a motivated action theory account of goal …...a motivated action theory account of goal...

A Motivated Action Theory Account of Goal Orientation

Richard P. DeShonMichigan State University

Jennifer Z. GillespieBowling Green University

Rapid organizational change is increasing the pressure on employees to continually update their skills andadapt their behavior to new organizational realities. Goal orientation is a promising motivationalconstruct that may explain why some individuals adapt to change better. Unfortunately, the current goalorientation literature is in a state of conceptual and methodological disarray. This presentation reviewsthe goal orientation literature and identifies numerous conceptual ambiguities, including definitionalinconsistencies, dimensional inconsistencies, and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of stability.These conceptual ambiguities result in a confusing array of goal orientation measures and manipulationsand ultimately an incoherent empirical database. A dynamic self-regulation model of goal orientation,termed motivated action theory, is presented to integrate the various conceptual perspectives and toprovide guidelines for future goal orientation research.

Keywords: multiple goals, self-regulation, goal orientation, action, motivation

The nature of work in organizations is rapidly changing. Team-based work structures are now the norm in many industries asorganizations grapple with the increasing complexity and informa-tion demands of modern work. The concept of “going to theoffice” is becoming less relevant as organizations transition frompermanently assigned office space for each person to variousmodels of flexible, shared workspace (e.g., Wallace, 2000). Ascommunication technology improves, the trend toward geograph-ically distributed systems to accomplish work is rapidly increasing.In fact, many organizational employees now accomplish a majorityof their work responsibilities at home through telework systems(O’Mahony & Barley, 1999). Similarly, team members are oftennot in the same geographic location even during team meetings,and distributed, temporary project teams are rapidly becoming thenorm in organizations (Devine, Clayton, Philips, Dunford, & Mel-ner, 1999). Jobs are becoming more cognitively complex andrequire increased levels of coordination and communicationamong employees (Appelbaum & Berg, 1999; Tannenbaum,Beard, & Salas, 1992).

The rapid pace of organizational change places increased pres-sure on employees to continually update their skills and adapt theirbehavior to new organizational realities. This challenge raises anumber of important questions concerning organizational behav-ior. Why do some individuals display remarkable plasticity in their

behavioral responses to changes in the organization, whereas oth-ers steadfastly resist change or experience great stress when facedwith the need to alter behavior? Why do some individuals contin-ually strive to improve themselves over their life span, whereasothers are content to forge through life using the same basicknowledge and skills? Why are some individuals able to overcomedamaging behaviors that may affect their work and work relationssuch as smoking, overeating, alcoholism, and gambling, whereasothers repeatedly succumb to damaging behavior? Why do someindividuals throw themselves wholeheartedly into challengingtasks, whereas others avoid challenging tasks or engage in self-handicapping activities?

The construct of goal orientation provides at least a partialanswer to these questions. Although originally developed in theeducational psychology literature to explain differences in studentlearning behavior (e.g., C. I. Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980;Dweck, 1975; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973), goal orientation hasbecome one of the most frequently studied motivational variablesin applied psychology and is currently the dominant approach inthe study of achievement motivation. Since its introduction to thefield (e.g., Farr, Hofmann, & Ringenbach, 1993; Kanfer, 1990),goal orientation has been used to understand and predict learningand adaptive behavior in a wide variety of contexts, includingtraining (Brown, 2001; Cannon-Bowers, Rhodenizer, Salas, &Bowers, 1998; Fisher & Ford, 1998; Ford, Smith, Weissbein,Gully, & Salas, 1998; Stevens & Gist, 1997), sales performance(VandeWalle, Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 1999), feedback seeking(VandeWalle & Cummings, 1997; VandeWalle, Ganesan, Chall-agalla, & Brown, 2000), goal setting (Phillips & Gully, 1997), andperformance adaptability (Kozlowski et al., 2001).

The Problem: Conceptual and MethodologicalInconsistencies

Despite the widespread study of goal orientation, the literatureon this construct is in disarray. As highlighted by Elliot and Thrash(2001) and Grant and Dweck (2003), the conceptual ambiguities

Richard P. DeShon, Department of Psychology, Michigan State Uni-versity; Jennifer Z. Gillespie, Department of Psychology, Bowling GreenUniversity.

This work was supported by U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Re-search Grants F49620-98-1–0363 and F49620-01-1–0283. The views andconclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not beinterpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorse-ments, either expressed or implied, of the Air Force Research Laboratoryor the U.S. Government.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to RichardP. DeShon, 306 Psychology Building, Michigan State University, EastLansing, MI 48824-1116. E-mail: [email protected]

Journal of Applied Psychology Copyright 2005 by the American Psychological Association2005, Vol. 90, No. 6, 1096–1127 0021-9010/05/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.90.6.1096

1096

present in the goal orientation literature have resulted in a largenumber of inconsistent empirical results that are difficult to rec-oncile. Furthermore, as goal orientation has moved beyond itsoriginal focus on student achievement in the classroom, a numberof methodological and conceptual ambiguities have developed(Button, Matheiu, & Zajac, 1996; Phillips & Gully, 1997). Giventhe conceptual confusion that currently exists, it is not surprisingthat the relationship between goal orientation and important out-comes such as learning and performance is unclear. In fact, re-search results support a variety of conflicting relationships amonggoal orientation, learning, adaptation, and performance. Even thewidely held belief that mastery orientation results in adaptivebehavior and performance orientation results in maladaptive be-havior is no longer supportable (e.g., Harackiewicz & Elliot, 1998;Urdan, 1997).

The purpose of this study is to first identify the conceptual andmethodological inconsistencies in the goal orientation literature.We then propose a theoretical framework to resolve the identifiedconceptual and methodological inconsistencies. In this review, wefocused on adult goal orientation processes relevant to the worksetting. We began our literature search with the articles used inButton et al.’s (1996) review of the goal orientation literature. Wethen conducted a search of the PsycINFO database from 1995 toJune 2005 for articles containing any of the following keywords:achievement motivation, achievement goals, goal orientation, mas-tery orientation, learning orientation, performance orientation,mastery goals, learning goals, and performance goals. Given ourfocus, we excluded research examining the role of goal orientationin the context of health, kinesiology, leisure studies, and childeducation. This restricted search identified the 88 published em-pirical studies (Table 1). We examined each of these studies andidentified the major differences in conceptual and operationaltreatments of goal orientation that we next present.

Conceptual Inconsistencies

Definition

The first conceptual inconsistency involves differences in thedefinition of goal orientation. As Pintrich (2000a) and Elliot andThrash (2001) highlighted, there is no common definition of goalorientation, and researchers refer to very different processes by thesame name. To capture the extent of this problem, we examinedthe definitional approaches present in the empirical goal orienta-tion literature and identified five distinct categories of definitions:goals, traits, quasi-traits, mental frameworks, and beliefs. Theresults of this coding process are presented in Table 1. Represen-tative examples of each definitional approach are presented inTable 2.

The classifications capture the main themes present in authors’descriptions of goal orientation. However, as with any classifica-tion system, judgment is required when placing definitions into therespective categories. When the authors’ description did notclearly fit into one of the categories, we categorized it as “other”(2.3% of studies) for coding purposes. Other authors provideddescriptions that overlapped the different categories. For instance,Brett and Atwater (2001) and Yeo and Neal (2004) first describegoal orientation as a mental framework (our fourth definitioncategory) but later focus on the dispositional aspects of goal

orientation (our second definition category). When authors’ de-scriptions overlapped our categories, we placed the definition inthe category that we felt best represented the authors’ perspectiveof goal orientation. Three studies (3.4%) did not provide sufficientdetail to determine the adopted definitional approach.

Goals. The most common definitional approach present in theempirical literature (k � 29; 33% of studies) views goal orientationas the adoption and pursuit of specific goals in achievementcontexts (e.g., Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001; Elliot, 1999; Elliot &Church, 1997; Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot & McGregor,2001; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997; Elliot & Thrash, 2001;Grant & Dweck, 2003). For research studies to be placed in thiscategory, the authors needed to explicitly refer to goal orientationas the pursuit of specific achievement goals. Research based onthis approach to goal orientation is dominated by the work of Elliotand Harackiewicz (see Table 2 for representative examples of thisapproach).

Within this category, the number of achievement goals and thereasons for adopting specific achievement goals vary across au-thors. Performance and mastery goals are, by far, the most fre-quently discussed goals in this definitional approach. However,Elliot and colleagues frequently subdivide performance goals intoperformance-approach and performance-avoid goals, and Elliotand McGregor (2001) further subdivide mastery goals intomastery-approach and mastery-avoid goals. The reason why anindividual adopts one of these goals over the other possibleachievement goals is often not well specified. Elliot and his col-leagues typically view goal adoption as reflecting an individual’sconstrual of competence. If individuals seek to develop or improvecompetence, they are likely to adopt a mastery goal. If, alterna-tively, they seek to demonstrate competence to others, then theyare likely to adopt a performance goal. The most common com-peting explanation for achievement goal adoption is that the con-strual of self-worth, rather than competence, is the primary deter-minant of goal adoption (e.g., A. J. Martin, Marsh, & Debus,2001).

Traits. In the second most common definitional approach (k �26; 29.5%), authors view goal orientation as a trait or dispositionthat is responsible for individual differences in behavior. Studieswere placed in this category if they explicitly referred to goalorientation as a disposition (e.g., VandeWalle, 1997; VandeWalleet al., 2000), a personality variable (e.g., VandeWalle et al., 1999;VandeWalle, Cron, & Slocum, 2001), a trait (e.g., Bell & Koz-lowski, 2002; Phillips & Gully, 1997), an individual difference(Holladay & Quinones, 2003), or a stable dispositional trait(Towler & Dipboye, 2001). A number of studies placed in thiscategory did not explicitly define goal orientation as a trait orpersonality variable but rather referred to types of individuals whopossess a particular goal orientation (e.g., mastery-oriented indi-viduals) and made no mention of situational impacts on thisorientation or of flexibility in adopting various orientations acrosstime or situations (e.g., Bembenutty, 1999; Madzar, 2001; Wolters,2003).

As can be seen in Table 2, goal orientation is described as anindividual difference variable most similar to a facet of personal-ity. As with most trait approaches, little effort is directed atspecifying the causes of the trait or the developmental trajectoriesof the trait. Goal orientation is viewed as being part of the generalpersonality of the person that is manifested by behavioral patterns

1097SPECIAL SECTION: MOTIVATED ACTION THEORY

Tab

le1

Cod

ing

ofG

oal

Ori

enta

tion

Res

earc

hU

sed

inth

eL

iter

atur

eR

evie

w

Aut

hors

Yea

rD

efin

ition

type

No.

dim

ensi

ons

Prof

ilepe

rspe

ctiv

ePr

ofile

anal

ysis

Stab

ility

Dom

ain

spec

ific

Res

earc

hde

sign

Mea

sure

used

Am

es&

Arc

her

1987

Fram

ewor

k2

No

No

Stab

leY

esO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Arc

her

1994

Goa

ls3

(alie

n)Y

esY

esb

P�

SN

oO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Ban

dalo

s,Fi

nney

,&

Ges

ke20

03G

oals

2—

No

—N

oO

bsR

oede

let

al.

(199

4)B

arro

n&

Har

acki

ewic

z20

01G

oals

2Y

esY

esP

�S

No

Bot

hSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Bel

l&

Koz

low

ski

2002

Tra

it2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsB

utto

net

al.

(199

6)B

embe

nutty

1999

Tra

it3

No

No

Stab

leY

esO

bsPA

LS

Bou

ffar

d,B

oisv

ert,

Vez

eau,

&L

arou

che

1995

Tra

it2

Yes

Yes

bSt

able

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edB

rela

nd&

Don

ovan

2005

Tra

itan

dgo

als

2N

oN

oP

�S

No

Obs

Boy

le&

Klim

oski

(199

5)B

rett

&A

twat

er20

01Fr

amew

ork

3N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

Van

deW

alle

(199

7)B

rett

&V

ande

Wal

le19

99Fr

amew

ork

3N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

Van

deW

alle

(199

7)B

row

n20

01B

elie

fs2

No

No

P�

SN

oO

bsM

odif

ied

But

ton

etal

.(1

996)

Bun

ders

on&

Sutc

liffe

2003

—a

1(m

aste

ry)

No

No

—O

bsM

odif

ied

Van

deW

alle

(199

7)B

utto

n,M

athi

eu,

&Z

ajac

1996

Qua

si-t

rait

2Y

esN

/AP

�S

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edC

aldw

ell,

Her

old,

&Fe

dor

2004

Tra

it1

(mas

tery

)N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edC

hen,

Gul

ly,

Whi

tem

an,

&K

ilcul

len

2000

Tra

it2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsB

utto

net

al.

(199

6);

Van

deW

alle

(199

7)C

hurc

h,E

lliot

,&

Gab

le20

01G

oals

3N

oN

oP

�S

No

Obs

Elli

ot&

Chu

rch

(199

7)C

olqu

itt&

Sim

mer

ing

1998

Qua

si-t

rait

2Y

esN

oP

�S

No

Obs

But

ton

etal

.(1

996)

Cor

don

&Jo

hnso

n20

00Q

uasi

-tra

it3

(alie

n)N

oN

oP

�S

No

Obs

Mod

ifie

dN

icho

lls(1

989)

DeS

hon,

Koz

low

ski,

Schm

idt,

Miln

er,

&W

iech

man

n20

04T

rait

2N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

But

ton

etal

.(1

996)

Die

fend

orff

2004

Tra

it2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsB

utto

net

al.

(199

6)D

ykm

an19

98T

rait

2N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edE

lliot

&C

hurc

h19

97G

oals

3N

oN

oP

�S

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edE

lliot

&H

arac

kiew

icz

1994

Goa

ls2

No

No

—N

oE

xp—

Elli

ot&

Har

acki

ewic

z19

96G

oals

3N

oN

o—

No

Exp

—E

lliot

&M

cGre

gor

1999

Goa

ls3

No

No

—N

oO

bsE

lliot

&C

hurc

h(1

997)

Elli

ot&

McG

rego

r20

01G

oals

4N

oN

o—

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edE

lliot

,M

cGre

gor,

&G

able

1999

Goa

ls3

No

No

—N

oO

bsE

lliot

&C

hurc

h(1

997)

Elli

ot&

Thr

ash

2001

Goa

ls3

No

No

P�

SN

oO

bsE

lliot

&C

hurc

h(1

997)

;E

lliot

&M

cGre

gor

(200

1);

Elli

ot,

Shel

don,

&C

hurc

h(1

997)

Fish

er&

Ford

1998

Goa

ls2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsB

utto

net

al.

