disraeli, the conservatives and the government of ireland: part 2, 1868–1881

Parliamentary History, Vol. 18, p t . 2 (1999), pp . 141-167

Disraeli, the Conservatives and the Government of Ireland: Part 2, 1868-1881

ALLEN W A R R E N University of York

In the years up to 1868, Disraeli’s Irish engagements had been of two kinds. When in opposition, most notably fiom 1843 until 1852, he had expressed himself in grand and general terms, drawing upon a repertoire of notions, first articulated in the 1830s. and founded on an anti-whg interpretation of Enghsh history combined with a Burkean view about Enghsh political institutions. When in government in 1852, 1858-9 and 1866-8, Disraeli had worked largely as a parliamentary manager, trying to sustain minority administrations through winning Irish catholic support. On assuming the premiership, his situation in the spring and summer of 1868 was rather different (and not dissimilar to that later faced by Salisbury in 1885): one in which a minority government holds office in a political environment largely determined by its opponents, and where a general election is about to take place with a wholly new electorate. It was also clear that the election itself would be fought around Irish issues, with the reform of the Irish Church at its centre. In a sense Disraeli’s position was one of being in opposition whilst in government, and perhaps not surprisingly his actions were geared to trying to defeat the political agenda and assumptions set by Gladstone in the form of his church resolutions. ’

The government’s already agreed position on Ireland was laid out in a speech by Mayo on 10 March in a reply to a motion of the Irish member, Maguire. Mayo took direct issue with the assumption that Ireland was in crisis because of the growth of Fenianism, denying that it reflected a general alienation on the part of the Irish people. Fenianism, he argued, was an exclusively American product, and not found among other Irish emigrant communities. He also denied Ireland’s being run by an alien class, that it was the Poland of the west, by pointing out that all the leading members of the present Irish executive were closely associated with the A i r s of the country. As to argument that the land system was exploitative and confiscatory, Mayo gave chapter and verse on the unexampled increase in general prosperity over the previous 30 years. It was fiom this perspective that he introduced the government’s own policy; of firm administration of the law, modest land reform through the new land commission, an Irish hnchise bill, along with the reform of the Irish railways and the educational system, including the universities. On the Irish Church, Mayo drew attention to the commission already investigating its revenues, adding that the position ofthe Church of Ireland had nothing to do with Fenian outrage. In respect of ecclesiastical endowment

I Gladstone’s Church resolutions, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CXCI, 32: 23 Mar. 1868.

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more generally, Mayo concluded there should be greater equality achieved through ‘elevation and restoration’, rather than by ‘confiscation and degradation’.’

In his own speech in the debate, Disraeli also attacked Gladstone’s claim that Ire- land was in crisis, repeating the advantages ofthe government’s approach, and stating that, whatever Ireland’s problems, disestablishing the Church of Ireland was not the solution. Nevertheless Disraeli had to defend the Irish Church itself, gwen Glad- stone’s anticipated resolutions, even though he recognised privately that it was an unpopular cause. He concentrated on the value of Church establishments in theni- selves; stating that nothing was more important than the connexion between the principles of religion and the actions of the civil government, that this inevitably involved the question of endowment, and that the electors had to have their say on such fundamental issues. From the outset, Disraeli was trying to set a rival ecclesiastical agenda to that of Gladstone. Twitted by his opponents’ references to the 1844 speech, Disraeli defended himself by referring to the changed conditions of the country, and by using the phrase that ‘in my historical conscience the sentiment of that speech was right’. H e continued in the same vein, concluding that it was only in an historical perspective that Ireland’s problems could be properly understood, ‘But, Sir, Irish policy is Irish history, and I have no faith in any statesman who attempts to remedy the evils of Ireland who is either ignorant of the past or who will not deign to learn from it.’3

Ilisraeli’s attempted defence of the Irish Church through the principle of establishment was not simply a reaction to its unpopularity. It was linked to a wider assumption that a defence of the historic and protestant nature of the anglican church would be electorally popular. As a political strategy it built upon the church politics that Disraeli had begun to articulate during the years prior to Palmerston’s death. H e still believed, as he expressed it to Cairns, that a significant number of Liberal members would support the principle that the state should uphold religion as an essential part ofthe constitution, and that this also would have electoral weight. Already disenchanted with the divisive impact of ritualism on the Church and fearful of the influence of scientific rationalism on belief, Disraeli was hoping through the defence ofEstablishment to preserve the formal position of the Church of Ireland in constitutional terms, and to create a popular Conservatism thereby. Consequently, Gladstone’s church resolutions were met with an amendment of Stanley’s that any consideration of the Irish Church should be deferred until after the elections, in which Disraeli remained confident he would secure a m a j ~ r i t y . ~

It was within this general ideological and political context that Disraeli attacked Gladstone’s church resolutions, when they were brought forward a fortnight later. He,

* For Mayo’s long statement in reply to Maguire’s motion on the state of Ireland, ibid., CXC, 1353: 10 Mar. 1868. ’ Disraeli’sspeech in the Maguire debate, ibid., 1771: 16 Mar. 1868. For Disraeli on the unpopular-

ity of the Church of Ireland, Wdliam Flavelle Monypenny and George Earle Buckle, T h e Li/p 4 Benjamin Disraeli. First Earl ojBeaonsJeld (6 vols.. new edn., 1929). 11, 358: Disraeli to Cairns, 19 Mar. 1868. ‘ Monypenny andBucWe, Lifeofoirraeli, 11,358: Disraeli to Cairns, 19 Mar. 1868. Disraeli on Stan-

ley’s amendment, City ofLiverpool R. O., Derby MSS, 920 DER (14). 146/4: Disraeli to Derby, 25 Mar. 1868.

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again, rejected the idea of any general Irish crisis and supported the policy brought forward by Mayo. Disraeli represented Gladstone as overturning an established conciliatory tory policy towards Ireland based on a legtimate recognition of catholic claims, the latest example ofwhich was the promise ofa charter for a catholic university. Gladstone, he continued, was intent on destroying a broad consensus within Ireland by alienating the protestant community, and by threatening the Church of Ireland’s property through disendowment. By such an approach, and through the substitution of a papal for a protestant ascendancy, Gladstone was determined to reverse the policies pursued by Peel, Graham and Palmerston.

But, Disraeli continued, Gladstone also threatened a more vital principle, that of any government’s overall responsibility to a divine power, ‘for if the government is not divine, it is nothing. It is a mere affair of the police-ofice, of the tax-gatherer, of the guard-room.’ Public policy needed to be based on religious principle, and how could that be achieved without an establishment? This, he added, should not be taken to imply his support for a concurrent endowment of Roman Catholic and protestant churches. That was impractical o n historical grounds because ‘The United Kingdom is a Protestant Kingdom. The people ofthe United Kingdom are a Protestant people.’ At the same time, he accepted that principles ofreligious tolerance implied religious diver- sity, but that did not mean that the historically constituted state should itself be religiously indifferent. High church ritualists and followers of the pope, Disraeli concluded, were now in open confederacy. Under the pretence of legislating according to ‘the spirit of the age’, they were about to seize through Gladstone’s resolutions ‘the supreme authority of the

The failure to carry Stanley’s amendment placed Disraeli’s government in a dilemma, as whether to resign before Gladstone brought in his Church Bill or to try to remain in office until the forthcoming dissolution. They decided to hold on. In so doing, they were trying to give themselves maximum electoral advantage; Ireland took second place in terms of both policy and politics. As a result, the government began rapidly to off-load its Irish baggage. Given the difficulty Mayo had experienced in securing any agreement with the hierarchy over a university charter, and the anxieties this had cre- ated among ministers, it was relatively easy to break off the negotiations. Mayo chose to publish parts of the correspondence as evidence of the government’s honourable intentions and to fend off protestant protests. It was unlikely that Gladstone would wish to pick up the negotiations himself. Similarly the idea ofa new ‘Devon Commission’ came to nothing, and so the government was left simply with what was regarded as an unhelpful report on the endowments of the Church of Ireland, and an uncompleted enquiry into the national school system.

Disraeli had also to recognise the deep divisions within the tory party over the issue of concurrent endowment. He had to explain away Mayo’s apparent sympathy for the idea in the form of ‘levelling up’, a task made more difficult as the hierarchy were not themselves seeking such an approach. Nor was Disraeli’s own protestant style univer- sally approved by colleagues, Stanley, in particular, wishing for a more broadly-based

Disraeli’s speech on Gladstone’s resolutions, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CXCI, 893: 3 Apr. 1868.

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strategy. Disraeli, however, showed his full colours i n August after parliament had been prorogued, by his appointment of an extreme Lancashire evangelical to the deanery of Ripon, which became something of a cause cdhbre. In fact, Disraeli’s ecclesiastical patronage was seen as particularly hostile to high churchmen, among whom Samuel Wilberforce was the main victim. In writing to Stanley after the appointment to Ripon, Disraeli acknowledged that the political battle had not yet settled on the defence ofthe Church itself. But he continued to remain optinustic throughout the autumn about the outcome ofthe election, resolutely refusing to say what the government’s policy on the Irish Church would be. Interestingly, one of Disraeli’s last acts was to accede to the queen’s desire to appoint Tait to Canterbury. According to Tait, Disraeli haranged the future primate at their first meeting, expressing his desire to rally a Church party to fight the extremes of rationalism and ritualism, and claiming that his patronage policy had been to secure this objective.6

Disraeli described his church policy as follows: ‘My church policy was this: to induce if possible the two great and legitimate parties to cease their internecine strife, and to combine against the common enemies: Rits and Rats [Ritualists and Rationalists] .’ The 1868 election campaign with its attempt to defend the established nature ofthe Church was part of that broad ecclesiastical politics. Ilisraeli’s continuing optimism about the outcome, an opinion not shared by Derby, was possibly based on drawing too much comfort from the tone of Lancashire politics. Whatever the cause, Disraeli’s over- whelming defeat left that strategy in ruins. He accepted that Gladstone had received a mandate to disestablish the Irish Church, while promising debate and argument over the details. Disraeli’s speeches on the Church Bill have therefore the tone of a lament. Re-affirming his belief in Church establishments, Disraeli presented the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland as continuing a process of growing ecclesiastical factionalism, whereby the functions of government would increasingly fall into the hands ofthe denominations. In such a situation, Ihraeli asked, how could the conflicts between the government and the rival claims of denominations be resolved? He

