cdc sit awareness assessment

8/3/2019 Cdc Sit Awareness Assessment

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Bridging the GapsSituational Awareness and

Assessment

Public Health and RadiationEmergency Preparedness Conference

March 22, 2011CDC, Atlanta, Georgia


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Panel

Harvey Clark, PhD, Principal Scientist,DOE Remote Sensing Laboratory

Bill Irwin, ScD, CHP, Radiological Health

Chief, Vermont Department of HealthJames Kish, BS, Technological HazardsDivision Director, FEMA

Patricia Milligan, BS, Senior TechnicalAdvisor, Preparedness and Response,NRC


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The Setting for This Panel

We will discuss situational awareness and assessmenttools, and present questions about their value.We will describe their use by state and federal agenciesin radiological and nuclear emergencies which include: Nuclear power plant accidents;

Hostile actions radiological dispersion devices, radiologicalexposure devices, mass or individual poisonings;

Transportation incidents;

Nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear device (IND)detonations; and

Criticality accidents at nuclear facilities.Nevertheless, what is presented here can be applied inmost instances if you substitute the word chemical agentor biological agent for radiological agent.


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Situational Awareness andAssessment is Critical

Who in the public needs to know what when? Could it be that an informed populace generally responds more

constructively than if they only operate on informally obtainedinformation?

How much is too much to share?

How much of the status of operations should theemergency responders be provided? What is sufficient so they can see the whole of it and understand

their work relative to objectives?

Can too much information lead them to inappropriate action?What if the information is inaccurate, too complicated orpoorly presented?


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How the Public Builds SituationalAwareness

They will likely hear or see things about the situation in: Commercial media

Internet

Personal conversation

They might get some information from the government,e.g., public affairs, the communications office, the PublicInformation Officer (PIO) or other source.

Can a lack of timely and accurate information from thePIO or other party in possession of the facts leave thepublic vulnerable to acting on inadequate or wronginformation?


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And What about EmergencyResponders?

They have the same sources usually, the PIO,commercial media, internet and personalconversation, but they also ought to have: An Incident Action Plan (IAP);

Data products like maps, charts, graphs, field data,computer models and photographs; and

The guidance of technical advisors.

One of the challenges is getting information tofield offices that may not have sufficientresources including internet access and plottersfor printing large documents.


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What Information Depicts the Situation forthe Public and Emergency Responders?

Likely the same for each party, though that for the publicmay be limited in extent and detail: What happened;

What authorities are doing about it;

What people can do to help; What people can do to protect themselves;

What consequences are possible;

What consequences are likely knowing what we do at the time;

Where to go for help; and

Where to get additional information.Photos and videos feed the mind these days; we need touse them.


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Maps are Perhaps the Most UsefulMeans to Display Information

Where the incident occurred

Restricted areas with traffic control points

Emergency facilities available for thoseaffected including Community reception centers,

Congregate care facilities,

Medical countermeasures points ofdistribution, and

Available medical facilities.


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Maps are Perhaps the Most UsefulMeans to Display Information

Where inputs to the food chain are restricted, and

Critical infrastructure that is not currently accessible; Electric, water, communications and other utilities

Government offices, including police, fire and ambulance

Businesses, especially major employers Schools

Health care facilities

Farms

Food retailers and wholesalers

Road, rail, boat and air transportation thos open; those closed


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Dose Assessment Tools

Dose and contamination projection models.

RESRAD: A library of models for radiation andcontamination effects for most incidents

RASCAL: for nuclear power plant and spent fuelaccidents

A raft of other models from various government sitesand private firms, e.g. ALOHA, CAMEO, MARPLOT

Field team radiation and contaminationsurveillance data.

Aerial monitoring results.


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Dose Assessment Tools

Environmental instruments like EPAs RadNet, DOEsComprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitors, and those ofstates and local government. Standardized presentations how many times standards, how

many times background, actual units

The US is severely hampered by not adopting SI unitsconfusion is bad enough without having sieverts and rem, grayand rads, becquerrel and curies.

Emergency responder and public dose andcontamination records.

Emergency responder and public contaminated injuryrecords.Medical records for radiation overexposures.There are still privacy concerns to be met.


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But, Its Not Just About Dose

Weather It may have been a cause

It may make things better or worse

It affects dispersal and fallout of the agent

It affects the timeliness and nature of many elements of theresponse

It affects the terrain

Used and available beds for medical and special needspopulations.

Personal protective equipment inventories.Medical countermeasures inventories.

Emergency responder staffing rosters.


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One States Experience

Vermont and Empire 09


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Empire '0906/04 - Thank You from Vermont Health Commissioner Wendy Davis, MD (pdf)

05/29 -Vermont to Exercise Public Health Response to "Dirty Bomb"

This site documents the simulated events as they unfold. This is NOT a real event.

