21st bomber command tactical mission report 34

8/6/2019 21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 34

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I. . . ---By 1'I1Jt"


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HEA I ' lQ .UART,ERSX X I B O l \ l l 1 3 E R C O M M A N DAPO 254

T A CT I OA L . M IS S IO N R E PO RTField Order No, 29 Mission No, 3~

Target: liJlttsubishi AlrcT'af't Ellgine PlantNAGOYA . JJlPAN

15 Febru.ary 1945Table Q r Contents

Tactioal Narrative .ReportAnnex A _ Operations R~orts

Par-t I - Naviga,tionPart I I - BombingPart III - Flight 'Engineering.Patt IV - RadarPart V - Gunnerypart VJ;. - Air-Sea Rescue

Annex C _ Commun.ications Repo.rtsrU Part I - Rad.1U' counterMeasuresJ;>art II_ommunications (Radio)

Annex 0- Intelligence ReportsPart! _ EnemyAir OppositionPart II _ Antiaircraft e.nd Air to Air

Bomb.ingPart III _ Bombing Results and Damage

As.s,essmentAnnex .E _.Consoli!iated StatisticsJ summaryAnnex F - Fie.1d Ol'dersAlUlax G _ Elistn.bU'tioll List

Prepared By:A-2 SectionXXI, Bomber command


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::::::::IIIHHUIUIISECRETBy Auth of the C. G.XXI Bomber C0 J I I I ! I I l . I I d2 6 / 3 /4 ~ J D.6- .Date Initials.

::;:::~::!,::;::::;:;:::HEADQUARTERS

XX I B~BF;R COMMANDAPO 234S U B J E C T : , Report of Operations, 1 5 February 1945TO: Comm.anding General, Twentieth Air Foroe, Washington as. D.C.

Identifioation of !Aission:..6.. Field Order Number 29. Headq.ual"tere XXI Bomber Command.

datod 11 Febru.ary 1 9 4 5 . direoted thE.: 73rd Wing to oommit a foroe ofeight squadrons and tho 313th Wing a force of four B~uadron8 to anattaok against a target on aonshu on 1 5 February 1 9 4 5 .

b. Tar~ets Speoified:(1) Primary Tarp:;et: MitsuDishi Aircraft Engine Plant,Nagoya. Objective folder 90.20 -193. SiX squadt-ons VlON to us" .lim-

ing Point 123069 and six were to use Aiming Point 086064. (Refer toannotated ph~tograph of target following page 4.)

(2)' SecQ.ndary Targ~:. Same as primary.(3) Last Rosort Target: Any industrial city on Honshu.

~ Strategy and Plan of Operation:a. Reasons for Selection of Target:.

(1 Y This comlnand I s attack on Honshu was 0 oord1natedwith that of the Navy soheduled for 17 and 18 February againSt Tok~o.In a.ddition to striking the Japanese mainland, the attaoks would bea diversibon,screcEillg the inva,sion of Iwo Jimil.. on 19 February. ;lhileit was des irab1e for the B-291 s to I'l.ttaoic TokyO. fore


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29/30N - 137/37E to This leg mad.e use of a northerly heading inthe olimb phase to prevent head1'1nds.34/ 47N - 137/00S: to This point was seleoted in order to give apoint of entry at the coast with a visual~nd radar check point ar_d ~he smallest poa-

~ible turn ~t the I,P,35/08N - 137/BEl to Initiel Point

Nagoya. to Target27/00N - 143/Z0E to This course was dssign61 to utilil~ ~il-wi nd s , The Boni!";.,,;"nd ,'r :-thern 1iU" la!\.as

were availa'ble fo, v is ua .: . an d r ad a,r c he ckpoints.

Base(3) Fli,ht Engineer' 8 PI antUhg:

(a) Flight P1an,sp seds and altitudes were plan-ned to obtfil,ln maximum fuel ecanemy.

(b) The min imUlTl bomb load for the T3rd "1lf iag 1IaSplaoed at 6000 pounds andror the :n3th Wing .at 5000 pounds, in ac-~ordance with ;('ue1 0i:!lnsu:mp"tiionestimateS calculated for th6' aircreftflyil'l.g -th'!;lleast favoro.bleposit;ion in the formations,

(4) Radar Planning.:(.a) it " " a s decia.ed an. upvlind approach to this

target w0ulo;l b_s most dooirable i'roll).a bOillbing and navigational sta.'lli-po into A eO~l'se was esta.bU shsd as 28 2 degreeS true from the ini tls.1point. .Asuke,maldng a run 0f 19 miles to the ta:rgait.

(b) Thi s is a good r9.dj;l:t apprul>:ch. The firstcheck po.i nt on ccu rse!>. t 1a ndf'all is La.k>alfo.m.s.na,whi 0h lies directlyinsida the coast 1,ine. Fr om this point, up to the lni tial point. andon to 'the radar target, th,ecity of 'Nagpya, returns should a.lwc.yS bewell resolved on the scope, .

(5) Radar Co.untar Meo.:sures:(!'l) No diver s1 onary me(l.S ures ware taken on 1;h1 S

miss ion.(b) The usual routine seo.l"ch for enemy rnaM'

s igna.1s Ilindvoio e transmi ss1. ons was Plant:led.(6) .Air-Sea .Rescue Phnnin_g:

ea) The. Navy was furnished with the d


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AIMING POINT12:1069

TARGET 193NAGOYA


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:3. Execution:n , Tn.ke-cff = The first group of the 73rd 'l! '1ng wns

scheduleq to toke-orr Cot 142045Z and thd of the :313th Wing ~.tl42055Z. Actunl tnke-off was Q.ccQmplished ns folloWCI:

Air cr ('.ft Fbst A le Last A leWing Airborne T::ke-


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First A le Lo.st A le151324Z3rd 151002Z

313th 151225ZOne aircraf't of the 313th Wing ditched en route to base. (SeeAnnex A, Part VI for details.}

f. Operations Summary:'(1) Navig_a.tiolP (See Annex;". Po.rt I. for details,) J(x

Navigation to 28/00N was good. bu.t from thi s point on the roma.tionswere required to break because of a 100 mile strip of instrumentweather, Navigation wa.s accomplished by de ad reckoning based onmetro winds. The majority of aircraft ma.ce landf''i'.l other tl-.anbriefed. necessi.tat1ng bombing of ll.vai: able ] e.~'- . esor t and oppor-tunity targets.