O n the question of resignation, Disraeli, Derby and the Conservativp Party. Journals and Memoirs .f Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-69, ed. John Vincent (Hassocks, 1978), pp. 332-3: 22 Apr., 4 May 1868; on breaking off negotiations with the hierarchy, National Library of Ireland, Mayo MSS, 11164: Derby to Mayo, 10 May 1868; Bod., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 90/3, f. 1 1 1 , 135/6, f. 336: Mayo to Disraeli, 16 May, 2 Dec. 1868; for later published correspondence, Parl. Papers. 1867-8 13801 liii, and Mayo, Hansard, Par/. Debs, 3rd ser., CXCII, 112: 28 May 1868; for Dis- raeli on concurrent endowment, ibid., CII, 787: 22 May 1868. O n the election campaign, Disrdi, Derby and the Conservative Party, ed. Vincent, p. 335 : 28 May 1868; Liverpool R. O., Derby MSS, 920 DER(14), 146/4: Disraeli to Derby, 30 May 1868; for Disraeli’s desire for a great Protestant cru- sade, Monypenny and Buckle, Lqe of‘Disraeli. 11. 400: Disraeli to Stanley, 21 Aug. 1868; and for MacNeile’s appointment, G. 1. T. Machin. Politics and the Churches in Great Britain, 1832 to 1868 (Ox- ford, 1977). p. 367; on electoral prospects, Monypenny and Buckle. I!.$ qfDisraeli, 11, 426: Disraeli to Derby, 23 Aug. 1868, Derby MSS, 920 DER(14), 146/4 : Derby to Disraeli, 15 Sept. 1868, Beacons- field MSS, Dep Hughenden 90/3, f. 36: Mayo to Disraeli, 25 Aug. 1868, Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party, ed. Vincent, p.336: 14 Sept., 9 Oct. 1868. O n the government’s deterniination not to reveal its own hand on Irish church policy, Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 90/3. f.73: Mayo to Disraeli, 4 Oct. 1868, Mayo MSS, 1 1 164: Disraeli to Mayo, 8 Oct. 1868. O n Disraeli’s ecclesiastical patronage, Monypenny and Buckle, L$e of Disraeli, 11, 396413. Dr John Wolffe tells me that Disraeli had originally wanted Ellicott of Gloucester for Canterbury, and then, according to Tait, had tried to secure Wordswonh of Lincoln for the vacated see of London. Both men were ‘old style’ protestant high churchmen.

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repeated his view that it was not only anglicans who benefited from establishment, and that the union of Church and state in the English case guaranteed rather than limited toleration and religous liberty. He also expressed fears for the rights of property if the Church of Ireland was to be disendowed, concluding that all necessary reform of the Irish Church could be secured within the framework ofthe establishment, while its unnecessary abolition would create the dangers of a popish kingdom.’

Disraeli’s defeat in the 1868 election seemed to be a significant blow to both his own and the Conservative party’s future. His attempt to control and direct the pressures for parliamentary and ecclesiastical reform had failed alniost completely, raising doubts once again about his political capacities and talents. As Robert Blake has pointed out, Disraeli’s position was exposed in the years 1869-72. Disraeli provided his own retrospective gloss upon what might have proved to be the conclusion of his career through his publication of Lothair, and in the preface he wrote to a collected edition ofhis novels in 1870. Ecclesiastical issues feature prominently, and notjust in the hostile portraits of Manning and Wilberforce as Grandison and the bishop in Lothair, but also in the reflec- tions upon his writings in the 1840s. Disraeli’s comments should not be taken at face value. Nevertheless the arguments used in 1870 have an earlier echo and provide an insight into how Disraeli now viewed the political world since writing those early novels. Thus the preface reminds the reader of Ilisraeli’s views upon party; that it had become debased since the seventeenth century, that fanaticism had been substituted for religious liberty, and that national institutions had become eroded. His career had been dedicated to reversing those processes, changing oligarchy into generous aristocracy, infusing new vigour into the Church of England, governing Ireland by the policy of Charles I rather than that of Oliver Cromwell, and to freeing the political system from sectarian bondage. From this retrospective political and social agenda, Ilisraeli turned to the reasons why it had not all turned out as he would have hoped, focussing in particular on the ecclesiastical and religous concerns he had expressed in Tancred. Disraeli explained the failure ofchurch and state to develop in the ways he would have liked by the Church’s inability to produce a leader of sufficient stature and iniag~nation. Instead it had fallen into the hands of monks and schoolmen, with the secession of Newman dealing it a blow ‘under which it still reels’. Instead offounding themselves on the historic church, the seceders to Rome sought refuge in ‘medieval superstitions, which are generally only the embodiment ofpagan ceremonies and creeds’. Now, in 1870, Chris- tian truths themselves were being assaulted by German scholarship, leaving Disraeli with the sole comfort that the semitic core of Christian belief had been able to resist all previous onslaughts. The failure to defend the Irish Church had been merely part of a collective failure of religious vision, leaving the future dark.‘

’ Disraeli on his own Church policy, Moneypenny and Buckle, LiJe ofDisraeli, 11,4074 : Disraeli to Derby, 2 Nov. 1868; for Derby’s less sanguine view ofelectoral prospects and Disraeli’s slow realization about the probable out-turn, Bod., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 110/3, A: 299, 311, 317: Derby to Disraeli, 29 Oct.. 14.23 Nov. 1868. Liverpool R. O., Derby MSS 920 DER( 14) 14614: Dis- raeli to Derby, 13 Nov. 1868. For Disraeli’s speeches on the Irish Church Bill, Hansard, Pad. Debs. 3rd ser., CXCIV, 1662, CXCV, 1052, CXCVI. 1042: 18 Mar., 16 Apr., 31 May 1869.

* Disraeli published Lothair in 1870; for the introduction to the 1870 collected edition ofhis novels, B. Disraeli, Collerted Edition ojrhe Novels and Tales ofrhe Rtj$hr Honourable B. Disraeli (10 vols.) I , ix, General Preface. 1870.

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O n Ireland, Ilisraeli had little to say in 1870, once disestablishment was a fact and the disputes over disendownient had been settled. With Mayo now in India, he had no-one to provide him with a clear Irish perspective. O n land reform, he had to ask Napier what he should say. Opposition to the 1870 Land Bill was also made more dificult by Disraeli's earlier support for compensation for improvement (in some form), and by the failure of the Irish landlords, particularly those in the north under political pressure from their tenants, to mount any effective resistance. Opposition in the Commons was largely left to J. T. Ball. O n Gladstone's misconceived Irish University Bill in 1873, Dis- raeli needed to do little to aid its internal collapse, and he left niost ofthe detailed work to Cairns. Nevertheless, in his one speech on the bill, he took the opportunity of ridi- culing an institution in which there could only be instruction in religions other than Christianity, while, equally absurdly, history and philosophy were also excluded. His true feelings only emerged in his review of the past history of the university question. O n this aspect, he portrayed Derby's attempt to grant a university charter on the basis of concurrent endowment as being opportunistically overturned by the Roman Catholic hierarchy, through its support for Gladstone's attack on the Irish Church. Ironically, Disraeli added, it was now that same hierarchy that was destroying another attempt at solving the university question, but in a situation in which concurrent endowment was no longer possible, given that the Church of Ireland was now disendowed."

Disraeli's only other comment on Irish affairs was in a debate on the Deny celebrations and sectarian marching in the north of Ireland, a subject that had much exercised Eglinton in 1852 and 1859. Urging a policy ofequal treatment or the repeal ofthe Party Processions Act, Disraeli continued,

I think that in the long run you will find it impossible to suppress expressions of strong convictions founded upon national feelings, whether they be shared by Prot- estants or Ronian Catholics, by the descendents ofthe Saxon or the representative of the Celt. It is impossible to make people discard the memory of great acts, or forget the existence ofgreat men who have passed away. Whether it be Walker or Sarsfield, his memory will always excite great sympathy in large masses ofhis countrymen."'

Following his rehsal to form a government after Gladstone's defeat, Disraeli gave a broad-brush sketch ofthe current political scene. As he now saw it, the great issues of taxation, trade and public economy were now resolved, but other questions were begmning to engage public attention. Was the mixed constitution to be preserved, was a national church to be maintained and rights ofindividual and corporate property pro- tected? Their defence, he concluded, would require 'a great Constitutional party', and

' For the passingofthe Church BiU, P. M. H. Bell, Disestablishmentin Irelandand Wales (Publications of the Church Historical Society, XC, 1969). pp. 110-57; for Disraeli on the Irish Land Bill. Monypenny and Buckle, Life @Disraeli, 11,457-8 : Disraeli to Napier, 21 Feb. 1870, and Hansard, Par/. Debs. 3rd ser., CIXC. 1803: 1 1 May 1870; forJohn Thomas Ball (1815-98). M.P. for Dublin Univer- sity, 1868-75, lord chancellor oflreland, 1875-80 on lrish land ibid.. CXCIX, 1449: 7 Mar. 1870; on Irish landlord acquiescence, A Selectionfiom the Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley. 15th Earl @Derby (182693) , between September 1869 and March 1878. ed. John Vincent (Camden Society, 5th ser., lV, 1994) [subsequently quoted as Derby Diaries], pp. 50-1: 19 Feb. 1870; for Disraeli on the lnsh University Bill, Hansard. Pad. Debs. 3rd ser., CCXIV, 1807: 1 1 Mar. 1873.

"' Disraeli on Deny celebrations, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CCX. 575: 22 Mar. 1872.

Disraeli. Consetvatives and Ireland 151

he was not going to stand in the way of i ts development by forming a weak and discred- ited administration. In this prospect of future politics, Ireland appeared to play no significant part.”

