3c l apport de la théorie des jeux à l intelligence te rritoriale illustration from a case...

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Game Theory and Territorial Game Theory and Territorial

IntelligenceIntelligence

Illustration Illustration fromfrom a Case a Case StudyStudy

Michel Carrard

National School of Engineering, Bourges

RESO-UMR 6590, Rennes 2 University

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The objective of this contribution is to The objective of this contribution is to

present the principles of a present the principles of a

methodological work that has methodological work that has

mobilized game theory to illuminate mobilized game theory to illuminate

a town and country planning issue a town and country planning issue

(Carrard, 2009):(Carrard, 2009):

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PLANPLAN

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22 Methodology: Game TheoryMethodology: Game Theory

33 The The ““Community GameCommunity Game””

44 Conclusion Conclusion and Prospectsand Prospects

ContextContext and and Study StakesStudy Stakes

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http://www.aeroport-grandouest.fr

ContextContext and and Study StakesStudy Stakes: : the transfer the transfer of Nantes Atlantique airportof Nantes Atlantique airport

Aéroport NDDL

5Dossier d’enquête préalable à la déclaration d’utilité publique, DGAC, 2006.

ContextContext and and Study StakesStudy Stakes: : thethe main components of NDDL airportmain components of NDDL airport

6Ernst&Young, CG d’Ille et Vilaine, 2006

ContextContext and and Study StakesStudy Stakes: : thethe impact of future NDDL airportimpact of future NDDL airport

Nantes: very high

impact

Rennes: high impactWestern and northern

Britain: no impact

NDDL airport: very high

impact

Zone of influence of

NDDL airport: high

impact

Rural area: low

impact

Secondary urban

centers: high impact

Nantes-Rennes: high

impact

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1) NDDL : « the largest airport in the West ? »

Resulting from competitioncompetition between airports

What statusWhat status for future NDDL airport ?for future NDDL airport ?

Two options were discussed during the Public Debate (2003):Two options were discussed during the Public Debate (2003):

or

2) NDDL : « the airport of the Great West ? »

Resulting from cooperation between airports

ContextContext and and Study StakesStudy Stakes: : problemsproblems

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• Using game theory to analyze real situations

encounters two types of objection:

• 1) Game theory formalism is too restrictive to take the

complexity of reality into account.

• 2) Game theory does not “claim to say what is”, because

the assumptions of its models are too simplistic.

• Finally, the boundaries of game theory significantly

reduce its ability to help in decision making.

Methodology: Methodology: ReflexiveReflexive ModellingModelling

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• Choosing a method: reflexive modelling (Thépot,

1998)

• “Reflexive modelling claims to act further upstream on the

mental representation by which the decision maker

structures his schematic vision of reality” (Thépot, 1998, p.

8 and following )

• Reflexive modelling sets itself the objective of extracting

from the real “a few stylized facts from which other stylized

facts are deduced by using simple models of game theory

which will be submitted to the discretion of the decision

maker” (Thépot, 1998).


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Methodology: game theoryMethodology: game theory

“Reflexive modelling and normative modelling” in Thépot J., (dir.), 1998, Gestion et théorie des jeux. L’interaction stratégique dans la décision, ed. Vuibert

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• Reflexive modelling creates space for game theory and provides an objective as well as a methodology of work:

• An objective since this type of modelling claims to help the decision maker to clarify his strategic choices.

• A methodology as this approach only claims to describe the nature of the strategic interactions of players so as to draw logical implications and consequences.

• The aim is then less to determine the existence of solutions than to clarify the nature of the difficulties to reach them: coordination problems, conflicts of interest, impasses in cooperation, reputation effects, etc....


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Methodology: Game Theory and Methodology: Game Theory and

Prospective Prospective ApproachApproach

• Proximity can be found between the approach of prospective scenario and the solution concept of game theory.

• “A scenario is not the prospective reality but a means to represent it with

a view to illuminating the present action in the light of possible and

desirable futures” (Godet, 2004, p. 10)

• The solution concept refers to the conditions imposed on the strategies of players, which if they are verified, become the solutions of the game (Guerrien, 2002).

• The solution to a game, when it is reached, suggests the existence of “a viable social order”, that is to say, such a state of the world that the mutual interest of players ensures its stability.

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• "Game theory can, on intuitive bases, ultimately identify some socially possible futures among the many conceivable

scenarios” (Schmidt, 1999, p. 56).

• Three situations may come up which can help the futurist to identify scenarios (Schmidt, 2000):

– The first, when the solution to a game is an empty set, then the related scenario must be abandoned.

– The second, when the solution is unique, then the scenario identified is the only stable state, and should be analyzedcarefully.

– Finally, a game may sometimes have several solutions. This can lead the futurist to make recommendations based on criteria thatare external to the game itself.



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• "The intelligence of a social situation is scarcely reduced to the understanding of a single game" (Schmidt, 2000, p. 258).

• In our study, we developed three games, which each in their own way, have approached an aspect of the interactions between the players concerned by the future airport:

– The focus is on the institutional dimension of the players in the “Community Game”

– In the other two games, the «Airport / Airlines Game» and the « Airport in the Metropolitan Loire-Bretagne Area game (EMLB)” attention is focused on airports and their interactions with airlines.