(3) Flight ttnAinee:ring: (See J..nnex A, Pert III fordeto.i1s,) The Viea ther front encountered prevented forma ti on !'lyingand forced the aircraft into small elements, Thi s resulted in asaving of fuel consumed en route to the tarbet, Failure to reachthe prima.ry target and good tail winds on the return route savedadditional @asoline. resulting in the highest average fuel reservesto date.

(2) 132mbing: (Sse il.nn,;x - , !Jrt r. for details.)A1 though all bombing on the primary t'O..rge'.; -':as d'_iJ~ vi sually through3/10 Clouds, accur eoy was poor becaus e of ,","lec Lon errors and lackof air diSCipline. .dada:: bombing wo.s used -:: a s'-lrricient number ofaircraft on t~e ll'l',t resort target of HameI'a".:su to warrant damagea;; sesemerrb, (Sse Annex D , Part III.)

(4,) Radar: (See Annex A, Part IV, for detailS,)AN/1\JlQ.-13was used extensively dur Lng frontal penetration in theprevention at' aircraft colliSion. ).lost of the bombing on the pri-mary target was vi.:n:al, with some radar aids buing used, S~- 18(Radio A1timeter) and SOR-695 (IFF) employment was norma.L, A W APN-4 (Loran) ranged about 800 miles.

(5) Gunne_ty: (See Annex .A,Part V for details.)Gunnery problems on this mission were minor since there was verylittle enemy air opposition. One unusual occurrence was that~ufone B-29 fir ing upon another B-29 as a result of an approach! roo t.nose quarter.

(6) ~ir-Sea Rescue: (See Annex., Part VI. for de-tails.) One B-29 ditched with no definite position having beengiven, Are a sear ch was ini tis.ted and one survivor was si ghted u . ' Odays after the miSSion, Enlerge.ncy eqLl.i.pmant'IfI'IlS dropped and re-covered by the survi.vor. but oontact Wo.s lost during the nigbt(l.lJdnever esto.b 1ished agai n dus to bad wea the r ,

-5-SECRET-------


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O PERATI ONS REPORT S&hib:t.t - Track Chal"ts:Part I - Navi.gationPot II - BombingPa'l't III - Flight EngineeringPart IV - RadarP~tV - GU.l).:tleryPart VI - Air-Sea Rescue~xhibit - ,f,ir,...3ea, Rescue Map

'MiS,sion _No. 34. 15 February 1-945


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CON F ID EN T IA L

50S-ISOS~S 1.A le lO IT fORMAno~~t.J'f"


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!'["UARY 1945

135


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A N N E X AOPERA'rIOllS REFmTSPART I ~ NAIGATION

1. Navigation to the wing assembly pOint. Nishino-Shima,was as briefed. The four groups of the 7:3rd Wing departed thewing assambly pOint at 1200 on course, for the briefed pointo . 29 -30' N 1370-37' E. The formations encountered a front at 280_OO"N. and the aircrai't were required to break formation and pro-ceed to landfa.ll il'ldiviriual1y. Navigation vIas made extremelydifficult by the 400 miles of frontal condition encounteredNavigators were unable to read drift or use celestial aids," A sa result, they were o1illiged to base their dead reckoning on metrowinds.

2. Win.us at bom"bing a I ti tude Were predicted at 280 atlIO knots and exp er te nced at 2750 at 125 knots.

3. After penetration of the front, aircraft made visualand radar orientation at landfall but in most cases bombedlast resort targets beo au se of their inability to reassemble.

4. Aircraft stayed above weather conditions on the routehome, remaining at altitude and following the briefed coursewi thout Gleviation.

5. The return home at high altitude and the failure tobomb the primary target shortened the total time of flight toan av-erage time of 13 :15 as compared with the briefed time of14:30.

1. ['he weather frol'lt encountered south of the coast ofJapan re.sul ted iin the eomplete disruption and see.ttering of thefgrma'tions. A few airc raft were able to assemb Ie e.t the coastand proceed to the primary target, A number of aircraft alsobombed the pr:Lmary target individually. As a result of thesecOl'lditions. only 33 aircraft bombed the assigned target, The .remainder of the striking force attacked last resort targets USlogradflJr. dead reck.oning and visual me+hode ,

2~ Tbe I.P .i\suke . could not be identified althoUgh itwas the best available I.P, in t:;at area, The ;...P.'s. he....ver.were easily distinguishable.

5, In summarizing the results of those aircraft bombingprim().ry target. approxima.tely 55%of the bombs dropped byfirst Squf:ldron, 13rd 'fling. were within 1000 [eet of the A.P,second Squadron dropped Southeast. and the third squa~ron:&'D,nr'ox:imlately2500 feet south of the primary. The 313th 'ling. b '6 ults are consid-plots were not dlst1nguishable. Born lng 1 s ..poor, 16135 than 2Q%of the hits oeing within 1000 feet of the

-1-SEC RET------


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4. Of' the aircraft bom'b1ngthe primary target most of'the errors can be attributed to persormel. Air dls1pl1ne con-tinued to be poor. Premature releases by wingmenand subseq_uent dropping by other aircraft On these aircraft waa the prinoi-pal Oause of bombing error. The procurement and installationof radio b omb r el ea .s es would eliminate this condition to a targeextent.