(199

6)Fo

rd,

Smith

,W

eiss

bein

,G

ully

,&

Sala

s19

98Fr

amew

ork

2N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

But

ton

etal

.(1

996)

Fran

ken

&B

row

n19

95B

elie

fs2

No

n/a

Stab

leY

esO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Gag

ne&

Zuc

kerm

an19

99G

oals

2N

oN

o—

No

Exp

—G

ist

&St

even

s19

98Q

uasi

-tra

it2

No

No

P�

SN

oE

xp—

Har

acki

ewic

z,B

arro

n,T

auer

,C

arte

r,&

Elli

ot20

00G

oals

2Y

esN

o—

Yes

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edH

arac

kiew

icz,

Bar

ron,

Tau

er,

&E

lliot

2002

Goa

ls3

(alie

n)Y

esY

esC

onte

xtN

oO

bsH

arac

kiew

icz

etal

.(2

000)

Har

acki

ewic

z,B

arro

n,C

arte

r,L

eto,

&E

lliot

1997

Goa

ls3

(alie

n)Y

esY

esC

onte

xtN

oO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Her

tens

tein

2001

Bel

iefs

2N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

But

ton

etal

.(1

996)

Hes

lin&

Lat

ham

2004

Tra

it1

(mas

tery

)N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

Van

deW

alle

(199

7;4

item

s)H

ofm

ann

1993

Goa

ls2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Hof

man

n&

Stri

ckla

nd19

95Q

uasi

-tra

it2

Yes

Yes

P�

SN

oO

bsM

odif

ied

Dud

a&

Nic

holls

(199

2)H

ollid

ay&

Qui

none

s20

03T

rait

2N

oN

o—

No

Obs

Roe

del

etal

.(1

994)

Jaga

cins

ki,

Mad

den,

&R

eide

r20

01G

oals

2N

oN

oP

�S

No

Obs

Mod

ifie

dD

uda

&N

icho

lls(1

992)

Jaga

cins

ki&

Nic

holls

1984

Goa

ls2

No

No

Con

text

No

Exp

—K

arab

enic

k20

04G

oals

4Y

esN

o—

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edK

arab

enic

k&

Col

lins-

Eag

lin19

97G

oals

2N

oN

oC

onte

xtN

oO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

1098 DESHON AND GILLESPIE

Tab

le1

(con

tinu

ed)

Aut

hors

Yea

rD

efin

ition

type

No.

dim

ensi

ons

Prof

ilepe

rspe

ctiv

ePr

ofile

anal

ysis

Stab

ility

Dom

ain

spec

ific

Res

earc

hde

sign

Mea

sure

used

Kaw

ada,

Oet

tinge

n,G

ollw

itzer

,&

Bar

gh20

04B

elie

fs2

No

No

P�

SN

oE

xp—

Kiv

ligha

n,Sc

huet

z,&

Kar

dash

1998

Goa

ls3

No

No

—N

oO

bsH

ayam

izu

etal

.(1

989)

Koh

li,Sh

erva

ni,

&C

halla

galla

1998

Qua

si-t

rait

2Y

esN

oP

�S

Yes

Obs

Mod

ifie

dSu

jan

etal

.(1

994)

Koz

low

ski,

Gul

ly,

Bro

wn,

Sala

s,Sm

ith,

&N

ason

2001

Qua

si-t

rait

2N

oN

oP

�S

No

Bot

hB

utto

net

al.

(199

6)K

rist

of-B

row

n&

Stev

ens

2001

Goa

ls2

Yes

No

P�

SN

oO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Lee

,Sh

eldo

n,&

Tur

ban

2003

Fram

ewor

k3

No

No

Stab

leY

esO

bsE

lliot

&C

hurc

h(1

997)

Lee

,T

insl

ey,

&B

obko

2003

Tra

it2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsB

utto

net

al.

(199

6)M

adza

r20

01T

rait

2N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

Van

deW

alle

(199

5)M

ango

s&

Stee

le-J

ohns

on20

01Q

uasi

-tra

it2

No

No

P�

SN

oB

oth

But

ton

etal

.(1

996)

Mar

tin,

Mar

sh,

&D

ebus

2001

Tra

it2

No

No

Stab

leY

esO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Mar

tin,

Mar

sh,

Will

iam

son,

&D

ebus

2003

Tra

it2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

(int

ervi

ew)

Mar

tocc

io19

94B

elie

fs2

No

No

P�

SN

oE

xp—

McG

rego

r&

Elli

ot20

02G

oals

3N

oN

o—

No

Obs

Elli

ot&

Chu

rch

(199

7)M

iller

,B

ehre

ns,

&G

reen

e19

93G

oals

2N

oN

o—

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edM

orf,

Wei

r,&

Dav

idov

2000

Goa

ls2

No

No

P�

SN

oE

xp—

Niiy

a,C

rock

er,

&B

artm

ess

2004

Bel

iefs

2N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

Dw

eck

(200

0)N

ords

trom

,W

endl

and,

&W

illia

ms

1998

—2

No

No

—N

oE

xp—

Phill

ips

&G

ully

1997

Tra

it2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsB

utto

net

al.

(199

6)Pl

aks,

Gra

nt,

&D

wec

k20

05B

elie

fs2

No

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsD

wec

k(2

000)

Rob

erso

n&

Als

ua20

02Q

uasi

-tra

it2

No

No

P�

SN

oE

xp—

Roe

del,

Schr

aw,

&Pl

ake

1994

Oth

er2

Yes

No

Stab

leN

oO

bsSe

lf-d

evel

oped

Schr

aw,

Hor

n,T

horn

dike

-Chr

ist,

&B

runi

ng19

95B

elie

fs2

Yes

Yes

bSt

able

Yes

Obs

Roe

del

etal

.(1

994)

Seijt

s,L

atha

m,

Tas

a,&

Lat

ham

2004

Tra

it3

No

No

Stab

leN

oB

oth

Mod

ifie

dV

ande

Wal

leet

al.

(200

1)Si

mon

s,D

ewitt

e,&

Len

s20

00O

ther

2N

oN

oSt

able

No

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edSo

mun

cuog

lu&

Yild

irim

1999

Tra

it3

(alie

n)Y

esY

esSt

able

Yes

Obs

Self

-dev

elop

edSt

eele

-Joh

nson

,B

eaur

egar

d,H

oove

r,&

Schm

idt

2000

Goa

ls2

No

No

—N

oE

xp—

Stev

ens

&G

ist

1997

Qua

si-t

rait

2N

oN

oP

�S

No

Exp

—St

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Table 2Representative Examples of the Definitional Approaches to Goal Orientation

Study Quotation

Goals (36.5% or 18.9% without Elliot papers)

Elliot & Harackiewicz(1994)

Achievement theorists have differentiated two types of general achievement goals that characterize an individual’spurpose for task engagement: performance achievement goals, which focus on the demonstration of ability anddefine competence normatively, and mastery achievement goals, which focus on the development of skills andabilities and define competence self-referentially (Ames & Archer, 1987; Dweck, 1986).

Harackiewicz et al. (2002) More recently, theorists have focused on achievement goals, conceptualized as situationally specific measures ofmotivational orientation, and argued that they may be stronger predictors of academic success (Pintrich & Schunk,1996). Achievement goals reflect the purpose of achievement behavior in a particular setting (Dweck & Leggett,1988; Nicholls, 1984). When pursuing mastery goals in a learning situation, a student’s purpose is to developcompetence by acquiring new knowledge and skills. When pursuing performance goals, a student’s purpose is todemonstrate competence relative to others. Not all students are positively oriented toward competence, however,and some adopt work avoidance goals that focus on effort minimization (Brophy, 1983; Nicholls, 1989).

Karabenick & Collins-Eaglin(1997)

Achievement goals (or goal orientations) refer to the motivational basis of learning (i.e., the purpose for whichlearning is undertaken).

Disposition/trait (24.3%)

Bell & Kozlowski (2002) “Goal orientation is a construct originating in the educational literature that suggests that individuals hold either alearning or performance orientation toward tasks (e.g., Dweck, 1986, 1989).”Individuals with a learning orientationtend to pursue what researchers have called an adaptive response pattern. Performance orientation, however, isassociated with what researchers have called a maladaptive response pattern.

Towler & Dipboye (2001) Goal orientation has been identified as a stable dispositional trait that can moderate the effects of training (e.g., Buttonet al., 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988).

VandeWalle (1997) Dweck (1986) proposed that individuals have goal orientations: dispositions toward developing or demonstratingability in achievement situations.

Quasi-trait (13.5%)

Button, Mathieu, & Zajac(1996)

We believe that goal orientation is best characterized as a somewhat stable individual difference variable that may beinfluenced by situational characteristics. Thus, dispositional goal orientations will predispose individuals to adopt aparticular response patterns across situations, but situational characteristics may cause them to adopt a different orless acute response pattern for a particular situation.

Hofmann & Strickland(1995)

Nicholls and others have discussed the notion that individuals may have underlying tendencies to be either task or egooriented. In other words, in the absence of a strong situation cue, individuals will adopt a “default” achievementgoal.

Mangos & Steele-Johnson(2001)

Researchers have characterized goal orientation as a somewhat stable individual difference factor that can be changedby situational characteristics (Button, Mathieu, & Zajac, 1986; Dweck, 1989; Farr, Hofmann, & Ringenbach, 1993).

Mental Framework (10.8%)

Ames & Archer (1987) Achievement goals are thus viewed as an a priori framework for how individuals construe achievement situations aswell as how they interpret, evaluate, and act on achievement information (cf. Dweck, 1984).

Lee, Sheldon, & Turban(2003)

Achievement goal patterns, sometimes referred to as goal orientation, refer to how individuals perceive and respond toachievement situations (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). We theorize that the global personality traits outlined by self-determination theory will predict these domain-specific achievement goal patterns.

Strage (1997) Mastery versus learned-helplessness orientation. This pair of constructs from the achievement motivation literaturereflects two constellations of achievement-related attitudes and behaviors that learners have been shown to display.Mastery-oriented learners tend to adopt learning goals. Learners who adopt a learned-helplessness orientation tendto adopt performance goals.

Beliefs (8.1%)

Franken & Brown (1995) In general, the research indicates that people who believe that intelligence can be acquired tend to adopt a masteryorientation, whereas people who believe that intelligence is fixed tend to adopt a performance orientation.According to the distinction made by Dweck (1991), performance types are more concerned with pleasing others,whereas mastery types are concerned with developing competence.

Hertenstein (2001) First identified in school-age children by Dweck and her colleagues, goal orientation refers to an individual’s belief inthe malleability of ability.

Wood & Bandura (1989) Research has identified two major conceptions of ability to which people subscribe (M. Bandura & Dweck, 1987;Dweck & Elliot, 1983; Nicholls, 1984). In one perspective, they construe ability as an incremental skill that can becontinually enhanced by acquiring knowledge and perfecting one’s competencies. People with this conception adopta learning goal. In the contrasting perspective, ability is construed as a more or less fixed entity. This type ofconception of ability heightens evaluative concerns about personal competence that can have diverse effects oncognitive functioning (Nicholls, 1984). Because performance level is regarded as diagnostic of intellectual capacity,errors and deficient performance carry personal and social evaluative threats. Therefore, people adopting the entityview tend to pursue performance goals of demonstrating their competence.


that occur in achievement contexts. It is somewhat ironic thatmany of the studies in this category cite Dweck and her colleagues(e.g., Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) to support the traitapproach even though Dweck has explicitly voiced concerns aboutthe ability of the trait perspective “to capture parsimoniously thedynamic, process-oriented nature of personality” (Dweck, 1996, p.348).

Quasi-trait. The third common definitional approach (k � 9;10.2%) is to view goal orientation as a somewhat stable trait thatcan be modified by appropriate situational characteristics (e.g.,Button et al., 1996; Mangos & Steele-Johnson, 2001). As in thecase of trait definitions, studies were placed into this category ifthey either explicitly referred to goal orientation as a quasi-trait oras a somewhat stable disposition or referred to types of individuals(e.g., mastery-oriented individuals) and explicitly highlighted thesituational malleability of the individual’s goal orientation.

As can be seen in Table 2, this definitional approach eitherexplicitly or implicitly incorporates the concept of situationalstrength. In weak situations in which few cues are present to guidebehavior, the individual is predisposed to adopt a particular orien-tation to achievement tasks. Conversely, in strong situations, manycues exist that suggest appropriate behaviors, and in this case thesituational cues may override the individual’s natural predisposi-tions to a particular goal orientation. The situational features andthe required strength or salience of the situational features that arelikely to modify the adoption of an orientation remain unspecified.The near-uniform practice adopted in the quasi-trait approach is tobriefly concede cross-situational variability in goal orientation andthen refer to goal orientation as a trait (e.g., Roberson & Alsua,2002), an individual difference (e.g., Kozlowski et al., 2001;Mangos & Steele-Johnson, 2001), or a personality variable (e.g.,Colquitt & Simmering, 1998).

Mental framework. The fourth common approach (k � 9;10.2%) is to define goal orientation as a mental framework con-sisting of a wide variety of beliefs, affects, goals, and cognitionsthat covary in achievement contexts and result in achievementrelated behavior. The representative examples of this definitionalapproach in Table 2 highlight that there is very little focus on theprocess of goal orientation, and instead the term goal orientationis used as a catchall phrase to describe global patterns of howindividuals perceive and respond to achievement situations. Itsometimes appears that there is a process model specified indefinitions of this type, but on further analysis the detailed processis often poorly specified or even circular. For instance, the defi-nition provided by Strage (1997) in Table 2 suggests that mastery-oriented learners tend to adopt mastery goals. However, a mastery-oriented learner refers to an unspecified constellation ofachievement-related attitudes and behaviors, and one of themastery-oriented behaviors is the adoption of mastery goals. Invirtually all cases, authors using the mental framework approach togoal orientation are unclear about the relative contributions ofstable person and unstable situation affects on the person’s goalorientation in a particular situation.

Beliefs. Perhaps the greatest irony present in the various def-initional approaches to adult goal orientation is the infrequent useof definitions that focus on the individual’s beliefs or implicittheories of ability (k � 9; 10.2%). As can be seen in Table 2, goalorientation, from this perspective, is thought of as following from

an individual’s beliefs or implicit theories concerning the mallea-bility of ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988, p. 262). To be placed inthis category, authors must have explicitly highlighted the primaryrole of beliefs or implicit theories in the individual’s adoption of agoal orientation.

The relative absence of this perspective in the empirical goalorientation literature is noteworthy because it is the core aspect inDweck’s model of the goal orientation process (e.g., Dweck, 1996,1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Specifically, Dweck et al. suggestthat one’s implicit theory of intelligence creates a meaning systemthat influences the types of goals that are salient to the individual(Dweck, 1986; Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Heyman &Dweck, 1992). Individuals who believe that intelligence is a fixedcharacteristic of the person tend to adopt performance goals. Theyfocus on gaining favorable judgments of competence or avoidingunfavorable judgments. In contrast, those who believe intelligenceis malleable tend to adopt mastery or learning goals and focus ondeveloping competence. In this model, beliefs about the mallea-bility of ability lead individuals to adopt either a mastery orperformance goal when engaging a task.

Summary. The multiple definitions of goal orientation providean unstable foundation for research on the antecedents and conse-quences of the goal orientation construct. When examining theeffects of goal orientation, should one focus on identifying indi-viduals who possess a particular orientation (trait), manipulatingthe goals pursued by individuals (goals), manipulating the beliefsor implicit theories held by individuals (beliefs), or manipulatingthe salience of features in achievement contexts (quasi-trait)?Similar questions arise when attempting to apply the existing goalorientation definitions to actual organizational practices. Is goalorientation a selection issue (trait), a climate issue (beliefs andnorms), or a developmental issue that may be managed throughappropriate goal setting and feedback processes (goals)? The im-portance of differences in the conceptualization of goal orientationbecomes even clearer as we move to examining issues of dimen-sionality, stability (e.g., state–trait), and operationalization.

Dimensionality

Consistent with the lack of agreement on the definition of goalorientation, researchers also differ with respect to the number ofdimensions thought to underlie goal orientation. Current concep-tualizations of goal orientation maintain that there are somewherebetween one and six distinct facets of goal orientation. Goalorientation was originally conceived of as consisting of a singlecontinuum ranging from learning goal orientation to performancegoal orientation depending on the individual’s beliefs about themalleability of ability. It was not considered possible to simulta-neously believe that ability is both fixed and malleable, and so,from this perspective, individuals could not hold both goal orien-tations simultaneously (e.g., Ames & Archer, 1987; Dweck, 1986;Nicholls, 1984). Later Dweck (1989) and others (e.g., Button et al.,1996) reasoned that it is possible for an individual to simulta-neously strive to improve one’s skills and to perform well relativeto others. This perspective results in a two-dimensional approachto the goal orientation construct.

Achievement goal theorists such as Elliot, VandeWalle, andtheir respective colleagues (Brett & VandeWalle, 1999; Elliot,


1999; Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot& McGregor, 1999, 2001; Elliot, McGregor, & Gable, 1999;Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997; VandeWalle, 1997) have pro-posed the integration of approach–avoidance motivation into theconceptualization of goal orientation to create a third dimension ofgoal orientation. These authors recommend that the performanceaspect of goal orientation should be broken down into two distinctdimensions of proving competence (performance approach) andavoiding the demonstration of incompetence (performance avoid).Grant and Dweck (2003) suggest that it is productive to breakdown performance-approach goals into goals oriented towardproving competence to others or proving competence to oneself.Other researchers have highlighted the importance of incorporat-ing work avoidance or an alienation goal orientation (e.g., Archer,1994; Cordon & Johnson, 2000; Wolters, 2003). This form of goalorientation is relevant when achievement in a particular domain isnot valued by the individual, and when forced to function in sucha context the individual will strive to minimize expended effort.

