236 cm hegemony 1nc 2ac supplement

8/14/2019 236 CM Hegemony 1NC 2AC Supplement

1/27


2/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony is not sustainable

Hegemony isnt sustainable - China

Elisabeth Economy, fellow Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, China and AntiterrorismThe picture that emerges in the security realm is thus a mixed one. While China has not asserted itself as an alternative to U.S

leadership, the potential exists. Despite strengthened military ties between the U.S. and some regional actors, a strong reservoir ofdistrust and enmity exists toward the United States in many of the regions publics. It is plausible that over time, Chinas

message of non-interference, cooperative security, and the diminution of the role of the U.S. that is implied by Chinas

approach will gain in popularity, although the United States may yet again broaden its approach to security and regain territory ithas lost.

Hegemony is not sustainable action is the only alternative.

Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson professor of International Politics at Columbia University, 2007, The

Remaking of the Unipolar World as published in The Washington Quarterly.The irony is that Washington seeks to change the rules of todays unipolar world order. Preemption but is actually prevention,

including preventive war. In extreme cases such as Iraq, the United States has justified the use of force by arguing that eventhough Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, he would have developed them whenconditions were propitious. It was better for the United States to act rather than wait for this to occur. This may be a politicaland psychological rationalization, but the argument does have a strong logic to it, especially if deterrence cannot cope with

dedicated adversaries, most notably terrorists. When defense is also inadequate, the United States must use preventive measures.Preventive actions, however, even if effective in the short run, will only be a stopgap if international politics were to proceed on

its normal trajectory. To bring lasting peace, stability, and prosperity, the system must not simply be preserved, as the DefenseGuidance advocated; it must be transformed. Although the second element in this trilogy can perhaps be squared with a conservativeview of the role of the hegemon, the other two cannot. Together, the three argue that even if the status quo is in some sensesatisfactory, it is an illusion to believe that it can be maintained. One way or another, world politics will change drastically.Thequestions are who will change it and whether it will be for better or worse. In a way that should shock Henry Kissinger and other

students of the order established by the Congress of Vienna, U.S. foreign policy should be more closely modeled after Napoleonthan after Talleyrand and Metternich. The United States simply cannot maintain its hegemonic position through the policies

advocated by realists and followed before September 11, 2001, so current doctrine argues that the United States must instead be arevolutionary power.

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 2


3/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Current Hegemony doesnt solve - Space

Current US space technology and hegemony unable to solve terrorism and security

Linda Bilmes (professor at Harvard University) and Joseph E. Stiglitz (professor at Columbia University),April 2008, The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of theConflictWhy has a retrenchment in U.S. space dominance occurred? First, space weapons have little application to the overriding

security threat of Islamist terrorism. Second, for the time being, a rapid rise of technological adversaries does not appear

imminent. But the most compelling case against space weapons is that the U.S. space industry and associated military space

leadership are incapable of delivering any space capability, let alone a space weapon.Space weapons advocates (and there aresome in the military) have little chance when every space penny goes to funding overruns on such programs as the Space-BasedInfrared System (intended to detect and track ballistic missiles) and Future Imagery Architecture (a planned constellation ofreconnaissance satellites) programs that are both five times more expensive than initially estimated. Those who are genuinelyconcerned with space security should take no comfort in these developments. We are confronted with an increasingly

interconnected world served by global utilities, many of which are based in or rely upon space systems.The war on terrorism isactually a multi-decade war of ideas. Space is a vital component of the information distribution and collection systems that will make

it possible to win that war. Yet, U.S. leadership in space security and industry seems incompetent to address these issues,particularly from a technically sophisticated standpoint. As such, not only U.S. security, but also global security is at risk.



4/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Counter-Balancing wont Happen

Counterbalancing will not occur, but hegemony is not sustainable without further actions.

JosefJoffe, fellow for Centre for Independent Studies, 8/5/2005, Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule theWorld?This is surprising. Many observers expected sharp breaks with the past after the cold war, such as the end of Americanhegemony, the return to great-power balancing, the rise of competing regional blocs, and the decay of liberal multilateral

regimes. Yet even without the Soviet threat and bipolarity, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan have reaffirmed

their alliances, contained political conflict, expanded their trade and investment ties, developed new mechanisms for inter-

governmental cooperation, and avoided the return to strategic rivalry and traditional balance-of-power politics.Continuity, nottransformation, has been the hallmark of the postcold war era. Change today is not revolutionary but incremental, a variation on anold theme: it mainly entails the expansion and integration of the 1940s order rather than something new. World politics is much likecontemporary suburban sprawl, in which expansion is relentless but the basic model or organizational logic dates to the 1950s. Likesuburban sprawl, contemporary world politics involves the unwieldy and unplanned growth of more of the same. The old roads andbridges, not built for todays traffic, threaten breakdown and gridlock. But an entirely new system, absent an earthquake, isunthinkable. What we need are city planners who can insinuate some design into the sprawl, and engineers who can repair and

expand basic infrastructure. The American postwar order has been hugely successful, built on a rich tradition of thinking and practicecentered on how markets, society, democracy, and institutions can give shape to political order. The ability of the industrialdemocracies to dampen or overcome the underlying manifestations of anarchy (order built on balance of power) and

domination (order built on coercive hegemony) explains the character and persistence of this order.Yet most observers havefailed to recognize its institutional foundationa logic in which the connecting and constraining effects of institutions and democraticpolities reduce the incentives of great powers to engage in strategic rivalry or balance against American hegemony. Because of itsdistinctively open domestic political system, and because of the array of power-dampening institutions it has created to

manage international political conflict, the United States has been able to remain at the center of an expanding,

institutionalized, and legitimate political order



5/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Counter-Balancing wont Happen