THIS IS AN EXERCISE. THIS IS NOT AREAL EVENT.

Status Update:

06/04 (1600) - Field Lab Tests on Some Crops Show Excess Contamination

06/03 (1000) - Field Measurements in Vermont Show Low Contamination So Far

06/02 (1100) - Statement by Department of Health Commissioner Wendy Davis, MD (pdf)

06/01 (1800) - Environmental Testing in Vermont Shows Low Contamination So Far

06/01 (0900) - Low Levels of Contamination Detected. Special Precautions for Vermonters

05/31 (2100) - Updated: Instructions for Vermonters

05/31 (1800) - Instructions for Vermonters

05/31 (1800) - Explosions in Albany, NY Confirmed to be Dirty Bombs

05/31 (1230) - Explosions in Albany, NY

Public Information Line:Dial 2-1-1 for Vermontinformation (2-1-1 monitoring exercise only)

Facts About Dirty Bombs (exit VDH) For Hospitals & Health Care Providers Facts about Americium-241

For Individuals and Families(exit VDH) Facts about Cesium-137 Radiological Field Testing

Frequently Asked Questions

Exercise News and Advisories

Vermont Department of Health | 108 Cherry Street | Burlington, VT 05402

Voice: 802-863-7200 | In Vermont 800-464-4343 | Fax: 802-865-7754 | TTY/TDD: Dial 711 firstVDH District Offices | Contact Us | Accessibility Policy (pdf) | Privacy PolicyA Vermont Government Website

2005 Vermont Department of Health. All rights reserved.

Publicinformation wasuseful forsituationawareness for

responders


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TheDepartment ofEnergy can getthese kinds ofmaps tosophisticatedfixed facilities.For field unitsto get them,

they must havelaptops and aircards. To usethem forbriefings orother display,

they needprinters orlarge monitors.


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A National Atmospheric ReleaseAdvisory Center (NARAC) data

product. Great for decision makers.What about other emergencyresponders? What about the public?How do you keep from confusing anyof these audiences with this uniquelanguage and unsettling and

mysterious source of exposure?


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The state has tested field teams which collect environmental samples for laboratoryanalysis for many years. The teams had no incident command structure, however,after they were deployed to forward camps. We asked Region 1 EPA to bring in an

Emergency Response Team. They provided us additional sampling teams and anICS structure. Their tent wasnt bad either.


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As teamsdeploy, wemust

maintainaccountabilityas well asprogresstowardmeeting

incidentobjectives

I dditi t h i lth f i ti l tf hi h d


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In addition to having a wealth of communications platforms which madeinternet communications possible, the EPA mobile command post also camewith a plotter that could be used to print large documents neede to providebriefings to large groups and to show activities taking place across the fourstate region affected by the RDDs in Albany, NY.


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The EPAdeployed itsRadNet units fordetailed beta and

gamma radiation,airborneradioactivitymeasurementsand basicweather which

are sent bywireless signalsto EPAheadquarters inWashington, DC.This one was at

the samplingbase camp.Others weredeployed toforward areas offallout deposition.


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States, even the biggest, are not likely to havesufficient people to do it all. We had to sample morethan 6,000 square miles that were modeled ascontaminated. How can you integrate federal andother state teams without situational awareness?

Some may require


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Some may requireteleconferencecapabilities to linkwidely Briefings arecritical. dispersed

assets. One briefinghere used a blackberryon speaker phone foran address to allemergencyresponders from a

high rankinggovernment official

Connecticut lent us their


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Connecticut lent us theirmobile radiochemistrylaboratory under the NewEngland Compact. We wereable to process high priority

samples right at the samplingbase camp. Who should hearthe sampling results?


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Geographical informationsystems (GIS) areinvaluable for displayingthe situation over layers of

critical infrastructure likehealth care facilities, firestations, ambulancefacilities, utilities, farms,reservoirs and roads.


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The Resources of the Department

of Energy and the FederalRadiological Monitoring and

Assessment Center (FRMAC)


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Radiological Assistance Program

8

7

5

8

7 4

32

16

2

2 Advise on radiological issues

First responder - arrives in 4-6 hours Assist with radioactive material recovery

Assist with the characterization of radiological incident


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Advisory Team

Provides coordinated advice andrecommendations on environment, foodand health matters to the Federal, state,

local and tribal governments.

