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CountryReport

Italy

TinaMagazzini

November2019

http://grease.eui.eu

This Country Report offers a detailed assessment of religious diversity and violentreligiousradicalisationintheabove-namedstate.Itispartofaseriescovering23countries(listedbelow)onfourcontinents.Morebasicinformationaboutreligiousaffiliationandstate-religion relations in these states is available in our Country Profiles series. ThisreportwasproducedbyGREASE,anEU-fundedresearchproject investigatingreligiousdiversity,secularismandreligiouslyinspiredradicalisation.Countriescoveredinthisseries:Albania,Australia,Belgium,BosniaandHerzegovina,Bulgaria,Egypt,France,Germany,Greece, Italy,Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon,Lithuania,Malaysia,Morocco,Russia,Slovakia,Spain,Tunisia,TurkeyandtheUnitedKingdom.

TheGREASEprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion'sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementnumber770640

ItalyCountryReportGREASE

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TheEU-FundedGREASEprojectlookstoAsiaforinsightsongoverningreligiousdiversityandpreventingradicalisation.Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, theMiddle East, Asia and Oceania,GREASEis investigatinghowreligiousdiversity isgoverned inover20countries.Ourwork focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices thatmay (ormay not) proveuseful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on howdifferent societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities andmigrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can begovernedsuccessfully,withanemphasisoncounteringradicalisationtrends.Whileexploringreligiousgovernancemodelsinotherpartsoftheworld,GREASEalsoattemptstounravel theEuropeanparadoxofreligiousradicalisationdespitegrowingsecularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failedbecausesecondgenerationyouthhavebecomemarginalisedandradicalised,withsometurning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovativeacademic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights forgovernanceofreligiousdiversity.TheprojectisbeingcoordinatedbyProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidoufromTheEuropeanUniversityInstitute(EUI)inItaly.OtherconsortiummembersincludeProfessorTariqModood fromTheUniversityofBristol (UK);Dr.H.A.Hellyer from theRoyalUnitedServices Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr.MilaMancheva from The Centre for the Study ofDemocracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Racius from Vytautas Magnus University(Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA(Germany);ProfessorMehdiLahloufromMohammedVUniversityofRabat(Morocco);Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation(Turkey); Professor PradanaBoy ofUniversitasMuhammadiyahMalang (Indonesia);Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research DevelopmentCentre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University(India);andProfessorMicheleGrossmanofDeakinUniversity(Melbourne,Australia).GREASEisscheduledforcompletionin2022.ForfurtherinformationabouttheGREASEprojectpleasecontact:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidou,[email protected]

http://grease.eui.eu/GREASE-Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingTogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectives


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Contents

RELIGIOUSGOVERNANCEINITALY:SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICCONTEXT,THEROLEOFTHECATHOLICCHURCHANDRADICALISATIONCHALLENGES.............................................................4

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................4SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICCONTEXT......................................................................................................................5MAINTRENDSANDCHALLENGES.....................................................................................................................9

HISTORICALBACKGROUNDOFSTATE-CHURCHRELATIONSANDCURRENTINSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORK:AMBIGUITYASTHENORM.......................................................10

CHURCH-STATERELATIONS’ROLEINITALY’SNATION-BUILDING...............................................................10CURRENTREGULATORYFRAMEWORK:AMBIVALENCEASTHENORM..........................................................11

VIOLENTRELIGIOUSRADICALISATIONCHALLENGESANDPOLICIESRESPONSES.............13

CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................14

REFERENCES................................................................................................................................................15


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Religious governance in Italy: socio-demographic context, the role of the Catholic church and radicalisation challenges

Introduction Italyrepresentsapeculiarcasewithrespecttothegovernanceofreligion,inthatitcouldbesaidthatChurch-Staterelationsareolderthanthestateitself.AnarticleintheNYTimesoncelabelledItalyas“theEuropeannationwherereligionandstatehavemingledmost”,claimingthat

