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Military Police Commission d'examen des Complaints plaintes concernant Commission la police militaire

FYNES PUBLIC INTEREST HEARINGS held pursuant to section 250.38(1) of the National Defence Act,

in the matter of file 2011-004/ LES AUDIENCES D'INTÉRÊT PUBLIC SUR FYNES

tenues en vertu du paragraphe 250.38(1) de la Loi sur la défense nationale pour le dossier 2011-004

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS/

TRANSCRIPTION DE L'AUDIENCE BEFORE/DEVANT: Mr. Glenn Stannard Chairperson/Président Ms Raymonde Cléroux Registrars/Greffières Ms Chantale Cyr APPEARANCES/COMPARUTIONS: Ms Geneviève Coutlée Mr. Mark Freiman

Commission counsel/ Avocats de la Commission

Ms Elizabeth Richards Ms Korinda McLaine

For/pour Sgt Jon Bigelow, MWO Ross Tourout, LCol Gilles Sansterre, WO Blair Hart, PO2 Eric McLaughlin, Sgt David Mitchell, Sgt Matthew Alan Ritco, Maj Daniel Dandurand, Sgt Scott Shannon, LCol Brian Frei, LCol (Ret’d) William H. Garrick, WO (Ret’d) Sean Bonneteau, CWO (Ret’d) Barry Watson

Col (Ret’d) Michel W. Drapeau Mr. Joshua Juneau Cdr David J. Statham

For/pour Mr. Shaun Fynes and Mrs. Sheila Fynes

HELD AT: TENUE À: 10th Floor 10e étage 270 Albert Street 270, rue Albert Ottawa, Ontario Ottawa (Ontario) 3 October 2012 3 octobre 2012 Volume 57


- ii -

TABLE OF CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIÈRES

PAGE SWORN: MAJOR DANIEL DANDURAND 1 EXAMINATION BY MR. FREIMAN 1


- iii -

EXHIBITS / PIÈCES JUSTIFICATIVES NO. DESCRIPTION PAGE P-170 Summary Investigation Report page 26 54 P-171 January 13, 2010 letter to Major Kate Ritter 54 P-172 Witness book index for Lieutenant-Colonel Sansterre and Major Dandurand 54 P-173 MPPTP Chapter 13, March '09 55 P-174 MPPTP Chapter 13, Annex A 55


1

Ottawa, Ontario / Ottawa (Ontario) 1

--- Upon resuming on Wednesday, October 3, 2012 2

at 0902 / L'audience reprend le mercredi 3

3 octobre à 0902 4

SWORN: MAJOR DANIEL DANDURAND 5

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Good 6

morning. 7

Mr. Freiman. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. Our first and 9

only witness for the day is Major Daniel 10

Dandurand. 11

THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning, 12

sir. 13

MAJ DANDURAND: Good morning. 14

THE CHAIRPERSON: Welcome. 15

EXAMINATION BY 16

MR. FREIMAN: Good morning, sir. 17

MAJ DANDURAND: Good morning. 18

MR. FREIMAN: I wonder just to get 19

us going, sir, if you can fill us in on your 20

background and training both in the military and 21

in the Military Police and NIS. 22

THE CHAIRPERSON: If you could 23

just pull your mike down a little bit it might -- 24

thank you. 25


2

MAJ DANDURAND: Okay, where would 1

you like me to begin? I joined the Canadian 2

Forces in 1994. 3

MR. FREIMAN: Let's start with 4

that. 5

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah. I joined 6

the Canadian Forces in 1994 as part of the regular 7

officer training program. 8

Attended Acadia University. At 9

the time I was undergoing pilot training. 10

Upon graduation from Acadia 11

University I went to Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan and 12

commenced my pilot training. 13

Upon being unsuccessful in that I 14

found myself looking for another source -- another 15

military occupation. 16

Going with my second choice in 17

life which was to be a police officer, it was a 18

good fit to stay in the military and proceed on 19

with Military Police. 20

Once I was accepted I attended the 21

Military Police Academy in Borden, underwent my 22

training. 23

Was posted to Petawawa, Ontario 24

where I spent one year on at the time what was a 25


3

provisionary employment period for officers. We 1

did six months in a detachment on patrols and 2

learning the ins and outs of a detachment. 3

Following that went to the NIS in 4

Ottawa for a six-month period as well. 5

Called back about a month early 6

due to Afghanistan in 2004. I deployed to 7

Afghanistan with my platoon as a multinational MP 8

Platoon Commander and spent approximately eight 9

months there. 10

Once that was completed I came 11

back to Canada. I was the Executive Assistant for 12

the Provost Marshal. 13

Upon which I was posted to the 14

United Kingdom as the Second in Command of an MP 15

Company. 16

Deployed to Iraq in 2006 and 17

recovered from there in 2007 and was posted back 18

to Canada and to the NIS in Western Region as the 19

Officer Commanding. 20

Since that time, since 2011 I've 21

been the Commandant of the Military Police 22

Academy. 23

During my time in the Military 24

Police Branch training has included my Military 25


4

Police Officers course, my investigators course, 1

Major Case Management Team Commanders course out 2

of the Canadian Police College and various other 3

professional development seminars. 4

MR. FREIMAN: I noticed from your 5

curriculum vitae that you actually completed your 6

criminal investigators course after you were 7

appointed Officer Commanding. Is that unusual? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: No, that is not 9

unusual. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So does that 11

mean that prior to 2008 you weren't engaged in 12

criminal investigations, or does it just mean that 13

you got your formal certificate after having done 14

some investigations? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: Prior to 2008 I 16

would have had experience on patrols as conducting 17

investigations. The Military Police investigators 18

course is designed for advanced investigations at 19

the level of the NIS. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So prior to 21

obtaining your criminal investigators certificate 22

or completing the course, had you done any serious 23

or sensitive investigations? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I had. 25


5

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Had you done 1

any sudden death investigations? 2

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I had not. 3

MR. FREIMAN: Had you done any 4

criminal negligence investigations? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I had. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. What was the 7

context? I don't need the details but what was 8

the allegation of criminal negligence if you were 9

investigating? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: I'm just pausing 11

because due to the nature of the investigation 12

it's rather sensitive and classified -- 13

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. 14

MAJ DANDURAND: -- sufficient to 15

say that the individuals that were involved in the 16

allegations were believed to have not performed 17

their duty according to the norms. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. We'll leave 19

it at that. 20

How about investigations for 21

negligent performance of duties as opposed to for 22

criminal negligence? Had you had any -- had you 23

done any of those? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: I'm sorry. I 25


6

thought that's what your question was or is it -- 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Well, as I 2

understand it there is a Criminal Code offence -- 3

MAJ DANDURAND: Correct. 4

MR. FREIMAN: -- called "Criminal 5

Negligence Causing Death" or "Criminal Negligence 6

Causing Bodily Injury" and there is a separate and 7

distinct service offence, "Criminal" -- sorry -- 8

"Negligent Performance of a Military Duty". 9

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. No, my 10

previous answer was with respect to the National 11

Defence Act offences. 12

MR. FREIMAN: All right. 13

Do you have an estimate of how 14

many criminal investigations you might have done 15

before you assumed -- before you came into contact 16

with the case that is going to occupy us for the 17

next day or two? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I don't have 19

an estimate off the top of my head. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Can I assume that 21

you hadn't done any investigations for failing to 22

provide the necessities of life? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, that would be 24

a safe assumption. 25


7

MR. FREIMAN: And would it also be 1

a safe assumption that you hadn't done any 2

investigations regarding the duties of an employer 3

vis-à-vis a safe workplace? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, that would 5

also be a safe assumption. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Can you tell us a 7

little bit about the role of the Officer 8

Commanding of an NIS detachment? What's the gamut 9

of responsibilities involved with that position? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, the 11

responsibilities commence with being accountable 12

to the Commanding Officer of the NIS with respect 13

to the investigations that are on-going in your 14

detachment. 15

You very much are an enabler of 16

the work that's being done, everything from 17

whatever the resources the individuals would 18

require. 19

You track the core competencies 20

with respect to your detachment. 21

Due to the human resource 22

management mandate such as people posting in and 23

out of the detachment you need to make sure that 24

specific skillsets as they depart, as they have 25


8

been developed, are then either recruited into the 1

organization or developed through the 2

organization. 3

You fulfil a leadership and 4

mentoring role and, as well, ensure that questions 5

that need to go above and outside of the 6

detachment are fielded accordingly. 7

MR. FREIMAN: With specific 8

reference to on-going investigations conducted 9

call it at ground level by NIS members, what's the 10

role of the Officer Commanding? How much 11

involvement in an individual investigative file 12

would the Officer Commanding have? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: That really 14

depends upon a few factors. One is the individual 15

themselves in command. 16

The other one is with respect to 17

the individuals between the person who is in 18

command and the investigator, the line 19

investigators themselves. 20

As well, it depends upon the 21

volume of work at the time. 22

In the NIS all members from the 23

newest member on the team straight up through to 24

the Officer Commanding is considered an 25


9

investigator. They are trained. They are 1

qualified and therefore when an incident occurs 2

they may be called upon to personally actively 3

become involved in that, investigating the initial 4

response. 5

So the involvement is really 6

dependent upon that. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Well, maybe 8

we'll take the last and then we'll go backwards. 9

What sort of files -- I take it 10

the Officer Commanding is called upon to take part 11

in a file as an investigator. That's the Officer 12

Commanding's choice or would that be an assignment 13

that would come from above? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: Both. It does not 15

