21st bomber command tactical mission report 43

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U IS S IO N N O . 43

F L O W N I,6 M '1 R 1 9 4 5

C O P Y N O . 104



FOREJ rORD

TlUs h the fourth report ora.

series covering 1'1v a low-level night

incendiary attaoks. The broad plan-

ning for ~h1s phase appears in tho

first of these reports-1Uss!on No.

40 against Tokyo.

This mission. ex.eoutl:ld by all :5

Wings of the XXI Bomber Command. was

flown in honor of Brigadhr General

La. Vern.e Saunders, B-29 pion.er. who

18 now reouperating In Walter Reed

BOB.pite.1. Wa.shington, D.C.. trom.

injurios r&oeived. in an airoraft

a.ccident •

.IJR.BJl



H E J J ) Q . U A R T E R S

m B WBE R CO l&A ND

. A P O 234

T AC TIC AL M ISS IO N R E PO R T

Field Order No. 46 141aalon No. 43

Target I U rb a. n A re a ot

KOSE . JilPAN

16 March 1945

Table of Contents

Tactical Narrative ••••••••••••••••••

Exhibit .. Radar Approach Cbar~ japan .••••••

Exhibit - Radar Soope Photo. • •••••••••

Annex A ~ ope rati ona • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Exhibl t-Traok CbaJot • • • • • • • • • •

Pert I .. Navigation. • • • • • • • • ••••

Part II • Bombing • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Pa r t III - Flight Engineering • • • • • • • • • •

Part IV - Radar • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •Part V .. Gunnery • • • • • • • • • • • •

Part VI - Air-Sea Resoue •• • • • • • • • • • •

Exhibit - Air-Sea Rescue M a p • • • • • • • •

Annex B - Weather • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Pert I-Weather Summary • • • • • • • • • • • •

Pert II - Chart - For ec as t Weather VII

O bse rv ed W ea the r

Part III - Prognos t ic M ap • •• • • • • •• • • •Part IV - SynoptiO Map •••

· . . . .· . .

Annex C .. Communications • • • • • ••••••••P ~r t I - Radar Counter Measures •••••••••

Part II - RadIo • . • • • • • • • •. . . . . . . . .AnnexD - Inte llige'nce • • • • • • • • ~ • • • • " •• 31

Part I - Enemy Air Opposition ••• ~ •• , • •• 32

Pert II .. Enemy .tult1aircrai't and.

il.lr-to-A:l.r Bombing •• • • • • 35

Part III - Bombing Results and Damage

Assessment • • • • • • . .. . .Annex. E - Consolidated Statistioal Summary • • • •

Annex F - XXI Bomber Command Field Order • • • • . . . .Annex G - Distribl1ti.on ••••••

Prepared By:

A-2 Seotion

XXI Bomber Command

P~e

N o

1

1011

1 213

14

1 415

18

18

1 819

20

2 1

2S

U

25

26

27

28

. .•• 43

57

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-----------------------------------------------------------------------111TTT11111111111II 11I1I1II

I SICRIt' •

1 By &lIth. ot the O . G .XXI BOBer O0mmu4

1 1i April isDat.

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111111'1"1'11111'1'11"111

H E A D - lU A R 'l 'E R S

X X I B O l4 B E R C O ID JA N D

!PO 234

19 April 1945

S U B J E C T : Report of Oper~tion •• 1 6 Maroh 1945.

TO, C,olllll~ndingeneral. Tw entieth Air Force. Washington 25. D.O.

1 . IDENTIFIQAtIQN O F M I S S I O N .

e.. Field Order N o . 4 6 . H eadq uarter. XXI Bomber Oomman4.dated 1:5 Maroh 1945. direoted the '73rd. 313th and 314th Bombardaul1;Wings to pnrtioipate in an a.ttack on Kobe. the fourth of the serios

of low -level incendiary strik e • •

b, Tauet. Speoified.

(1) Prtmaty Targets Inoendiary Zone No, 1 of the c1ty

of K obe, as outlined on the photograph in Da.mage Assessment Report

No, 23 (Annex D. Part Ill) of this report.

(2) No lIeeondnry or last resort target wile designated.

2. STRATEGY AND PLAN O F O PEMTIO NS I

a . Selection o f D - D a y ' Slnce the current series o f inoen-

diary, low-level efforts was planned 1:or alternate nights and thoweather predictIon for the mission'time was favorable. firm deci,ion

was made to attack on 15 Maroh.

b. Importanc!? of Targej;t Kobe not only is the sixth lo,r-

geat city in JapAn with a population of 1.000,000, but ~lso is the

enemy's largest port and ~ key dity in transportation. Its ship-yards represent the country's larges~ ship-buliding and marine-engineeonoentrat1on. Th e junction of the ma i.nrallrortclliM f rom S hi mo no -IEIkiwith the main line wast to O saka and Tok :ro is in Kobe, and anational highway. the only good td~d in and out of the City. runsthrough its congested business section. These important trllnspor-tatlon facilities integrate Kobe ci6sely with such key Induetr1alfaoilities as steel. railw~ eqUipment. machinery, rubber and ard~nanae , The highly congested core of the c1 ty (an o.vero.g epopu1a. tionof over 100.000 per Bquare mile) was selected for attalJk. }. luC-

o& ssfu1 attack w ould pundicap Japan1s already inadequate ship-bu114-ln~'and repair progrwni establish a bottleneck in the main eo.st·W$strail artery of Honshu, destroy stores 1n wo.terfront warehouses; andef feot production in importo.nt w a r industries.

c. OtMr ,FlletOt!! 1n Sf,!1e9ti 9n of Target I

(1) Bij,ldingo! Only about 10 per oent of lobo',buildings ! ;l.ref brlOk. sheet metal, stone, or concrete. Eany of

the modern buildings are sl.lrroundedby flimsy re81deM0s or them-

s el ve s oo nt ai n h ig hl y i nf lr um mn bl o i nd us tr ia l m ute ri al8 .



AECLASSIf'IED --____- _ ______J At~~~ 7r5o q ~ ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - -

(2) Wnter SumllYI \'Tithno hrge river or canal., lobe

is dependent for its water iupply on 3 l or ,e t es er vo 1r s, p, supply

which ho.s n evsr been plentiful o.nd i s oonll1dered ino.dequnte for br-g e-s onl e fi re r ig hti ng.

(3) Fin-Fight:l.nc EguiP!M!n ta Al th ou gh f 1r e hy dto .n tsare well distributed nnd fire-fighting equipment is believed to be

the most modern available, the poor wntsr su~ply and inadequate wa-ter pressure les s ens effeoti veneaa of this equipment.

d. D et ai ls o r P la nn in c. :O pe ru ti on ,l .

(1) Introduotiont Faots le~nad. trom the 3 prn10u.missions were used in planning this attack. In long rnnge planningprior to start of this series of nttacks (See Tactioa1 Mission Re-port No. 4 0 ) , It W o. s e st im at ed t ho .t a pp ro xl mo .t el y 1 5 0 airc :rai 'twoul d

be Q,vo.ilnblefor this atto.ck; however, it was possible to schedule342 p la nes s inc e m o.i nte nnh oe w or k WO os d on e fa .st sr th an e v e r beforein this Oommand and losses to the enemy were smaller than had beenantioipated. Other facts brought out by the 3 p re vi ou s m is si on s and

incorporated in planning this strike follow:

(a) Greater· conoentration and merging of tire.

must be a~hieved by the following methods •

. 1 . . Y ax im Ul lln Ul ll be ro f a ir or af t m us t b e oyerthe target in the shortest period or time.

~ Aiming points must be as close together

as possible.

~. Intervalometer spa~ing must be limited

to 50 feet.

J . Bombs must not be dropped in isolated

areas with no large fires burning nearby.

(b) Approaches to ortut aiming paints must bemade by radar.

(c) Air disoipline must be observed olosely.

(d) A distinctive method of target marking mustbe used,

(e) Night landfalls made by i nd iv id ua l n av ig at or s

had been equal or superior to those made in daylight.

(f) Iwo Jima was a great sattey aid and a goodradar check point in ~ddition tQ furnishing facilities for homingr adi o r ang e s tat io n.

(g) Low altitude missions to HOnshu saved 1 00

miles in distance and an average 850 gallons of fuel per airoraft.

{2) Selection of Aiming Points I EqUal forcel were toattaOkthe 4 aiming points selected, all within Inoendiary Z·one No.1. One point was in the northwest Corner of the zone I the seoondwaS south of the,main railroad line; the third was northwest of the

main railroad station; and the fourth Wall northeo.at of that pOint.The predicted ground wind WaS from the west and 3 of the 4 aiming

- 2 -



iJll.J.ll

po inta were in the w e stern eectlon or Zone No.1. In addi tlon tothe oonsiderations listed, seleotion .lso w " base. on rea.onl 11.-

ted in the introduction for operational planning. (For 1 ' u rt he r i n-

formation on a.illl1l1gOints see Radal' Approach Ohart po. R A - ' follow-

ing this tactical narrative.)

(3) Bombing PIMS I.

(11) D et er mi na tIo n o f Bomb to",

l . Each Wing diapatched 6 pathfinder air-~raft which carried incendiary bombs fuzed instantaneous noae. n o n -de la y t nil , AN.lf16 •. the most effecti veo.vall a.ble t o produce largesile fires as aiming points for the main force.

~. The main force Carried a. many SOO-poundi no en di o. ry c lu st er s c on ta in in g 14-89 b om bs o .s we re a va il abl e, withA N - M - 1 7 A I clusters comprising the load for the others. E - 3 e and E -

3 6 olusters were fuzed to open 2000 feet above the target. while E-4.5olusters were to open 2590 feet o.bO". Theee 6.1titud....· gave a.'

greater denSity from individual planes than from higher opening.and at the Bame time the striking velooity obtained was suffioientto penetrate the target. Since the M-59 bombs available were limit-

ed and there were no M-47's beoause of a shortage of T - 1 9 olusteradapters. the M-l7 olusters of 4.-pound ma&nesium bombs were the only

substitutes. Released from low altitude, and set to open at 3000

feet, these clusters gave the following advantagesl

~ The eh~nge of bomb type from thoseused on similar missions would force fire fighters to adopt new tac-tios. Immediate attaok with water greatly reduces the number otfires from the M-69 type bomb, but water OaUses magnesium bombs to

b ur n f as te r.

~. Twenty per cent of the b om bs o on ta in edexplosive heD.ds w ith variable delay explosion times, This would

make fire fighting d1rricul t until after explosions had oocured.g1ving other bombs time to start fires,

~. The dock and industrial area subjeotto att~ck would be damaged by th~se bombs' greater penetrat.ing abil-ity.

A . Multiple hi~8 would oCOur since theo lu st er o on ta in ed 110 individual bombs. compared to the 38 in theli-69 type.

~. Every third o.lrplan.eoartied 00..6 T4E4

saO-pound fragmentation cluster fuzed to open 3 0 0 0 feet beneath theairoraft. These were to disrupt fire fighting as muoh 0.8 possible.

J . Ground spacing of 50 feet was used torall munitions, for reaSons listed in para.gr~ph (1) Introdugtiopunder D et ai ls o f P la nn in g. -O pe ra ti on al .

(b) B om bi" .M et ho d. Pl An ne d.

1. Because of Kolle' B peculiar shape (10 mileslong and 2 miles wide) aiming pOints had to be selected at greaterdistances apart than on previous mi8sions. The aiming points were

designated eo thst eaoh wing hit down wind targets to prevent somke

-3 -



J1Q!!1

from interf ering w ith visibility. The initial point was the samefor all aircraft. 3'; 19N - 135/06/30£. Altitude. and axe. of attaokfor the Wings f ollow.

~ Altitude Arla of Attaok

o a d eg r~e 8 t ru e (2 aiming pointa on .~ axi.)3rd 6000 to 6500

3l3th 7000 to 7 800 10 degrees true

314th 5000 to 5 5 00 06 d eg re es t ru e

(See Radar Approach Chart No. R A - 4 f ollo wing t his s eoti on t o radditonal details on axis of attaok. aiming points. initial point •• tc.)

1. The shape of tM c it y c ;f 'f er edan advantage

i n givi ng D l ' \ e xcel lent shor e l ine es an of fs et aim ing pOin t.

J . Bombardiers were instruoted to make a ra-dnr bombing run over D . rada r o.im ing poin t bet ore m ak in g a ny vi sua l001'''0'!'l~n..

N Q yl ga t io n al P l an n in gl

ReA.ona f or Choice

Baseto

25/00N ..14~/OOEto

The route was pl~nGd to avoid Iwo Jima opera-

tions by 75 miles.

2'l '/161 .. 1 4 0 / 5 3E

toThis enabled use of NiBhino-Shima lUI a rada.:r

c he ck p oi nt .

3 5 / 5 3 N . .ISS/03/S0E Landf all was designated on Hino-Saki Point.

The bay area between HonshU and Shikoku pro-vided a g oo d r ad ar i de nt if !o a. ti oD p oi nt and

pe rmit ted e asy o rien tati on f or nnvi gato r.to if th ey h ad made ~ndfall error.

3 ~/ 1 9N - 135/06/30E (IP) This initial point provided a peninsulaw hi ch i nt en s1 f. le d l an d . .a te r c on tr o. st and

p er mi tt ed c on ti no us o ri en ta ti on o J. on g Os al ca .to Bay during t h e bomb run.