PA R '] ' I I I -- F L IG J :rr EN G IN EERIN G1. Assembly and ~w Altitude Cruise:

~. Both the 73rd and 313tb Wings m~de their groupassemblies nenr base~ as in previous miSSions.b. T he I ni t ial cruls e of the 73rd YJingWI!.S made ingroup formation to the desl!;uo.ted assembly point where 0. ~Y1ngassembly waS effected w ithout incident.

c. The initial cruise of the 3l3th ~ing waa made ingroup formation w ith no a .t te mp t o f "Vingassembly.d. Winds and weather were as predicted glrtmg notrouble on this cr u t s e ,

2. Climb to B o mb i ng ~ lt i tu d e:The weather froht, pen~tr~ted during the o~ di8-p er se d f or ma ti on s of both wings. Little attempt was -.de toreassemble groups nfter the bombing a.ltitude had be~ reached.

3. High AltitudGCruise Xo Target:n. Thi& cruise was normal for the 13rd ~ A

small saving in fuel was experienced becaue of 'th!l ...a.t ,.._mations.t b. The bombing a lti tu de o ru i4 ewas planned at 190 C.A.S. ill an a.tteJ)lft ... d'lca""_'~m"l1!1to operate at maocimum automaticairspeed enabled a few drplaDeIt to .~~q

Buccessfully in auto le.a W1~~1~l~~~~11ult1as.

Retu1'l:lere..ft. GOOdtaila.bly in a av .S .l'l$5.


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c. S e e C on so li da te d St!;.tistlcal Summaryfor fuelconsump'b Ien and we,ight data.

PART IV - RADJIR1. Employment:

a. .AN!J.PQ-13 ( Bl in d B omb in g)(1) The radar equipment was used for navig-

ation in the t~rget area.(2) Rada r was used for establishing vi su al r un s.(3) 13 A /e made bomb runS by radar.(4) Successful US'6 of radar equipment was I i lB.deduring penetration of a broad weather front to prevent A l e

collision.b. SCR-718 (Radio h1tirneter) Employment was normal.c. SCR-695 (IFF) Emp1oyment WaS norma.l.d. kN/APN-4 Loran operative during mission.

2. Equipment performance:

(1) 107 ~C were radar equipped.(2) 81 1./0 reported performances sat1a1'~

for bombing.(3) 52;,JC operate:d

( (4)for bombing.b.


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SECRE'f--_ . . . _-(.5)' OnG:: No bomb ro100.so lino.(6)' Throe:. Lost t.o.rgots at o.lt1tudl3.(7) Ono i. Weak targets.

b. SCR-695: One IFF failure.e , AN I APN-4 :

(1) Ono:: Ihverter failure.(2)" Onos: Swoop lost.

d. SCR718:. Throe reportod fo.iluros.FA R T V - GUNN ER Y

1. Very little enomy opposition Wo.s oOBountorod o n this mission.More then ~o onemy fighters wore encountered, but olosoly p r o s s e dttttnoks ware tho oxception.

2.,. This was the first mission in which ono B-29 fired upon c.noth-01" B-29. ..This is reportod to have boon duo mainly to tho fa.ot tho.tone B-29 uppr onchcd tho other froln tho nOBO quarter. I:.Ildto tho gun-ners I tendency to firo o .t long ro.ng.;::s.

7.2rd Win!!j .21~h Wl~ ~Am.munition Exponded 52,000 rds 8.275 ro s 60.275 rdaC.F.C. Op13ro.tion 100% 100%' 1 0 C l : CCo.l .50 M.G. Operation 98.1% 9 7 % 91..s5SE/A Destroyed 6 1 7E/A Probo.bly Destroyod 8 II 8E/A Dama.god 21 2: 23

PA RT V I - A IR-SEA RESCUESumma . ry of ditohing incident ocourring o n this mission 18 .. -t~""81AiFora.ft 10V756 gavo no defin1'to _ ..._ . t :

position report baing roooivod rJ'Q11 .II&~!l1UUl!O. -)~I(;.lad tho.t th1s Al e ditohod betw'lta.n .21.I8!II ....at nppraxlmatoly 1 5 0 8 5 5 Z .miles on oaoh side a t a 11U~wQQ.therooncUtions woro Ql)I~QlpttbGJl0V756 11'0.8 sightod 410 _~P . t )C l I1 it1va lJl.C!,nifo raft.

the t5WMI>3.,lr.IlIll:..,.,::f I ,ot


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G ON f' I DE N T! A13S

MISSION NO. . . .3.!._OATE If!Eeb, '45XXI BOMCOM _


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A N N E XB

Mi_ss 10Q No. . _ 341 . 5 Februa:ry 1945


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WEATHER

1. It was the desire of thi s Commandto strike Tokyo, but poor vleatherforeeast for ~he Tokyo area gave rise to the possibilities of strikingNagoya ror whIoh good weather V/ELB forooast. Boo~uso of thoso woather-f:-.otor s , doo 1131on to attso k N o .g.,y ._ i: ;: ) .s to o.d of Tokyo was IIndo..2. Bl!.sCIon Tll.kc..Off': The re were 5/10 oumulus o'louds '/11th bases at1500 l-eat and tops at 6000 feet. Vislhi litie s '/lere 12 to 1 .5 miles.3 'Route outgoing! To 27~ there were 3/10 oumulus o1ou.ds with basesat f500 l'eal and tops from 3000 to 6000 f'e!"t. VisibiHties were 15miles. From this point to the frontal zone at 28~. there were 6/10stratocumul.u,s '!fit'"! bases at 1.500 feet and tops at 5,000 feet and 5tlO9.1toouin\l.lus with be.sa s at 12, 000 feet and tops at 13.000 feet. Fr omthe front to the ooa.st thera ':ere 10/10 cum-rLue and stratoc'J.onul"s ithbases at 800 feet dropping to I~OO feet in moderate shoce r s and tops at10,000 feet. Ther.e were 10/1Q altooumulus from 11,000 feet to 24.000feet in several layers. These middle C1nuds e 1eared out at the ooast There were 10/10 oirrost.ratus at a8oN. with bases at 26.000 feet slop-ing up to 29.000 f'e!'!t at t'le ooast and thinning out to 5/10 at tha.tpaint. Crews reported light ioing and moderate to severe turbu.lenoe01 imb ing through this zone. The 'Ire9.ther broke up format ions, some ofwhioh partially reformed OVer the target.4. T:..rgot: There -'rere 2-3/10 oumu.lus olouds over the target .ith 4/10oirrus at 30,000 feet. Flight altitude was 26,000 feet and orews thatbombed the primary target did so visually. Winds at flight level werereported as 2750 at 125 knots. Forecast winds were for ~80o at 110knots.