More recently, Pintrich (2000a) and Elliot (1999; Elliot &McGregor, 2001) have suggested that a fourth dimension of goalorientation can be obtained by decomposing mastery goal orien-tation into two dimensions also based on the approach–avoiddistinction. According to Elliot (1999), the typical mastery goalorientation is an approach goal. Individuals desire to master tasksand thus they adopt mastery-approach goals. Both Pintrich (2000a)and Elliot and McGregor (2001) argue for the existence of amastery-avoid goal, which represents individuals’ striving to notfall short of task mastery. Elliot (1999) suggests that, althoughmastery-avoid goals are less common, an individual may set thesegoals under specific conditions, such as an expert who desires toavoid losing skills. Finally, Elliot and Thrash (2001) have takenthis approach even further and proposed six distinct facets of goalorientation by crossing the ways that individuals might definecompetence (absolute, intrapersonal, or interpersonal) with theapproach–avoid distinction.

Clearly, there are substantial differences in conceptualizationsof the dimensions of goal orientation. To determine how theseconceptual differences are manifested in the empirical goal orien-tation literature, we coded the conceptual treatment of the dimen-sionality presented in the studies included in this review. Ourcoding of this variable is provided in Table 1. The general patternof dimensionality is quite clear. Four studies (4.5%) included onlythe single dimension of mastery orientation. Fifty-five (62.5%)conceptualized goal orientation as consisting of two dimensions.Of these 55 studies, 2 by Strage (1997, 2000) conceived of thedimensions as being mastery and learned helplessness rather thanthe much more typical dimensions of mastery and performance.Twenty-three studies (26.1%) viewed goal orientation as consist-ing of three dimensions. Six of these 23 studies focused on thedimensions of mastery, performance, and work avoidance. Theremaining studies used Elliot’s trichotomous framework of mas-tery, performance-approach, and performance-avoid goal orienta-tions. Three studies (3.4%) conceived goal orientation as consist-ing of the four distinct dimensions presented by Elliot and Thrash(2001). Finally, inspection of Table 1 highlights the interesting factthat the pattern of dimensionality just presented has remainedsurprisingly stable across recent years.

Dimension Profiles

If goal orientation is conceptualized as consisting of two ormore dimensions, profiles of goal orientation become relevant.The simplistic assumption that mastery orientation is good andperformance orientation is bad is being challenged by a multiple-orientations perspective in which a combination or profile ofmastery and performance orientation results in desirable behaviorand outcomes. Dweck (1989) made this point in her early writingon the topic, but this issue appears to have been lost in much of theearly empirical research. Button et al. (1996) highlighted that aperformance orientation is necessary in an organizational contextbecause employees must contend with performance standards foran organization to be successful. They suggested that a balance ofboth orientations is adaptive in most work settings and note that“this style cannot be elucidated unless a two dimensional goalorientation approach is adopted” (p. 41). The idea that individualscan be simultaneously high or low on the dimensions of goalorientation has been referred to in various fashions, including amultiple-goal perspective (Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001; Harac-kiewicz, Barron, Tauer, Carter, & Elliot, 2000; see also Archer,1994; Hofmann & Strickland, 1995; Pintrich, 2000a), goal config-urations (Schraw, Horn, Thorndike-Christ, & Bruning, 1995), goalorientation patterns (Somuncuoglu & Yildirim, 1999), and profiles(Bouffard, Boisvert, Vezeau, & Larouche, 1995).

In Table 1, we categorized researchers’ use of a profile concep-tualization of goal-oriented behavior. To be coded as endorsing aprofile perspective of goal orientation, the researchers must haveexplicitly mentioned the possibility that individuals could haveindependent standing on the distinct goal orientations such thatbeing high on one dimension (e.g., mastery orientation) does notsimultaneously restrict standing on other goal orientation dimen-sions. This makes it possible for the individual to simultaneouslyhave high levels of performance orientation. Alternatively, theauthors could explicitly mention the possibility of simultaneouslypursuing both performance and mastery goals.

Based on the results of our coding presented in Table 1, it isclear that goal orientation researchers are not commonly using thismore complex goal orientation perspective. Only 16 (18.2%) of thestudies in our review conceptualized goal orientation using aprofile perspective. There is no clear trend indicating that onedefinitional approach to goal orientation is more or less likely toendorse the importance of profiles. Only the mental frameworkconceptualization had no instances of researchers using a profileperspective, but this may be due to the relatively small number ofstudies using this perspective. Surprisingly, there is no evidenceindicating that the use of the profile perspective is becoming morecommon in recent research. Examination of Table 1 highlights thatthere have been one or two studies each year from 1994 to 2002that used this more complex perspective. Whatever the reason, it isclear that arguments favoring a profile approach to interpreting thedimensions of goal orientation (e.g., Barron & Harackiewicz,2001; Button et al., 1996; Dweck, 1989; Pintrich, 2000b) have notyet affected research practice.

Of the studies that did use a profile or multiple-orientationsperspective of goal orientation, it is useful to examine the analysesused to investigate goal orientation. The standard approach foranalyzing the results of goal orientation research is to incorporategoal orientation dimensions into either an analysis of variance or


regression model as main effects or simple predictors. However, aprofile perspective requires that the same individual be allowed tobe simultaneously high or low on each goal orientation dimension.Analytically, this means that the interactions of the goal orientationdimensions must be incorporated into the statistical model. Exam-ination of Table 1 indicates that 5 of the 16 (31.3%) studies thathighlighted the importance of a profile perspective did not analyzethe research data in a way that allowed the investigation of pro-files. Perhaps even more disturbing is the continued use of mediansplits to form goal orientation groups out of continuous measuresof goal orientation despite the well-known limitations of thistechnique (e.g., G. H. McClelland & Judd, 1993).

Stability

Button et al. (1996) noted the absence of consensus aboutwhether goal orientation should be treated as a stable trait or a stateinduced by salient features in the situation. Despite the largeamount of research conducted since then, it remains unclearwhether goal orientation is a disposition to behave that expressesitself in consistent patterns of functioning across a range of situ-ations (a trait; Pervin, 1994) or a short-term, continuous, concreteway of thinking, acting, and feeling (a state; Fridhandler, 1986;Nesselroade, 1988). To examine the manner in which researchershave approached this issue in the empirical literature, we coded theresearchers’ conceptualization of stability and present this infor-mation in Table 1.

A study was coded as representing a stable conceptualization ifthe authors explicitly referred to goal orientation as a disposition ortrait and made no mention of situational malleability or if theauthors used language that distinguished types of individuals (e.g.,mastery-oriented individuals) and provided no discussion of thesituational malleability of the individual differences. Researchersusing this perspective often comment on the stability of goalorientation over long periods of time (e.g., Dykman, 1998) andmake person-based statements about goal orientation such as “theperformance-oriented individual” (Fisher & Ford, 1998, p. 403;also see Franken & Brown, 1995; Madzar, 2001; Schraw et al.,1995; Strage, 1997). If the authors explicitly recognized the impactof situational features on an individual’s goal orientation, wecoded the study as using a Person � Situation interaction concep-tualization of stability. Finally, a number of researchers viewedgoal orientation as a highly unstable state induced by salientsituational features. Studies representing this conceptualization ofstability, or more appropriately instability, are coded as “context”in Table 1. To be placed in this category, the authors must haveexplicitly highlighted the strong impact of situational cues on goalorientation and made no mention of personal or dispositionaltendencies to adopt a particular orientation.

Another aspect of the stability conceptualizations of goal orien-tation is the issue of domain specificity. A number of researchersconceptualize goal orientation as stable but only within contexts ordomains (e.g., VandeWalle, 1997). We coded the authors’ per-spective on the domain specificity of goal orientation and reportthis information in Table 1. To be placed in this category, authorsmust have either described goal orientation as a context- ordomain-specific trait (Somuncuoglu & Yildirim, 1999; Vande-Walle, 1997) or made qualified statements about goal orientation

such as “academic goal orientations” (Schraw et al., 1995; see alsoAmes & Archer, 1987).

The results of this coding process (see Table 1) highlight thatthere is substantial conceptual disagreement on the stability of goalorientation across situations, domains, and time. The majority ofcoded studies (k � 41; 46.6%) conceived of goal orientation asbeing a stable characteristic of the person. Not surprisingly, thisperspective was much more common for researchers using a traitperspective of goal orientation. Twenty-three of the studies(26.1%) viewed goal orientation as a combination of both personaland situational factors. The majority of these 21 studies (n � 19)highlighted the dominant role of personal factors over situationalfactors in determining a person’s goal orientation. The Person �Situation interaction approach to goal orientation was not associ-ated with any one definitional approach of goal orientation. Only4 (4.5%) of the studies viewed goal orientation as a highly unsta-ble, situationally induced process. In every case, this conceptual-ization of the stability of goal orientation was associated withresearchers adopting a goal approach to the definition of goalorientation. Finally, 11 studies (12.5%) conceptualized goal orien-tation as a domain-specific variable. There is no clear associationbetween the definitional approach adopted by the researchers whoviewed goal orientation as domain specific; domain specificitymay be conceptualized as the result of beliefs (e.g., Franken &Brown, 1995), goals (e.g., Harackiewicz, Barron, Tauer, Carter, &Elliot, 2000), or traits (e.g., VandeWalle, 1997). There does notappear to be a trend toward viewing goal orientation as a stable orsituationally malleable construct. Each of these conceptualizationsof stability continues to be used in current research.

Operational Inconsistencies

In addition to examining the conceptual inconsistencies presentin the goal orientation literature, we also examined the variety ofways in which researchers have operationalized goal orientation(research design). As can be seen in Table 1, most researchersmeasure the construct (k � 70; 79.5%), but many use experimentalmanipulations (k � 14; 15.9%), and a small percentage of studies(k � 4; 4.5%) both measure and manipulate goal orientation. Onceagain, there appears to be no trend in whether goal orientation ismanipulated or measured in the studies included in this review.The fact that some researchers measure goal orientation, whereasothers manipulate it is consistent with different conceptualizationsof situational effects on goal orientation. In this case, the funda-mental issue is inconsistency in the conceptualization of goalorientation and not an operationalization problem per se. However,within each of these operational approaches, there is substantialinconsistency in the measurement or manipulation of the construct.The end result of these operational differences is a confusing arrayof findings that are difficult to portray as a body of research.

Measurement

We recorded whether the research used one of the many existingscales to assess goal orientation or developed a unique scale for theresearch (see Table 1). Of the 70 studies that measured goalorientation, a slight majority used an existing measure (k � 49;70%), but a very large proportion (k � 30; 42.9%) used a self-developed measure unique to the particular research study and the


self-developed measures were almost always unvalidated. Also, anumber of researchers modified an existing scale for their partic-ular study (k � 9; 12.9%). Of those researchers who used theButton et al. (1996) trait measure (k � 13; 18.6%) followed bysome variant of the VandeWalle (1997) domain-specific measure(k � 7; 10.0%), the Elliot and Church (1997) goal measure (k �6; 8.6%), and the Roedel, Schraw, and Plake (1994) measure (k �4; 5.7%).

It is important to note that the most commonly used measures ofgoal orientation differ in substantial ways. The Button et al. (1996)and VandeWalle (1997) scales are both focused on personalityassessments of goal orientation. The Button et al., (1996) measureuses two dimensions of goal orientation and is not domain specific,whereas VandeWalle’s (1997) scale includes three dimensions ofgoal orientation (mastery, performance-approach, and perfor-mance-avoid) and is specific to the workplace. In contrast, theElliot and Church (1997) scales focus on three dimensions of goalpursuits in a specific domain but do not focus on goal orientationas a personality trait. The key point is that there are substantialconceptual differences between the three most popular measures ofgoal orientation. This issue is compounded by the surprising lackof construct validation data that would support the idea that,irrespective of conceptual orientation, the measures converge to-ward a similar operationalization of goal orientation. As a result,identifying communalities in the antecedents and consequences ofthe self-report data using these scales is challenging if not impos-sible. This problem is magnified substantially by the large numbersof researchers who either modified existing measures or developedidiosyncratic measures of goal orientation. In short, the lack ofconsistency in the measurement of goal orientation makes it un-clear what the measures of goal orientation actually assess, and theimpact of these differences on the comparability of results acrossresearch studies is highly uncertain.

Manipulation

A number of research studies investigated the effects of goalorientation through manipulating factors thought to effect goalorientation (k � 18; 20.5%). Given the various conceptualizationsof goal orientation presented earlier, it is not surprising that thefocus of the manipulations is not consistent. Approximately half ofthe attempted manipulations of goal orientation targeted beliefs.Wood and Bandura (1989), for example, told participants in theirmastery condition that certain skills were developed through prac-tice and told those in the performance condition that the skillsreflect basic cognitive capabilities that people possess (see alsoMorf, Weir, & Davidov, 2000; Steele-Johnson, Beauregard,Hoover, & Schmidt, 2000). Roberson and Alsua (2002) manipu-lated individuals’ beliefs about ability by simultaneously manipu-lating interpersonal competition and the perceived malleability ofa skill. Their experiment, which occurs in a personnel selectioncontext, framed a training activity as either an opportunity todevelop and improve a skill (mastery condition) or as an oppor-tunity to test and demonstrate the skill (performance condition; seealso Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998).

Approximately 26% of the studies that manipulated goal orien-tation focused on the manipulation of the goals adopted by partic-ipants. In general, individuals are given a learning (mastery) goalor a performance goal. That is, individuals are given the goal of

developing their skills or the goal of demonstrating their skillthrough performance (e.g., Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001, Study 2;Gist & Stevens, 1998; Stevens & Gist, 1997). Elliot and Harack-iewicz (1996) used a similar manipulation with both performance-approach and performance-avoid goals.

Finally, a sizable proportion (14%) of the experimental ap-proach to goal orientation manipulated situational strength. Forexample, researchers attempt to induce varying degrees of perfor-mance orientation by manipulating the degree to which a situationis interpersonally competitive (e.g., Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1984;Morf et al., 2000) or the degree to which mistakes are acceptable(e.g., Martocchio, 1994). For example, in his performance orien-tation manipulation, Martocchio (1994) told participants not tomake mistakes but told participants in his mastery condition thatmistakes are normal and that practice makes perfect. Again, thedifferences in the manipulations used to research goal orientationreflect conceptual differences and make it difficult to compareresults across studies.

Taken as a whole, the confusing array of conceptualizations andoperationalizations of goal orientation have resulted in a literaturethat is nearly impossible to summarize. However, when interpret-ing these differences, we emphasize that the substantial variationin the conceptualization and operationalization of goal orientationis not necessarily a problem. In fact, most topics that receivevigorous research attention may be characterized by a diversity ofopinion and strong scientific disagreements. In many cases, theensuing heated debate on the appropriate conceptualizations andoperationalizations are often the source of substantial theoreticaland empirical gains. We fear, however, that this is not the case ingoal orientation research. With the exception of Elliot and Thrash(2001) and to a lesser extent Phillips and Gully (1997), the authorsin the empirical research on this construct did not acknowledgethat there are other perspectives on the appropriate conceptualiza-tion of goal orientation and provide a justification for the adoptedperspective. It is as though multiple conceptualizations of goalorientation are being researched in parallel over time but notinteracting with each other or engaging in debate over the mostproductive conceptualization or boundary conditions. We believethat the first step in engaging in this process is the recognition thatthere is a problem. Thus, it is our hope that the documentation ofthe many various approaches that we provide here will stimulatehealthy scientific debate on the topic of achievement motivationand goal orientation. We now present a model of goal orientationthat represents our attempt to clarify and integrate varied goalorientation perspectives.