1

In forming the first majority Conservative administration since 1841 at the begnning of 1874, Disraeli did not have any particular Irish agenda in mind. Since the failure to pre- vent Irish disestablishment his own approach to Irish issues had been largely tactical, and he no longer had a person like Mayo, committed to Ireland and its Conservative politics, to take one of the major Irish offices. Disraeli eventually persuaded Abercorn to resume the viceroyalty, but, as Mayo had commented in 1868, Abercorn’s weakness was a liking for having things done for him. He appointed, as chiefsecretary, the young English county member, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, who had neither Irish interests or experience, but did possess ability and a desire to make his way in the world. Not that he was given much opportunity during the first three parliamentary sessions, with Disraeli being firm that Irish issues should be kept in the background. Nor was there any pressing political o r parliamentary reason to disturb calm Irish waters. Relations between the Liberal party and Irish Catholics were in disarray, and Gladstone’s recent experience did not encourage any further attempt to solve the Irish university question. In fact, the emergence ofa separate grouping of Irish home rule members under Isaac Butt actually eased the tory government’s parliamentary position. Ireland was also relatively prosper- ous and peaceful, and Hicks Beach could anticipate less stringent coercion and arms legislation from early in the ministry.’*

That is not to say that Hicks Beach found the country wholly content. In the first place, the general election had resulted in a further deterioration of the Conservatives’ position, a process that had begun in 1865. In the rural parts ofulster, in particular, great Conservative territorial interests were being undermined by the rising aspirations of the tenant farmers, protestant and catholic alike. In the smaller boroughs, the Conservatives would also be threatened if the franchises of Great Britain and Ireland were equalised. Disraeli recognised the Ulster rot but did little about it. Administratively, Hicks Beach found a range ofissues engagng his interest and attention. Education (aside from the university question) was a continuing difficulty with the Powis commission, itself a tory creation, having reported in 1870 upon significant weaknesses in the national system. There were also disputes over teachers’ pay and conditions, the position ofthe model and endowed schools, and the secondary (or intermediate) education system was known to be inadequate. Hicks Beach briefed himself fully but was discouraged by Disraeli, who

I ’ On Disraeli’s refusal to form a ministry, ibid.. CCXIV. 1929: 20 Mar. 1873. I* On Abercorn’s eventual acceptance after Northumberland’s and Marlborough’s refusals. BodI..

Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 5012, fI 125A. 129, 133, 135: Abercom to Disraeli, 19.24 Feb. 1874, Marlborough to Disraeli. 20 Feb. 1874, Northumberland to Disraeli, 22 Feb. 1874; for Aber- corn’s laziness, ibid., 90/3, f. 132: Mayo to Disraeli. 18 Aug. 1868; on Disraeli’s determination to keep Ireland off the political agenda, West Sussex R.O.. Goodwood MSS, 865/W22: Disraeli to kchmond, 5 Mar. 1874. For the queen’s speech, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CCXVIII. 22: 19 Mar. 1874.

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opined that there was too much popery and sacerdotalism around to risk dabbling in education. Even so, some minor refonns in teachers’ pay and housing conditions were put through at the end ofthe 1875 session. On Church questions, some minor incumbents still felt aggrieved over the 1870 Church settlement and looked for action from their tory friends: but none came. The Irish local government system, as well as the poor law, was widely regarded as in need of reform, as the pressure increased for extra expenditure. However, no action was taken which might agitate Conservative interests in Ireldnd, despite Hicks Beach’s interest and enthusiasm to do 5 0 . ’ ~

In London, Disraeli adopted an unforgiving posture, declining to receive a deputa- tion on behalf of the remaining Fenian prisoners, and giving no ground, in form or substance, to Butt’s parliamentary motions on the constitutional relations between Great Britain and Ireland. For Disraeli, any concession would involve a complete re-ordering of constitutional arrangements, giving rights to Irish members not claimed by their English or Scottish colleagues. Broadening his attack, Disraeli explained the Irishman’s attachment to the soil in ternis of ‘tribal relations’, and concluded with the familiar slur on Irish Catholics; that their loyalty was divided between the crown and Rome. Any step towards home rule would begm the disintegation ofthe empire.’4

The only apparent exception to this unrelieved negativism was the tour of Ireland planned for Disraeli in the late autumn of 1874. The intention was not to signal a new bepnning; rather it was to provide a fillip for the demoralised Conservative forces in the north of Ireland. Clearly this could not be stated at the outset, otherwise there could be embarrassing home rule demonstrations. As a result the tour was planned to be on a non-partisan basis until Disraeli reached the safe-haven of Belfast. Even so colleaffues like Derby (the 15th earl) warned against a general raising ofexpectations on which the

I J O n 1874 election in Ireland. Francis Thompson, ‘Land and Politics in Ulster, 1868-86’, Queen’s University, Belfast, 1’h.D.. 1982, B. M. Walker, Ulster Politics. The Formotive Ycors. 11368-86 (Belfast. 1986). pp. 74-1 16; for Disraeli’s comments, P.R.O.. Cairns MSS. 30/5/l , 6. 106 : Disraeli to Cairns, 13 Feb. 1874; for the threat to Conservative interests in Irish boroughs through franchise equalisation, Gloucestershire K.O.. St Aldwyn MSS, 112455, PCC/52. f. 6 : iiieino on Irish borough franchise equalisatton and its impact on Conservative strength (prepared by Col, Taylor, Lord Cnchtoii and Edward Gibson), 16 Jan. 1879; on education in general. Donald H. Akenson, 7hr Irish Edrtrarion I!.vper- iment. The National System qf Education in the NinPtrrnth Century (197(l), esp. pp, 316-23; for Hicks Beach and education, Churchill College, Cambridge, Marlborough MSS [subsequently referred to as Marlborough MSS- CambridgeJ, MAW3 3/21 : 1’. J. Keenan (resident commissioner for national education), memo on Irish education, Uune 18741. St Aldwyn MSS, D4255, PCC/52, f. 5 : Hicks Beach to board ofeducation, 5 Nov. 1874; on trainingschools. earl ofHarrowby, Sandon Hall, Staffordshire. Harrowby MSS, [subsequently referred to as Harrowby MSS]. 2nd ser., LII, f. 21 : Hicks Beach to Sail- don, 8 Dec. 1874; on Disraeli’s reaction, Lady Victoria Hicks Beach. The Lib qfSirMichnel Hicks Reorh, Earl St Aldwyn (2 vols. 1932). I , 46-7: Disraeli to Hicks Beach, 17 Dec. 1874; and Hicks Beach’s toeing the line, Hansard, Parl. Debs, 3rd ser., CCXXII, 1133: 5 Mar. 1875; for the 1875 legislation, 38 & 39 Vic., chaps 92 and 96. O n minor incumbents, Bell, Diseslablishment in Ireland and Wales, p. 203. For the interconnected issues of finance, local government reforni and the future funding of Irish railways, Parl.Papers, 1867-8 13921 x, 1867-8 [40181 xxxii, 1868-9 I40861 xvii, St Aldwyn MSS, D4255, PCC/147: Hicks Beach memorandum, [1874], and Hicks Beach, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CCXVII, 813: 20 Apr. 1874. O n Aberconi’s obstruction of reforni of the poor law rating system, St Aldwyn M S S , D4255, P C U 4 9 : Abercorn to Hicks Beach, 13 Jan. 1875, along with further correspondence in 1876.

I‘ O n Disraeli’s refusal to meet delegation on the Fenian pnroners, Bod., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 54/3, f.27 : Algernon Turner to secretary of the Amnesty Association, 23 Mar. 1874; and his rejection of Home Rule, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., C C X X , 951: 2 July 1874.

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government had no intention of delivering. In the end the tour had to be cancelled owing to Disraeli’s illness, but the idea was never r e ~ i v e d . ’ ~

The same negative tone also dominated the 1875 session, even though Hicks Beach was able to renew coercion on a less severe basis. He was only allowed to introduce minor reforms in the national education system, and forbidden to make even small-scale amendments to the 1870 Land Act. This was despite the fact that the exclusion of Ulster leaseholders from the benefits of the legislation on the termina- tion of their leases was increasing the party’s political difficulties in the province. N o reforms of local government or its funding regime were announced, other than the annual notional commitment to grand jury reform. In a debate on Ireland’s material condition, Hicks Beach also made it clear that the government was not going to give further assistance to land reclamation schemes, arguing that the improvement of land already under cultivation was more important. The first two parliamentary sessions were almost entirely barren in terms of Irish business, reflecting both the political quiet of the Irish countryside and Disraeli’s determination not to tangle unnecessarily with Irish issues.“

From early in 1876 this policy ofgovernmental inactivity began to change, at least as far as Hicks Beach and the Dublin executive were concerned. In late 1875 Hartington, as Liberal leader in the Commons, had made it clear in forthright terms that the Irish members should not expect the Liberals to be sympathetic on either of the two issues highest on their agenda - home rule and denominational education. The hierarchy quickly took note, and by early the following year Bishop Conroy ofArdagh, on behalf of Cardinal Cullen, had established contact with Hicks Beach through the catholic Conservative peer, Granard, and the Ulster king-of-arms, Sir Bernard Bourke. Simul- taneously, Irish home rule members announced they would be introducing university, land and home rule legislation during the coming parliamentary session. For his part Hicks Beach was becoming increasingly concerned that so little attention had been devoted to Ireland since 1874, and he responded to the hierarchy’s approach by hinting that the best ground to explore initially might be intermediate education. At the same time he announced a select committee on Irish local government and taxation. Conroy took the hint and communications continued throughout most of 1876, with the government, however, opposing the university proposals of Butt and his friends. A hiatus developed in the middle of the year as a result of Abercorn’s retirement and Disraeli’s desire to promote Hicks Beach to the cabinet. (Neither member of the Irish executive had been in the cabinet up to this point.) The assumption was that when promoting Hicks Beach, Beaconsfield (as Disraeli had now become) would find him another post, leaving Marlborough, the new viceroy, as the senior member of the Irish executive team. In the event this proved impossible to achieve and Hicks Beach continued as Irish secretary in the cabinet, a development which put Marlborough’s nose out ofjoint for

l 5 For the file relating to Disraeli’s planned Irish tour, Bod., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 58/2, esp. the correspondence, ff. 6, 12b, 33-4, 38.

l6 O n coercion, Derby Diaries. p. 192: 28 Jan. 1875, queen’s speech, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CCXXII, 3: 5 Feb. 1875, and Granville’s attack, ibid., 22; for Hicks Beach on the renewal ofcoercion, ibid.,998: 1 Mar. 1875,andoneducationalreform. ibid., 1333: 5Mar. 1875,andon 1870LandAct, ibid., CCXXIV, 1730: 1 1 June 1875,andonreclamationofwastelands,ibid.,CCXXV, 1461: 14July 1875.

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some weeks. Eventually, he was persuaded to continue as viceroy, and Conroy resumed his negotiations with Hicks Beach in his enhanced political position.”