TARGET lobe,

t o3';44N - 134/55E A left hand turn o f f the target avoided O.ak ato defenses.

33/00N. 134/45E Planned west of Aw aj l-Shi ~a. t his poin t avoid.

ed i ncom ing f o r c s i ~d land defense area ••Remainder o f the route w~a direct to base,

p au in ,! ; w e st o f1 " 1 ' 1 " 0 Jima

to perm!tnavigator.

to use rad.io range station. and to land in~o event of emargenoy.

Base

--'-

l



(5) FllthtEnclneer'. Plannipg.

(a) Exoept for the bombing run, which waS to bemade at 250 mph calibrated air speed for greo.ter saf'tey, the flight

plnn to be flown was planned to secure mo.ximum fuel eoonomy and air-orr.ft performance, The entire mission Will t o be flown by individualaircrnft.

(b) AircRaft of the 73rd and 3l3th Wings oarried

an average fuel load of 6600 gallons, filling wing and oenter wingtnnks to capacity. Because of greater distance, airoraft of the 314th

Wing carried an additional full bomb bay tank, ~ving that Wing anaverage fuel load of 7300 gallons.

(c) No maximum or minimum bomb load waS speoified,

but average load estimated for the 73rd and 313th Wings was slightlymore than 15,000 pounds and for the 314th Wing 10,000 pounds.

(d) Two hundred rounds of 50~co.liber ammunition

were carr1ed 1n tail turrets by the 73rd and 313th ~V1ngs. w hile none

was specified for the 314th.

(6) Radar Planningt

(n) One initial point, 0. sharp prOjection of land

into Osaka Bay was used for all "11ngs.

(b) From the initial point :3 approach~s into thetarget were used e 6, 6 and 10 flogreel True. The shnrp and distinctlyshaped h~rboT shore line Was used as an offset aiming point insteadof anyone deSignated point.

(0) Radar operators were provided with radar naV.igation and approaCh charts which permitted them to establish pro-per oourse. The 73rd Wing used the small dookin~ area for finnlcorrection; the 31:3th Wing set its cours~ along the eastern dock

areas i and the 314th Wing used 0. Course to the right of the bulgeat the mouth of the Suma River. All wings used tho southern co~st-

Iine of Kobe IlS a timing point.(For additional information on radar pla.nning see

Approach Chart RA-4 and Scope Photos (RS.lS) following the tacticaln a rr a ti v e. )

(7) Radar Countor Measures I Routine search tor enellWr a d a r sign~~s on fr0quencies between 100 me and 3000 mo by , RadarO bs er ve rl w as p la nn ed .

(8) Alr.Sea R'SQue PlanninCI

(a) li.a.uJ.1 The Navy was furnished with detailsof this mission and requested to fu rn ll h av ai la ble fa cl 11 t ie s f orair-sea r-escue p urpOles. The following were made o.vallB.blo,

1. Five submarines were Itationed, duringthe entire miSSion, at the follOWing points: 33/00N - l34/40!,32/30N - 135/00E, 31/30N - 135/:30El :30/:30N- 136/30E, and 29/30N -

137/00E.

l. One plane tender WaS stationed at la/OOIf-144/00E until all aircraft had passed on return from the mia.ion.

- 5 -



A. Tw o Dwnbo aircraft were assit;ned ..

tollowsl 1 at 22/00N - lll/40E from 2000Z to ~ end of the m1ssion

and 1 at 19/00N - 143/30E from £lOOZ until the . n d of the milsion.

~, Piok et boats and crash boat. were on duty

during critical periods of take-orf and landing until reli • • ed byth e Oon trol Tow er.

(b) A6lJ. This Command .nigned 3 Super-Dumbo air . .

plane. to orbit the following .ubmarine positions for the speoifiedtime.. 32/30N - 135/00E from 161600Z to 161900Z1 31/30N - 135/301f rom ;51530Z to t6l845Z, and 30/30N - 136/30E trom 161640Z to l6lB30Z.

(For additional details on air-sea resoue planning, see exhib1t

foUoW"'ng Part VI in Annex A)

d . D et ai ls o f P l, np ln g- -In te ll i, .n c8 1

(1) Enemy F"'bter RMCtigD I In f or ma t io n O b tm .1 n e4 trcag on ar al In te 1l 1g en "e 8 01 11 '0e Si nd 1o t' .t edt ba .t t h e K ob e a re a b ad m or ef ighter. than any of the Command's other priority target • • in thatthere were 150 Single-engine aircraft w ithin a 50.mi1e radius anda total of 250 within a lOO-mile radius, There w ere tew. 11 ' any,

twin-engine airplanes in the vicinity. These f igures and pait .X~perience indicated that our a.ircraft would sustain more attack. dur';'

ing this mission than on previous Similar strikes and that enemfnight fighters preferred tail attacks. Beoause of these consider ..

ations, it waS decided that ammunition YlOuld be carried in the taUguns of the 73rd and 313th Wings I planes.

( 2) Ene my Anti aircr af t,

(a) On the basi. of flak reports on previous low

level attacks and the much smaller antiaircraf t defenses at lobe(61 heavy gun. and 31 automlltic weapons), it WaS decided that thelime al t 1tude o.f at tack would be used (5000 to 7800 feet.). Stag-gering of aircraft in these altitudes w as also planned.

(b) No barra.ge bal1oDn. had been reported in thear ~a. Eight een ser achli ghta. 11 much smnl1er number thnn of otherhenvlly defended areas, were reported. None of the seo.rchlights W I l .of the ' sp re ad b el ll ll 'y pe . l I' ort he se r en so n. , b ar ra ge b al lo on ::md

11 8arch llght cons idera tions did not nf fect the plan ning of ' th e mi nion.

(0) The best radar approach to Kobe WIlS 0.1.0thebest f rom the point of view of flak risk. The turn lett nt targetPo.st Ako.shi a.nd then south over the Inland .en nnd Awa.ji Islnnd broughtthe aircraft within the def ended o.l"easfot the shortest poslible time.The turn south WIlS made bef ore the H lmeji detenaes were encountered,

3. E XE CUTIO N O F T H E MISS IO N I

a. Tpke-orr I P at hf in de r n ir ar ai 't o f the :n4tb Wing were

sc hedul ed t o tak e-of fn.t 160940~ w hile tho se of: the 7~rd nnd 313thWings were to tllke-of r nt loSlOlOZ. Tnke-ofr of the tota.l f orae TIO.S

IM I follows:

-5-



TO'l'AL 3 3 1 • 161);39Z

1611saZ

161135Z

1611171

161l56Z

jl.£lLil

lintTake-oft Lalt TAke=Ott

73rd

313tb

314th

151*

128

_..§L

161011Z

161009Z

169939Z

• Exoludea :5 Super Dwnbo. and Inclu.4 .. 1 span /lie l l I U I b O N _ r S . -!4!1...

b. RouM0u1a The course tloWD 'Ro. . g8nerlllly 0.8briefed.wlth"1.rrnn being moat effectIve ~1d on the mInIon dn.ce turhulenoe

a.nd oJl;ud oOV8 l' at 1000 t'eothan!p tired ettluti~l no.v:1go.tlon. Rndor

'lio.s u_d f01'10.nd1'o.l1 o . n d . bomb run. A.wo.ji Sb1mn and t~ Inlthl

po.int-Were cloud up on several. ro.dar 'oope, a . n d ma..nynQ.viga.tQr. andradnor· opero.tor. confused the southern paint of the il,land witb the

(iobe Mming poInt. Despltetu.rbulences nnd light .bower., W6o.thl!lr

on the ;routl!l 9ut 'lfM generally good.

(1) 'rimy 'l'flJ'g.!t1 "11th 5/10 oumulus 0101141, baae

:3000 feet and top 6000 feet. 250 or the 306 o.ircpoJ't over tbe pri-

mary tlll'get bombed by radar. Bombing 1 Ins c. t o.ltitu.des tram 4660

to 9000 .feet o.nd from 1738Zto 1946Z, with 2328.1 tons of bomb. be-ing d r o p p e d . (See C o n a o l 1 d o . t e d Statistical Summary, Annex E, tor

detailS).

(2) Lilt Resort 'f.arget' One o.1reroJ't 0 . 1 ' tM73rd 1fl~

dropped i;l tOM of bO""..1l9 on Sldngll at 1900& fron o .n ..ltiUd.. o r 7900

feet.

(3) Junta oCQRportunUX1 On,e alror.att of the T3J'11

Wing dropped. 9.1 tons o.nd 1 .o.ircratt 0 . 1 ' the 313th '.'ing dropped 8.5

tons of bombs. both being on Ilnkno1fn targets from ~kDOwn o:lt1t~de.

and o.t unknown times.

(4.) Twenty...one nlroraft were non-effecti'T8. (See Aft-

nex E, CODaol1do.ted Sta;tiatle:o.l Summnry)

d. RouWBg,glp Arter bom.bint. Q. maJority at a.ircraft flow

ba. .cko .s briefed. Twoflew dIrectly fl:'om to.r get to bue, going "..tto Iwo Jlma.,wh:ile 15 lo.nded ~t thc.t ish-.nd., Href'uel1ng c.nd one

f l o r minor mn.lnteno.nce. ':'leather for the return tripwa. lim11ar to

that en route to tQ.rget.

e. Lp.n d ln p A lr cr !l.ft 0 . 1 : t;he m0.1 .D f o r c e l an - d a d. o .t ba.se.

under good w e 0. the l' conditions e,s follow ••

. nn&73rd313th

314th

TOTAL

I

Firat LOAdipg

16234.0Z170001&

1 7 Q0 31 3

1623"o2

taat LaMing110256'Z

1702S0Z

l 1QUU.

1702S62Landings QXlllude a;l.roro1't tha.t landed. at lwo Jlma and returnedlatllr.

t , Lgln.. Three B~29tl were lott dlle to unknown rOlLaona.

(The tOM'<gG of' • are included. under 'Targets 01' Opportunity· t.hnt

of the third u.nder 'Prima.ry Target.·)

-7.



JJ2.111

g. O p lt r at i on s S u mm , WI

(1) Navigationl(Se. Annex A, Part I, for detaill)'

Celeatia.l work wns hampered by 010u4 cover and navigators ha.d to 4.-pend on Loran u an a.id to their dond reckon1ng.

(2) B Ol lb in c: :( So o An ne x A . P ar t II, f or d et a. 1l e) .

From the bombing .tandpoint the mission wa. luco08.ful. Few meohAn-ioal failures were reported, w i t h most bombs being dropped in the

briafed llreaa.

(3) Flight EQdneeriDs,.:.uee Annex A, Pa.rt III, tor

d,eto.lls)I The times required for o11mb to bombi.ng altitude var1Ctdbeoause different types of prooedures were used. Fuel oon.umptlon.were .lightly more than predicted due to slight hea.d w ind. encoun-tered, The 73rd lITingcarrhd the gret\.te.taverage bomb 1 0 1 1 4 tbo.t

hs•• been carried to date -- 16,637 pounds.

(4.) ~:('See AnnexA, Part IV, f or df ttal l.) · Ap pro z-

1mately 82 per cent radar bl)mb relaa.8es were ma.de. IOl'llldlU80 WQa

mnde of SCR-718 r ad a. r a lt im et er a nd SCR-695 IFF equipment. IlIlzllllwara.nge of Loran fixes w a.s betw een 700 a.nd 1600 na uti oal mi lo ••

(5) G un na ry :( Se e A nn ex A, Pa.rt V, for detail.), Yore

enemy fighters o.ttacked than on previous night miasio08. Equipment

o pe r at e d 8 ~t ls f~c t or l 1y .

(6)u nk no wn C au ll es .b e instituted.

A i r . S e a Reacu!, Three 8 - 29 ' 8 were mi.sing ~ue toSincs no posItions were given. no aen.rches oould

g. W ea th er t (S ee A nn ex B, for detaUs); Weather oondition.for the miuion "ere genero.lly as predicted. Winds on the ret\1J"l\were from the south inlltead of rrom the north, all predicted. '~a-

other o ondi tiona at ba.ses "ere good for tak e-ofr ond landing.

h. Cpmmunication.;

( 1 ) R Q d o . r Cou nte r & eq §u res ;( See A nne x O t P~rt I t fordetails). No offensive counter meo.suras W6r~ employed. Signal. in-teroepted in t he t tu 'e ;e tQ .. re o.o .i le d t o i nd lc o. te e xt en si ve : ,, ".-0( ~-lqL ng a ct iv it ie s. . S us pe ct ed A I lIignnh were intercepted, but oouldnot be defin1 tely o.uoch.tad with ooord1 nated fighter o.ttt;lck ••

(2) C gm mu ni cn ti on .: (S ee A nn ex a , P~rt I I , t or d et al l. ~:A t o tt \ l o f 39 b ea .r in gs w o. s r e qu es te d a nd all w er e o bt ni ll ec !. iJetdiSCipline WOOS good.

1. InhlllgeMo Summqry,

(1) Enemy Fighter ReaotioQI(See Annex Dt Pnrt It tord eto .ll s)· A lth oug h .: ?J30· Jn pan esGi ght era w ere ai ght ed, on ly 06 orthem ~ttacked with l04 o.tto.ck .in toto.l. QIlal1ty and qu~i ty of op-

p a s t i o D i nd lc o. te d t he e n- em y' IJo on ti nu .e d i na bi li ty t o ~n t" rc ep t 0 1 1 1 "forces with other than negligible oppOSition. Howe . . r, proportionof aircraft Sighted to those attacking wa.s the higheat yet eXp&l"i~-ad on n1ght miSSions.