r

S. Route Roturn.1ng: Conditions were similar to the route out, exoeptfor the cumulus deck between base and 270N that h~d thiokoucd to 5/10.6 . Bseu acturn1ng: Conditions were as follOnS; 6/10 oumul~s and strato-cumulus Irith bases at 1000 to 1500 feet and soast~red light showers.Tl,is iiid not interfere with landings.7. R6mn.rk1H The clouds in th..l f'roti:were nearly solid from 800 teet to24.000 feet and the general intensity of' the frontal 8att>~r 'lt8.S IlIIlOhmore severe than foreoaot. The front ras foreoas't to be at '240s &all wasaotulLlly- anc ountered at 2SoN where ol1mb was starq,d.


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A N N E Xo

CO!muNIC! l .T IONS REPORTS

Part

Part


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PA RT I - RA D.A B...CO UN TE.R M EA SURESi 1. G enere.l~ Seven ROM sea ro h aireraft were 8Qheduled to partioipateon this mission. One plane returned ear-Ly and another failed to take ..

ofr. The remnining five planes efiloh ":ith one observer oompleted themission.. T~e frequency band of 28-3000 mo/s 'rre.ssearoh.:d.2. Resu1 ts of 89aroh:

a, A total of 18 rade.rsignals was interoepted.b. Only ODe signal "'ith GUn-laying eha re.eteristic s was in:tercepted:

77/9/1600 lnhroepte,d. in th~ target area.o , Other signals interoepted 'IIere as foll~v-rs ..

(l) Target Area:1I.j.8/20/1000E144/7/1000158/6-12/4001.66/10/1000154/7/1000E1 5 0 / 7 - 1 2/5bOE102/7/800~

Sweep l'e.te1 rpmTrackingSW'sepingSweepingTrackingTraokingS weeping

(2) Enroute to target:Charaoteris~ Intercept Looati~ RemarkS94/40/600102/30/400187/--/500E1 0 4 . 5 / - - / - -

Atoumi Rantol '! ih in o S hi maHa.mamatsuN ishil ln S hima.

Traoking

Return from target:1 0 4 / 1 2 / 4 0 0104/--/9001 4 9 / 6 / 4 0 0 - 5 0 01.56/13/10001 5 9 , 6 / '400-500194/3/150~2002 5 3 / 8 / 1 0 0

BoninsTori S"imaTori :ShImaSofu GanV o l o a n o e sVoloanoe ..BQni~8


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b. No lobe switching signals were noted on this mission.e, It is believed that the signals intercepted on this missionoriginated from the follow1ngenemy equipment:

S hipborne Air S earchShipborn9 Air SearchMark 34Mark 35Mark 12 an dMark 12KMark :3Mark :isMobile Air SearchLand Based Portable Air SearchS hipborne A ir Search


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PART II - COMMUN ICATIONS (RAPIO),

1. S trike Reports: ~tcrll! t radio opera.tors transmitted forty-five Strike Reports (Bombs Awo.y) ! All were received by t he G ro un dStntions.~ Fox Transmissions: Weo.ther e ncoded in UCO?AC o.ndTime Ticksw er e t ro .n smi tt ed s imul tn neo us ly on 0 .1 1s tr Ike f re qu en ci es o n ~e h a l fhour end the hour respectively, No requests for W6:cther or time tickswere made by aircraft in flight.3. Freguencies, Slight interference WO o S noticed on all strikefrequencies mmoni t ored by the Ground Stutions, A ircro.ft S ignals on0.11 frequencies w ere loud and c L ear on 0.11 str1ke frequencies usedduring the miS Sion, A ircrll.ftreported incidents of jumm1ng on thefrequenCies at different times during the miSSion. Intentionnl OWj wn mi ng e nco un ter ed o n 6055 KeS on previous mission was not notic-ed. In 0. p er oen t~g e b re akd ow n of t ra ff ic on 0 .1 1 st rik e f req ue nci es .t we nt y- two p er ce nt WOOS Carried out on the three M e frequencies,seventeen peroent on the seven M e f re qu en Ci es n nd s ixt y. on e p er oe nton the eleven MO frequaneies,4 . N nvignt.ionnl A ids: Aircraft radio operntors requestedf or ty -o ne H F/ DF b ea ri ng s, T ht rt y- al gh t b eo .r ln gs W Br e o bt a. ln ed .'l'hree earings were not obtained due to t he i no.' bl11tyf' th e r a.di oo pe rn to r t .o h en r t he G ro un d S to .t io n's i ns tr ue tl 'J ns . R ll Ii icr nB ge I lD d.Homer were ut.ilized by all Bomb Groups partielpa.tlng. O.W.I. S~tion wnB used and go~d homing on it WIlS reported by s ome Q i rora ttbelow Iwo Jima.. Eight VHF/OF Bearings warG requested c.Dd oll ftJ'Oobt.a.1ned.5 .. N et. Disoipline and S eourity. .kerlal r ndl0 opera.tors 4Ss-pl~ed ~ vast. ~mprovement. in the mnint~ining ot net d ia OlpliD a IDaincident of one aircraft int.erfering with o.nother'8 v:lll8lll ..t_o a aeduring the period when 'Bombs Awny" reports were 'bslag .......1itIa.Rodio Silence ~s broken by nn nircraft nborttag a o a tobase. With this exception, there were no other - " : G Q I P i ll r .. _ " ' i I ; j ~ . ~

en08n.