In appointing Marlborough, Beaconsfield chose a man who was not simply a spokes- man for the Irish conservative classes, and, together with Hicks Beach, he began to put pressure on the prime minister and his colleagues to move more positively on Irish affairs. Hicks Beach reminded Beaconsfield of the justice of Parnell’s criticism of a lack of Irish legslation, and that the government could expect parliamentary obstruction during the 1877 session as a result. For Bishop Conroy, and possibly Marlborough and Hicks Beach also, reform ofthe intermediate education system could be a ‘trial run’ for another attempt to resolve the university question the following year. The advantages for the government were that it might re-establish the working rapport with the hierarchy, attempted by Naas (as we have seen) between 1866-8, as well as giving some encourage- nient to the moderate home rulers, increasingly threatened politically by the obstructionist tactics of Parnell and Biggar. It would also ease the overall legislative programme - Irish bills traditionally came at the end of the parliamentary session - enabling the government to put pressure on Parnell and his friends not to put Irish business at risk by obstructing earlier non-Irish legislation. It was after such a bout of obstruction that Hicks Beach announced in July 1877 that the government would introduce an intermediate education measure during the next parliamentary session. With Hicks Beach spending an increasing amount of time in London, Marlborough became more involved in the details ofthe education question. By the end of 1877 he was meeting directly with Cullen, and pressing Beaconsfield and Hicks Beach on the need to take up the university as well as the intermediate education question.”

’’ For Hartington’s speech at Bristol, 7he 7irnes. 15 Nov. 1875, p. 7c, in which he also anticipated an Irish-Conservative alliance on the education issue. For the early negotiations with the hierarchy on the education question, Bod., Beaconsfield MSS, I k p Hughenden 116/ l , f. 28: Bishop Conroy to Granard, 7 Feb. 1876, Granard to Bourke. 10 Feb. 1876, Bourke to Abercorn, 18 Feb. 1876, Hicks Beach to Abercorn, 20 Feb. 1876, Gloucestershire R . O., St Aldwyn MSS, 112455, PCC/64: Conroy to Granard, 3 Apr., Abercom to Hicks Beach, 7 Apr. 1 876. For the bills to be introduced by home rule members. Mitchell Henry, Hansard. Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CCXXVII, 109: 8 Feb. 1876, and for Hicks Beach’s response on Irish local government, h i d . , CCXXVIII, 242: 17 Mar. 1876, and later rejection of Butt’s University Bill, ibid.. CCXXIX, 825: I6 May 1876; for Select Committee Report, Par/. Papers. 1876 (352) x. O n lack of Irish leg~slation, St Aldwyn MSS, D2455, PCC/13: Hicks Beach to Disraeli, 20 July 1876. The main problem in finding a replacement of sufficient quality for Hicks Beach, albeit outside the cabinet. was that the obvious candidate, Lord George Hamilton, was not only the son of the outgoing viceroy, but also the brother in law of the marquess of Blandford. Marlborough’s eldest son, whom it was feared was about to embark on a messy divorce. For this, Bea- consfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 50/1, K 138, 142, 146. 148, 145, 147: Marlborough to Disraeli, 22 July, 14 Aug., 16,24 Sept., Lord George Hamilton to M. Cony, 13 Sept., Hicks Beach to Beaconsfidd 20 Sept. 1876. Marlborough MSS - Cambridge, M A W 3/ 10: Ikaconsfield to Marlborough, 31 Aug. 1876. P. R. O., 3015117, f.40: Hamilton to Cairns, 5 Sept. 1876.

I n John Winston Spencer-Churchill. 7th duke ofMarlborough (1 822-1883), M. P. for Woodstock. 1844-5 (resigning because in supporting Sir Robert Peel over the repeal of the Corn Laws he went against the views of his father), 1847-57, lord president of the council, 1867-8, lord-lieutenant of Ireland, 1876-80, ‘a sensible, honourable, and industrious public man’ ( D . N. B.), an evangelical churchman, responsible for the New Parishes Act, 1856. ‘the Blandford Act’ (19 & 20 Vic., chap 104). and opposed to marriage with a deceased wife’s sister. At his funeral in 1883, Hicks Beach was present. and his later chief secretary, Lowther. apparently not. For a description of the Marlborough regime. including the role of Lord Randolph Churchill. R. F. Foster, Lord h n d o l p h Churchill. A Polifical Lye (Oxford, 1981). pp. 33-57. O n Hicks Beach’s view that the 1877 session should be more productive, partly as a response to the anticipated obstruction from Parnell. Derby Diaries, p. 342: 8 Nov. 1876, B. L.,


By early 1878, therefore, the Irish executive in Dublin was committed to measures of intermediate and university reform. Intermediate education had proved the easier of the two to agree upon, largely because there were fewer existing vested interests. Within Ireland moderate Catholics and protestants could see the advantages ofa national system of secondary examinations linked to the provision of prizes and scholarships. With care over matters of conscience, the implied concurrent endowment involved would only agitate the most austere believers in the voluntary system. The case of the university question was likely to be very different, as previous experience suggested, and there was no real discussion of detail or timing in London or Dublin before the beginning of 1878. For his part, Marlborough saw London University as being the only possible institutional model. It could provide a common pattern of examinations linked to prizes and scholarships, to which individual colleges could affiliate.

Beaconsfield had played no part in the formation ofthis Irish education strategy. As in 1866-8, it was a result ofthe Irish executive’s becoming conscious ofits increasingly iso- lated position on an issue, which was important for much informed opinion, catholic and protestant alike. In 1875 he had largely vetoed Hicks Beach’s interest in the question, but he had eventually accepted the Dublin executive’s advice, at least on intermediate education. There is little other evidence on Beaconsfield’s Irish opinions at this time.

In fact, Beaconsfield’s most significant Irish decision was his appointment of James Lowther as Irish secretary, when Hicks Beach succeeded Carnarvon at the colonial office in February 1878. He had not: found it easy to fill the principal Irish posts in either 1874 or 1876, and although Marlborough turned out to be a success, this may have been more due to Marlborough’s high-minded and responsible personality than any deeply considered decision on Beaconsfield’s part. By contrast, the appointment of Lowther appears almost whimsical in its irresponsibility or, more cynically, a deliberate attempt to put a block on the reformist direction which the Dublin executive was taking by early 1878. Beaconsfield could have hardly found a more reactionary and prejudiced minister, or a more tactless politician. A change in the political atmosphere in Dublin

I* (continued) lddesleigh MSS, Add. MS 50021, f. 227: Hicks Beach to Northcote, 1 Jan. 1877; on the renewed contacts with the hierarchy, Gloucestershire R. 0.. St Aldwyn MSS, D2455, PCC/64: Conroy to Hicks Beach, 20,27 Nov., 15 Dec. 1876, Marlborough MSS - Cambridge, MARB 3/12: Hicks Beach to Marlborough, 31 Dec. 1876. On the continuing negotiations during 1877. despite the cabinet’s decision not to proceed during what the Annual Register called a ‘lazy’ session, the duke of Marlborough, Blenheim Palace, Woodstock, Oxfordshire, Marlborough MSS [subsequently referred to as Marlborough MSS-Blenheim], correspondence ofthe 7th duke, Nos. 265,272,280,287: Hicks Beach to Marlborough. 26 Jan., 7, 15 Feb., 13 Mar. 1877, Conroy to Hicks Beach. 12, 16. 18 Feb., 9 Mar., 3 Apr. 1877, St Aldwyn MSS D2455, PCC/64,64, 13: J. L. Porter (on behalfofCenera1 Pres- byterian Assembly) to Hicks Beach, 15 Mar. 1877, Marlborough to Beaconsfield, 12 Mar. 1877, Bodl., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 9313, f. 22: Marlborough to Beaconsfield, 30 Mar. 1877. For Hicks Beach’s response to Butt’s University Bill and his later promise on intermediate education in the 1878 session, coming immediately after a period of Parnellite obstruction, St Aldwyn MSS. D2455, PCC/66: Butt to Hicks Beach, 17 May, Northcote to Butt, 18 May 1877, Hicks Beach, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CCXXXV, 1625, 1926: 20,26 July 1877. For further discussions and negotiation during late 1877. Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden. 9313, K25-6: Marlborough to Beaconsfield. 9 Nov.. 16 Dec. 1877. Derby Diaries, p.465 : 18 Dec. 1877, St Aldwyn MSS, D2455, PCU65.52: Marlborough to Hicks Beach, 18 Nov. 1877, Hicks Beach cabinet memorandum, 24 Dec. 1877, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 334: Cullen to Marlborough, 2 Nov. 1877, Hicks Beach on government’s legislative intentions, following the queen’s speech, Hansard. Pad. Debs. 3rd ser., CCXXXVll, 206: 18 Jan. 1878.

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was detected almost immediately. Within a month, Lowther had professed himself in public to be ‘an out and out Tory’, had declared his continuing opposition to the 1870 Land Act and the Ballot Act, and, finally, in May 1878 reaffirmed his hostility to the 1867 Reform Act itself. Marlborough had not been consulted about his appointment, and Northcote expressed considerable doubts about Lowther’s capabilities. Almost immediately on taking ofice, Lowther voiced regrets that the government had become involved in the intermediate education question. A few weeks later, he described the scufnes surrounding the funeral of the murdered Lord Leitrini as the work of ‘a handful of scum’, and that he had insuficient powers to deal with Ribbonism.”

Not surprisingly, the hierarchy became alarmed, seeking reassurances that the commitment to intermediate education was safe, and that there would continue to be consideration of the university question. As neither Marlborough or Lowther were in the cabinet, Woodlock, following Conroy’s retirement, continued to negotiate directly with Hicks Beach. Woodlock was right to be worried, as Lowther remained distinctly luke-warm on intermediate education. In the event, the government did not decide to legislate until late June, when the threat of Irish obstruction on the Queen’s Colleges’ estimates, and some politicking from Randolph Churchill, possibly acting on his father’s behalf, finally convinced the cabinet that it had to seize hold of the issue. Differences emerged in the cabinet between Hicks Beach and Cairns, but these were resolved in time for the bill to be introduced in the Lords on 21 June. As passed, the act established an examining board for intermediate education, including a system of prizes and scholarships, and also payments to schools on the basis of their results. A conscience clause was incorporated, allowing a child to withdraw from religious instruction, which had to be time-tabled in such a way as not to disadvantage the child academically. The new structure was to be funded out of the Irish Church surplus. The passage of the Intermediate Education Act was a success for the Irish executive as represented by Hicks Beach and Marlborough, but the extremely cautious way in which their proposals had been treated by Lowther and his colleagues in London did not bode well for a similar initiative on the much more divisive university question.*”

“’ Three years before, Disraeli had described to Cairns the qualities required in an Irish secretary

But Booth is a boor and F[red] Stanley a stick - at least at speaking and an Irish Secretary should have the gift of the gab. He should be a gentleman too, and rather a fine one. In this respect FS would have done, particularly as he has a charming wife.