“thedebateoverchurchandstatehasnotstoppedfor1,700years,inthisnationwith a public Christian heritage stretching back to theEmperorConstantine’s conversion early in the fourth century, where aneighbourhoodinRomeisitsowncountryandseatoftheRomanCatholicChurch.Thoseyearsseemtohavelentenoughtimeandhardexperienceforchurchandstatetosettleintoanalmostindistinctwhole,wheretheveryrealsecularizationinItalyinthelastfewdecadesisbalancedbyitshistory, culture, architecture and, even though church attendance hasdeclinedsignificantly,faith.”(Fisher2004).

Yet,Italyhasbeenaunifiednationstateforlessthan160yearsold.ThecityofRomeonlybecamepartofItalyin1870,andthecountry’sunificationwasnotreallycompleteduntil after the FirstWorldWar, when in 1918 the territories of Venezia Giulia andTrentino(previouslybelongingtotheAustro-HungarianEmpire)wereannexed.ThisreportfocusesoncontemporaryItaly,itschallenges,theexistingofficialrecognitionof (or lack thereof) religious groups and the regulations between the state and thedifferentconfessionspracticedbyvariousreligiouscommunities,oldandnew.Itwouldhoweverbedifficult tomake senseof Italy’s current institutional asset and religiousgovernancewithoutconsideringthecentralrolethattheCatholicChurchandtheVaticanStatehaveplayedover thecenturies,particularly in Italy’snation-buildingandstate-building.In the following sections I will therefore first provide an overview of the currentchallengesandopportunities in the fieldof religiousdiversitygovernance.Thesearenamely the country’sdemographics and the changing compositionof thepopulation,mostlyduetoanagingpopulation,recentmigration(bothofItalianyouthleavingthecountryandofimmigrantflowsarrivingfromEUrecentmemberstatesaswellasfromAfrica, Asia and South America) and the significant economic, political and culturalregionaldifferencesacrossItaly.InordertounderstandtheNorth-Southdivide,theroleoftheCatholicchurchinwelfareprovisionandtheimportanceofthefamilyinthecontextofanunstableeconomy,the


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second sectionprovides a historical backgroundof state-organised religion relationsand analyses the current institutional framework that governs religion and religiousdiversitytoday.The third sectionmoves to examine themainviolent religious radicalisation threats,exploreswhytherehavebeenrelativelyfewincidentsofthiskindsofar,andwhatkindofpoliciesandpracticeshavebeenputinplacetopreventandtotacklethem.Eventhoughthemediaandsomepoliticalparties’discourseshave,inrecentyears,madean instrumentalusageofreligionforpoliticalgains(mainlybypanderingtoa fearofforeignersandofMuslims)contributingtowidespreadperceptionsofinsecurity,todatetherehavebeennovictimsofviolentreligiousextremisminItaly.Whathasbeen,andcontinuestobeanongoingthreat,isratherviolencetiedtoorganisedcrime(whichhasalonghistoryandveryautochthonousroots)andhatecrimerootedinextremeright-wingideology.Theconclusionsaimatbrieflysummarisingthevarioussectionsandtoprovidepointersregardingpossibleavenuesforfutureresearchandformeaningfulcomparisons.

Socio-demographic context Italy’spopulation,accordingtothelastofficialcensus(ofDecember2017),isofslightlyless than60millionandahalf inhabitants,whichplaces it roughly in samegroupasFranceandtheUK.WhatisnoteworthyofItaly’sdemographicsishoweverthatwhileinthe1980sitspopulation(at56,5million)wasslightlylargerthantheFrenchandBritishones,ithaspracticallystagnatedsince,whilebothFranceandtheUKcountnowaround67millioninhabitants.

