a fé como confiança kvanvig

The Idea ofFaith as Trust:

Lessons inNonCognitivistApproaches to

Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction

Alternatives tothe CognitiveModelGrounds ofDisaffection

Non-CognitivistAlternatives

Value-DrivenInquiry andAffective Faith

TheInadequacy ofTrust-basedAccounts ofAffective Faith

MetaphysicsandEpistemology

Conclusion

The Idea of Faith as Trust: Lessons inNonCognitivist Approaches to Faith

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Baylor University

BGND Conference, October 3, 2013

1 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline

1 Introduction2 Alternatives to the Cognitive Model

Grounds of Disaffection

Non-Cognitivist Alternatives

3 Value-Driven Inquiry and Affective Faith

4 The Inadequacy of Trust-based Accounts of AffectiveFaith

5 Metaphysics and Epistemology

6 Conclusion

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline







6 Conclusion

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Cognitive Model

Mark Twain: “Faith is believing what you know ain’t so.”

Brian Leiter: “religious belief in the post-Enlightenmentera involves culpable failures of epistemic warrant” (p.82) and “Religious beliefs, in virtue of being based on“faith,” are insulated from ordinary standards ofevidence and rational justification, the ones we employin both common sense and in science.”The Cognitive Model: talk of the Christian faith, theBaptist Faith and Message; talk of knowing what “we”believe and why. From this use of the language of faith,it is easy to adopt a cognitive picture of what faithinvolves: to be a Christian is to endorse the Christianfaith, it is to believe and have faith in (some vague butimportant subset) of the truths that constitute theChristian faith.Weaker and stronger cognitivist positions: faith as atype of acceptance (Alston, D. Howard-Snyder) or akind of knowledge (Plantinga).

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Cognitive Model

Mark Twain: “Faith is believing what you know ain’t so.”Brian Leiter: “religious belief in the post-Enlightenmentera involves culpable failures of epistemic warrant” (p.82) and “Religious beliefs, in virtue of being based on“faith,” are insulated from ordinary standards ofevidence and rational justification, the ones we employin both common sense and in science.”

The Cognitive Model: talk of the Christian faith, theBaptist Faith and Message; talk of knowing what “we”believe and why. From this use of the language of faith,it is easy to adopt a cognitive picture of what faithinvolves: to be a Christian is to endorse the Christianfaith, it is to believe and have faith in (some vague butimportant subset) of the truths that constitute theChristian faith.Weaker and stronger cognitivist positions: faith as atype of acceptance (Alston, D. Howard-Snyder) or akind of knowledge (Plantinga).

4 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Cognitive Model

Mark Twain: “Faith is believing what you know ain’t so.”Brian Leiter: “religious belief in the post-Enlightenmentera involves culpable failures of epistemic warrant” (p.82) and “Religious beliefs, in virtue of being based on“faith,” are insulated from ordinary standards ofevidence and rational justification, the ones we employin both common sense and in science.”The Cognitive Model: talk of the Christian faith, theBaptist Faith and Message; talk of knowing what “we”believe and why. From this use of the language of faith,it is easy to adopt a cognitive picture of what faithinvolves: to be a Christian is to endorse the Christianfaith, it is to believe and have faith in (some vague butimportant subset) of the truths that constitute theChristian faith.

Weaker and stronger cognitivist positions: faith as atype of acceptance (Alston, D. Howard-Snyder) or akind of knowledge (Plantinga).

4 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Cognitive Model

Mark Twain: “Faith is believing what you know ain’t so.”Brian Leiter: “religious belief in the post-Enlightenmentera involves culpable failures of epistemic warrant” (p.82) and “Religious beliefs, in virtue of being based on“faith,” are insulated from ordinary standards ofevidence and rational justification, the ones we employin both common sense and in science.”The Cognitive Model: talk of the Christian faith, theBaptist Faith and Message; talk of knowing what “we”believe and why. From this use of the language of faith,it is easy to adopt a cognitive picture of what faithinvolves: to be a Christian is to endorse the Christianfaith, it is to believe and have faith in (some vague butimportant subset) of the truths that constitute theChristian faith.Weaker and stronger cognitivist positions: faith as atype of acceptance (Alston, D. Howard-Snyder) or akind of knowledge (Plantinga).

4 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline







6 Conclusion

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline







6 Conclusion

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Some Quotes of Disaffection

“Here [when discussing faith in a person] the crucialfeature would seem to be trust, reliance on the personto carry out commitments, obligations, promises, or,more generally, to act in a way favorable to oneself. Ihave faith in my wife; I can rely on her doing what shesays she will do, on her remaining true to hercommitments, on her remaining attached to me by abond of love.” (Alston)

“Unbelief,” like “theology” is a product of the Greekmind . . . . Where the word “belief” is used to translatethe biblical Hebrew and Greek it means not the “beliefthat” of Plato, but “belief in,” a matter not of cognitiveassent but of faith, trust, and obedience . . . . Plato’s“theology” is not in fact an accurate apprehension oftraditional religion. It is the self-conscious intellectual’stranslation of that religion into terms that he canunderstand.” (Bellah)To those inclined toward cognitive construals of faith,these remarks don’t help much. If belief-in is a matterof faith, among other things, then it looks like we are ina tight circle if we are objecting to accounts of faith interms of belief. But if we drop the word ‘faith’ from thelist, the idea is that belief-in is more a matter of trustand obedience, and it is belief-in that is playingsurrogate here for the idea of faith. In that light,consider another passage:

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


“Here [when discussing faith in a person] the crucialfeature would seem to be trust, reliance on the personto carry out commitments, obligations, promises, or,more generally, to act in a way favorable to oneself. Ihave faith in my wife; I can rely on her doing what shesays she will do, on her remaining true to hercommitments, on her remaining attached to me by abond of love.” (Alston)“Unbelief,” like “theology” is a product of the Greekmind . . . . Where the word “belief” is used to translatethe biblical Hebrew and Greek it means not the “beliefthat” of Plato, but “belief in,” a matter not of cognitiveassent but of faith, trust, and obedience . . . . Plato’s“theology” is not in fact an accurate apprehension oftraditional religion. It is the self-conscious intellectual’stranslation of that religion into terms that he canunderstand.” (Bellah)

To those inclined toward cognitive construals of faith,these remarks don’t help much. If belief-in is a matterof faith, among other things, then it looks like we are ina tight circle if we are objecting to accounts of faith interms of belief. But if we drop the word ‘faith’ from thelist, the idea is that belief-in is more a matter of trustand obedience, and it is belief-in that is playingsurrogate here for the idea of faith. In that light,consider another passage:

7 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


“Here [when discussing faith in a person] the crucialfeature would seem to be trust, reliance on the personto carry out commitments, obligations, promises, or,more generally, to act in a way favorable to oneself. Ihave faith in my wife; I can rely on her doing what shesays she will do, on her remaining true to hercommitments, on her remaining attached to me by abond of love.” (Alston)“Unbelief,” like “theology” is a product of the Greekmind . . . . Where the word “belief” is used to translatethe biblical Hebrew and Greek it means not the “beliefthat” of Plato, but “belief in,” a matter not of cognitiveassent but of faith, trust, and obedience . . . . Plato’s“theology” is not in fact an accurate apprehension oftraditional religion. It is the self-conscious intellectual’stranslation of that religion into terms that he canunderstand.” (Bellah)To those inclined toward cognitive construals of faith,these remarks don’t help much. If belief-in is a matterof faith, among other things, then it looks like we are ina tight circle if we are objecting to accounts of faith interms of belief. But if we drop the word ‘faith’ from thelist, the idea is that belief-in is more a matter of trustand obedience, and it is belief-in that is playingsurrogate here for the idea of faith. In that light,consider another passage:

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


“While belief now refers to a state of mind, a disposition toassent to a set of propositions, even within the earlyChristian intellectual tradition historically it had as much ormore to do with love, loyalty, and commitments akin topledging one’s allegiance to a person as Lord or to a causeor to entering into a covenant such as marriage. The Latinword credo (apparently a compound of cor, cordis ‘heart’and -do, -dere, ‘to put’ derived from the protoIndo-European root for placing one’s heart upon something,*kred-dhe) means ‘I set my heart’ upon the entity ordoctrines in question. Even for scholastics such as Aquinas. . . credo meant to pledge allegiance to, to give one’s selfand one’s loyalty. The Latin terms most closely expressingtoday’s meaning of belief and opinion, opinio (‘opinion,belief, supposition’) and opinor (opinari, to be of the opinion,to believe) played an almost negligible role in Christianthought.” (McKaughan)8 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Cognitive Turn

Attention to the history of Christian doctrine reinforces suchdisaffection. Very early in this history, doctrinal disputesarose, and the language of anathema was quickly adoptedfor those with non-standard views. See for example, theseemingly hyperbolic language of the Athanasian Creed:“Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessarythat he hold the catholic faith. Which faith except every onedo keep whole and undefiled; without doubt he shall perisheverlastingly. . . . This is the catholic faith; which except aman believe truly and firmly, he cannot be saved.”

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Lessons of History and Heroes

The lesson is clear here. The faith is defined in terms ofpropositional content, and salvation requires believing trulyand firmly the members of the set of propositions inquestion.

Disaffection results immediately when we consider heroesof faith: Abraham, Moses, Job, and even the Apostles. It ismind-boggling to think of them as satisfying the cognitivestandard embraced.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline







6 Conclusion

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Varieties of NonCognitivism

Perhaps faith is an attitude or affective state of a certainsort (Clegg 1979, claiming this is Wittgenstein’s view).

Perhaps it is a kind of hope (Pojman 1986, Sessions1994)Perhaps it is a kind of desire or preference (Buchak2012)Perhaps it is a kind of practical commitment ordisposition toward certain patterns of action (Tennant1943, Kvanvig 2013)Or, perhaps, it is a special kind of trust (Alston 1996,Audi 2011, Schellenberg 2009).Befuddlement at the variety: how could they all betalking and thinking about the same thing?That aside, It is the last suggestion that I will focus onhere: How plausible is it to think of faith as a kind oftrust?

