NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS

United States vs Ang Tang Ho

Facts: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and

approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay

and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor

General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of

such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53

which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should

be sold at 63 centavos per ganta.

On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the

price of 80 centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The

sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of

the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment

plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation

of power to the Governor General.

Issue: Whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Held: By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is

left to the discretion of the Governor-General. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in

any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment

and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is

or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule

or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.

A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative

branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other

appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its

details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the

ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

PANAMA v RYAN

Facts: Section:9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized the

President of the United States to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign

commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced to withdrawn from storage in

excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state

law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer,

or other duly authorized agency of a State.

Any violation of an order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection

shall be punishable by a fine, not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment not to exceed six

months, or both.

The President issued the foregoing prohibition by Executive Order, and then authorized the

Secretary of Interior to exercise all of the powers vested in the President under

Section:9(c). The Secretary of Interior then issued regulations to carry out the Presidents

orders, which required all petroleum producers to file monthly statements, under oath,

with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior. Further, the President

approved a Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, and designated the

Secretary of Interior with all of the powers vested in him under the Act and the Code.

Section:9(c) was challenged on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power by Congress.

Issue: Was the delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) of the National

Industrial Recovery Act an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?

Held: Yes. The attempted delegation was plainly void because the power sought to be

delegated was legislative power, but nowhere in the statute did Congress declare or

indicate any policy or standard to guide or limit the President when acting under the

delegation.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO

626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement

of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.

On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was

then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it

violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority

provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is

unconstitutional.

The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in

order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of

carabaos.

He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president underAmendment number 6. While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be said that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap. Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company

Facts: The General Electric Company owned and was operating a broadcasting station at Schenectady, N. Y., when the Radio Act of 1927 went into effect. Thereafter it sought and obtained from the commission successive licenses under that act for the further operation of the station January 14, 1928, the company made application for a renewal of that license. The application was not acted upon until October 12, 1928, and then the commission ordered that a license be not issued with terms like those of the existing license, but that one be issued with other terms much less advantageous to the company and the communities which it was serving; the chief change being a pronounced reduction in the admissible hours of service The act of 1927, c. 169, 44 Stat. pt. 2, p. 1162 (47 USCA 81-119), was enacted as a regulation of interstate and foreign radio communication; and it is in such activities that the company's broadcasting station is used. The act authorized the commission to determine the question of public convenience, interest, or necessity; declares that decisions of the commission in all matters over which it has jurisdiction 'shall be final, subject to the right of appeal' therein given; provides ( section 16) that any applicant for a station license or the renewal of such a license, whose application is refused by the commission, may appeal from such decision to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia We think it plain from this re sume of the pertinent parts of the act that the powers confided to the commission respecting the granting and renewal of station licenses are purely administrative, and that the provision for appeals to the Court of Appeals does no more than make that court a superior and revising agency in the same field. The court's province under that provision is essentially the same as its province under the legislation which up to a recent date permitted appeals to it from administrative decisions of the Commissioner of Patents. ISSUE: Our jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is challenged. HELD: A proceeding in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia under the Radio Act of 1927, to review an order of the Radio Commission refusing an application for the renewal of an existing license for full time operation of a broadcasting station, is not a case or controversy within the meaning of the judiciary article of the Constitution, but is an administrative proceeding, and the decision therein is not reviewable by this Court. The court's province under that provision is essentially the same as its province under the legislation which up to a recent date permitted appeals to it from administrative decisions of the Commissioner of Patents

'The decision of the Court of Appeals under section 9 of the act of 1905 2 is not a judicial judgment. It is a mere administrative decision. It is merely an instruction to the Commissioner of Patents by a court which is made part of the machinery of the Patent Office for administrative purposes.' In the cases just cited, as also in others, it is recognized that the courts of the District of Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution but are legislative courts, and therefore that Congress may invest them with jurisdiction of appeals and proceedings such as have been just described. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only, and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. MERALCO v PASAY TRANSPORTATION Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final." Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the court requesting the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Meralco. Copies were sent to affected transportation companies including Pasay Tanspo Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final. The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, can act in that capacity. Held: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter. DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Pelaez vs. The Auditor General Facts: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part: The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress.