Italy’sbirthrate,afterademographicboomthatlastedfromtheendoftheSecondWorldWar to the 1970s, has been declining for decades, leading governments across thepolitical spectrum to raise the alarm about the country’s aging population. Despitecampaignssuchasthecontroversial‘Fertilityday’and‘NationalFertilityPlan’promotedby theMinistryofHealth in2016,or the ‘natalityplan’announcedby the firstContegovernment(June2018–September2019),theurgencyandconcernoverItaly’sagingpopulation have however so far involved more political statements than concretemeasures in terms of social policy or welfare reform (Markoviti and Molokotos-Liederman,2017).While the overall size of Italy’s population has remained fairly stable over the pastdecades, its compositionhasnot. Frombeinga large-scale emigration country in thenineteenth and twentieth centuries1 , it has only in the past few decades become adestination country formigrants coming fromCEE countries,NorthAfrica and LatinAmerica.AsSimonMcMahonpointedout,inItalytheundergroundlabourmarketshaveprovided employment opportunities for immigrants (albeit often in precarious,

1 An estimated 13 million Italians emigrated and permanently settled in their host countries between 1880 and 1976 (Ben-Ghiat and Hom 2016) and by the late 1970s an estimated 25 million Italians were residing abroad (King, 1978), even though a Registry of Italians Resident Abroad (A.I.R.E.) was not created until 1988, now counting approximately 5 million registrations.


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irregularandtemporaryconditions)regardlessoftheirlegalstatus,fosteringhighlevelsofundocumentedmigrantsthathavebeenaddressedthroughadhoc,butfairlyregular,amnesties(in1986,1990,1995,1998,2002and2009)(McMahon2015,p.6).

Table1.Italy’spopulationpyramidbyageandgender(2018)2

Arguably immigration is, togetherwitha lowbirthrate, thedefiningcharacteristicofItaly’spopulation shift in the twenty-first century. It is a trend thatholdsbothgreatpromise (as most migrants are younger than the average Italian population andimmigrantfamiliestendtohaveahigherbirthratethantheaverageItalianfamily)aswell as challenges (mostly tied to the fear held by part of the population of being‘replaced’,bothintheincreasinglyprecariousjob-marketaswellasintermsofculturalpractices, andwhichhas led to a riseof racist attitudesboth in society aswell as inpoliticalpartyrepresentatives).

2 Data based on the Italian Statistical Office (Instituto Nazionale di Statistica, ISTAT), available at http://www4.istat.it/


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Table2.ChangesintotalpopulationandpercentageofforeignresidentsinItaly(2004-2017)3Year Totalpopulation Foreignresidents %2004 58.462.375 1.990.159 3,42005 58.462.375 2.402.157 4,12006 59.131.287 2.670.514 4,52007 59.619.290 2.938.922 52008 60.045.068 3.432.651 5,82009 60.340.328 3.891.295 6,52010 60.626.442 4.235.059 72011 59.394.207 4.570.317 7,52012 59.685.227 4.052.081 6,82013 60.782.668 4.387.721 7,42014 60.795.612 4.922.085 8,12015 60.665.551 5.014.437 8,22016 60.589.445 5.026.124 8,32017 60.483.973 5.046.994 8,3

Thedataregardingreligionidentificationisneithersystematicallycollectednoreasilyavailable.As elsewhere, thenational census includesnoquestionaimedat collectingdataonreligiousaffiliation,andeventhoughanumberofsurveyshavebeenconductedby thePewResearchCentre,aswellasby Ipsos,Eurispesand theEurobarometer inrecentyears,theyallusedifferentquestions,samplesandmethodologies,whichmakecomparisonsunreliable.

Intermsofgeneraltrends,however,allsurveysshowadeclineinthepercentageofthosewho declare themselves Catholic, and the most comprehensive study, which isconductedyearlybasedonasampleof60,000interviews(Ipsos),hasdocumentedoverthelastdecade(1)ariseofabout10%inthenumberofpeoplewhoidentifyasnon-religious—whichcoincideswithadecreaseinthosewhodeclarethemselvesCatholic—aswellas(2)anincreaseofreligiousaffiliationsotherthanCatholicfrom1,6%to3%.