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Perhaps faith is an attitude or affective state of a certainsort (Clegg 1979, claiming this is Wittgenstein’s view).Perhaps it is a kind of hope (Pojman 1986, Sessions1994)

Perhaps it is a kind of desire or preference (Buchak2012)Perhaps it is a kind of practical commitment ordisposition toward certain patterns of action (Tennant1943, Kvanvig 2013)Or, perhaps, it is a special kind of trust (Alston 1996,Audi 2011, Schellenberg 2009).Befuddlement at the variety: how could they all betalking and thinking about the same thing?That aside, It is the last suggestion that I will focus onhere: How plausible is it to think of faith as a kind oftrust?

12 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Perhaps faith is an attitude or affective state of a certainsort (Clegg 1979, claiming this is Wittgenstein’s view).Perhaps it is a kind of hope (Pojman 1986, Sessions1994)Perhaps it is a kind of desire or preference (Buchak2012)

Perhaps it is a kind of practical commitment ordisposition toward certain patterns of action (Tennant1943, Kvanvig 2013)Or, perhaps, it is a special kind of trust (Alston 1996,Audi 2011, Schellenberg 2009).Befuddlement at the variety: how could they all betalking and thinking about the same thing?That aside, It is the last suggestion that I will focus onhere: How plausible is it to think of faith as a kind oftrust?

12 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Perhaps faith is an attitude or affective state of a certainsort (Clegg 1979, claiming this is Wittgenstein’s view).Perhaps it is a kind of hope (Pojman 1986, Sessions1994)Perhaps it is a kind of desire or preference (Buchak2012)Perhaps it is a kind of practical commitment ordisposition toward certain patterns of action (Tennant1943, Kvanvig 2013)

Or, perhaps, it is a special kind of trust (Alston 1996,Audi 2011, Schellenberg 2009).Befuddlement at the variety: how could they all betalking and thinking about the same thing?That aside, It is the last suggestion that I will focus onhere: How plausible is it to think of faith as a kind oftrust?

12 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Perhaps faith is an attitude or affective state of a certainsort (Clegg 1979, claiming this is Wittgenstein’s view).Perhaps it is a kind of hope (Pojman 1986, Sessions1994)Perhaps it is a kind of desire or preference (Buchak2012)Perhaps it is a kind of practical commitment ordisposition toward certain patterns of action (Tennant1943, Kvanvig 2013)Or, perhaps, it is a special kind of trust (Alston 1996,Audi 2011, Schellenberg 2009).

Befuddlement at the variety: how could they all betalking and thinking about the same thing?That aside, It is the last suggestion that I will focus onhere: How plausible is it to think of faith as a kind oftrust?

12 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Perhaps faith is an attitude or affective state of a certainsort (Clegg 1979, claiming this is Wittgenstein’s view).Perhaps it is a kind of hope (Pojman 1986, Sessions1994)Perhaps it is a kind of desire or preference (Buchak2012)Perhaps it is a kind of practical commitment ordisposition toward certain patterns of action (Tennant1943, Kvanvig 2013)Or, perhaps, it is a special kind of trust (Alston 1996,Audi 2011, Schellenberg 2009).Befuddlement at the variety: how could they all betalking and thinking about the same thing?

That aside, It is the last suggestion that I will focus onhere: How plausible is it to think of faith as a kind oftrust?

12 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Perhaps faith is an attitude or affective state of a certainsort (Clegg 1979, claiming this is Wittgenstein’s view).Perhaps it is a kind of hope (Pojman 1986, Sessions1994)Perhaps it is a kind of desire or preference (Buchak2012)Perhaps it is a kind of practical commitment ordisposition toward certain patterns of action (Tennant1943, Kvanvig 2013)Or, perhaps, it is a special kind of trust (Alston 1996,Audi 2011, Schellenberg 2009).Befuddlement at the variety: how could they all betalking and thinking about the same thing?That aside, It is the last suggestion that I will focus onhere: How plausible is it to think of faith as a kind oftrust?

12 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Trust?

But when we ask what trust itself is, we get amind-boggling variety of opinion.

Russell Hardin identifies trust with belief: “Thedeclarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trustyou” are equivalent” Hardin 2002, p. 10.Annette Baier (1986) thinks of trust as involvingdependence on the goodwill of another,Karen Jones (1996) claims that trust is constituted byan attitude of optimism about the goodwill of another.James Coleman (1990) characterizes trust as a kind ofaction that one places or not, depending ondecision-theoretic calculations of the ordinary variety,Richard Holton (1994) thinks it is crucial that anaccount of trust include normative, reactive attitudesinvolving dispositions to feel betrayed and grateful,depending on whether one’s trust is violated.Once again, the thought of theories of personhood interms of things inclined to don attire comes to mind.How could such disparate approaches involve peoplelooking at the same phenomenon?

13 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Trust?

But when we ask what trust itself is, we get amind-boggling variety of opinion.Russell Hardin identifies trust with belief: “Thedeclarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trustyou” are equivalent” Hardin 2002, p. 10.

Annette Baier (1986) thinks of trust as involvingdependence on the goodwill of another,Karen Jones (1996) claims that trust is constituted byan attitude of optimism about the goodwill of another.James Coleman (1990) characterizes trust as a kind ofaction that one places or not, depending ondecision-theoretic calculations of the ordinary variety,Richard Holton (1994) thinks it is crucial that anaccount of trust include normative, reactive attitudesinvolving dispositions to feel betrayed and grateful,depending on whether one’s trust is violated.Once again, the thought of theories of personhood interms of things inclined to don attire comes to mind.How could such disparate approaches involve peoplelooking at the same phenomenon?

13 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Trust?

But when we ask what trust itself is, we get amind-boggling variety of opinion.Russell Hardin identifies trust with belief: “Thedeclarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trustyou” are equivalent” Hardin 2002, p. 10.Annette Baier (1986) thinks of trust as involvingdependence on the goodwill of another,

Karen Jones (1996) claims that trust is constituted byan attitude of optimism about the goodwill of another.James Coleman (1990) characterizes trust as a kind ofaction that one places or not, depending ondecision-theoretic calculations of the ordinary variety,Richard Holton (1994) thinks it is crucial that anaccount of trust include normative, reactive attitudesinvolving dispositions to feel betrayed and grateful,depending on whether one’s trust is violated.Once again, the thought of theories of personhood interms of things inclined to don attire comes to mind.How could such disparate approaches involve peoplelooking at the same phenomenon?

13 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Trust?

But when we ask what trust itself is, we get amind-boggling variety of opinion.Russell Hardin identifies trust with belief: “Thedeclarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trustyou” are equivalent” Hardin 2002, p. 10.Annette Baier (1986) thinks of trust as involvingdependence on the goodwill of another,Karen Jones (1996) claims that trust is constituted byan attitude of optimism about the goodwill of another.

James Coleman (1990) characterizes trust as a kind ofaction that one places or not, depending ondecision-theoretic calculations of the ordinary variety,Richard Holton (1994) thinks it is crucial that anaccount of trust include normative, reactive attitudesinvolving dispositions to feel betrayed and grateful,depending on whether one’s trust is violated.Once again, the thought of theories of personhood interms of things inclined to don attire comes to mind.How could such disparate approaches involve peoplelooking at the same phenomenon?

13 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Trust?

But when we ask what trust itself is, we get amind-boggling variety of opinion.Russell Hardin identifies trust with belief: “Thedeclarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trustyou” are equivalent” Hardin 2002, p. 10.Annette Baier (1986) thinks of trust as involvingdependence on the goodwill of another,Karen Jones (1996) claims that trust is constituted byan attitude of optimism about the goodwill of another.James Coleman (1990) characterizes trust as a kind ofaction that one places or not, depending ondecision-theoretic calculations of the ordinary variety,

Richard Holton (1994) thinks it is crucial that anaccount of trust include normative, reactive attitudesinvolving dispositions to feel betrayed and grateful,depending on whether one’s trust is violated.Once again, the thought of theories of personhood interms of things inclined to don attire comes to mind.How could such disparate approaches involve peoplelooking at the same phenomenon?

13 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Trust?

But when we ask what trust itself is, we get amind-boggling variety of opinion.Russell Hardin identifies trust with belief: “Thedeclarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trustyou” are equivalent” Hardin 2002, p. 10.Annette Baier (1986) thinks of trust as involvingdependence on the goodwill of another,Karen Jones (1996) claims that trust is constituted byan attitude of optimism about the goodwill of another.James Coleman (1990) characterizes trust as a kind ofaction that one places or not, depending ondecision-theoretic calculations of the ordinary variety,Richard Holton (1994) thinks it is crucial that anaccount of trust include normative, reactive attitudesinvolving dispositions to feel betrayed and grateful,depending on whether one’s trust is violated.

Once again, the thought of theories of personhood interms of things inclined to don attire comes to mind.How could such disparate approaches involve peoplelooking at the same phenomenon?

13 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Trust?

But when we ask what trust itself is, we get amind-boggling variety of opinion.Russell Hardin identifies trust with belief: “Thedeclarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trustyou” are equivalent” Hardin 2002, p. 10.Annette Baier (1986) thinks of trust as involvingdependence on the goodwill of another,Karen Jones (1996) claims that trust is constituted byan attitude of optimism about the goodwill of another.James Coleman (1990) characterizes trust as a kind ofaction that one places or not, depending ondecision-theoretic calculations of the ordinary variety,Richard Holton (1994) thinks it is crucial that anaccount of trust include normative, reactive attitudesinvolving dispositions to feel betrayed and grateful,depending on whether one’s trust is violated.Once again, the thought of theories of personhood interms of things inclined to don attire comes to mind.How could such disparate approaches involve peoplelooking at the same phenomenon?

