laying claim to beirut_urban naratives and spatial identity in the age of solidere

8/10/2019 Laying Claim to Beirut_urban Naratives and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere

1/47

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Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of SolidereAuthor(s): Saree MakdisiSource: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 23, No. 3, Front Lines/Border Posts (Spring, 1997), pp. 660-705Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344040Accessed: 23-08-2014 12:28 UTC

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2/47

Laying Clainl

to Beirut:

Urban

Narrativeand

Spatial

Identity in

the

Age of

Solidere

Saree

Makdisi

As

regards

oastal owns,one

mustsee

to it thatthey

are situated n

a height

or amidsta

people

sufficiently

umerous

o come to the

support f the

town

whenan enemy

attackst. The

reason or

this s

that a town

which s

near the sea but

does

not havewithin

ts area

tribeswhosharets group eeling,or isnot situatednruggedmoun-

tain

territory,s

in dangerof

beingattacked t

night

by surprise. ts

enemies

can easily

attack t with a

fleet. They

can be sure

that the

cityhas no one

to call

to its support

and that

the urban

population,

accustomedo

tranquility oes

not knowhow

to fight.

IBN

KHALDUN,

he

Muqaddamclh

Whenhe came

o the end of

his

ourney,Abd

al-Karim idnt

realize

hed traveled

more

than all the shoe

shiners

n the world.

Not be-

causehe

had

comeall the way

romMashta

Hasan n

Akkar o Bei-

rut, butbecauseBeirut tselftravels.You stay whereyou are and

All

translations re

my ownunless

otherwise

noted.

An earlier

and much shorter

version

of this essay was

presented at the

Middle East

Studies

Association

MESA)

onference n Phoenix,

November

1994;part of

section 3 was

presentedat the MESA

onference

n Washington,

D.C.,

December 1995;part of

section 4

was

presentedat the

"Dislocating

tates" onference

on

globalizationheld at the

University

of

Chicago in 1996.

Portionsof

this essaypreviously

appeared

in Saree Makdisi,

"Letter

from

Beirut,"

ANY(ArchitectureNew

York)5

(Mar.-Apr. 994):

56-59.

For the

formation

and elaborationof

many of the ideas I

present

here, I am deeply

indebted to discussionswith my parents and brothers,RonaldAbdelmoutaleb udy, Rich-

ard

Dienst,

CesareCasarino,Paul

Silverstein,David

Rinck,

Nadya Engler,Roger

Rouse,

Maha

Yahya,Michael

Speaks,Homi

Bhabhaand the

othercoeditorsof

Crttical

nquiry,Elias

CrS2cal nquiry 23

(Spring 1997)

X) 1997

by The University of

Chicago.

0093-1896/97/2303-0007$01.00.

All rights

reserved.

661

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/47

s

. : . .

;-s ,2 s } --, - ^ ;

FIC. l(a). What used to be Martyrs'Square, facing south; the statue has been re-

moved for renovation.The excavation n the foreground s an archaeologicaldig. The re-

mainingbuildings n the backroundmarkSolidere's outhern perimeter.Photo by author.

FIG. l(b). Postcardof Martyrs' quarebefore the war, acing north. The street lamp

in the foreground(near the buses) is visible n its postwarruination n the photo in fig. 5.



4/47

662

SareeMakdisi Laying Claimto Beirut

it travels. Instead

of

you traveling, the city

travels.

Look at Beirut,

transforming

rom the Switzerland

of the East to Hong

Kong,

to Sai-

gon, to Calcutta,

o Sri

Lanka. It'sas if we

circled the

world in ten or

twentyyears.We stayedwherewe were and the worldcircled around

us.

Everythingaround

us changed,

and we have changed.

ELIASKHOURY, he

ourney f

LittleGandhi

The very center

of Beirut

is today a wasteland.

For thousands

of square

metersextending

from Martyrs'Square

ittle remains

of the heart

of this

ancient city.Several

adjoining

areasare made

up of a patchworkof

build-

ings slated for recuperation

and of nakedsites

where buildingsor souks

long

since bulldozed

or demolished

once

stood. Today a bold

new

rebuilding project is underway,one that, under the aegis of a single

company

(Solidere),

promises to bring

new life

to the center of the

city;

indeed, the company's

slogan is Beirut

An Ancient

City for the

Future.

Ironically,

hough, in the

months since reconstruction

officially

began in earnest

(summer 1994), more

buildings

have been demolished

than

in almost twenty years

of artillery bombardment

and house-to-

house

combat.

As of the summer

of 1994, indeed,

whatever

one wants to say

about

the reconstruction

plan currently

being

put into effect

in central Beirut

is almost (but not quite) beside the point. Forthe objectof discussion

the center

of the city virtually

does not exist

any longer;

there is, in its

place,

a dusty sprawlof gaping

lots, excavations,

exposed

infrastructure,

and archeological

digs. Criticsof the

reconstruction

plan mourn the

loss

of the old city center;

but

its supportersclaim

that the old

city center had

been

left beyond salvation

by the end of the

war and that

not only was

reconstruction

on this scale

inevitablebut, for

any number of reasons,

this particular

reconstruction

plan

was and is the only

possible

option.

The debate

has

centered for the most

part on

how or whyor whether

the

current plan is the only option. In the meantime,we are losing sight of

Khoury,

Ramiz Malouf(director

of information

at Solidere),Zakaria

Khalil (of the Town

Planning

Deparmentat Solidere),

NajahWakeem,

nd aboveall Kamal

Hamdan.Thisessay

forms

only one partof a much

larger project;

n subsequentessaysI

more fully elaborate

the historicalquestions

raisedby

the Solidereproject,and

I also try to move beyond

critique

to an elaboration

f alternatives

o the Solidereproject.What

s at stake

n the presentessay

is merely

an outline of the project

and an

overall assessmentof some

of its political

and

cultural

ramifications.

Saree Makdisi

is an assistantprofessor

of

English and comparative

literatureat the

University

of Chicago. He is

the author

of Universal m-

pire:Romanticism

nd heCulture

f Modernization

forthcoming).

He has also

been

writing a series of essays,

including

this one, on the

politics of cul-

ture in

the contemporary

Arab world.



5/47

FIG.

2. The wastelandof whatused to be Martyrs' quare,with one of the ubiquitous

Mercedesdumptrucks n foregroundand a "recuperated" uilding in background.Photo

by author.

FIG.

3. Infrastructure nstallation.The scale of some of the work on the infrastruc-

ture can be quite overwhelming,evocative perhaps of a technologicalsublime.

Photo by

author.

s w s



6/47


7/47

Neocolonial World: Modern Arabic

Culture and the End of Modernity," oundary 2 22

(Spring 1995):85-1 15.

Critical Inquiry

Spring1997 665

FIC.4. Wartimedamageto the city center.Photo by author.

During he war, erritories roliferated, efinedaccordingo subna-

tionalcommunity r sectariandentities.Otherspaceswereabandoned,

mostdramaticallyhe so-calledGreenLinedividing astandwestBeirut,

I.

Wz N

N [ i q

Wi

S1tg

X t e r s



8/47

666 SareeMakdasi LayingClaimoBeirut

and aboveall the veryheavilydamaged itycenter,which or more han

fifteenyearsremained n emptied-out ite marking he graveyard f na-

tionaldialogueand reconciliation.3o be sure,the questions enerated

by the war will continue o be contestedat various evelsand through

differentmodalitiesin a reversal f the termsof von Clausewitz'samous

dictum).However, entralBeirutmust,I believe,be seen as a keysite for

the development nd contestation f theseand otherquestions; nd it is

for this reason hatthe processof reconstructionssumes significance

thatfarexceeds he directlymaterialerms n which t hasalready egun

to takeshape.This shapetakes he formof the worknowbeing under-

takenby the newly nventedoint-stock ebaneseCompanyor the Devel-

opmentand Reconstructionf BeirutCentralDistrict, etterknownby

its French cronym olidere,whichnow has legalor managerialontrol

over the land in the centerof the city.But here it becomesnecessaryo

explainwhatSolidere's roposed patial arrativeooks ikeand whatare

its originsand the originsof the companytself.