Table3.ChangesintotalpopulationandpercentageofforeignresidentsinItaly(2007-2017)

Year Catholics(%) Non-believers/atheists(%)

Otherreligions(%)

2007 85,4 13 1,62008 87 11,4 1,62009 84 14,2 1,82010 83,2 14,5 2,32011 81,9 15,6 2,52012 80,7 16,8 2,52013 81 16,5 2,52014 80,2 17,2 2,62015 78,4 18,9 2,72016 77 20,1 2,92017 74,4 22,6 3,0

3 Data based on the Italian Statistical Office (Instituto Nazionale di Statistica, ISTAT), available at http://www4.istat.it/


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Ofthosewhoself-identifyasCatholic,mostclaimtogotoChurch‘occasionally’(35%ofthe overall population in 2017), while approximately 27% of the total populationdeclaredtobeafrequentchurch-goerortobeactivelyinvolvedinchurchactivitiesin2017.

Other than the above-mentioned surveys, one available indicator of the role thatreligiosityplays in contemporary Italian society is thenumberof religiousweddingsversus thenumber of civilweddings. Theproportionwent from98,34%of religiousweddings in1948 to50,49%of religiousweddingsversus49,51%of civilweddings.Morenoteworthy than the shift from religious to civilweddings is however that theoverallnumberofweddingshasdecreasedsignificantly,withmorecoupleschoosingnottogetmarriedatall.

Table4.Numberofreligiousweddings(inblue)andofcivilweddings(inorange)from1948to20174

Regardingforeignresidents,approximatelyonethirdidentifiesasMuslim,around30%asChristianOrthodox,andaround18%asCatholic,whichisnotsurprisingconsideringthatthemainsendingcountriesareMorocco,Romania,BulgariaandUkraine.

Table5.ReligiousaffiliationofimmigrantsresidinginItaly(2018)5Religion Members %Orthodox 1.523.300 29,6Catholics 918.100 17,8Protestants 224.400 4,4OtherChristiandenominations 39.900 0,8Muslisms 1.682.600 32,7Jews 4.600 0,1Induists 152.500 3

4 Data based on ISTAT figures. 5 Data based on the Statistical Dossier on Immigration of 2018, available at https://www.dossierimmigrazione.it/


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Buddhists 117.200 2,3OtherEastAsianreligions 83.700 1,6Atheists 241.700 4.7Traditionreligions 65.300 1,3Other 90.700 1,7

Main trends and challenges WhathastherelativelyrecentshiftfromanemigrationtoanimmigrationcountrymeantforItaly’sreligioustraditions,church-staterelations,andreligiousgovernance?

Aswehaveseen,whileCatholicismremainsthemostwidespreadandwell-establishedmajority religion in the country—to the point that the historian Paul Ginsborg hasdefinedItalyasacountrycharacterisedbyafeelingof“widespreadreligion”[religionediffusa](Ginsborg2006)—thepercentageofItalianswhoidentifyasCatholicshasbeenslowly but steadily declining, as is the case inmostWestern European countries. Ofthese,evenlessself-identifyas‘practicingCatholics’.

It can therefore be said that,with secularisation as a backdrop, immigration to Italyincreasesthepercentageofreligiousmembersofthepopulation,sinceestimatesfrom2017and2018seeonly4,7%offoreignersresidinginItalyidentifyingas‘atheistsoragnostic’,againsta22,6%of Italiancitizens thatdeclare themselvesasnon-religious.Thenoveltyandperceivedthreatonbehalfofthemajorityhashoweverlittletodowithwhetherimmigrantsarereligiousornot,astheconcernissquarelywithmigrantsfromnon-Catholiccountries.