Counter-balancing is ineffective to US hegemony

William Thomas Allison, professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy, 9/24/2007, Primacy and theUnipolar Moment: The Debate over American Power in an Asymmetrical World as published in the AustralianArmy JournalHow then do major powers bring about a multipolar system or at least begin to balance US hegemonic power? After all, it is

an ironclad rule of international history that hegemons always provoke, and are defeated by, the counter-hegemonic

balancing of other great powers.Hard-power, or military force, counter-balancing seems out of the question, considering thedisparity between US military power and that of its distant military rivals.Moreover, the risk-reward calculus of such a strategyof counter-balancing would favor none of the potential challengers. Some argue that soft-balancing strategies that are non-military in nature, like diplomacy, international law, multilateral international institutions, or transnational organisations, can

limit hegemonic, or in this case US, behavior. Such a peaceful approach does not overtly threaten or unnecessarily provoke thesuperpower. While this might be good on paper, such approaches have not had much success in recent years in counter-balancing US hegemony, mainly because of the impotency of international institutions.

Counter-balancing will not occur effectively.

G. John Ikenberry, IR professor at Georgetown University, 4/28/2003, Strategic Reactions to AmericanPreeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of UnipolarityAmerican unipolar power is unlikely to trigger a full-scale, traditional balance of power response. The major powers Russia,

China, Germany, France, Britain and Japan will attempt to resist, work around, and counter American power -- even as they

also engage and work with American power. But they are not likely to join in an anti-American countervailing coalition that

will break the world up into hostile, competing camps. The balance of power is the most time-honored way of thinking aboutpolitics among the great powers. 2[2] In this classical view, when confronted with a rising and dominant state, weaker states flocktogether and build an alternative power bloc. The circumstances for this type of dramatic, order-transforming move do not exist

-- and they are not likely to exist even if American power continues to rise relative to other major states and even if Americanpolicy antagonizes other states in the way that is has recently over the Iraq war. There are a variety of reasons why this is so. One issimply that a bloc of major states with sufficient power capabilities to challenge the United States is not possible to assemble.

Another is that American power itself is not sufficiently threatening to provoke a counter- balancing response.To be sure,American power and the policies and roles that this power enables does worry other major states. Responding to it is theirmajor geopolitical challenge. But counter-balancing responses manifest in separate and competing security alliances andsystematic policies of opposition are both not feasible and not responsive to the distinctive challenges posed by unipolarity.

What troubles the other major countries about American power cannot be remedied by the classic geopolitical tool of the

balance of power.



6/27


7/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Counter-Balancing Wont Happen

Counter-balancing will never happen and is counterproductive for othercountries

G. John Ikenberry, IR professor at Georgetown University, 4/28/2003, Strategic Reactions to AmericanPreeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of UnipolarityThe first facet of American power is its traditional power assets material capabilities that allow it to pursue its objective and getother states to go along with it. One aspect of material capabilities is the sheer size of the American military establishment. Asmentioned earlier, American military expenditures are greater than the next fourteen countries combined and if currenttrends continue, the United States military expenditures will be equal to the rest of the world combined by 2007. The advanced

technological character of much of this military power makes this power disparity even greater. This mass of military power

makes it difficult if not impossible for a group of states to develop capabilities that could balance or counter the United States.

But other considerations further increase the difficulties of organizing a counter-balancing coalition. First, there are collective

action problems. States might like to see the formation of a counter-unipolar coalition but they would prefer other states do th

work of organizing it and covering its costs. This is the problem of buck passing the collective action problem that makes i

less likely that a coalition will form.There is also the problem of regional blocking problems. If particular great powers do

decide to amass greater military power to challenge the United States, other major states in their region are likely to be threatenedby this move and challenge it. For example, if Japan were to undertake military mobilization to counter the United States, it wouldfind a hostile East Asian neighborhood awaited it. These considerations make counter-balancing unlikely. 5[5] Other materialpower assets also work to Americas advantage namely, security protection, markets, and nuclear weapons.Alliance securityprotection that the United States has the capacity to extend to states in all four corners of the world provides a positive incentive tocooperate with the United States. This incentive is of two sorts. One is simply that American security protection reduces theresources that these countries would otherwise need to generate to cover their own protection. It is a cost-effective way to deal

with the elemental problem of national security. If it means working with the United States and not offering opposition to it,

the forgoing of this option of opposition is a cost that is more than compensated by the value of the security protection itself.

The second benefit of security protection, at least for some states, it that it means that these states wont need to face the

regional challenges that might come if they provided for their own security. Germany and Japan are the best examples of this.