1. Berytus Delenda Est;or, XnAncientCityor theFuture"

Following he close of the traumatic vents of 1975-76 (which

marked he beginningof the Lebanesewar), he questionof what o do

aboutthe damage o the centraldistrictof Beirutwas firstopened for

discussion. he warseemed hen to be over,and variouspublicand pri-

vateorganizationsegan o considerproposalsor the reconstructionf-

fort. These discussions ulminated n the first officialplan, in 1977,

commissioned y the Council for Developmentand Reconstruction

3. See Kamal Salibi,

A House of Many Mansions: The Hzstoryof Lebanon Reconsidered

(Berkeley,1988). "In all but name,"Salibiwrote during the war,"Lebanon oday is a non-

country.Yet, paradoxically,here has not been a time when the Muslimsand Christiansof

Lebanon have exhibited, on the whole, a keener consciousnessof common identity,albeit

with somewhatdifferentnuances."Thus, he goes on to say,

The people of Lebanonremainas dividedas ever; the differencesamong them have

come to be reflected geographicallyby the effective cantonizationof their country,

and by massive population movements between the Christian and Muslim areas

which have hardenedthe lines of division.In the continuingnationalstruggle,how-

ever,the central ssue is no longer the question of the Lebanesenationalallegiance,

but the termsof the politicalsettlementwhichall sides to the conflict,certainlyat the

popular evel, generallydesire. Disgracedand abandonedby the world, t is possible

that the Lebaneseare finallybeginning to discover hemselves. Pp. 2-3]

Now that the war has indeed ended, it has been argued that central Beirut should

serve as a site in which the spatialized ectarianism f the war could be deconstructedand

hence as a site in which a new sense of national dentity could be given spatialexpression,

by,among other things,bringing ogether membersof the differentsects in a common and

collectivelyreinventedarea.



9/47

Critical

Inquiry

Spring

1997

667

(CDR),

o

rebuild

he city

center

along he

linesof

its

traditional

ayout,

o

restore

ts

centrality

n the

life

of

Beirut,

nd

to improve

ts

nfrastructure.

Particularmphasiswasplaced,however,n theneedto reintegratehe

center

n

both

class

and sectarian

erms

that

s, to

restore

he

class

and

communal

iversity

hathad

characterized

t

before

he

war)

and

on

the

need

to

ensure

he

reintegration

f

the center

nto

the rest

of the

city's

urban

fabric.

Before

the

war,

he

downtown

ad

served

not

only

as a

commercial

nd

cultural

enter

but

also

as a

transport

ub

(all

bus

and

service-taxi

outes

originated

nd

terminated

here,

or instance,

o that

trips o

different

arts

of

the city

or the

country

more

often han

not

were

routed

hrough

he

city center).

As

Jad Tabet

points

out, the

1977

plan

highlighted desire"toremold hecenterof the Lebaneseapitalntoa

meeting

place

or

the

various

ommunities,"

hile

at the

same

ime

bear-

ing in

mind

the

need

to

"modernize

he

center

n

an attempt

o

solve

he

serious

problems

f functioning

nd access

Beirut

aced

before

he

war,

while

maintaining

he

specific

mage

of its site,

history,

nd

Mediterra-

nean

and 'oriental'

haracter."4

In

any

case, he

warwas

not yet

over.

n

late 1977,

ighting

esumed,

punctuated

y

the first

Israeli

nvasion

f Lebanon

n

1978

and

the

sec-

ond

Israeli

nvasion

n 1982,

which

culminated

n

the siege

(andtempo-

raryIsraelioccupation)f westBeirut n the summerof thatyear.After

the

massacre

f

Palestinian

efugees

at

the

Sabra

and

Shatila

refugee

camps,

multinational

peacekeeping"

orces

returned

o Beirut

n

Sep-

tember

1982,

and

the

Israelis

were

compelled

o

withdraw

rom

Beirut

and

to retreat

o

a heavily

defended

occupied

trip

of southern

Lebanon.

Once

again

he

war

seemed

obe

over.

In

1983,

OGER

Liban,

private

ngineering

irm

owned

by

the

Leb-

anese

billionaire

Rafiq

Hariri,

ook

over

the

reconstruction

roject

and

commissioned

master

plan

from

the Arab

consultancy

roup

Dar al-

Handasah.nlate 1983,and ntheabsence fanewofScialplan,demoli-

tion

began

n

the central

area

on the

pretext

of cleaning

up

some

of

the

damage.

This

"cleaning

p,"

whose

perpetrators

emain

fficially

niden-

tified

(though

t has

been

repeatedly

lleged

hat

they

stand

behind

o-

day's

reconstruction

roject),5

nvolved

he

destruction

f

some

of

the

district's

most

significant

urviving

buildings

and

structures,

s

wellas

Souk

Al-Nouriyeh

nd

Souk

Sursuq

nd

large

sections

of

Saifi

without

recourse

o

official

nstitutions,

n

whatcritics

rgue

were

alse

pretenses,

4. Jad Tabet,"Towards MasterPlan for Post-WarLebanon," n

RecoveringBeirut:

Urban

Design

and

Post-War

Reconstruction,

ed. Samir

Khalaf

and Philip

S. Khoury

(Leiden,

1993),

p.

91.

5. See,

for example,

Nabil

Beyhum

et al.,

I'amar

Beirut

wa'l

fursa

al-da'i'a

[The

Recon-

struction

of Beirut

and

the Lost

Opportunity]

Beirut,

1992),

p.

16.See

alsoAssem

Salaam,

"Le

Nouveau

plan

directeur

du

centre-ville

de

Beyrouth,"

n

Beyrouth:

Construire

'avenir,

reconstruire

e passe

2 ed. Beyhum,

Salaam,

and

Tabet

(Beirut,

1996).



10/47

668

Saree

Makdisi

Laying

Claim

to Beirut

and

in total

disregard

or

the then-existing

1977)

plan

for reconstruc-

tion,

which

had specifically

alled or

the rehabilitation

f those

areas

of

thecitycenter.6

In 1984,

however,

nother

round

of

fighting orced

he cessation

f

planning

nd reconstruction

ctivities,

nd

intensive

helling

aused ur-

ther damage

o

the downtown

rea.

Whenthe

warentered

another

ull

in 1986,

further

unofficial

demolition

was carried

out in

the

downtown

area;

hesame

parties

hat

had

been behind

he 1983

demolitions

lleg-

edly

began

implementing

plan

(bearing

omedistant

resemblance

o

the

current

Solidere

proposals)

hat

called

or the

destruction

f a

large

proportion

up

to 80 percent

of the remaining

tructures

f the

city

center.Accordingo critics,hiswascarried utwithouthe authorization

or

approval

or

interference

of

any

official or

governmental

nsti-

tution.7

Following

he

final

paroxysm

f violence

hat

signalled

t last

the end

of the

war n

1990,attention

nceagain

ocused

on

the reconstruction

f

the

nowvery

heavily

amaged

enter

of Beirut.

And

t was

n thiscontext

that

several

developments

ookplace

that

enabled he

resumption

f the

6.

See Beyhum

et al.,

I'amarBeir7lt

wa'lfursa al-da'i'a,

pp. 15-25, esp.

pp.

15-21.

7. See ibid., p. 16.

FIG.

5.- Martyrs'

Square

after the

war but

before

the Solidere

demolitions,

facing

south;

compare

with

fig. l(a), which

wastaken

from

the same

standpoint,

to see the

scale

of

the demolitions.