( 2) Ene my A nt1 Q~r Xl' a.f tQ nd A ir- to- Air : Bom bin C (SeeAnne,x .0, P art II, for details Enemy antialrorCl.1'tas mengel" IUldi na .c ou .r o. te .S om .e a ir -t o- a. ir b om bi ng a nd r oc ke ts w er e o bs er ve d.



(3) DOMineBesun, anaDyu. ,Atun.nt l e S e , ADDex D.

Po.rt III. ror dete.Il1) j' Two POlt ..mission reoonnnill8.noo fllt;bt. wezoe

made and from photogro.phs o.nd subsequent interpretB.tlon the follow-

ingresulte were indIcated I, .

(a) o,r lobe'll a-I,qu.are m11e 0l'0II.. 3,0 miles

(.Ill,' peroent) were d,e,stroyed.

(b) Forty-ai,x per cent of Incendiary Zone No. 1

wo,& destroyed.

(0) Target 169 (M1tsub1shl Heavy Industry) w a .8 per oent dostroyed, Tn.rget 171 (Kawasaki Heavy Indu.try) was 13

per cent destroyedl o.nd the A l " o . t o . Sh1pyo.rd ' W I l l 21 per oent deltroyed.

(d) Target 34 (Kobe Harbor DlIItrlct No.2) was

destroyed.

£~ r.C41 .1~ .CUR TIS E . LelW' I

1!a.jor General. U. S. A.Commanding



A-2 SECTIQN RADAR

XXI BOM BER COM

'3oDoo

1 ; ; ; ; F f " " ~

II

1

';1-l.!' .....T NO. RA-APPROACH C H A R T - J A P A NKOBE.- OSAKA AREASCALE 1'250000

r.ESTRICTE

6 = INITIAL POINT

14,g

135"00'

Aiming Po_intNo. Assigned.A/G eo.Wing

1 a 2 1/2 of 73rd. on eo.A.P I3 Allof 3'13th. ~~

" 4 AU of 314th.

-,_ .--_"'""'~ ;~.._~:_-~6LL_ = - - - - -v ~

135" 15' I::;"'''' =



CONFIDENTIAL

APPROACHES TO KOBE

KOBE

SWEEP

AYAMA

XXI BOMBER COMMANDMARCH,1945 REPRODUCED BY 949TH



.§J,g.B.ll

A N N E X

A

ClIRAUOJ§

Exhlbl t ..Traok Obo.rts

P o . r t I . . N o . v i g o . t l o n

Po.rt n ..' B o ; D b l n g

Put III .. Flight Engineering

Pl1rt lV .. Ra.dar

Put V .. tlunnery

Part VI .. Air..ea R.esuoa

E:xhl.bi.t - .Ur-SeaReaoue Kap

MiSsion N o . . 43

16 Maroh 1945



IIII

---+-------

FE8flU.RY 15I4!

130· 13!1·

•

+ - . -ffmonO$8kiSIroilI)

~INAWA

25-

~ . . . ! ! ! : .1619!12Z 73·161700162000l 313·16172316192!1l 314.161744

\,~'.~'1~~

l\ \ ~ .\\

~+IPAN

- - --- -- - -- -\ ~~INIAV-'

\ 1 - -G U A M J ,

FF .I.U l " . l I L . . . LAN 1.J

16120:!! 182340! 170161151! 170020. '702161001l! 170031. 170

140· 14~.--=:J

,-~~~- REPRODUCED -B-'-3-'-TH____;'P'-HO-T-O-T-E

' .

130· 135'

TRACK CHART X XI 80" SER CONFIOtNTIAL0100

TA

73 •

313 •314 •

I

.l!1161010Z161010!160950l

MISSIO

DATE ..I2.JIIIIWId.L

XX I B CiII.1 c('M . _ _

~-Briefed-----73rd.---313th.

"--'3 14th..t

lII



P A R T I - N A Y IG A T WI

1. The naviga tional p roblems encou.ntered on thill ml l1l11onwere

nearly ide ntical to those enco untered on the Osaka mil lsion of 1 3. M a roh. Oelesti al work was hampe red by cl oud cover above flight al-

titude, and navigators were requi red to depend upon Loran 1 1 . 8 an aid

to their dead reCkoning. Loran r ange was effecti ve to the ooas t of

Honshu, with the avera ge landfall error 1 0 miles east o f the brieted

point.

2 ,axis of

justify

fly the

O rews failed to make M ufficient effort to follow the bri efedattack . Oa ses of la..ndfa.l lrr or were not great enough to

direct routes to the target w ith no at tempt being made to

briefed axis o f attack o r to p ass o ver the initial poInt.

3. Awajl-Sh1m a Isla nd and the point at the IP were closed up

on several rn dar scopes, and a larg e numb er of n~vlgators and radar

op erators c onfused the southarn point at the island with the lo be

aimin g point. W inds we re brie fed at 320 deg rees at : a s knots and

co mputed at 340 d egrees at 25 knots.

4. O n return. two aircraft flew direc tly from target to base,

flying west of Iwo Jima. A ircraft in diffic~l ty flew directly over

Iwo Jima; o ther. flew Q$ b ri ef ed •

• • • • •PJ.R T II - BOMBUIG

1. A 3 / 1 0 to 5 / 1 0 und ercast waS re ported on this miSSion, w ith

th e target be ing obscu red b ecause of smok e. il. great deal o f tu rbu-

lence W!LS a ls o e nc o u nb er -ed, The ma jor1 ty of the relea ses were by

radar , with a number of aircraft reportin g deflecti on correotions

being ma de visua.ll y just prior to bom b release.

2 . All Win gs reporte d li ttle dif f1culty in loca. ting IP and

JJ P w hen these points we re not smoke cove red.

3. The 314th Wing had s.eme diffi culty, due to searchl ights

bl inding bomb ardiers. Searchlights, however, were use d only du ring

pa rt of t he mis sion.

4. F lak was reported by a.ll Win gs but it did not dis1lract t he

bomba rdiers on the b omb run.

5. Few meC hanical failure s wer e re ported. wi th t he majo rityof th~ bombs bei ng d ropped in the deSignated tar~t areaa.

6. Several large fires and numerous small fi res were visible

o n s tr ik e p ho to gr ap hs .

7 , Both the ~13th and 314th Wing s' b Qnbs were s hort and s ome

bo mbs were west of the axis of attack. T he 73r d Wing' a a.im1ng pointwa s completely d estroyed.



1J.2111

PAR T III .. F UG RT E NG IN§!iB lR q

1. Nar ratiye of Milsio n as Flo wnl

a. Low altitu de cr ijiool T he init ial cru ise was flow n's

indi vidual aircraf t by all Wings, wit h al titudeo and speeds fl own

being as pla nned. No attempt was made to assemb le elemont s or g roap.

during the entir e miss ion.

b. Climb to Bo mbing A ltitudl' The time requi red to r olimb

to bombi ng altitud e varied gre atly 8inoe many types of olimb .proo.-

dure wa .s u sed.

e , Cruiae to targetl V ery low po weres were required to

obta in maximum ran ge airspeed in the oru ise pr ior to start ing the

bombing run, the appr oximate average pow er setting b eing only 2000rpm and 30. 6. inohe s ma nifold pre ssure. The average pcnre[ Bettin g

requir ed t o obtain 250 mph cal ibrated air spee d on the b ombing run

was approxim ately 23 50 rpm and U. i no he s m an if ol d p re S8 ll l" e. In af ew i ns ta nc es I hig h powet' a we re use d fo r a oons iderabl e leng th or

ti~ to elu de ene my fighte r plan es.

d. Retur n to base : In nearl y all O ales the returDs to

base were m ade at 7000 to 10,000 f eet until a pproxima tely one hourfrollLthe base; where letdowns at app rOximate ly 1 00 teet per minute

we re made. F uel oons umptions were q prQxlma tely 200 gallo ns more

than pred .icted due to slight b ead win ds en countere d.

2 . Comment s on Result s of Mission i

a. The 73 rd Wing car ried t ha grea test avera ge b om.b load

th at h as bee n oarri ed to Ja part to date ~ 16.637 pound s. Al l al r-

craft i n the 73rd W ing Ca rried a bomb load sp ecified by the Wing.

In the 3l3th Wing. loads ''iEU'S limited bv the ty pe of inc endiary

bomb s avo.lla ble. Th e 314th Wi ng s peoified 22 )(-46' s o r 24 &.46' s

for bo mb l oads a veragin g 10.202 pound s.

b . A verage fuel consum ptions to targ et f or a ll Wings w e r eas predioted.

c. A verage fuel reserv es f or al l Wings w ere slightl y lee.

than predic ted beco. useof he ad win ds.

d . For fue l consum ption a nd weigh t da ta, s ee O onsolida tedS ta ti st ic al S um ma ry .

3. Exhibits I

a, F or vertioa l p~ot. fuel oonsu mptloft, and b omb load seo

Chart I A · . C ross hato hed areas represe nt al lowanoes for reduced po -

tentia l b omb load and addi tional f uel requir ement to target for 31 'th

Wing.

b. For histor ioal relD ord o f Pllst 9 m is si on s llee Chart "1 31•



AJ.TITdPG"(!=EEr)

~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~~~~~~~

1 ~~}

; i ' . . . ; !

I t r'1''1~-~''i. .. , i'~ ~.\.- . 4 - : ? : : ! : . p , . A ...

! ! ,; I :! , I ! 1 l

. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .1 , " " 1 , . " , . 1 , , " , , . , ' [ . 1 " . . , " , . ~; ; i I;

! ! l I !iii, ,!

I. . . . . . . . . . . ." ~ '" 4 "- · · · ! · · · · · · · · · · .~·t;

I

A f t ( ~ ~ ~ L A S § 6 d>____ .....C~:I'V\R;\ D a t c : 2 & L z _ ~-=-_ ........ .



(;)

rtlEI.

.ReSFI?VE /t? t 1 t J - t .

(64tt()NS) 800 t .~



P .A R T IV - R A D A R

1. hdq,r Employment:

a . A N/ .A .P Q- 13 ( Bl in d B Gl ll bi n~)I Ro.do.rwus u.ed tor target

n~vigation ~ bombing. It ho.d b een antioipated that the speoifiO

off set aiming point might 1\ot be visible beouo.se the o it y' s s ou th -

arn COo.st w a c used f or timing o.nd c ourse correc~on8 w ere made with.ref erence to coo.sto.lf eatures. Reports indioo.ted some orew s '-.reable to distinguish specific aiming pOints wbJle otbere estimAted

t he ir po si ti on . Ap pr ox im o. te ly 82 per oent mo.de oomplete radar re.

l eo .s e o f b om bs .

b. S CR -7 1B ( Ro. do .rAl ti me te r) I Employment w us normal.-c. SCR-695 (IFF), Employment WIlB normal.

d. APN-40 (Loran) I Transmission throughout m188ion to a14in navigation to and f rom target.

2. Equipment Perf ormance:

0., A N / A P Q - 13 : O r 306 A lO bombing the target, 250 bombed

by radar nnd 56 made radar approaches and bombed viSUally. Opera-tion of APQ-13 over the targst w as 94 per cerrt, Avere,ge maximum

landf all range w as between 65 and 70 miles. Extending of radar-

domes did not increase the r ange of the eq uf pmenb ,

b. AN/ APN-41 Loro.n f ixes nnd line of pod tion were to.k: an

at maximum ranges of between 700 and 1500 nnutical miles.

3. Miscepaneous: One radar operated w i th Interf 'er: enoe on

its scepe , By i t d ir ec ti ve ch et rO )c te ris ti cs , t hi s i nt er fe ne rc e s ee m . .

ed to emanate from an· enemy night. f'ighter. Approximately baIt of

the scope w as covered with interf erence, dense along radii at the

oenter, less dense at the sidesi the center of the l1I9.ssf inter-

ference rollow ed enemy night f ighters wh1·ch were observed visually •

•••••PART V - GUNNERY

1. This mission w as the first night mission inw h1ch strong

enemy foroes were encountered. . 1 , . 1 1 a re suI t. it w as f elt that more

ammunition should be carried on f uture missions. Theref ore, the

lower ef t. upper af t, and tail mounts w ill hencef oroe carry am-

munition instead of just the tail mount,

2. C.F.C. eq uipment for ~ll 3 Wings was 98.7 per oent opera-

tive and 50-cal. guns were 97 pe~ cent operative •

• • • • •

PART VI .. AIR-8M RESroE

There w ere no k nown ditchinga on thiS m1saion. Three airorc1't

are missing due to unknow n reasons. Sinoe no pos1t1ona w ere ~veDtno searches could be instituted.

-16-



FEIIIUARY 1'4 ~

r--"""'"T--·-1~-,).":""_1----'---'--'--1-35-·~-....--..-__,.~".0!I--·',--...,.--.---r----r--;

I

S E C M

I .45" ,, I

1 ~ - .

MISSION NO . 1 ~DATE 18 March

XXI BO MCO M.