(1)


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(0.) At 0504Z. Ilnkn'JW!1. sto.':.i on w~uld t'llnsmi.t LVIIIwhenever one of our opero.tors would o.ttemptto make 0. tro.nsrniB sion.

(b) IJ' lt JD.nunlng during bombs r : . w o : y rGports.(c) Unidentified 1 J ' 1 { b e ' t 1 1 1 ' 6 en 0600Z ~ 0100Z; po.r-tio.l1y eff' cctive.

b. 313thBombardment Wi,ng.(1) 3410 KeS.

( G \ ) No jamming reported.(2) 7310 KGS.

(0.) No jo.mclng reported.(3) 11160 KGS.

(0.) No jamming reported.7, Distres:, No S.O.S. tro.nsmissiona were recelveti by the

Ground Stations. OneC'.ircrai't utilized the emergency messo-ge tOl'1llto indico.to 0. possible ditching. Thrrugh. use , . , r Air-te.-Air Heming.this o.lrcl"o.ft obto.ined 0. ~buddyW und 1mB able to rench the ba.sesafely. Ground S~~tion received throe requests for urgent bscr1ag8itw o were obto.ined. The third bearing wus not ob~ined beo~U5. u1r-~r:J't o pe rat or d id Mt henr the Gr"lund Station's 1nstruotlolWl.

8. Eguipment Malfunctions:a. AN /A RT -iS . cne ftt11ure.b J.JlIMN-7,. 1va sense nntenBCLs bl"olt-.e , SCR.s22;

(1) Three c~sa6 of needle huntl~.(a) On@ 1nopernt1?8 ~ all .-....'

two oha.nnels.


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A NN EXD

I N T E L L I GE N C E R E P O R T Spart 1-En emy Air Opp'ositionPa.rt II - Antiaircraft and Air to J.1r BombingP a r t I I I - Bombing Results and Damage A s s e s s m e n t


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P M - X I - .AIR OPPOSITION

1. . General: Enemy air opposi ti on was weak I' 91 enemy e.1r-craf't making 165 attacks, Five 8-29s (4, '7 % o.f our effort) weredamaged. No:a -29 was destroyed by ene.mye.1l"C:raft. Our forcedestroyeil 7, probably destroyed 8,e.nd dW!l!l.ged23 enemy r19ht.ers.

2, Sightingsand j,_ttacks:a, Ratio of attacks to sightings for 1;,ou.rm1asions inthe Nagoya areal ! ! V A Ell.. Ratio ofMISSION A.ttacks Sighted Attacks to S1Jl':hting;s

THIS MISSION 16 5 9 1 l , B to 1Miss10n #26 273 205 1. 3 to 1Mission #22- 625 225 2 .6 to 1Mission #20 15 9 304 0,5 to 1b, Ratio of enemy aircraft B ighted to number of 5-29aover Japan:

lUSSIOn E/J~ No, B-29a Ratio of Sight1nga toSighted OVer Japan Strength of our Poroe91 105 0.9 to 1205 99 2.1 to 12 2 5 55 3.5 to 1301) 72 '.2 to 1

THIS MISSIONMission # 2 6 'MiSSion #22Mission #20

c. Ratio of enemyaircraft attacking to D.u.lJerrtf 8'"over Japan:MISSION F / J . No, B-29s Ra.tto o r .1"-*_ '"Att.acks Over Japan Strepg1!h et -, ; 7166 105 1.0wI273 95 1 I.e to1626 65 9,.. _.159 '12 ,.THIS !USSIO:NMission #Z6lIiias10n #22Mission #20

to bombs'to bombs


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Enemv a i r o r a f t Number o r kttaQks Percent. of all A1rtaogTonyI r v i n gZekeTojoOsCnrNickU/I sisU/I TIEJackTOT.1.L

4 5313028U1064--L166

2619181776,2--L100

5. Direction of.&ttacks: J"n unusual feature was th e co...paratively high percentage of atta.cks made from left and rigbtq u a r t e r , 2:3%Il.nd27%. respectively. Thirty ...three pel' cent otattacks were from nose. th e lowest percentage fo r noae o . t t a d k s onall ~issions e x o e p t missions ct 19 January 19~ and 13 December1944, Tail attacks were l?;t of t h e t o t a l .

6. Leve1 of J . . t t a c k s : Level attacks cansti tuted S 9 % of e.llatta.cks, higher than average percentage, Thirty-seven POI'centof' all attaoks were from above and 24% were from below,7, Direction a n d L e v e l o f A tt ac k:

a. o r the high a tt aC ks . n os e,were practically equal.b. Of the level attacks, nose and ript ~tt1pwere most numerous,c. O f the low attacks only the ta.tl ~~~:!~,,'i!~~i c a n t 1 n number,

r


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13. Enemy Aircuft Markings:1 ViI TIE - Olive drab with G er ma n m ar ki ng s.1 U/I TIE - L ig ht ma ro on .1 Typs ABC- Black.6 Irving - Brown with blue unders ide.8 Irving - Olive drab.I Irving - Olive drab on to~ with r~d underside and red

1 Type ABC1 IrvingI Ol3oarI Oscar

I I rving2 Irving5 Irving1 I rving2 Nick5 Nick1 Z ek - e1Zeke2 Zeke1 Z e k e5 Zeke1~eke:3 TonyI Tony2 Tony6 Tony8 T0ny5 Tony3 Tony1 Tony1 Toja2 T aja1oj o

- At least four guns were observed t o be firingfrom both nose and wings.- 2 0- mm cannon wing fire.- 2 0- mm cannon.- 6 machine guns in wing.