Could I consider offering the Irish Secretaryship to Chaplin? He IS a first-rate speaker, very nch, a capital sister, and altogether still horsey, which the Irish like, though he has disposed and parted wlth his stud.

O n Northcote’s reservations, B. L., Add. MS 50017, f75: Northcote to Beaconstield, 9 Feh. 1878, and for Marlborough’s observations, Bodl.. Beaconfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 50/1, f. 151 : Marlborough to Ueaconsfield, 10 Feb. 1878, Marlborough MSS - Cambridge, MARE 3/10: Bea- consfield to Marlborough, 16 Feb. 1878; for Lowther’s opinions see, his speech on re-election for York, M r James Lowther, Holdenby, Northamptonshire, Lowther MSS [subsequently referred to as Lowther MSSI: Yorkshire Gazette. 6 Feb. 1878, p. 6, Hansard, Par/. Debs, 3rd ser., CCXXXVIII, 1695, CCXXXIX, 91: 20, 27 Mar. 1878, also, B. L., Add. MS 50040, f. 100: Lowther to Northcote. 13 Apr. 1878.

2(1 For Woodlock’scontinuingcorrespondence with Hicks Beach, Gloucestershire R. 0.. St Aldwyn MSS. D2455, PCC/ 64: Woodlock to Hicks Beach, 18 Feb.. 17 May, 4,29June 1878, (Bishop Conroy seems to have disappeared from the scene, and was to die on 4 Aug. 1878); for continuing uncertainty

(P. K. 0.. 30/51/1, f.128: Disraeli to Cairns, 6 Aug. 1875):

Disraeli, Conservatives nnd lrclarid 157

Beaconsfield was, of course, frequently ill during his second government, and in mid-1878 overwhelmingly involved in the negotiations leading up to the Congress of Berlin. But once the decision was made not to dissolve parliament on his return, longer-term electoral considerations began to assume greater significance. In Ireland, very little had been done to stop the continued erosion of Conservative support in Ulster, and the Intermediate Education Act was seen by most commentators as only the first step in an attempt to woo moderate catholic opinion; a point made both by Hicks Beach and by the rising star among Irish Conservative members, Edward Gib- son. Even so, there was no agreement in the cabinet on whether the government should tackle the university question in 1879. In the queen’s speech in late 1878, following the special summons of parliament on the outbreak of the Afghan War, no announcement was made, and Northcote continued to press Beaconsfield for a decision. Marlborough’s position was clear, Lowther’s more ambiguous, while Northcote gave pre-eminent weight to the opinion of Hart-Dyke, the chief whip, and the government’s own friends in Ireland, led by Crichton. Their response was negative, and so in the queen’s speech in February 1879 there was no mention of the university question, much to the irritation of the bishops.”

Lowther was not displeased with this outcome, although he feared that Northcote might later cave in to parliamentary pressures. I t was certainly true that the government was exposed in terms of Irish legislation, only promising (as ever) g a n d jury reform, but never coming forward with any actual proposals. Parliamentary and implicitly electoral pressures were also increasing. Even if the government did not announce a university bill ofits own, it was clear that the Irish members would. Their leader on this issue, following Butt’s illness and subsequent death, the O’Conor Don, was able to draw on

*” (confinued) about the governmerit’s legislative intentions. 13. I... Add. MS 50041, f. 100: Lowther to Northcote. 13 Apr. 1878, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 425: Imwther to Marlborough, 30 May 1878; for Lowtherand Churchill, Hansard, Pad. Debs. 3rd ser.. CCXL, 1139, 1216 : 3,4June 1878; for discussion in cabinet, The CahinefJoortnial o/Ditdley Ryder, Viscoutif Satidon, ed. Christopher Howard and Peter Gordon (B.I .H.R. , Special Supplement X, 1974). pp. 24, 25 [subsequently quoted as Saridon

Journal]: 17, 19 June 1878. 2’ For Cabinet discussion on ditsolution, Sandon Jounial: 7 Aug. 1878, Marlborough MSS -

Blenheim, 461: J . T. Ball (Irish lord chancellor) to Marlborough. 13 Aug. 1878; for Hicks Beach’s continuing role as negotiator and intermediary, ibid.: I7 July 1878, Gloucestershire K. 0.. St Aldwyn MSS, D2455, PCC 64, 66, 13: Woodlock to Hicks Beach, 23 Nov. 1878, Butt to Hicks Beach, 31 Oct., 29 Nov., 21 Dec. 1878.7, 12, 19 Jan. 1879, Hicks Heach to Beaconstield. 2 Dec. 1878, Tlte Ashbourne Papers, 1869-1913. A Caleiidar qf h e Papers c!f Edward Gihsotr, 1st Lmd Ashhoume, coirlp. A. B. Cooke and A. P. W. Malcolnison, (The Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast, 1974), p. 161, [subsequently quoted as Ashbourne Papers]: Hicks Beach to Gibson, 15 Nov. 1878, Marlborough MSS - Cambridge, MARB 3/12: Hicks Beach to Marlborough, 10 Nov. 1878; for non-referral in Northcote’s ministerial statement, and Mitchell Henry’s critical response, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser.. CCLXIII, 1076, 1101: 13 Dec. 1878; for Marlborough’s views. Bod., Beacons- field MSS, Dep Hughenden 93/3, ff. 30, 32-3: Marlborough to Beaconsfield. 31 1)ec. 1878, 17 Jan. 1879, Marlborough cabinet memo., 16 Jan. 1879, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 528: Granard to duchess ofMarlborough, 1 Feb. 1879; for Lowther’s hostility, St Aldwyn MSS, 112455, PCC/PP/55: Lowther cabinet memo., 20 Jan. 1879. Marlborough MSS - Cambridge. MARB 3/13: Lowther to Marlborough, 21 Jan. 1879, B. L., Add. MS 50017, f. 138: Northcote to Beaconsfield, 4 Feb. 1879; for Northcote’s announcement that the government was not going to introduce Irish university legislation during the 1879 session, Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CCLXIII, 1307: 17 Feb. 1879, and the hierarchy’s hostile reaction, Marlborough MSS - Cambridge, MARU 3/18: Granard t o Marlborough, 19 Feb. 1879.

158 Alleri Warrcrr

wide Irish parliarnentary support. Secondly, the Irish land issue was coming to the fore once again, not yet as a result o f poor harvests, but through the publication of Shaw Lefevre’s select committee’s report on the operation of the land purchase clauses of the 1870 Land Act. An Irish members bill on this subject was also likely, again attracting broad Irish support. O n this question, Lowther’s virulently hostile reply to Shaw Lefevre was impolitic, since Lefevre was supported by such Irish conservative menibers as David Plunkett and Arthur McM. Kavanagh. Northcote had to come to his rescue. Finally, in a speech in Liverpool, Hartington made it clear that his earlier hostility to co-operation with Irish nienibers was not as strongas it had been in 1875, and he anticipated the time when, once again, Irish members would see the Liberals as their ‘natural allies’. In an atmosphere of ministerial drift, Northcote asked Beaconsfield what he should say in reply to the University Bill introduced by the O’Conor Don on 31 May 1879. Beaconsfield’s reply is not known, but Northcote found himself forced to stall. By early June, the government still had n o plans for any Irish legslation with which to conclude the session. Lowther’s grand jury proposals had still not niaterialised. As a result it faced the prospect of serious Irish obstruction, unless a positive response was made to the O’Conor Don’s bill. By the second week, Irish rnembers began systematic obstruction of the estimates, while the O’Conor Don pressed the government on its intentions. T h e outcome, when his bill came forward again on 25 June, was an announcement that the government would introduce its own bill in the Lords the following day. Cairns’ announcement was an extremely modest one. T h e O’Conor I )on’s bill had anticipated the use o f A l . 5 n i of the Irish Church surplus to create a St Patrick’s University, made up o f a number ofaffiliated colleges to which money would be chan- nelled, through the payment o f t h e fees of successfully graduating students, and by the provision of museums, libraries and laboratories. Cairns’ proposal, on the other hand, only made provision for a university examining body without any scheme of endowment of the constituent colleges through prizes and scholarships, or any provision of buildings. T h e government immediately ran into dificulties with a range ofEnglish and Irish peers, including sonie of its own supporters. Beaconsfield’s only contribution was to make a delicate political situation worse by a slip of the tongue, which implied that the bill was the outcome of direct negotiations with the bishops. The resulting protestant paranoia made the government’s situation even more difficult in the Com- mons, when it tried to remedy the deficiencies of the bill through providing funds for scholarships and buildings. T h e legslation as finally passed therefore represented a largely tactical response to the government’s parliamentary dilemmas during the 1879 session. It bore little relation to the strategic settlenient of the education question that had been anticipated by Marlborough and Hicks Beach at the end of the previous year. As in 1866-8, an attempt to create a legislative and political base for Conservatism in Ireland had been frustrated by the caution and negativism ofthe cabinet in London.”