A IR SEA R ESCUE

K EV

• - SublNl,ln,

t- I " \ :

~r~-~--+--4_~_+-I-+_4-_~-+-4--~-+~~4--'~--+-1-----

: ~ 1 \ i . _ - 2I \ ~ \ :".,:mc Ve~ "O

I ~fOoe Vess.1 on \- ~Stoll n Unt,l All

LSiolio~ Until All • IC \ ' I AIC Posse

• Pa.se on Roule ome • oulll ~

I ~!: LI \ ~ : --L

~ t A N ,' - ~ T iN iA N -

<> I

20'

1

Crosn Boats on SI lion

+Vicini! S;il~ N' ~ INIA

5~ ~ ---- -r- -- -~ '-r--- ++: -I- _~r~~~I!. 3'._bon£lp.i,-- Pe" ds.

II

130' i

GUAM({

I Ir----+_~-+--~+_-~I4-~~--+-~-+--~4-~-~:--+-~~

~~-+--~+--+~~+I--~'_-+--r-4--+-_.~~-+i--~,_-+~

1~5' 140" lis.

TRAC eli'"T x X I 901ol8E" co .. SECRET REPRODUCED" Y 3.5TH PHOTO TECH U



Put .1 .. Weather Summary

Part II .. Chart .. Forecast vs, Observed Weather

P~~t I I I . . P r o g n o s t i o M a p

Part I V . .Synopt1olla: v

iJ~Jll

B

Minion N o . 4 3

16 llarch 1945



PLANNING m tEQAST

~ OUaJn.I 4/10 oumulus, base 1800 ttl top 7000 ft, lnereuing to

6/10 with show(l.rs at'ter 0600Z.

Saiplln: 41'10 cumulus, bo.se laCO ft., top 6-'7000 tt, 3/10 Uto ..

9Ul11U1ulI,\>a.s~ 14,000 ft. , tOll 15.000 ft•

.~I To MONI 4./10 cumulus, base 1aOO tt, top 6-7000 tt J 3/10 a.lto-

cumulus, b!l.Se 14.000 ft, top 15,000 ft,

240N to 26QNI 6/10oUll'lu1us, base 1800 ft, top 7000 tt, e/10a.1to-oumulus, base 13,000 ft, top 15,000 ft.

, oo0N to eaoN: 10/10 clouds. base 1200 ft, top 20,000 tt,·

with showers. Light to moderate turbulenoe. light loing

above 10.000 ft. Ceiling dbwn to 500 ft .• in rD.1n.

OOoNto COIlBt I 9/10 str'1.toCW1!UlUB bas", 1500 ft, top e..10,000 ft. 8/10 mid.dla olouds, ba.se 11, O O Q rt, tQP 18,000

ft, in layers decrea.slf\g to coo.st.

Ta.rget:

lobe I GilO strlltooumulus, base 2000 tt, top 4000 ftJ 10/10

altostratus ,bnse 6000 ft, top 11.000 ft. changing to 6/10

high st.rntoGumulus ",j'ter aoCE . •

Afd~~"i'i~6~5: . r________ --' C~Alli\2a.!_~~ ~ ~.~._~ .. ~..~_._~_

PAR T I _ 1 IE AIllE R

Qperg.tional FOreoast

Base at 5/10 oumulus, b~se 1500 ft,

Tnke O c r I top 8000 £tIS/lO middle

cloud, bo.se 12,000 ft, top 13.000 .ft,

6/10 cirrus,. baGe30,OOO ft. Visi-

bili ty 13 miles. lowering to 1 mile

in !Showers.

Route lSoN to 23oN: 4/10 cumulus,

~ base 2000 ft, top 5000 ft,visibility 15 miles.

250N to 270Nz 6-8/10 cumulus.baae 1500 ft, tops 6-8000 ft; 5/10

a lt oc um ul us b ec om in g 10/10, bas~

10,000 f t. top 14,000. Visibility

10 miles, lowering to 1 mile in mo-derate showers.

270N to 340Nz 8/10 oumulus .• bale2000 ft, top 5-6000 ft, vi.sibiHty

20·miles.

340N to Torgetl 5/10 cumulus.

base :!OOO.ft. tops 6000 ft. Visi-

bility 15 mileG.

'Hea.the:J' Encountered

4/10 cumulus. brUle 2000 ft, top

6000 ft; 2/10 altostratus, bue

13,000 ft, top 14,000 .ftl e/rocirrus bnse 28,000 ft. V.hi._

bility 15 miles.

l50N to 25oN: 5/10 oUllulus,

balHl 2000 ft,. top 5000 ft. Vis!-

bUity 15 .miles. 3/10o.1tostre.. ..

tUB sta.rting aeoN, base 8000 ft,

top 10,000 ft.

asoN to .27°WI 9/10 oumulU..II,

base 1200 ft, top 8000 ft, 5/10

0. 1 tostrutuB, base 10,000 ft.top 13,000 ft. VisibUity 15mlleB, dropping to 5 mUes in

Hghtshowers.270N to eg°N'1 3/10 stroto ..

oumulus, base 2500 ft, top

5000 ftI 3/10 0.1oatro.tus, bo.se

10,OOC)ft. top 12.000 ft.290N to 330NI 10/10 strato.

oumulus, base 1500 ft, top 7000

ft.! lalla nltostl'ntulS 1n It\yere-

botween 9000 ft. nod 16,000 ft.Vhibi11ty 10miles.

330N to To.l'!;otl 4/10 strl1.t.o-CUIJ),uI.us,bllse 3000 ft, top 6000

ftJ3/10 al tostrntus, bo.se9000tt, top 12,000 £1;, v.is.1bll1.ty

15 inUlts.



§.1!U1JI

~I 5 / 1 0 o u m u 1 u s , b u . 3 0 0 0 tt,

t o p 6000 f t , ' Vi s i b i l i ty 15 m . 1 1 e ( l l .

4 /1 0 s t r a 1 l o Q W l l ul u l , bu. 3 0 0 0 tt.

t o p 6000 ftl 3/10 a l t o a t r a t u . ,

base 10, 00 0 f~, t o p . 12,000 tt.

V i . i b i l i t y 12 m i l e a .

B e p t a B e - S i m i l a r t o R ou te O ut go -tntn1 PC: ing.

S i m i l a r t o R o u t e O u t g o i n g .

BM" pn 4 / 1 0 cumulus. l)ase 1500 ttl

~ : t o p 70QO f t ; 3/10 m i d d l e

clouds, base 1 , 3 , 0 0 0 ('t, 'op 14,,000

ft. V i s i b il i t y 1 5 m i l e . , l o w e r i n g

t o 1 m i l e i n ~how~rB.

5 /1 Q c um u1 u. , bale 1600 f t , top

6000 f t j 5 / 1 0 m i d d l e c l o u d . ,

ba,1I1!12.000 f t . V i a i b l l i t y 15

m i l e s .

W l n d & Aloft ... F o r e~aB t

lSON. 200N 200W _ aeON 2SoN ... 330N Target

15,000 65/12 0 ~10J35 - 4 1 3 9 0 / 5 5 ·9 260/65 - 1 9

10,OOQ 'l0/15 8 320/27 4 290/35 -2 290/40 - 1 1

8,000 ';'0/15 12 340/25 7 3~0/30 1 300/35 ...

6,00Q 70/15 16 10/22 10 330/25 4 320/30 -7

4,000 70/15 20 40/22 13 360720 6 350/25 -5

2,000 70/17 24 75/21 16 30/20 6 20/20 -3

Surf'aoe 70/11 2 '7 50/14 18 10/14 10 360/13 -1

W i h d e A l o f t . . .O b l l er ' Vs d

10,000 90/~ 270/40 ~0/35

8.000

5,000 300/30

4,000

2.000 6.0/25 60/25 '300/35

S u r f a c e

Remark; I This foreoast ~ oonlJ1dered good except that wind. on r e t u r n

w e r e o f f o n d ll "s ot lo n. IIhifting th ro ug h t he south instead of

throl.lgh the north.

A l & ~ ~7 7 f 5 6 ~s :--...____.. ~ C~ARc\~al~~~



•~

. . . . .& &

:; =. III• •D

:I -Ie. .~• } /

1M

0 -'0 '". . •

~

~~

I

I

~~

~

~

LU

a a a a a a ua a Cl a a a <'(

0 0 a < : : > a 0.. _a::

o~ lIl- a- LD a II> ::>. . ., P" '''' IJ1

u.J0 a 0 a a 0 v0 0 0 0 a 0 «0 a 0 a a a

. . . . .6 t_n- g~ 00::

0 If\ =:l1'1 (I !J)

u,M,o,l.,:l,,'j,t!tu

560>



;"

I~ ( ...,.,. -c ; J

,~..J

OPTIC

1800Z

6' MARC

•iRU

/94.5.



11.2&11

e

Part I ,. Radar Counter lIeaau.N1I

Part II - Radio

. . 6 -

Ji.Q.Bl.I

A \ & ~ ; '~ U M S '6 a5":;...;........____.~il,RA Dal~>L?lL/~ L..".._____"...;!!IIIII!b-", ....... --=-_~_"=-"' ... 1 I l !



PAl\TI - B A D A l cowqm M!jAStlBES

1. Gen&rall

a. Four R9U SearBh aircraft participated in and completed.

this m1es10n. Search was performed for enemf transmissions in the

freqllency bands of 4.10 mc, 25-100.0, and IM-300 Il10. While over tbatarget, the soarchwae concentrnted on logging radar signals w1th hlth

PRF and short pulse length characteri8tic ••

b. A total or 54 a1gn~ls was 10gs-d, but atter analysis torrepet1t10n and amb1guity. ~h18 numbeTwaa resolved into 15 ditterent

signals. Analysis inCluded c01n01deoo. o t the signala with ene., .0-

tion, their po.aible transmission from partioular ene., equipments,

and previous InterceFts.

c. Nooffensive counter measures were employed.

2. R"lJlts o r Search I

a. The signals 1ntnceptod which were of particular intereat

fOlloWl

(1) \95/2000/31 This sigDAl was intercepted about 10

miles from Kobe over Osa.kaWanand 1s believed to be the Mark 21 AA

Fire Control type rada.r eqUipment. It was coincident with intenae to

meager but inaccurate flak through ~lO to 9/10 clouds. The few search-

lights at the target area were inerfective except 1n a few oases inwhich aircraft were Conedby 8evera! searChlights and '1isual lighting

of AAwas useg.. This sfgna.l 19'8.8 traCking.

(a) 79/2000.2500(5.71 This MarkTAModel 3 a1gnal wtl.S

very strong' in the tnrgst areu nnd cnn be comparedwith the incidence

(If flak stated nbove in po.ragrnph (1). This signal _B tra.c.king.

(3) l50/1200/-.~1 This I!I1gno.l.interoepted 50 miles oft

Sh,lono-M1Bnki.V(Q.sobe lWitGhing and tncldng. A few minutes later 4

or 6 tw1n-ent;ine Eli were following the a.ircro..ft. Noo.tto.okllweremade ,

(4) 1300/---/2: A a1mlle.r 8igna1wo.s picked up in theOsaka area on a previous mission. Nodefinite coordination with fight-ers was made on either mission to associate the signal with AI. Fight-ers were knownIItill to 'be trailing the aircraft after eve.J1ve aotion

through clol.lds was employed. Noalgnal. however, lI!l' Int&roepted a.tthis time.

b. Other dgna.1s intercepted to nnd from target nreD.1

Qhlltac3$r1stio. I nt er c ep t L eg A ti o p Remark,

100/750/710 3.:?!55.N• l3S/50E Strong ligno1.

lobe switChingD.ndtrD.cking.

94/eOO/20

97/600/20

110/eOO/20



The foregoing three li,nal. (on the preceding po.ge) were intercepted~t 33/20N • 134/40E, and are believed t o be Mark II Fixed Air Searchbased near Y u r o t o Z a k i .

156/350/7.5

104/600/18

78/400/40

107/750/7-10123/700F/10

146/450/5

310/600/10

Lobe Sw1toh1Dt

Possible Mark 3,,35

TrtlCldng

Tr~Cking

Nisbino Sh1Jna ,

28/l0N - l41/00E

31/l0N - l38/30E

West of 8 m th ts,100 m1 from Smith

Is.100 m1 SWSmith la.

Nish1no Sh111l1l. 1 !'pm

The foregoing seven signals were intercepted en route to J a p a n , an4

indiCate ~equate Jap~ese early warning equipment from Nishino Sb1mnto Smith Island with a range exceeding 100 mile••

3 , Ana!v,lg q p d Copclu8ioDl'

.,a. NoD/F'ing of an y I!Iigna1was poae1ble dlle to the 1 1 1 . 0 1 1 ; o r

suitable eqUipment. The looations listed ~re suapected locations,

b. The B1gno.lai~tercep*ed in the tnrget area failed t o in-dicate any extensive lise of gun-le.yin~ activities. Raao.r searchlightoontrol was notlceaoly 1aoking except 1n a few iaolated CasOs 1n which

the aircraft was coned effectively by lights. Visua.l aight1ng IIpre-sumedfor A A. HeavyA A-was reported only by lllumip.ated aircraft.

Three types of fire were encountered through 0/10 to 10/~0 clouds.

c. The ;iuspeoted AI signals are stU1 being intercepted, but

as yet cannot be deflnately associated with coordinated fighter attaCks,Furtb3r search is Wing maintained for more evidence pf these signals.

PAB·T II - R AD IQ

1.' Strike Reports I Aircra1"t rad10 Gpere.tors transml tted 26 strikereports, all belng received by the Ground Stations. Three reports were

trnnsmitted on 11080 Ito 'but were not received. Tbe'e l"eports were then

retransmitted on 6055 Xo and were received ~ the OrOlU1dtation.