All the buildings

n

the photo have

been removed.

Photoby author.



11/47

FIG. 6. Aerial photograph

of central Beirut followingthe war.Solidere'sperimeter,

markedby the large boulevards,

s clearlyvisible.Note the Normandie andfillat the north-

ern end of the photo; Place de l'Etoileand Martyrs' quareare clearlyvisible n

the center.

Source:Solidere.



12/47


13/47

FIG. 7. Martyrs'Square,facing north toward the sea. All the

buildings have been

removed to make way for a

boulevard inking Fouad Chehab Avenue to the port. Photo

by author.

FIG. 8. Martyrs' quare,

acingnorth. Note the poster in the

background,presenting

what this scene is supposed to look like after the reconstruction.Photo by

author.



14/47

672 SareeMakdisi

LayingClaim o Beirut

been

placedunder heleadership f those eaning

oward he creation f

sucha

firm, hisbody(in cooperationwithproperly

rivate-sectornter-

ests, notablyHaririand

OGERLiban, hat were

also in supportof the

single irmconcept) ommissionednother tudy romDaral-Handasah,

which,

unsurprisingly,alled

or the creation f a single irm o takeover

the

centerof Beirut.The new planalsocalled or the

demolition f most

of the remaining tructuresn

the center n order o

facilitate n unfet-

tered

arge-scale evelopment

roject.But despite he growing upport

for thisnew plan n certain

public-and private-sectorircles,opposition

to it also grew romboth the

generalpublicand a

protestgroup hatwas

formed o debate he ideaand

to tryto generate ossible lternativeso it.

Evenas the planwas

beingwidelydebated,

owever, fficial anction

for it wasbeing consolidated,

most mportantlyn

the formof lawsand

decreescalling or the

institution f a single

company o take over the

real-estate ights n central

Beirut.The most mportant f these is Law

117 of

7 December1991, whichprovided he legal

frameworkor the

constitution f such a

company, law that has

been repeatedlyde-

nouncedas unconstitutional."

t shouldbe noted,however,hatthis aw

in no

way mandated he creationof Solidere

pecifically r as such

that is,

the collectionof private nterestsand

powerful ndividualswho

gathered ogetheras Solidere's oardof founders n 1992.Thus without

regard

o the public or even to thosewhose

propertywouldbe expro-

priated

by the company did

Solidere ome nto being: he ultimate x-

pressionof the dissolution f

any real distinction

betweenpublicand

private

nterests r, more

accurately,he decisive olonization f the for-

mer by the latter.As the

Lebanese rchitect nd publicplannerAssem

Salaam

rgues,"entrusting

eirut'sCentralBusinessDistrict CBD) ede-

velopment o the CDR s a

typical xampleof the

dangers nherent n the

state's

bdication f its role in

orienting nd controlling ne of the most

sensitive econstructionevelopment rojectsn thecountry."'2

In

the springof 1992, furtherdemolitionwas

begun in the down-

townarea, histimeon behalf

of the government,

venthough he recon-

structionplan as such hadnotyetbeen pprovedr

evendefined.Not only

werebuildings hat could

havebeen repairedbroughtdownwith high-

explosivedemolition harges,

but the explosives

used in each instance

were ar n excessof whatwas

needed orthe ob,

thereby ausing nough

damage

o neighboring

tructureso require heir demolition s well.'3

Thus, oreachbuilding

"legitimately"emolishedeveral therbuildings

weredamagedbeyondrepair,declaredhazards,and then demolished

11.

See "Al-sharikal-iqariyyai al-itarayn l-dustouriwa

al-qanouni" The Legal and

the

ConstitutionalAspects of the RealEstateCompany], n I'amar

Beirut wa'lfursa al-da'i'a,

pp.

87-88.

12.

Salaam,"Lebanon's xperience with Urban Planning:

Problemsand Prospects,"

in

RecoveringBeirut, p. 198.

13.

See Beyhum et al., I'amarBeirut wa'lfursa al-da'i'a,

pp. 15-20.



15/47

FIG. 9. A map of the proposed 1991 reconstructionplan. Source: Beyhum et al.,

Reconstruction f Beirut anJl he Lost Opportunity 1992).

FIG. 10.

An artist's mpressionof the proposed 1991 plan. Source: Beyhum et al.,

Reconstruction f Beirut and the Lost Opportunity 1992).

::

*e

>. . .

* t s- P -swe ...,i

s

1vE1

tX

-; rs

F

-

+

. , t:g-' ' j

v44a


16/47

674 SareeMakdisi Laying Claimto

Beir7lt

themselveswiththe

samezealfor big explosions. t is estimated

hat,as

a resultof such demolition, y the time

reconstructionfforts

began n

earnest ollowing heformal eleaseof the new Daral-Handasahlan n

1993,approximately

0 percentof the structuresn the downtown

rea

hadbeen damaged eyondrepair,whereas

nlyarounda thirdhadbeen

reduced o suchcircumstancess a result

of damage nflictedduring

he

war tself.l4 n other

words,morerreparableamageasbeen one o

thecenter

ofBeirut y hose ho

laimohe nterestednsalvag?ngndrebuildingt

than ad

been one uringhe oursef theprecedingifteen

ears fshellingnd

house-to-

house ombat.5

As this demolitionwasbeing carried

out, though,opposition

rew.

In the springof 1992,for instance, groupof concerned rchitectswas

formedto formulate

lternativeso the (still unofficial) econstruction

plan. In Mayof that

year, his grouporganized conference o

debate

issuesof aesthetic,

ultural, ocial,economic,

and political ignificance

in any reconstructionffort,and to call

a halt to the demolition.l6

he

conference lso called or the necessity

f publicand governmental

e-

batebeforeanydecisions

ouldbe madeand urged hatappropriate

on-

siderationbe given to their proposals

nd to other issues of

concern

raised n the large-scale ublicdiscussions

y the holdersof

property

rights n the downtownrea.

In spiteof all these calls,however, nd

in spiteof the increasing t-

tentionand coverage

einggiven o the

national arliamentarylections

that year (electoral

ampaigning, egun in earnest n the summer

of

1992,overshadowed

he debates verdowntown

eirut), he government

passeda seriesof laws

enabling he creation

f Solidere,whosearticles f

incorporation ere

approvedn July of that

year.One of the last actsof

the previousgovernment

shortlyafter

the electionsand before it re-

signedand was replaced

by the Hariricabinet),

n fact,was the formal

approval f Dar al-Handasah'srand new masterplan on 14 October

1992.Thus in an atmosphere f national

nxietyand concern

withthe

outcomeof the September

lections, nd withno publicparticipation

n

decisionmaking the futureof the heart

of Beirutwas decided,

ong

before any (official) nvestments ad been

made in it. Demolition

was

14.Seeibid.,p.l9.

15. Salaam, or one,

points out that more buildings

were destroyedby bulldozers han

by the war.According o Salaam,"I1 a eu plus d'immeubles

detruitspar les bulldozersque

par la guerre. En 1992,des constructionsbordaientencore la place des Martyrs.Elles ont

ete demoliesen six mois" LeMonde, June 1995).

Some cynics, n fact, assert hat

much of

the fighting n the downtown

area during the war was

paid for in order to achieveas much

destructionas possible;Najah Wakeemhas made this

allegationpubliclyon severalocca-

sions. Such views are certainly

cynical,but given the many twistsand turns of the

war, hey

cannot be entirelyruled

out of the question; n anycase, many seeminglyequally

mproba-

ble events have been substantially

ocumented.

16. The papers fromthis conferenceare collected

n Beyrouth.



17/47

Critical nquiry

Spring1997 675

resumed n 1994 and, by the end of thatyear,as I've said,muchof the

centerof the cityhad been razed.