The Model: Motivated Action Theory

One fortunate outcome of the numerous inconsistencies in thegoal orientation literature is that they provide clear guidance on thequestions that must be answered by a comprehensive model ofgoal orientation. How stable is goal orientation over time andsituations? Is goal orientation a situationally determined state or arelatively stable disposition? How many dimensions of goal-oriented behavior compose goal orientation? Does goal orientationcomprise one bipolar dimension, two independent dimensions,three independent or hierarchically structured dimensions, or evenmore facets of motivated behavior? What effect do beliefs (e.g.,implicit theories) have on a person’s goal orientations? Should


researchers measure or manipulate goal orientation? If it should bemeasured, what is the most appropriate measurement technology?If goal orientation can be manipulated, what is the most effectivemethod of changing a person’s goal orientation? What follows isan attempt to provide answers to these questions by providing amodel that integrates the numerous goal orientation perspectivesinto a coherent theory of achievement motivation.

It is important to emphasize that the study of goal orientation isfundamentally an examination of choice behavior in achievementcontexts. Individuals must choose, either consciously or subcon-sciously, to engage in certain types of behaviors in achievementsituations. The pattern of these behavioral choices provides insightinto the goal orientation construct. For instance, faced with anachievement situation, individuals with high levels of masteryorientation may choose to engage in adaptive behavioral patternssuch as selecting challenging tasks, setting difficult goals, andpersisting when obstacles are encountered. In contrast, individualshigh in performance orientation might choose to avoid challengingtasks, set low goals, and choose to engage in self-handicappingbehavior when difficulties are encountered. To model the cognitiveand behavioral choices that reflect goal orientation adequately, it isnecessary to explain choice behavior as it unfolds dynamicallyover time and across achievement contexts.

Moreover, in the work environment, individuals have multiplegoals continuously vying for the control of attention. The relevantquestion is rarely which course of action to follow but rather howto best allocate resources and switch between tasks to efficientlyaccomplish the multiple goals. To do this, people must makerepeated choices over time concerning where to focus their atten-tion and actions and revise these decisions in response to changesin the environment (Brehman, 1992; Diehl & Sterman, 1995; Luce,1995). Therefore, a model of goal orientation must integrate de-cision making, personality, and motivation into a dynamic per-spective that accounts for a stream of behavior in the service ofcompeting goals over time (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Hollenbeck,Ilgen, Phillips, & Hedlund, 1994; Kanfer, 1990; Kuhl & Atkinson,1984; Luce, 1995).

To address these issues, we present a motivated action theory(MAT) model of goal-oriented behavior in achievement contexts.MAT is an extension of self-regulation and goal-directed actionmodels (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hy-land, 1988; R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994; G. A. Miller, Galanter, &Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973). The foundational assumptions un-derlying MAT are that action is directed toward the attainment ofgoals (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1981;Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Heckhausen, 1991; Srull & Wyer,1986), that goals are hierarchically structured within the individualsuch that high-level goals are distal desired states and lower levelgoals are means to obtain the higher level goals, that a single goalcontrols action at any point in time, that activation levels determinewhich goal guides behavior at a given point in time, and thatsituational features interact dynamically with activated goals toaffect choice and behavior. These assumptions are elaborated andqualified later. For the remainder of this presentation, goals areconstrued as “internal representations of desired states where statesare broadly construed as outcomes, events, and processes” (Austin& Vancouver, 1996). From this perspective, the term goal encom-passes values, needs, drives, and any other desired standardsagainst which current states may be evaluated.

Goal Structure

Many important aspects of MAT are conveyed in the set ofhighly interconnected goals presented in Figure 1. The most salientfeature in Figure 1 is the hierarchical structure of goals. To easepresentation, only four goal levels are considered in this represen-tation, ranging from high-level goals that compose the self to lowerorder action plans that detail rough guidelines or strategies forachieving the higher order goals. This graphic representation ofgoals and their relations may be stated formally as follows:

Postulate 1. Goals are hierarchically structured such thathigher level goals specify the purpose (“why”) of action andlower level goals provide increasingly specific actions(“how”) required to accomplish the higher level goals.1

The existence of hierarchical structures that either control oraffect choice and behavior is not a source of much controversy.Many different hierarchical specifications exist, each of which isfounded on distinctive assumptions and typically addresses differ-ent aspects of behavior. For instance, Powers’s (1973) controltheory model incorporates 11 distinct goal levels; Newell’s (1990)model of cognition incorporates four levels (social, rational, cog-nitive, and biological); Cropanzano, James, and Citera’s (1993)hierarchical model uses four levels (values, self-identities, per-sonal projects, and task goals); Frese and Zapf’s (1994) actiontheory also consists of four distinct hierarchical levels (heuristic,intellectual, flexible action patterns, and sensorimotor); andBeach’s (e.g., 1990) hierarchical decision-making model usesthree levels (values, trajectories, and strategies). It is also interest-ing to note that personality theory appears to be converging on ahierarchical approach to studying individual differences in person-ality (e.g., Ashton, 1998; Paunonen, 1998; Paunonen & Nicol,2001).

The four levels that top the goal hierarchy in MAT consist ofself goals, principle goals, achievement goals, and action plangoals. In general, self goals are the fundamental outcomes that allindividuals must achieve, to some extent, to lead normal, healthy,fulfilling lives. Goals at this level of analysis are the focus ofvirtually all research on the self, such as self-discrepancy theory(Higgins, 1989a), self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), self-evaluation maintenance theory (Tesser, 1988), self-verificationtheory (Swann, 1983), and self-assessment theory (Trope, 1986).Serious psychological and physical health problems are known tobe associated with large discrepancies on any one of these funda-mental goals.

Self goals are desired outcomes but they do not provide a meansto achieve the desired goals. Therefore, to achieve self goals,individuals must engage in actions to achieve goals at the principle

1 Throughout this article the terms postulate, conjecture, proposition,and corollary are used in a manner consistent with the traditional meaningof these terms in the philosophy of science. A postulate is a statement, alsoknown as an axiom, that is taken to be true without proof. A conjecture isa statement that is consistent with known data but has not yet been verifiedor shown to be false. A proposition is a statement that is to be proved infollowing sections. A corollary is a consequence of a proved result. Detailson this standard usage may be found at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/topics/Terminology.html.


goal level. Following Powers (1973), principle goals are generalheuristics or behavioral principles that serve as guides for clustersof behavior. Goals at this level have names found in commonlanguage such as integrity, hardworking, fair, and friendly and areanalogous to the subdimensions of personality (e.g., Ashton, 1998;Paunonen, 1998). So, for instance, one way for an individual toachieve the affiliation goal is to behave in a helpful manner.Alternatively, an individual may work toward the agency goal bybehaving in a studious manner. There are, of course, many moreprinciple goals than are presented in Figure 1. Normally, the goalhierarchy would appear as a pyramid that rapidly increases incomplexity as one moves down the goal levels. However, somedegree of simplicity is obtained by limiting the focus of thispresentation to goals most relevant to striving in achievementcontexts, and so the representation of goals in Figure 1 may bethought of as a vertical slice of goals, relevant to achievementstrivings, which are part of a much larger goal structure. In general,as one moves down the goal hierarchy in Figure 1, the content ofthe goals becomes increasingly relevant to behavior in achieve-ment contexts. The cost incurred by this simplifying choice is alack of generalizability across other contexts and types of strivings(e.g., family goals, relationship goals, leisure goals); however, astructurally similar model could be developed for other areas.

The third level of goals in Figure 1 consists of the achievementgoals most closely associated with Elliot’s (e.g., Elliot & Church,1997; Elliot & McGregor, 1999) model of goal orientation. Theseintermediate goals reflect the general action patterns that individ-uals use in achievement situations to pursue principle goals. Inother words, depending on the relative salience of the differentprinciple goals, an individual will adopt an achievement goal thatsuits the profile of principle goals being pursued. Thus, if theindividual perceives that the potential for growth in a situation isoutweighed by the threat to standing on one or more of the otherprinciple goals, then the individual will pursue an achievementgoal that reduces the likelihood of the potential threatening out-come. Although we adopt the achievement goals specified byElliot et al., we do not subscribe to Elliot’s perspective on theantecedents of the achievement goals as directed only towardcompetence through need for achievement and fear of failuremotives.

The final level in Figure 1 consists of action plan goals. Per-ceiving a situation as a threat and striving to avoid a loss ofself-esteem or social value does not provide a clear mechanism foraccomplishing this goal. Instead, a person needs to develop anaction plan to accomplish the goal. Action plans are highly flexiblestrategies, pathways, or trajectories for achieving desired goals.

Figure 1. Motivated action theory model of the goal orientation hierarchy.


They are analogous to mental models or mental simulations thatallow a person to cognitively evaluate the acceptability of a planand the likelihood (i.e., expectancy) of achieving the desiredoutcomes using the plan. The plans make it possible to evaluatedifferent action plans before actions are implemented. So, forinstance, a person might develop and evaluate various action plansfor introducing a controversial idea in an upcoming meeting orpresentation. Once an action plan is identified or developed, it cuesattention to opportunities and means present in situations thatfacilitate goal accomplishment (Gollwitzer, 1996).

Of course, additional levels of increasingly specific goals arerequired to adequately reflect the variety and flexibility of humanaction. For instance, to enact an action plan (e.g., seek feedback),a person must select or construct a more specific action sequence(seek diagnostic feedback from the supervisor). Each action se-quence consists of a number of action steps at the next lower levelof the goal hierarchy (walk to the supervisor’s office, ask to speakwith the supervisor, speak to the supervisor) that need to be carriedout in a specific order. Otherwise, a person could initiate a con-versation with the supervisor while sitting alone in one’s office orknock on the inside of one’s own office door instead of thesupervisor’s office door. Any action step, such as walking to thesupervisor’s office, consists of a motor sequence (e.g., walking).Each motor sequence consists of a series of motor steps (lifting aleg or swinging an arm). To accomplish each of these motor steps,there are many subgoals that become increasingly biological orneurological in character.

The hierarchical representation of goals in Figure 1 is notparticularly innovative, and other hierarchical specifications wouldlikely work equally well. In fact, the goal hierarchy presented inFigure 1 merges many aspects of other hierarchical specificationssuch as Powers’s (1973) principle goal level, Frese and Zapf’s(1994) flexible action patterns, and Elliot’s (Elliot & Church,1997) achievement goal level. In hierarchical models of cognitionand action, representations at the higher levels specify the mean-ing, or the “why,” of action and goals lower in the hierarchyspecify the “how,” or means, for accomplishing the higher levelgoals (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1996; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).Consistent with the goal dimensions presented by Austin andVancouver (1996), higher level goals are generally less specificthan lower level goals, and so it is more difficult to evaluateprogress toward higher level goals than toward lower level goals.Higher level goals typically refer to more distal outcomes thanlower level goals. After all, to meet the higher level goals, onemust first achieve the subgoals. As Vallacher and Wegner (1989)have demonstrated, midlevel goals are more consciously accessi-ble than are high-level or low-level goals. Finally, goals at higherlevels are more likely to be common across individuals eventhough the importance of the high-level goals may differsubstantially.

For current purposes, the optimal number of goal levels and thecorrect number of goals in each level are not as critical as thegeneral functioning of the hierarchical structure of goals. Theconnections among the goals in Figure 1 are critically importantand represent a departure from many other hierarchical goal spec-ifications. In MAT, goals are massively interconnected both withinand across levels. The connections may be either excitatory orinhibitory (positively or negatively weighted) such that doing oneaction increases the likelihood of doing another complementary

action or decreases the likelihood of performing a competingaction (e.g., Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). The con-nections are represented as double-headed arrows, indicating thatthe flow of action may result from discrepancies on higher levelgoals (top-down processing) or lower level goals (bottom-up pro-cessing) as a result of encountering obstacles or environmentalchanges (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994).

The large number of connections to lower level goals representsthe principle of equifinality (McDougal, 1923; Heider, 1958),meaning that many different actions can be used to meet higherlevel goals. This principle also highlights the substitutability ofactions (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Henle, 1942; Lewin, 1935; Shah& Kruglanski, 2000), such that one action can substitute foranother in accomplishing a higher order goal. In addition, lowerlevel actions are connected to multiple higher order goals, depict-ing the principle of multifinality (Broadbent, 1985; Shah &Kruglanski, 2000; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), meaning a singlelower level action may serve to meet multiple higher level goalssimultaneously. The only current limitation imposed on the inter-connection of goals in MAT is that connections between goals maynot skip levels. In other words, the connection of achievementgoals to self goals occurs only through principle goals. This patternof goal interconnectivity may be stated formally as follows:

Conjecture 1. Goals in the goal hierarchy are massivelyinterconnected both within goal level and between adjacentgoal levels. The structure of inhibitory and excitatory inter-connections is responsible for the principles of top-down andbottom-up processing, goal equifinality, goal substitutability,and goal multifinality.

This conjecture is reasonable given current knowledge but willlikely need to be revised as further empirical results accumulate.

Goal Content

Viewing goals as hierarchically structured is relatively free ofrisk. The general idea is well accepted and spans virtually all areasof scientific investigations of human cognition, motivation, andbehavior (e.g., Newell, 1990). However, to actually implement aparticular goal hierarchy to understand and predict behavior, it isnecessary to specify the content of goals at each level in thehierarchy. This is a topic in which strong disagreements mayoccur. After all, goals placed higher in the hierarchy are, bydefinition, more important or fundamental to the functioning of theperson than goals placed lower in the hierarchy. Similarly, goals atthe same level in the hierarchy are treated, to some extent, asequally important. The ordering of specific goals in the hierarchyhas been a source of contention since the beginning of philosoph-ical treatments of behavior and willpower, and we do not expect toresolve these arguments here. Instead, what follows is an attemptto integrate a large body of literature into a cohesive and usefulperspective on goals. This representation is, without question,incomplete. It is simply a starting point to be refined as dataaccumulate.

One of the major difficulties encountered by hierarchical goalrepresentations is specifying the goal contents at the top of thehierarchy. After all, what are the ultimate goals that individualsseek? To avoid theological and philosophical debate over the


ultimate purpose of being, we focus on goal states that meetBaumeister and Leary’s (1995) criteria for fundamental goal sta-tus. The goals at the top of the hierarchy in MAT all have clearconnections with physical and mental health, and when discrep-ancies on these fundamental goals are large, not much else mattersto the individual. Three themes occur across virtually all motiva-tional theory and research. First, individuals are highly motivatedto achieve and maintain the perception that they can affect orcontrol important aspects of their environment. Following Bandura(2001), we refer to this as the agency goal. Second, individuals arestrongly motivated to achieve and maintain a positive self-image.Following G. W. Allport (1955), we refer to this as the esteemgoal. Finally, individuals are social beings, and the need to belongor be affiliated with a group of other individuals is an extremelystrong motivation, resulting in severe repercussions if not met.Following Murray (1938) and D. C. McClelland (1951), we referto this as the affiliation goal. This approach to the goal content atthe highest level of representation may be stated formally asfollows:

Proposition 1. All individuals possess, in varying degrees, thehighest level goals of agency, esteem, and affiliation.

Self Goals

Agency. Unless individuals believe that they can act to pro-duce desired effects and to overcome undesired effects in theirenvironment, then there is no reason to act at all. Without thisbelief, the world would appear to be completely chaotic, and basiccause-and-effect relations would not hold with respect to theindividual’s actions. Under these conditions, pursuing goals orpersisting when difficulties are encountered would be pointless(Bandura, 1997), and behavior would be consistent with Selig-man’s research on reactions to uncontrollable shock (e.g., W. R.Miller & Seligman, 1975). Bandura (2001) maintains that believ-ing in and increasing agency (personal control over one’s envi-ronment) is the most fundamental aspect of human existence.Similarly, deCharms (1968) stated that “man’s primary motiva-tional propensity is to be effective in producing changes in hisenvironment.” Other perspectives on the critical importance ofagency can be found in the intrinsic motivation literature, in whichit is believed that the fundamental human goal is to increasecompetency and self-determination (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985;Elliot et al., 2000; R. W. White, 1959). Failure to establish agencyis strongly related to poor physical health and chronic depression(Seligman, 1991). In fact, this goal is so fundamental to humanpursuits that individuals will delude themselves into believing thatthey are able to control aspects of their environment that are, infact, uncontrollable or random (e.g., Langer, 1975; Langer & Roth,1975).