2, Fox TransmifaioM I GroundStilt! ODS tr~1Il1 tted. OOOPACweatMr" '

and time ticks simultaneously on all strire frequencies on the half

hour and hour reapeethely. GuM! _ather was held in reserve by Saipan

o.ndTinlan in Case of 11 diversion of a.ircrB1't to other than their hoQltl

bases.

3. Fteguenci&B .Air-sse. rescue f.requenc1es were monitored ~urlngthe entire mission. The tollowing information was interoepted. An

aircraft of the 313th Wing :f,ntorllleda atllt10n guarding 4476lca that

he W a s low on fue;!. !lndmir;ht 1 1 9 t mo,kebase. Lnter interception indi-

oated that this plans was in sight of the field and 1I'Ouldbe o.ble tolo..ndso.!'ely. Tbts o.irero.ft landed nt Saipu.n. The I1boveinformo.t1onW0.8

relo.yed to the o.ircrti£t' Ii headqunrtera ~Oll receipt 'by the GroundSta.-t1on. RadIo oper~tor8 reported t.bo.t frequenoy 11080 los . 0 . . not re-ceived neo.r the t a r g e t . Bowever. 6055 Iqs and 3145 Ics (the other fro-

- 2 8 -

§.1.2..!L!l

A l & ~ _UM

S 6 a >...... "--_~ ...I C~fln .A_Dat ' . :>~z . .



J.i.2AJl

quenoh. used by the 73rd Wing) were reoeive4 with an excellent 81C-

nnl. Aerio.l operntors stated tllat j8lllll1nc wal reoeived on 0.11 Itrlkefrequenoies o.t one t1me or an other du.rlD&the IIluioD" Atmospherl0

interferenoe was slight to moderate on all frequ.enoles. 'ollowing 1.

a. peroento.ge bret\kdownof tra.tfio I '2 percent on ,. mer;.oyole trequ.on-oy; 3 7 peroent on 3 megaoycle frequonoy; and 2 1 peroent on 1 1 "ca-

oyole frequ.enoy.

4. Hayigg.tiond Aid.. Thirty-nine IP/DF bearinsl were requ.t-

ed and . 0.11 obtained. Eight requests were mad. for VBF/TI ! bear1Dgs.0 .11 -wereobi;a.ined. One BF / 1 1 ! bearing was not requested but the all'.

oraft tranalil1tted an emergenoy (XXX)messAge. The Gr ound Stat10n 1m-

mt?dio.tely shot a. bearing on the aircraft and sent 1t to the aircraft.

Ranges a . n d bo~ers were utiliaed extensively with SOodresults. On.Gro~ attempted Q.ir-to-o.lr homingwith only latisfaotory result ••

Most Groups reported too muoh interferenoe for air-to-air boa1ns pur.poses. Althou.gh the O.W.I. Broaclcastlng Station ~ Intermittentl,

jammed, 2 orews reported homing on tbll .tation all the WlI¥ fro. 1lbeC00.8tof Jo.po.n.

5. Het D1.seipl1M !ll!d Securityr Het dhcipline ftl 1004. Air-crn1't operators were carrying 2 asp 1270 c04e book. Binoe one wentout of effect during the mll.ion. Seven mdio operator. used t b D OQa-

promised eode after it became effecti".. StePI are ~iDg taken torectify this situation.

S. ~emy Trallsm1§§ong: The fGllcw1ng inoidents of jllllllDlngaDd

interference were noticed during this miSSion.

a. 3145 Kes:

(I) Intentional c : w jammingwas partioularly effeotiveover ta.rget.

(2) Steady tone was effeotive at 1100Z. 13201 and for :5

hours after leavlng target aren.

(3) m v jMlIlling. narrow ba.ndwidth. wo. . very effeotivea.t 1930Z.

b. 6056~9S I

(1) Jap music at l510Z, 0.180.at 1559Z. sourx1edlike Jo .p

broadoast.

(2) Short period of bagpipe jo .mm1ng at 1725Z; il¥'tfeQ-

t1ve.

0 UOBQ XO . I

(1) OWjD.llllnlngnt 2QOOZ i w1dl!!bo.!1dspread mOodet .f1'eo-tiv9J some at 1130Z.

(2) Unidentified 0 ' 1 ' 1 at 1545ZJ was partlo.1ly effective.

d. Fr~q~enoie. 3 4l e~ $ a9D , 7 e& Oi 1415, l e e 89 ·~. 11160 kGste,pGrted no ol1tAtandj.ng lnQldenils Qf jamm1nt .. aitbaugh atJll04phei'1.III ~nter-ferenoa. ,trail p~asem:t CD all fl"(!Iquona-ies.

-29-



112.111

7. Distress I GroundStations received. 5 dhtreu mes.. s e s•Bearings were obtained on all aircraft. Four planes landed ..10lwo

Jima, while the fifth stated 1t might ditch 100 miles frcDi b .

D/F st ..tion Wall immediately n.otiti'8d and obtained 'bearInr;a lon,1. 8 ditching W1LB immInent. Position, bearIng, aD d altItude were ob-

tained from the radio operator and this information wall forwarded to

ADCOAir Defense Control Center) whioh immediately pIaiced 110lip 011the radar aoope, 'l'h1a aircraft c U d . not ditch and was able to 1aD4Barely.

8. EquipmentMalfupptiono I A N IART13 ; 1 dynamotor caused RatiO

in BC-384; 1 dynamotor inoperative. BC-348ReceiveI'I 1 ott oalibra-tion; 1 with no aidetone. WARN. .7 Radio COmpUSI 1 iocl1o.t01' hl1llting;1 inoperative completely. 1 inoperative on 'Compaas' positIon. SOR-saa

Oomand: 2 inoperative. RC-36I 1 dJll1fier and 1 miorophone Switch

inoperative, Antennae.: 31 RL-42 reelo inopep..tive; , R L - ' 2 r•• 1sstioking; 6 compass aense antennae.· broken.

•• • • • •

-30-

Afd~~'~'-"~505:

'--- __ .... C~I\Rt~ ~al·~~~~~ __ ~ ....



SEORIT. . . . --~,.._.

D

P t I l ' tI " . . . n em y . Ai r ( )p p o a it 1 . o n

P a r t I I . . .Enemy Antlo.1rcruf't and A ! r . .o-.A1r B o t I I b1D g

P a r t I I I _ B o m b i n g R e s u l t s a n d D a m a g e A a s s a a m e n t

Exhibit .. Photo

Exbiblt ...Photo

Million 1 1 0 4 3 .



PART I .. liM An gPPOSltIOI

1. Gonenl t

~. Enemy air opposition was weak on this mission. T w o bQn-

dred eight,y Jap fighters were sighted; 96 made 104 attack.. Previousexperience ~t the target together with intelligenoe on tighter aircraft

based in the aren lend to the belie! thnt the reported nwmber of sight-

ings is excesSive. No B-29 was known lost due to e ne my a 1r cr a. f 't C LO ti on .

T w o B-29'a (.6% of our i'orce) were damaged clue to enemy airoraft and

three B-29' s (1% of our force) were damaged by enemy a1rora.f't B.Dd a nt i . .

aircraft fire. Claims are 1 unldent1rled single-engine aircraft des-

troyed and 1 unidentii'ied f ighter damaged.

b. The m~jority (62 oi' t he 104 attaCks) ot o.ttack8 wu lIo.d.

the tail, as was the Cnse on the 3 previous night missions.

c. Ene~ fighters used the glow of fires to .ilbouette the

B-291 B. One fighter pressed hie attaok with the o.ld of lo.nd1.ng Ughts.

T w o B-29'e were followed 200-300 miles out to sea by the enemy.

d. Ene~ fIghter reaction on this mission indiCate, tbB con-

tinued inability of the enemy to intercept with other than negligible

opposition. It Ie to be obeerved, however. that the number of enelllY

aircraft sighted and attaCking on this mission ie the highest yet ex-

perienced on night missions.

2. Type of Enemy bircrnft Att\\cking:

a. It is estUnated thnt 96 tighters made 104 attacks. Seventy-

three o f the 104 attncks were made by ~ircrnft unidentified as to ~;

38 ntt\\cks by wholly unidentified aircraft; 24 . by single-engine; nnd 11

by tw in-eng1ne aircro.f 't.

E ne my . 4i re rl lf ' t No. ¢' Atto,Ckl

Unidontifled

a /E U/ I

lrvlng

T/m U/ITony

Zeke

TOjo

Zeke 32

Nick

o SCI!.!'

38

24 .

1111

e. ,.2

1

1_..,1

104OTAL

3. Enemy Aircra.rt Sigh\;eO But liot,Attopkingr O ne h un dr ed , e1gh~

tour enemy D.ircra.{'t~e..t d id n ot f ) .t tn ck1 II6 res : J. gb te d as f ol lo w s I 86unid.entifiad, 00 single-engine unidentif ied, 16 twin-engine unidentif ied.

6 iekes, 6 Ton7fs, 6 Oscars • .2 rojos. 1 Nick, and 1 Dinah III.



b. Tail attacks again were most numerous, 62 of the 104 attacks

being madefrom the rear quarter. On this mission the greater number otthese attacks. :n. were madefrom high tail. 24 baving been made at

level. ./

c. Of the remainder of atto.clca, right quarter attl1cks were 811~t.

ly favored over nose and left, having sustained 16,10. and 14 respective-I 1y.

d. Diltribution of Attacks on direotion Glld level basis o.pPOIll'S onthe following ohart.

4. Dire9t! pn and. level of At1ip9!c ,

0.. A total at 104 attacks was mild.,by enemy t1~ter. 8.1 com-pared to,39. 4 7 , and 40 made on the three previous ni~t miaaians. re-

speoti ve1y.

Direotion I1ndLevel of Approa.chof' Enemy.A i TCrlf' t

Total Number

of' Attacks

1 04

7

P'R CI( A BO V E

F R O M L E V E L 4 3

A ! d ~ ' i fS 6 as :_______ -' C~,I~I~a_s~0,

8

1



5. Acour!l9yof Ep,'IW Fighters I As far as b known, DO B.29 wudestroyed by eneMfairoraft. Five A le (l.~%) were 4ama~.4bf Japf'lghttrB as oom.parodto 0 % • • 7 % . 0 % , 0 % , 0 % , 16.5%, 4.7%. 22.8%, 13.]$.

and 53.9%. respectively. of B-29's 4emag.d a.nd/or d!8troyed by en!1IW'

aircraft on the 10 previous missions.

6. twes of Pro1ectile I l4ach1ne-guntire was observed !I.II were

7.7-mm and 20-mm. Someenemyfi~ters 'Were reported using tracer am·munition.

7. EnemyTactics I

a. Sometendenoy waSobserved toward oloser approaohe. onattaoks than experienced on previous night missions. Irvings and Tony.

were observed to be mElkingmore aggressive attacks.

b. In one instance, an eneuwairoraft attacked with the aidof his lo.nd.lng lights. Althou&h landing lights picked up the B-~.

short range of the beams and rapid rate of closure resulted 1.nineffeo-tive Il.ttack.

e, One unidentified twin-engine aircraft fired trom its top

turret a.t approximately 300 yards at 3 o'clOCk low while on a couraeparallel but opposite to a B-29.

d. Twocoordinated attacks were ob!lerved. Onone of the88

atta.cks. the a.ircraft Camein from 11 and 1 o'clock. O n the other,2 twin-engine a1rcrn.ft were observed flying individually 1000 teet

above aircraft over the target area. WhenB-29' s becnmefully illumin-ated by the fires, the enemyaircroft attacked from high at 5 and 7

o'clock. pressing to within 300 yards. Brenkll.W8.ysere unobserved.

e. Someenemyaircraft were observed i n pairs, especially over·bElYarea after In1t1o.l Point.

f. Over the tc.rget, 1 unidentified enemyo.lrcrn.ft Ml.S observ.ed flying above o.nd900 to the course of observing o.1rcrn.ft while dra.g-

ging a co.b1e with several cy.l1nders atto.ched. The cable Wl).S o.pprox1-

mntely 500 reet long o.ndits vertico.l appearo.noe 1ndico.ted weights tobe heavy.

g . Yany of the ene~ airoraft blinked wing and/or oockpit

lights. Some o.ttacklng pInnas out out tbe1'!' wing lights as they brokeon tbe approach.

h. One !!VA dropped a flare from between 15,000 teet to 10,000

feet over the target area..

L, Fitteen f'lghterl'J tro.11ed a. B·29 tor 30Qmiles on the with-dro.wCll. Seven flgh1;ers trailed one B-2SI for 200 lliles.

j. No radar ta.otlos \1Dreobaer·VEl4. Seerohl1ghts were negUrgible in effectiveness. Ho'IfQver,the glow fran. 1'ires, reflected ~n-

at scattered clou.ds, rendered 0. grent denl of illumination to the ttu'-

get nre~. Someenemf aircraft appeared to use light of fires bela. tosilhouette the bombers.

k. Ene~ aircrntt werGobserved apparently p o . c i n g . Theae 4 1 0flash.ed 1and.i.ne;igbtl!!.