Solidere tselfmakes ittle reference o its prehistory r to previous

plans or reconstructionn the centerof Beirut.Formally stablished n

5 May 1994,the company ays n its information ooklets hat it repre-

sents he largesturban edevelopmentroject f the l990s. Its sole refer-

ence to the recenthistory f the citycenter s as follows:

Located t the historical ndgeographicaloreof the city, he vibrant

financial, ommercialndadministrativeubof the country,he Bei-

rut CentralDistrict ameunderfire fromall sidesthroughoutmost

of the sixteenyearsof fighting.At the end of the war, hatareaof thecity was afflictedwith overwhelming estruction, otal devastation

of the infrastructure,he presence f squattersn several reas,and

extreme ragmentationnd entanglement f property ights nvolv-

ing owners, enantsand lease-holders.7

Solidere hus presents tselfas a healingagency, esigned o help central

Beirutrecover rom ts "afflictions."t makesno mentionof the previous

historyof reconstructionot onlybecause hesehistories o not exist in

official ermsbut also becauseof the company's eculiarand contradic-

toryrelationshipo history to whichI shallreturn hortly).

Solidere'sapital onsists f twotypesof shares, ogether nitially al-

ued at U.S.$1.82billion. Type A shares, nitiallyvalued at U.S.$1.17

billion,were ssued o the holdersof expropriated ropertyn the down-

townarea, n "proportion"o the relative alueof theirproperty laims,

as adjudicated y the company'soardof founders.A further ssueof 6.5

million ypeB shareswasreleased o investors, ringingn newcapital t

an initial tockofferof U.S.$100per share and ndeed he stockoffering

was denominatedn U.S. dollars,not Lebanesepounds).Withina few

weeks,until ts closing nJanuary 994, he stockofferinghadbeen over-

subscribed y 142 percent(that is, U.S.$926million,offeredby some

twenty housand ubscribers). here s, however, n important aveat o

all this. Stocksmayonly be purchased r held by certain ndividualsn

the followingorder of priority: he originalholdersof property ights

(of all nationalities,hough presumablyhe majoritywould have been

Lebanese);Lebanesecitizensand companies; he Lebanese tate and

public nstitutions;nd personsof Lebanese rigin,as wellas the citizens

and companiesof other Arabcountries.Non-Arabs, nless they were

originallyproperty holders, are thus not permitted to buy shares

(though,becauseof special xemptionso strictLebaneseawsregulating

the ownership f landby foreigners,heywillbe allowed o purchase eal

estate rom he company nce andand buildings replacedon the mar-

17. Solidere, nformationBooklet1995, p. 5; hereafterabbreviatedB.



18/47

676 SareeMakdisi

LayingClaim o Beirut

ketby

Solidere). urthermore,here s a maximum

ndividual harehold-

ing

limitof 10 percent.

Solidere haresare nowbeingexchanged n thecompany'swnpri-

vatestock xchange noton

the officialBeirutStock

Exchange,which he

companyhas circumvented).

s of December1994, shareshad already

appreciatedn valueby some 50 percent, hough

they havecome down

considerablyincethen.l8 n

addition o the expectedreturnsand divi-

dends

which houldaccelerate s buildings nd and

areput on the mar-

ket),

which he boardof

founders stimated t approximately8 percent

overa

twenty-fiveearperiod, he company nd its

investorswillnot be

taxed,eitheron income rom

he project r on capitalgains, or the first

ten years. n factthe firstsalesof land are already n process, eportedly

at a

price of U.S.$950per

built-up quaremeter (consideringhat the

project

ntailsa built-up reaof some4.5 million

quaremeters,one can

get

from his somesenseof the valueof Solidere's

roperty).l9

Solidere'smassiveadvertising ampaignnot

only plasteredhuge

postersall over Beirutand

the rest of Lebanonbut

also tookout ads in

foreign

newspapersnd

magazines. InLebanon,"eadsone of Solidere's

ads in

the

Financial Times,

"everyone nowswe must

rebuildBeirut's ity

centre.

Weknowhow."20nother d, in theNew York

Times,proudlypro-

claims,"We'venvested n the futureof an ancientcity.''2l arge-scale

mailings f glossy nformation

ooklets,maps,and

even a miniature et

of pictures aken rom

oversized ostershave

spread hroughoutLeba-

non

("Lecentrevillevous

nvite...."). All of this,incidentally,ppeared

before

he companytselfhad

actually ome ntobeing theadswere ech-

nically

ponsored y Solidere's

board f founders").

In

anycase,what ew people n Lebanon eem

to realize s thatSoli-

dere is not going to rebuild

he downtown rea: t is going to oversee

the rebuilding f the

downtown rea.Other hanthe infrastructure,he

companywill limit itselfto at most abouta thirdof the construction f

actualbuildings.Tobe more

specific,Soliderewill,accordingo its infor-

mation

booklets, ave our

principalunctions:irst, o supervisehe exe-

cution of the

government-authorized

econstruction lan; second, to

finance

ndrebuild he

infrastructure;hird, o rehabilitateertain uild-

ings and structures nd the

development f the

rest of the real estate;

and,

fourth,to manageand

sell these properties, uildings, nd other

facilities.One of the striking eaturesof the

development f the infra-

structures that not only will

the Lebanese tatedeny tselfany possible

taxrevenues rom hisdevelopmentor the first enyearsbut it willeven

18.

As of February1997, shares

are traded at aroundU.S.$110.

19.

See

al-Hayat, 4

July 1995.

20.

Financial Times,9July 1993,

p.

14.

21.

New YorkTimes,22 Nov. 1993,

p. C11.



19/47

pTg

f

/

l

f

H;

.

_

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. . . _ . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .

;,^

tt

+tr,kB

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"''t' "

li'

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20/47

678 SareeMakdisi Laying Claimto Beirut

go so far as to actuallypay for the infrastructureepairs estimated y

the company t U.S.$565million n 1993 dollars), argelyby allocating

the company xtra space for developmentn an area of land to be re-

claimed rom he sea.22

Solidere'sebuilding roject ncompasses surface reaof about1.8

million quaremeters,whichwill nclude he reclamationf over600,000

squaremeters rom the sea. The plan will involve he development f

over 4.5 millionsquaremetersof built-up pace,of whicharoundhalf

willbe dedicated o residential nits.Approximatelyalfof the areawill

be owned,managed, nd ultimatelyoldby Solidere.Muchof the restof

it willbe ceded to the state(infrastructure,arks,open spaces),and an

additional 0,000squaremetersareexempted ots(governmentndreli-

giousbuildings,whichrevert o their previous wners, hat is, the state

andthe various eligious ommunities).ome260 buildingsn the center

havebeen designated s recoverablendhencespared he bulldozer nd

dynamite rews; heir ormerownersor other nterested artiesmayre-

developand refurbishhem.Anyone, ncluding ormerowners whoare

given priority),wishing o recuperate uch a building,however,would

have o pay o the company 12 percent urcharge n the estimated alue

of the lot;theymustalsobe preparedo repair he buildingwithina two-

year time frameand subject heir plansto an architecturalrief ssued

by Solidereand underthe company'strictsupervision. olidere's ecu-

peration riefsare ntended o preserve achrecuperated uilding's rig-

inal external eaturesand faSades o that the centraldistrict etains ts

previous surface) ppearanceo the greatest xtentpossible nd so that

the centraldistrict anbe woven visually)ntothe restof the urban abric

of Beirut.