Esteem. Of all the higher level goals, the esteem goal iscertainly the best researched. Virtually every personality and selftheory maintains that viewing oneself positively is fundamental tohuman functioning (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1955; Epstein, 1973;James, 1890; Maslow, 1943; Rogers, 1951; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim,& Kasser, 2001; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988). In general, individ-uals have inflated levels of self-esteem (e.g., Baumeister, Tice, &Hutton, 1989; E. Diener & Diener, 1996), actively seek informa-tion to confirm the positive view of self (e.g., Steele, 1988; Tesser,

1988), and seek to further enhance self-value (e.g., Blaine &Crocker, 1993; Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Highself-esteem is critically important to mental health (e.g., Baumeis-ter, 1993; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Taylor &Brown, 1988), and negative views of the self are highly associatedwith depression (e.g., Coleman & Beck, 1981). According to terrormanagement theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, &Schimel, 2004), people need self-esteem to manage the anxietyarising from the knowledge that they will eventually die and thatthe time of death is unpredictable. Without self-esteem, thisknowledge would be paralyzing, and progress toward importantgoals would be severely impacted. Crocker and Park (2004) indi-cated that the pursuit of self-esteem can result in unhealthy out-comes depending on the actions used by the individual to pursuethe self-esteem goal. This perspective does not deny that individ-uals invest substantial effort into the pursuit of self-esteem butinstead suggests that a subset of the methods used to pursueself-esteem may be unhealthy.

Affiliation. Baumeister and Leary (1995) provide strong sup-port for the position that developing and maintaining interpersonalattachments is a fundamental motive, evolved for adaptive pur-poses, that results in people having a strong desire to belong tosocial entities like groups and organizations. The importance ofaffiliation goals to human functioning is recognized in virtually allmodels of human behavior (e.g., Bowlby, 1969; Maslow, 1968;D. C. McClelland, 1951; Murray, 1938). Further, individuals ex-perience severe anxiety when they face exclusion from their socialgroups (Barden, Garber, Leiman, Ford, & Masters, 1985), and oneof the most severe punishments society inflicts is solitary confine-ment. The empirical support, reviewed by Baumeister and Leary(1995), for affiliation as a fundamental human motive is impres-sive and extremely difficult to discount.

Principle Goals

Growth. Now that the three highest level goals have beenpresented, we shift our attention to the principle goal level andfocus on those principle goals we believe to be most relevant toachievement behavior. The first principle goal in Figure 1 isgrowth. To achieve ever increasing levels of agency, a person mustgrow, learn, develop, and explore. Maslow (1968) placed this goalat the top of his hierarchy and focused on a nearly spiritualmovement toward self-actualization. Alderfer (1972) viewedgrowth goals from a highly intrinsic perspective focused on ac-quiring and exercising skills to the fullest extent possible. Incontrast, we view growth goals as a desire to understand one’senvironment and to develop the skills necessary to affect theenvironment to meet the higher level self goals. We believe thatgrowth goals subsume motivational variables such as the need tounderstand (e.g., Murray, 1938), need for cognition (Cacioppo,Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), and the competence motive(R. W. White, 1959).

Fairness. In general, issues of fairness and judgment have notbeen well integrated into motivational perspectives on behavior(e.g., Mitchell & Daniels, 2003). Given the powerful effects offairness perceptions on behavior (e.g., Greenberg, 1987; Lind &Tyler, 1988), this is an unfortunate oversight. Cosmides and Tooby(1992) argue from an evolutionary perspective that humans haveevolved in highly complex social systems, and for these systems to


function appropriately there must be guidelines for social ex-change. In other words, there are expectations derived from evo-lutionary pressures for give-and-take relations such that if a persongets something from you they are expected to give somethingback. As a result of this developmental history, Cosmides (1989)argues that humans have developed automatic, hard-wired cheaterdetection schemas that allow individuals to detect violations ofsocial exchange rules. Thus, although individuals may be moti-vated to act selfishly for short-term gain, the possibility of beingdetected and facing long-term social punishment and rejectioninhibits these actions. This perspective is supported by theory andresearch suggesting that individuals have a strong desire or need tobelieve in a just world (Hafner, 2000; Learner, 1980).

Structure. A number of motivational approaches address anindividual’s desire to exist in a structured environment with un-ambiguous rules that guide behavior. Various terms, such as tol-erance for ambiguity (Shaffer & Hendrick, 1974), need for struc-ture (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), and need for cognitive closure(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), are used to describe this robustindividual difference in contextual preferences. Although referredto as a need for cognition, Cohen (1957; Cohen, Stotland, &Wolfe, 1955) conceptualized a similar variable such that “strongerneeds lead people to see a situation as ambiguous even if it isrelatively structured, indicating that higher standards for cognitiveclarity are associated with greater need for cognition” (p. 292).Adams (1959) demonstrated that individuals who strive for highlevels of cognitive clarity avoid ambiguity by using heuristics andexpert advice to understand their environment rather than carefullyevaluating information for themselves. With respect to social in-teractions, Shah, Kruglanski, and Thompson (1998) found thatindividuals with high need for closure were more positively dis-posed toward in-groups and more negatively disposed towardout-groups, indicating a clear desire for boundaries, than were theircounterparts with low need for closure, even if the groups wereartificial and temporary constructions in the laboratory.

Social value. An individual’s standing in a group meets manyhigher order goals. High levels of social status impart power, andpower serves agency goals by making it possible for an individualto modify others’ states by providing or withholding resources oradministering punishments (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson,2003). An individual’s respect and prominence in a group resultsin control over social resources and punishments (C. Anderson,John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Barkow, 1975). Social standing alsohas strong connections to esteem and affiliation goals. To maintainand increase standing on esteem and affiliation goals, individualspay very close attention to relationship status information (DeCremer & Van Vugt, 2002; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary etal., 1995). In addition to these aspects of social standing, Urdanand Maehr (1995) suggest that achievement motivation researchhas generally not accounted for the social aspects of achievementbehavior. Individuals may engage in achievement behavior to be aproductive citizen (social welfare goal), to bring pride and honor tothe family (social solidarity goal), or to gain the approval orrespect of peers. The content of goals at the principle level of thegoal hierarchy may be summarized using the following conjecture.

Conjecture 2. In situations construed by the individual asemphasizing achievement, the principle goals of growth, fair-

ness, structure, and social value provide the primary vehiclesfor obtaining the higher level self goals.

Achievement Goals

As discussed previously, various authors treat goal orientationas having somewhere between one (e.g., Dweck, 1986) and six(e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2001) distinct facets. In our view, the mostcompelling model of achievement goals responsible for goal ori-entation behavior is obtained by crossing the approach and avoid-ance aspects of behavior with mastery and performance goals (e.g.,Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Pintrich, 2000a). The approach andavoidance aspects of motivated action are fundamental to humanbehavior (Carver, 1996) and are represented in virtually everymodel of behavior (for a review, see Elliot & Thrash, 2002, andHiggins, 1997). Even the early theoretical treatments of goalorientation recognized the importance of approach and avoidanceaspects of behavior (e.g., Nicholls, 1984). However, at this point intime, we have not incorporated the mastery-avoid goal into MAT.This choice is based on the fact that avoiding a loss of mastery islikely only applicable to a very limited number of experts in aparticular domain. In addition, empirical research strongly sup-ports the distinction between performance-approach actions andperformance-avoid actions (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2002). However,only limited empirical data are available that supports the mastery-avoid goal. Therefore, the dimensionality of achievement goalsincorporated into MAT is consistent with the three-dimensionalperspective espoused by Elliot (e.g., Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot& Thrash, 2002) and VandeWalle (1997).

For now, the three achievement goals used in MAT are suffi-cient for capturing the major differences in behavior that occur inachievement settings. However, as more data are collected andinconsistencies identified, it will be important to further specify thegoals responsible for action. In this case, the goals at the principlelevel of analysis could be crossed with motivational distinctionbetween approach and avoid dimensions of behavior to yield avery flexible approach to modeling achievement goals. Futurechanges in the dimensionality of achievement goals will not alterthe basic structure or functioning of MAT. The current content ofgoals at the achievement goal level of the goal hierarchy may besummarized using the following conjecture.

Conjecture 3. In situations construed by the individual asemphasizing achievement, the achievement goals of mastery-approach, performance-approach, and performance-avoidprovide the primary vehicles for obtaining the higher levelprinciple goals.

Action Plan Goals

The action plan goals that may be used to meet the achievementgoals are too varied to enumerate. However, the existing goalorientation literature highlights some common behavioral themesthat occur in achievement contexts (e.g., Ames, 1992; Dweck,1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Nicholls,1984). Individuals pursuing mastery goals use feedback on theirown past performance to evaluate current performance, focusattention on acquiring knowledge and improving skills, are notconcerned about mistakes and frequently explore a task, and make


many mistakes in the process. Students with perfor-mance-approach goals focus on achieving a high level of perfor-mance with the appearance of minimal effort, do not engage inmistake-prone exploration, and evaluate performance with respectto others. Finally, individuals pursuing performance-avoidancegoals engage in a number of withdrawal behaviors such as self-handicapping, task disengagement, and off-task cognitions. Thecontent of goals at the action plan level of the goal hierarchy maybe summarized using the following conjecture.

Conjecture 4. In situations construed by the individual asemphasizing achievement, the action plan goals specify be-haviors that may be selected by the individual to obtain thehigher level achievement goals.

Discrepancy Detection

Each goal in the hierarchy is thought to be monitored by adiscrepancy monitoring system that compares the current state ofthe person to the goal states (Carver & Scheier, 1998; R. G. Lord& Levy, 1994). The negative-feedback loop presented in Figure 2is a reasonable approximation of how the discrepancy monitoringsystem associated with each goal functions. Basically, a sensorysystem detects the current state of the environment. A comparisonis then made between the current state and the desired goal state.The discrepancy or error that results from this comparison triggersan output function that filters down through the hierarchy until arelevant behavior is enacted to reduce the discrepancy. The envi-ronment is changed both through the actions taken by the personand by naturally occurring environmental forces beyond the con-trol of the individual. The sensory system again checks the statusof the environment, and the process continues.

On the surface, the assumption that discrepancies are monitoredfor all goals instead of those currently in the focus of attentionmight appear to be psychologically implausible because substan-tial parallel information processing is required for this model to

function. However, to maintain behavioral flexibility in responseto environmental changes, there must be some mechanism that iscapable of detecting change with respect to nonfocal goals andcapturing attention (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994). Otherwise, anindividual in the pursuit of a high-level goal, such as being viewedas hardworking, might not recognize that the noises emanatingfrom the machinery being used to cut metal signal danger and thata safer course of action would be to halt work. Discrepancydetection across goal levels provides a source of activation thatcaptures attention and makes it possible for lower level goals towrest control of behavior from higher level goals.

This perspective is consistent with research suggesting thathuman information processing is highly sensitive to errors anddiscrepancy information. For instance, it is clear that discrepancydetection occurs automatically even when attention is focused onother aspects of the environment (Hilton, Klein, & von Hipple,1991; J. D. White & Carlson, 1983). The sensitivity to discrepan-cies is so fundamental to human information processes that itappears to be a hard-wired function of the brain associated with theanterior cingulate cortex (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner, Braun,& Coles, 1997), and deficits in this system are associated withpsychological disorders such as obsessive–compulsive disorder(Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000). The existing data support thefollowing conjecture.

Conjecture 5. The individual’s goals are simultaneously andautomatically monitored for discrepancies between the cur-rent states and the desired states both within and across goallevels.

Goals and Action

The linkage of the individual’s goals to behavior or actionsimplemented to achieve the goals is a fundamental issue in thesocial sciences. MAT incorporates a very restrictive approach tothis linkage represented in the following proposition.

Proposition 2: At any fixed time point, action is directedtoward reducing a discrepancy on a single goal.

This perspective on the goal–action linkage does not mean thata particular action can only reduce discrepancies on a single goalbut rather that actions are directed toward the accomplishment ofa single goal. Proposition 3 is supported by two distinct theoreticalframeworks. First, models of attention, such as D. A. Allport’s(1989) selection-for-action model and Posner and Rothbart’s(1991, 1998) selection-for-thought model, highlight the function-ality of focusing attention on a limited set of goal-relevant stimuli(both internal and external to the individual). Humans have alimited number of sensors (e.g., eyes and ears) and effectors (e.g.,hands and feet); therefore, to accomplish goals, it is necessary toenact a behavioral sequence and then to protect the action se-quence from competing goals and actions until the action is com-pleted. Integrated actions require the selection of particular aspectsor attributes from the environment that are relevant to the action athand. At the same time, information irrelevant to the action mustbe ignored or inhibited (e.g., Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski,2002). Thus, attentional processes are viewed as the selection ofaction-relevant events or stimuli relying on particular action plans.Figure 2. Negative feedback loop for discrepancy detection.


Behavioral coherence in the pursuit of goals is achieved by se-quentially enacting behaviors and then protecting the goals andbehaviors from distraction as they are carried out.

The selection-for-action process is highly flexible. As D. A.Allport (1989) highlighted, the attentional process that protectsgoals and actions cannot be absolute. It is important that the personbe able to monitor the environment and switch goals and actionsquickly in response to environmental changes that present eitherthreats or opportunities. In fact, switching between goals andaction sequences may happen so quickly that it appears that theindividual is simultaneously pursuing multiple goals that requiredistinct actions (D. A. Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; D. A.Allport & Wylie, 2000). The focus of attention in the goal hierar-chy is flexible and may move up or down the goal hierarchy as afunction of progress toward the goal (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994).This approach to the linkage between multiple goals and actionsleads to the following corollary of Proposition 3.

Corollary 1. The appearance of simultaneous task perfor-mance (e.g., multitasking) designed to simultaneously reducediscrepancies on multiple goals reflects rapid switching oroscillation between goals and the actions connected to thesegoals that serve to reduce discrepancies on the multiple goals.

The second source of support for this perspective on goals,action, and attention is found in Vallacher and Wegner’s (1987,1989) action identification theory. If asked at any specific point intime, individuals report only doing one thing. The specificity of thereported goal appears to vary to some extent across individualssuch that some individuals provide more abstract responses to thisprobe, whereas others provide very concrete responses. However,irrespective of the reported goal level, individuals invariably iden-tify their actions with respect to a single goal at a time. Actionidentities that possess substantial detail are called low-level iden-tities, and those that possess little detail are referred to as high-level identities. As individuals gain experience with a task, theytend to move up in the action identification hierarchy and use themore efficient, higher level action identities (Vallacher & Wegner,1987). In contrast, when obstacles to goal completion are encoun-tered or actions are disrupted, the identification of action movesdown the hierarchy and individuals describe their actions in moredetail (Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986; Wegner,Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984). Vallacher and Weg-ner (1987) suggest that the optimal identity level is the highestidentity that an individual can use to maintain an action.

In action identification theory, middle-level actions are mostcommonly the focus of attention, similar to Rosch’s (e.g., Rosch,Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) basic level incategorization theory. In MAT, the most common focus of atten-tion probably occurs at the achievement goal level. If you askpeople taking a selection test what they are doing, they will mostlikely tell you that they are trying to do well on the test rather thanconnecting their actions to higher level goals such as striving foragency. Individuals rarely focus directly on esteem or affiliationgoals unless events make the high level goals salient. Similarly,when eating breakfast, individuals rarely focus attention on pick-ing up a cup of coffee. That behavioral sequence is automatizedand does not capture attention unless an obstacle is encounteredwhen trying to enact the behavioral sequence (e.g., an unexpected

spoon in the coffee cup). Similar processes may be found in theproblem-solving literature on subgoal creation when obstacles toproblem solution are encountered (VanLehn, 1989). These generalfindings lead to the following conjecture for a basic level repre-sentation of goals in achievement contexts.

Conjecture 6. In situations construed by the individual asemphasizing achievement, the achievement goal level is thedefault or basic level foci of attention.