8. B-2? TII,ct.1cao . n d P'irepp!!!!r n. Enpmy Airorpttl Ev'o.lI1yeo.ctiOIl

wo.s!l.coompliahedby some B.1roro.£t, by making right OJldlett turns 0 J l4changing ~ltitude. OneB-29 Ohanged oourse. o.ltitude OJld o.irapee4 tosho.ke oft enemyo.iror~ft. One B-29 dived, picked up !l.lrspeed, QDd turn-

ed. Someaircro.£t took evo.sive aotion by molting IIha.rp turns to thwart

o.ttncks. A few o.ircraft took advo.nto.geof cloudll to lose enemyfltbters

while ~ther 5-29 successfully evaded an attack by entering he~vy smoke

rising from the target.

9. Enemy Aircraft Mnrkingil

a. Mnrkings were, for the most part. unollssrved exoept for wing

lights. HOwever,1 Irving wo.sreported o.s s11ver-oolored, IUld1Tony a.

olive drab.

b. Enemyo.1rcraft were reported with wing lights, some red andgreen, others merely red. Someho.dwing lights reversed to those of

B.29's. Somehad 2 lights on I wing; I was seen with 2 orange-colored

Ughts on wings; Qllother ha.dbluo lights.

10. Results of' Hits on !!lpemyAirorp.1'tz One unidentified dogle-

engine enemyo.lrcro.£t exploded when hit by tail gunner. O~ uniden-

tified airoro.tt, nfter being hit by 0. tail gunner, went Into 0. dive.throwing out 0. cloud of smoke.

11. Cla1ms by Type EnemyAlroro.tt and , Qyn Po81t1.oD.1

Dellwoyed Gun PoBitiODgmnged .

I S/B 0-/1 1 U/I. To.11

NOTE; The foregoing analysis is bused on Inter intormuti on thlUl thatpresented in the Oonsolido.ted Statistical Summary

• • • • •

UR T II .. ANTIA lR CR AfT A@ AIR -TO -A IR BO MBING

1. EnemyAnthirgraf'j;:

a. En route to target flak was reported .s follows I

(1) Aircraft of the 73rd Wing !lIet meager flak between -

landfall IIJldIP. It was mostly heavy. continol1s1y pointd. and barra~eand fairly accurate.

(2) SCattered burets from automatio weaponl and 3 ~s onthe peninsula south of Iushimoto, neat Stuon-llisakl Seaplane BtLlI8, we r e .first met by the airoraft o~ the 313th Win~. Looation ot the &uns ~as

estimated at 33/~7N - 134/45E. :rhree DIore~s wore apotted at Shima-

Silto. SCattered flufrom lI.utomat~cweapons waS loen from Susam! and

Tanabe just south of WakaYamA. where both gu~ a n d A / W were encounter~.A/W fire was also met at the IP an d tram craft in the bq.

(3) The 314th \nng arierart mitt.meager aD d inaccurate

flak in the Vioinity of l . ' T o . J c a y e . m o . and Sana, the tire beln~ described III

'spore..dic and poorly controlled.'



b. Onr the Tvat.

(1) Aircraft of the 73rd WinEattacked the tar~t thrOQSh

underc.. tTIll'y1~ froID1/10 to e/10 usi~ &xes from S~ to 36 4eve •• ;planes of the 3l3th dropped their bombsthrough 2/10 t o 9/10 un4eroast

on an axis o r approximately 10 degrees, tM 314th Wins encountered U.Dder-

cast tram 0/10 to 1 0 / 1 0 and uaed ~S from 356 to 3 de~e.. The w i n !1flUI from UO to 320 degree8 at S3 to 46 miles per hour.

(2) AlAfire was described aI 'sporadio and erratic,'

lDD.1nlyarrage, with 80mepredicted oonoentrationa and oontinollaly point-

ed fire. Both heavy and med1W1 l flak were reported. It wu 118a&8ro

intense and generally inaccurate.

o. Two aircraft of the 313th Wint;1I9re 108t to Qnkncnmoauses·

and one aircratt of the 7lrd Will!ruled to return. At leaat a part ofthis 10s8 _ 8 due to flak. 8inoe, on interrogation crews reported seei~

1 B-29 IInder intense AlAfire gol~ downin a flat spin over the target.

d. Four airoraft of the 73rd, :5 of the 31:5th, and a of the314th Wing'Were dam~d by flak.

2. B-29 TactiC' Acainot MAl

course~nd

altitude to evade flak.aary.

Someaircraft eql10yed cha.nt;es 1n~r8 found no evasive action neoes-

3. Air-to-Air BombingA n d Rockets c

a. The 73rd Wing reported no rocket attacks. A few enelV air-craft dropped flares. One aircraft observed rockets in the target area.

b. The 3l3th Wingreported I

(1) At least 3 o.1r-to-air projectiles launched with negativeresults.

( ,(2) Apair of projeotiles witil trailing ta11s of tllllll2

orossing iofront of a B_29 1n the target area.

(3) A rocket fired from a single-engIne fighter.

(.) Arooket battery of 6 to 10 launchers firing from near

the o.1mlngpoint. The prOjectiles relt.ahe~ an altitude of 9000 feet,giving the appearence o,f' Ro.manoandles •

. . . . . ..I'AR 'l' III _ D AMAGE ASSESSMM•

Yiselon No.: 3PR5M8 l)ats Flownl 17..1&March 194P

Altitude, 34.000 fee~.

This report a8leSlllSIdamageto KobeCity re.u1t!l.~ frolll XX I BomberCommandi osioQ 43 of 16.17 Maroh 1945. Area destroyed totaled about79.630.000 square feet (2.86 aqua.re 1111188. 1.850 acres).



tODe City oovers an area. of about U. 8,Uars l 1111ea . About 20.5

peroent of the city W o . l destroyed. Forty-six per cent of Incendiary

Zone No. 1 w as d es tr oy ed .

Industries damaged inolude Tar~et8 3 4 . 1 6 9, and 1 7 1 .

Xbtal damage to Kobe 01ty f ro m XXI Bomb er C Olll llan dl isB 10nl 26 and43 is 8 2 . 2 8 1 .000 square feet or 2 .9 5 square miles. representing about ..

2 1 . 1 per cent of the entire city.

Photo q u~lity is gpod except for cloud cover w hioh may conceal

damaged portions of dock area.

S T A T I S T I CA L S V Y M A RY O F D A M A G E

Total Area of K obe -Total Area destroyed -

Per cont destroyed -

1 4 s qu ar e l II1 1e 8

2 . 6 6 s qu ar e l IIi le s

20 . 5 per oent

Area of Incendiary Zone No. 1 - 3 . 6 6 s qu ar e 1 II1 10s

Area of Incendiary Zone No. 1 destroyed - 1 . 60 s qu ar e 1 II1 1e lPer cent of Incendiary Z one No. 1destroyed--46.4 per oent

SUM MARY OF DAM AG E

AnnotatiOns

1 . Re side ntia l area d estr oye d

2. T w o r esi dent ial are as des tro yed

3 . Residential area. - R R Y a r d buildings

destroyed - Target 171, Kawa.salei HeavyIn du st ry d am ng ed .

4. R os 1d en ti o. l, l ig ht i nd us tr y and business

a re a d es tr oy ed . R R Station i n center of

I' re a n ot d es tr oy ed .

5. Target 3 4 . K ob e H -o rb or D is tr l e t No.2.,

w ar eh ou se s d .e st ro ye d.

6. Target 169. M its ubia hi H eavy Indus try ground

a ren aro und 6Hpways and i nd us tr b. l b u: tl di ng sdestroyed.

7. T hr ee r es id en ti al a r e a S destroyed

8, R es id en t1 o. 1 a re a d es tr oy ed

9. Three reSidential areaS destroyed

10. Tw o residentia.l area.l. l3.estroyed

II, Five r es 1d ep tl a1 a re as ~nd l ig ht i nd us tr y

destroyed.

12. T w o re8idetitial steHl5 destroyed

13. Tw o residential areas and light insudtry

destroyed.

BguMe Feet

1 . 3 50 ,0006 . 1 10 .000

·8.,310,000

630,000

- 3 60, 000

5 . 7 10 .000' , 8 30 ,000

570,0001,040.000

2 ,0 30,0001.750.00:0

Refernece photogrophyl Pre-strike. 3E'R5K 36 .. IV. 11. 12

P ost- stri ke 3 PR5 Y 6 '~ 6S . 8 6 . 8 7 , 68-1V.

Referenoel AAFAir Objeotive Folder 90 • .2 S )(-9.

All ref erenoes to numb-ered damaged areas are keyed to the m.oso.iothat

followsth1a page •

• O IU , mB C, D A R E PO R T 23



r~

"I • II " ,I ,

rt)

~

I

NI

0

I

I

Z

If)

~,

~<t

~Q :!

> - 10Iit: <t~ -:!::0

zi!:: 0~ I N

' -

~

.~

<t>-

I

~ IL. a:

I

0 <I"

0W Z

"

~~ wa: a: (.)

I

l- t; !:il

I I'I

<$ ' d.~:



J.!l1QJJl

I W 4 G E ASSESSMENt·

Mission N o . 1 3 P R 5 U ae Date Flown. 18 March 1945

~Bsion N o . 1 3 P R 5 U 95 Date flown. 24 March 1945

S I D 4 W A R Y

This report Bupplemets OIU D~~ge Assessment Report No. 23, asses-sing additional damnge to Kobe Ci~ and ~ivi ng a more detail ed as sessme nt

of 1ndustrl&1 damage resulting from XXI Bomber Command Mission No. 43,16 March 1945.

Recent coverage showed aIProximately 3,177,000 s~uare teet ot ad-

ditional destruotion to residential areas and revealed Target 1~9 to be

8 per cent destroyed. Target 171 was 13 per oent destroyed. and the

Arata Shipyard was 21 per oent destroyed.

Total damage to K obe City resulting f rom mBomber COIrm" lnd ll1ssionl

26 and 43 amounted to Q.bout 1; 15,458.000 s quare feet, 3.0 sq uare miles,

1,920 acres or 21.4 per cent of the city destroyed.

Interpretatien of the dock area is limited because of cloud coverage.

STATISTICAL SUM ltla RY O F !W lA qE

SQ. PI· §Q" MILES

A dd it io na l d am ag e

Pre viousl y rep orte. dama ge

Tot al d amage obser ved

3,rn,oao62.281,000

85,458,000

32

1.868

1.920

INDUSTRIAL DAMAGE

AREA

DESTBOYED-SQ.FT.

pm CENT

D i S S T R Q Y E DOTALAREA-S9· F T

169

171

A ra ta S hi py ar d

5,300,0004,050,000

700,000

429,000

510,000

140,000

8.013.0

20.0

sm !JABY O F D AMAG E -R E SI P E N T IAL( See Print 34 . follow .!ng this report for annob.tioD.. 1 hted below)

Amlotatlon 1

Annotation 2A nn ot a. ti on S

1,147,000 sq. ft. destroyed

700,000 sq. ft. destroyed1.~30,OOO sq . ft. destroyed

I TE M I ZA TI O N O F D A l i i G E- 1 N D U S TR I A L(See Print 90 follow ing this report for annotations l1sted below '

TARGET pI (34/4oN. 1 35/llE ) ltl lw asBk iH eav y Ind ustrie s. L td •• ooo upy1ng

reotAngular area of about 4,050,000 sq. rt~·

. /; .n no tu ti on1 . 2 l a. rg e a nd s ev er ll l B lI' ID .l lu ll d1 Jl l; 1! Ie st ro ye d. 6 0, 000 e q.

ft. of roof area deBtroy~d.

Annotation 2. 2 buildings occupying 17,000 Sq. f t. - d~8troy8d.

Annotation 3. Casting shop 30 per cent destroyed - 6 smaller building.

destroyed - totd destruction of about UX),OOO sq '• .ft.

• XXI B.C. O.I.U. D/l;. Report #26



Annotation 6. 5 slIIallbuildings destroyed - about 31,000 sq. ft.

Annotation 7. 7 s ma ll b ui ld in gs destroyed ..about 68,000 sq. ft.

Annotation 8. 6 s ma ll b Ui ld in gs destreyed . . a b o u t 44,000 sq. ft.

~It. ~IPI,ag!2 AH)2 E:l iG~m; 1!Q1!ii§(34/40N - 135/11E)

Annotation 4. 3 buildings totalling about 80.000 sq . f t. de. ~royed .

Annotation 5. 11 small buildin~s destroyed .. 1 lar~e buildi~ gutted -

total destruction of about 40.000 sq. ft.

Annotation 9, 1 building destroyed - 3 buildings gutted .. a bout

65,000 s q . f t. of destr uctio n.

Annotation 10. 6 build ings dest royed .. ab out 64,000 sq. f t.

Annotation 11. 1 bulldingdestroyed ..9,000 sq. ft.

WOET 169 (34/39N - 135/11E) W.tsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Annotation 1 Fitting shop and area adjacent to slipways destroyed,

t ot al s a pp ro xi ma te ly 3 5 ,000 sq . ft.

Annotation 2 1 b ui ld in g d es tr oy ed , 1 gutted. Sheds and smnll dock

building destroyed - destruction totals approximately

113,000 sq, ft.

Annotation:3 20 b ui ld in gs d es tr O" 'j ed - Q bo ut 281,000 sq. ft.