spinner.- Brown underneath and green on top.- Black.- B lack with red rounde la.- Light grey or dull silver.- Olive drab with red nacelles.- Black.;- Silver.- Olive drab.- Olive drab with red roundels.- BlaCk or very d ar k c olor .- Silver with red roundels.- Light grey or cream.- Green with red stripes on wtnss.Silver with orange stripe all 8l 'OIIDd tile '.EIiI!~- Silver wi th two or three a- onap ,Btb:~around wing about h a l t w ay out~- Olive drab with red roundels.- All silver with red rounae~- BlaCk or very dark.- Gray.- Brown with blue ~a~


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Destroyed P rob ab ly D es tr oy ed Damaged Gun. Poaltl9.11 Zeke 32 RSG3 TaJo RG:3 Tojo LG1Oj o RSG1aJ o Bomb:3 Irving TG1 Zeke T O2 Zek:e Bomb1 Oscar Bomb1Tony RG:3 Tony LG2 Tony RSOlull S/E B omb . KG- 1Ton~ TOOTAL 7 6 * 23

q Tmis figure while it does not agree with the S t a t l . t l e a lReport(Annex E)t i s a later assessment and more Dearly e o r r s o t .

r PART II ~ ANTIAIRCRAFTANDAIR-Tn-AIR BOlIBUG Rpaq1. E nemY.\ k Fire:

a. The Primary Target Wa s a.ttaCked by & Jla ~singly, and by four formations of 4, lIt 8. a.Dd4 !Ie ~The last formation bombed fran 27.000 ft at 055$Z alas & 0 .... dta.ttack. all o th er f 'o rma ti on s b omb in g from 25.300 to '-GOD ,. ft0506 - 0514Z USing axes of attack from 2580 to 3OaQ . ~ ~over the target area was from 2 7 00 _26)0 at 12 0 _ l3&~.there w a$ an ~ndercaBt over the target of rro. qIlO .. ~

b. H a . . v y flo.k over the Primary r . . . _ . . I ' I ! I I N~~indlcr.ted in the follOWing PIll"a,gt'ap.ba..C. O f the 6 A le bombillg 8b~1l1Lft by barrage type fire Whioh Wti. 8J:ttn!".!!!IIt~""-'!.A le were no t hit an d reported f~ .... IlIfi!very ,ea.ttered.d. The f'blt ~_.\toady pointed f1re W~.iIwelle hit.


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b. Heavy flak at other locations was reported as tallows:i ._ Over Hamam~tsu one A le a.t 25,000 1't reported meager,inQccurate, level, and trailing. continuously pointed flak, An-

other A le approaching Hamamatau {'rom the '/Test at 27_000 tt reported2B 'burets of predicted. concentration. 18 of the bu.rsts WI! ITe lowand 7 LeveL, This A le received minor dalnage,

j. Over Uji Yamada 4 A le f"lylng at 27,000 ft from the Butreceived meager predicted concentrations O f flak. The burets ~remostly high andtrai ling. inaccurate to aOcurate through 10/10undercaat. 2 A l e w er e d ama ge d by flak.

k , Over Ji.(aisaka and Fukuda 2 A le at 27,000 - :50.000 l'tencountered meager, inaccura.te, continuously pointed flak,

r:

1. Over Chichi Jima one A le at 21,000 ft reported 6 ,.6 hursts generally low, Yet it was hit by flak, a frapenb 1 H r 1 D & .found on return, although previou.sly this A le had DDt run ~to &Lfire. Another Ale at 14,000 ft ran into meager, accurate flak.BUrsts were l ea di ng , l eve l. and in line. Fire cams a p p a ; e a t l J traatwo guns on the island. This Ale wa.s once rooked by 'barsta J ftin front.

m.and accurate.and level.

n, A total of'2. Our Tactics V5. AA:


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ST;,TISTICAL S U M M , 4 R Y C F D AM A G ESq. ft. of roof area Percent of total roof area.

Destroyedst ru ctu ra l da ma geS upe rfi ci vJ : gu tt edU minorTotOol

46.17010.30082.50063.700202.670

1.2%.3 %2 . 2 %1.7%5.4%

Total roof areu of plant is: 3.811.000 sq, ft., as given in CIUIndustrinl Report No.2, 27 February 194 5.

I T E M I Z A T I O N O F D h l t A G EB ui ld in g! R oo f Damaae in ThousandS of SQ, it . .. t runctlonNumber 1 Area " superficia1,1 t . ' t ot atD estroyed Structural'Gutted Minor 'T otal R oofiBuild1n2

8 57.400 1 ,!!S, 700 2 8.700 5~' Uachine ShOll12 29 500, I I i 1.000 1 000 3~ Unidentif:led13 8.200 8.200 I I 8 200 100i UnideD.t1tletl19 1:3.500 4 700 I 4. 700 3 4 " I"",f 1*122 9.000 9.000 I 9.000 10M' UDidant1tW_A.B_.._C 2 0. 85 0 2 0 .85 0 ! I 2 0.85 0 100 1: trnldentH'iBli25 8 060' I :3 500: 3,500 ~ a -A - ; _ -26 8 120 5 600 I 5 600 6got e . " . .".e .4....;;29 700000 17 0 700 1 54.000 104700 15 " ABs&llbl,v45 8.120 8.,120 i 8.120 lOot IJ.nodldiUr'83 7.450 ! I 4.100 4.1:'20 5~ 1JDideatriAir84. 7.450 ! 4..20('-' 4 20(' !i71 1JM"

23

Total 4 6,17C IO,5ecNote: R efe re nc F) for o.b ove bu ildi ng numbe rs . fu nc tions . nreas. e1iO. t C1'I

Industrial Report No.2, 27 February 19 45.D iscussion of the effectiveness of t he r llid r

T his raid probably hnd n small etteet 011 the ]d'I~_~1Ithe plant in that it superficit.l ly ~d one orQI1 already dnm~gGd c5 sembly building. H0W8~.of the small bUildings to~l~ de8~o,ed. ~Gtbuild1ngs should be ensily re~nired. ~~~~inery wi thin the bu11dings is not Q . . . . . . ~Ml~~~ ..