Spreading Activation

In MAT the dynamic flow of behavior over time is determinedthrough a spreading activation process similar to that used inAnderson’s ACT-R model of semantic knowledge in declarativememory (J. R. Anderson, 1990, 1993). As stated in Conjecture 1and depicted in Figure 1, goal structures are highly interconnectedboth across and within goal levels. As with semantic knowledgestructures, the connections between goals can be either excitatory(positive) or inhibitory (negative). In other words, response ten-dencies (e.g., using a hand to type on the computer keyboard vs.using a hand to scratch an itch) that directly compete with thecurrently activated goal are inhibited. This reflects findings in thearea of selective attention demonstrating that competing responses(actions or thoughts) are inhibited to maintain and protect the focuson a particular, selected response (D. A. Allport, 1989; Gerns-bacher & Faust, 1991; Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Rypma, 1991;Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000). Similarly,response tendencies that are consistent with the currently activatedgoal receive increased levels of activation (e.g., cutting vegetablesmay prompt sharpening a knife). It is important to highlight thatthe analogy drawn here between goal structures and knowledgestructures should not be taken too far. At this point, not enough isknown about goal structures to determine whether they are simplyspecial types of knowledge and conform to what we know aboutassociative memory structures or whether they are in some waydistinct and require new models to be adequately represented.

There are two central aspects of the spread of goal activation inMAT. First, the activation of a particular goal is a function of theactivation levels of the other goals in the goal hierarchy that haveweighted connections with the goal. Activation flows in bothdirections, such that when higher level goals are activated, eitherby external factors in the environment or by internal goal-relatedcognitions, activation spreads throughout the goal network consis-tent with the weights connecting the goals. Similarly, when low-level goals receive increased activation through the detection ofdiscrepancies, activation spreads upward through the network ofgoals (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994) consistent with weights on thegoal linkages. This flow of activation among goals allows for bothtop-down or bottom-up processes to influence behavior. Second,changes in the perception of discrepancy between the current stateand a particular goal state alter the activation level of the particulargoal and, because of the massive interconnectivity of goals in thegoal hierarchy, the activation level of other goals connected to theparticular goal.

As a starting point, an activation function similar to that used inJ. L. McClelland and Rumelhart’s (1981) interactive activationmodel and Holyoak and Thagard’s (1989) ACME is used in MAT.


Specifically, the activation of a goal at time t � 1 is conceptualizedas

aij�t�1� � aij�t� � �wij�t�aij�t�, (1)

where aij is the activation of the ith goal at the jth level of the goalhierarchy, t is a time indicator, and wij is the weight linking goalsboth within and across levels. At this point, the overall activationlevel of a goal at time t � 1 is a function of its activation level attime t along with the weighted sum of all the activation levels ofthe goals connected to the goal. Given this, the activation level ofa goal may be negative if the sum of inhibitory connectionsoutweighs the sum of excitatory connections to a greater extentthan the current positive activation level. Equation 1 highlights thatthe activation level of a given goal is simply a linear composite ofthe previous goal activation level and the weighted sum of all theactivation levels of the goals connected to the particular goal. Assuch, Equation 1 captures the first aspect of spreading activation ingoal hierarchies highlighted previously. Although this function isa reasonable starting point in the study of goal activations, it islikely too simple to capture the complex relations between goals.We expect that this function will need to be revised in response toimproved understanding of goal activation patterns.

Also, it is important to highlight that the time subscript on theweight in Equation 1 indicates that the relationship among goals inthe hierarchy may change over time. As stated, the second aspectof spreading activation in MAT reflects the change in the activa-tion level of a goal as a function of the magnitude of the perceiveddiscrepancy. As discrepancies are reduced through actions, goal-level revision, or environmental changes, the activation level of thegoal decreases. The opposite effect also occurs: As discrepanciesincrease, so too does the activation level of the goal. The functionfor a change in the activation level of a goal is adapted fromAtkinson and Birch (1970) and may be represented as

aij�t�1� � aij�t� � ed�t� �aij�t�

d�t��1 � ed�t��, (2)

where the goal activation levels are defined as previously and d isthe signed magnitude of the discrepancy at time t. This functiondescribes the exponential change in the goal activation level as afunction of either an increase or decrease in the discrepancyassociated with the goal. As a starting point, it is assumed that thechange in activation is symmetric for discrepancy increases anddecreases, but this will likely need to be amended as the theorydevelops.

Considered together, these two activation functions may becombined to yield the overall goal activation level as a function ofprevious activation levels, changes in discrepancies, and changesin activation level as a result of relations with other goal activationlevels. Combining the activation functions represented in Equation1 and Equation 2 yields,

aij�t�1� � �aij�t� � ed�t� �aij�t�

d�t��1 � ed�t�� wij�t�aij�t�. (3)

This conceptualization of goal activation highlights that any actiontaken to reduce a discrepancy on a particular goal can also simul-taneously reduce discrepancies on multiple higher level goals.Similarly, many different actions can serve to reduce discrepancies

associated with a particular higher order goal (Lewin, 1936; Valla-cher & Wegner, 1987). This perspective may be stated formally asfollows:

Conjecture 7. The activation level of goal(ij) at time t � 1 isan exponential function of the perceived discrepancy betweenthe current state and the goal state and the weighted linearcomposite of the activation levels of all goals connected togoal(ij) in the goal hierarchy.

In addition to considering the manner in which activation levelsin the goal hierarchy change over time, it is equally important toconsider factors that are omitted from Equation 3. Specifically, theabsence of a decay parameter in the activation function (Equation3) represents an important theoretical issue. Unlike activationfunctions used in learning and memory research, there is no decayparameter associated with the activation of a goal in MAT. Thisreflects the theoretical positions espoused by Freud (1915/1949)and Lewin (1936) that once a goal receives activation it will persistin the current level of activation until it is acted on by some forcethat either increases or decreases the perceived discrepancy be-tween the current state and the goal state on either the focal goalor on goals related to the focal goal. Research on rumination andthe persistence of thought focused on uncompleted goals providesconvincing support for this perspective (Bargh & Barndollar,1996; Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999;Zeigarnik, 1927). This effect is particularly strong for goals centralto the self (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; L. L. Martin & Tesser,1996; McIntosh & Martin, 1992).

Conjecture 8. Goal activation does not spontaneously decay.In the absence of perceived discrepancy reduction on goal(ij)or perceived discrepancy reduction on goals connected togoal(ij), there is no change in the activation level of goal(ij) .

Action Selection

The current pattern of goal activations, along with the connec-tions among the goals, results in some goals being more active thanothers. The goal with the highest activation level captures atten-tion, and actions are taken to reduce discrepancies on this goal.Pursuit of the activated goal continues until the activation level ofother, competing goals becomes higher either through the effectivereduction of the discrepancy on the current goal or environmentalchanges that increase the activation of competing goals. In otherwords, action selection in MAT is a natural outcome of the patternsof goal activation, and conscious choice among competing actionsis not required to guide the majority of behavior. This is consistentwith Bargh and Chartrand’s (1999) argument that the vast majorityof behavior cannot possibly result from conscious choice pro-cesses.

Conjecture 9. At any fixed time point, action is directedtoward reducing the perceived discrepancy on the goal withthe highest activation level.

It is important to highlight that this action selection mechanismis much more flexible than traditional models of goal pursuit. Thetest–operate–test–exit (TOTE) cycle proposed by G. A. Miller etal. (1960) remains the dominant approach to action selection. In


the TOTE cycle approach to action selection, a goal is tested to seewhether it has been achieved and, if not, an action is performed toachieve the goal; this cycle of test–operate is repeated until thegoal is eventually achieved or abandoned. At this point, a new goalis identified and a new TOTE cycle is enacted until this goal isachieved or abandoned. Unlike the MAT approach to action se-lection, a TOTE cycle approach does not allow for partial discrep-ancy reduction on multiple goals. In MAT discrepancy reductionresults in decreased goal activation, and, as the activation leveldecreases, the probability that a competing goal will have a higherlevel of activation increases. So actions that reduce discrepancieson one or more goals increase the probability that other goals willcapture attention and that new actions will be selected to reducediscrepancies on one or more different goals that have higherlevels of activation.

Although MAT uses a different process to implement actionselection, there is substantial overlap with expectancy theories ofbehavioral choice. Expectancy theory (e.g., Atkinson, 1958;Vroom, 1964) appears to have fallen out of favor, and the amountof new research either evaluating or using this choice model hasdropped off precipitously since the zenith of its popularity in the1970s and 1980s. This is a highly unfortunate result of numerousdifficulties with measurement (Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981),research design (Mitchell, 1974), and theoretical limitations (e.g.,R. G. Lord & Maher, 1990). However, it is clear that individualsmust select among possible actions to accomplish goals, and themost reasonable choice is to pursue valued goals using actions thathave the highest probability of goal accomplishment. Any theoryof action must account for this basic necessity of action selection.

MAT, along with other goal hierarchy models of behavior, hasthe potential to subsume expectancy models of decision making. InMAT, the activation of goals determines their current importance.Active goals capture attention, and actions are undertaken toreduce discrepancies on these goals. However, which actionshould be selected? The weights connecting higher level goalswith lower level means or actions reflect the likelihood that a givenaction will reduce discrepancies on the active goal. In other words,the weights connecting lower goals to higher goals can be thoughtof as expectancies. If a person has an activated high-level goal(valence), they will most likely choose actions that have thehighest connection (expectancy; probability of meeting the goal) tothe higher level goal. R. G. Lord, Hanges, and Godfrey (2003)provide a similar perspective on this issue, although the mecha-nism they propose differs.

Conjecture 10. The action with the largest weighted linkage(expectancy) to the most activated higher level goal will beenacted to reduce the perceived discrepancy on the goal.

Person � Situation Dynamics

Personality and motivational researchers invest substantial ef-fort to understand individual differences that are assumed to bestable across time and situations (i.e., traits). As such, the dynam-ics of behavior and the influence of situational factors on behaviorhave received relatively little attention (Funder, 2001; Mischel,Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002). Instead, situations are oftenconsidered to represent noise or error that masks individual dif-ferences in personality. The predictable result of this perspective is

that personality variables are rarely able to predict individualdifferences in behavior to any substantial extent (Funder, 2001;Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Instead, tounderstand, influence, or predict behavior, it is critical to under-stand the dynamic interplay of the individual as he or she encoun-ters situations over time (Lewin, 1935). The same objective situ-ation may be perceived very differently depending on themotivational structures possessed by different individuals or thesame individual at different times (C. G. Lord, Ross, & Lepper,1979; Ross, 1990; Simon, 1994). An individual possessing ahighly active failure-avoidance goal might react to a situation as athreat and engage in avoidance-oriented actions, whereas anotherindividual possessing a highly activated mastery goal might per-ceive the same objective situation as an opportunity and engage instrong approach actions. The key point is that to understand actionit is not enough to understand the person or the situation. Tounderstand an individual’s actions, it is necessary to understandhow the person’s goal structure affects the perception of thesituation and how this perception further activates goals that resultin actions.

Currently, the best available model of situated behavior is Mis-chel and Shoda’s (1995) cognitive–affective personality system(CAPS). In this model, situational features activate a stable set ofcognitive and affective representations based on the individual’sprior experience with those features. The personality system isconceived as consisting of a large repertoire of “if–then” relations.If the situation activates a particular set of “ifs,” a resulting set ofbehavioral “thens” are produced. The CAPS model overlaps sub-stantially with J. R. Anderson’s production models of memoryconsisting of many if–then relations. When the features of thesituation meet the conditions of the production, then the associatedbehavior is “fired.” When the ifs presented in the situation change,so too do the thens generated by the CAPS model even though theif–then relations remain the same.

The approach to situations adopted in MAT is somewhat dif-ferent and is based on the theory of structural alignment in simi-larity research (Goldstone, 1994; Markman & Gentner, 1993). Inthis approach to situations, there is a dynamic interplay betweenthe goals that currently have the highest activation levels andsituational features. The currently active goals affect the percep-tion of the situation, and the features present in the situation resultin increased activation for goals that are relevant to the situationalfeatures in a reciprocal fashion. So, for instance, Pickett, Gardner,and Knowles (2004) have shown that individuals with a highlyactivated affiliation goal are particularly sensitive to social cues.Conversely, it is now widely recognized that numerous features inthe situation capture attention irrespective of currently activatedgoals (e.g., Franconeri, Simons, & Junge, 2004). In the similarityliterature, this iterative process has been shown to operate veryquickly using parallel processing until the internal representationsand the external situational features are brought into alignment.The computational model developed by Goldstone (1994) providesa mechanism for modeling the interaction of the person andsituation.

Conjecture 11a. The perception of situational features, at agiven point in time, is biased toward currently active goals.


Conjecture 11b. Perceived features in the situation affect theactivation levels of goals by altering perceived current state–goal state discrepancies.

The treatment of the impact of the situation on behavior in MAThas many similarities to Mischel and Shoda’s CAPS model ofsituated behavior. In their model, the individual has a series ofif–then productions akin to J. R. Anderson’s ACT-R productionmodel of memory. This system, embodied in a computationalmodel, makes it possible for different individuals to perceive thesame situation in different ways and to “fire” different behaviors asa result. There is, however, a crucial difference between Mischeland Shoda’s CAPS model and MAT regarding the effect of thesituation on behavior. Because Mischel and Shoda (1995) rely onproductions to model the effect of the situation on behavior, thesame situation should always be perceived the same way by aparticular person and, as a result, the same behavior should “fire”each time. This is not meant to imply that production models arecompletely inflexible. Productions may be modified over time, butthe changes are relatively slow and so over long time spanssituations may be perceived differently, and different behaviorsmay result. In contrast, the activation model underlying MATprovides a mechanism by which the same situation may be per-ceived differently from time to time depending on the activity levelof the system goals when the situation is encountered. This doesnot imply that behavior will be completely inconsistent each timethe same situation is encountered. Individuals tend to have chron-ically active goals, and so similar patterns of goal activation willlikely be salient each time the individual encounters the situation.

Implications for Goal Orientation Research

MAT provides numerous improvements in the conceptualiza-tion of goal orientation. According to MAT, actions are undertakento reduce discrepancies on currently active goals. The pattern ofgoal activation in the goal hierarchy (valences), coupled with thelinkages connecting higher order goals with lower order goals(expectancies), yields appropriate actions for a given situation. Thecurrent pattern of goal activation interacts dynamically with situ-ational features to yield new patterns of goal activation. We nowexamine the inconsistencies identified in our review of the goalorientation literature from the perspective of MAT and highlightthe improved understanding of goal-oriented actions that resultsfrom adopting the perspective of MAT. We then discuss researchimplications of MAT that have not been addressed in the goalorientation literature.

Definition of Goal Orientation

As highlighted previously, numerous inconsistent definitions ofgoal orientation currently exist in the literature. This makes itchallenging to compare the existing definition of goal orientationto the definition derived from MAT. It seems reasonable, however,to compare the definition derived from MAT with the currentdefinition used by one of the construct originators. According toDweck (1996, p. 69), “implicit theories [people’s basic assump-tions about themselves and their world] create a meaning system orconceptual framework that influences which goals are salient andimportant to the individual.” The bracketed information comes

from the definition of implicit theories provided in an earliersection of the same study. Dweck continues the description of goalorientation as

Essentially, it is proposed that a belief in a fixed trait orients anindividual toward the goal of measuring, judging, or evaluating thetrait. That is, when one holds an entity theory, the way one strives toknow oneself and others is by diagnosing people’s fixed attributes. Incontrast, a belief in a more dynamic, malleable attribute—one that canbe cultivated and changed—is proposed to orient the individual to-ward the goals of developing that attribute and of understanding thedynamics behind behavior in that domain. (p. 69)

From this description, it is relatively clear that the beliefs heldby individuals concerning the malleability of a trait (i.e., intelli-gence) result in the activation of different goals. The individual isthen oriented toward actions that are consistent with the goal madesalient or activated by the belief. This approach to goal orientationleaves a number of questions unanswered. What goals are acti-vated by the beliefs? How do the beliefs activate goals? How doesthe situation affect either goals or beliefs? Is everything about aperson’s actions in a given achievement situation determined bythe simple belief in the malleability of a personal characteristic?

