openstorage area, Ta.rget 1394 and Target 1370.Some of the damage may have been oaused by strikes prior to 19

Fehruary 1945.Storage Area : Entil'e area or 165..000 sq rt delltroyed with thDexception of a few IImall buildings.Residential Area: Soattel'ed high-exp1oa1ve and 1 nC 18 II I . ... ~age within an area o r about 1.;6OI.,

Total roo!' area destroyed:Ab out 6100 sq ft. or ~ .""';pp!.i~

5. Resi4agtial ~"I~.


43/68

7. Target 1370 (3S/44N - 13!;l/48E: Sumida River Bridgej SumidaRiver Ra.ilroad Ya.rd of theJohan Lines: About 2400 sq rtof freight warehouse roof des-troyed.

8. Unidentified Plant on Wet Bank of Fdo River:a. One building destroyed: 1500 sq ft.b. One building severely damaged. Origina.l roof area about9000 sq ft. 20 percent destroyed.G. One building severely d~aged. Original roof area. ~bout

7900 SF ft. About 18 percent d.estroyeci:.d. Ground haze prevents mo r e detailed assessment.e. Fourteen bomb craters are visible in the ple.nt and a small

doc~tng urea.r. All damaged areas, referred to in this report are annotated

on the photo of !iI-lO March included herein.9. Resul ts of OtMr Bombings as SefiD on Str ike PhotolS:a. 73 bursts are in an area (!35/44N - 139!S2E) about 35,000

rt north east of the Imperial Palace between the Edo andFurutone Rivers.

b. Prints 87lBS 5 1 4 37-3V:8,9: 42 butsts are in an area (35/4511l39/46E) about 22,000 ft north of the Imperial Palace, ~d-l~tely seutheast of Target 20 4 and east of Target 207. Mostof the bursts are among manufacturing buildings,

0. Prints 870BS 5 1 4 37-5V:7,8: 8 incendiary burats are observedwest of the Edo River (35/4lN - 139/548) about '0,000 fteast of the Imper ial Po.lace. Results are unknown because otphoto quality. Seven bursts are observed 1n a populatedarea (!35/39N _ 139/53E) about 35,000 ft southeast ot tbe I m -perial Palace on the west bank of the ido Jiver and aciJaoentto Target 360.

Strike Photography I8708S 5M3? SVl l-8875BS SIa'7 1".1-12S98BSSI IS ' r 1V 1-6

871BS 5M3? lV:1-12871BS 5M372V:l-B87lBS 5M37 3V:l-IO8nBS 5M374V.ll-S

(The damage a.aaesament photog.,,,, which. tol1owfmade of Photo ReaolU'laiaaanoe photoJ ~a.ttaok ot 10 lIaroh 1945 witJltranspoaecl from pravtoue ho


44/68


45/68


46/68


47/68


48/68

L; .

ANNEX

E

CONSO LI DA TEP STA TI ST IC~L S U M M A R y


49/68

00zo-t-c r :lLIQ..o

ozct:5.:5oo

tim:EooLLo> -c r :


50/68

rz l N(T) c Y " \ - ' d '.. ~ -:t C'"l C" - c~ l:-lijo8~ . . . . . .....,..,0- < 2; ' : < I~ f " . t~~ rlOCOCO C" - C 'J N :3 : .-I~ Q E : NC'"l i"i ...... CO NN ~~4~

f -o ~~

9"Hrl

d:zHI;-

0 1 P lI ... 1

I t J I ,

I t I I I ,

I I I I I ,

~I 0111 ...... '..4 ,.-I o-l C\I

.o1~1~1 RI. . . . . . " . - 1 I \ll ''''' c Y ' \ 00I I , , I


52/68

-.0 I c. I,... ..,j,

0 1r- Q.J N (,I CIl

,I , I '!

! 1

PII 'N ("\I ! rl I (\.I I ,\J

dO00lQ~Nrl0000~~NN


53/68

(\J I;'- 0.) 0"\. '. . . .0"\ 0--",.

'-D I t(\j

, I

,I

I

'-D I I I(\jo.i:'-

0.) Irj 0N"\. . . . .'-D C ' - N " ,. . . . . . . . . . . .coN

I r I I I

I I I

O"\1rj0... .N C ' -'"Cl) I;'-CO. . .'-D 0--

I I I

I I I

C O C \ J N. ' ..; : t e o ~N . - I

oeo .co. . . . . .O C \ J ....0. . . . . .

00CO C1'. - I . . . . . .

I I

I I

N'-D. . . . .


54/68

~g-g.=: -::t t"-t"- -::t c o:g 0 t"-t"- ' & : ! ~~ ~t;~ ( \J -::t -::to- : ' ; : : ) g(~ '-0 ~-I ( \J c Y " \ " " * ""lrl r1f:3. B 0 00 0 at'- r2 0 00 0 0(l") :l 1",,0 0 I I 0 a - . . t'-~ t"- t"-( \ J ( \ J

H . . - I

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~\ . r i O ( r ) r i ~E; ~"'\ (I") ( \J C" ' I ( \J

I% t ov ov 0 " \ 1 ' ) . . . 0 - . 0 I I~E-4 C" ' I C ' I " ' IQ~~ ; ; !

E o < 8~~O" .... - . 0 c o - .0 . , _ O.

~~ ~" , - . 0 S;

~-::too s'--.o :::


55/68

I I1--:::;--+-----1--+--+--+.-----.--

I I

..-!..:i$~g~til~r--8~----~-r~,-+-------~

~:: 3~ I I I co c o (\J I (\J

0'0 II I'Ct"\

I I I I I


56/68

J;.i( '"H:-.nlI'f ~110mrH N O. I.f/i;J..09 .Sv99H OO,(:vst 9 9 1 . . 8 ' 6 " [ I. . 9 1 . . 1 7 t J oS 0 1 ON ':' Q3. :n SK OO 13 r.o !! 'T . . .L O J.

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21st bomber command tactical mission report 37

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