If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC. HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

SUFFICINECY OF STANDARDS People v. Rosenthal & Osmena Facts: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law. Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos. On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds one of which is: 1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional in any of the three grounds Held: The law is CONSTITUTIONAL on all grounds alleged by the appellants. The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person ,partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.

The maxim delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare has beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, in practically all modern governments. CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL

Facts: Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) with annual salary of P15,000.00. The NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949.

On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive Order No. 93

This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds:

a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.

b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and voidbecause it is as an illegal delegation of legislature power to executive, and was promulgated beyond the period of one year limited in said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void. And R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

HELD: The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation.

Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

People v. Jolliffe (1959) Facts: William Ernest Jolliffe is a canadian, born in China, permanently residing in HK. Son of former Chancellor of West China Union University and had been Trade Commissioner for Canada in Shanghai and HK. He made several trips to manila for business or to meet his wife and children. One day he came to Manila to collect on a debt from Woo. He was paid in cold which he hid under his shirt. On his way to his hotel room, he was acoosted by a secret service agent, Amanda Arimbay. The 4pcs of gold bullion and $100 travellers check was found on him. He does not deny he had no license to export the gold. He was arrested for violationg RA 265: An act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines SEC 34: whenever anyone willfully violates this act or any order legally issued by Monetary board, he shall be punished by imprisonment. CB Circular 21: any person desiring to export gold bullions must obtain license from Central Bank Jolliffe was arrested. He questioned validiy of Circular 21 for being an undue delegation of legistlative power. ISSUE: Whether or not CB 21 vaild? HELD: Yes. The rule is that the delegated power, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which sufficiently marks the field within which the administrator is to act so that it may be known wheteher he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will. In this case, Sec 74 of RA 265 conferred upon Monetary board and President the power:

subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to protect the international reserve of central bank

take such apporpirate remedial measures to protect the international stability of the peso

These powers must be exeriesed in relation to the objectives of the law creating the central bank which is to maintain monetary stability & promoto a rising level of production, employment, and income. These standards are sufficiently definite to vest in the deleagated authority the characteher of administraive details in the enforcment of the law.

Balbuna v Secretary of Education Facts: Members of the Jehovas Witnesses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the CFI of Capiz against the Sec. of Education, et al. It was to prevent the enforcement of Dept. Order No. 8 issued pursuant to RA 1265 promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools. The facts are the same with the Gerona case. It allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of speech, however, new issues have been raised this time such as:

it is an undue delegation of legislative power Is it unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power?

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power Held: The requirements in Sections 1 and 2 of the department order constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem. Specifically, to observe daily flag ceromony which shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem and rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony. In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public interest" The Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States

Facts: In 1935 the FDR administration sought to regulate the poultry industry through the National Industrial Recovery Act procured by the executive branch. Section:3 of the Act authorized the President to approve codes of unfair competition for trades and industries, and a violation of any code provision in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce was made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine.

The relevant portion of the law regulated the price of chickens as well as the eventual sale of unhealthy chickens Under this regulation, Plaintiff was convicted of 18 counts of selling unhealthy chickens. Petitioners contended that the Code had been adopted pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of legislative power.

Issue: Did Congress, in authorizing the codes of unfair competition establish the standards of legal obligation, thereby performing its essential legislative function?

Held: No. The code-making authority conferred was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Under Title 1, Section:1 of the Act there was a broad Declaration of Policy, and the Presidents approval of a code was simply conditioned on his finding that it would tend to effectuate the policy of this title. The Act imposed no limitations on the scope of the new laws, and there was a very wide field of legislative possibilities.

Section:3 of the Act was without precedent in that it supplied no standards for any trade, industry or activity. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorized the President to make the codes to prescribe them. Congress made an unconstitutional delegation because it vested in the President a clearly legislative function without imposing necessary standards and restrictions.