By positioning themselves under the American security umbrella, Germany and Japan were able to reassure their worried neighborsthat they would not become future security threats to their respective regions. The United States is able to provide security to so many

countries because it has the economic and military capabilities to do so on a worldwide basis. Indeed, it might well be that economiesof scale exist for a versatile and high-tech military power such as the United States.



8/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Solves EU CB and NATO

US hegemony prevents EU counter-balancing and saves NATO.

ChristopherLayne, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 6/1/2008, It'sOver, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic RelationsThe United States is determined to maintain its regional hegemony in Europe, and thus to keep NATO intact, in order to

prevent the EU from emerging as a rival pole of power in the international system. However, US strategy has changed subtly.During the Cold War, the US needed large numbers of troops in Western Europe to keep the Europeans from being at each other'sthroats; contain Germany; deter the Soviet Union; and prevent Western Europe from developing the capabilities to act autonomouslyin the realms of foreign and security policy. One might term the US strategic role in Europe during this period as one of 'positivehegemony.' Today, however, although the American goal of preventing the emergence of an independent pole of power on the

Continent has remained constant, the means of attaining it have changed. The US no longer deems it necessary to maintain a

huge military presence on the Continent to control Europe. Instead of positive hegemony, the United States has now embraced

a policy of negative hegemony.



9/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Must Increase Hegemony Now

US must end proliferation now, we are on the brink of nuclear attacks

Shultz et al., George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, Mr. Shultz, adistinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perrywas secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary ofstate from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1/4/2007, AWorld Free of Nuclear Weapons, Published in the Wall Street Journal.

North Koreas recent nuclear test and Irans refusal to stop its program to enrich uraniumpotentially to weapons grade

highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood

that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In todays war waged on world order by terroristsnuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptuallyoutside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges. Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgentnew actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically

disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence.It is far from certain that we can successfullyreplicate the old Soviet-American mutually assured destruction with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies worldwidewithout dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years ofstep-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments, or unauthorized

launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent toensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War, by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be asfortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?



10/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Addressing Climate Solves Hegemony

Addressing climate change restores US hegemony.

Washington Quarterly, publication concerning United States actions past, present, and future, 4/1/2008 RealLeaders Do Soft Power: Learning the Lessons of IraqSecond, Washington can restore the legitimacy of U.S. leadership by showing a greater willingness to take into account theviews of its necessary partners. The administrations about-face on North Korea and Iran and support for global initiatives onHIV/AIDS and malaria are valuable steps in the right direction. Yet, more could be done, starting with a leadership role inaddressing climate change, supporting the International Criminal Court, and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in U.S.strategy to bolster the flagging nonproliferation regime. The United States has a unique capacity to foster peace and stability in theworld, but its unique role and capabilities do not justify an unconstrained version of U.S. exceptionalism. If the United States wantsothers to live by the rules and be responsible global stakeholders, it must accept the need to do the same.



11/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts Indonesia Add-On

Hegemony solves Indonesian economy and prevents instability.

John T. Dori, former Research Associate in The Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 2006,Indonesia's Economic and Political Crisis: A Challenge for U.S. Leadership in AsiaIndonesia's present economic and political crisis presents a key challenge to U.S. leadership in Asia. Indonesia has been

devastated by an economic crisis comparable to the U.S. Great Depression. At the same time, Indonesia is beginning a politicalreform process that many Indonesians hope will reverse the effects of years of strict political authoritarianism and economic autocracyBy offering targeted assistance, the United States can help Indonesians to emerge from their crisis and perhaps to build theworld's third-largest democracy. By helping in Indonesia's economic recovery, the United States can lessen the impact of Asia'

economic crisis on the U.S. economy.Although offering humanitarian food assistance and necessary economic advice toprevent a second Indonesian political crisis, the United States also should encourage Indonesians to consolidate free-market

economic reforms that promote transparency in the financial sector and reduce the government's role in the economy. TheUnited States also can offer advice to help new political parties to learn democratic skills. Just as important, it should rebuild ties toIndonesia's military as it promotes reform in that institution.

Indonesia key to US security

John T. Dori, former Research Associate in The Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 2006,Indonesia's Economic and Political Crisis: A Challenge for U.S. Leadership in AsiaIndonesia is important as well to the security of the United States. Indonesia sits astride strategic sea lanes connecting theIndian and Pacific Oceans through which passes 40 percent of the world's shipping, including 80 percent of Japan's oil supply and70 percent of South Korea's. Indonesia has been suspicious of China's intentions in the region and has worked within ASEAN toconvince China to modify its claims to most of the South China Sea. In recent years, the United States and Indonesia have affirmedtheir interest in regional security by engaging in military exercises, some in Australia. And, as the world's largest Muslim state,Indonesia has been a welcome moderating force in the Islamic world. The United States should champion reforms that revive

Indonesia's economy and encourage its transition to a democratic political system.

Indonesia on the brink now.

John T. Dori, former Research Associate in The Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 2006,Indonesia's Economic and Political Crisis: A Challenge for U.S. Leadership in AsiaBut the current calm could prove illusory. Predictions of dire food shortages as early as this fall raise the prospect of renewedviolence and rioting that could lead to a second Indonesian political crisis. The United States should do what it can to help

Indonesia to avoid further economic dislocation and violence, and to safeguard and advance the tentative steps toward economicand political reform that have been made since President Suharto's ouster.