happen very often that assignments are provided 16

from above. However, due to the serious 17

sensitivity and timing of the file it may come 18

from above that a particular officer is involved. 19

MR. FREIMAN: So if it comes from 20

you what sort of file causes you to call your own 21

number, as one might say in football? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: Again, it really 23

depends upon the totality of the circumstances 24

that exist within the detachment at the time. 25


10

What would call me in is perhaps a 1

level of experience within a particular domain, 2

perhaps a familiarity with a particular area 3

that's occurring whether -- not necessarily with 4

respect to investigative history or activity in 5

that but perhaps having experienced it within the 6

military as such. 7

One example would be an 8

investigation inherited from Afghanistan 9

continuing on due to the troops having come home 10

would be something of rules of engagement. So if 11

one had to make judgment calls with respect to 12

rules of engagement or had been involved in 13

training troops to make those judgment calls 14

despite having never been involved in a rules of 15

engagement investigation, you may be the best 16

suitable person within the detachment to take that 17

on. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. In terms of 19

files in which you would not be an investigator or 20

the lead investigator, what typically would be the 21

supervisory function? What would you say about a 22

file? How often would you hear about it; by what 23

means? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, when I was 25


11

in Western Region one thing that I implemented 1

that I had -- quite frankly I had taken from my 2

colleagues from another service, is a 48-hour 3

briefing. 4

So for instance as the duty 5

officer, if I'm the duty officer of the day, I 6

would be involved right from the beginning. 7

However, if I'm not the duty officer then I would 8

come into the office 48 hours later. Let's say we 9

would sit down and have a briefing. 10

Generally, this was when the 11

investigators would have returned from their 12

initial response. We would say, "What do we have 13

and what direction do we see this investigation 14

going in?" and more importantly, "Are there 15

resources that are missing or particular issues 16

that need the attention of the Office of the 17

Officer Commanding?" 18

So that would be right from the 19

very beginning. Once that occurs, generally 20

speaking, the investigators have their 21

understanding and the benefit of the totality of 22

the group's experience in pursuing these 23

investigations and then they go and do their work. 24

The day to day activity of an 25


12

investigation does not necessarily come to the 1

attention of the Officer Commanding. 2

What would come to the attention 3

are critical developments, very unanticipated 4

turns in an investigation perhaps and, as well, on 5

a weekly basis the case manager and the command 6

team would sit down and provide a situational 7

report as to where we sit with an investigation 8

and that would form part of our case file 9

management matrix which would then go up to our 10

Headquarters so that they can understand the full 11

picture of what is being worked on by the 12

detachment. 13

MR. FREIMAN: How about briefing 14

up? What sort of briefing would you be expected 15

to give to those above you in the chain of 16

command. 17

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, any 18

involvement with my Headquarters was quite 19

regular. I would say even daily depending upon 20

what was going on in our detachment. 21

There is always a new file 22

happening. There is always a file closing. There 23

is always a file that requires some advice. 24

So with respect to if you take it 25


13

in isolation one investigation, briefing up that 1

occurred weekly through the reports and returns 2

that we would provide as a minimum. 3

And again, much like the 4

investigators would brief me on any significant 5

developments I would then assess if that required 6

to be briefed to the Commanding Officer. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Are those briefings 8

regularly recorded anywhere or are they simply 9

oral or written and there is no permanent record 10

kept of them? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: Significant -- no, 12

they're not necessarily recorded. And the word 13

briefing used in describing this interaction with 14

the chain of command may be a bit of a formal 15

word. 16

This is -- to paint a situation or 17

to provide an example would be the significant 18

development that an investigator would bring to my 19

attention would be recorded in the general 20

occurrence. That would then be verbally provided 21

to me because it already exists within the general 22

occurrence. 23

I would then take that and brief 24

the chain of command which they would themselves 25


14

also have access to the general occurrence and 1

dive into and see if they wanted to look at it any 2

closer. 3

So, no, there is no actual written 4

notes of that per se. 5

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Was any part 6

of your responsibility as Officer Commanding 7

involved with public affairs and communications? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. 9

MR. FREIMAN: Can you tell me what 10

sort of involvement you had with that? What was 11

the nature of your responsibility vis-à-vis public 12

affairs and communications? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: With respect to 14

public affairs it was my duty to maintain a flow 15

of information to our public affairs 16

representatives that were assigned to the NIS in 17

order just to make sure that they had situational 18

awareness. 19

That's it. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. What about 21

vis-à-vis the Canadian Forces in general? Did you 22

have any liaison or briefing responsibilities 23

vis-à-vis the chain of command in Western Region? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I never had 25


15

any responsibilities to them. 1

My responsibilities were with 2

respect to ensuring that any potential involvement 3

of Western Area's chain of command that could 4

impinge or encroach upon my investigation was 5

dealt with. 6

I mean my interactions, for 7

instance, with public affairs officers within 8

Western Area were strictly designed to ensure that 9

if they were starting to delve into a particular 10

public affairs topic or public relations topic 11

that was in my view an NIS mandate that they were 12

reminded and very clear that NIS public affairs 13

has the lead. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Was there any policy 15

about joint briefings with the chain of command or 16

the Canadian Forces non-NIS where there were 17

topics that -- as you said, areas where there 18

could be an overlap of activity? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, there was. 20

MR. FREIMAN: And how was that 21

taken care of? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, it starts 23

with the briefing protocol which is a protocol 24

that sets out the interactions between commanders 25


16

and, well, the NIS Western Region. 1

Every detachment has these and 2

what they're meant to do is to meet these 3

commanders and these people within the various 4

chains of command in the areas that our 5

interactions are going to occur with to make sure 6

that we're meeting first off on a pleasant note, 7

not on a sad note or on a very difficult and 8

contentious note to establish how the 9

communication would go. 10

Sometimes commanders don't have 11

experience in dealing with the NIS. They've been 12

dealing as they've come up through the ranks with 13

Military Police and they know of the NIS's 14

existence but often they don't understand how 15

their actions or inactions can either help or not 16

help the NIS do its duty. 17

The intent of those protocols, 18

those conversations, those meetings, they last 19

approximately about an hour depending upon the 20

dialogue between the commanders. Then it's their 21

chance to ask all forms of questions. 22

Outlined in there are various 23

topics such as the construct and the chain of 24

command of the NIS, how the division of areas are. 25


17

Some of our commanders have vast areas of 1

responsibility particularly, for instance, in the 2

air force. So they may have interactions with 3

multiple OCs from the NIS whereas army tend to be 4

along more compartmentalized lines and the navy, 5

obviously, on both coasts. 6

So their understanding of how the 7

NIS is constructed will better help them in the 8

future understand who they need to call if they 9

should have a question. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Were your dealings 11

with the chain of command face to face or were 12

they through an intermediary? I don't mean the 13

NIS chain of command. I mean the CF chain of 14

command. 15

MAJ DANDURAND: They were face -- 16

they were both -- I used face to face meetings. 17

Obviously preferable, but due to the vast area 18

that I had responsibility for from Thunder Bay all 19

the way through to the Northwest Territories and 20

all the provinces in between with the exception of 21

British Columbia, that was underneath another 22

Officer Commanding. 23

It was often unrealistic to be 24

face to face with people. So my annual meetings 25


18

I'd always strive to be face to face with people 1

but if I had a situation that required immediate 2

attention of somebody I would pick up the phone 3

and call. 4

MR. FREIMAN: So where physically 5

were you based in these days? Was it in Edmonton? 6


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Let's talk 8

about 2008. You came upon the scene in July of 9

2008, as I understand this. Is that correct? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: That's correct. I 11

believe it was in the month of July. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. At that point 13

was there any part of the 2008 investigation that, 14

to your knowledge -- this is into the Langridge 15

suicide -- was there any part of that 16

investigation that, to your knowledge, was still 17

ongoing? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: To my knowledge, 19

no. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, had you 21

been briefed on that file when you came in, or was 22

it already treated as a closed file that didn't 23

require your briefing? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I had not been 25


19

briefed on that. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. By the fall 2

of -- let's say by the spring of 2009, had you had 3

occasion to work on any files with Master Corporal 4

Ritco as he then was? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: Not that I can 6

recall. If memory serves me correctly, I believe 7

Sergeant Ritco was posted to -- not posted, but 8

assigned to the major crimes unit at K Division by 9

that time, by the time I had arrived, and if it 10

wasn't exactly when I had arrived, it would have 11

been in around that period because our annual 12

posting season tends to be from May to September. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Mm-hmm. 14

MAJ DANDURAND: So it was very 15

much a time of transition in there, but by the 16

time my feet were on the ground running in 17

September, I don't believe he was around. 18

MR. FREIMAN: All right. So -- 19

THE CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. You said 20

you don't believe he was there? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't believe he 22

was physically working within the Western Region 23

Detachment, I think he was working at K Division 24

by that point. 25


20

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thanks. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Did you ever have 2

any face-to-face meetings with Sergeant Ritco? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: Sergeant Rit -- 4

yes, I would say we did, but I can't say that they 5

were formal meetings. We were still responsible 6

for administrating our secondments and our 7

exchanges, so Sergeant Ritco's claims would have 8

to be processed by us, so he would come in every 9

few weeks and, if I happened to be in the office, 10

I would see him in the halls for a few minutes. 11

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Did you at 12

any time up to the closing of the 2009 and 2010 13

files, have a meeting with Sergeant Ritco to 14

discuss the 2008 investigation? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I believe I 16

did sit down with him, if I can recall, about 17

maybe once to specifically ask him what he did on 18

the investigation. 19

MR. FREIMAN: How about Sergeant 20

Bigelow; did you have a chance to discuss the 21

investigation with him at any point? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I had not. 23