22. According o IB, "the Company hallbe reimbursedby the Statefor all infrastruc-

ture costs incurred, n one or a combinationof the followingways: n cash, in State-owned

land within the BCD [Beirut CentralDistrict], n land within the reclaimed and zone, or

in concessions or the exploitationof infrastructure ervices." ince the state is going to end

up paying for the project in the end, many critics of the Solidere plan argue that, at the

very least and if for no other reason than this-the state should have much more of a

direct role in the company'saffairsand even that the state should simply seek financing

from multilateral ending agencies or from banksand manage the reconstructionby itself,

reapingat least some of the benefits n the form of tax and other revenues,of which t is in

considerableneed, rather than passing those on to a privatecompanyandultimatelyaying

for the reconstructionn any case. It should be noted that critics of the Solidere plan have

argued that the real cost for the infrastructure n the center of the city is in the range of

U.S.$50-U.S.$70 million, a figure well within the reach of the Lebanesegovernment; ee,

for example, Le Monde,3 June 1995. Since so much of the support for the single-firm

concept has been argued in terms of the government's upposed inability o pay for the

infrastructure and hence the need for private nvestmentas opposed to public expendi-

ture-this is a crucial ssue. Criticssuggest that the government,now firmly n the hands

of certain private sector interests, has abandoned its own role in the city center in favor

of these same interests.



21/47

Critical

Inquiry

Spring

997

679

Solidere's

master

plan

calls

or

the

creation

f

a

lively

and

attractive

urban

core

in

Beirut,

eaturing

balanced

mixture

of office

space,

resi-

dentialareas,commercialndretailzones,parksandtree-linedprome-

nades,

as

well

as

beach

acilities

nd

two

yacht

clubs.

n

contrast

with

the

notorious

991

Daral-Handasah

lan

which

n

a

way

ooks

ike

a

deliber-

ate

red

herring),

concerted

ffort

has

been

made

by Solidere's

rchitects

and

urban

planners

led

by the

Harvard-educated

ussama

Kabbani-

not

to

depart

visually

rom

the

traditional

ppearance

r

street

plan

of

the

city

center

or

adjoining

eighborhoods

except

n

the

area

to

be

re-

claimed

rom

the

sea,

which

will

be

based

on

a grid

layout

with

wider

streets).

The

company's

dvertising

ooklets

rely

heavily

on visual

and

photographicontrasts etween he ruinedcentraldistrictas it stands

today,

he

bustle

of the

district

n

the

heady

prewar

ays

of

the

1960s

and

1970s,

and

the

promise

f

a poised

and

elegantly

manicured

owntown

sometime

n

the

next

ten

or

fifteen

years.

In response

o

the

various

riticisms

f

the

previous

Dar

al-Handasah

plan,

the

current

master

plan

highlights

he

intended

reintegration

f

the

central

district

within

the

greater

Beirut

metropolitan

rea.

It

will

also

nclude

he

planned

preservation

f

certain

buildings

n

the

historic

core

(particularly

n

the

relatively

mall

area

from

the

grand

Serail

o

Martyrs' quare);he "reconstruction"f some of the old souks;the

planned

preservation

f

the

lower-class

nd

lower-middle-class

esiden-

tial

areas

within

he

central

district

though

t

seems

fairly

obvious

hat

these

areas

will

not

take

on

their

previous

lass

dentities

nd

will

proba-

bly

be

priced

beyond

the

reach

of

most

Lebanese

itizens);23

nd

as

a

nod

toward

he

more

culturally

nd

environmentally

otivated

ritics-

the

planned

reation

f

a seaside

park

on

the landfill),

which

will

nclude

what

one

of

the

booklets

efers

o

as "some

ultural

acilities,"

ncluding

a

library

nd

a center

or

the

arts.

In

addition,

here

s a

policy

hat

imits

high-rise uildings ndcalls ora seafront oulevard, otels,restaurants,

cafes,

gardens,

nd

a

new

highway

inking

he

central

district

with

Beirut

International

irport,

which

s

barely

hree

miles

away

o the

south.

A

major

eature

of

the

Solidere

plan

allows

or

the

preservation

f

various

archaeological

inds,

some

of which

will

remain

n their

present

locations,

thers

of

which

will

be relocated

o

an

archaeological

ark

near

Martyrs'

quare.

The

archaeological

ichness

f

the

central

district

an-

not

be

overestimated:

he

earliest

settlements

n

Beirut

date

to some

65,000

years

ago,

and

the

city

has

been

inhabited

nd

rebuilt

by

virtually

everymajor ulturen theeasternMediterranean.resent rchaeological

23.

Property

prices

n

Beirut

aretoday

not

only

astronomical

ut

out

of all

proportion

to

the

local

economy;

t is

not

unusual

for

a new

apartment

o

be

priced

in

the region

of

one

million

dollars.

It

should

be said

that

Solidere

claims

that

its

residential

units

willbe

aimed

at a variety

of

income

groups,

but

it remains

o

be

seen

to

what

extent

this

claim

will

be realized.



22/47

X t'-Y,4

r.S_

B s

_

_S tA5|S

|

9 { jt s Ww t

-_

-

Se '%>Mo;

\

{}>.2

2.5

FIG.

26.

advantage

f

the verysame

market

iberalizations

hat they mandate.

At

least

untilthe

electionsof

1996,

the parliament

ncluded

everal

pposi-

tion

members,

who

werecritical

f the

government

nd ts

reconstruction

plan and

were

able to block

certainprojects.

During he

1996

elections,

however,

lmost all

of those

oppositional

igures

ost

their seats

and

(thanks

argely

o overwhelming

oterigging)

werereplaced

y

a compla-

centparliament

madeup

largely f businessmen

n pursuit

of

wealth in-

cluding

Hariri).Today's

arliament

s

one of the

richest

n the world;

t

includes

hirty-five

millionaires

nd three

billionaires.

Because

of the

situation hatLebanon ounditself n afterthewar

(the

near-total

eterioration

f

publicorder,

of state

apparatuses,

f

civic

organizations,

f the national

nfrastructure),

heprocess

f privatization

is

alreadyat

a more

advanced

tage in

Lebanon

han it is elsewhere

n

the world,

where he

forces

of privatization

suchas Berlusconi

n Italy)

havehad

to face

the opposition

ut up precisely

y those

orms

of public

and

civic

and national

rganization

hich

n Lebanon

had already

een

eroded

or destroyed

y the

war. n this

sense,Lebanon

maybe seen

as a

kind of

laboratory

or the

most

extreme orm

of laissez-faire

conomics

thattheworldhas everknown.And,moreover, eirut tself,especiallyn

view

of

the reconstruction

roject, an

be

seen as a laboratory

or

the

current

nd future

laborations

f global apitalism,

s wellas

for itsown

future,

hough

whethert

is possible o

speak

of the imminent

Lebanoni-

zation"

f the

worldremains

o be seen

(this

wouldof course

be a differ-

ent "Lebanonization"

han

the one popularized

y the

media n

the early



38/47

696

SareeMakdisi LayingClaim o Beirut

1980s,whichwas used to

referto an uncontained preadof communal

violence).

Indeed, if one can speakof a discourse alledHarirism,t would

center

on but not be limited o Lebanon's

ultibillionairerimeminister,

who in the name of

economicstabilityhas

broughta previouslyun-

dreamt-ofntensificationf profitseeking o the

Lebanese conomy,n

which

he apparatusesf the

statehavenot so muchbeen dismantled r

circumventeds theyhave

been put to use for private

nterests,ncluding

thoseof

Haririhimself.

Witness or example he recentpassageof a law

enabling he greatercommercial xploitation f

the previously ighly

regulated ational oastline.

hortly fterwardscoincidentally)ame he

announcementf a private evelopment roject alledPortHariri,which

wouldcenter on the

construction, n Beirut'sonly remainingpublic

beach,

of a privatehotel and yachtclubcomplex,

adjoining,t mightbe

added,a roadthatwasonly

recently enamed

BoulevardRafiqHariri.34

One could ust as easilypoint

to the impending lans

or the reorganiza-

tion

and possibleprivatizationf the national

irline,whichare contin-

gent on negotiations

between leading politicians; r to the plans to

reducethe numberof

television tations rom sixty

to five, whichwill

basically e splitup among

various nfluential ersonalities.