13 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Diagnosis

One answer to that question is given by Thomas W.Simpson (2012):

The ways that the word is used are simply toovarious to be regimented into one definition.Sometimes ‘trust’ is naturally understood asreferring to a sort of affective attitude (‘I will trustmy husband, I will not be jealous’); at other timesto a conative one (‘Come what may, I will trust youto the end’); and at yet others to cognitive ones (‘Iknow you are an honourable woman, so I trustyou’). Sometimes it is not a mental state but actionwhich is described as trust (‘The patrol followedthe scout, trusting him to spot any ambush’).Similarly, it is used in situations where themotivation to trustworthiness is dramaticallyvaried: love, or mutual gain, or moralconsiderations may all count as reasons not tobetray someone’s trust. These all support theinductive argument against the plausibility ofanalysing of trust. Counter-examples can be givenso easily because there are so many ways theword may permissibly be used, and so it would befoolish to seek a single definition. pp. 553–554

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Solution?

And what of Simpson’s solution? He recommendsabandoning the project of linguistic analysis and substitutingthe methodology of genealogy in its place:

An alternative way of thinking takes the value oftrust as of first importance. A genealogicalapproach addresses the concept obliquely, byasking why we might have the concept that wehave, given some broad facts about how we liveand the projects we pursue.The claim is that if we can give a ‘role description’for an important concept that looks and feels verysimilar to a notion that we actually operate,explaining what is needed of a concept in order todo a particular job, then that sheds light on thecontent of our actual one. Rather than trial bythought-experiment, it instead accommodates thevagueness and conflicting intuitions that surrounddifficult and abstract notions. No doubt all theadvocates of the ‘trust is this’ claims I critiquedabove have replies to my counter-examples. Butthe sorts of replies on offer will tend to consist inargument over the cases, and ultimately adiscovery that we use the word ‘trust’ to describedifferent things on different occasions, illustratingJackson’s point above. What would be genuinelyrevealing is an explanation of why the term permitsthis variability. As well as yielding a clearer graspon the content of the concept, such an approachalso makes it entirely perspicuous where its valuecomes from. Two results for the price of oneenquiry is no bad thing in these straitened times.[p. 555] Simpson2012

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Good and The Bad of this Proposal

Simpson is well-aware that his case for an alternativemethodology is not exactly compelling. But I think he ison to something important here. We can engagephilosophically in an analysis of anything in thedictionary, but we don’t, and the reason we don’t, whenjustifying of our practice, is because we presuppose thevalue or importance or significance of what we focus onin our philosophical explorations of them.

But even if Simpson is onto something important, theintrusion of geneaology into the story is unfortunate.Genealogical accounts, by the use of the term, ought tobe relying on some history or supposed history, andthis is their flaw. Look again at Simpson’s descriptionabove, Two things to note here, one good, one bad.The good is the value-driven heart of the approach,and the bad is the bad metaphysics.That is, the historical aspect of the genealogicalaccount is supposed to point us to the fundamentalreality the importance of which motivates ourtheorizing, and do so in a way (perhaps) that lets ussee how to defend our favorite metaphysical picture inthe process. But no historical or historically-tingedmythology will accomplish either of these tasks, at leastwhen considered purely abstractly.It is wrongheaded in a way that favors value-drivenapproaches over genealogical ones, since the latterrequires immense backfilling in order to justify therelevance of the historical dimension it touts.

16 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Simpson is well-aware that his case for an alternativemethodology is not exactly compelling. But I think he ison to something important here. We can engagephilosophically in an analysis of anything in thedictionary, but we don’t, and the reason we don’t, whenjustifying of our practice, is because we presuppose thevalue or importance or significance of what we focus onin our philosophical explorations of them.But even if Simpson is onto something important, theintrusion of geneaology into the story is unfortunate.Genealogical accounts, by the use of the term, ought tobe relying on some history or supposed history, andthis is their flaw. Look again at Simpson’s descriptionabove, Two things to note here, one good, one bad.The good is the value-driven heart of the approach,and the bad is the bad metaphysics.

That is, the historical aspect of the genealogicalaccount is supposed to point us to the fundamentalreality the importance of which motivates ourtheorizing, and do so in a way (perhaps) that lets ussee how to defend our favorite metaphysical picture inthe process. But no historical or historically-tingedmythology will accomplish either of these tasks, at leastwhen considered purely abstractly.It is wrongheaded in a way that favors value-drivenapproaches over genealogical ones, since the latterrequires immense backfilling in order to justify therelevance of the historical dimension it touts.

16 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Simpson is well-aware that his case for an alternativemethodology is not exactly compelling. But I think he ison to something important here. We can engagephilosophically in an analysis of anything in thedictionary, but we don’t, and the reason we don’t, whenjustifying of our practice, is because we presuppose thevalue or importance or significance of what we focus onin our philosophical explorations of them.But even if Simpson is onto something important, theintrusion of geneaology into the story is unfortunate.Genealogical accounts, by the use of the term, ought tobe relying on some history or supposed history, andthis is their flaw. Look again at Simpson’s descriptionabove, Two things to note here, one good, one bad.The good is the value-driven heart of the approach,and the bad is the bad metaphysics.That is, the historical aspect of the genealogicalaccount is supposed to point us to the fundamentalreality the importance of which motivates ourtheorizing, and do so in a way (perhaps) that lets ussee how to defend our favorite metaphysical picture inthe process. But no historical or historically-tingedmythology will accomplish either of these tasks, at leastwhen considered purely abstractly.

It is wrongheaded in a way that favors value-drivenapproaches over genealogical ones, since the latterrequires immense backfilling in order to justify therelevance of the historical dimension it touts.

16 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


Simpson is well-aware that his case for an alternativemethodology is not exactly compelling. But I think he ison to something important here. We can engagephilosophically in an analysis of anything in thedictionary, but we don’t, and the reason we don’t, whenjustifying of our practice, is because we presuppose thevalue or importance or significance of what we focus onin our philosophical explorations of them.But even if Simpson is onto something important, theintrusion of geneaology into the story is unfortunate.Genealogical accounts, by the use of the term, ought tobe relying on some history or supposed history, andthis is their flaw. Look again at Simpson’s descriptionabove, Two things to note here, one good, one bad.The good is the value-driven heart of the approach,and the bad is the bad metaphysics.That is, the historical aspect of the genealogicalaccount is supposed to point us to the fundamentalreality the importance of which motivates ourtheorizing, and do so in a way (perhaps) that lets ussee how to defend our favorite metaphysical picture inthe process. But no historical or historically-tingedmythology will accomplish either of these tasks, at leastwhen considered purely abstractly.It is wrongheaded in a way that favors value-drivenapproaches over genealogical ones, since the latterrequires immense backfilling in order to justify therelevance of the historical dimension it touts.

16 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline







6 Conclusion

17 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Affective Faith

So, to repeat, the methodology I favor here focuses on whatis important in a given domain. In this domain, I thus focuson what I take to be an important, and perhapsfundamental, kind of faith–“fundamental”, in the sense ofbeing common ground between religious and mundaneexamples of the phenomenon that is central to a flourishinglife.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Unity and Connectedness

The development of plans and purposes typically ariseout of conative or affective experiences such asnegative emotional experiences and positive emotionalexperiences.

Among the negative emotional experiences are fear,horror, regret, guilt, worry, sorrow, shame, anger,misery, meaninglessness, and despair.Among the positive are joy, compassion, awe, wonder,beauty, and the sublime.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


The development of plans and purposes typically ariseout of conative or affective experiences such asnegative emotional experiences and positive emotionalexperiences.Among the negative emotional experiences are fear,horror, regret, guilt, worry, sorrow, shame, anger,misery, meaninglessness, and despair.

Among the positive are joy, compassion, awe, wonder,beauty, and the sublime.

19 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


The development of plans and purposes typically ariseout of conative or affective experiences such asnegative emotional experiences and positive emotionalexperiences.Among the negative emotional experiences are fear,horror, regret, guilt, worry, sorrow, shame, anger,misery, meaninglessness, and despair.Among the positive are joy, compassion, awe, wonder,beauty, and the sublime.

19 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Origin of This Kind of Faith

responses that involve faith of one sort or another.

To adopt a longer-term project or goal or plan involvesa kind of hope that success may be possible, or at leasta decision not to give in to feelings of hopelessness,and a kind of self-trust, and perhaps trust in structure ofthe universe and the society in which one hopes toflourish, regarding the accomplishment of some plan.Faith, in this sense, is an orientation of a person towarda longer-term goal, an orientation or disposition towardthe retaining of the goal or plan or project in the face ofdifficulties in achieving it, one prompted by affections ofvarious sorts and involving complex mental states thatare fundamentally affective even if they involvecognitive dimensions as well.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


responses that involve faith of one sort or another.To adopt a longer-term project or goal or plan involvesa kind of hope that success may be possible, or at leasta decision not to give in to feelings of hopelessness,

and a kind of self-trust, and perhaps trust in structure ofthe universe and the society in which one hopes toflourish, regarding the accomplishment of some plan.Faith, in this sense, is an orientation of a person towarda longer-term goal, an orientation or disposition towardthe retaining of the goal or plan or project in the face ofdifficulties in achieving it, one prompted by affections ofvarious sorts and involving complex mental states thatare fundamentally affective even if they involvecognitive dimensions as well.

20 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


responses that involve faith of one sort or another.To adopt a longer-term project or goal or plan involvesa kind of hope that success may be possible, or at leasta decision not to give in to feelings of hopelessness,and a kind of self-trust, and perhaps trust in structure ofthe universe and the society in which one hopes toflourish, regarding the accomplishment of some plan.

Faith, in this sense, is an orientation of a person towarda longer-term goal, an orientation or disposition towardthe retaining of the goal or plan or project in the face ofdifficulties in achieving it, one prompted by affections ofvarious sorts and involving complex mental states thatare fundamentally affective even if they involvecognitive dimensions as well.