Representatives from:

EPA - FDA CDC - USDA

Other Federal agencies as needed


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Mission: Get data from large area quickly, Fly high and fastActivation: 5 to 10 hours on site

Beech King Air B-200

Avg. post-flight data processing time: 1 hour Data Products: Breadcrumb overlay plot

Real-time data telemetry

AMS On-Call Response


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Fixed Wing Response Range


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Mission: Get more detailed data. Fly low and slowActivation: 8 to 20 hours to site

Bell-412 Data product: Contoured ground exposuremap

Data processing time: 3-4 hours

Intermediate phase product

AMS Radiological Mapping

Helicopter Response


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Operations 24 hours (for limited time)

Capabilities

Assessment Geographical Information

Systems

Health & Safety

Monitoring & Sampling

Five field teams

Logistics

Mission: Initial field element of FRMAC

Activation: 4 hours following notification

CM Response Team I


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Additional responders

24-hour/day operation for several weeks

Augmented monitoring, sampling andassessment

Additional equipment

20 field teams

Laboratory Analysis

Sample receipt Prepare samples for transport to labs

Training for additional responders

Mission: Complete CMRT staffing for full 24-hour operations

Activation: 12 hours following notification

CM Response Team II


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Data Products Cycle

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Automated Web-Initiatedor via Emergency Call;Only know release timeand location

Example revised data: Updatedsource location, detailed weather

Cycle ofnew

productsbased onupdatedsets of

measure-ments

Source scaled to initialset of measurements

Set 3. The model is compared witha few initial field measurements to

make an initial estimate of theamount released

Set 4. A health-effects plotis developed based on asource term estimatedfrom field measurements

Set 5. We use more extensivesets of field measurements to

improve the accuracy of thesource term calculation

Later sets:We develop

Relocation andFood-Ingestion plots

Set 2. Revised eventdata used to produce

quality assured reach-back plots

Set 1. An initial automatedplot shows downwind

location only with noestimate of health effects


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Briefing Products

Critical to explain for each

Data Product

What decisions or actionsare being addressed

Key points they should takeaway

Actions that should beconsidered

Assumptions and limitationsof Data Product

How each Data Product fits

into the overall situation


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FRMAC

NARAC

CMHT

AMS

RAP

CMRT I& II

CMAugmen

t

REAC/

TS

A-TeamEPA

DHS/

FEMA

DoD

NRC

NNSA

FBI

State,Tribes,Local

FRMAC Participation


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Transfer from DOE to EPA

At a mutually agreeable time

After consultation with DHS, the JFO CoordinationGroup, state, local, and tribal officials

The following conditions are to be met beforetransfer: Immediate emergency condition is stabilized

Offsite release of radioactive material has ceased

Offsite radiological conditions have been characterized

Initial long-range monitoring plan has been developed

Other Federal agencies will commit required resources


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Environmental Protection Agency

Assist with non-radiological hazards Such as chemical spills, hazardous materials fires,

accidental hazmat releases due to radiological event

Coordinate off-site cleanup activities with NRC

with appropriate jurisdiction

Eventually close FRMAC in time and transitionto EPA-only or other monitoring program


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CM / FRMAC ContactInformation

Colleen OLaughlinNNSA / NSO - 702-295-0648

[email protected]

FRMAC Program Informationhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/

frmac/default.htm

Emergency Response Numbers (24-hr)NNSA / HQ 202-586-8100

NARAC 925-422-7627
mailto:[email protected]://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac/default.htmhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac/default.htmhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac/default.htmhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac/default.htmhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac/default.htmmailto:[email protected]


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Manuals

FRMAC Operations Manual Oct. 2010

This manual describes the Federal Radiological Monitoring and

Assessment Centers (FRMAC) response activities in a major

radiological emergency

FRMAC Assessment Manuals (2 volumes) April 2010

These manuals provide the scientific basis and methods forassessment calculations

FRMAC Monitoring Manuals (2 volumes) Dec. 2005

These manuals provide the monitoring and sampling methodsfor a radiological response


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Manuals (cont)

FRMAC Laboratory Analysis Manual Dec.2005 This manual provide general guidance relating to

sample tracking and analysis

FRMAC Health and Safety Manual May 2001 The manual describes how radiological health and

safety plans will be implemented for FRMAC

Link:http://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/default.htm
http://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/default.htmhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/default.htmhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/default.htmhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/default.htm


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NRC Incident

Response Program


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Typical Response Process

Local

Support or Response

State

Support or Response

Federal

Support or Response

Incident


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National Response Framework

DHS designatesg. Other types of incidents not otherwise addressed above

DOD or DOEf. Nuclear weapon accident/incident (based on custody at time of event)

(1) DHS/USCG

(2) EPA

e. Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material:(1)Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material incertain areas of the coastal zone(2)All others

(1) NASA or DOD(2) DHS/USCG(3) EPA

d. Space vehicles containing radioactive materials:(1)Managed by NASA or DOD(2)Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone(3)All others