AsGulioErcolessihaswritten

“Italians considered themselves ‘naturally’ non-racists. Throughout theyears of the civil rights struggles in the U.S., and during the years ofapartheidinSouthAfrica,theItalianmediainparticularoftenshowedasense of superiority and considered their Catholic and/or humanisticheritageasortofinsuranceagainsteverypossibleracistviruswithintheirownranks.TheillusionfadedonceItaliansocietybecamemorediverse.”(Ercolessi,2009,p.17)

TheconsequenceofinstitutionalracismandofageneralisedincapacitytoacknowledgeandtoacceptimmigrantMuslimminoritieshastranslatedintoseriousdiscriminationstowardmembersofminorityreligionsingeneralandofMuslimsinparticular.

If,untilthelate1990s,themainchallengesrelatedtoreligiousgovernanceinItalyhadtodowiththeobstaclesinadvancingcivilrightsthattheCatholicchurchopposed(suchasabortionrights,LGBTequalrights,andsoon)andprotectingthefreedomofthenon-religiousminorityfromCatholicreligion(moreonthisbelow,seetheLautsiv.Italycase),thecountrynowfacesadualchallenge.

While the threat ofmajority religious norms being imposed on atheists or agnosticspersists(forinstance,whileaccessinglegalabortionsisarightaccordingtoLawno.194of 22May1978, the right of doctors to opt out fromproviding thembased on their


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religious conscience, effectively renders the norm void in certain regions), thediscriminationintreatmentbetweendifferentreligionsisalsoaseriousissue.

Such disparity between the privileges (economic, legal, mediatic and more) of theCatholicchurchandthelimitedrecognitionofminorityreligionswillonlycontinuetowidenandbecomemoreevidentduetotheincreasinglydiversereligiouscompositionoftheItaliansociety,unlesstheinstitutionalframeworkonwhichsuchdisparitiesarebased is reformed. In order to understand how the state relationswith the Catholicchurchcametoevolveintothecurrentinstitutionalframework,abriefoverviewofthehistoricalbackgroundmustbeprovided.

Historical background of state-church relations and current institutional framework

Church-State relations’ role in Italy’s nation-building TheCatholicchurchinItalyhasalwaysbeen,aboveandbeyondareligiousinstitution,apoliticalone.Oneofthevastestandmostpowerfulentitiesinthepeninsula,thePapalStatescontrolledmostofwhatisnowconsideredcentralItalyforaboutamillennium6andplayedacrucialroleintheformationoftheItalianstate.EventhoughmostofitsterritorieswerelosttotheKingdomofSardiniain1861(whenKingVittorioEmanueleIIofSardiniawasproclaimedKingof Italy),Turinwasdeclared Italy’scapital—sinceRomeandLaziowerenotyetpartofItaly.

TheKingdomofSardinia,whichalreadyin1848hadrecognisedequalcivilandpoliticalrightstoJewsandWaldesians,favouredaseparationofstateandreligion,despitemanyofthepoliticalleadersoftheItalianRisorgimentobeingreligious(andoftenCatholics)intheirprivatelives.

WhenItaliantroopsconqueredRomein1870,puttinganendtothetemporalpowerofthePope,theso-called‘leggedelleguarentigie’[statuteoftheguaranties]waspassedtoensuretheindependenceanddiplomaticstatusoftheHolySee.However,thethen-PopePiusIXretreatedtotheVatican,wherehedeclaredhimselfa‘prisoner’,excommunicatedthekingandtheleadersoftheItaliangovernmentandordered‘goodCatholics’nottorecognise its legitimacy and to abstain from participation in Italian political life andparliamentaryelections(nonexpeditpolicy)(Ercolessi,2009;Kertzer,2015).

Eventhoughthe1848AlbertineStatute(theconstitutionof thepreviousKingdomofSardinia,adoptedbytheKingdomofItalyin1861)consideredCatholicismtheofficialreligionofthestate,itadoptedaregimeofseparationbetweenchurchandstatebasedontheprincipleofindividualfreedom.