20 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion


responses that involve faith of one sort or another.To adopt a longer-term project or goal or plan involvesa kind of hope that success may be possible, or at leasta decision not to give in to feelings of hopelessness,and a kind of self-trust, and perhaps trust in structure ofthe universe and the society in which one hopes toflourish, regarding the accomplishment of some plan.Faith, in this sense, is an orientation of a person towarda longer-term goal, an orientation or disposition towardthe retaining of the goal or plan or project in the face ofdifficulties in achieving it, one prompted by affections ofvarious sorts and involving complex mental states thatare fundamentally affective even if they involvecognitive dimensions as well.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Little Leaguer

Suppose a young Little League pitcher gives up agame-winning home run and experiences the typicaldespondency for having done so.

One reaction is to adopt a goal of becoming a betterpitcher and never having to feel that way again.Such a reaction generates an orientation or dispositiontoward various efforts at becoming better, in hopes ofdoing so (or at least some aversion to the idea that anyefforts of any sort are hopeless), and display a kind ofself-trust or self-reliance and perhaps some trust ofothers who may be recruited to help in the project.He makes a commitment to a certain kind of future,though how firm a commitment is yet to be seen.In carrying out the commitment, he will display the kindof faith I’m considering, and the firmness of thecommitment is a function of the degree of faith involved.It is, in a word, an affective faith, both in source andsustenance. In a short motto, we grasp the noun formof what (this kind of) faith is from the adjectival andadverbial form involving being full of faith: faith is whatfaithful people have and faith is whatever it is thatunderlies and explains patterns of behavior and activitythat is engaged in faithfully.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Little Leaguer

Suppose a young Little League pitcher gives up agame-winning home run and experiences the typicaldespondency for having done so.One reaction is to adopt a goal of becoming a betterpitcher and never having to feel that way again.

Such a reaction generates an orientation or dispositiontoward various efforts at becoming better, in hopes ofdoing so (or at least some aversion to the idea that anyefforts of any sort are hopeless), and display a kind ofself-trust or self-reliance and perhaps some trust ofothers who may be recruited to help in the project.He makes a commitment to a certain kind of future,though how firm a commitment is yet to be seen.In carrying out the commitment, he will display the kindof faith I’m considering, and the firmness of thecommitment is a function of the degree of faith involved.It is, in a word, an affective faith, both in source andsustenance. In a short motto, we grasp the noun formof what (this kind of) faith is from the adjectival andadverbial form involving being full of faith: faith is whatfaithful people have and faith is whatever it is thatunderlies and explains patterns of behavior and activitythat is engaged in faithfully.

21 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Little Leaguer

Suppose a young Little League pitcher gives up agame-winning home run and experiences the typicaldespondency for having done so.One reaction is to adopt a goal of becoming a betterpitcher and never having to feel that way again.Such a reaction generates an orientation or dispositiontoward various efforts at becoming better, in hopes ofdoing so (or at least some aversion to the idea that anyefforts of any sort are hopeless), and display a kind ofself-trust or self-reliance and perhaps some trust ofothers who may be recruited to help in the project.

He makes a commitment to a certain kind of future,though how firm a commitment is yet to be seen.In carrying out the commitment, he will display the kindof faith I’m considering, and the firmness of thecommitment is a function of the degree of faith involved.It is, in a word, an affective faith, both in source andsustenance. In a short motto, we grasp the noun formof what (this kind of) faith is from the adjectival andadverbial form involving being full of faith: faith is whatfaithful people have and faith is whatever it is thatunderlies and explains patterns of behavior and activitythat is engaged in faithfully.

21 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Little Leaguer

Suppose a young Little League pitcher gives up agame-winning home run and experiences the typicaldespondency for having done so.One reaction is to adopt a goal of becoming a betterpitcher and never having to feel that way again.Such a reaction generates an orientation or dispositiontoward various efforts at becoming better, in hopes ofdoing so (or at least some aversion to the idea that anyefforts of any sort are hopeless), and display a kind ofself-trust or self-reliance and perhaps some trust ofothers who may be recruited to help in the project.He makes a commitment to a certain kind of future,though how firm a commitment is yet to be seen.

In carrying out the commitment, he will display the kindof faith I’m considering, and the firmness of thecommitment is a function of the degree of faith involved.It is, in a word, an affective faith, both in source andsustenance. In a short motto, we grasp the noun formof what (this kind of) faith is from the adjectival andadverbial form involving being full of faith: faith is whatfaithful people have and faith is whatever it is thatunderlies and explains patterns of behavior and activitythat is engaged in faithfully.

21 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Little Leaguer

Suppose a young Little League pitcher gives up agame-winning home run and experiences the typicaldespondency for having done so.One reaction is to adopt a goal of becoming a betterpitcher and never having to feel that way again.Such a reaction generates an orientation or dispositiontoward various efforts at becoming better, in hopes ofdoing so (or at least some aversion to the idea that anyefforts of any sort are hopeless), and display a kind ofself-trust or self-reliance and perhaps some trust ofothers who may be recruited to help in the project.He makes a commitment to a certain kind of future,though how firm a commitment is yet to be seen.In carrying out the commitment, he will display the kindof faith I’m considering, and the firmness of thecommitment is a function of the degree of faith involved.

It is, in a word, an affective faith, both in source andsustenance. In a short motto, we grasp the noun formof what (this kind of) faith is from the adjectival andadverbial form involving being full of faith: faith is whatfaithful people have and faith is whatever it is thatunderlies and explains patterns of behavior and activitythat is engaged in faithfully.

21 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Little Leaguer

Suppose a young Little League pitcher gives up agame-winning home run and experiences the typicaldespondency for having done so.One reaction is to adopt a goal of becoming a betterpitcher and never having to feel that way again.Such a reaction generates an orientation or dispositiontoward various efforts at becoming better, in hopes ofdoing so (or at least some aversion to the idea that anyefforts of any sort are hopeless), and display a kind ofself-trust or self-reliance and perhaps some trust ofothers who may be recruited to help in the project.He makes a commitment to a certain kind of future,though how firm a commitment is yet to be seen.In carrying out the commitment, he will display the kindof faith I’m considering, and the firmness of thecommitment is a function of the degree of faith involved.It is, in a word, an affective faith, both in source andsustenance. In a short motto, we grasp the noun formof what (this kind of) faith is from the adjectival andadverbial form involving being full of faith: faith is whatfaithful people have and faith is whatever it is thatunderlies and explains patterns of behavior and activitythat is engaged in faithfully.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Religious Faith: Abraham

Such an identification of affective faith with faithfulness isalso well-suited to explaining important and centralexamples of religious faith, such as the faith displayed byAbraham in leaving Mesopotamia for Canaan. The narrativein Genesis 12 is sparse—we are told only that the Lordsaid, “Go,” and “So Abraham went.” Later accounts of thematter attribute his behavior to faith: “By faith Abraham,when he was called to go out into a place which he shouldafter receive for an inheritance, obeyed; and he went out,not knowing whether he went.” (Heb. 11:8) The explanationhere is quite natural: Abraham is faithful to the divinecommand to leave for Canaan; his doing so is “by faith.” It isalso a fundamentally non-cognitive feature of Abraham thatundergirds his behavior. We do not know the details, butsome possibilities come to mind easily: perhaps heexperiences a felt obligation to a divine command, orperhaps a deep attraction to a life guided by a divine being;perhaps these were mixed with fear of divine displeasurewith disobedience. What we can be confident of, however,is that the source of his behavior and the attitude thatunderlies it are just as fundamentally affective as they are inthe case of the Little League pitcher. In both cases, affectivefaith involves faithfulness to an ideal.22 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What Not to Say

What we should resist are interpretations of Abraham’s faiththat are overtly cognitive. As Abraham’s life with Godprogresses, he receives promises about what his future willbe like, and (we are told) believes God regarding thesepromises. But his initial acts of faith involve nothing morethan following the command of God, independent of thesepromises. It is the following that is essential here, not thebelieving. How things develop is one thing, where thingsstart is quite another.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Stump on Abraham

So it is a mistake to identify Abraham’s faith with the fullexpression of it in the story of the offering of the sacrifice ofIsaac. On this matter, Eleonore Stump writes,

And so this is indeed a test of Abraham, as thenarrative says. God’s command to sacrifice Isaactries the measure of Abraham’s commitment to thegoodness of God. The way in which Abrahamdealt with Ishmael makes the form of this test theright one for him, too. For Abraham to treat Isaacin the same way as he treated Ishmael is forAbraham to commit himself whole-heartedly to thebelief that God is good.. . . [I]t is precisely Abraham’s willingness tobelieving in God’s goodness, even against strongtemptations to the contrary, that makes him thefather of faith. When Abraham passes the test, hepasses it just because he believes that God isgood and will not betray his promises . . . . Stump(2010), pp. 298–300

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Too Optimistic?

There is too much to say here about how different aperspective I have on the life and times of Abraham, but thefollowing will have to suffice. First, even if the story ofoffering to sacrifice Isaac is the primary jewel in the crownthat is Abraham’s faith, it is not the substance of it.Whatever is central to Abraham’s faith was already presentin his leaving Mesopotamia at the command of God, and soif faith requires believing that God is good and keeps hispromises, we’d have to find some sign of that in the earlyrelationship between God and Abraham. Needless to say,there is none.