Again, I met Sergeant Bigelow when I was on my 24

house hunting trip and it was at that point that I 25


21

was informed that he would be posted to Ottawa. 1

MR. FREIMAN: And what about 2

Warrant Tourout? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: No. Again, 4

Warrant Tourout never worked for me. He was 5

posted I believe that same year. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Do you remember when 7

you would have had your meeting with Sergeant 8

Ritco? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I do not. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Do you 11

remember what the subject matter was rather 12

than -- other than the file in general; was there 13

any specific point that you were discussing with 14

him? 15

Was there a trigger for the 16

meeting that you can recall? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe the 18

trigger -- yes, there would have been a trigger 19

and I think it was the issue of the suicide note. 20

And that would have caused me to, 21

at the next opportunity when he comes in to do 22

some administration, to just pull him aside and 23

ask him what had happened. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. We'll get to 25


22

the suicide note in a moment. Let's go back to 1

your first engagement with this matter. 2

As I understand it, some time in 3

early 2009 there was a request by the BOI for the 4

2008 file. Do you recall the discussions around 5

that? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: Not specifically, 7

no. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Maybe we should have 9

a look at Tab 159 in the books on your right. 10

You'll see they're tabbed volumes. 11

Just so you'll understand the 12

architecture of the books, the volumes on your 13

right are tabbed loose volumes, the volumes on 14

your left are the GO files from 2009, 2010 and 15

2008 and a couple of stray things as well. 16

MAJ DANDURAND: Okay. 17

MR. FREIMAN: So, if I ask for "at 18

Tab...", it's almost always going to be on your 19

right. 20

This is the first document that I 21

was able to find where you appear to be involved 22

and you can see it's Major Parlee introducing 23

himself and he's asking you for a copy of the NIS 24

report in relation to the incident. 25


23

From your experience, would that 1

be something usual for a BOI to be given access to 2

a GO file? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, it is. 4

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And does the 5

BOI have a right to the entire GO file or does it 6

only get portions of it? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: My understanding 8

is they have access to the whole thing. 9

MR. FREIMAN: All right. At a 10

certain point there's a request that -- oh, sorry, 11

let's have a look at the 2009 GO file, and it will 12

be on your left, the 3 February -- sorry, 2008 at 13

page 21. 14

I just want to look at the cover 15

letter that goes with this. You're sending a 16

cover letter to Major Parlee, and there's nothing 17

remarkable about it, except in the second 18

paragraph -- are you with me? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I'm not. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Are we in the 2008? 21

You may find there are some blank pages because 22

they don't scan well, so look at the end of the 23

blank pages and that will be page 21. 24

So, you see those -- 25


24

MAJ DANDURAND: Is that page 21 of 1

714? 2

MR. FREIMAN: 21 of 714, that's 3

correct. Just go over the very next page from 4

that. There it is. 5


MR. FREIMAN: Sometimes in these 7

files they don't scan the images so we get blank 8

pages and then we get mechanically photocopied 9

pages. 10


MR. FREIMAN: Paragraph 2 is a 12

summary. I think, and I just want to confirm with 13

you, that that summary is simply taken from the 14

concluding remarks of the 2008 file, or would you 15

have actually read the entire file in order to 16

acquaint yourself with what was going on? 17

I can tell you that all those 18

facts appear in the concluding remarks of the 2008 19

file. So, I'm not sure whether you can remember 20

now whether you actually acquainted yourself with 21

the file at this point, or whether this was simply 22

a transmission? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't -- I don't 24

believe I drafted this letter. 25


25

MR. FREIMAN: All right. Well -- 1

MAJ DANDURAND: I have no 2

recollection of drafting this letter and two 3

reasons that I don't believe I did is, first off, 4

the manner in which it is written I don't -- in 5

addressees above the subject line, I don't -- 6

that's not my style of writing, right there, 7

"Attention Major Parlee". 8

MR. FREIMAN: Mm-hmm. 9

MAJ DANDURAND: If it was to Major 10

Parlee specifically, I would have said, "BOI 11

President for...", whatever BOI. And, secondly, I 12

would have signed this myself. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Well, we've 14

seen throughout these proceedings, there's nothing 15

unusual about it, that letters are routinely 16

drafted for signature by someone else. 17

MAJ DANDURAND: Right. 18

MR. FREIMAN: And so I take it 19

that's what happened here. 20

MS RICHARDS: Sorry, just to be 21

clear, counsel, I think the point is that Major 22

Dandurand didn't sign this letter. 23

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. That's fine. 24

At some point though there was a 25


26

request from the Board of Inquiry, and we can look 1

at Tab 42 where Major Parlee tells you: 2

"In the course of conducting 3

the Langridge BOI...'" 4

MR. FREIMAN: He's come across: 5

"...evidence that indicates 6

there was a suicide note left 7

in Corporal Langridge's room. 8

The NIS report does not have 9

any record of the suicide 10

note. Can you confirm there 11

was or was not a suicide note 12

found?" 13

MR. FREIMAN: Now -- 14

THE CHAIRPERSON: What tab are you 15

at? 16

MR. FREIMAN: Tab 42. 17

THE CHAIRPERSON: Of...? 18

MR. FREIMAN: Of the document 19

books. 20

COL (RET'D) DRAPEAU: Last page. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Last page. 22

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. 23

MR. FREIMAN: By this time he's 24

addressing you by your first name, so I take it 25


27

you would have had occasion to have actually 1

spoken to him? 2

MAJ DANDURAND: Oh yes, I had. 3

MR. FREIMAN: So, was this the 4

first that you were aware of a suicide note, or 5

were you already aware there was a suicide note on 6

the file? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't recall 8

right now if I actually knew when he wrote this -- 9

when he wrote this, however, I would have checked 10

immediately upon receipt of this email. 11

MR. FREIMAN: All right. And if 12

we look at the same email you are -- the same 13

email chain, if we look at the email dated Friday 14

the 13th of March at 1751, this is sent to Major 15

Bolduc, I'm sorry, to lieutenant colonel Labelle, 16

and it introduces the question asked: "Do we have 17

authority to disclose the suicide note?". 18

Can you tell me why it was 19

necessary -- was -- is the request for a suicide 20

note unusual? Was there something? Why was it 21

that you needed permission to release the suicide 22

note? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, this was an 24

unusual request because when we -- for two 25


28

reasons. One, when we have BOIs and we disclose 1

the totality of our general occurrence, printing 2

it of, select all in the system and hit print and 3

then we give it to them. 4

I would have at the time assumed 5

that the suicide note was in the GO scanned in and 6

that would be sufficient for them. 7

What was happening in the Western 8

Region at the time with BOIs is there was -- there 9

were a lot of requests for holdings from our 10

evidence for a BOI, things such as photographs of 11

the deceased at the scenery. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. 13

MAJ DANDURAND: And that was 14

viewed by me as well above and beyond the scope of 15

what the BOI should be entitled to and what I was 16

engaging there and at the same time are dialogues 17

in other matters with respect to these practices 18

and how this was happening. 19

So, I was being very careful on 20

how to disclose things that we were holding as 21

evidence in our evidence lock up. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Well, were you aware 23

or are you aware now that there is in fact the 24

scanned suicide note in the 08 file? 25


29

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I am. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, I am 2

struggling with why either Major Parlee was unable 3

to find it in what you sent him or why you were 4

unable to locate it in what had been sent to him 5

as well? I mean it's there. It's not as if there 6

is no discussion of the suicide note, but it's 7

there. 8


MR. FREIMAN: So, what was the 10

issue of sending it to him because you already had 11

it? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't recall at 13

this time. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. You 15

request the permission and that same -- that same 16

email chain on the 13th of March at 1803, which is 17

just over the page previous, you send an email to 18

Major Bolduc and you talk about they're just 19

looking for evidence above and beyond what we 20

normally give to BOIs. 21

Is that the incident that are the 22

issue that you were telling us about, that people 23

were requesting more or were requesting evidence? 24



30

MR. FREIMAN: And what was the 1

issue about giving evidence or giving a copy of 2

evidence to a BOI? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: From my 4

understanding, the issue is that the general 5

occurrence is the start point for the BOI and they 6

have entitlement to see it all and they have 7

entitlement to call any witnesses they wish, which 8

would obviously be identified in our general 9

occurrence, particularly from the entities, but 10

they would be able to gauge the depth of the 11

involvement of the individuals from the general 12

occurrence. 13


MAJ DANDURAND: And they would be 15

able to gauge the involvement and subject matter 16

knowledge from the investigators assigned. 17

We often provided investigators 18

who would accompany the evidence to the BOI. 19

However, it was at the time very -- it was very 20

uncommon for us to be reaching into the evidence 21

lock up to hand over evidence because we didn't -- 22

we needed to maintain continuity of that. 23

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. This maybe 24

the first time we'll talk about it and we'll come 25


31

back to it, but what was the status of the suicide 1

note as evidence at this point? 2

MAJ DANDURAND: At this point, in 3

my mind, it was still classified as evidence. 4

MR. FREIMAN: Of what? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: Simply as a 6