Rocts at buildings13 December 194,.4 and r8J!lDJ~Ct!i3, show all but ?80C2 9, pr evious ly d o.ma~4root "epnired.

References l


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P r e s t r i k e

Dur ing

NAGOYA\


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r ; J 1

Hamamatsu

;Jf," . J

,

-~~" l: ;,\ r: ,... .$

P r e s t r i k e

Poststri~e -,


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E

OONSOL1DATEDTATISTICALI

til


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e nzo. . . . .f0 -e:{Q::Wc,o

oz -a : :


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'do 1 .. . . ' " til0...... Q 1 -1 l:l"flO ~8 8 . . ~'" oj o .bt " ' I . . . . . . . . . . r . ; , Q) I i l + >

I ! I I l' I : :' i' ," !: !: : ~ G} .p " O i , " " Q '" ~ ~(I)'" a 0..",. .........~ .l4 oj ~ k ;:l O ::; '1:::G }:;Jfjoj ( I 1 j3 . . . . 0 0 H a 0 .~jl' ~~.oj Q )~io

oJ-U1 I: " c . > 1~ ti ~I I I I ' " N I I Nc a r==00-

~~.~ @"" I I I I I I I I

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I , t I I


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- C'") C'")C'")l""'i NN N CI) C'") cY")' 0 : : 1 II : t'- 0...0 o I.f) e- ~J . . . . c' J s N ~~N NC\ I C\!C'ilN IN. . !: . (f) 01'" r! 3 ~UI Z

~~. . . , : : I I-( H1'1 L I l f0 r: Q~0~~.~:o ~

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'C JoIIIr-+-~~~~--4-----'_~-----n~----------~ ~

o g


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MISSION._::_:J=.""_---;--=o.:..-15 ~'oru.e.w 1911SlTE,~~ -FUEL CONSum'TION '& FLIGHT DATA.