2L For Lowther’s fears about Northcote, Marlborough MSS - Ulenheinr, 572: Lowther to Marlborough. 2 Apr. 1879; for his defemng the introduction o f a scheme of grand JUV refomi, Hansard. Pad. Debs, 3rd ser.. CCLXV, 265,007, 1097: 3. 18.25 Apr. 1879; for Hartinyon’s speech in Liverpool, T I t e Timer, 8 Feb. 1879, p. 10a; for the government’s hostility to land reform. even though supported by their own mmmbers, Lowther’s reply to Ulster Conservatives’ Ulster Tenant Right Bill, Hansard, IM. Debs., 3rd ser., CCXLV, 955: 23 Apr. 1879, and on Shaw Lefevre’s resolution, ibid., 1656: 2 May 1879 (a resolution supported by Irish Conservatives like Plunket, Kavanagh and

Disraeli, Conservatives and lrelnrid 159

Beaconsfield’s cabinet had tangled with the Irish university question only with the greatest reluctance and largely for reasons of parliamentary tactics. Its problems did not end with the passing of the bill itself; as the appointments to the senate of the new university showed. I t was difficult to secure a chancellor (Abercorn eventually accepted), and achieving a denominational balance among its members was still consuming ministerial time in the last days of the government in March 1880. Ironically, given the deteriorating economic condition of the west of Ireland during the autumn, the question o f w h o should be chancellor occupied at least as much ofBeaconsfield’s time as the relief policy to be adopted.’3

During the summer and early autumn of 1879 the government, both in London and Dublin, was slow to appreciate the gravity o f the economic situation that was developing in Connaught. Little or no notice had been taken o f the rising political temperature in the r e g o n earlier in the year, with a growing number o f political meetings, which ministers put down to one of the periodic eruptions ofRibbonism. In late August Northcote had written to Marlborough about the need to think about Irish matters in the recess, by which he meant the new university, the church fund and possible amendment of the Bright clauses. By the end of the first week in September, Burke, the under-secretary. was becoming worried about the state o f the harvest and the likelihood of distress during the winter. Ministers remained sanguine however. Northcote, w h o had just returned from a tour of Ireland, was against almost any lep la t ive action and thought the distress much exaggerated, while Lowther’s eyes were firmly fixed on a possible reaction from English farmers to any exceptional measures for their Irish brothers. Various streams of advice came together in late October. In response to the rising levels of distress, Henry Robinson, the vice-president o f the local government board, opposed setting up public works and urged the vigorous administration of existing relief policies. This advice was combined with the recommendation to provide land improvement funds for landlords and sanitary authorities in order to create employment. T h e response of the cabinet in London was to stall, with Lowther supporting those

22 (continued) King-Harman); on the government’s confusion on the introduction of the O’Conor Don’s University Bill, Marlborough MSS - Cambndge, MARB 3/15: Ball to Marlborough, 20 May 1879, U . L., Add.MS 50018. f. 150: Northcote to Beaconsfield, 21 May 1879; for Northcote’s response to the O’Conor Don’s University Bill. Hansard, Pad. Debs, 3rd ser., CCLXVI, 501, 987: 15, 21 May 1879 (again some Irish Conservatives like Kavanagh and Lord Charles Beresford supported O’Conor Don); on Irish obstruction ofthe estimates, 26 May, 16 June 1879, ibid., 1266, 1919: 26 May, 16 June 1879; for the introduction ofthe government’s own bill, Cairns, ibid., CCLXVII, 931: 26 June 1879 (once again the government faced criticism from its own Irish supporters, Leitrim. Inchquin and Donoughmore as well as Liberal Irish peers like O’Hagan and Powencourt). ibid., 1842-5: 8 July 1879; for Lowther’s denial ofnegotiations with the hierarchy, ibid., CCLXVIII, 631, 1182: 17,24 July 1879, along with Northcote’s denial earlier in the year, ibid, CCLXIV, 925: 14 Mar. 1879; for details ofthe act, as passed, 42 & 43 Vic., chap 65; oil some of the ecclesiastical politics behind the Irish university question in 187Y, Thomas J. Momssey, Touurds a National University. William Delany S.1. ( 1 835- 1924) (Dublin, 1983). pp. 3MO. *’ For the extended process in establishing the senate of the Royal University of Ireland, whose charter was not finally signed until 24 Apr. 1880, Bod., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 93/3, ff. 39-40, 46, 48-53, 91/1, 249, 256: Marlborough to Beaconsfield, 9, 18 Oct.. 5, 18 Nov., 6. 9. 17, 30 Dec. 1879, 10 Jan. 1880, Cairns to Beaconsfield. 13 Oct., 11 Dec. 1879, Marlborough MSS - Blenheirn, 683, 71 4, 732, 774: Lowther to Marlborough, 25 Nov. 1879, Abercorn to Marlborough. 27 Dec. 1879, Beaconsfield to Marlborough, 6 Jan. 1880, Lowther to Marlborough, 2 Feb. 1880.

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(probably including Beaconsfield) w h o argued that the crisis was being overstated. Despite this, Lowther saw n o inconsistency in supporting improvement loans for landlords, a policy which was accepted despite treasury objections. Beyond this, the cabinet merely instructed the board of works energetically to use the relief powers they already possessed. They also decided to attempt again a prosecution o f some of the leading land agitators.’4

It was not until about six weeks later that ministers in London became worried that they had been too coniplacent. As the evidence of distress grew, so also did the cry, ‘who starves Ireland?’. Hartington, as Liberal leader, had already begun a tentative rec- onciliation with the Irish members, and in English constituencies with a large Irish presence, candidates in by-elections were having to talk soft words on Irish issues, espe- cially as l’arnell and his colleagues were now speech-making on both sides of the Irish sea. Cross was the first cabinet minister to become concerned that the governnient would look particularly foolish ifit was still presiding over the Church surplus (explic- itly designated for use in the face of unavoidable calamity), while Ireland starved. H e admitted that the government had been lax in looking for constructive ways to dispose of the sanie funds through schemes of economic development. As the opening ofpar- liament approached, niinisters could expect a vigorous assault from the opposition and obstruction from Parnell. They would need satisfactory answers in what was likely to be the last session before the dissolution. Cross quickly secured agreenient for additional funds for relief, drawn from the Church surplus, and Lowther was charged with prepar- ing a more comprehensive Irish policy for the cabinet. In it he recommended the renewal of the Protection Act until August 1881 (a dilution ofwhat the Irish law ofices were requesting), and the entire dispersal o f the Church Fund, with some 25 per cent set aside to finance intermediate education, and the remainder to be distributed in land improvement loans. H e concluded that emigration was the only effective remedy for the overcrowded districts in the west, and drew attention to the Canadian government’s migration scheme to encourage settlement in the North West Territories. In

.’J I n the first half of the year, there had been some sectanan disturhances in Conneniara, and tome concern over thc land nieeting addressed by O’Connor Power and I’arnell in Mayo; generdlly, the Ilublin executive remained sanguine, with Lowther believing the agranan situation more distressing in England and Wales. for summary see, Bod., lkaconsfield MSS, I k p Hughenden 5413. f. 39: Lowther cabinet Inemo, uuly 1x791; for Northcote and the Irish legdative programme, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 608: Northcote to Marlborough, 17 Aug. 1879; for the debate over the rising threat oflnsh distress. Marlborough MSS - Cambridge, MAI- 3/14: T. H. Burke-Marlborough. 8 Sept 1x70, B. L., Add. MS 50018, (171: Northcote to Beaconsfield, 12 Oct. 1879, Beaconsfield MSS, I k p Hughenden 9313, K 4 ( b l : Marlborough to Beaconsfield, 18, 25 Oct. 1879. Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 631, 640: Lifford to Marlborough. I X Oct., Kenrnare to Marlborough 29 Oct. 1879; on prosecutions. Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 630: Lowther to Marlborough, 18 Oct. 1x79, Heacons- field MSS, Dep Hughenden 9313, f. 43: cabinet rneniorandunt by the Irish law officers, 28 Oct. 1x79; on distress policy to be adopted, Marlborough MSS - Cambndge. MARB 3/10: Beaconsfield to Marlborough, 20 Oct. 1879, Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 93/3, tT. 41, 47, 47a-b: Marlborough to Beaconsfield, 25 Oct., 2 Nov. 1879, Marlborough cabinet memo., 5 Nov. 1879, cabinet papers by Henry Ikobinson and A. Power, 28 Oct., 1 0 Nov. 1x79; for reports on the cabinet’s discussions, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 656, 659. 664, 666-8, 673. 675: Lowther to Marlborough, 5, 6. 10, 11, 12, 14 Nov., Cross to Marlborough, 12, 17 Nov. 1879. The Diary q / Carhontc Hardy, Lam Lord Cranbrook, 1 8 6 6 1892. Political Selecfions, ed. Nancy E. Johnston (Oxford, 198l), p.427 lsubsequently referred to as Cranbrook D i a r y ] : 7 Nov. 1879. Marlborough MSS - Cambridge, M A N 3 3/13: Lowther to Marlborough. 7 Nov. 1879.

Disraeli, Conservatives nnd Ireland 161

discussions among ministers, Northcote proved to be particularly obstructive, remaining hostile to anything which appeared like social engineering through the creation of peasant proprietors. As chancellor, he was prepared to increase grants to enable dis- ease-free potatoes to be planted, and to augment the loans to landlords for improvements, but in other respects he maintained a stiff treasury line.’5

At this poict the government began to g v e mixed messages. Speaking at Kendal, Lowther adopted a vigorously reactionary position, blaming the state of Ireland on Gladstonian legislation, describing the country as being in the hands of faddists, theorists and carpet-baggers, and opposing extended proprietorship. In his view, the duty of the government was to maintain property rights along with law and order, now that the principal Irish grievances over education had been met. The queen’s speech on the other hand was much more opaque, making no mention of the government’s intentions with regard to law and order. By this time, talk ofa dissolution was becoming intense, and, in this atmosphere, the government decided merely to extend the funds available to relieve distress, shelving all thoughts ofother legslation. In the face ofwhat appeared to be positive indicators from by-elections, Beaconsfield, at the cabinet on 6 March, announced a dissolution rather than face the parliamentary difficulties in continuing with the session. The whips were encouraging and he decided to fight on the issue of who governs Ireland?’6

Beaconsfield’s dissolution letter to Marlborough with its implied appeal to anti-Irish sentiment, along with the reluctance ofthe government over the previous two years to support Hicks Beach’s and Marlborough’s attempted rapprochement with the hierarchy over Irish education, shows that the priority clearly lay with the English political scene. Unlike the years between 1866 and 1868, there had been little need to woo friends within Westminster between 1874 and 1880, and, consequently, the Dublin

25 O n government’s growing awareness of the economic crisis, and of Cross in particular, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 668, 675, 713, 722-23, 727, 740: Cross to Marlborough, 12, 17, 26 Dec. 1879,3,5, 10Jan. 1880. memorial ofarchbishops and bishops oflreland, 24 Dec. 1879; for Con- servative comment on Liberals associating with the Irish cause in English elections, Lowther MSS: Yorkshire Gazette, 4 Oct. 1879 p. 8, Bodl., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 58/2, f6b: Charles Stu- art Wortley to Beaconsfield, 1 Jan. 1880 (Wortley had been the recently unsuccessful candidate in the Sheffield by-election, following the death of the veteran Radical, J. A. Roebuck, in which he estimated that Liberal wooing of the Irish voters in the city had cost him 1200 votes). For cabinet discussion and Northcote’s continuing hostility to public expenditure, Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hugh- enden 54/3, f. 40b: Lowther cabinet memo., 13 Jan. 1880, P. R. 0.. 30/51/5, f. 42: Northcote to Cairns, 13 Jan. 1880, Harrowby MSS. 2nd ser., LIII, f. 236: Northcote to Sandon, 28 Jan. 1880, Cranbrook Diary, pp. 433-4: 18,27 Jan. 1880, Marlborough MSS- Blenheim, 75840,768,781,791: Lowther to Marlborough, 22.23Jan. 7,10,11 Feb. 1880, Northcote to Marlborough, 22.28 Jan. 1880.