I should also point out what I regard as excessive optimismin Stump’s account of the sacrifice event. Stump notes theduplicity and double-mindedness that has characterizedAbraham’s relationship to God and his promises prior to thecommand to sacrifice Isaac, and she emphasizes as wellhis continued double-mindedness towards God’s promise inthe taking of Keturah as his wife (or concubine) afterSarah’s death and fathering six children with her (asinsurance of progeny should Isaac and Rebecca continue tobe childless). But somehow, Abraham manages, in thecommand to sacrifice Isaac, to achieve purity of motive andfull clarity of belief regarding what God is like and how surehis promises are. I find such an explanation beyond belief,and if we pay attention to the point made earlier that aprimary moral of the story is about God’s self-revelation ofhis character to the father of the nation he has chosen, wecan see why there is no need to posit such an astonishingchange of character in Abraham. What has characterizedAbraham from the beginning in his relationship with God isconstant here: when God says go, Abraham goes; whenGod says do, Abraham, does. It is the very externalizedfollowing that is the heart of the faith of Abraham, not someimputed story about motives and beliefs that are somehowboth ideal and out-of-character in the most difficult followingof all. It is, in a word, a rendering of Abraham’s faith in termsof his faithfulness that is crucial to the story, which is thefundamental point made about the affective faithcharacterized above.25 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

An Alternative View

Moreover, there is a deep inadequacy in any treatment ofthe story of Abraham that leaves certain options open forthe future. One such option left open by Stump’s account isthat nothing in her account explains why God’s command tosacrifice Isaac is essential to the situation. As far as I cantell, her account leaves open Abraham’s deciding on hisown, or vowing to sacrifice Isaac (on the model of Jephthah)and then have the same degree of belief in God’s goodnessas she attributes to Abraham in the actual story. Stumpmakes much of the contrast between Jephthah andAbraham, arguing that the usual reasons for takingAbraham to be the father of faith (having to do with hiswillingness to kill his only son) are reasons for giving thetitle to Jephthah instead, since (according to one traditionalinterpretation) he carried through in his vow to sacrifice hischild. There are several reasons this argument is less thancompelling. For one thing, the father of faith needs beearlier in the chronology rather than later, and Abrahamwins on that score. Second, it is crucial to the story that thisepisode is instigated by God, and thus that the moral of thestory is something about God himself and what he is like.There is more to say on this point, and it arises from asecond option left open by Stump’s account: the option ofGod making such a command to other people at othertimes, including current ones. Let me point out the obvioushere: if you or anyone you know thinks they hear the voiceof God commanding such sacrifice, get professional helpimmediately. Don’t gather firewood.

Why can we be confident in this last point? Crucial to aproper understanding of the Abraham saga is its role in thesalvation history that is recorded in Sacred Writ. The storiesfrom the pre-history of Israel are stories primarily about theGod who has chosen and what he is like. As with all gods,this one appears first and foremost under the guise of agreat and powerful supernatural being. The rest of whatYahweh is like is fundamentally a matter of self-disclosure,and a central role of the stories is to reveal what God is like.The stories about Abraham are thus stories with a moral,and the moral is, in a minor moment, about Abraham, butprimarily about God. First, God is powerful and capable ofdoing unimaginable things, such as bringing about the birthof Isaac through a woman of Sarah’s age. Second, God isnot like pagan deities, deserving only awe and respect oftheir power. He is not a deity who demands wrongdoing.The story of the sacrifice of Isaac has a special place in thedevelopment of ethical monotheism, and if Abraham is to bepart of the moral of this story, it is in virtue of having arelationship with God cultivated long enough that he couldbe trusted as the one through whom this moral wasconveyed. The story, at bottom, then, isn’t about whatAbraham believed or didn’t believe, but rather aboutwhether he was the kind of person who could be counted onto carry through in obedience to God’s command for thepurpose of revealing that God doesn’t ask for such things aschild sacrifice. It is for this reason that the story is properlyunderstood to be a unique one, not to be duplicated at othertimes and other places: the moral of the story is that God,unlike pagan counterparts in the same cultural milieu, doesnot ask for and does not approve of the horrible evil of childsacrifice. And more generally, it is a stark pedagogical tooldesigned to reveal the full ethical dimension of the one whohas called a people to himself. It is for this reason that thestory is singular and unique, even as the death andresurrection of Jesus is singular and unique in the narrativeof the New Testament.26 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

The Audi Objection

So characterizing the view leads directly to an objection dueto Robert Audi. The objection claims that one can have faithwithout displaying faithfulness:

It should also be stressed that even if a person’sattitudinal faith (faith in) is highly comprehensive,as is faith in democratic institutions, the personmight not have the character trait of faithfulness.This may not be widely realized because we sooften speak of faith in the context of consideringfaith in God, and that kind of attitudinal faith iscommonly presupposed to imply some degree ofcommitment to being faithful to what God, at leastin the eyes of the person in question, commandsor requires. Nonetheless, someone could havefaith in God or great faith in other people, yet notbe able to keep faith with them and thus lackfaithfulness toward them. Having faith in others ismainly a matter of how we view them, and how weare disposed to respond to them, in terms of whatwe value. Being faithful to others is more a matterof how we act toward them in terms of what theyvalue (though it is not wholly a matter of what theyvalue, since people can be clearly mistaken abouttheir own good).One way to see this difference is by consideringthe relation of each kind of faith to trust. If I havefaith in you, then I trust you, at least within a certaindomain of conduct. If I am faithful to you, you mayproperly trust me; and if I am faithful to an ideal, Imay, in the main, be trusted to live up to it. Neithercase of trust implies the other. We can have faith inpeople, such as foreign heads of state, with whomwe have either no relationship or one that does notcall on us to keep faith. One way to put thecontrast is this: faith is fulfilled when its objectmeets certain expectations— roughly, fulfills thetrust—of the subject; faithfulness is fulfilled whenthe subject—the faithful person—meets certainexpectations, or certain hypothetical expectations,of the object. Audi (2011), pp. 296–297

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Audi’s Two Points

Audi makes two central points against the idea that faith isalways tied to faithfulness. One idea relies on thinking offaith as connected with trust, relying on the idea that if onehas faith in something, one trusts. In the next section, I willargue that there is no such connection, so we can focushere on the other point, which is that faith is an attitude of acertain kind while faithfulness is a disposition of character.As Audi says, “Having faith in others is mainly a matter ofhow we view them, and how we are disposed to respond tothem, in terms of what we value. Being faithful to others ismore a matter of how we act toward them in terms of whatthey value.”

Consider first the claim that having faith (in others) is“mainly a matter of how we view them.” While this may betrue of special kinds of faith, it is not true of faith in general.For one thing, it is primarily cognitive, and hence unable toexplain the kind of affective faith displayed by our LittleLeague pitcher and Abraham. Abraham has faith, accordingto the author of Hebrews. In what does this faith consist? Isit mainly a matter of how he views God? There is no textualevidence for such a claim, and it has a bizarre ring to it.Perhaps if we thought Abraham’s faith was a kind of trust,and agreed with cognitive positions on trust, such asHardin’s view that trusting someone just is believing thatthey are trustworthy, one might come to conclusion thatAbraham’s faith was a matter of viewing God as trustworthy.The central problem is that such an account of Abraham’sfaith is—how shall I put it?—unfaithful to the text. Abrahamhears God’s command and leaves. By faith. So what isinvolved in the faith in question? The only textual evidenceof what such faith involves is that it provides the explanationof his behavior. It involves a displayed disposition to followthrough and the disposition has an affective source, of thesort that provides impetus to the agency of the individual inquestion. So whatever we might wish to say about someother possible kinds of faith, the distinction Audi is drawingbetween faith and faithfulness does not apply, or at leastdoes not obviously apply, to the affective faith involved inour examples of Abraham and the Little League pitcher.28 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline







6 Conclusion

29 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Trust and Reliance

Consider, first, the insight of Simpson above, arisingout of Baier’s important early work on trust: whatevertrust is, it involves, or is built on top of reliance.Simpson claims that reliance is Ur-trust, and that agenealogical investigation of trust shows how varioushuman interests will build various uses of the term‘trust’ on top of Ur-trust. Baier holds a similar view,claiming that we distinguish between reliance and trust,but that the latter is a special case of the former.

Examples of reliance without trust are easy to find.Spies often find themselves in the position of having torely on informants, even though they do not trust them.The simple reason such examples can be found is that,while trust can be betrayed, reliance cannot: when werely and things go badly, feeling of disappointment andregret are normal and appropriate, but feelings ofbetrayal are not.

30 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Trust and Reliance

Consider, first, the insight of Simpson above, arisingout of Baier’s important early work on trust: whatevertrust is, it involves, or is built on top of reliance.Simpson claims that reliance is Ur-trust, and that agenealogical investigation of trust shows how varioushuman interests will build various uses of the term‘trust’ on top of Ur-trust. Baier holds a similar view,claiming that we distinguish between reliance and trust,but that the latter is a special case of the former.Examples of reliance without trust are easy to find.Spies often find themselves in the position of having torely on informants, even though they do not trust them.The simple reason such examples can be found is that,while trust can be betrayed, reliance cannot: when werely and things go badly, feeling of disappointment andregret are normal and appropriate, but feelings ofbetrayal are not.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Implications for Alston and Swinburne

It is for this reason that no account of faith can employthe notion of trust contained in the Alston quote fromthe introduction, where trust is glossed in terms of“reliance on a person . . . to act in a way favorable tooneself.” Bernie Madoff relied on his victims to act inways that would be favorable to him–that is whatcon-artists are good at. But they don’t trust theirvictims, and feelings of betrayal, while appropriate inthe case of violations of trust, are not appropriate whenscams are uncovered and victims don’t play along.

This same difficulty plagues another prominent accountof trust deployed in service of understanding faith.Richard Swinburne claims that

To trust someone is to act on the assumptionthat she will do for you what she knows thatyou want or need, when the evidence givessome reason for supposing that she may notand where there will be bad consequences ifthe assumption is false, . . . [where to act on anassumption is] to do those actions which youwould do if you believed the stated assumptionstrongly. Swinburne (2005), p. 144

Once again, shysters and con-artists do not trust theirvictims, but they rely on them for exploitative purposes.In Swinburne’s terminology, they act on the assumptionthat their victims will do for them what they know iswanted or needed.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Implications for Alston and Swinburne

It is for this reason that no account of faith can employthe notion of trust contained in the Alston quote fromthe introduction, where trust is glossed in terms of“reliance on a person . . . to act in a way favorable tooneself.” Bernie Madoff relied on his victims to act inways that would be favorable to him–that is whatcon-artists are good at. But they don’t trust theirvictims, and feelings of betrayal, while appropriate inthe case of violations of trust, are not appropriate whenscams are uncovered and victims don’t play along.This same difficulty plagues another prominent accountof trust deployed in service of understanding faith.Richard Swinburne claims that

To trust someone is to act on the assumptionthat she will do for you what she knows thatyou want or need, when the evidence givessome reason for supposing that she may notand where there will be bad consequences ifthe assumption is false, . . . [where to act on anassumption is] to do those actions which youwould do if you believed the stated assumptionstrongly. Swinburne (2005), p. 144

Once again, shysters and con-artists do not trust theirvictims, but they rely on them for exploitative purposes.In Swinburne’s terminology, they act on the assumptionthat their victims will do for them what they know iswanted or needed.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Reliance?