12/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts Climate Solvency

Hegemony is key to global climate change solvency.

Lynn M. Wagner, editor for the International Institute for Sustainable Development's Reporting Services (IISDRS) Division, 2008, Identifying US Preferences and a Way Forward in the Ozone, Climate and ForestsRegimesThe three books demonstrate the importance of norm entrepreneurs and leaders for effective international environmental policy.Hoffmann's computer simulation indicates that a norm entrepreneur who only reaches 30 percent of agents can still produce anoutcome in which 70 percent of agents accept the norm. Hoffmann also suggests that a hegemon may act as a norm entrepreneur,although he finds that US entrepreneurial activity on climate change has caused instability in the global governance of climate

change. Davenport presents suggestions for how the willingness of the United States to take on a leadership role could be increased.Could the same actions increase US willingness to change its entrepreneurial activity? Humphreys' proposal to negotiate aconvention on transnational corporations would benefit from consideration of what would be involved for a norm entrepreneur orleading state to take it up. He suggests that the very "revitalization of the charter as an active instrument for accountability willstimulate citizen [End Page 141] engagement and participatory democracy" (p. 231), although Hoffmann's simulation on normcreation suggests that the first step should come from a norm entrepreneur. Similarly, Davenport suggests that, under currentcircumstances, US leadership is required for effective agreements to emerge. What would need to precede the development of acharter to ensure that it would have US support? The case studies presented in these three books illustrate the difficulties in assessingcosts, benefits and underlying norms for the negotiator and analyst alike, but they also indicate that that they do change. Thenegotiators' changing positions in international talks about ozone depletion, climate change and forests are admirably charted andanalyzed in these three books, and point to potential actions and some hope for those who would like see the development of effectiveenvironmental policies.



13/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts Proliferation

Hegemony key to stop proliferation

Shultz et al., George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, Mr. Shultz, adistinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perrywas secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary ofstate from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1/4/2007, AWorld Free of Nuclear Weapons, Published in the Wall Street Journal.Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take

the world to the next stageto a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to

preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. Nuclearweapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end ofthe Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant considerationfor many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasinglyhazardous and decreasingly effective.



14/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts NATO

US leadership is key to NATO and EU security.

Richard Holbrooke and Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. ambassador to the UnitedNations. Ronald D. Asmus is executive director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center inBrussels. 3/14/2006, Next Step for NATO, published in the Washington Post.In the new global security environment, NATO has to address the gravest threats to its members' collective security. But now

those threats come thousands of miles from the European heartland, not just a few yards away on the East Berlin side ofCheckpoint Charlie. If NATO does not take on more of these problems, we will all be less safe, and the alliance will again riskbecoming irrelevant. This does not mean that NATO should, or could, become a globo-cop; not every security problem in the worldis of direct concern to NATO, and not every issue can be solved by it. Nor is this a call for a new age of Western imperialism; we aretalking here of dealing with issues of national security vital to all NATO members-- issues that happen to lie outside NATO'straditional area of concern but on which NATO can make a difference. In fact, NATO has put its toe in some global waters by(belatedly) taking over a major mission in Afghanistan authorized by the United Nations, starting a modest training mission for Iraq,flying relief missions to the earthquake zone in Pakistan, and beginning (again, belatedly) to discuss a significant, U.N.-authorizedrole in Darfur. These are all commendable actions, but NATO has not yet crossed the Rubicon and explicitly embraced a more

global mission. Each individual NATO action thus becomes the arena for an internal battle royal. It is time for a formal policydecision, which should be made soon and then announced at the NATO summit eight months from now in Riga, Latvia. For NATO tomake this mission leap, there must be real European support and effective U.S. leadership. In principle, a more global NATOwould pursue precisely the kind of goals embraced in Europe's own security strategy. Defending Europe by dealing with thesenew threats is a core European -- and U.S.-Canadian -- foreign policy objective. A case in point is Iran, where policy is now weakenedbecause it is divided among several institutions, no single one of which contains all the Western nations whose security is endangeredby Tehran's nuclear program. It should be stressed in this regard that involving NATO does not necessarily mean military action; itmeans, however, a seriousness of diplomatic and political purpose backed by the threat of collective action.

US hegemony key to NATO.

ChristopherLayne, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 6/1/2008, It'sOver, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic RelationsThis article is structured as follows. First, I discuss the historical roots of the current tensions in transatlantic relations. Second, I arguethat the real source of transatlantic conflict is America's role as a global and European hegemon, and the concomitant gap inhard-power capabilities between the United States and Europe. Third, I show that, although US primacy is the major cause oftransatlantic friction, the very fact of American hegemony is what explains why NATO still is in business more than a decade

after the Cold War's end. I conclude that, although NATO essentially is obsolete as a military alliance, US power will not beretracted from Europe any time soon. As long as there is a consensus among the American foreign policy elite that the US

should be a global hegemon NATO will continue to be perceived as an indispensable instrument both of US geopolitical

preeminence, and America's containment of European power.



15/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts UN, genocide, security, proliferation

US leadership key to the UN and solving genocide, proliferation, and US security.