classification not necessarily of anything because 7

thought had been given to whether we should be 8

disposing of it or not at that time. 9

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. But isn't 10

evidence defined as an information or a thing that 11

tends to prove or disprove a matter in issuing a 12

criminal investigation? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I would agree 14

with that. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. And there 16

was no criminal investigation ongoing? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: No, there was not. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. In any 19

event, we know that it wasn't until April that the 20

suicide note itself was provided and we can see 21

the email exchange. 22

Well, let's -- I don't want to go 23

through in painful details, so I can tell you that 24

Major Parlee on the 16th of March wrote a formal 25


32

letter requesting a certified true copy of the 1

suicide note found in Corporal Langridge's room. 2

And if we look at tab 159, we'll 3

see it wasn't till the 16th of April that this was 4

actioned. That's 169 then. No, I'm sorry, it's 5

159, the 16th of April at 1616. And you'll see 6

that's on the second page of that email chain that 7

we -- 8

THE PRESIDENT: It's 159 of? 9

MR. FREIMAN: At 159 of the -- 10

right here. 11

THE PRESIDENT: And what date? 12

MR. FREIMAN: It's an email chain 13

that seems to have been assembled in a funny way. 14

It starts with the letter that we looked at, the 15

January 26th letter. The next letter that we see 16

is April 16th. Do we have concurrence? 17

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 18

MR. FREIMAN: I can tell you that 19

the formal request was the 16th of March. Do you 20

recall what took so long? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I don't. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. It would 23

appear that the suicide note was delivered that 24

same day, the 16th of April, and the BOI appears 25


33

or either the Regiment of the BOI appears to have 1

given the suicide note to the family. 2

Was that done with your 3

concurrence? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I believe it 5

was. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. Did they 7

need your concurrence to release the suicide note 8

to the family? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: At the time? I 10

believe they did. 11

MR. FREIMAN: Shortly thereafter 12

there was a good deal of media attention focused 13

on the fact that the suicide note had not been 14

released in May of, sorry, in 2008, there had been 15

14 months since the death. 16

Do you remember how you became 17

involved in any of these discussions? Well, 18

let's -- 19

MAJ DANDURAND: Actually, I'll 20

answer the question. 21


MAJ DANDURAND: No, right now, I 23

don't. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. Let me 25


34

just go back a little bit. In the documents, 1

there is a back and forth that you may or may not 2

recall and we don't have to look at it in the 3

original. It was just about what needed to be 4

gone through in order to release the suicide note. 5

There was the discussion first 6

with the BOI and then a larger discussion as to 7

whether it was necessary for an ATIP request in 8

order to release the suicide note. 9

Do you recall discussions about 10

the issue of an ATIP request as a pre-condition 11

for releasing the suicide note? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: No, not at this 13

time, I don't. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. 15

MAJ DANDURAND: Can you refer me 16

to a document that would -- 17

MR. FREIMAN: Yes, I will. Let's 18

look at 159 again and look at the 28 May email 19

chain and I think it's arranged in reverse 20

chronological order and I am just trying to get it 21

right. Yes. So, 137 and -- alright. 22

So, we'll start with the one at 23

the bottom of the page of page 13, if you see a 24

page 13 at the bottom. This is 159. It's 25


35

actually the third page in in your notes. 1

So, if you take 159, the first 2

page is the January 26 email; the second page is 3

an April 16th email; the third page is a series of 4

May 28th emails. It's -- yes, you are looking at 5

it, on the right hand side. Do you see it? 6

There are two emails on the page. 7

The first one is dated Thursday, May 28 at 1113; 8

the second is dated Thursday, May 28 at 0137 p.m. 9

Got it? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: Are they emails 11

from Captain Angell? 12

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. Well, from 13

Captain Angell to Warrant Officer Ross and then -- 14


MR. FREIMAN: -- from Captain 16

Angell to you. So, the original message at the 17

bottom of the note, captain Angell who is the 18

Adjudant for the Lord Stratchona Horse Guard 19

Canadian writes to Warrant Officer Ross and says: 20

"I'm sure you can appreciate 21

the sensitive nature of this 22

request. The family already 23

has a copy of the note. They 24

want to possess the original. 25


36

As an ATI request will only 1

get them a copy, this is not 2

really an option. 3

Is there any other option we 4

can explore?" 5

And then, over the page, if you 6

turn it over, you will see a response from Warrant 7

Officer Ross to Captain Angell: 8

"Concerning the family's 9

desire to have the suicide 10

note, the best course of 11

action will be to have the AO 12

to the family making ATI 13

request on their behalf. 14

Should you have any further 15

questions, please feel free 16

to contact me." 17

And, then we go back to the top of 18

the previous page, which is Warrant Officer Ross 19

sending a response to Captain Angell with a carbon 20

copy to you and he says: 21

"Sir, we appreciate the 22

sensitivity of this matter. 23

However, the original note is 24

still retained as evidence. 25


37

I do not foresee the original 1

note being turned over. That 2

being said, I will make some 3

further inquiries when I am 4

back in the office tomorrow." 5

So -- 6

MS RICHARDS: Just for the sake of 7

clarity before you move on, I think you have read 8

the emails backwards. 9

MR. FREIMAN: Hum, hum. 10

MS RICHARDS: I think the very 11

last one is the first email, the middle one is the 12

response to the first email and the top email was 13

the latest email. 14

MR. FREIMAN: You're right. 15

You're right. So, the original message was from 16

Warrant Officer Ross to Captain Angell with a copy 17

to you, suggesting that a request be made to ATI, 18

Captain Angell's response saying: 19

"We've already got the 20

information and we want the 21

original." 22

It's not going to get -- ATI is 23

only going to give them a copy, they want the 24

paper and Warrant Officer Ross responds that: 25


38

"It's still evidence and we 1

don't foresee releasing it." 2

Does that refresh your memory as 3

to some of the concerns and some of the 4

discussion? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: I do. I do have 6

some recollection of this, but not -- not in great 7

detail. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. That's 9

fair enough. 10

Do you have a recollection, at 11

this point, of a discussion about the suicide note 12

as evidence? 13


MR. FREIMAN: Alright. And do you 15

remember the nature of the discussion that was 16

had? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: I just remember 18

discussing very briefly with Warrant Officer Ross 19

that the question was: "Is this still classified 20

as evidence?" And our interpretation of the -- of 21

our procedures for evidentiary holdings at the 22

time was that it was. 23

But I do -- I do remember having 24

our conversation on the phone and I do believe it 25


39

was because I wasn't in the office at the time. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, can you 2

reconstruct what your understanding of the rules 3

for evidence or the classification of material as 4

evidence and release of those materials was at the 5

time that prevented the release of the note? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, at the time 7

I had a -- I had a belief that if we were holding 8

it, particularly this amount of time after the 9

fact, that we would have released all personal 10

belongings back to the rightful owners and 11

anything that we were holding at that time we 12

would have -- we would have by then been holding 13

only because it was evidence. 14

Now, I can say that today, my 15

understanding of all of this is much different. 16

MR. FREIMAN: Right. There is a 17

lengthy email chain that we can find at tab 123, 18

and that's going to be in Volume 3. And as is 19

often the case, this email chain goes from back to 20

front. So, chronologically, the first page in the 21

chain will be all the way back at 8 of 14. And we 22

can start at the bottom of -- you'll see page 38 23

or page 7 of 14 at the top or 38 at the bottom. 24

And this follows up, there is 25


40

information on an earlier email that the AO had 1

been informed that legalities prevented the 2

release of the suicide note and there is a bit of 3

an exchange then at the bottom of page 7 of 14 4

Colonel Hammond sends an email to Lieutenant 5

Colonel Bradley saying: 6

"Are we sure no one gave a 7

copy to a member of the 8

family earlier? It's a bit 9

shocking if we did not." 10

And after that there is a response 11

from Lieutenant Colonel Bradley: 12

"The letter surfaced from the 13

NIS at the end of the BOI, 14

never made its way into the 15

testimony earlier as being in 16

existence. To the best of 17

what I know, they were the 18

only ones with a copy. 19

When we found out, we quickly 20

figured that although not 21

mandated to do so, it would 22

clearly be in the family's 23

interest to have this and 24

also so that they wouldn't 25


41

find out when the BOI 1

documentation was released at 2

the end and really be 3

unhappy." 4

So, that's the background of it. 5

And if you turn back at page 6 of 6

14, there is -- at the bottom, there is an email 7

from Colonel Hammond up to Brigadier General 8

Jorgensen and he recounts a long trail of emails. 9

It starts with a note from the 10

family of Corporal Langridge about 14 months ago 11

saying they've just received the copy of the 12

suicide note from the president of BOI, which is 13

not quite complete and they want the original with 14

the NIS: 15

"The family note that our 16

actions were cruel, calice 17

and disrespectful. PAO is 18

preparing renewed MRLs." 19

And there is a question for you: 20

"Then, can we release the 21

original ASAP at this point?" 22

And your response, several minutes 23

after that is: 24

"Colonel, I just got 25


42

authority from Lieutenant 1

Colonel Bell this afternoon, 2

we'll be taking action 3

Monday. It's worthwhile to 4

note this letter is held as 5

evidence and it is not 6

routine for us to divulge or 7

release evidence in a case 8

and evidence is held for 9

several years. Should you 10

wish to discuss in greater 11

detail, please let me know." 12

And not to belabour the point, but 13

what was the source of your understanding about it 14

not being routine to divulge or release evidence 15

and that evidence is held for several years? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, this would 17

have come from a conversation with members of my 18

detachment who are experienced in this domain and 19

that's where I based my understanding of what we 20

should be doing at the time. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, and do I 22

understand you were simply passing on information 23

that others had given to you? Had you ever come 24

across this issue? 25


43

MAJ DANDURAND: I had never come 1

across this issue before. 2

MR. FREIMAN: There is a further 3

discussion and I think because you were copied 4

throughout the email chain, you would have seen 5

the email at the -- on page 4 of 14 from Colonel 6

MacAulay to Brigadier General Poulton who says: 7

"Sir, I don't have all the SA" -- which I 8

understand to be situational awareness -- "but 9

this may be as much about NIS culture as it is 10

about CF administrative stovepipes." 11

Did you have any understanding of 12

what that refers to? 13


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. At the top of 15

that page, there is a request to the Provost- 16

Marshal saying that the CLS wants an investigation 17

as to why the NIS would held the note from the BOI 18

and the family for some 14 months. 19

And on the first page -- 20

MAJ DANDURAND: Sorry; where are 21

you looking? 22

MR. FREIMAN: I am looking at the 23

top of 4 of 4. You see, for LFPM? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: Okay, Land Forces 25