R ef e re nc e P ho t og ra ph y :

Pre-strike:

Post-strike:

3PR5M19-4R I 106 and 4L: 1083PR5}d66-:3L: 29 and 3RJ 28

3PR5M 96 ..2 : 34

R ef er en ce u nt er la l:

O I U Damage AsseSSlllent Report No. 23

O I U H a r b o r R e p o r t N o . 1

. . 0 -



I

1.J .!ZII%

•C O N S O L I D A T E D STATISTICAL S U lA lA R Y

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FLIG HT D ATA & FUE L CONSUMPT ION

M ISSIOH___:_ :!+ ::: .3 _

DATE 1 6 M arch 1 9 .45

A l c C OM P L ET IN G M I S SI ON *

nIG HT DATA

Avg. T im e A t Low Al t it u de 7: 30

.498 G p . .499 Gp . 500 Gp . 7 3 Wi n g97 Gp.

)659

3953

3351

)0

2338

:271B

1920

30

None

6020

61~85

5637

39 28 38 !! c 135

7 : 1 5

: 20

:31

1 5 : 1 4

2912

3635

3 8 60

3 3 7 2

37

2 3 3 2 .

'2.472

2 1 1 3

2

23262360

2313

'5969

6218

5700

:13

:38

14:39

750 749 899

1 1 3 3 1100 1 4 5 6

' :: : 85 507 4 19

7:03

2 7 5 4

3 5 3 5

3910

3273

27

2 3 49

2536

2010

1

27972797

2797

5900

6 3 8 1

5 3 4 4

4 13 . 7 391.9 402 . 7

2 .1 4 2.05 2 . 1

* A le tar whicbfuel data are available.!l Includes 1 drcrE'ft l e n d i n g I:"t Iw o Ji mo. far r e f u e l i n g .

Avg. T i m e Of Climb T o B o mb -i n g A lt i tu d e : 05

Avg. T im e A t B om b in g Al t it u de : 2 5

Avg. Flying Time 1 4 : 3 3

Avg. Distance Flown (NauticalAir Miles) 2810

FUEL CONSUMPTION

C o n s u m e d T o T ar get ;

Average

Maximum

MiniIllUJll

Consumed From T a r g e t To Base:

(A/c Without Malfunction)

B o. Of .Aircraft

A v e r a g e

Maximum

Minimum

Con~ F r o m Target To Base:(A/C With Malfunction)

Ho. o r Aircraft

Average

Ma:ximull

J I in imum

T o t a l F U e l Used:

Average

MaxiI lUBl

lfinilmll

T o t a l J U e l Re_ining:

Average

~

Mn.llI!1

ivg. Gala. CorulumedPer Hour

Avg. a.l•• Con6Ulled Per tile

6:38

: 1 8

:5 7

14:4"1

2 7 2 5

3 5 3 4

3 8 20

3305

36

23/+7

2552

1901

2

2 5 4 32690

2396

5881

6255

5491

869

1279

514

397.9

7:05

:1 5

: 3 9

14:50

2£04

3591

3953

3273

130

2341 .

2718

1901

2507

2797

2313

5941

6485

5 ; 4 4

1 5 1 4

11.56

285

4.00.6

5

2 . 1 2

TO TAL FUEL USED O N AIRBO RNE Aje 222901 242166 181708 2 3 5 5 7 2 882347



M I S S I O N 4 3- - ,1 : - :; 6 ,. . .. .. . ,. . ,M - a r c- - :- h ~ · C O - 1 9 C O - 4 ~ '5--

F L I G H T D A T A & F U E L C O N S I J M P T I OD A T E

N

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A l c C O M P L E T I N G M I S S I O N.G f

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F L I G HT D A T A

A v g . T i m e A t L o w A l t i t u d e

7 : 0 0 Date. 7:05 7 : 0 3

A v g . T i m e O f C l i m b T o B o m b - : 1 0i . n g Altit u d e

1 '1 t : 2 0 : 1 5

A v g . T i m e A t B o m b i n g A l t i t u d e1 : 1 0 Available : 3 0 : 4 9

Avg. Flying T i m e1 5 : 1 8 1 5 : 0 8 1 1 , : 3 1 1 4 : 5 2 14:53

A v g . D is t a nc e Flown ( N a u t i c a l 2 7 8 7 2 7 5 0 2 8 0 1A i r M il e s )

2 7 0 0 2 7 5 5

FUEL C O N S U M P T I O N

C o a s u m e d T o T a r g e t :

A v e r a g e3.5n 3 6 1 7 3 4 7 4 3 6 7 4 3 5 9 2

llaxillllllll3 6 4 7 3 8 9 6 4 0 1 4 L . 3 2 5 4 ] 2 5

Minimum 3 / + 9 4 3 4 5 2 3 2 5 73;':01 3 2 0 1

~~ C o n s u m e d F r o m T a r g e t T o Base:

(Aje 1f1t h o u t M a l f u no t i o n )

N o . o r A i r o r a f t2 7 2 4 :::2 3 0 1 0 3

A v e r a g e2L.l6 3 1 6 8 2 2 8 7 2 1 5 8 2 4 8 9

'Ifaximum2 6 7 5 3 3 3 3 2 5 6 2 2 3 3 5 3 3 3 3

I lin . imWll2 2 8 5 2 8 8 9 2 0 1 4 1 5 4 5 1 5 4 5

C o n s u m e d From T a r g e t T o Base:

( A l e With M a l f u n o t i o n )

N o . o r A i r c r a f tN o n e N o n e N o n e 1 1

A v e r a g e- - - 1 5 4 2 1 5 4 2

Maximul - - - 1 5 4 . 4 1 5 4 2 -

~I I :1 . . n im W I l

- - - 1 5 4 2 1 5 4 2

Total FUel D e e d a

A v e r a g e5 9 6 8 5 7 2 0 5 7 6 1 5832 5 8 2 6

liaxiMUll6 3 2 2 6 0 9 6 6094 6 2 2 7 6 3 2 2

llinllwl5 7 7 9 5 2 2 8 5445 5 5 1 0 5 ~ 2 8

'rotal Fuel RellalDing:

A v e r a g e812 1 0 6 5 1 0 2 4 8 8 3 9 3 6

IIaximWIl1 0 0 1 1 5 5 7 1 3 4 0 1 2 6 5 1 5 5 7

Mini.l1m

45 8 639 6 9 1 2 7 3 2 7 3

Avg. Cals. C o n s u m e d Per Hour3 9 0 . 1 3 7 8 . 1 3 9 6 . 8 3 9 ~ ; . 2 3 8 9 . 2

Avg. 008. C o n s u m e d Pal" M i l e2 . 1 4 2 . 0 e 2 . 0 t 2.1e ;~.1l

!OTAL rmn. USED O N AIRBCME A lc(!.•• i ' a " 5 I T ~(Uj';1 ~jO~U4 ~"b T§z;s7'1

* A l e ter wbicb fuel data are available ( E x c l u d . e s E'.lrcr~ft lfl.l1.clJ.nr; ~t I w o Jim~)

Fuel R e m a i n i n g 6th G r o u p - 6 Ale - iU9, 12E9 , 1 5 E i l , 1 6 0 8 , 1 6 1 9 , 1 7 6 2 {(;aIs.

At Iwo Jima: 9th Grour - 5 A l e - 1 5 3 . < \ . ,1 5 5 1 , 1672, 1879, 2 0 4 4 (ala.5 0 4 t h G t - o u p - 1 A l e - 1 [ . 0 0 g a l s .

S05th GraUl' - 1 A le - 1 3 4 2 l';a1B.



MISSIO N _ _ ---4~----

FLIG HT D ATA & F O E L C ONS UM PT IO NDATE 16 ':Iarch 1 Q~ 5

19 Gp. 29 Gp. 314 Wg. 2 1s t B .C .

A/C COMPLETINGMISSION * 23 22 a 45 284

FLIGHT DATA

Avg.Time At Low Altitude 6:20 7:04 6:1.2 7:00. Avg. Time Of Climb To Bomb-I ing Altitude .;19 :10 :15 :15

Avg. Time At Bombing Altitude :54 Not .AvP.i :54. :44

Avg. Flying Time 15:.36 15:39 15:37 15:00

Avg. Distance Flown (NauticalAir Miles) ;~ IG73 2871 2872 2797

F D E L CONSUMPTION

Consum.ed To Target I

Average 3994 36'88 3844 3631

Maxill lUlD J;:72 3877 /.,2.724325

Minimum 3 7 E : C ,366$ 3668 ]201

«~Consumed From Target To Base I

(AlC·Without UalfWlction)

Ko. Of Aircraft 2 3 22 1 4 5 naAverage 2433 2476 21.54 2414

Ifaximum 2700 3050 3050 3333

llinimWl 2183 2004 ::004 1545

Consumed Frail Target To Base:( i / c With Malfunction)

Ifo. o r Aircraft tJon6 No.w None 6

Average - - - 2346

llaximull - - - 2797

II:I..n11IWI - - - 1542

Total FIlel Used I

Average 6286 6344 6314 5958

IfaxiJIum 6780 7216 7216 6485

llinimwa 58/...0 6117 5840 5;:"28

Total Fu.e1 Rellabing:

Average 10~1 986 1004. 889

llaxinnm 1460 1275 1460 1557

Mini.l1m 5 e O 114 114 114

Avg. Gals. Consumed Per Hour 402.9 405.4 4 0 4 . 2 397.2

lvg. a . l . . Consu.ed Pel" tile 2.19 2 . 2 1 2.20 2.13

TOTAL FUEL USEDOK AIRBORHEA l e 157618 160887 318505 1935731

* A l e ter whicb fuel data are available •

.!. Does not incluc..te 1 ai.rcnft lr.ndinll. :'It Iwo J'lll'l.



, . . . . . .~



A N N E X

1 1 '

BO MBE R C OllW iD PIE Ll) O R DE R

I M _ . · .M



FR O M: BO MCO MXXI

TO : BOM 'WG ' 1 "BOMV !G 3 1 3BOM' , IG 314

SEC RET--,...---By Auth of CG XXI BC ,

.e;p 1 '3 f J A C ( /? d 1 / ) ; - -Initials Date

XXI BO MBER COMMAND

GUAM0800 1 3 Uarch 194 .5

FIELD ORDERNO. 46 MIDDLEL:ANNO.2.

M a p s f or p lo tt in g: J a p a n Aviation Chart 1 :218,880Aiming point reference .x:;·~IBam Com Litho 1,,1osiaco. 90.2,Kobe Urban.

1. Omitted.

2. The XXI Bam Com will a t t a ck urban area of Kobe with max-imum. effort on "0" Day •

.3 . a. 73rd Wing:

(1) Take off time:

(0) First A/e of pathfinders: Zero houl,'minus1 0 m in ut es .

(b) First A/C of main force: Zero hour.

(2 ) Altitude enroute: 4,000 to 4,,00 feet.

(3) Altitude of attack: 6,000 to 6 ,8 00 f ee t.

(4) Aiming Point Axis of Attlli Force ReguiIed

(8) 074139 08 degrees true 1/2 force

(b) 0,6123 08 degrees true 1/2 force

( 5 ) : Bomb load:

(6) P ot hf in de r: S ix .a lr or nf t deaignt'ltedaspathfinder A/e will lOAd M-76 500 lb. in-oendiary bombs.

(b) Main 1'oroj!l:Viill load incendiary olustersconteining M - 6 9 bombs to the extent ofa v a i l a b l e s u p p l y . R e m D 1 n d e~ w il l l o a dl·i-l ?Al Incendiill,"Y clusters. InCluded inevery 3rd A/e will be one 500 lb. Frogcluster fused to open ,,000 ft. below A/O.

b. 313th Wing:

( 1 ) Teke oft t; im.e:

(al First A/e of l'8thfiJ1ders: Zero hour minus10 minutes.

(b) First A/e of main force: Zero hour.

(2) Altitude enroute: 5,000 to 5,500 feet.

(3) Altitude of attaok: 7,000 to 7,800 teet.

S 1 ! l C RET---- . . . . -



§'!QE.!!

FIE LD O RD ER N O. 46 (C ON TINU ED )

(4) Ai mi ng p oi nt :

09:5140

( 5 ) B om b lo ad :

( a ) P a t h f i n d e r s : S i x A/ e d es ig nat ed a s p at h-finder A /e w ill l oa d M -7 6 500 l b. In ce nd il '+ _: 'a ry b om bs .

Axis of A tt ac k F or oe Re qu ir ed

10 d eg re es tr ue Al l A/ e

( b) Ma in fo rc e: \ "d ll lo ad i nc en di ar y c lu st er soonteining iA'-69 b o m b s t o t h e e xt en t o fa va il ab le s up pl y. R er on in de r of f o r c e wi 11load ~d-l7 Al i nc en d: La ry 01usuars , I nc l u d e din pr es cr ib ed bom b lo ad in ev er y 3 rd A / ewi ll be on e 500 l b. F ra g c lu st er f use d too p e n 3.000 f t. be lo w A/ C.

c . 31 4t h Wi ng :

(1)Take off t i m e :

(a) F i r s t A/e o f pathfinders: Zero ho ur mi nu s 40minutes.

(b ) F i r s t A /e o f m8in fo rc e: Z er o ho ur m i n u s 30minutes.

(2 ) A lt it ude e nro ut e: 3,000 to 3,;00 f e e t .

( 3 ) A lt it ude o f rt ta ok : ; .0 0 0 t o ; .~OO f e e t .

(4) A i m i n g paint

0 4; 1 3 ;

(5 ) Bombing Load :

A xi s of att~c k Fo rc e re qu ir ed

06 d eg re es t rue A l l A /e

Pa th fin de rs : Si x a ir cra ft de si gn~te d os p a t h -finder A/e wil l l oad with M-76 500 l b, incendi-Flry b o m b s .