ThismeantthatthefirsthalfcenturyoftheItalianstatewascharacterisedbytheabsenceofCatholicfactionsinpolitics,sincethenonexpeditwasonlydefinitelyrevokedin1918,

6 Beyond the Lazio region, the Papal States controlled the Marche, Umbria, and most of Emilia-Romagna.


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eventhoughin1905PiusXhadmodifieditsothatthebishopscouldaskforasuspensionoftheruleincaseoftheneedtopreventtheelectionofa‘subversive’candidate.

In the general elections of 1919 a Catholic party, the Partito Popolare, participated,obtainingapproximately20%ofthevotes,whichwasabolishedasallotherpartiesbytheFascistdictatorship in1929.Thatverysameyear,however, theHolySeeandtheItalianKingdom signed the LateranTreaty,which created theVaticanCity State andrestoredmanyof theprerogativesof thechurch, to thepoint thatPiusXIreferredtoMussoliniasthemanofprovidence(Kertzer,2015).

WhileItaly’sregulatoryframeworkhasbeenslowlychanginginresponsetodiversity,acknowledging some religiousminorities through ad-hoc agreements that provide acertaindegreeof legalrecognitionandtheaccesstopublicspacesandtaxprovisionsthatcomewithit,thefundamentalregulatoryframeworkhasremainedthatof1929.TheadhocagreementsbetweenminorityconfessionsandtheItalianstatehingethereforeonthepoliticalwillonbehalfofthestate,aswellasonthecapacityofminorityreligionstospeakwithasinglevoice.ThishastranslatedintothefactthatMuslims,whicharedivided between various religious associations, despite representing the largestreligious minority of approximately 1.5 million, have not yet obtained an officialrecognitionasareligionbytheItalianstate.

Current regulatory framework The1848AlbertineStatute,Italy’sfirstconstitutionaldocument,recognisedCatholicismasthestate’sofficialreligion,yetalsodeclaredthetolerationof“othercurrentlyexistingconfessions”.Such ‘toleration’waserodedandeventuallycompletelydoneawaywithunder fascism, despite an initial formalwindow-dressingwith the so-called “Lawonallowedworships”(lawn.11593/1929)passedinthesameyearastheLateranTreaty.

Matters of religious freedom are to be found in the current Constitution of 1947 atarticles2,3,8,19and20,whichread:

“2:TheRepublicshallrecogniseandprotecttheinviolablerightsoftheperson,bothasanindividualandinthesocialgroupswherehumanpersonalityisexpressed.[…]

3:Allcitizensshallhaveequalsocialdignityandshallbeequalbeforethelaw,withoutdistinction of gender, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and socialconditions.[…]

8:Allreligiousdenominationsshallbeequallyfreebeforethelaw.DenominationsotherthanCatholicismshallhavetherighttoself-organisationaccordingtotheirownstatutes,providedthesedonotconflictwithItalianlaw.

19: Everyone shall be entitled to profess freely their religious beliefs in any form,individuallyorwithothers,andtopromotesuchbeliefsandcelebrateritesinpublicorinprivate,providedtheyarenotoffensivetopublicmorality.


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20:No special limitation or tax burden shall be imposed on the establishment, legalcapacity or activities of any organisation on the ground of its religious nature or itsreligiousorconfessionalgoals.”

Despitesuchprovisions,one tellingcontroversy thatprovidesagoodexampleof thekindofdebatestillongoinginItalyregardingfreedomofreligioninsocietyistheLautsiv. Italycase.ThecasewasraisedbyMrs.Lautsi,whocomplainedaboutherchildrenhavingtobeexposedtotheCatholiccrucifixinclasswhileattendingpublicschool,whichissupposedtobenon-confessional,andaskedforittoberemovedfromtheclassrooms.Whentheschool inquestiondecidednot todoso, thecasewent first to theregionaladministrativecourtofVeneto,thentothesupremeadministrativecourtandfinallytothe European Court of Human Rights. The final decision was that the presence ofcrucifixesinpublicschoolsdidnottoviolatetheprincipleofsecularism,soMrs.Lautsilostthecase.WhatisnoteworthyishoweverthereasoningbasedonwhichtheItaliangovernment defended the presence of crucifixes in public schools, claiming that thecrucifixsymbolisednotareligiousconfessionbutratherItaliancivilization,itshistoricalrootsanduniversalvalues.