44

Provost-Marshal? 1

MR. FREIMAN: Right. 2


MR. FREIMAN: CLS would like an 4

investigation -- an explanation for why the NIS 5

would held the note from the BOI and the family 6

for some 14 months. 7

And the response on -- oh! for 8

some reason, you are not copied on the response 9

from Lieutenant Colonel Lander now. 10

MAJ DANDURAND: I am not in the 11

original email under; am I? 12

MR. FREIMAN: You're in -- you're 13

in there somewhere. 14

MAJ DANDURAND: I'm in there at 15

the very beginning. 16



MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And then you 19

seem to drop off at some point in the -- on the 20

30th of May. 21

So I guess the question remains, 22

there is an explanation from Lieutenant-Colonel 23

Lander that he gives to the Brigadier-General, to 24

a number of other individuals at Land Force 25


45

Western. 1

Now, what was Lieutenant-Colonel 2

Lander's position at Land Force Provost Marshal? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: That was his 4

position. He was the Land Staff Provost Marshal. 5


MAJ DANDURAND: He's the adviser 7

to the -- at the time what was the CLS. 8

MR. FREIMAN: He had to get his 9

information from somewhere. Do you know where he 10

got his information from? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: I know he has 12

access to SAMPIS. And the second thing that I 13

vaguely recall is a conversation with him on the 14

phone. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. I want to -- 16

MAJ DANDURAND: It would not be -- 17

it would not be uncommon for advisers to call the 18

source directly, particularly when it involves 19

NIS, because we're only one chain -- one level in 20

the chain of command removed from the 21

Headquarters. 22


MAJ DANDURAND: And they would -- 24

there's a strong working relationship between 25


46

Officers Commanding and the various MP advisers 1

throughout Canada. 2

MR. FREIMAN: Do you have any 3

doubt that Lieutenant-Colonel Lander would have 4

called you to get information that he could report 5

up to the Land Force -- through the chain of 6

command? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't 8

specifically recall him calling me, but it would 9

not have been uncommon. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Well, the reason I'm 11

asking is I'm struggling to understand what the 12

response is and the basis for the response. 13

Here's what Lieutenant-Colonel 14

Landers says: 15

"The incident occurred 15 16

March '08. The MP 17

investigation was concluded 18

in July '08. It appears the 19

MP investigative team did not 20

reveal the existence of the 21

note to the family, as it, in 22

their opinion, would not have 23

added anything to the 24

information already passed 25


47

during the normal victim 1

services provided and they 2

felt it may have had -- even 3

had a negative effect. 4

The fact the note existed was 5

passed to the BOI with the 6

original documentation 7

provided by CFNIS. The BOI 8

asked for a copy and were 9

provided one 3 February '09 10

once permission from the 11

Deputy Provost Marshal police 12

was granted. The OC of CFNIS 13

Western Region is conducting 14

a detailed quality assurance 15

review of the file and the 16

investigation it represents, 17

which should be completed by 18

5 June '09. This will 19

include the decision not to 20

reveal the existence of the 21

note to the family by the 22

investigative team. 23

The original note is no 24

longer deemed evidence and is 25


48

in the process of being 1

passed to the family in 2

accordance with their 3

request." 4

Do you have any understanding as 5

to the basis of those -- of that information that 6

was passed on? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: I have no 8

understanding of why we would say that it's not in 9

the interests of the family to pass on. 10

It was not uncommon for us to 11

discuss with people such as executors or close 12

family representatives of family when we did seize 13

materials from the scene if they were of a 14

sensitive or potentially embarrassing type for us 15

to discuss with them did you want these or did you 16

want us to dispose of them. 17

And that may be -- I don't want -- 18

even want to speculate as to what Colonel Lander 19

was thinking. 20

With respect to the quality 21

assurance, yes, we were conducting a quality 22

assurance at the time and I believe we have copies 23

of it. 24

MR. FREIMAN: So let me ask you a 25


49

couple of follow-up questions on that. 1

This note appears to be conveying 2

information from the investigators who conducted 3

the investigation about the reasons why they 4

withheld the suicide note. I can tell you there's 5

nothing that corresponds to this explanation 6

anywhere in the 2008 file, so its source had to be 7

something other than a review of the GO file. 8

Do you have any idea of who or 9

what could have been consulted in order to come up 10

with this explanation? 11


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. The next 13

question, I guess, that requires a bit of pursuing 14

is the issue of the quality assurance review. 15

When was a decision made to have 16

such a review, why was it made and by whom was it 17

made? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: Okay. Who made 19

the decision, it would have been a discussion, I 20

believe, if memory serves me correctly, between 21

Colonel Sansterre, who was the Commanding Officer 22

at the time, and the Headquarters and myself, 23

possibly other -- possibly Warrant Officer Ross at 24

the time, who was, I believe, in an acting 25


50

capacity for the detachment Master Warrant Officer 1

position as the chief investigator. So that 2

answers who. 3

What were your other two 4

questions? 5

MR. FREIMAN: Why? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: Why the quality 7

assurance? 8

The quality assurance process is 9

there as an audit on a file in order to identify 10

what potential shortcomings exist in an 11

investigation. It's understood that every single 12

investigation can be done better. 13

And in our view, the issue of this 14

suicide note and as well our in-depth knowledge of 15

the investigation in itself due to the fact that 16

it was now going to be called into question was 17

not as fresh in everybody's mind as what a quality 18

assurance would afford us. 19

MR. FREIMAN: So who does the 20

quality assurance or, in this case, who did the 21

quality assurance? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, by position 23