Even though their accounts don’t quite get thedistinction right between trust and reliance, bothSwinburne and Alston agree that trust is a form ofreliance, and with this assumption there is nearlyuniversal agreement. Of course, the plausibility of suchapproaches requires adopting a suitable account ofreliance. Accounts of reliance can go wrong bydemanding too much in the way of vulnerability:reliance doesn’t require likelihood of harm, nor does itrequire some objective chance of harm.

Such a principle is surely too strong—one can beunknowingly immune to the flu, for example, and stillrely on one’s flu shot to protect one from the disease.Neither does it require the possibility of harm, for onecan rely on God’s good will even if it is impossible forGod not to have good will towards one. Moreover,accounts of reliance can err in another direction, bytaking a significant chance of harm to be sufficient forreliance. I do not rely on the venomous snake in thegrass (not to bite me) of which I am unaware just bywalking across the yard. So reliance-based accounts oftrust need to be careful not to undermine this approachto trust simply by adopting a ham-fisted account ofreliance. I think this issue can be finessed easilyenough, but won’t take the time here to do so,insteading urging that we treat it as a platitude that trustinvolves reliance when the latter is properly finessed.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

What is Reliance?

Even though their accounts don’t quite get thedistinction right between trust and reliance, bothSwinburne and Alston agree that trust is a form ofreliance, and with this assumption there is nearlyuniversal agreement. Of course, the plausibility of suchapproaches requires adopting a suitable account ofreliance. Accounts of reliance can go wrong bydemanding too much in the way of vulnerability:reliance doesn’t require likelihood of harm, nor does itrequire some objective chance of harm.Such a principle is surely too strong—one can beunknowingly immune to the flu, for example, and stillrely on one’s flu shot to protect one from the disease.Neither does it require the possibility of harm, for onecan rely on God’s good will even if it is impossible forGod not to have good will towards one. Moreover,accounts of reliance can err in another direction, bytaking a significant chance of harm to be sufficient forreliance. I do not rely on the venomous snake in thegrass (not to bite me) of which I am unaware just bywalking across the yard. So reliance-based accounts oftrust need to be careful not to undermine this approachto trust simply by adopting a ham-fisted account ofreliance. I think this issue can be finessed easilyenough, but won’t take the time here to do so,insteading urging that we treat it as a platitude that trustinvolves reliance when the latter is properly finessed.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Trust Issues

If we think of trust as a species of reliance, I think weknow enough about trust to understand why suchaccounts of faith are bound to be inadequate. I havetwo complaints to make about trust-based accounts offaith, where trust is a species of reliance.

First, no such account is metaphysically satisfying. Ametaphysically satisfying account of faith will showwhere it metaphysically “bottoms out.” One of theattractions of the idea that faith is a kind of belief is thatbelief itself is a psychologically basic state (or at leastis plausibly taken to be such by philosophers such asmyself). So if you tell me that faith is a kind of belief, Imight disagree, but not because I find the accountmetaphysically unsatisfying. But when you tell me thatfaith is (a kind of) trust, I am metaphysically unsatisfied.Why? Because trust is simply not fundamental enough,even if we endorse the additional point that trust is (akind of) reliance. For reliance itself is not fundamentalenough.My second complaint is more straightfoward: at leastwhen it comes to the affective faith I am focusing onhere, trust-based accounts are thoroughlywrongheaded. What is distinctive about affective faith isthat it is active rather than passive. Abraham is faithfulto the command of God to leave, the Little Leaguer isfaithful to his resolution to never let that happen again.And, time and again in Scripture, the model ofcommitment to the Kingdom of God is described interms of being a follower. These examples of faith arenot properly characterized in terms of passivity. And yetpure passivity, of the sort displayed by the successfulachievement of Stoic apatheia, can be an expression oftrust. Such an attitude toward the universe as a wholecan display one’s trust in the created order and inwhomever or whatever is responsible for that order. Butit is simply too passive to characterize the kind ofaffective faith involved in the examples of our LittleLeaguer, Abraham, or followers in general. So the firstpoint to note about the view that faith involves trust isthat the view will have to be modified to accommodatethe fact that some instances of trust do not help usunderstand certain types of faith.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Trust Issues

If we think of trust as a species of reliance, I think weknow enough about trust to understand why suchaccounts of faith are bound to be inadequate. I havetwo complaints to make about trust-based accounts offaith, where trust is a species of reliance.First, no such account is metaphysically satisfying. Ametaphysically satisfying account of faith will showwhere it metaphysically “bottoms out.” One of theattractions of the idea that faith is a kind of belief is thatbelief itself is a psychologically basic state (or at leastis plausibly taken to be such by philosophers such asmyself). So if you tell me that faith is a kind of belief, Imight disagree, but not because I find the accountmetaphysically unsatisfying. But when you tell me thatfaith is (a kind of) trust, I am metaphysically unsatisfied.Why? Because trust is simply not fundamental enough,even if we endorse the additional point that trust is (akind of) reliance. For reliance itself is not fundamentalenough.

My second complaint is more straightfoward: at leastwhen it comes to the affective faith I am focusing onhere, trust-based accounts are thoroughlywrongheaded. What is distinctive about affective faith isthat it is active rather than passive. Abraham is faithfulto the command of God to leave, the Little Leaguer isfaithful to his resolution to never let that happen again.And, time and again in Scripture, the model ofcommitment to the Kingdom of God is described interms of being a follower. These examples of faith arenot properly characterized in terms of passivity. And yetpure passivity, of the sort displayed by the successfulachievement of Stoic apatheia, can be an expression oftrust. Such an attitude toward the universe as a wholecan display one’s trust in the created order and inwhomever or whatever is responsible for that order. Butit is simply too passive to characterize the kind ofaffective faith involved in the examples of our LittleLeaguer, Abraham, or followers in general. So the firstpoint to note about the view that faith involves trust isthat the view will have to be modified to accommodatethe fact that some instances of trust do not help usunderstand certain types of faith.

33 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Trust Issues

If we think of trust as a species of reliance, I think weknow enough about trust to understand why suchaccounts of faith are bound to be inadequate. I havetwo complaints to make about trust-based accounts offaith, where trust is a species of reliance.First, no such account is metaphysically satisfying. Ametaphysically satisfying account of faith will showwhere it metaphysically “bottoms out.” One of theattractions of the idea that faith is a kind of belief is thatbelief itself is a psychologically basic state (or at leastis plausibly taken to be such by philosophers such asmyself). So if you tell me that faith is a kind of belief, Imight disagree, but not because I find the accountmetaphysically unsatisfying. But when you tell me thatfaith is (a kind of) trust, I am metaphysically unsatisfied.Why? Because trust is simply not fundamental enough,even if we endorse the additional point that trust is (akind of) reliance. For reliance itself is not fundamentalenough.My second complaint is more straightfoward: at leastwhen it comes to the affective faith I am focusing onhere, trust-based accounts are thoroughlywrongheaded. What is distinctive about affective faith isthat it is active rather than passive. Abraham is faithfulto the command of God to leave, the Little Leaguer isfaithful to his resolution to never let that happen again.And, time and again in Scripture, the model ofcommitment to the Kingdom of God is described interms of being a follower. These examples of faith arenot properly characterized in terms of passivity. And yetpure passivity, of the sort displayed by the successfulachievement of Stoic apatheia, can be an expression oftrust. Such an attitude toward the universe as a wholecan display one’s trust in the created order and inwhomever or whatever is responsible for that order. Butit is simply too passive to characterize the kind ofaffective faith involved in the examples of our LittleLeaguer, Abraham, or followers in general. So the firstpoint to note about the view that faith involves trust isthat the view will have to be modified to accommodatethe fact that some instances of trust do not help usunderstand certain types of faith.

33 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

There may be more to learn as well. Consider peoplewho have trust issues, people who fail to develop basictrust in early childhood. Such people will have difficultytrusting, and some will never be able to trust much atall. They will, nonetheless, have to rely on others andthe world around them, and they will typically come torealize that even though trust is optional, reliance isn’t.

Could Abraham have been such a person, consistentwith the remarks made about him? I don’t see why not.He would still have been relying on God in the processof leaving, and his leaving would have been by faith.But it would have been questionable whether hisleaving would have involved trust.It is also noteworthy, as documented in Stump (2012)the degree of double-mindedness in Abraham’sfollowing of God. It is not really clear to what degree hebelieved the divine promises, as opposing to holding acherished hope that the path he was following wouldget him what he wanted: He brings Lot with him, whentold to leave his family; he makes Eliezer his heir evenafter being given the promise of his own offspring; andeven after Sarah’s death, he fathers more children withKeturah, apparently as an insurance policy against thebarrenness of Isaac and Rebeccah.Perhaps the preponderance of the evidence heresuggests that our question about Abraham’s level oftrust is that it isn’t a hypothetical possibility that hedidn’t really trust much, but rather the actual situationas described in the story.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

There may be more to learn as well. Consider peoplewho have trust issues, people who fail to develop basictrust in early childhood. Such people will have difficultytrusting, and some will never be able to trust much atall. They will, nonetheless, have to rely on others andthe world around them, and they will typically come torealize that even though trust is optional, reliance isn’t.Could Abraham have been such a person, consistentwith the remarks made about him? I don’t see why not.He would still have been relying on God in the processof leaving, and his leaving would have been by faith.But it would have been questionable whether hisleaving would have involved trust.