Main fo roe: Will l oa d i nc en dh ry 01u sters oo n-teioing M-6~ b ombs. Inolude d 1n pr escri bed b ombload in ev ery 3rd A/e w ill be on e ,00 l b. F ragclus ter fu sed to open 3,000 ft. belo w A/C.

(6)~he 3 14 Wi ng wi ll d ispeto h one B- 29 A l e tor purpo seot condu oting ':\nobse rvati on of t he bom bing ot th etar get. Tu ke off t ime, altitu de fo r observ Dtion a ndpla ne for ob serva tion J I i . / e will be lef t to the dis~oretion ot the 314 Wing.

x. ( 1 ) l Jethod of ott" 'ck: By ind lvidu 'll airo raft at-tacking w i t h mi nimum in terval betwe en air craft.A d efini te rad~r b ombing r un will be mnde overa r adar a iming point befo re m ilking a viau'!!1correction.

(2) Routes:

BAse2500N - ;t4}OOE27l5 N - l40.53E'353 N - 13503 30E3419N - 1350630E (IP)Terget



§.;m.Q.E!1

FIELD ORDER NO. 46 (CONTnroED)

3444N 134.5.5E:nOON - 1344.5EBase

{a } In t urn of f f r om the targe t Ale w i ll f lyW est of th e lin e bet w een poi nt 3444N -13455E a nd 3300N - 13445E t o avoid poss i-ble cb 11is ion w it h inco ~ing aircr af t.

(b) A f ro nt is f o reca sted to be in pat h ofpres crib ed ro ute. All " li ng s w i ll pene=r: "t rote f ro nt ~t 1,000 f t. The ;14th Wingw ill f ly a ~prox imat ely 20 mil es W est o fthe pr escr ibed co urse. The 313th Wingwill fly t he -p resc ribed c ourse an d th e73rd. Wing will fly apnroxi.mately 20 Eastof' the ~re scri bed cou rse.

{ o} A l e w ill av oid f lying over Jup anes e is ~lands enro ute to avoi d pos sible f l a k dam-

fl.ge.

(3 ) Fuse sett ing:

(o ) M-76 IB , In stont llne ous no se, n on de 1 , ' " ytoil.

(b ) E . - 2 8 and E- 36 clusters f used to open2,000 f t . abov e tl lrget .

(c) E-46 fused. t o open 2500 f t, abov e target.

(d) M-17 clus ter, f used to o pen 3,000 ft. abovetarget.

(4) Calibrated airspeed o n bom bing run - 2,0 1{P H .

( .5) In te rv al om et ar s et ti ng :

(a~ M-76 bombs: Minimum train.

(b) All olusters; 50 teet.

(6) Bombing inst~uotlons: Crews will b e c au ti on edto check position oarefully before releasingbombs. In previous ~lss~ons bombs were droppedin tire et~rted outside of t~rget oren. A oon-centration of tires within a ssign ed z ones isdefinitely desired. .

(7) ~or tbls misaion pine Rnd Car-o-se~l w ir e ma ybe removed from fuses prior to t!:1keo f f .

(8) All ai~or9rt will s3lvo 1.~ediatelY otter in-tennlo.meter bas been run through. A/e o~rry-ing bomb boy tnnk!! will ml1ke use ot spreaderbars on A-2 end A-4 releases unless otherwisemodified.

(9) Ammunition 10ad1ng: Tail turret· only will b elooqed in 7~rd 'lnd 313th Wings. Lower f o r w a r dand aft turrets will be landed in the 31 4thVling . M aximu m. l oad of 200 r ounds p er a utho r-ized turret w ill be loade d.



§'~2.R!!

FIELD O RDER NO. 4 6 (CONTINUED)

(10) Gun nGry ins truct ions : T ail g unne r wi ll be in-s truc ted to fire at ae riol targ ets on ly an do nly whe n fir ed upon . Onl y s ide g unne r-s in t he314th Wi ng will be pcrm .itt ed to fi re Lowe r tur -r e t s nnd g r o u n d o bj ec ts w il l b e t h e only t a r -

g ets. Bom bard ier def init ely will not cont rollo wer fo rwar d tu rret .

(11) Rad ar set s wil l be tu rned off f or 45 m inut esimmediat31y after leaving t f! rg et s o i nt er fe r-en oe wi ll not be m ade i n o ther ai rcrf tft o nbo mbin g ru n.

(12) , Abor ting '1i rcr! :1ftn ro ute out wi ll turn 90d e gr ee s f r om " ' )r es c ri be dr ou t e h e a d i n g and flY '.5 minu tes befo ro t urni ng on re turn heading.

(13) liD" Doy nnd Zer o H our: 162020K.

4. e. No cha nge.

b . T his is XXI B om Com Tact ical Mi ssio n No. 43.

5. Communications:

n. (1 ) R edia sil ence wil l ~reva il e nrou te to targ etexcept in case s o f ext reme e merg ency.

(2) R adio hom ing plnn as will ca rry on e spa re radi ohom ing tran smit ter and on e sp~re li aiso n Dy na-mot or. (H efere nce X XI Bom C om Regu latio n 100-37) A lt it ud es , f re ~u en ci es , a nd i de nt if io at io nsig nRls f or ho ming A l e er e d eSig nated as fol lows :

LLTITUDE FRE ' 7UENCY IDENTIFICATION

J

KP

2 5 ,000

26 ,00027,000

362 K CS

4 0. 5 K C S486 K GS

( 3 ) J'''1;;urdngac tios may b e employed by o n e m y but atleas t one o f t hree rr eq~e noies sho uld be o pen.

(4) No oont aot rep orts will be sent en rout e to ta r-g et. Oo nt~ot rep orts will be s ent on retu rnroute only whe n nort h of 28 d eg re es n or th .

( 5 ) Wings will d eSig nate one pl ene pe r squ adron asthe only plone to t rc ns mi t" Q s tr ii (e report.

(e) Sp eoia l stri ke re port will c onsi st of time6ver tnr gat ( GMT), targ et bom bed, met hod atb o m b i n g , oloud c o v e r~ g e , r es Ul ts o bt a1 ne i.

t1ght er oppos itio n and tl~k op posi tion .

!!!!!!.

Tar get b ombe d

~~e th od o f B om bi ng

- Ov er ta rget (GM T)

.. p ~ Primary

- V Visual- R - Radar- N - Nflvlgation

- 1 to ~ for t enth s,X f or 10/10

C lo ud c ov er ag e



§.lQ.:B.!I

F IE LD O R D E R NO . 46 (CONTINUED)

B om bi ng r as ul ts _ I\. ... Generalconfla-gratlon

... S ev erA l lar ge tir es

... C Many fire.s

...D Fewscatterad tires

.. . U no bse rve d

... A Heavy

... B Mod.srote

... Meager

... D None

F ig ht er o p1 )o si tl on

F l a k op1)osltlon ... A .. Heovy... B ... Moder8to. . . . .Meager. .. . ..o ne

.£R~F G ~M O N ' l ' O O M E R YD/OPNS

DISTRlBUtIO~ : 2 to en wing



S E C R E T

DI3 'l '1 l IB IJ 'l 'IOH LIST

.J.llil



Copy N S .

1

• 2

2 A .

3

4 -

I S6

T

8

9

10

1 11 2

131 4

1 51 6

l718

1 920

212 2

23

U

2526

2 7 - 2 8

2930-31

3231

~sa36

5'7

385960

41

' 2q"64e-&'7

DISTRmUTIoN

taCTICAL HISSIONREfQRTS

Commanding Oener~l. Twebtieth ~ir PoreeCommand ing Gene rDl, D CI B amber Command

B ri ga di er G en er al La V er n~ S au nd er sD e p u t y Commander, Twentioth ~ir Faroe

Ch1.ef of Staff. ~entieth Air Foroe

Chief of Staff, XXI Bomber CO!lllllQ.nd

Deputy cIs. Opns, XX I Bomber Commf:l.nd

Deputy C I S , Sup & Malnt, XXI Bomber Command

AC of S, k.2, X X l Bomber Command

Commanding Geneml. A rm y A .i r F o rc es ,

Attn: AC/AS, Intelligenoe

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ooean Arens (AdvHq)

Commander in Chief, Po.oi£'10 OOonn Arens (Renr Hq)Chief of Nn~l Operntions. OP-16-V

Joint Inta11i~nce Center, Po.oifio Ooean Areas

Commander J..ir Force. Paoific Floet

Commander, Fifth Fleet

Commander. First Carrier Tnsk Forco

Commnnder, Forward !roo.

CommandIng General, U.S. Army Foroes in Far East

Commnnding General, U.S. Army Forces; Pe.cifI0 Ooea.n AreaS

COllllllanding General, Allied Air Forces, SouthYl'llst PaoU'ic

Arens

CommD.nding Genera.l, SWl'A, Attn: a.2, (For Section 22, ROll)

Comma.nding Genero.l, FQr East 1..ir Foroes

C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r ~ l , U . S . S t r a t e g i o A i r Forces i n E u r o p eCommanding General, Eighth Air Forca

COllllllo.ndlng 'Gene rD.l, lIedi terro.neo.n . . i . l l i e dir F o r C e 8OOJlllDarding G e n e r a l . Fitteonth Air For08

tlollllUa.Ddlng General. Seventh 1.11" Force

00lllllla .J¥11ng G e n e r d , V I I Bomber Comma.nd

COlJIID8.ntilng General, V II Fighter CollUDCU\ClC o mm a n d 1 n g G en e r a l , E l e v e n t h ~Ir F o r c e

CQlllllla.Dding OaMral, XX Bomber COllllllB.ndC o m m a n d 1 n g General, 38th F l y i n g T r a i n 1 n g W i n g

OODllllnnd:ingOenero.l, 68th BOl$a.rdment WingCommDCllng O e n e r a . l , 73rd Bomba.rdment Wlag

COII I II IaD41ng Gene r a l, S13th Bombo . r dmOn t Wlft~

O O l l l l 1 o . n d l n gOenernl, 314th Bombardment Wing

O C I I D I I D . n d 1 n gGenero.l, 31Sth ~ompardlllent W i n g

O O l l l l l l 4 n c l 1 n gff1oer, 3rd Pho1!o Recon ~ q u d r o n

O o m m a n d i n g O t r i c o r . 3 3 r d S ta t l . t l c a 1 dontTol U n i tObllll1oiLl 1fnI'fe.:re 01 '1 '1081 ' , XII BOlllber OolllllllUldTa.ctios • Trll1ning Sedtlon. J , . . . 3. XlI Bomber COllllllanci

Ordn&noe Ottl~.r,XJl Domper Oomman4Oommamlng General, XXI Bomber COlllJland, o,taohment lA-

Hbtorical Officer, .lXI Bomber Oommand



78

7980

81

62

83

84

65

86

87

86

89

90

91929: 5

9495

96

97

0091 1

100

l~102

1 03

1 04

1 05 - 1 1 5

Comme.ndingGe ner e.l, Army Air Fproe B. ATTJi: AC/AS

Intelligen.ce, Colleytion Division

A M ' Evaluation BOl)l'd, c/o Headquarters AAFPOA

CQmmanding Offlcor, 6 th Bomb Group ( V R )Command i ng o r r 1 c er , 9th Bomb G r o up (V II)

Commanding Orrico:!', 16th Bomb Group (VB)

Command i ng orrioe.r, 19th Bomb Group (VB)

Commanding Of,fioer, 2~th Bomb Group (VB)

Comman d l.n g O f'f'lcerI39t!~ Bomb G rqup (V B)

Comm.ll .l ldlng o r r 10 er , 40th Bonb G.roup (VB:)

C omma n ~llfg O f f. l0 ~ I',. ~3 0t: h Bomb Group ( VH )

O ,gm ma nd ln g O ffic er , 3315t Bomb Group (vn)

CO ll ll l lanq,ing Offioer. 444th Bo~h Group (VB)

Comm"ll.~iing Officer. ~62 nd Bomb Grol1P ('lH)

Command ! rlg Offi eel', 45 6 th Bomb G ro up (VlI)Co~a.ndlng Offioer, '97th Bomb Group (v:e:)'

COfl lm!1 l '1d i ng Ofrt~r, 498th Boll'lliC!t'oup (VB)

Oommand i ng Ofrloe~, 499th Bo~b Group (VR)

Gomm.anding Officer, SOOth Bdtnb Group (VB)Command in,! ClIff ' iO'sr. 501 st Bomb Group (VB)

Comlll .l lnding Offioer, 502nd ltomb G1 " 'OUp (VB)

COInmMding Of'fieel', 504th Bomb Group (VB)Comma.n .d i ng Officer, S05t.h Bomb G ro up (V H )

Commanding Officer, 655thBonib Sll (H) (WR)

Command i ng Officer, Twentieth Air Fo.roe Lell;d (Jre"S~hool

CODUtio.ruln g o rr leer , lSthF Lgh tel' Gro up -

Command i ng Otricr;;cr. 21st "Fj ,ghter GTou.p

Command i ng Officer, SOOth Ftghter Group

A - a , RaportingUnit. J C X I Bomber O 'omm.and (FUe Copy)

A - a ; Repor t i .ng Un1t, XXIB.omber Comma n d

21st bomber command tactical mission report 43

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