Another highly influential perspective on goal orientation isfound in Elliot’s work (e.g., Elliot & Church, 1997, 2003; Elliot &Thrash, 2001). Elliot et al. approach goal orientation from thebroader perspective of achievement motivation. In this model,achievement goals result from the achievement motives of need forachievement and fear of failure. Achievement motives are definedas “domain specific motivational tendencies that energizecompetence-relevant behavior and orient individuals toward pos-itive or negative possibilities” (Elliot & Church, 2003, p. 372). Inthis model, goal orientation is viewed as the effect of achievementgoals on behavior such that

Achievement goals are conceptualized as concrete cognitive represen-tations that focus on a particular type of competence. Elliot andcolleagues’ (Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996)trichotomous achievement goal framework posits two forms of ap-proach goals: mastery goals directed toward the attachment of taskmastery and improvement, and performance-approach goals directedtoward the attainment of normative competence. Performance avoid-ance goals are avoidance goals directed toward eluding normativeincompetence. . .Achievement goals are presumed to represent animportant motivational pathway through which cognitive strategiesexert their influence on achievement-relevant outcomes. (Elliot &Church, 2003, p. 373)

MAT provides a different perspective on goal orientation andachievement motivation. Viewed from the perspective of MAT,the term goal orientation is a misnomer. Individuals are notoriented toward different goals; instead, they pursue particularachievement goals and the resulting pattern of cognition and actionis labeled goal orientation. To be precise, we define goal orienta-tion as,

Definition 1. Goal orientation is a label used to describe thepattern of cognition and action that results from pursuing amastery-approach, performance-approach, or perfor-mance-avoid goal at a particular point in time in a specificachievement situation.


The pattern of goal activation resulting from the dynamic inter-play of the person (current goal activations) and the situation (goalrelevant, salient features) is coupled with the linkages (expectan-cies, beliefs, or implicit theories) connecting higher level goals tolower level goals, yielding a pattern of coherent behavior directedtoward achieving the activated goals. As the individual’s behavioralters perceived goal discrepancies, different achievement goalsmay become more active, resulting in a different pattern of coher-ent, goal-directed actions. Using goal orientation terminology, theperson’s goal orientation may switch over time, even in the sameachievement context, in response to changes in the pattern of goalactivation or changes in the situation.

There is necessarily substantial overlap in the definition of goalorientation derived from MAT with existing definitions of theconstruct. All of these perspectives highlight the importance ofgoals in determining actions. However, the definition of goalorientation derived from MAT goes beyond the existing perspec-tives in many important ways. First, MAT integrates the belief(implicit theories) aspect of Dweck’s definition with Elliot’s per-spective on the importance of hierarchical goal structures. Second,MAT provides explicit goal content along with a processing struc-ture that explains how goal-oriented actions result from the dy-namic interplay of the person and the situation. Third, the spread-ing activation mechanism in MAT highlights that a person mayswitch goal orientations many times over the course of working ona task and, therefore, provides a dynamic model of goal-orientedactions. Finally, Elliot’s perspective focuses exclusively on thedevelopment or demonstration of competence as the higher levelgoal. The goal hierarchy in MAT incorporates competence but alsoincorporates a much broader range of higher level goals known toaffect action in achievement contexts.

Stability

The issue of whether goal orientation is a trait, quasi-trait, orstate has been one of the most vexing problems in the goalorientation literature. Rather than face the issue head on, research-ers appear to operationalize the construct in whatever manner isconvenient for the adopted research methodology and then providea passing acknowledgment that other perspectives exist. This prac-tice, coupled with the dimensionality issue discussed next, isresponsible for a great deal of the ambiguity now present in theliterature. So, is goal orientation a trait or a state? Is it stable oversituations and domains, or is it situation and domain specific? Is itstable over time within the same situation (e.g., a team meeting)?

From the perspective of MAT, the answer to these questions isa qualified “it depends.” Specifically, it depends on the breadth ofinference that the researcher is attempting to support. If the re-searcher is interested in predicting or understanding an individu-al’s behavior at a particular time in a particular context, goal-oriented behavior is most appropriately treated as a situationallyspecific state that is unstable over time. In other words, theindividual’s behavior is directed toward reducing discrepancies onthe goals that currently have high activation levels using actionsthat have the highest expectancy for achieving the active goals inthe particular situation. For this inferential focus, goal-orientedbehavior falls at the extremely unstable end of the state–traitdimension.

However, it is also clear that very general self-report measuresof dispositional goal orientation are able to provide small tomoderate predictions of behavior across time and situations. Thisperspective, with a focus on broad inferences across time andsituations, may also be understood through the functioning of goalactivation in MAT. The activation of goals can be thought of interms of chronic and transient accessibility. Goals that are fre-quently stimulated or activated become highly accessible and,therefore, are chronically ready to be activated (Bargh, 1999;Bargh & Thein, 1985). Goals that are chronically activated influ-ence behavior across time and situations. Transient accessibility ofgoals, in contrast, results from environmental cuing of specificgoals. In this case, goals that are typically not activated becomeactivated through unique aspects of a situation. These goals havetemporarily heightened levels of activation until somethingchanges either as a function of the person reducing discrepanciesor a change in the situation. In general, transient goals that havebeen recently activated through the dynamic interaction of theperson’s goals with the features of the situation are more easilyactivated in subsequent situations (Higgins, 1996). Similar pro-cesses have been found to operate in many different domains suchas knowledge accessibility (Higgins, 1989b), attitude accessibility(Fazio, 1995), and person categorization (Srull & Wyer, 1979). Ofcourse, the activation levels associated with goals are continuous,and so there is no clear point at which a goal becomes chronicallyaccessible.

Although not directly focused on goal activation, Fleeson (2001)provides data highly consistent with this perspective. Through theuse of experience sampling methods, Fleeson demonstrated thatindividuals reported manifesting nearly all levels of all Big Fivepersonality traits in everyday behavior. In other words, within-person variability in reported personality-relevant behavior wasvery high on a daily basis. However, the central tendency of thebehavioral distributions was highly stable across individuals. Fromthis perspective, traits are the result of average state-orientedbehavior. Therefore, if a researcher is only interested in relativelystable individual differences and is not concerned about the highlevels of within-person variability in the expression of states oversituations and time, then a dispositional approach to goal orienta-tion is appropriate. To be clear, we define

Definition 2. Dispositional goal orientation as a label used todescribe the stable pattern of cognition and action that resultsfrom the chronic pursuit of a mastery-approach, performance-approach, or performance-avoid goal in different situationsover time.

The domain-specific approach advocated by Duda and Nicholls(1992) and VandeWalle (1997) falls somewhere between thesetwo extremes and is highly appropriate depending on the inferen-tial goals of the research. The vocational choice literature clearlyhighlights that individuals believe they have different aptitudesthat are more or less important for different vocations (e.g., Betz &Hackett, 1981; Hackett, 1985), and vocational choice is highlyinfluenced by these beliefs. In goal orientation terminology, indi-viduals often hold entity beliefs (expectancies) about their skills invarious achievement domains and, therefore, adopt differentachievement goals and enact different behaviors in the differentdomains. If the researcher is willing to limit inference concerning


behavior to a particular achievement domain, then the within-person variability will be reduced to some extent and prediction ofbehavior should be higher.

Definition 3. Domain-specific goal orientation is a label usedto describe the pattern of cognition and action that resultsfrom the chronic pursuit of a mastery-approach, performance-approach, or performance-avoid goal over time in a specificdomain of achievement (e.g., work, academics, or sports).

Dimensionality

As discussed previously, we believe that current theory and databest support the three achievement goals suggested by Elliot andChurch (1997) and VandeWalle (1997): mastery-approach, perfor-mance-approach, and performance-avoid. Goal-oriented behavioris best thought of as clusters of behavior targeted at meeting one ofthese goals at a given point in time. In addition, it must berecognized that individuals may switch back and forth between thegoals over time. At this point, we do not feel that incorporating themastery-avoid goal is supported by existing data, and it is likely oflimited practical utility. However, although we currently endorse athree-facet approach to goal strivings in achievement contexts, weexpect that this perspective will need to be elaborated as more dataare collected and inconsistencies identified.

Profiles

In MAT, behavior is enacted to accomplish a single goal. In sodoing, the action may conveniently accomplish other goals and, ifsuccessful, the results of the action should cascade up the goalhierarchy and reduce discrepancies on many sequentially highergoals. However, the focus of an action, at any given time, is on asingle goal. As discussed previously, any other model of goalpursuit would result in chaotic action, and goal accomplishmentwould be virtually impossible. The implication of this perspectiveis that at any one point in time a person is pursuing only a singleachievement goal and can be portrayed as mastery oriented orperformance-approach oriented or performance-avoid oriented.However, over a period of time, a person may switch between thevarious achievement goals and perform sequential actions de-signed to reduce discrepancies on more than one higher level goal.The proportion of time, over a fixed period, spent in pursuit of aparticular achievement goal can be used to represent a profile ofachievement goal pursuits. Thus, a person may flip back and forthbetween a performance-approach achievement goal and a mastery-achievement goal many times over the course of working on a task.The task-switching literature provides clear limitations on theindividual’s ability to switch between goals and the costs associ-ated with task switching (e.g., Monsell & Driver, 2000). Only aperson who focuses exclusively on a single achievement goal forthe entire period of time relevant to the research may be typified ashaving a single orientation (e.g., mastery-oriented individuals). Inany other case, the appropriate portrayal of a person’s goal pursuitsmust reflect the proportion of time spent pursuing the differentachievement goals.

Conjecture 12. A profile approach to modeling goal-orientedaction will provide incremental understanding of the conse-

quences of adopting a particular achievement goal andswitching between achievement goals beyond the level ofpredictability achieved using standard achievement goal ori-entation analyses.

Research Design: To Measure or Manipulate?

Is it best to measure or manipulate goal orientation? Again,using the MAT perspective, the most appropriate answer to thisquestion is that it depends on the desired inference. If the re-searcher is interested in aspects of the situation that lead to theadoption of a particular achievement goal or in the outcomes ofpursuing a particular achievement goal, then manipulating thefactors that affect goal adoption is warranted. In this case, MATprovides insights into the functioning of manipulations that can beused to affect the goals adopted by individuals. The situationalfeatures that should impact the adoption of achievement goals arethose that are most closely aligned with threats and opportunitiesto the self (i.e., agency, esteem, or affiliation) or those that shouldprime the principle goals. The former should work because of thecommunality and importance of these goals across individuals.The latter should be effective influences on goal adoption becauseof their close proximity to achievement goals.

If the research focus is on the consequences of achievement goaladoption, then the strength of linkages between the higher goalsand the achievement goals may be manipulated to limit choice.Recall that the linkages between the goals across different levelscapture the concept of expectancy: the likelihood that a particularaction will result in the desired outcome. Increasing the expectancyconnecting a desired outcome with an achievement goal willincrease the probability that the achievement goal will be adoptedand vice versa. An excellent example of this manipulation is foundin the entity versus incremental manipulations. Expectancies arethe basic mechanism through which this manipulation has itseffects. If a credible source informs you that you cannot improveyourself or control your outcomes in a particular domain, then theexpectancy for accomplishing this desired outcome is diminished.As a result, other achievement goals, with higher expectancies forobtaining other higher level goals, will be adopted. Finally, a verypowerful manipulation of achievement goal adoption, and hencegoal orientation, could couple a goal-priming manipulation with anexpectancy manipulation.

If the researcher is interested in the natural functioning ofindividuals in achievement situations or in individual differencesin the propensity to adopt a particular achievement goal, thenmeasurement is the most appropriate operationalization of goalorientation. In this case, the primary decision is whether theachievement goals will be treated as states and the goal orientationprocess will be examined within persons over time and situationsor whether goal orientation will be treated as a stable individualdifference and the average use of chronically accessible achieve-ment goals will be used to represent individual dispositions. If theintraperson dynamics of achievement goal functioning across timeand situations are the research focus, then an extreme state ap-proach to measurement is required. An excellent measurementstrategy for this approach would be to use experience samplingtechniques coupled with Vallacher and Wegner’s (1987) approachof having participants report “what they are doing” at differenttime points across the observation period. A less precise but


perhaps more practical approach would be to have participantsprovide one or more retrospective reports on the specific achieve-ment goals pursued over the course of task performance.

If individual differences in the pursuit of achievement goalsacross time, situation, or both are the focus of research, then twomeasurement approaches seem reasonable. The most informativeapproach would be to follow Fleeson’s (2001) lead and use ag-gregates of repeated reports of achievement goal pursuit based onexperience sampling methods. This would allow the researcher toprovide data on individual differences and within-person variabil-ity. A more practical and less useful approach is to rely onself-reports of typical achievement goal pursuit across situationsand time. This measurement procedure is most similar to theself-report measures currently used but would focus less on as-sessing antecedents and consequences of goal-oriented behaviorand more on the pursuit of specific achievement goals across timeand contexts. Again, a domain-specific measurement approachwould focus on individual differences in achievement goal pursuitthat are stable across time but expected to be variable acrosssituations or domains. In sum, depending on the research purpose,it is completely reasonable to either manipulate aspects of thesituation to affect an individual’s goal orientation or to measure anindividual’s goal orientation over a specified period of time. Thekey point made here is that the operationalization decision shouldbe clearly based on a rationale evaluation of the research purposein terms of a specified model of goal orientation.

New Directions for Goal Orientation Research

Achievement Goals, Goal Difficulty, and Goal Specificity

The MAT perspective of goal orientation espoused previouslyhighlights that behaviors in achievement contexts, collectivelylabeled as goal orientation, reflect the pursuit of achievement goalsover time. Other than the specific content of these goals andperhaps the level of the goals in a goal hierarchy, there is no reasonto believe that there is anything out of the ordinary or special aboutthese achievement goals. They function just like any other goal anindividual strives to obtain. Given this, it is important to considerthe integration of the substantial literature on goal setting with ourMAT perspective on the pursuit of achievement goals. In thiscontext, we are much more interested in self-set goals than themore common focus on assigned goals in the goal-setting litera-ture. However, because assigned goals have their effect on perfor-mance through self-set goals, the basic findings in this literaturehold for both self-set and assigned goals (e.g., Locke & Latham,1990, 2002).

What are the implications of goal-setting theory for the study ofgoal-oriented behavior? One very important point of overlap is theconcept of goal level or goal difficulty. Goal pursuits are notbinary decisions in which the individual either does or does notstrive for the goal. Instead, there are both intra- and interpersonaldifferences in the difficulty levels and the specificity of the goalsthat individuals strive to achieve. Thus, one person might adopt aperformance-approach goal and be content if his or her perfor-mance falls above the majority of people performing the task. Thesame person at a different point in time or an entirely differentperson might also adopt a performance-approach goal in the sameachievement context but strive to outperform 90% of the individ-

uals working on the same task. This information is importantbecause the goal-setting literature has clearly demonstrated thatindividuals who set more challenging and specific goals are likelyto invest greater effort, persist longer in pursuing the goal, andachieve higher levels of performance with respect to the goal beingpursued.

This means that to understand and predict an individual’s goal-oriented behavior in an achievement context, it is important tounderstand the goal being pursued, the difficulty level of the goalbeing pursued, and the specificity of the goal being pursued. Thisinformation would make it possible to distinguish individuals notonly with respect to the types of behavior enacted but also in termsof the intensity and persistence of effort exerted to achieve thedesired goal. When researching goal-oriented behavior, we recom-mend that individuals’ achievement goals be assessed along withthe difficulty and specificity of the adopted goal.