Jle eCllPIErlBGMISSICIf*W EIG HT III T A .J.:vg. Basic Wt. of A le

J.vg. Fuel Loaae;d (Gals.)Avg. Bombs Loaded (lbs.)Avg. GrossWt. at 'rake-off

fLIGHT D A T 1 ! .Avg. Time at Low .AltitudeAvg. Time of Clim.b t


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ANNEX

(B Q;iB m COMMA N D FIEL D ORm!8S


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.. xx 1 BOVlBER COlOIl!.ND. . G 1 lA li i . !~ 1900 11 Feb 4 5 , .

~~~~~~.~~~~~.4~*.~~~ .:j'"Initials

. .. .. ,~ By J\.uth of CG XJCI Be

TO I: Oak: GEN 73 RD BCM '. II lNGCOM GEN 313TH BO~ WINGCOM GSN 3l!A.TH BaM WING

"11 Feb 1945

Date '"' "

F IELD o .RD ER N O :29 Efu ,.D lCA TE N O.. 41. Ipfotlllation

a. Fr ilmd.1y(1) Air

ea) CTF 9.3 will provide air d.efense of theoperating bases.

("6) DUlDboServioe: To follow.~

(2) Naval(a) Li.feguard submar ine: To follow.(b) D estroyer: To follow.

(1) Airoraft: There is estimated to be approximately211 o pe ra ti on al e ne my fi gh te r a ir cr aft inthe vio-inity of t he t ar ge t.Anti-Airoraft: There are 9 0 . heavy M guns withinrange of airoraft on the run to t he t arge t aDda pp ro xi ma te ly 1 58 heavy M guns in the JIAQOYA - - . , , ; . y

2. Deoision:1 The XXI Bomber CotDmand will attaGk the tarptignated below on woa Day_3. INSTRUCTION to Units:

fl.. 73rd Wing ObjectiveaPrimazy Target and }poatiop90.20. - 193t3S11N - 136578)


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AimiBg point rerereno8 on XXI Bomber command L itho ~os1aoNo.90,,?O - 193Seoondary Target~ Same as primarY.L ast R esort: A ny indl1strial oity.

o. S cheme of k" aneuver:

Base1700N - 14400E ( De pa rt ur e P oi nt )2900N - 1371.5E34 4 7~r - 13737E3.508N - 13719E (li')Target3510N - 1364. .r : t . :34 4 3N - 13645334 00N - 138 00E2700N - 14330EBase

(1) M !l th od o f a tt ao k: By squadrons in c ol um n. a tt ao ki ngwith a minimum time interval between oombat squad-rons. The primary target will be attacked by visua.lb om bi ng m ,e th od s if possible and by r ad ar b om bi ngme th od s i f n eo es sa ry .(2 ) A xiS and altitude of attack: 2 81 degrees true at abase altitude of ~5tOOO feet.(3) Time control: The first oombat group of t he 3 l3 thWing will leave the de-p


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: J J ?!Initials 13 Feb. 4 Soate..~Q.R~l.TO ; CO ld G aN 73 rd BO !. W GCO li! . G GN 31.3th BI J i i. . l itG

INFQ : .3RD PHOTO S Q U . . .RO N

11:1::1::1::::1::111:"':'I ~ll ~ a " 1. I~ By A~th of CG XXI BO

X X I B O t B EP . C Ol.3 i"J ;.:N D IGU,Ali I1800 13 February 1945 :

':::::=:::::~:;:::::::::::

., .J ia 8NElJ J. .ENT NO 1 TO F IB LD ORDE:R H O 29 ERn.D lCaTE N O 4Change paragraph 3 c (3) to read:

Time CoP!trol: The first oombat gro~p of the 73rd 'lingwill leava the departure point (2715N - IIj.053E) at"DM Hour on "D" Day. The first combat group of the313th ':!ing 'II1ill leave the departure point at approximatelyn D " HQur plUB I S minutes on ftOwn a y .

Change paragra.ph 3 d to read:d. Routos: 73J:'d and 313th Wing

Base1700N - 14515El2500N - 1423082715N - 140538 (Departure Point)293O N - 13737E3447N - 13737E3508N - 13719E (IF)Target3510N - 13645E34 43N - 13645E34 00N - 1_3800E2700N - 14330EBase

'nLSONn /OPN3


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; Initials 14 Feb 45Date

:I:: to:::::::::::':;; =:::' =::!:'~~~1I_'!': By Au:th of CG XXI BeTO: COM GEM 73RD BO~'IWGCOM GEN 313TH BO~~G

I N FO : 3RD F HOTO SQUADRON

X XI BO i.o B ER CO ~N D: G U . A l ! J .L: 1600 14 February 191t.5

Amendment No 2 to Fie1d Order No 29 Erad1:o:a:t~ 'N d :4~:: : : : : : : : : :: : :Cha.c.ga paragraph 1a tG read Ia. Friec.dly

(a) CTF 93 will prov ide a 1 1" defense for operating base.(b) DQmboService: One dumbo call 24V890 will be on

station 230m - 1430.%:: from IOOO! to 12 00K .( 0) Superd timbo Sa r v 10e : One supe rdumbo will be on sta-tion at 30S0N - 14032E along return flight.

(2 ) N aval(a) D estroyers: One destroyer will be Qn station

2000N - l4 4l0E from 0900K to l200K then will proceedto 2000N - 14 500B from 1600K to 2400K.

(b) Submarines: There will be fiva submarines on dutyduring entire flight on following stations:3507N - 14052E34 2BN - - 1394 6E34 06N - 138 51E34 14 N - 1374 BE3302N - 14 026E

I nubo S!lkiSUlIiOSakilao Saki013.10SakiHaohijo Jima.

C ha ng e p ar ag ra ph 3 b to read~b , 3l3th W in g O bj eo ti ve s:

Primarv T arget and Logatiog A iming Pgint90.2.0 - 193(3511N - 13657E ) 086064


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Change paragraph 3 X (1) to read:(1) .O M Ho~ and W O f t Day: 1230X

Paragraph 4 b should readJb. This is XXI Bomber Command.ractlcal lAisaioh BwD'be :J4

Fiuagraph .. 5 d .should read:d. IFF will be turnad off when within 300 miles of thGmainland and turned to on pcBl~ion upon leavtD g the main-

lalld.

L E l 6 A . YCOl( GENHI BOll COX

,:'IlSONO/OFNS


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G-~t DISTRIBUTION LIST


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COPY No.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526 - 27282930313233. 3 4 .353637383940414 :a -4344 - '1 3

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DISTRIBUTION

.T:ACTICAL MISSION REPORTS

COl!IIIIQnd:l:ng General, Twentieth Air Foroeo ommand l:o.g Gener-e.l , XXI Bomber CommandDeputy Ce.mmandar. Twentieth Air ForoeChief of Staff ,Twant ieth Air ForoeChief of' Staff', XXI Bomber COlllJllB.ndDeputy cis ,.Op.ns. XXI Bomber COJIIInandDeputy O/S. Sup- & Maint, XXI Bomber COlD!ll !l .ndAle of s, A-2, XXI Bomber CommandCommanding General, Army Air Foroes, Attention; AC/ASIntelligenceCommander I n Ch ie f, P aoi fi c Oeean Areas (A dv H q)Commander In Chief, pacific Ocean Areas (Rear Hq.lch.ie' of Naval Operations, DP-l6-VJoint Intelligenoe Center, Paoific Ocean AreasCommander .Air Force, Pacific FleetCOI!ll!lB.nder, Firth FleetCommander. Fir st Carr Ler Task ForceCommander, Forward Areacommand~ng General, U .S. A rmy Forces in Far EastCommanding General. U . s . Army Forc~s, Pacific O cea n A reaComrn.andlngGeneral, All ied Air Forces, Southwest Pac if'ieAreaCommanding General, Far Eastern Air ForoesOomm.anding General. U.S. Strategic Air Foroes In EuropeCommanding General, Eighth Air ForceCommanding Genoral, Mediterranean Allied Air ForoesCommanding Genoral, Fifteenth Air oroeCommanding General, Seventh Air Fo?:,oe

-- Commanding General, VII BombOl"CommandCommanding General, VII Fighter Co_ndCommanding General, Eleventh Air ForoeCommanding Genoral, XX Bomber CommandCOll'llllB.ndingGeneral, 58th Bombardment Wingcommanding General, 73rd Bombardment WingComme.nding General, .31,3th Bombardment W1DgCOI'IlDl9.ndingGeneral, 314th Bombardlnent WingComman41ng General, 31.5th Btlmbardment Win.g (AU D UColllJllB.nding Otf'iaar, ,3rd Photo R eo on $q ua dr oaColllJllB.nding Offi,oer. 33rd sta.tbtiqal eonWol 1fa1tChemioal Warf'&re Of'i'io$r. XXI BQlIlbe~TaotioB ~ A~~OrdDanoe ,",'f'


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787 9808182838 4 -8 5868788899091 - 100

commanding o rf ic er , 3 9t h B omb Group ( V R )c om ma nd in g O ff ic er , 4 0th Bomb Grou.p (V B)commanding O ff ic er , 3 30 th B omb Group (VB)Comne.nding Officer, 4 44 th Bomb Group (VB)commanding Officer, 4 6 2 n d B omb Gr ou p (VB)c~nding Officer. 4 6 &th B omb Gr ou p (VB)comma.nding O ff io er . 4 9 7t h Bomb Group (VIi)CO!lll(lElndingfficer, 498th Bomb Group (VB)Commanding Orf~cer. 4 99 th Bomb Group (VB)C om ma nd in g O ff ic er , Sooth Bo~b Group (VB)commanding Officer, _504th Bomb Group (W):c omma.nding O ff io er , 5 05 th Bom.b Group (va)Reports SQo~iQn, A - 2, XXl Bomber Command (File Copy)Reports Section, A-2, XXI B omb er C omma nd

21st bomber command tactical mission report 34

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