It is also noteworthy, as documented in Stump (2012)the degree of double-mindedness in Abraham’sfollowing of God. It is not really clear to what degree hebelieved the divine promises, as opposing to holding acherished hope that the path he was following wouldget him what he wanted: He brings Lot with him, whentold to leave his family; he makes Eliezer his heir evenafter being given the promise of his own offspring; andeven after Sarah’s death, he fathers more children withKeturah, apparently as an insurance policy against thebarrenness of Isaac and Rebeccah.Perhaps the preponderance of the evidence heresuggests that our question about Abraham’s level oftrust is that it isn’t a hypothetical possibility that hedidn’t really trust much, but rather the actual situationas described in the story.

34 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

There may be more to learn as well. Consider peoplewho have trust issues, people who fail to develop basictrust in early childhood. Such people will have difficultytrusting, and some will never be able to trust much atall. They will, nonetheless, have to rely on others andthe world around them, and they will typically come torealize that even though trust is optional, reliance isn’t.Could Abraham have been such a person, consistentwith the remarks made about him? I don’t see why not.He would still have been relying on God in the processof leaving, and his leaving would have been by faith.But it would have been questionable whether hisleaving would have involved trust.It is also noteworthy, as documented in Stump (2012)the degree of double-mindedness in Abraham’sfollowing of God. It is not really clear to what degree hebelieved the divine promises, as opposing to holding acherished hope that the path he was following wouldget him what he wanted: He brings Lot with him, whentold to leave his family; he makes Eliezer his heir evenafter being given the promise of his own offspring; andeven after Sarah’s death, he fathers more children withKeturah, apparently as an insurance policy against thebarrenness of Isaac and Rebeccah.

Perhaps the preponderance of the evidence heresuggests that our question about Abraham’s level oftrust is that it isn’t a hypothetical possibility that hedidn’t really trust much, but rather the actual situationas described in the story.

34 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

There may be more to learn as well. Consider peoplewho have trust issues, people who fail to develop basictrust in early childhood. Such people will have difficultytrusting, and some will never be able to trust much atall. They will, nonetheless, have to rely on others andthe world around them, and they will typically come torealize that even though trust is optional, reliance isn’t.Could Abraham have been such a person, consistentwith the remarks made about him? I don’t see why not.He would still have been relying on God in the processof leaving, and his leaving would have been by faith.But it would have been questionable whether hisleaving would have involved trust.It is also noteworthy, as documented in Stump (2012)the degree of double-mindedness in Abraham’sfollowing of God. It is not really clear to what degree hebelieved the divine promises, as opposing to holding acherished hope that the path he was following wouldget him what he wanted: He brings Lot with him, whentold to leave his family; he makes Eliezer his heir evenafter being given the promise of his own offspring; andeven after Sarah’s death, he fathers more children withKeturah, apparently as an insurance policy against thebarrenness of Isaac and Rebeccah.Perhaps the preponderance of the evidence heresuggests that our question about Abraham’s level oftrust is that it isn’t a hypothetical possibility that hedidn’t really trust much, but rather the actual situationas described in the story.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Second Example

Or, again, could people with trust issues have beenamong the followers of Jesus, either during his life onearth or during the life of the Church? Again, theanswer would seem to have to be “yes.” Consider, forexample, the response of Peter after Jesus’s “hardteaching” in John 6.

Many disciples abandon Jesus because they can’taccept the teaching, and Jesus asks the closestwhether they will leave as well. Peter’s response is notto endorse the teaching or to claim that he understandsand believes the message Jesus is communicating. Hisresponse is merely to follow, for, as he says, “whereelse can we go?”Silence on the issue of the hard teaching is telling: it isreasonable to conclude that Peter believes that Jesushas the words of eternal life (he sincerely asserts this),but that he doesn’t know what to make of the claimsabout eating Jesus’s flesh and drinking his blood. Hisexpression of faith, in spite of whatever misgivings arepresent, is similar to Abraham’s: it involves being afollower in terms of an activity faithfully engaged in overtime, one which may involve, for those with trust issues,varying levels of success in trusting the one followed.But the faithful following will nonetheless involve thekind of affective faith characterized above, and if so,identifying faith with any particular kind of trust ismistaken as well.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Second Example

Or, again, could people with trust issues have beenamong the followers of Jesus, either during his life onearth or during the life of the Church? Again, theanswer would seem to have to be “yes.” Consider, forexample, the response of Peter after Jesus’s “hardteaching” in John 6.Many disciples abandon Jesus because they can’taccept the teaching, and Jesus asks the closestwhether they will leave as well. Peter’s response is notto endorse the teaching or to claim that he understandsand believes the message Jesus is communicating. Hisresponse is merely to follow, for, as he says, “whereelse can we go?”

Silence on the issue of the hard teaching is telling: it isreasonable to conclude that Peter believes that Jesushas the words of eternal life (he sincerely asserts this),but that he doesn’t know what to make of the claimsabout eating Jesus’s flesh and drinking his blood. Hisexpression of faith, in spite of whatever misgivings arepresent, is similar to Abraham’s: it involves being afollower in terms of an activity faithfully engaged in overtime, one which may involve, for those with trust issues,varying levels of success in trusting the one followed.But the faithful following will nonetheless involve thekind of affective faith characterized above, and if so,identifying faith with any particular kind of trust ismistaken as well.

35 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Second Example

Or, again, could people with trust issues have beenamong the followers of Jesus, either during his life onearth or during the life of the Church? Again, theanswer would seem to have to be “yes.” Consider, forexample, the response of Peter after Jesus’s “hardteaching” in John 6.Many disciples abandon Jesus because they can’taccept the teaching, and Jesus asks the closestwhether they will leave as well. Peter’s response is notto endorse the teaching or to claim that he understandsand believes the message Jesus is communicating. Hisresponse is merely to follow, for, as he says, “whereelse can we go?”Silence on the issue of the hard teaching is telling: it isreasonable to conclude that Peter believes that Jesushas the words of eternal life (he sincerely asserts this),but that he doesn’t know what to make of the claimsabout eating Jesus’s flesh and drinking his blood. Hisexpression of faith, in spite of whatever misgivings arepresent, is similar to Abraham’s: it involves being afollower in terms of an activity faithfully engaged in overtime, one which may involve, for those with trust issues,varying levels of success in trusting the one followed.But the faithful following will nonetheless involve thekind of affective faith characterized above, and if so,identifying faith with any particular kind of trust ismistaken as well.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

We can see the distance between faith and trust moreeasily in the case of mundane faith. Consider thosewho followed Ceasar across the Rubicon. What didthey see in him that led to them crossing the Rubiconwith him? Never mind those who followed blindly, or asmercenaries, or as conscripts. No emperor surviveswithout a loyal band of devoted aids. And what did theysee in him?

What they “saw” wasn’t something they cognitivelyperceived at all: it was their affections at work, anadmiration, or hope, or wish, or affection for the man orthe ideal he represents, that motivates. And what is itthat their commitment to, their embracing of, an ideal,which in this case is a person and the prospects andhopes he embodies, involves?Their commitment is expressed in the crossing of theRubicon. To have hesitated or wavered, to haveretreated or abandoned at that point, would have beento be unfaithful to the ideal in question; it would havebeen a display of lack of faith.So the question to ask of such followers is not whatcognitive states they were in at this crucial moment of,perhaps, January 10 in 49 B.C.E. if we want to knowwhether his followers had faith in him then; nor shouldwe posit some high level of trust, conceived as an innerstate, they were experiencing when they followed. Theyfollowed faithfully, and that they could have done, withthe same affective features that led to their initialcommitment to the vision for Rome embodied in thisJulian band while finding trust difficult and any specificbeliefs beside the point.

36 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

We can see the distance between faith and trust moreeasily in the case of mundane faith. Consider thosewho followed Ceasar across the Rubicon. What didthey see in him that led to them crossing the Rubiconwith him? Never mind those who followed blindly, or asmercenaries, or as conscripts. No emperor surviveswithout a loyal band of devoted aids. And what did theysee in him?What they “saw” wasn’t something they cognitivelyperceived at all: it was their affections at work, anadmiration, or hope, or wish, or affection for the man orthe ideal he represents, that motivates. And what is itthat their commitment to, their embracing of, an ideal,which in this case is a person and the prospects andhopes he embodies, involves?

Their commitment is expressed in the crossing of theRubicon. To have hesitated or wavered, to haveretreated or abandoned at that point, would have beento be unfaithful to the ideal in question; it would havebeen a display of lack of faith.So the question to ask of such followers is not whatcognitive states they were in at this crucial moment of,perhaps, January 10 in 49 B.C.E. if we want to knowwhether his followers had faith in him then; nor shouldwe posit some high level of trust, conceived as an innerstate, they were experiencing when they followed. Theyfollowed faithfully, and that they could have done, withthe same affective features that led to their initialcommitment to the vision for Rome embodied in thisJulian band while finding trust difficult and any specificbeliefs beside the point.

36 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

We can see the distance between faith and trust moreeasily in the case of mundane faith. Consider thosewho followed Ceasar across the Rubicon. What didthey see in him that led to them crossing the Rubiconwith him? Never mind those who followed blindly, or asmercenaries, or as conscripts. No emperor surviveswithout a loyal band of devoted aids. And what did theysee in him?What they “saw” wasn’t something they cognitivelyperceived at all: it was their affections at work, anadmiration, or hope, or wish, or affection for the man orthe ideal he represents, that motivates. And what is itthat their commitment to, their embracing of, an ideal,which in this case is a person and the prospects andhopes he embodies, involves?Their commitment is expressed in the crossing of theRubicon. To have hesitated or wavered, to haveretreated or abandoned at that point, would have beento be unfaithful to the ideal in question; it would havebeen a display of lack of faith.

So the question to ask of such followers is not whatcognitive states they were in at this crucial moment of,perhaps, January 10 in 49 B.C.E. if we want to knowwhether his followers had faith in him then; nor shouldwe posit some high level of trust, conceived as an innerstate, they were experiencing when they followed. Theyfollowed faithfully, and that they could have done, withthe same affective features that led to their initialcommitment to the vision for Rome embodied in thisJulian band while finding trust difficult and any specificbeliefs beside the point.