While increasing religious diversity is becoming a normal feature of Italian society,particularlyinlargecitieswhereglobalisationandmigration’s,onetellingindicatorofthedifferential treatmentstill rooted in thecurrentregulatory framework is that theCentral Directorate for Religious Affairs—the institute in charge of religious affairs,includingthekeyroleofstipulatingagreementsbetweentheItalianstateandreligiousgroups—isdividedintotwobranches:Catholicaffairs,andnon-Catholicaffairs.Allnon-Catholicreligionsaregroupedtogether,andthelawthatregulatesthemis,todate,stilltheso-called“normontheadmittedcults”,Lawno.1159approvedon24June1929bytheFascistregime.Whilearticle8ofthe1948Constitutiondoesenvisionthepossibilityfornon-Catholic religiousgroups toenter intoanagreement [Intesa]with the Italianstate,thisultimatelydependsonthediscretionoftheDirectorateforReligiousAffairssincethecompetencetoinitiatenegotiations,inviewofthestipulationofanagreement,lies with the Italian government. So far agreements between the state and thegovernment(whichinanycasearefarfromresemblingthekindofprivilegesaffordedtotheCatholicchurch)havebeenstipulatedwiththeWaldensianEvangelicalChurch,theEvangelicalChristianChurchesAssembliesofGodinItaly,theSeventh-dayAdventistChurch, the Union of Italian Jewish Communities (UCEI), the Baptist EvangelicalChristian Union of Italy, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Greek OrthodoxArchdiocese,theChurchofJesusChristofLatter-daySaints,theApostolicChurch,theItalianBuddhistUnion,theItalianHinduistUnionandtheSokaGakkaiItalianBuddhistInstitute(IBISG).7

No agreement nor recognition exists forMuslims, the largest religiousminority, andsuch status is unlikely to change soon, taking into account that the Directorate forReligious Affairs falls under theMinistry of Interior (a position held, in 2019, by an

7 See the official governmental webpage ‘Service for relations with religious denominations and institutional relations’, accessible at http://presidenza.governo.it/USRI/confessioni/intese_indice.html


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extreme-rightpoliticianwhocampaignedonanexplicitlyxenophobicandanti-Muslimplatform).

Overall,inthecurrentlegislativeandadministrativeframeworkofreligiousgovernancein Italy, while freedom of religion is officially ensured, not all minority beliefs aretoleratedinthesameway.