Linda S. Jamison, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/5/2007, Leadership vs.Stewardship: Advice for the New UN AmbassadorThe United Nations is the most successful international institution ever established, and that stature has allowed the

international body to set norms and standards of international behavior that one country could never impose on its own. The62-year history of the United Nations has proven that shaming human rights abusers, curbing weapons proliferation, stoppinggenocide, conducting peacekeeping, and mitigating conflict are best done when the world stands together, even when the

outcome is insufficient or the problem goes unsolved. The United Nations was never intended to solve the worlds problems. It wasenvisioned as a mechanism to manage and mitigate conflict by providing a forum for dialogue to save the world from catastrophe. Butregardless of any successes that the United Nations has had over the years, it needs the might and will of the worlds

superpower behind it at every level. The United Nations needs U.S. leadership in order to be a more effective body, and the

United States needs the United Nations to help counter violence and threats to peace. No degree of raw power can ever

substitute for the agility of leadership and the ability to bring the world together for the greater good of humanity.



16/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts Middle East

US leadership causes Middle Eastern peace.

Daniel C. Kurtzer, S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor of Middle East Policy Studies at PrincetonUniversity's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Aairs, served as U.S. Ambassador to Egyptfrom 1997 to 2001 and U.S. Ambassador to Israel from 2001 to 2005, August 2008, Shortsighted StatecraftWashington's Muddled Middle East PolicyStrong U.S. leadership in the Arab-Israeli peace process can make a difference.A coherent strategy in Iraq can be formulated soas to disengage and withdraw U.S. forces, instead of pursuing the illusion of a "victory" that remains undefined after more than fiveyears of war. And although engagement with Iran will not instantly end Tehran's nuclear ambitions and ongoing support ofterrorism, it is surely preferable to waiting until military action becomes the only option available. Smart, sustained diplomati

engagement may make the challenge of choosing enemies -- and bolstering ties with friends -- much easier for the next president.



17/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts China

Collapse of US leadership causes US-Sino military conflict.

Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader, Flynt Leverett is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policyat The Brookings Institution. Jeffrey Bader is director of the Brookings China Initiative, 2006 ManagingChina-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle EastThe bid by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire Unocal earlier this year triggered not only a hostilereaction in the U.S. Congress but also growing interest and debate within the foreign policy community about the rapid growth inChinas energy demand and the prospect for competition between the United States and China for access to global oil and gasresources.1 Henry Kissinger has gone so far as to argue that competition over hydrocarbon resources will be the most likelycause for international conflict in coming years. Chinas hunt for oil is clearly influencing its foreign policy toward its neighbors,such as Russia, Japan, and the Central Asian states, and toward regions as far afield as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.3 AsChina seeks access to global energy resources, its status as a rising power is already enabling it to exercise influence in ways

that make it more difficult for the United States and the West to achieve their goals on a number of issues. The potentially

explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept U.S. leadership and the prospect of competition between

China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the

Middle East. Chinese engagement in the Middle East has expanded economically, politically, and strategically over the lastseveral years. Since the late 1990s, Beijings policies toward the region have been closely linked to the objectives of the three major,state-owned Chinese energy companiesthe China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National PetrochemicalCorporation (Sinopec), and CNOOCto seek access to Middle Eastern oil and gas, frequently on an exclusive basis. Since 2002, theMiddle East has become the leading arena for Beijings efforts to secure effective ownership of critical hydrocarbon resources,

rather than relying solely on international markets to meet Chinas energy import needs. There is every reason to anticipate

that China will continue and even intensify its emphasis on the Middle East as part of its energy security strategy. China will

likely keep working to expand its ties to the regions energy exporters over the next several years to ensure that it is not

disadvantaged relative to other foreign customers and to maximize its access to hydrocarbon resources under any foreseeable

circumstances, including possible military conflict with the United States.It seems doubtful that Chinese energy companiesfledgling efforts to lock up petroleum resources will succeed in keeping a critical mass of oil reserves off an increasingly integratedand fluid global oil market. Nevertheless, Chinas search for oil is making it a new competitor to the United States for influencein the Middle East. If not managed prudently, this competition will generate multiple points of bilateral friction and damage

U.S. strategic interests in the region.

US leadership on climate key to US-Sino relations

Elizabeth C. Economy, C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on ForeignRelations, 10/2007, The Great Leap Backward?.Given this reality, the United States -- and the rest of the world -- will have to get much smarter about how to cooperate withChina in order to assist its environmental protection efforts.Above all, the United States must devise a limited and coherent set ofpriorities. China's needs are vast, but its capacity is poor; therefore, launching one or two significant initiatives over the next five toten years would do more good than a vast array of uncoordinated projects. These endeavors could focus on discrete issues, such asclimate change or the illegal timber trade; institutional changes, such as strengthening the legal system in regard to China'senvironmental protection efforts; or broad reforms, such as promoting energy efficiency throughout the Chinese economy. Anotherkey to an effective U.S.-Chinese partnership is U.S. leadership. Although U.S. NGOs and U.S.-based MNCs are often at theforefront of environmental policy and technological innovation, the U.S. government itself is not a world leader on keyenvironmental concerns. Unless the United States improves its own policies and practices on, for example, climate change, the

illegal timber trade, and energy efficiency, it will have little credibility or leverage to push China



18/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts China Brink

US-Sino relations are strained now.