(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(2) DHS/USCG

(4) EPA

c. Transportation of radioactive materials:(1)Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE(2)Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials(3)Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are notlicensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see USCG list ofresponsibilities for further explanation of certain areas)(4)All others

(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(3) EPA

b. Nuclear facilities:(1)Owned or operated by DOD or DOE(2)Licensed by NRC or Agreement State(3)Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an AgreementState, or currently or formerly licensed, but of which the owner/operator is notfinancially viable or is otherwise unable to respond

(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(3) DOE

a. Radiological terrorism incidents (e.g. RDD/IND or Radiological Exposure Device):

(1)Material or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE(2)Material or facilities licensed by NRC or Agreement State(3)All others

Coordinating AgencyType of Incident


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NRC Roles & Responsibilities

Monitor and independently assess licensees actions.

Serve as an independent source of information, advice andtechnical analyses for State.

Determine if the incident meets criteria for ExtraordinaryNuclear Occurrence.

Coordinate Federal response and provide Federal support forlicensee, State, and locals.

Support other Federal agencies.

Coordinate public information for the Federal Government.


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NotificationsNotifications typically are made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center

[(301) 816-5100]Although licensees are required to classify events as described in theiremergency plans, the NRC response may vary based upon an evaluation ofthe situation; not solely upon the classification

Event Notification

Headquarters Operations

Officer Assesses information,

then makes notifications

Headquarters Emergency

Officer determines if HQ

management needs to benotified

Regional Duty Officer

appropriate regional

management/decision

makers

Notification to other

Federal agencies

Notification to State

agencies


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NRC Incident Response Modes &Locations

ResponseModes:

Normal

Monitoring

Activation Expanded

Activation

Headquarters

Operations Center

On-Scene

Site Team

Regional

Incident Response Center


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Management

Technical Assessment

Security / Safeguards

Protective Measures

Liaison

Public Information

Response Coordination

Functional Response Organization


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Joint Field Office

NRC Senior Officialswould support the

Unified CoordinationGroup


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State

Advisory Team(EPA, HHS, USDA)

Senior NRC Official

DOE FRMAC

Field Monitoring Data

Principal Federal Official

FRMAC

JointFieldOffice

Laboratories

NRCHeadquarters

Team

(Director)

NRC Site Team

(Site TeamDirector)

Regional BaseTeam

(Base TeamManager)

Onsite

Remote

NRC Field Interfaces


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NRC Incident ResponsePost-Plume Phase Staffing

NRC Senior Official

ResponseCoordination

Leader

ProtectiveMeasures

BranchLeader

GovernmentLiaisonLeader

Public AffairsLeader

Site TeamDirector


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NRC Ingestion Pathway Team Responsibilities

Assess the adverse consequences of the incident to thegeneral population and the environment

Evaluate the protective actions being considered, providing anassessment, and as appropriate, a recommendation to the SiteTeam Director

Ensure that NRC radiological information is coordinated withother Federal and offsite decision-making authorities

Together with Department of Homeland Security (DHS)representatives, coordinate and/or provide Federal assistanceto the State, to assess radiological conditions


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NRC Ingestion Pathway Team Responsibilities(continued)

Coordinate relocation to the Federal Radiological Monitoringand Assessment Center (FRMAC)

Coordinate the dispatch of the Advisory Team for Environment,Food, and Health (ATEFH) to the site

Coordinate the development of Federal positions on protectiveactions and assessment of radiological conditions withDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) representatives

National Response


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National ResponseFramework

DHS designatesg. Other types of incidents not otherwise addressed above

DOD or DOEf. Nuclear weapon accident/incident (based on custody at time of event)

(1) DHS/USCG

(2) EPA

e. Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material:(1)Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material incertain areas of the coastal zone(2)All others

(1) NASA or DOD(2) DHS/USCG(3) EPA

d. Space vehicles containing radioactive materials:(1)Managed by NASA or DOD(2)Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone(3)All others

(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(2) DHS/USCG

(4) EPA

c. Transportation of radioactive materials:(1)Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE(2)Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials(3)Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are notlicensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see USCG list ofresponsibilities for further explanation of certain areas)(4)All others

(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(3) EPA

b. Nuclear facilities:(1)Owned or operated by DOD or DOE(2)Licensed by NRC or Agreement State(3)Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an AgreementState, or currently or formerly licensed, but of which the owner/operator is notfinancially viable or is otherwise unable to respond

(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(3) DOE

a. Radiological terrorism incidents (e.g. RDD/IND or Radiological Exposure Device):

(1)Material or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE(2)Material or facilities licensed by NRC or Agreement State(3)All others

Coordinating AgencyType of Incident


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The Federal Emergency

Management Agency

cdc sit awareness assessment

Documents