"Let hemeat cellularphones"mightsuggesttselfas Harirism'sall

to arms.

For, n the faceof dire

poverty nd squalor t a national evel, n

the face

of an immense ocioeconomicrisisand an

increasingly esper-

ate

standard f living or mostof Lebanese ociety

theminimumwage s

the equivalent f U.S.$ 50a

month,whileprices or

rentandmanygoods

and

services reoften

comparableo those n NewYork r London),Har-

irism

offers he publica vastly mproved

nfrastructurethe newcellular

phone lines,the new

roadways,he new cable

television alsoownedby

Hariri),

he new airportand

newlyexpandedair services whetheror

not they need or can afford o use them. Evenas the countryprepares

for a supposedeconomic

boom that is supposed o

follow he regional

"peace"

greementwithIsrael, mprovementsn

basic ocial ervices, s-

pecially

hose providedby the

state (education, ealthcare, sanitation,

housing), ave or the most

partgone unaddressed

with he notable x-

ception

of municipal arbage

ollectionn Beirut,whichwasrecentlym-

proved, ollowing ts

privatizationnd purchaseby

none other than a

Hariri ompany).ndeed, o

the broadmassof the

Lebanese opulation

Harirism as littleor nothing

o offer exceptthe samehollowpromises

as thoseof the long-awaitedrickle-downffectsof AmericanReagano-

micsor

EnglishThatcherism.

n fact,Harirism mploys he sameneolib-

eral

rhetoric f Reaganism

nd Thatcherism.

Whileat one levelone couldeasily

misunderstand arirism s repre-

34. For more on this event, see

the Beirut newspaper as-Safir,

20 Dec. 1994, p. 1.



39/47

Critical

nquiry

St7zng

1997

697

senting

the withering

awayof the

state,

or its reduction

o simply

he

maintenance

f

order,and

while

t is undoubtedly

ruethatthe

stateap-

paratuses avebeen circumventedndto a certain xtenteitherdisman-

tled

or privatized,

we need to

extend

our analysis

a bit more.

For

at

another

evel,what

we are

witnessing

s not

so much the

dissolution

f

the state

but rather

ts reinforcement,

ts strengthening.

n their

book

Labor

f

Dionysus,Michael

HardtandAntonio

Negri

argue

hat"the

neo-

liberal

project

nvolved

substantial

ncrease

of the

State n terms

both

of

size and powers

of intervention.

he development

f the

neoliberal

Statedid

not lead toward

'thin' orm

of rule

n the sense

of theprogres-

sive

dissipation

r disappearance

f the State

as a social

actor."

hus, hey

argue,n spiteof theneoliberal hetoricf privatizationndthe thin state,

"neoliberal

ractice

moves

n the

oppositedirection

o reinforce

ndex-

pand

the State

as a strong

and

autonomous

ubject

hat dominates

he

socialfield,

in the realm

of publicspending

as in that

of judicial

and

policeactivity."35

WhileHardt

and

Negri's rguments

re

directed

n the first

nstance

at

the postmodern

conomies

f

the firstworld,

here

s a startling

egree

of accuracy

f

we stretch heir

analysiso

include

a statesuch

as

Lebanon.

For

he

moment et

mejust

register he

accuracy

f their

theoretical

s-

sessment: ot only has government eficitspendingncreaseddramati-

cally

(withtotal

public

debt running

at around

60

percentof

the

1995

gross GDP),

but

the repressive

pparatuses

f the state

have

also been

enormously

trengthened.

orexample,

old

censorship

aws,

previously

ignored,

are now being

enforced;

new

education

policy

brings chool

curricula

under

much tighter

government

egulation;

ew

media laws

will,

as I already

mentioned,

liminate

ll but a handful

of radio

and

TV

stations

nd bring

hose

under ight

control

hereby

ilencing

pposition

voices

in

the public

sphere;

he death

penaltyhas

been

brought

back

for civil and politicalcrimes; hereare widespreadand substantiated)

allegations

f

the torture

and abuse

of prisoners

n Lebanese

ails; and

since

1993 there

has

been a ban

on street

protests

f any kind.

This

last

law

has been

used

with particular

ffectiveness

n

the government's

e-

peated

clasheswith

trade

unionsseeking

o

organize trikes

nddemon-

strations:

irst

n July

1995,when

the army

and internal

ecurity

orces

wereordered

o suppress

he trade

uniondemonstrations

gainst

he re-

cent

ncrease

n the

tax burden

borne

by the working

lass

and the paral-

lel

decrease

n the tax

burdenof

the wealthy

minority

who

constitute

he

government nd its circle of businessassociates;nd more recently n

February

996,when

a military

urfew

was mposed

on

Beirutand other

cities

o

prevent strike

and demonstrations

lanned

by

the General

La-

35.

Michael

Hardt and Antonio

Negri, Labor

of

Dionysus: Critique

f the

State-Form

(Minneapolis,

1994),

pp. 242, 245.



40/47

698 SareeMakdssi LayingClaimoBeirut

bor Confederationo call for an increase n the

monthlyminimum

wage demands hathad been rejected y the

government.n ordering

the army o impose he curfew,PrimeMinisterHarirideclared,"wewill

not allow he governmento be toppled rom he street."

So in factLebanon aswitnessed othan astonishingncreasen the

activities f repressivetateapparatusess wellas an increasen the state's

role in thoseformsof publicplanning hat as opposed

o healthcare,

education, nd ow-income ousing arecalculated

ither o yield mme-

diateprivateprofitsor to improve he infrastructuralonditions or the

generation f privateprofits.This does not entail

merely he confusion

of publicand private nterest, s has often been suggested. t is, rather,

the colonization f the formerby the latter.For, o be sure,wheretate

projects nd and privateprojects egin can no longerbe determined-

not because his is a strong tate hat s organizing

command conomy

but becausecapitalhas becomehe state.Stateand

capitalhavebecome

incorporated s one and the sameforceor process

definedby the same

discourse Harirism).36

The transition as not been smoothand seamless;

here has been

widespread nd ongoingpopular esistanceo it, mostnotably he work-

ers' movements. urthermore,his is a processwith

manyexteriorities;

thereare manygroups hat t does not assimilate r even regulate.The

economy tillhas a burgeoningnformal ector forexample, he tens of

thousands f Syrian aborersworkingn Lebanon, ut

also unregulated

agriculturalnd ndustrial roduction ndeconomic

ctivlties f allother

kinds, ncludingarious ormsof banking ndfinance).

Onecouldsay hat

the informal,unregulated conomy hat sprangup

and persisted-

during he warhasnot yetbeenfullycolonized nd ncorporatedntothe

intensified ormof capitalismhat the Haririst tatehas

come to repre-

sent. Once againthis sectorof the economy arrieson

with or without

regard o the presence f the state;peopleare left to theirown devices,

to makedo as best theycan,for betterand for worse.

Onemight magine woLebanonsiving imultaneouslyndperhaps

evencoextensively,hizomicallyndunevenlyntersectingr overlapping

with one another.On the one hand, there is the

modern ebanon hat

was born duringthe war, n whichan informal,

uneven,unorganized,

unregulated ombination f modernand traditional

atterns f owner-

36. This is what Negri, followingMarx, dentifiesas the total

subsumptionof society

and the state into capital.See Negri, "TwentyTheses on Marx:Interpretation f the Class

SituationToday,"rans. Hardt, and Kenneth Surin, "'The ContinuedRelevanceof Marx-

ism' as a Question: Some Propositions,"n MarxismBeyond Marxism,

ed. Makdisi,Cesare

Casarino,and Rebecca Karl (London, 1995), pp. 149-80 and

181-213. See also Ernest

Mandel,Late Capitalism, rans.Joris De Bres (London, 1987);Martin

Carnoyet al.,

TheNew

GlobalEconomy n the InformationAge: Ref ectionson Our Changing WorZd

UniversityPark,Pa.,

1993);and Paul Knox andJohn Agnew,The Geography f the

World-EconomyLondon, 1989).