Maryann Kelton, professor at the School of Political and International Studies, University of Flinders, 2008,US Economic Statecraft in East AsiaThere are those in Congress, however, who do not share the same sanguine view. Testimony provided during the 2005

Congressional Armed Services Committee revealed the depth of fear derived from Chinese expansion (US House ArmedServices Committee, 2005). This was reinforced later in the year by the Pentagon's annual report assessing Chinese militaryexpansion. Reputedly, this report was delayed by some four months as the State and Defense Departments debated the assessment.Though State argued for a more benign interpretation, the Pentagon promoted a more threatening analysis. Clearly, the hawks inthe administration had bought into an analysis that played on the development of China's nuclear arsenal and the

accumulation of missiles that could target the majority of the US mainland. More broadly, Kurt Campbell interpreted thechange ominously: I think we will look back on 200104 as the high point in US-Sino relations. We are entering a new periodwhere trade tensions, macro-economic disputes and strategic worries are animating the larger picture

http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/8/2/#LCN001C62http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/8/2/#LCN001C62http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/8/2/#LCN001C62http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/8/2/#LCN001C62


19/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Good Impacts ASEAN 1/2

US hegemony trades off with China in ASEAN countries, leadership key to security and economic

interests.

Maryann Kelton, professor at the School of Political and International Studies, University of Flinders, 2008,US Economic Statecraft in East AsiaThe recurring pattern of US interest in establishing preferential trade agreements in the Asia Pacific region is, where possible, tooverlay trade agreements upon the established system of security arrangements. The overarching purpose of the economic andsecurity linkage is to shore up US engagement in a region where China is regarded, particularly by the Pentagon, as anincreasing threat to US hegemony. It is a method by which the US can reinforce its dominance as the hub of both security and

economic arrangements. As FTA negotiations are subject to political and bureaucratic influences, where the domestic elite

value US relations over any Congressional attempt to exacerbate the US gains in an agreement, the FTA will most likely be

signed. Thus, for the US linkage strategy to be set in place, the regional domestic elite payoffs must be perceived as significantenough to override any losses sustained through a separate neo-mercantilist agenda.

US leadership and action key to maintaining ASEAN relations and solve security issues economic ties.

Maryann Kelton, professor at the School of Political and International Studies, University of Flinders, 2008,US Economic Statecraft in East AsiaThe US is aware that China has already signed an agreement with ASEAN that aims to create free trade by 2010. ASEANcountries are keen to ensure that their specialized high-end manufactures have assured and established markets in China prior to theinternationalization of local Chinese products. With increasing skill development with also a commensurate rise in labor costs ASEANcountries need to ensure preferential access to Chinese markets as early as possible. Although some of the ASEAN states experiencedtheir highest growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2004, both China (with US$72 billion) and Hong Kong remained as thelargest and second largest recipients of FDI. ASEAN thus has a particular interest in fostering its associations with the US as itcompetes with China (and increasingly India) in this marketplace. Specifically, it has interests in liberalizing its domestic

economy and taxation regulations in raising its magnetism for US FDI. For ASEAN, the necessity for a rapid recovery to the Asian

Financial Crisis also heightened the FDI imperative and sharpened ASEAN's interest in trade agreements with the US.Responding to questions regarding the competition for influence in Southeast Asia and an appropriate US response to Chineseclout in the region, the USTR argued that the US should be active in our own right. Our response to others activism should beactivism, not negativism'. US relations with Malaysia demonstrate the extent to which the US has prioritized its anti-terrorismagenda and its preparedness to use its economic statecraft to serve those ends. USMalaysian relations have endured a roller

coaster ride over the past decade. Tensions relaxed after early support for the US post-September 11; however, they were revivedafter the US invasion of Iraq. Malaysia perceived the US operations as damaging to normative behavior in international system and asan assault against Muslims. However, Malaysia has actively cooperated with the US in the apprehension of alleged Islamicextremists and suspects in nuclear proliferation networks. Consequently, the US remains prepared to weather criticisms over

its defense policy in order to retain Malaysian cooperation in anti-terrorist activities. Integral in maintaining this level ofMalaysian support has been continued US attention to trade matters. The US signed off on TIFA arrangements in 2004 and launchedFTA negotiations in March 2006. The US remains Malaysia's largest single country export market with export increases of 5.3%recorded in 2006. The US is the fourth largest investor in Malaysia and its trade deficit since 1992 endures.



20/27


21/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Multipolarity now

Multipolarity NOW.

Parag Khanna, senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation.,1/27/2008, Hegemony is a Thing of the Past: Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, published in the New YorkTimesAt best, Americas unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war peace

dividend was never converted into a global l iberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the

globe, we are competing and losing in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the worlds other superpowers: the European

Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run byGazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both developmentand strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules their own rules without any one of them dominating. And the othersare left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. The more we appreciate the differences among the American,

European and Chinese worldviews, the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game.Previous eras of balance opower have been among European powers sharing a common culture. The cold war, too, was not truly an East-West struggle; itremained essentially a contest over Europe. What we have today, for the first time in history, is a global, multi-civilizational,

multi-polar battle.