26 For Lowther’s speech at Kendal, Lowther MSS: [late Jan 18801; for queen’s speech and later Northcote comment on the Irish programme, Hansard, Par/. Debs, 3rd ser., CCL. 164: 6 Feb. 1880; on talk ofmssolution and ofthe good electoral prospects, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 801,826: Low- ther to Marlborough, 20 Feb., 10 Mar. 1880. Marlborough MSS-Cambridge, MARB 3/13: Lowther to Marlborough, 8 Mar. 1880. Bodl., Beaconsfield MSS. Dep Hughenden 58/2(K), f. 9: Algernon Borthwick to Beaconsfield, 6 Feb. 1880; and on the recent by-elections, John Patrick Rossi, ‘Home Rule and the Liverpool By-Election of 1880’. Irish Historiral Studies, XIX (1974), 156-68; for the government’s increasingly generous approach to relief policy, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim, 787, 791, 809-10,814,817,826: Lowther to Marlborough, 10,11,26,28 Feb.. 1 ,2 , 10 Mar. 1880; for details of the reliefofdistress and seeds legislation, 43 Vic., chaps 1,4; for Beaconsfield’s decision to dissolve and his open letter to the duke of Marlborough, 8 Mar. 1880, Blake, Disraeli, p. 707, Moneypenny and Buckle, L> o j D i m e l i , 11, 1386-8.

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executive had found it difficult to engage the political attention of the governnient in London. This also applied to the Irish Conservative classes more generally. The continuing difficulties of the landlords in the north of Ireland, the position of the minor incumbents, the need for local government reform as well as the grievances ofthe moderate Roman Catholic community had all been largely ignored, despite the best efforts of Hicks Beach and Marlborough. Only when economic crisis and a general election loomed in late 1879 did Ireland attract Beaconsfield’s attention, and then as a means of niobilising Conservative support in England.

The electoral landslide came as a shock to almost everyone. with even some Lib- erals, like Childers, expecting a Conservative majority of about 30. Beaconsfield and the tory ‘wire-pullers’ were similarly confident. In fact, the anti-Irish cry did not catch fire, except in constituencies in which there was a significant Irish presence, or as in York, where Lowther tried unsuccessfully to defend his position against both Liberal and Irish nationalist campaigners. In Ireland, hardly surprisingly, the cry was unhelpful, reinforcing the trend against the Conservatives’ position, both north and south .27

Electoral defeat left Conservatives perplexed and in some disarray, as they pondered why the electorate appeared so fickle, given the decisive rejection of the reforniing impulse six years before. Beaconsfield himselfblamed the depression oftrade and the failure ofthe clergy to stir themselves, but few had the detailed information to come to any objective judgement. Nor was the political future any clearer. Beaconsfield did not announce his retirement at the party meeting at Bridgwater House on 19 May, and, in the short parliamentary session, he remained one ofthe more active ofthe party’s leadership. Freed again from the complications of being in government, the Conservatives could concentrate on political tactics. But this proved problematic also. Because they had not announced the renewal of Irish coercion in their own queen’s speech earlier in the year, it was difficult for them to attack the Liberal government’s decision to govern without special powers, once the 1875 legislation expired on 31 May. I t was ofcourse easy, a month later, to ride on the back ofwhig discontent with the Compensation for Distur- bance Bill, but the general assumption that it would be thrown out by the Lords made Beaconsfield’s difficulties greater, as he worked hard to keep his fiontbench in London during August. Cairns was particularly difficult, at first refusing to come south to add legal weight to the Conservative attack, and later sending Beaconsfield some grouse as recompense for not staying to speak against the government’s ground game legdation.2H

27 For the general election, Trevor Lloyd, The General Election .f 1880 (Oxford, 1968); for general confidence about the electoral prospects, Marlborough MSS - Cambridge, MARE! 3/13: Lowther to Marlborough, 8 Mar. 1880, Marlborough MSS - Blenheim. 826, 833: Lowther to Marlborough. 10 Mar. 1880, Nonhcote to Marlborough. 20 Mar. 1880 (in which Lowther reports the ‘wirepullers’ as anticipating a Conservative niajority of 30), Cranbrook Diary, pp. 440-1: 1 0 , 20 Mar. 1880; for Childers’ view, Northamptonshire R. O., Cartwright MSS. 6/14: W. R. Cartwright diary, 6 Feb. 1880. For reactions to defeat, Cronbrook Diary, pp. 442-3: 1 , 4 Apr. 1880, West Sussex R. 0.. Good- wood MSS. 869, c45: Cairns to Richmond, 2 Feb. 1880, P. R. 0.. 30/51/4, ff. 159. 160: Cairns to Richmond, 3, 16 Apr. 1880. On the continuing erosion ofthe Conservatives’ position in Ireland and particularly in Ulster, Walker, Ulster Politics. pp. 127-53.

*” For Beaconsfield’s reactions to defeat, Blake, Ditraeli. pp. 720-2, Moneypenny and Buckle, Lge o j Disraeli, 11, 1447-9: Rowton to the queen, 19 May 1880; for those of other ministers, P. R . O.,


It was only fiom September onwards that the Conservative leadership, Northcote most notably, began to reflect on what line the opposition should adopt in the face of the deteriorating situation in the Irish countryside. For Northcote, such matters were largely ones ofparliamentary tactics, while for Beaconsfield, ill for some weeks in Octo- ber, they were more ones of mood as he anticipated the conclusion of his career. Immediately after the elections, he had predicted that the coming question would be that ofthe relations between the Lords and Commons, and the panic among the landed classes resulting fiom Gladstone’s first parliamentary session did not lessen these forebodings. In the debate on compensation, Beaconsfield had reminded the peers of the Conservatives’ reforming record on Irish land in the years following the Devon Commission report, drawing particular attention to Napier’s proposed legislation in 1852, and to the fact of the Conservatives not dividing the Commons on the second reading ofthe 1870 Land Bill. But now, he continued, the situation was very different. There were members ofthe cabinet who wanted to attack the landlords as a class, and he predicted that this would be the first ofa series ofbills aimed at altering the character and constitution of the country. This depressed mood deepened during the autumn recess.*’

In these gloomy feelings he was joined by Salisbury, who, with the election defeat, began to re-engage with domestic politics. The closeness of the two men was now remarked upon, and their correspondence and public utterances show a shared thinking. In Salisbury’s speech at Woodstock in early December, there are clear Disraelian echoes in his attack on Gladstone as the destroyer ofthe bi-partisan approach to Ireland which had been adopted before 1868, and Disraeli used phrases contained in Salisbury’s letters to him. The challenge to landed authority in Ireland and the early actions of the Liberal government were of a piece, representing a co-ordinated attack on the landed basis of the English constitution and system of government, something which would have to be resisted by all available constitutional means.30

(continued) 30/51/7, f. 54: Cranbrook to Cairns, 6 Apr. 1880, Bod., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden 92/2, f. 54: Salisbury to Beaconsfield, 7 Apr. 1880, B. L., Add. MS 51267, f. 36: Cranbrook to Cross, 8 Apr. 1880. marquess of Salisbury, Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, Salisbury MSS, HH/3M/E: Richmond to Salisbury, 10 Apr. 1880. B. L., Add. MS 60772, ff. 100, 109: Bath to Carnarvon, 10, 19 Apr. 1880. O n the general political prospects, Salisbury-Bauour Correspondence. Let- ters Exchanged between the Third Marquess 4Salisbury and his Nephew, Arthurjames Ba!four 186% 1892, ed. Robin Harcourt Williams (Hedordshire Record Society Publications, IV, 1988). pp. 38-43: A. J . Balfour to Salisbury, 8 Apr., Salisbury to Balfour, 10 Apr., Balfour memo., 8 May 1880, West Sussex R . 0.. Goodwood MSS, 869, c46: Salisbury to kchmond, 17 Apr. 1880.

c, For Beaconsfield’s feelings, Salisbury-Ba!jiour Correspondence, p. 38: Balfour to Salisbury, 8 Apr. 1880. Beaconsfield on compensation, Hansard, Par/. Debs, 3rd ser., CCLV, 94 : 3 Aug. 1880, P. R. 0.. 30/51/1, f. 169: Beaconsfield to Cairns, 29 Oct. 1880, Winston Spencer Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (2 vols .. 1906). I , 155-6: Gont to Churchill, 9 Nov. 1880; for Northcote’s views, B. L., Add. MS 50041. ff. 32,39,41,50017, f. 230: Northcote to Gont, 11 Sept. 1880, Northcote to Beaconsfield, 7 Oct. 1880, Gont to Northcote, 30 Oct. 1880, Northcote to Goat, 1 Nov. 1880.

XJ For Northcote’s view ofBeaconsfield being under Salisbury’s influence, B. L., Add. MS 50063A. f. 324: Northcote diary, 28 Apr. 1880; for Salisbury’s speech at Woodstock, The Times, 1 Dec. 1880, p. 10a, for Beaconsfield’s using Salisbury’s phrases, Bod., Beaconsfield MSS, Dep Hughenden, 92/2, f. 148: Salisbury to Beaconsfield, 1 Dec. 1880, P. R. 0.. 30151 /1, f. 171: Beaconsfield to Cairns, 7 Dec. 1880.

164 Allen Warren

Such broadly prophetic thoughts did not resolve Northcote’s anxieties about how the party should react to the government’s policy. As it turned out, Gladstone’s own tactics were skilful by combining the announcement of the immediate suspension of habeas corpus in the queen’s speech with a series ofgeneralities about land. In taking the lead for the Conservative front bench, Gibson could attack the government for not introducing coercion earlier, but they could hardly ask for more in terms of additional powers. O n land, the situation was complicated by the rumours that Gladstone did not hold advanced opinions, by Richmond discovering how different Ireland was during his agricultural commission’s visit, and by the early indications that the Irish landlords (and not just those in Ulster) were not wholly opposed to arbitrated rents.