and by -- by capability, it's the detachment's 24

Master Warrant Officer in the detachments. 25


51

Now, we have a Standard Operating 1

Procedure within the NIS that every two months 2

you're to take a file and quality assure it. And 3

that runs it through the entire gamut of the 4

checklist of the investigation so that nothing is 5

missed and it's a methodical examination of the 6

file. 7

The chief investigator is the one 8

that conducts it for a couple of reasons, first 9

off, due to their years of experience and their -- 10

and their ability to be critical, and secondly 11

because if they -- the process of a quality 12

assurance is very laborious. 13


MAJ DANDURAND: It involves 15

essentially taking that individual out of the 16

stream of work, normal activity for the detachment 17

for anywhere from five to, I would say, 10 days, 18

working days. 19

So what that means is that 20

person's locked in an office and they -- and they 21

do their job in order to come up with the final 22

product. 23

That product is then forwarded on 24

to our Headquarters and it's designed in order to 25


52

highlight our lessons that we have to learn. 1

MR. FREIMAN: So who would have 2

been the Master Warrant Officer at the time who 3

would have conducted this quality assurance 4

review? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: That would have 6

been Warrant Officer Ross? 7

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And his is 8

the name that we saw in the correspondence with 9

Captain Angell. 10

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah. We would 11

have had a -- we had had Master Warrant Officer 12

Watson promoted and posted to the Regiment and, 13

due to that, there was a vacancy and we were -- we 14

were left vacant for almost a year in that 15

position. And Warrant Officer Ross was viewed as 16

a very capable and suitable stand-in for that 17

position while we awaited the ability to pull 18

somebody in. 19

MR. FREIMAN: All right. So let's 20

look at Tab 113, please. It's in Volume 3. 21

We were having trouble a few 22

minutes ago locating the source of some of the 23

information in Lieutenant-Colonel Landers' email. 24

Perhaps we can go back. 25


53

I'm sorry. We've already looked 1

at some of this, so let's look at some -- at a 2

further discussion. 3

Let's look at, you know, the -- 4

let's look at some of this email chain that we 5

haven't looked at before. 6

And I'd like to look with you at 7

the note at 29 May, 1735. See if I can find it. 8

Sorry. The -- my -- 9

--- Pause 10

THE CHAIRPERSON: There's 1733. 11

MR. FREIMAN: That's close, but 12

that's not the one I'm looking for. I think I'm 13

probably in the wrong -- okay. 14

I'm told that I'm looking at Tab 15

159 instead of 113. 16

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Freiman, I'm 17

getting a request for a break. Might this be a 18

good time while we go through that? 19

We'll break until 10:30. 20

--- Upon recessing at 1011 / Suspension à 1011 21

--- Upon resuming at 1029 / Reprise à 1029 22

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank you. 23

MR. FREIMAN: Mr. Chairman, before 24

we recommence, I believe we still have some 25


54

evidence that needs to be entered as exhibits. 1

MS COUTLÉE: Mr. Chairman, I'll 2

just enter the exhibits. 3

So we have Summary Investigation 4

Report, page 26. 5

MS CLÉROUX: Exhibit P-170. 6

EXHIBIT NO. P-170: Summary 7

Investigation Report, page 26 8

MS COUTLÉE: January 13, 2010 9

letter to Major Kate Ritter. 10


EXHIBIT NO. P-171: January 12

13, 2010 letter to Major Kate 13

Ritter 14

MS COUTLÉE: Witness book index 15

for Lieutenant-Colonel Sansterre and Major 16

Dandurand. 17


EXHIBIT NO. P-172: Witness 19

book index for 20

Lieutenant-Colonel Sansterre 21

and Major Dandurand 22

MS COUTLÉE: MPPTP Chapter 13, 23

March '09. 24



55

EXHIBIT NO. P-173: MPPTP 1

Chapter 13, March '09 2

MS COUTLÉE: MPPTP Chapter 13, 3

Annex A 4


EXHIBIT NO. P-174: MPPTP 6

Chapter 13, Annex A 7

EXAMINATION (cont'd) BY 8

MR. FREIMAN: Major, before we go 9

back to the email chain, there's a couple 10

questions that I realized I hadn't asked you in 11

our background discussions. 12

We were talking about your 13

background and experience in the NIS. 14

How long were you posted in the 15

NIS before you became OC? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: I was OC from the 17

moment that I arrived in July 2008. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Right. But were you 19

a member of the NIS before you became OC of 20

Western Region? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: As I mentioned, I 22

was on a provisionary employment period as part of 23

the development process for new officers in 2004 24

with what was then the Sensitive Investigation 25


56

cell within the NIS, which has since been 1

dissolved. 2

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So that would 3

have been your experience up to the time you 4

became OC. 5

MAJ DANDURAND: In the NIS, 6

correct. 7

MR. FREIMAN: And during that 8

period of time, can you give us an estimate -- and 9

I don't need any precision at all -- of how many 10

domestic investigations you would have done as 11

opposed to overseas investigations? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: Are you asking 13

specifically to the NIS or are you asking as a 14

military policeman? 15

MR. FREIMAN: No, I -- NIS. 16

MAJ DANDURAND: During that four 17

month period would have been about a dozen. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And finally, 19

I asked you if you had meetings with a number of 20

individuals. 21

Did you have meetings with Master 22

Warrant Officer Watson to discuss the Langridge 23

file at any point? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: I had meetings -- 25


57

no meetings that I can specifically recall that 1

were called to deal with that. 2


MAJ DANDURAND: However, the way 4

that we command in organizations is the officer 5

and the most senior Non-Commissioned Member are a 6

command team, and everything from coffee every day 7

at 10 o'clock with MWO Watson straight through to 8

any critical decision that needed to be made, I 9

routinely conferred with him, as he did with me. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. But do you 11

remember any specific conversations about the 12

Langridge matter? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: None come to mind, 14

no. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Now, let me 16

start off with an explanation. 17

Before the break, we were 18

struggling a little bit. I'm attempting to 19

reconstruct some of the events in late May-early 20

June 2009 about the suicide note and how it was to 21

be dealt with and what the explanations were. 22

The raw materials we have to work 23

with are mainly email chains. They appear at 24

various places in our materials in various forms. 25


58

Some of the email chains branch 1

off because not everybody on the original email 2

chain is copied. Sometimes new people come in, so 3

it gets a little bit complex. And I apologize for 4

that. I'm going to try to simplify it. 5

But to some extent, the stuttering 6

progress we made before the break may continue for 7

a few moments until we get the narrative straight. 8

So with that brief explanation, 9

I'd like to go back to Tab 159. And I'd like to 10

direct you to the email at 1735. And that's at 11

page 16 of our materials. 12

And you'll see this is in response 13

to Colonel Hammond's statement that regardless of 14

the rules of evidence, there has to be a way to 15

ensure this doesn't happen again. 16

And you responded, 1735, and you 17

said: 18

"Colonel, I'll look into 19

whether that is the case." 20

And we're going to have to ask 21

what is what case in a moment. 22

"It has been my experience 23

that everything in these 24

circumstances are not always 25


59

100 percent accurate when 1

first reported. I will speak 2

with the investigators and 3

review the file and get back 4

to you next week. I agree 5

they should have at least 6

been told." 7

And I think that relevant to that 8

is the email on page 18, which is the last page 9

here, that was sent from Warrant Officer Ross to 10

you at 10:43 p.m., which would have been a couple 11

of hours after your email of 1735. 12

And what Master Warrant Officer 13

Ross says is: 14

"I was under the impression 15

the family had made an ATI 16

application and subsequently 17

received the note, however, 18

it was Major Hamilton-Brown 19

who took it upon himself to 20

provide a copy to the family, 21

which obviously wasn't a very 22

good copy at that, and I 23

assume was the copy which we 24

provided him. It would 25


60

appear that those wishing to 1

do the right thing have 2

caused more angst for the 3

family than they have good." 4

MR. FREIMAN: And I'm trying to 5

understand what we're talking about. The other 6

"T" email, and it's out of sequence, is the one at 7

the top of page 16 from Colonel Hammond to you 8

that, he says: 9

"You are right. Maybe next 10

of kin was informed but the 11

family wasn't. Thanks. 12

Speak to you next week." 13

MR. FREIMAN: Is it fair to say 14

there's a fair amount of confusion at this point 15

about what happened, who said what to whom, who 16

was informed, who wasn't informed? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I'd say 18

that's fair. 19

MR. FREIMAN: All right. And in 20

the first email we looked at at 5:30 p.m., you say 21

you're: 22

"...going to speak with the 23

investigators, review the 24

file, get back next week with 25


61

a report." 1

MR. FREIMAN: Now, it is entirely 2

possible that somewhere within this mountain of 3

material there is a response from you to Colonel 4

Hammond with answers to some questions, we haven't 5

found it and that may be our problem. 6

But I wanted to ask you, do you 7

recall whom you spoke to to answer the kinds of 8

questions you were getting about who was informed, 9

who wasn't informed and why? 10

You say you're going to speak to 11

the investigators, review the file and get back to 12

Colonel Hammond. Do you recall what happened? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't 14

specifically recall, however, I do remember being 15

in conversation with Warrant Officer Ross at the 16

time and I do not recall getting back to Colonel 17

Hammond on that specific issue. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Do you recall 19

whether you spoke to any of the investigators? 20


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Is it safe to 22

assume though that you at least reviewed the file 23

to familiarize yourself with it? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: Again, I would 25


62

say, no, that's not fair, in the sense that I know 1

that I'm sending these correspondence by 2

wireless -- by Blackberry -- 3

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. 4

MAJ DANDURAND: -- and if I was 5

sat in my office I'd be sending them from my desk, 6

therefore, I'm led to believe that I'm not able to 7

access SAMPIS at this time. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Well -- 9

MAJ DANDURAND: Would I have 10

expected Warrant Officer -- my expectation would 11

have been that Warrant Officer Ross would have 12

been intimately aware of the file at that time and 13

I would have relied on his input. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Is it fair 15

then to assume that when you talk about speaking 16

to the investigators, you're really talking about 17

relying on Warrant Officer Ross to gather 18

information and convey it to you? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: Correct. I'm not 20

going to specifically deal with the investigators 21

necessarily directly. In Warrant Officer Ross' 22

absence, because we are a team and we're 23

essentially at many times one entity, I would -- 24

if he was not able to, then I would take that on. 25


63

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, let's 1

just move forward a little, and we're going to be 2

moving forward and backward over a relatively 3

short period of time, but there's no other way to 4

do this. 5

An issue arose as to whether there 6

was an apology that was given to the Fynes and who 7

delivered the suicide note to the family. Do you 8

remember those being issues? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I do. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Well, let's 11

first of all establish the factual background. 12

Was there an apology given to the Fynes at this 13

time by the NIS? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: At which time? 15

MR. FREIMAN: Around about the end 16

of May, the beginning of June when the note was 17

delivered? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't believe we 19

had because we had not met with them for the first 20

time. 21

MR. FREIMAN: All right. Do you 22

recall how the note was delivered? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I do not. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Let me direct 25


64

your attention to a series of emails back and 1

forth on the topic of how the letter was -- how 2

the suicide note was delivered and issues 3

surrounding that. 4

And again, I'm taking my life into 5

my hands with these email chains, but let's try 6

Tab 150. And at Tab 150, I'd like to start with 7

the email at 1527. 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Sorry? 9

MR. FREIMAN: There's an email at 10

1527, it's at page 86 of this collection of 11

documents. 12

This is Major Bolduc and he's 13

addressing an email to you and to Lieutenant 14

Colonel Sansterre and it appears to be directed to 15

both of you, so he says: "Sir and Dan..." "Sir" I 16

guess referring to Lieutenant Colonel Sansterre 17

and "Dan" referring to you: 18

"CFPM is asking if we 19

apologized to Mrs. Fynes for 20

not giving the note sooner 21

than we did. I'm looking in 22

all the email and I cannot 23

find a confirmation. Did we 24

do it in person when we gave 25


65

her the note or, sir, did you 1

do it when you spoke to her 2

or Mrs. Fynes on the phone? 3

I remember you returned to 4

phone thinking it was the 5

AO." 6

MR. FREIMAN: And the response 7

you'll find on top of that is: 8

"I spoke with Dan and I have 9

what I need. Sorry, I did 10

not mean to distract you from 11

your game." 12

MR. FREIMAN: So, it appears that 13

Major Bolduc spoke to you making it unnecessary to 14

respond -- for Colonel Sansterre to respond. 15

And the last piece of this puzzle 16

is over the page at 85 from Major Bolduc to you, 17

and it says: 18

"Do you remember when you 19

apologized, date June 09?" 20

MR. FREIMAN: Do you remember that 21

exchange and do you remember what you might have 22

told Major Bolduc at the time? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I don't 24

specifically recall that, however, I do know that 25


66

I had not apologized by that point. 1

MR. FREIMAN: So, there's a 2

continuation of that discussion. Again, it's a 3

separate set of emails also from that same day, 4

and we'll look at Tab 77. 5

If we can start with the bottom of 6

page 446 which is the first page of this email 7

chain and at the bottom -- it's from Lieutenant 8

Colonel Grubb and it's addressed to a number of 9

recipients including Major Poulin, and she was the 10

PAO for the NIS; is that right? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: Major Poulin? 12


MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, she was the 14

Public Affairs Officer. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Right. And Major 16

Bolduc is on the receiving end as well. And 17

Colonel Grubb writes as follows: 18

"Ms Fynes received a 19

face-to-face personal apology 20

from the Detachment Commander 21

Major for NIS Western Region. 22

This apology and explanation 23

of why the delay happened and 24

how the CFNIS would stop 25


67

recurrence was given at the 1

time that the original note 2

from Stuart Langridge was 3

provided to her." 4

MR. FREIMAN: Now, that's entirely 5

incorrect; isn't it? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: You're right, 7

yeah. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Were you made aware 9

that this representation had been made by Colonel 10

Grubb to the PAO and presumably somebody had made 11

the representation to him? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I wasn't, I 13

don't believe so. I have no recollection of this 14

whatsoever. 15

MR. FREIMAN: All right. So, 16

again, trying to put all of the material together. 17

Okay. So, I guess we can't go very much further 18

with it. 19

Your understanding is that you 20

weren't involved in these discussions about 21

whether there's an apology given, or there wasn't 22

an apology and that was misunderstood? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: I had not 24

apologized at this point. My recollection is that 25


68

in our -- is that I apologized about the note when 1

we met and that was done face to face. 2

MR. FREIMAN: So, that would have 3

been in November of 2009l; right? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe so, yes. 5

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. At around 6

exactly the same time, and Major Poulin being one 7

of the recipients of Colonel Grubb's email may be 8

related to this. There was, and I think we've 9

seen a reference in the email chains -- excuse me. 10

There was a need to prepare media response lines 11

about this entire issue. 12

Were you involved in the process 13

whereby there were media response lines drafted? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: To answer that 15

question specifically I can't recall which media 16

release lines I would be involved in. 17

However, what I can say is that as 18

a matter of course the Public Affairs Officer 19

dealt with the Officers Commanding directly. I 20

dealt regularly with the Public Affairs Officer on 21

every single file. 22


MAJ DANDURAND: They would draft 24

MRLs. They would send them to me and then I would 25


69

send them back either with a comment or anything 1

of that nature. Most often never used, just 2

drafted in anticipation. 3

MR. FREIMAN: And in your 4

experience were the MRLs who were being drafted, 5

drafted for exclusive NIS MRLs or were there 6

occasions where the NIS took a portion of media 7

response lines that contributed a portion of the 8

media response lines along with the CF itself so 9

that there would be one package including both? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: What I recall and 11

what I understand everything to be, and perhaps 12

this is what you're getting at in your question is 13

did our Public Affairs Officer have interactions 14

with other Public Affairs Officers on other CF 15

issues that may overlap into our domain? And the 16

answer to that is yes, absolutely. 17

Would we have situational 18

awareness on other public affairs matters for 19

instance, on a death in Afghanistan? The army may 20

wish to draft MRLs with respect to protective 21

equipment. 22


MAJ DANDURAND: As an example and 24

they would make that known to the Public Affairs 25


70

Officer for the NIS because they had no visibility 1

whatsoever on where we're going with our 2

investigations, what we've done. 3

Before they start commenting on 4

things that are related but not necessarily 5

directly involved it's important for us to be able 6

to assess that to determine if it would infringe 7

or impinge or affect our investigative activities 8

that we were either anticipating, have identified 9

or that we could possibly take part in the future. 10

MR. FREIMAN: What I'm really 11

getting at is here you have a situation. Let's 12

talk about this one specifically, where there is 13

an issue arising with respect to Mr. and Mrs. 14

Fynes. There is a number of components to that 15

issue, right? 16

There is components about the 17

suicide note and its delivery but there is also a 18

wider context about the BOI and its conduct and a 19

number of issues that Mr. and Mrs. Fynes are 20

bringing to the public. 21

In those circumstances do you 22

produce separate NIS lines that are made available 23

through your PAO or do you combine forces with the 24

Public Affairs Officers for the Canadian Forces as 25


71

a whole to produce a joint briefing or a joint 1

media response line package? 2

MAJ DANDURAND: I always viewed 3

our media release lines as separate. The Public 4

Affairs Officer would have visibility of it and, 5

at times, forward the other departments' questions 6

or drafted MRLs in order to make us situationally 7

aware of what was happening so that we could 8

possibly, if it would have an impact, flag it to 9

her. 10

But when I received my MRLs for a 11

case they were specific to the NIS. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So can we 13

look at Tab 44? 14

--- Pause 15

MR. FREIMAN: The cover note which 16

is on page 38 of the collection states: 17

"Hi, Dan [it's from Major 18

Poulin]. Here are the MRLs 19

from LFWA. There are just a 20

few points regarding the 21

CFNIS including a generic 22

line regarding the suicide 23

note. Can you please review 24

and let me know what you 25


72

think?" 1

So this would appear to be a Land 2

Force Western Area set of lines and you're being 3

asked to comment. 4

If we look at the questions 5

themselves, question 1: 6

"Why has it taken 14 months 7

for Corporal Langridge's 8

family to receive a copy of 9

his suicide note?" 10

And the answer suggested is: 11

"The suicide note was 12

collected as evidence during 13

the CF National Investigation 14

Service investigation. A 15

prior policy dictated that 16

all evidence in an 17

investigation could only be 18

released to the family of the 19

deceased after severance 20

under the Access to 21

Information Act. This policy 22

has been changed and a copy 23

of the suicide note was 24

provided to the family." 25


73

Is that a correct statement of 1

what was going on and what the situation was? 2

MAJ DANDURAND: I'm not sure in 3

the sense that it blends together several issues, 4

one being the issue of policy. At the time my 5

interpretation of the evidence -- MPPTP's policy 6

was that it was evidence. That opinion would 7

have -- has since of course changed over the last, 8

what, three, four years. At what point it changed 9

I can't identify. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Well, where would 11

this information come from? Would this be 12

something that would have been drafted by Land 13

Force Western Area about NIS policies? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe we would 15

have had our Public Affairs Officer go in there 16

and do that. 17

But again, I'm only assuming 18

because at the end of the day I did know that the 19

Land Forces Western Area and Public Affairs 20

Officer knew their lines but they did want to 21

prepare for questions should they arise. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Yeah, well, what I'm 23

trying to get a handle on is how this would have 24

been accumulated. 25


74

Who would have given input with 1

this information? Would it have gone through you 2

or could it have gone through some other avenue 3

and ultimately what the basis was for this 4

information? 5

First, I'd like to establish that 6

it could only have come from the NIS or could it 7

have come from some other avenue? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't speculate 9

as to where this came from but I can say that the 10

information would have typically in our practice 11

at the time, come from the NIS. 12


And do you recall participating in 14

this exercise at least to the point of 15

familiarizing yourself with whether what was being 16

stated was accurate or not? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I would have 18

been involved in discussions with Paul Poulin. 19

MR. FREIMAN: So was this an 20

accurate representation of the understanding at 21

the time of what appears to be described as an old 22

policy and a new policy? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: I think it 24

accurately reflects that we were shifting our 25


75

practices. As for policy itself I would say 1

that's not an accurate reflection. 2

MR. FREIMAN: But I'm trying to -- 3

we've seen it on a number of occasions this issue 4

of severance and access to information being 5

raised. We saw a reference to it in Warrant 6

Officer Ross's communications. 7

Do you know whether this has any 8

basis at all in existing policy, the whole issue 9

of the relevance of access to information with 10

respect to requests for evidence? 11


MR. FREIMAN: Do you know anything 13

about what's described here as the new policy? 14

The policy has been changed and a copy of the 15

suicide note was provided to the family. 16

Do you know anything about that, 17

what's being referred to as the change in policy 18

that led to the provision of the suicide note to 19

the family? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: Sorry, can you 21