Violent religious radicalisation challenges and policies responses Between the late1960suntil the late1980s—theso-called “YearsofLead”—violentattacks,kidnappingsandbombingsweretiednot toreligiousmotivesbut topoliticalterrorism,both‘red’(far-left)and‘black’(far-right).Othergroups thatengaged inpolitical terrorism in thesecondhalfof theXXcenturywereindependentistmovementsinSouthTyrolandinSardinia.Consideringthereligiouslyattributedviolentattacksthathavebeentakingplaceoverthe lasttwodecadesinEurope, Italyhashoweversofarnotseenthesamedegreeofviolentradicalisation.Whetherbecauseofsuccessfulpreventivemeasures(anumberofplannedattackshavebeendiscoveredandblockedbeforetheycouldbecarriedout),because international networks have been less successful in training and organisingradicalised individualsorbecauseofhighersocietalcontrolat localcommunity level,crimesrelatedto“internationalIslamicterrorism”havebeenrelativelyfew.On issue that has increasingly raised the attention of politicians and radicalisationexperts is the phenomenon of radicalisation among inmates, often non-nationals, inovercrowdedprisons.Asaresponsetoasurgeinthenumberofindividualsflaggedforradicalisation in prisons, the Italian government has activated de-radicalisation andcounter-radicalisationprogrammescarriedoutbyauthorizedImams.Meanwhile,ithasalsostartedplacingdetaineessentencedforreligiouslyinspiredviolentradicalisationinhigh security special sections (separated from other inmates), and when they haveservedtheirsentence,manyhavebeenexpelledfromItaly(79in2018).InJanuary2016aproposedlaw(draftlawno.3558)onthepreventionofradicalisationmadeitthroughtheLowerHousebutwaseventuallynotapprovedbytheSenate.Oneoftheconcernsraisedduringthedebatewastheassociationofword“jihadist”withthatof“radicalisation”throughoutthelegislativetext.Asamatteroffact,radicalisationwasdescribedas“thephenomenonofthosepersonswho,evenwithoutanystablelinkwithterroristgroups,upholdideologiesofjihadistorigin,inspiredbytheuseofviolenceandterrorism,evenbyInternetandsocialmedia”.Suchaphrasingmeantthatthescopeofthelawwouldhavebeenlimitedtowardsthepreventionofradicalisationofjihadistinspiration,whiletheviolentreligiouslyinspiredcrimescommittedoverthepastyearsinItalyhavelargelybeenIslamophobicandracistsattacksperpetuatedbyItaliannationals.


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Conclusions WhileCatholicismremainsthemostwidespreadandwell-establishedmajorityreligionin the country—to the point that the historian Paul Ginsborg has defined Italy as acountrycharacterisedbyafeelingof“widespreadreligion”—thepercentageofItalianswhoidentifyasCatholicshasbeenslowlybutsteadilydeclining,asisthecaseinmostWesternEuropeancountries.OfthosewhoidentifyasCatholic,lessthanonethirdself-identifyas‘practicingCatholics’.With secularisation as a backdrop, immigration to Italy increases the percentage ofreligiousmembersofthepopulation,sinceestimatesfrom2017and2018seeonly4,7%of foreigners residing in Italy identifying as ‘atheists or agnostic’, against a 22,6%ofItalian citizens that declare themselves as non-religious. The novelty and perceivedthreatonbehalfofthemajorityhashoweverlittletodowithwhetherimmigrantsarereligiousornot,astheconcernissquarelywithmigrantsfromnon-Catholiccountries.Frombeingacountryofemigrants—thenumbersofItaliansresidingabroadhavebeenestimated tobearound25million in the1980s—since the1990s Italyhasbecomeacountryofbothemigrationandimmigration,withmigrantsarrivingfromtheBalkans,CentralEurope,NorthAfricaandAsia.ThecurrentItalianConstitution,whichenteredintoforcein1948reinstatingdemocracyafter two decades of fascist dictatorship, incorporated the Lateran Treaty at art. 7,acknowledgingboththepoliticaltreatywhichrecognisesthefullsovereigntyoftheHolySee in the State of Vatican City and the ‘Concordat’ which regulates state-churchrelations. While the Constitution also guarantees the right of freedom of religion, anumberoflegalcasessuchasLautsiv.Italyhaveinrecentyearshighlightedthedifficultyofdisentanglingreligiousandstatematters.Overall,Italy’scurrentreligiousdiversitymanagementapproachreflectsanunderlyingframework according to which minority religions are only relevant to the specificminorities,butCatholicreligionisseenasholdingauniversalculturalvalue,whichinturnscanbecomeproblematicnotonlyforminorityreligionsbutalsoforanincreasingnon-religiousminority.


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Projectname:Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingTogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectivesProjectAcronym:GREASEProjectCoordinator:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidouContact:[email protected] November2019Documentseriesreference:D2.1CountryReports

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