36 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

We can see the distance between faith and trust moreeasily in the case of mundane faith. Consider thosewho followed Ceasar across the Rubicon. What didthey see in him that led to them crossing the Rubiconwith him? Never mind those who followed blindly, or asmercenaries, or as conscripts. No emperor surviveswithout a loyal band of devoted aids. And what did theysee in him?What they “saw” wasn’t something they cognitivelyperceived at all: it was their affections at work, anadmiration, or hope, or wish, or affection for the man orthe ideal he represents, that motivates. And what is itthat their commitment to, their embracing of, an ideal,which in this case is a person and the prospects andhopes he embodies, involves?Their commitment is expressed in the crossing of theRubicon. To have hesitated or wavered, to haveretreated or abandoned at that point, would have beento be unfaithful to the ideal in question; it would havebeen a display of lack of faith.So the question to ask of such followers is not whatcognitive states they were in at this crucial moment of,perhaps, January 10 in 49 B.C.E. if we want to knowwhether his followers had faith in him then; nor shouldwe posit some high level of trust, conceived as an innerstate, they were experiencing when they followed. Theyfollowed faithfully, and that they could have done, withthe same affective features that led to their initialcommitment to the vision for Rome embodied in thisJulian band while finding trust difficult and any specificbeliefs beside the point.

36 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline







6 Conclusion

37 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Confusion?

Is this line of thought one gigantic failure that confusesmetaphysics and epistemology? The confusion chargecan be generated as follows: you talk of knowing whohas faith and who doesn’t and you answer that questionby looking to see whether the person in question isfaithful. But that’s just an epistemological matter oftrying to discover who has faith and who doesn’t, notthe metaphysical issue of what faith itself is. So youcan have your identification of faith with being faithful ifyou’d like, but we still get the cognitive picture of faithwe know and love.

To see why this line of concern is misplaced, begin witha more telling Christian example. Consider theJohannine perspective here on the attraction of Christ:“and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the onlybegotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” It is clearthat what is fundamental to the Johannine perspectivehere isn’t cognitive at all. It is seated in the affections,involving a complex aesthetic and emotionalexperience of a sort that resonates with many of us. Totry to paint it as fundamentally a cognitive experienceinvolving belief that God exists and is good simplymakes no sense.

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Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Confusion?

Is this line of thought one gigantic failure that confusesmetaphysics and epistemology? The confusion chargecan be generated as follows: you talk of knowing whohas faith and who doesn’t and you answer that questionby looking to see whether the person in question isfaithful. But that’s just an epistemological matter oftrying to discover who has faith and who doesn’t, notthe metaphysical issue of what faith itself is. So youcan have your identification of faith with being faithful ifyou’d like, but we still get the cognitive picture of faithwe know and love.To see why this line of concern is misplaced, begin witha more telling Christian example. Consider theJohannine perspective here on the attraction of Christ:“and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the onlybegotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” It is clearthat what is fundamental to the Johannine perspectivehere isn’t cognitive at all. It is seated in the affections,involving a complex aesthetic and emotionalexperience of a sort that resonates with many of us. Totry to paint it as fundamentally a cognitive experienceinvolving belief that God exists and is good simplymakes no sense.

38 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

So the source of Johannine faith is clearly affective. Butthe source isn’t the faith, for if John had beheld theglory in question, and then decided to return to hisordinary life, he would have been in the same faithlesscategory as the rich young ruler, who with sadnesswent back to his wealth when hearing the call to adifferent life. For faith to be present is for somethingelse to be found here.

And notice, what more is needed is clearly not somebelief that God (or Jesus) exists and is good, noranything else doxastic or cognitive. What is needed is adisposition to follow and for that disposition to bedisplayed in action. The disposition alone, undisplayed,perhaps may be counted as the weakest of faith, andthe general defeasibility of dispositions may require usto categorize some persons as people of faith in spiteof lack of faithfulness.But such are the extremes, at best, and I’m suspicioushere. Perhaps it is the lingering and deep-seatedattraction for not allowing distinctions that don’t make adifference, even though we should reject such aphilosophy. So I hold my nose and leave open thebarest possibility of faith without faithfulness, where thedisposition to the relevant behavior is present butalways and everywhere masked or finked. But when wefind faithfulness to an ideal, we have a display of therelevant behavior as an expression of the disposition inquestion, and disposition whose source and identityadvert to the affective origins of the faith in question.Seen in this way, the worry that there is a confusionhere between metaphysics and epistemologydisappears. The behavior in question is not merely asign of an internal state, it is an expression of it andpart of the identity conditions on it being the specifickind of behavior it is. It is also, to be sure, evidence ofan internal state, and it is a benefit, not a disability,when metaphysics and epistemology align in this way.

39 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

So the source of Johannine faith is clearly affective. Butthe source isn’t the faith, for if John had beheld theglory in question, and then decided to return to hisordinary life, he would have been in the same faithlesscategory as the rich young ruler, who with sadnesswent back to his wealth when hearing the call to adifferent life. For faith to be present is for somethingelse to be found here.And notice, what more is needed is clearly not somebelief that God (or Jesus) exists and is good, noranything else doxastic or cognitive. What is needed is adisposition to follow and for that disposition to bedisplayed in action. The disposition alone, undisplayed,perhaps may be counted as the weakest of faith, andthe general defeasibility of dispositions may require usto categorize some persons as people of faith in spiteof lack of faithfulness.

But such are the extremes, at best, and I’m suspicioushere. Perhaps it is the lingering and deep-seatedattraction for not allowing distinctions that don’t make adifference, even though we should reject such aphilosophy. So I hold my nose and leave open thebarest possibility of faith without faithfulness, where thedisposition to the relevant behavior is present butalways and everywhere masked or finked. But when wefind faithfulness to an ideal, we have a display of therelevant behavior as an expression of the disposition inquestion, and disposition whose source and identityadvert to the affective origins of the faith in question.Seen in this way, the worry that there is a confusionhere between metaphysics and epistemologydisappears. The behavior in question is not merely asign of an internal state, it is an expression of it andpart of the identity conditions on it being the specifickind of behavior it is. It is also, to be sure, evidence ofan internal state, and it is a benefit, not a disability,when metaphysics and epistemology align in this way.

39 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

So the source of Johannine faith is clearly affective. Butthe source isn’t the faith, for if John had beheld theglory in question, and then decided to return to hisordinary life, he would have been in the same faithlesscategory as the rich young ruler, who with sadnesswent back to his wealth when hearing the call to adifferent life. For faith to be present is for somethingelse to be found here.And notice, what more is needed is clearly not somebelief that God (or Jesus) exists and is good, noranything else doxastic or cognitive. What is needed is adisposition to follow and for that disposition to bedisplayed in action. The disposition alone, undisplayed,perhaps may be counted as the weakest of faith, andthe general defeasibility of dispositions may require usto categorize some persons as people of faith in spiteof lack of faithfulness.But such are the extremes, at best, and I’m suspicioushere. Perhaps it is the lingering and deep-seatedattraction for not allowing distinctions that don’t make adifference, even though we should reject such aphilosophy. So I hold my nose and leave open thebarest possibility of faith without faithfulness, where thedisposition to the relevant behavior is present butalways and everywhere masked or finked. But when wefind faithfulness to an ideal, we have a display of therelevant behavior as an expression of the disposition inquestion, and disposition whose source and identityadvert to the affective origins of the faith in question.

Seen in this way, the worry that there is a confusionhere between metaphysics and epistemologydisappears. The behavior in question is not merely asign of an internal state, it is an expression of it andpart of the identity conditions on it being the specifickind of behavior it is. It is also, to be sure, evidence ofan internal state, and it is a benefit, not a disability,when metaphysics and epistemology align in this way.

39 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

So the source of Johannine faith is clearly affective. Butthe source isn’t the faith, for if John had beheld theglory in question, and then decided to return to hisordinary life, he would have been in the same faithlesscategory as the rich young ruler, who with sadnesswent back to his wealth when hearing the call to adifferent life. For faith to be present is for somethingelse to be found here.And notice, what more is needed is clearly not somebelief that God (or Jesus) exists and is good, noranything else doxastic or cognitive. What is needed is adisposition to follow and for that disposition to bedisplayed in action. The disposition alone, undisplayed,perhaps may be counted as the weakest of faith, andthe general defeasibility of dispositions may require usto categorize some persons as people of faith in spiteof lack of faithfulness.But such are the extremes, at best, and I’m suspicioushere. Perhaps it is the lingering and deep-seatedattraction for not allowing distinctions that don’t make adifference, even though we should reject such aphilosophy. So I hold my nose and leave open thebarest possibility of faith without faithfulness, where thedisposition to the relevant behavior is present butalways and everywhere masked or finked. But when wefind faithfulness to an ideal, we have a display of therelevant behavior as an expression of the disposition inquestion, and disposition whose source and identityadvert to the affective origins of the faith in question.Seen in this way, the worry that there is a confusionhere between metaphysics and epistemologydisappears. The behavior in question is not merely asign of an internal state, it is an expression of it andpart of the identity conditions on it being the specifickind of behavior it is. It is also, to be sure, evidence ofan internal state, and it is a benefit, not a disability,when metaphysics and epistemology align in this way.

39 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

Outline







6 Conclusion

40 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

Faith might involve trust, just as it might involve belief orsome closely-related cognitive feature.

In fact, it might be typical or normal or expected thatfaith involve trust as well as belief or someclosely-related cognitive feature.But its core lies elsewhere.

41 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

Faith might involve trust, just as it might involve belief orsome closely-related cognitive feature.In fact, it might be typical or normal or expected thatfaith involve trust as well as belief or someclosely-related cognitive feature.

But its core lies elsewhere.

41 / 41



Faith

Jonathan L.Kvanvig

Introduction






Conclusion

A Deeper Problem

Faith might involve trust, just as it might involve belief orsome closely-related cognitive feature.In fact, it might be typical or normal or expected thatfaith involve trust as well as belief or someclosely-related cognitive feature.But its core lies elsewhere.

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idea offaith

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