22/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Multipolarity Inevitable

Multipolarity is inevitable US acceptance of it allows for primacy in themultipolar system

William Thomas Allison, professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy, 9/24/2007, Primacy and theUnipolar Moment The Debate over American Power in an Asymmetrical World as published in the AustralianArmy JournalChristopher Layne offers an intriguing alternative to hard-power and soft-power counter-balancing. In what he terms leash-slipping,Layne suggests that US hard- power is a non-existential threat to the autonomy and interest of other powers. Other powers

see US hegemony as a real threat to their security interests. Moreover, Layne holds that traditional balance-of-power politics isstill alive and well, and because of this other powers will act to counter-balance the hegemon regardless of the nature of the

hegemonic threat. In order to obtain the ability to act independent of the United States to pursue security objectives, other

powers must build up military capabilities to act regionally without the need or behest of the United States. As more states

attain such capability, they can more easily slip free of the hegemons leash-like grip and compel the United States to respect theirforeign policy interests. For Layne, leash-slipping is not a hard-power counter to US power because it is does not counter anexistential threat. Layne argues that successful leash-slipping would restore a multipolar system and bring the briefAmerican unipolar moment to an end.However, the United States can stave off this counter-balancing by adopting anoffshore strategy of self restraint. In order to lessen the fear of American power, the United States will have to restrain its use

of military force, accommodate the rise of new great powers, and abandon the myth that American national security is

dependent upon a globalised image of itself for the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy.Thus, accepting amultipolar system, unilaterally practicing ideological restraint, and depending less upon unilateral use of forceoffshore

balancingwill perhaps ensure US primacy in a more accommodating multipolar system



23/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Multipolarity Inevitable

Multi-polarity is inevitable India, China, Japan and regional powers willcounter-balance.

William Thomas Allison, professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy, 9/24/2007, Primacy and theUnipolar Moment: The Debate over American Power in an Asymmetrical World as published in the AustralianArmy JournalSo, if the United States does not speak for the international community even though it says it does, is not then the United States arogue state? Or, as Huntington suggests, a rogue superpower? While many would not consider the United States a military threatto their national existence, they do see the United States, in Huntingtons words, as a menace to their integrity, autonomy,prosperity, and freedom of action. The major powers view the United States as intrusive, inter- ventionist, exploitive,

unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical, and applying double standards, and using financial, cultural, and intellectual

imperialism to pursue its own goals while stifling those of the major powers. The worlds business is US business.Thus, for amajor power like India, the United States has the capability to veto or at least bring together enough international pressure to preventIndia from pursuing any number of regional and international strategies. For India, the United States is a political and diplomaticthreat, as it is for China, Russia, Japan, and the regional powers of the Middle East. 9 Around the same time as Huntington

proposed the uni-multipolar system as a more accurate view of the new world order, Coral Bell took Krauthammers unipolar

concept even further, suggesting that the unipolar momentof American power will last at least another four decadesmuch

longer than a moment. For Bell, the gap that US peer competitors had to overcome to transform the unipolar system into amultipolar system is currently insurmountable. For a major power such as China, Russia, or Europe to challenge Americansupremacy, many diverse obstacles would have to be overcome. In fact, for Bell, multipolarism may not be the best option in

the long run. A return to a bipolar system with either China or Russia as the balancing superpower is much more likely.LikeKrauthammer, Bell points to the United States preference for apparent multilateralism in the way the United States approaches itsunipolar vision: The unipolar world should be run as if it were a concert of powers. The post-Second World War, US-madeorganisations now must be used to at least give the appearance of multilateralism and legitimacy to US action. Witness using theUnited Nations Security Council to impose sanctions or condemn the action of another major power. It helps ease the burden of theunilateralist impulse to use multilateral organisations to put the stamp of international legitimacy on US-desired action. Thus,

the United States uses the pretence of concert as part of its unipolar strategy. Lately, the United States seems to be doing thisquite poorly.



24/27


25/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

EU will counter-balance

EU will counter-balance US hegemony.

ChristopherLayne, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 6/1/2008, It'sOver, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic RelationsThree considerations predict that the EU will counter-balance the US in coming years. First, EU military capabilities

constitute a hedge against future American policies. Although 'the US may be a benign hegemon today, there is no reason toassume it will always be so' (Posen, 2004, 9). Second, Europe is concerned about how its overall political and economic positionin the international system is affected by American power (Art, 2004, 180). Indeed, there is 'a growing sense among manyEuropeans that the current and deeply uneven distribution of power leaves them far too dependent on an America whose views onworld politics it does not necessarily share' (Cox, 2005, 226). Third, by investing itself with the capability to act autonomously ofthe United States in the realm of security, the European Union can also gain bargaining power to force the US to respect

European interests abroad rather than running roughshod over them. As BarryPosen (2004, 9) has said, the EU's drive to build-up its own military capabilities is consistent with the expectation that in a unipolar world, those actors that can do so 'will at aminimum act to buffer themselves against the caprices of the US and will try to carve out the ability to act autonomously should itbecome necessary.' If the EU's drive to gain military independence from Washington through the European Security and

Defence Policy (EDSP) is successful, the result would be the creation of a new pole of power in the international system whichwould (along China's rise) restore multipolarity and bring American hegemony to an end.