41/47

Spring1997 699

riticalInquiry

ship and production ersists; nd, on the otherhand, there s the post-

modern intensification f capital representedby the new Lebanon,

which,while t maymakeuse of the stateand even absorbhe state, s to

a muchgreater xtentaimedat the transnationallowsof theglobal con

omy.Harirism eeks to set up Lebanonas a servicecenter,a regional

node or stagingpointfor the circulation f capital, basethroughwhich

capitalcan be channeled nto the still highly undevelopedand unex-

ploitedmarkets f the post-peace ettlementMiddleEast.In this sense,

the statebecomesone organizing ubric,amongothers, or a discourse

and process hatgoes farbeyondanyparticulartateand thatfinallyhas

little nterest n states,borders, erritorialities.o thisextent, t is no coin-

cidenceat all thatmoreand more ransnationalompanies-particularly

in the informationalnd financial ervice ector are eitheropeningor

reopening heiroffices n Beirut:Saatchi& Saatchi nd Citicorp,o name

only two, ust reopened heirBeirutoffices; nd major nvestmentirms

such as Flemings nd ING/Baringstwoof the world'seading irms n

openingso-calleddevelopingmarkets)ocatedregionaloffices n Beirut

(notAmman,not the Gulf,and notTelAviv).Nor is it a coincidencehat

moreand more nternationalirlines re flying o Beirut.

Thus we might theorize he presenceof a postmodernLebanon

alongside modernLebanon,withthe highlycharged nd fluidborders

between hemgoingas often as not unmarked nd undefined.The bor-

dersdo becomemanifest, owever, fterepisodes uchas the indiscrimi-

nate Israelibombardmentf civilian argets n April1996,when we see

how quickly ertainareasor sectorsof the economyare repairedwhile

othersare left to shiftfor themselves s best they can. The postmodern

Lebanon hatI havebeen identifyingwithHarirism nd the global nfor-

mational conomy ndSolideremay ndeedbe seenas markinghe phase

of the realsubsumptionf society ndstate ntocapital.37utthisanalysis

cannotaccount or the otherLebanon,whichpersists longside he post-

modern-the Lebanon hat Israeland Syriahavebeen trying and fail-

ing)to understand ndcontrolprimarily ybrute orce.Wecanthusalso

imagine woLebanons t the levelof the regional tatesystem.The Arab-

Israeliconflict, he variousSyrianand Israeliprojects f dominationn

Lebanon, he strugglebetween he Israeliarmyof occupation nd the

resistancemovement, ven the much-vauntedMiddleEastpeaceprocess

itself: heseall takeplaceat the levelof whatI am trying o suggest s an

outmoded,worn-outevelof internationaltatepolitics, he residualoli-

ticsof apreviousraormode fsovereignty,erritoriality,ationalism,tatism,

37. Hardtand Negri argue that "capitalno longer has an outside in the sense that . . .

all productiveprocessesarise within capital itself and thus the productionand the repro-

duction of the entire social world take place within capital" Hardt and Negri, Labor of

Dionysus, p. 15).



42/47

700 SareeMakdisi Laying

Claim o Beirut

namely, he

era of the modern(as opposed

to postmodern)

tate, the

modern as opposed o postmodern)

orld ystemor world

economyas

embodied n Harirism.38

Harirism epresents

will o privatize irtuallyverything,

rom ele-

vision stations o garbage

collecting o educational

nstitutions o con-

structionprojects

o stateproperty nd institutions

o real estateto the

national irline

o, finallyand ultimately,he

centerof Beirut.

At the pe-

rimeterof

Solidere'serritory,here are today

a number

of postersde-

pictinghappyscenesfrom

a future"reconstructed"

eirut; he slogan

reads,Beirut

s Yours:Ask

aboutIt. But to mostpeople,excluded

rom

the so-calledbenefitsof a

reconstruction

hat is aimed at foreignand

Lebanese apital ather hanat peopleandthe social ormationn gen-

eral,thiscan appearonlyas

a meaningless

hrase, f not an actual nsult.

Cormputs

it succinctly: Clearly,t is the Lebanese

opulation,

esident

or emigrant,

hat s the missing lement rom

he actualprocess

f recon-

struction."39or n Solidere

he discourse fHarirism asreached

ts pin-

nacleand climax,

ts ultimate xpression.

When,on 16 February

996,a family

of squatterswas killedwhen

the building hey had been

living n was

broughtdown by a Solidere

demolition

rew with he squatterstill nside),

manypeople'sworst ears

wereconfirmed:herewould iterally e no space n the revitalized nd

gentrified osmopolitan

ity

center or such destituteand

"undesirable"

migrants.As

Beyhumargues, his project epresents

othing ess thana

systemof class

segregation,

whereby he futurecentraldistrict

f Beirut

willbe cut

off and isolated rom he restof

the cityand the

countrypre-

cisely n class

erms.40While

he Solidere ooklets mphasize

he former

classdiversity

f the city center

and promise o restore hat

diversity y

incorporatingmixed-income

esidentialdevelopments

nto the overall

project,Beyhum

uggests hatwhat s far

more ikely o

happen s the

appearance f a dual city n Beirut,with theboundaryinesof the Soli-

dereproject

marking he limit.

"Thedualitybetween he city

centerand

the restof the capital," eyhum

writes,

willbe reinforcedrl he

mindsof ordinary eoplebecause

magesof

luxurywill contirlue o

bombard he

popular maginatiorln sur-

rounding

quarters.The inauguration

f the firstbuildings

will in-

38*The

other states, especially

Syria and Israel,continue to exist

and to operate at

this level, not realizing that, like emperors with no clothes, they are operatingwithin a

paradigm hat

is outmoded and outmaneuvered,f not

exactlyalreadyextinct:the residual

paradigmof state

powerpolitics,of negotiationsbetween

states,of statecontrol,

of borders,

occupation,sabotage,

domination,

n short, of raw,naked,brutal state power,

a paradigm

founded upon

a distinctionbetween

state and civil society,or for that matter

between the

state and capital.

39. Corm,

"LaReconstruction,". 96.

40. See Beyhum, "Beyrouth

u coeur des debats,"

. 108.



43/47

Critical

Inquiry

Spring

1997 701

::>

:

FIG.

27. Artist'smpressionof pedestrianstreet in newcity center.Source:Solidere.

crease

he signsof

uncontrolledwealth

hatare

insulting

o the rest

of

the

population.

The logicof

this

realestate

promotionwill

domi-

nate one area

of the

city,while

deteriorationwill

probably

ecome

morestrongly

elt in

other

areas.4'

Indeed,what

s central o

the

discussion f

the

reconstructionf central

Beirut s a

discourse f

limits,

of

boundaries, nd

of frontiers.

Withthis in mindwe canreturnto the overallSolidereplan.The

talk

of"proper

ntegration"side,

the company's

ooklets,maps,

plans,

and

discussions

uggest

hat this

projectmay

turn the

centerof

Beirut

into a

different

one of

space-time

han that of

the

rest of the city.

The

entire

project

has been

focusedand

discussed n the

narrowest ossible

terms

so that the

rest

of Beirutand

Lebanon

ade

awayand

become

vague

externalities

o the

plan,much

ike the

blank

spaceson the

com-

pany's

maps.This

does

not suggest

merelya

preoccupation ith

the city

center

which s

afterall

the focusof

the project).

Rather,t

constitutes n

effort ocoveroverthe restofthe citywiththis, tspostmodern lterego;

in fact,

one of

Solidere's

ogos is

simply

he word

Beirut,in

Arabic,as

though

he

company's

iefdom

omehow

tands n for

the rest

of the city,

representing

t to

the point of

exclusion.