In the face of such complexity, changes of parlianientary tactics were required, and one of Beaconsfield’s last formal political acts was to chair the meeting on 6 January which decided that Gibson should take a moderate position in the debate on the queen’s speech. Over the next two months, attention was focussed on the Commons and there was little that the opposition could do but support Forster in his long battle against the Parnellites to secure the suspension of habeas corpus. Beaconsfield played almost no part in any of this, remaining a detached observer. He was reported as being gloomy about the coming land bill, but took little active interest. Although there was no reference to any date for retirement, he was clearly an old and sick man. As it hap- pened the onset of his last illness coincided with the Gladstone’s introduction of the second Irish land Bill, but he left no political testimony on how he regarded it at his death two weeks later on 19 April.

2

In 1884 Pope Hennessy had asked whether there was anything more to Ilisraeli’s Irish policies than Cromwell and emigration. W e are now in a position to answer that question, as well commenting on some of the interpretative themes identified by later historians.

In the first place, it is clear that throughout his political career Disraeli’s interest in Ire- land and its government was dominated by tactical considerations of parlianientary and English electoral advantage. In his early attacks on Peel and in his attitudes to the Maynooth grant, he was largely trying to advance his political career. Later, in the wheeling and dealing in the years after the papal aggression, and in his attempts to con- tain the threat posed to the Irish Church, Disraeli was constantly striving to create the conditions in which a Conservative majority might be secured, either through political negotiation or electoral victory.

O n securing that objective for the first time in 1874, Disraeli preferred largely to ignore Irish affairs, warning the Dublin executive not to tangle with issues which were likely to offend English political and religious prejudices. Only in last two years of his government was he prepared to sanction even the most modest response to their requests, and then in March 1880 he largely reversed the signals which had been sent out by his decision to fight the election on an anti-Irish platform. In the last year of his

Disraeli. Conservatives and Ireland 165

life, the growing crisis in the Irish countryside was less important to him than the implied threat to the landed and aristocratic basis of the constitution.

Secondly, by adopting such an approach, particularly when in government, Disraeli found himselfat odds with his own advisors in Dublin Castle, anxious about the inexora- ble electoral decline of Irish Conservativism after 1859. Naas and Hicks Beach, as well as some oftheir viceregal colleagues, were keen to explore the basis for a more representative Irish Conservatism, through wooing moderate catholic support and by modest social and economic reform. Naas’ strategy between 1866 and 1868 was the more corn- prehensive, reflecting his native practical sense and knowledge, but it was destroyed by the challenge posed by Gladstone’s church resolutions and the British electoral considerations that flowed from that initiative. Disraeli’s priorities in 1868 were dominated by a confidence that he could afford to lose Irish ground in his defence of the established Church. After 1874, the experience ofelectoral defeat in 1868 and the subsequent fate of Gladstone’s own university legislation did not encourage Disraeli to seek ways of rebuilding the Conservatives’ position in Ireland, despite the mutual antipathy of the Liberal leadership and non-Conservative Irish members. The political confidence of Lancashire and the English countryside was more important than the political fate ofthe landed interest in Ireland. In appointing James Lowther as chief secretary, Beaconsfield added a reactionary counter-balance to the reformist tendencies of the Marlborough court. In so doing, he undermined a potentially powerhl political partnership of Hicks Beach and Marlborough attempting to fashion a concordat between the hierarchy and government. Even so, its importance should not be over-stated. Hicks Beach’s work from 1876 onwards was on a much narrower front than that explored by Naas ten years earlier. It did not engage at all with issues ofland reform, socio-economic development and the structure of Irish local government, all ofwhich were necessary ifthe Conserva- tive classes were to retain any long-term socio-political significance outside the north of Ireland. The government in London and Dublin responded slowly to the agrarian crisis in late 1879, with its reliefpolicy at first determined largely by crude Irish electoral considerations. This approach was then reversed dramatically by Beaconsfield’s personal decision to dissolve and fight an election on an anti-Irish platform.

If it is accepted that Disraeli’s Irish attitudes and actions were dominated by English considerations, does the way in which they were expressed tell us anything about his political personality and how it operated within his definition ofthe political world? As we have seen, Distaeli’s way ofviewing Irish affairs can be divided into four phases, each ofwhich offers a commentary on how he saw the political process in relation to his own and the Conservative party’s self-advancement.

Before 1845, Disraeli saw Ireland largely in terms ofan anti-Whig ideology. Drafted first in The Vindication, Disraeli reinforced his general views with material from early seventeenth century British political history, largely derived from his father. It was influenced later by the differently biassed enthusiasms of his Young England fiiends. From 1845, in his desire to destroy Peel, and then to fashion a Conservative politics freed from its protectionist limitations, Disraeli adopted the cause ofpopular protestantism, a strategy made much more complex and difficult by the papal aggression and Russell’s Durham letter. The tensions and limitations of such an approach were exposed by the experience of minority government in 1852 and 1858-9.

166 Allen Warren

The formation ofPalmenton’s last government in 1859 threatened to make Disraeli’s political objectives even less realisable, as the Whig leadership appeared to consolidate its position through the acquisition of Gladstone and some ofhis Peelite colleagues, and by the growing rapport with provincial dissent. Disraeli’s reaction was to try to move away from the politics of popular Protestantism and towards a broader defence of the established Church as a defining national institution. Sensing what he hoped was a change in ecclesiastical mood in relation to Church defence, he believed this to be reflected also in parliament through the decline in support for the abolition of the church rates. As a result he tried both in parliament and in his diocesan speeches in Oxfordshire to suggest that the progressive dismantling ofthe props of establishment threatened notjust a fundamental institution of the state, but also a defining element of English nationhood, as well as the divine purposes of civil government. His expectation was that the Church, clerical and lay, would mobilize itself, and, putting aside factious differences, see the Conservative party as its true defender.

Ireland played almost no part in this political and ecclesiastical thinking, and Disraeli was trumped by the political opposition through its renewed interest in Irish Church disestablishment from 1864 onwards. Dillwyn’s motion in the spring of 1865, and Gladstone’s apparent support for it, were particularly ominous. Even so, Disraeli continued to make Church defence a central plank in the election that followed, an election in which Gladstone was soundly rejected by the clerical electorate of his university seat.

Thereafter Ireland was a twin-stranded rope in the politics of reform between 1865 and the general election of 1868. O n the one hand, there was the rivalry between the Whig and tory Irish teams represented by Chichester Fortescue and Naas. Each tried to find an effective string ofpolicies that would be acceptable to their supporters in Britain, and catch the changing political mood in Ireland, as represented by the Fenian threat and a more militant and self-confident Roman Catholic church. O n the other hand, there was the growing realization, as the battle over the Reform Bill came to its conclusion, that Gladstone was going to make the issue ofthe Irish Church central to the next election campaign. This was not the ground on which Disraeli would have chosen to do battle, for the Irish Church’s unpopularity, its marginality to the concerns of many anglicans, and the lack ofunity ofview among the anglican bishops, all made defence of the established position of the Irish Church a difficult issue upon which to enthuse the new electorate. Disraeli’s response was to try to envelop the reform ofthe Irish Church within the more general defence of the established position of the anglican Church that he had been urging since the beginning of the decade, a strategy to which he added an evangelical-protestant gloss in the summer run-up to the election. Disraeli remained confident, despite the lack of success of a Church cry in 1865, that he would win that election, possibly being misled by the political intelligence he was getting from Lancashire. Whatever the reason, the Conservatives’ defeat shattered the strategy Dis- raeli had been trying to fashion over the previous eight years, leaving him both personally bitter and politically exposed. As a result it was possible to anticipate Dis- raeli’s career as coming to an end between 1869 and 1872, something which may have entered his own mind as he prepared the introduction to the collected edition of his novels in 1870.


In looking at Disraeli’s church politics in the 1860s. and the place ofthe Irish Church within it, we find at least the hint of an answer to some of the questions posed by John Vincent and earlier by Sir Isaiah Berlin about Disraeli’s career as a whole. In the language and ideas deployed in the defence ofthe Established Church, there is more than a little of Berlin’s ‘play of transforming phantasy’ in terms of anglican doctrine, a reading of Burke and a romantic sensibility. In addition, there is the attempt to place the anglican Church at the centre of the nation’s history, a narrative almost exclusively English in its character. Many of the ideas and much of the language used draw on Dis- raeli’s writing of the 1830s to which has been added an interpretative gloss on the ecclesiastical developments since that time, most notably the dangers posed by ritualism and rationalism in religious and scientific life.

John Vincent posed the question whether there is more to Disraeli’s career than a series ofenforced poses, and whether he was fighting one political culture with another. Debate on those questions usually focusses on the relationship between Disraeli’s writings in the 1840s and his actions in government from 1874 to 1880. At least as useful is to ask the question about Disraeli’s church politics in the 1860s. In this the Irish Church proved to be his Achilles heel, a weakness which Gladstone ruthlessly exposed. The long term result ofGladstone’s victory in 1868 was that the defence ofthe state/Church adjustment of 1828-9 could no longer be sustained as a fundamental element of Con- servative doctrine. If Conservativism was ever to command majority support within a dynamically changing political system, then new ideologies would have to be found and Church interests defended on a piece-meal basis.

If this view of Disraeli’s politics in the 1860s has any validity (and it certainly needs further exploration), then the place of Ireland in Disraeli’s final decade becomes clear. We have already made the point that in general Ireland was fundamentally part of Dis- raeli’s domestic politics in the 1840s and 1850s, and that it forced itselfupon his attempts at a politics of Church defence from 1864 onwards, destroying its potential in the process. After 1869 Ireland played a relatively small part in Disraeli’s domestic politics and it contributed little to the Conservative election victory in 1874. Thereafter it remained a governing problem, to be kept in the political background for as long as possible. But it retained a capacity to ti-ustrate and disturb, even in a political environment in 1880 in which Beaconsfield hoped that English prejudices in the face of Irish disturbance might secure him a new mandate. Not until 1886 could Ireland again become part of the Conservatives’ domestic political ideology through the defence of the Union, a development which was as much the product ofcladstone’s political dynamism as had been the defeat of Disraeli’s church politics in 1868.

disraeli, the conservatives and the government of ireland: part 2, 1868–1881

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