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• This multiplication of games is the opportunity to refine the analysis of certain types of interactions.

• Each game is an independent model but none is completely cut off from the other two.

– the players are the same from one game to the other

– the solution to a game can affect the next game, etc...

• All three games can be seen from a future oriented approach, as a metagame (Howard, 1971, Schmidt, 2000) which includes such games as many sub-games.



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The The ““Community GameCommunity Game””

Means used:

- Non-cooperative game for 2 players

- Solution concept used : Nash equilibrium and

Schapley value

A – Objective:

Reflecting on the conditions for cooperation between

Nantes and Rennes airports

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A – The players

A and B:A and B: two communitiestwo communities

� A has an airport leader

(interregional calling)

� B has a local airport (local

calling)

Objectives for A and B:Objectives for A and B:

� Increasing access through their

airports

� Maximize their attractiveness


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A – the game

The The ““community gamecommunity game””

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AA

BB BB

A – Community Game Tree

Scenario 1ScenarioScenario 11

Negotiated

Management

Scenario 2Scenario Scenario 22

Challenged Challenged

LeadershipLeadership


Hierarchical

Relationship


Competitive

Management

Cooperation

Cooperation Cooperation

Competitive

Competitive Competitive


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A – Preference order

(3 , X) (3 , X) (2 , X) (2 , X)

(0 , X)(0 , X)(1 , X) (1 , X)

The payoff matrix for A

Assumption


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A – Preference order

(X , 0) (X , 0) (X , 1)(X , 1)

(X , 2)(X , 2)(X , 3)(X , 3)

The payoff matrix for BAssumption


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A – The position of players with non-cooperative strategies

(1 , 3)(1 , 3) (0 , 2)(0 , 2)

(3 , 0) (3 , 0) (2 , 1)(2 , 1)

Nash equilibrium

The payoff matrix

Assumption


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Playing thePlaying the ““Community GameCommunity Game””

• In the context of reflexive modelling of the

situation, Rennes and Nantes players were offered

to participate in the “community game”

• This was, initially, to assess their preferences for

the scenarios from political, economic and social

criteria. Then, they were asked to play the game.

• As the proposal failed to reach its end, we will

present some results obtained with the test group

(8 participants).

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B - Experimental game

1 - Political criterion Reelection of politicians

2 - Economic criterion The growth of GDP per capita

Employment (unemployment)3 - Social criterion

Assumption: Three criteria weigh the same (1 / 3) in the choice of strategies

Three decision criteria for A and B


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1st rank 4th rank

(2,75 , 4,5) (2,75 , 4,5) ((--3 , 4,5) 3 , 4,5)

(5,25 , (5,25 , --1) 1) (1 , (1 , --2) 2)

(0,25 , 4,75) (0,25 , 4,75) ((--3 , 3,25) 3 , 3,25)

(4,25 , (4,25 , --3) 3) (4,5 , 1) (4,5 , 1)

B – Experimental game

Nash Equilibrium


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1st rank 4th rank

(2,75 , 4,5) (2,75 , 4,5) ((--3 , 4,5) 3 , 4,5)

(5,25 , (5,25 , --1) 1) (1 , (1 , --2) 2)

(0,25 , 4,75) (0,25 , 4,75) ((--3 , 3,25) 3 , 3,25)

(4,25 , (4,25 , --3) 3) (4,5 , 1) (4,5 , 1)



Differential between rankings Differential between rankings constitute margins from constitute margins from

which players can mutually adjust to (example 1)which players can mutually adjust to (example 1)

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1st rank 4th rank

(2,75 , 4,5) (2,75 , 4,5) ((--3 , 4,5) 3 , 4,5)

(5,25 , (5,25 , --1) 1) (1 , (1 , --2) 2)

(0,25 , 4,75) (0,25 , 4,75) ((--3 , 3,25) 3 , 3,25)

(4,25 , (4,25 , --3) 3) (4,5 , 1) (4,5 , 1)


Differential between rankings Differential between rankings constitute margins from constitute margins from

which players can mutually adjust to (example 2)which players can mutually adjust to (example 2)


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Conclusion Conclusion and Prospectsand Prospects

• If Game Theory concepts are not easily transferable to

real cases, Reflexive Modelling offers interesting

prospects to address situations in which the

interactions between actors are strong.

• Reflexive Modelling does not seek to determine an

optimal strategy for a decision maker but rather to

guide him in his decision making

• Reflexive Modelling requires a dialogue between the

decision maker (s) and the modeller.

• We also recalled that game theory allows a futurist

reading in so far as it allows to select the scenario

among a set of scenarios.

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Conclusion Conclusion and Prospectsand Prospects

• Finally, with respect to the subject of this conference,

it appears that territorial intelligence can fully benefit

from the contributions of game theory.

• We will give two examples:

- The first, we have experienced in our study, relies on

game assessment by the players themselves with a view

to clarifying their preferences, beliefs, etc... (Reflexive

modelling).

- The second, is related to the development of evolutionary

games which, together with information technology tools,

allow simulations of cooperation and competition

between economic actors (Berro, Leroux, 2006).

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Thank you Thank you for for your your

attentionattention

3c l apport de la théorie des jeux à l intelligence te rritoriale illustration from a case...

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