http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib74http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib5http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib19http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib19http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib19http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib74http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib74http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib74http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib5http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib19http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n3/full/#bib74


26/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Inevitable

Hegemony is inevitable soft power uncontestable

JosefJoffe, fellow for Centre for Independent Studies, 8/5/2005, Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule theWorld?Nonetheless, history and theory suggest that this cannot last. In the international system, power will always beget counter-power, usually by way of coalitions and alliances among the lesser players, and ultimately war, as in the cases of Napoleon,Wilhelm II. and Adolf I. Has this game already begun? The answer is 'no, but'. It is 'no' for two reasons. First, America irksand domineers, but it does not conquer. It tries to call the shots and bend the rules, but it does not go to war for land and glory. Maybe,America was simply lucky. Its 'empire' was at home, between the Appalachians and the Pacific, and its enemies-Indians andMexicans-easily bested. The last time the US actually did conquer was in the Philippines and Cuba a hundred years ago. This is acritical departure from traditional great power behaviour. For the balance-of-power machinery to crank up, it makes a differencewhether the others face a usually placid elephant or an aggressive T. rex. Rapacious powers are more likely to trigger hostile coalitionsthan nations that contain themselves, so to speak. And when the U.S. attacked Afghanistan and Iraq, it was not exactly invading aninnocent like Belgium. Nonetheless, Mr. Big is no pussycat, and he does throw his weight around. Why is it so hard to balanceagainst him? My answer: Counter-aggregations do not deal very well with the postmodern nature of power. Let's make no

mistake about it. 'Hard' power-men and missiles, guns and ships-still counts. It remains the ultimate, because existential,currency of power. But on the day-to-day transaction level, 'soft power' is the more interesting coinage. It is 'less coercive and

less tangible'. It grows out of 'the attraction of one's ideas. It has to do with 'agenda setting', with 'ideology' and 'institutions'

and with holding out big prizes for cooperation, such as the vastness and sophistication of one's market. 'Soft power' is

cultural-economic power, and very different from its military kin. The US has the most sophisticated army in the world. But i

is in a class of its own in the soft-power game. On that table, none of the others can match America's pile of chips; it isAmerican books and movies, universities and research labs, American tastes high and low that predominate in the global market.This type of power-a culture that radiates outward and a market that draws inward-rests on pull, not on push; on acceptance, not onimposition. Nor do the many outweigh the one. In this arena, Europe, Japan, China and Russia cannot meaningfully 'gang up' on theUS like in an alliance of yore. All of their movie studios together could not break Hollywood's hold because if size mattered, India,with the largest movie output in the world, would rule the roost. Nor could all their universities together dethrone Harvard andStanford. For sheer numbers do not lure the best and the brightest from abroad who keep adding to the competitive advantage ofAmerica's top universities. Against soft power, aggregation does not work. How does one contain power that flows not from

coercion but seduction? Might it work in the economic sphere? There is always the option of trading blocs-cum-protectionism. Butwould Europe (or China or Japan) forego the American market for the Russian one? Or would Europe seek solace in its vast internalmarket alone? If so, it would forgo the competitive pressures and the diffusion of technology that global markets provide. The future ismapped out by DaimlerChrysler, not by a latter-day 'European Co- Prosperity Sphere'. This is where the game has changed mostprofoundly. Its rivals would rather deal with America's 'soft power' by competition and imitation because the costs of

economic warfare are too high-provided, of course, that strategic threats do not re-emerge. To best Gulliver, Europe et. al. mustdo their work-out at home.



27/27

Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI 08 Clark/Martin

El Jeffe

Hegemony Turns Itself

Hegemony creates the threats it tries to solve.

Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson professor of International Politics at Columbia University, 2007, TheRemaking of the Unipolar World as published in The Washington Quarterly.The U.S. position in the world is without precedent, but the basic impulses animating it are not. Having established order

within its large sphere, a hegemon will find itself threatened by whatever is beyond its reach. The very extent of the hegemons

influence means that all sorts of geographic and ideological disturbances can threaten it. Frontiers can be expanded, but doing

so just recreates them. Despite the fact that or perhaps because it lacked what would now be referred to as peer competitors,

the Roman empire was never able to establish stable frontiers, and although the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century

was able to develop tolerable working relationships with European states, its empire expanded beyond the original intention in

part because of the inability to control and limit its holdings in Africa and Asia.Having established trading outposts, it was drivento further expansion not only by competition with other European states, but by the difficulties of establishing local order.7 For theUnited States, the frontier is ideological rather than geographic, but the basic point is the same: preservation of a desirable andordered zone requires taming or subduing areas and ideologies of potential disturbance. Hegemony thus also ironically

magnifies the sense of threat. The very fact that the United States has interests throughout the world leads to the fear that

undesired changes in one area could undermine its interests elsewhere. Most changes will harm the United States if they do notimprove its situation. Furthermore, U.S. hegemony means that even those who share its values and interests have incentives to freeride on its efforts, knowing that Washington cannot shirk its role. Thus, although the United States has few intrinsic interests in theborderlands around China and Japan is strong enough to carry much of the weight in this region, U.S. fears about the rise of

China follow a certain logic.

236 cm hegemony 1nc 2ac supplement

Documents