Bearing n mind

what

Samir

41.

Ibid.,

pp. 108-9.



44/47

702

SareeMakdisi Laying

Claimto

Beirut

Amin and others

have suggested

aboutthe polarizing

tructure f the

world

economy,t

is importanto recognize

he extent

to which uchpo-

larizations re playedout on a localandon a global cale.42 r,rather,t

becomes

mportanto see the

development

f polarization n

a simulta-

neously

ocaland global cale

and indeed

to see thattheseforces

are al-

waysat playwithin

he local

and the global n such

a waythatthey help

to define

he boundaries

r limitsbetween

hem (so

thatthe globaVlocal

opposition

mustbe seen as

misleadingo

beginwith).43

In

Beirut,as Beyhum,

Sarkis,and

otherspoint out, there

are very

serious ears hat

a newcity

centerwillspringup in

a few years

hatcan

have ittle

o do with

surrounding reas

of the cityor eventhe

restof the

country.Furthermore,t shouldbe obvious o anyoneevenglancingat

the proposedmap

that the

old Martyrs' quare,

whichonce servedto

bring the

rest of the city together,

s to be effectively

upplanted

by a

wide"boulevard"

unning

mere 1,200

metersor so fromFouad

Chehab

Avenue

o the port.

In fact, herewill,according

o

criticsof the Solidere

plan,be

manymoredividing

ines and notjust between

ast

and west

Beirut,

but between he new

centraldistrict

and the surrounding

reas

of the city.

Naturally,he

advertisingmaterials

hat have

constituted he heavy

artillery f Solidere'slanmakeextensive eferenceo the importancef

ensuring

"proper

ntegration"etween he

centraldistrict nd

the restof

the city.Andyet the

layoutwill

place he centerwithin

a five-minute

rive

from he

airport nd

hencecreate or ts

informational

orkers ndespe-

ciallyvisiting

businesspeople

sensethat

heyarecloser o the

restof the

world han

o any

partof Beirutor Lebanon.

These

and otherconsidera-

tionssuggest hat

this areawill

be developednot as

a site for the spatial

reconciliation f

Lebanonand

of Beirut tself but

ratheras a meeting

place or

foreignbusinessesAmerican,

astAsian,European,

audi,and

Israeli) nd Lebanese ntrepreneurs, anagers,inancial xperts,bank-

ers, and

technocrats.

his, clearly, an

only amount

o little more than

speculation

or the timebeing.

On the

otherhand, t hardly eems

ikely

42. See SamirAmin,

Delinking:

Towards PolycentricWorld, rans.

MichaelWolfers Lon-

don, 1990).

43.

Thus, while

in the currentconfiguration

of the globaleconomy,

which Manuel

Castellshas argued needs

to be seen

as preeminently"informational,"

few

cities have

emergedas world cities,

or as what

Knox and Agnewidentify

as "basingpoints for global

capital,"and within even

those cities

themselvesplanning strategies

of segregation

have

becomethe norm (Knox

and Agnew,

The Geographyf the World-Economy,

. 47).

See Manuel

Castells,

The Informational

City:InformationTechnology,

conomicRestructuring,and

the Urban-

Regional Process(London,

1989); hereafterabbreviated

C. Thus,

RichardSennettargues

that "the

thrust of modernurbandevelopment

has

been precisely o createcities

consisting

of isolated

zones, to destroy

or abandon he urban

center as a public

meetingground, leav-

ing onlya core of national

or international

usinessesbased on the

serviceeconomy" Rich-

ard Sennett,

"Introduction,"n Reclaiming

Beirut,

p.

4).



45/47

Critical

nquiry

Spring1997

703

that

the Solidere

project

has nothing

o

do with the

currentdiscussions

of the normalization

f economic

and political

elations

between

Israel

and theArabworld; t hardly eems ikelyaswell hat hismassive roject

is aimed

onlyatthe

domestic

Lebanese

conomy,

which s

alreadyharac-

terized

by

an enormous

lut

of apartment

nd office

space.

The

"dual ity"

f which

Beyhum

ndothers peak

must, n anycase,

be

understood

n asimultaneously

ocaland global

context.

For

assuming

things

gowell

for the

Solidereplan)

he

frontier etween

nsideand

out-

side

the central

district

of Beirut

wouldamount

o

a frontier

between

a

regional

node in the

global

nformational

conomy, o

which Manuel

Castells

efersas the

"space f flows,"

nd a peripheral

ackwater

denti-

fiablewiththe restof thecity andthecountry,whichwouldthenbe in-

creasingly

haracterized

y the labor

processes f

the informal

conomy

of

peripheral

ones n the

world

economy, ut

oS

fromwhatever

bene-

fits"

mightbe

associated

with the

"space f flows."44

This,once

again, s

assuming

hatSolidere

s right

n believing

hatBeirut

an

resume ome-

thingakin

o the

rolethat t

once

had n regional

conomic

evelopment;

this is far

from

a certainty,

nd if the

company's

ptimistic

predictions

turn

out

to be unfounded,

he entireproject

hreatens

o

becomea

mas-

sive

white

elephant,

ike the

Canary

Wharf

urbandevelopment

cheme

in LondoWs ocklands.)45husthe dualityof sucha city,as Castells r-

gues,

can

"beseen

as the urban

expression

f the

process

of increasing

differentiation

f labor n two

equally

ynamic

ectorswithin

he

growing

economy:

he

information-based

ormaleconomy,

nd the downgraded

labor-based

nformal

conomy,"

o that,as he

says,

"thedualcity

opposes,

in

traditionalociological

erms,

he cosmopolitanism

f the new

nforma-

tional

producers

o the

localism

f the

segmented

ectors

f restructured

labor"IC,

pp.

225, 227).

This means,

Castells

uggests,

hat t

is becom-

ing increasingly

lear that

thereis an

ever-proliferating

istinction

e-

44. "The space

of

organizations n

the informational

economy

is a space

of fows,"

writes

Castells:

Centralized

decision-making

an

only operateon

the basis

of customized

provision

of

servicesand

retrievalof information.

Backoffices

are the

materialbasis

for decision-

making,and

large-scalenformation-processing

rganizations

an only

work on the

basisof instructions

eceivedfrom

the center.The

constellation

of services

inked

to

each

stageof the process

of each industry

also depends

on access

to the correspond-

ing

level of the

communication

network.

Thus,

the linkages

of the intra-orga-

nizational

network

are the defining

linkages

of the new

spatial ogic.

The space

of

flowsamong units of the organizationand among differentorganizationalunits is

the

most significant

pace

for the functioning,

he performance,

and ultimately,

he

veryexistence

of any

givenorganization.

C, p.

169]

45.

Of course,as Castells

putsit elsewhere,

he worldeconomy

can

bypassentirecoun-

tries;hence

the threat

of a fall from

exploitation

to irrelevance

n the

global system,

which

to

Amin pushesus

to thinkof modes

of

"delinking,"y

which

he does not mean

a version

of autarky.

See Amin,

Delinking,

nd Surin,"'The

Continued

Relevance

of

Marxism'as a

Question."



46/47

704

SareeMakdisi

Laying Claim

to Beirut

tween he global

"space

f flows" nd more

ocallyunderstood

ensesof

place.46Whatall

this suggests,

hen, is that

the homogenizing

ressures

of capital

which tandat

one pole

of a globalantagonism)

enerate he

proliferationf a "space f flows" haracterizedrimarilyy a technical

kind of homogeneity;

or example,

the

most advanced elecommuni-

cations

ystems

inktogether arious

nodes

of intensityn the

global co-

nomic

system n

such a way that

laying claim to beirut_urban naratives and spatial identity in the age of solidere

Documents