When assessing goal difficulty and goal specificity, it is impor-tant to recognize that the referent for evaluating performancerelative to the goal being pursued has been found to differ acrossthe achievement goals (e.g., Dweck, 1989). Individuals pursuingperformance–approach and performance–avoid goals are likely touse a normative standard when evaluating performance, whereasthose pursuing mastery goals are more likely to use self-referencedperformance or indexes of domain mastery (e.g., understanding achallenging genetics book) when evaluating performance. As anexample of this issue, consider the research conducted by Seijts,Latham, Tasa, and Latham (2004). Although the authors did spe-cifically intend to manipulate goal orientation, this is one of theonly studies in existence that has investigated issues of assigninggoal levels (difficulty) on performance and learning goals. In thisstudy, individuals were assigned a performance goal (“Your goalas the new CEO is to achieve 21% or more total market share bythe end of the simulation”) or a learning goal (“Past users of thesimulation have shown that a goal of identifying and implementingsix different strategies by the end of the simulation is difficult, yetattainable; thus, your goal as the new CEO is to identify andimplement six or more strategies to achieve market share by theend of the simulation”). This example highlights two importantissues. First, the assigned learning goal is referenced to normativeperformance and is, therefore, inconsistent with the self-referencedevaluations used by individuals pursuing mastery goals. The im-pact of using this reference when assigning a mastery goal isunclear, but it likely makes the normative aspects of the tasksalient and pushes individuals toward the adoption of performancegoals instead of mastery goals. To the best of our knowledge,Harackiewicz and Elliot (1998) provide the only existing exampleof simultaneously manipulating mastery and performance goalsand performance levels in a manner consistent with the appropriateperformance reference (i.e., normative vs. self-referenced). Sec-ond, the difference in the referential focus of mastery and perfor-mance goals (self vs. other) makes the comparison of goal diffi-culty across the different achievement goals very challenging. So,for instance, in the Seijts et al. (2004) research, it is impossible toknow whether the assigned standards for the learning and perfor-mance goals were of equal difficulty; therefore, comparing theperformance of these groups provides only limited information onthe efficacy of the manipulation.


Time Course of Goal-Oriented Actions

Mitchell and James (2001) emphasized that most theories ofhuman behavior and empirical investigations of these theories failto consider the dynamics of behavior over time. They providedcogent arguments concerning the likelihood of inferential errorswhen time is not explicitly incorporated into behavior theory andinvestigations and succinctly stated that

At the simplest level, in examining whether an X causes a Y, we needto know when X occurs and when Y occurs. More complex relation-ships may involve repeated incidents of X or Y or predicted changesin either X or Y, or both. Without theoretical or empirical guidesabout when to measure X and Y, we run the risk of inappropriatemeasurement, analysis, and ultimately, inferences about the strength,order, and direction of causal relationships. (p. 530)

Thus, perhaps the most important contribution of MAT to thestudy of goal orientation is the explicit incorporation of the dy-namics of goal-oriented behavior over time and situations based onthe goal activation conceptualization.

Goal Orientation and Action Identification

The intersection of goal orientation research and research onaction identification levels provides another fruitful area for futureinvestigations. Vallacher and Wegner (1985, 1989) have demon-strated that individuals vary, sometimes substantially, in theiridentification of actions. In other words, if you ask people whatthey are doing at a given point in time, some individuals tend toprovide high-level, abstract identifications (e.g., improving mypresentation skills), whereas others tend to provide concrete actionidentifications that represent actions much lower in the hierarchy(e.g., listening to the trainer). There is every reason to believe thatthis process operates similarly for achievement goal strivings. Ifso, coupling MAT with action identification theory results in anumber of interesting research predictions. For instance, individ-uals who identify goal-oriented actions at lower levels in the goalhierarchy should be more distractible and more likely to switch thepursuit of achievement goals over time in response to situationalchanges. This implies that individuals with lower level actionidentifications should be less likely to persist in the pursuit of agoal when difficulties are encountered. Similarly, based on thenotion of situational malleability of goal pursuits, individuals usinglow-level action identities should be more influenced by the socialnature of many tasks and, therefore, more likely to use normativeperformance as a reference and adopt performance-approach andperformance-avoid achievement goals. If these predictions holdtrue, then the factors that affect action identifications could proveto be potent levers for influencing the adoption and pursuit ofachievement goals.

Practical Implications of the MAT Perspective

The practical recommendations that we derive from MAT differfrom those existing in the current goal orientation literature in anumber of ways. First, MAT highlights that each individual likelyhas distinct patterns of higher order goal activations that interactwith situational features to determine achievement goal pursuits ata particular point in time. This dynamic Person � Situation inter-action model strongly suggests that the typical, one-size-fits-all

approach to managing human resources cannot be the optimal wayto interact with and motivate organizational members. Dependingon the relative activation (both temporary and chronic activation)of an individual’s higher level goals, one individual might view a360-degree feedback process as highly informative and useful,whereas another might view the same system as a strong threat toself-esteem or affiliation. In other words, the same human resourceprocess can result in very different behavioral outcomes dependingon the pattern of goal activation within the person. Tailored humanresource practices designed to heighten motivation are certainlynot a new idea. The fact that tailoring human resource practices toindividual differences in goal strivings or personality facets has notgained widespread acceptance and use suggests that organizationaldecision makers are currently content to motivate the averageemployee to a moderate extent. As the pace of change in organi-zations increases and the need for developing an adaptable, highlymotivated workforce increases, we believe there will necessarilybe a shift toward more optimal tailored systems. We now highlightthree more important practical implications of the MAT approachto achievement goal strivings.

Performance Versus Effectiveness

The typical treatment of performance in goal orientation re-search is often simplistic. Button et al. (1996) originally empha-sized that mastery orientation is generally a desirable focus forindividual development and growth that presumably would resultin future improvements in performance. However, at any giventime point, an individual may need to focus attention on perform-ing a task rather than continuing to explore the task, and so aperformance orientation may be desirable. The ensuing organiza-tional goal orientation literature seems to have ignored this per-spective and has almost uniformly endorsed the perspective thatindividuals’ mastery orientation should be enhanced. Some havegone so far as to recommend that individuals be selected intoorganizations based on their mastery orientation (e.g., VandeWalleet al., 2000). Consistent with Mitchell and James’s (2001) critiqueof most organizational research, this perspective fails to consideror evaluate the dynamics of performance over time.

In contrast, the dynamics inherent in the MAT perspective ofgoal-oriented behavior highlight that organizational decision mak-ers should focus on effectiveness rather than one-shot indexes ofperformance. We use the term effectiveness to refer to the multi-dimensional nature of performance over time (e.g., Hackman,1990). The concept of effectiveness is related to economic per-spective of capital, which refers to resources withheld from im-mediate consumption in the expectation of greater future returns(Drucker, 1985, p. 27). In this context, the relevant resource ishuman capital (Czikszentmihalyi, 2003). Czikszentmihalyi sug-gests that capital is built up through activities that stimulate in-creased complexity within a person (which he conceptualizes asdifferentiation and integration) and consumed through activitiesthat do not. As an example, consider a manufacturing team that hasthe highest quarterly production record but is incapable of highproduction in future quarters because the process has depleted theteam members’ ability to perform both individually and collec-tively in the future. This group performed well but is not consid-ered effective (Czikszentmihalyi, 2003; Hackman, 1990). Thus, by


effective, we mean performing well and amassing psychologicaland social capital that supports and enhances future performance.

Employee Well-Being

MAT is fundamentally a model of intraperson goals that at-tempts to explain individual differences in achievement strivingsas a function of individual differences in goal structures andsituational influences on goal activation levels. From this perspec-tive, it is interesting to note that the focus of virtually all practicalrecommendations in the organizational goal orientation literatureis on improving organizational productivity. This focus is partic-ularly surprising given the educational roots of goal orientationand the strong focus in that literature on structuring environmentsto optimize student learning and development for the sake of thestudents. In the organizational context, one must ask, “What hap-pened to the focus on developing the employee?” Rare exceptionsto this asymmetric treatment of the employee–employer relation-ship are mostly found in the excellent European research onemployee well-being and emotion work (e.g., Sonnentag, 2001;Zapf, 2002; Zapf, Seifert, Schmutte, Mertini, & Holz, 2001),work–family conflict (Zedeck, 1992), and occupational healthresearch (Quick & Tetrick, 2003).

The idea that organizations should play a role in promotingindividual and collective employee well-being is not new (e.g.,Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959; Maslow, 1965; Roeth-lisberger & Dickson, 1939). In fact, Division 14 of the AmericanPsychological Association changed its name from Industrial Psy-chology to Industrial–Organizational (I/O) psychology in part torecognize what Viteles (1944) described as “the growing concernof industrial psychologists with the sentiments, feelings, and atti-tudes of workers, supervisors, and managers, and with the inter-play of people in the social organization of the industrial enter-prise” (Highhouse, in press, p. 182). However, as statedpreviously, goal orientation research in I/O psychology focusesalmost entirely on the benefits accrued by the organization ratherthan on the outcomes for the person. This criticism is, of course,not unique to goal orientation research; I/O psychology has his-torically been criticized (both internally and externally) for valuingorganizational effectiveness more than well-being (Blum, 1955)and, relatedly, for being interested in the latter only insofar as itrelates to the former (Nord, 1977).

From a short-term organizational perspective, an optimalachievement goal profile is one that complements the organiza-tion’s strategy (i.e., the pattern or plan that integrates an organi-zation’s major goals, policies, and actions sequences into a cohe-sive whole; Quinn, 1980). Strategies are important because theyhelp the organization develop and maintain a competitive advan-tage by creating value in its production process (Porter, 1985).Thus, an organization is likely to be most often interested inencouraging the adoption of a mastery goal when idea generationand product development are needed and a performance-approachgoal when deadlines must be met. There is little reason to believethat an organization would ever benefit from having its membersadopt performance-avoid goals.

Based on MAT, optimal outcomes for the individual occur whenthe person either perceives little discrepancy between desired andactual standing on desired higher level goals such as agency,affiliation, or esteem or at least perceives that he or she is making

adequate progress toward reducing the perceived discrepancies. Asreviewed previously, when the individual’s standing on thesefundamental human goals is threatened or progress toward thesefundamental human goals is blocked, the individual will experi-ence anxiety, worry, stress, and, in extreme cases, debilitatingdepression. Thus, from the employee perspective, the adoption ofa performance-avoid goal and the use of behaviors to pursue thisgoal (e.g., self-handicapping, task disengagement, and off-taskcognitions) can be highly productive insofar as it protects theindividual’s self-esteem, agency perceptions, or affiliation goals.

We are not suggesting that organizations should structure them-selves to be enablers of individual goal pursuits. That particularutopian ideal has been tried, and it failed. Instead, we suggest thatin most cases a situation may be structured in such a way that boththe organization and the individual are able to make progresstoward their respective goals. To illustrate this point, further con-sider the training context. Here, the context factors are relativelyfixed: The desired state is learning, the amount of time allotted toachieve it is relatively lengthy, the length of time expected tomaintain it is relatively short, and the cost per error is relativelylow. Thus, in terms of organizational goals, the case for theadoption of a mastery goal (and thus the case for a mastery trainingcontext) is clear. However, from an individual’s perspective,adopting a mastery goal in this context is only functional iflearning the training content makes it possible to achieve higherlevel goals. The organization must be able to convince the em-ployee that adopting a mastery goal in this context will result inimproved standing on important goals more so than adopting adifferent achievement goal.

Climates for Effectiveness

A common recommendation in the organizational literature is todevelop climates that promote mastery orientation (e.g., Brett &VandeWalle, 1999; Ford & Oswald, 2003; VandeWalle & Cum-mings, 1997). At least two limitations are associated with thisperspective. First, the overemphasis on creating a climate formastery does not reflect organizational realities that frequentlyrequire employees to focus on performance instead of learning orgrowth. Second, current conceptualizations of goal orientation arenot rich enough to provide guidance on the aspects of organiza-tional practices that need to be modified to support an effectivegoal orientation climate. In contrast, MAT provides clear guidanceon both these aspects of goal orientation climates. By focusing oneffective performance over time, MAT highlights the dynamicinterplay of switching back and forth between the various achieve-ment goals in response to organizational realities. However, MATfurther emphasizes that the short-term switches in achievementgoals to meet organizational realities should not occur at thelong-term expense of employee well-being and human capital.Furthermore, MAT provides clear guidance on the aspects of theorganizational climate that need to be aligned with the goals of theindividual to promote this process. Rather than focusing on creat-ing a mastery orientation climate, we believe that organizationsshould cultivate environments that promote employee growth (e.g.,career pathing), support fairness perceptions and trust, facilitateorganizational processes and structures that specify clear paths tosuccess and behavioral boundaries, and provide public rewards foreffective behavior that demonstrate the social value of the em-


ployee and the behaviors exhibited by the employee. By support-ing the employee’s strivings toward these higher order goals, thefactors that lead employees to select nonoptimal goal pursuits,from the organization’s perspective, will be reduced.

Conclusions

The title of this article is purposefully ambiguous. Is the focuson goal orientation as an achievement motivation construct or ongoal-oriented behavior as a dynamic process that unfolds over timein achievement situations? Our primary point is that there is nodifference between these two conceptualizations of action. Goalorientation refers to the clusters of actions undertaken in thepursuit of achievement goals in specific situations. As such, goalorientation is best viewed as a specific instantiation of moregeneral models of self-regulation and action. In MAT, goal-oriented behavior results from constantly shifting activation levelsamong competing goals that provides a mechanism for modelingbehavior as a dynamic stream of choices (either conscious orunconscious) over time and situations.

The MAT perspective of goal orientation provides researcherswith a great deal of flexibility in the methods used to investigateantecedents and consequences of adopting particular achievementgoals (i.e., goal orientations). Manipulations that focus on enhanc-ing or suppressing the salience of goals central to the self andmanipulations that affect the expectancies connecting actions tothe desired higher level goals are both excellent ways to study theantecedents and consequences of goal orientation. Measuring nat-urally occurring levels of achievement goal pursuit with a focus oninter- or intrapersonal differences can substantially improve ourunderstanding of this critically important motivational process inboth artificial and natural environments. However, the flexibilityprovided by MAT comes at a very real cost. It is the responsibilityof the researcher to clearly identify the aspects of goal orientationunder investigation and to clearly limit inference to the aspects ofgoal orientation actually investigated.

There are numerous boundary conditions for the model pre-sented previously and even more unresolved questions. The MATapproach to goal orientation only addresses the pursuit of achieve-ment goals in situations perceived by the individual as emphasiz-ing achievement. Further, the MAT approach focuses on adultstrivings once the individual’s goal structure is already well estab-lished. The developmental history of this structure is not specifiedand is poorly understood. In addition to these boundary conditions,there are many unresolved issues that need to be incorporated intothe MAT perspective of goal orientation. First, there is no reasonwhy the goal hierarchy specified in Figure 1 should be the same forall individuals. The self goals are generally thought to be universal.The weights may differ, but every human is thought to pursuethese fundamental goals. However, lower level goals becomeincreasingly idiosyncratic, and at some point this could result inqualitatively different goal hierarchies. Second, the impact ofaffect and expected affect is not currently incorporated into themodel. Affective outcomes of goal achievement or goal frustrationare relatively straightforward. The differences in affective reac-tions to pursuit of approach and avoidance goals are also becomingincreasingly clear. What is entirely unclear is how affect impactssubsequent goal activation, goal linkages, attention, and actionselection in a dynamic process. Third, it is important to highlight

that there is currently no central executive in MAT or, for thatmatter, in any hierarchical model of goal-oriented self-regulation.The functioning of goal activation and action selection in MAT hasmore in common with the automatic functioning of neural net-works than conscious choice processes. The role of the executivein self-regulatory processes is currently not understood wellenough to be integrated into a self-regulatory model. These threemajor limitations of MAT are just a sample of the many areas thatneed further research before self-regulatory models can becomemore complete explanations of behavior.

To conclude, it is worthwhile to highlight the conspicuousabsence of empirical results in our literature review. After goingthrough every empirical piece of research we could identify, wearrived at the conclusion that an accurate representation of theempirical literature would be so highly contingent on the methodsused to study goal orientation that little useful information wouldactually be communicated. Even the generally accepted findingthat high levels of mastery orientation result in adaptive behaviorand positive outcomes and high levels of performance orientationresult in maladaptive behavior and poor outcomes can no longer beclearly supported from an empirical perspective. It is our hope thatMAT will provide a vehicle for future achievement motivation andgoal orientation research to operate from a more conceptuallygrounded perspective so that the antecedents and consequences ofthis important motivational process may be clearly identified.

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Received July 1, 2003Revision received June 10, 2005

Accepted June 27, 2005 �


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