repeat your question? 22

MR. FREIMAN: Yeah. The last 23

sentence of the answer to question 1 is: 24

"This policy has been changed 25


76

and a copy of the suicide 1

note was provided to the 2

family." 3

It appears that what's being said 4

here is that the note was provided to the family 5

either because the policy is changed or, at least, 6

that the policy has changed and that has some 7

bearing on releasing the note to the family. 8

I'm just wondering whether you 9

recall what the change in policy that's being 10

referred to that allowed the family to get the 11

note would refer to. 12

MAJ DANDURAND: That would refer 13

to the lengthy discussions that we had had with 14

respect to this very topic to identify whether or 15

not it was to be held as evidence and our 16

understanding of when these are collected, what 17

are the immediate actions that we should be 18

taking. 19

Concurrent to all of this were 20

discussions about: How do we rectify this for the 21

future so that we don't end up in the same 22

situation where we have erred? 23

MR. FREIMAN: Can we look then at 24

Tab 98 which appears to be a further discussion on 25


77

precisely these issues? 1

If you look at the email from 2

Major Poulin to you, here she says: 3

"Please see my red 4

corrections so far. We still 5

need to talk to tighten up 6

the details, please. 7

Thanks." 8

So as I understand it these are 9

comments and you see them in a slightly different 10

typeface, so not in red on the media relation 11

lines or media response lines that had originally 12

been drafted. 13

And the first thing is on page 3 14

which is page 1 of the chain. We have the first 15

paragraph: 16

"Corporal Stuart Langridge 17

died in March 2008 apparently 18

at his own hand." 19

And then in round brackets which I 20

take to be Major Poulin's comments: 21

"(It was at his own hand, 22

deemed by the coroner's 23

report and other evidence 24

collected through the process 25


78

of an investigation. 1

There is no need to use the 2

ambiguous word 'apparently' in the statement.)" 3

MAJ DANDURAND: Sorry, where are 4

you looking? 5

MR. FREIMAN: I'm looking at Tab 6

98. 7


MR. FREIMAN: The very first page 9

of that tab. 10

MAJ DANDURAND: Oh. 11

MR. FREIMAN: Okay? 12

There are two emails. The first 13

one is closer to the bottom of the page where 14

Major Poulin tells you that her corrections are in 15

red. On top of that you say you're going to make 16

your own comments in blue. 17

We unfortunately don't have red or 18

blue so we don't know whose comments are what. 19

But my belief is and maybe you can correct me if 20

I'm wrong, that we only have Major Poulin's 21

comments. 22

And here is the -- we saw the 23

first paragraph where Major Poulin is simply 24

suggesting that the word apparently can be taken 25


79

out. 1

The second comment, though, is 2

more to the discussion we've had. "Recently..." 3

the draft says: 4

"...the family received a 5

copy of Corporal Langridge's 6

suicide note 14 months after 7

his death. The CFNIS [has 8

gathered the note] had 9

gathered the note as evidence 10

and initially could not 11

release it in accordance with 12

the policies in effect at the 13

time." 14

The notation by Major Poulin, I 15

take it, is: 16

"These policies still exist 17

so [to use the word] to use 18

'at the time" mislead the 19

reader to think the policy 20

has changed..." 21

Then the text continues: 22

"...which prohibited the 23

informal release of 24

information to the family." 25


80

And then in round brackets: 1

"(Informal releases still do 2

not occur. The mechanism by 3

which they receive the 4

information or documents has 5

been simplified by empowering 6

the assisting officers with 7

knowledge and right of access 8

to facilitate the family's 9

request.)" 10

Then: 11

"Recently in consultation 12

with the Director of 13

Information and Privacy the 14

family including secondary 15

next of kin may request 16

content of CFNIS 17

investigations through their 18

assisting officer although 19

the documents still have to 20

be severed under Access to 21

Information and Privacy Acts 22

but does not require an 23

official request under Access 24

to Information." 25


81

And in round brackets either Major 1

Poulin or you say: 2

"(I think it is important to 3

note that the files are not 4

'pushed' to the families. 5

They must still request them 6

albeit in a much less formal 7

manner.)" 8

First, let's comment about my 9

assumption. Am I right that these are Major 10

Poulin's comments or might they well be your 11

comments? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: In brackets those 13

are mine. 14

MR. FREIMAN: The ones in brackets 15

are yours? 16



So we know from those comments 19

that your understanding as of June 1 was that the 20

policies referred to in these media relations 21

lines had not changed. They were still in effect 22

with regard to evidence and the release of 23

evidence? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, that's 25


82

correct. 1

However, the policies that I'm 2

referring to here are not policies with respect to 3

evidence. The policies that I'm referring to here 4

are with respect to ATI. 5

The reason why I can say that is 6

because I know that we had prior to this had 7

instances where the question was why can the -- 8

better yet -- should the NIS be involved in 9

generating the ATI request for the families prior 10

to going to do the family briefings? 11

And you'll note that we're 12

referring to a copy of the note, not the note 13

itself. 14


MAJ DANDURAND: And the copy of 16

the note is something that would have been 17

disclosed as a matter of the entire file. 18

So what I'm referring to here is 19

we had had great discussions with Administration 20

Officers or Assisting Officers -- sorry -- for 21

families within Western Region and we were in tune 22

with this to make sure that they understood that 23

the families, particularly next of kin, would be 24

getting a privacy copy of the report, not a 25


83

generic ATI request copy. 1

That was where these comments were 2

specifically speaking to. 3

MR. FREIMAN: All right. So we're 4

only talking then about the ATI policies. We're 5

not talking about the policies about evidence and 6

the release of evidence. 7

MAJ DANDURAND: That's what I 8

believe we're referring to there. 9


So let's move on then to Tab 49. 11

Although it's in the lower numbers it's in fact 12

later in time. 13

--- Pause 14

MR. FREIMAN: If we start at page 15

107 at the top of the page that's page 2 of 6 at 16

the top. It's from Major Poulin to Major Bolduc, 17

and he informs Major Bolduc: 18

"Dan and I just talked. I 19

have a bit more information 20

but the MRLs should stay as 21

they are below. Do you agree 22

with the MRLs, please? That 23

way I can send to LFWA PA. 24

Thank you." 25


84

And the MRLs are still in exactly 1

the same form as they were discussed because this 2

is actually, I think, a little before. No, 3

they're still in the same form as they were in the 4

email chain that we discussed earlier. 5

But here is a comment from Major 6

Bolduc and I'm not sure whether you were copied on 7

it. But if you look at page 1 of 6, Major Bolduc 8

asks Major Poulin: 9

"I'm good with the MRL. Just 10

one point: Did we confirm 11

policies in place for 12

disclosure to BOI and 13

families with DP and police? 14

I am not sure if the 15

statement is accurate and I 16

don't have the access to the 17

MPPTP to validate my thought. 18

Question: CFNIS had gathered 19

the notice evidence and 20

initially could not release 21

it in accordance with the 22

policies in effect at the 23

time which prohibited the 24

informal release of 25


85

information to the family." 1

And Major Poulin answers: 2

"Before the Roberts case 3

Vanessa and I spoke and 4

investigations or parts 5

thereof had to be requested 6

formally through ATI. Now, 7

they don't have to be 8

formally requested through 9

ATI but can be requested 10

through their Assisting 11

Officer." 12

So as I understand it, the 13

correction here is what you were talking about, 14

what the policies were at the time and what they 15

are now and the only difference would have been no 16

need for ATI. 17


MR. FREIMAN: So let's look at Tab 19

166 and see what happens to the MRLs at this 20

point. 21

--- Pause 22

MR. FREIMAN: If we look at the 23

first page -- 24

THE CHAIRPERSON: Tab 1...? 25


86

MR. FREIMAN: 166. 1

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. 2

MR. FREIMAN: The first email in 3

this collection or, actually, it's a covering 4

email for the rest of it -- 5

MS RICHARDS: I don't believe 6

that's a covering email for the rest of it. I 7

think the Commission has simply copied these 8

incorrectly. This covering email I don't believe 9

has anything to do with the -- 10

MR. FREIMAN: You're right. 11

MS RICHARDS: -- subsequent MRLs. 12

MR. FREIMAN: You're right. So 13

let's ignore the covering email and just look at 14

the draft media release lines. 15

I just want to confirm. Yes, if 16

you look at page -- the third page of the draft 17

media response lines, the notation is that: 18

"They were prepared by Major 19

Poulin in consultation with 20

you, Major Bolduc, Colonel 21

Sansterre and had been 22

approved by Colonel Grubb. 23

And we have already looked at the 24

issue of ATI and that's if pressed on the release 25


87

of CFNIS Investigation Reports to families, we see 1

that -- do you see that on the second page? 2


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, these are 4

answers that are drafted to respond to specific 5

potential questions. And on that issue, we have 6

already looked at the text and the history of its 7

evolution. 8

There is a new question though 9

that we haven't seen before. If pressed on 10

whether the suicide note was mentioned during the 11

interview with the mother and stepfather of 12

corporal language, the answer is: The mother and 13

stepfather did not ask about the note and were 14

aware of the coroner findings into the cause of 15

death. 16

"They did not ask about the 17

note, a note and the 18

investigator did not mention 19

it as the investigation was 20

still ongoing. In hindsight 21

a copy of the note should 22

have been provided to the 23

family at the time. The 24

CFNIS regrets the situation 25


88

and has revised its 1

procedures to ensure it does 2

not happen again." 3

My first question is: Do you know 4

the basis for these representations in this 5

response and where they could have come from? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't believe I 7

do know. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Is it safe to 9

assume, given of who was consulted, that they must 10

have come through you at some point? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: The specific -- 12

are you asking for the specific paragraph? 13

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. If you look at 14

who was consulted, it was you, Major Bolduc and 15

Lieutenant Colonel Sansterre. 16


MR. FREIMAN: Of those three, who 18

could be the possible source for the information, 19

other than you? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: It could be anyone 21

of us, but if this was in the original media 22

release lines, this is entirely possible that I 23

missed it. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Because none 25


89

of this is correct; is it? 1

MAJ DANDURAND: No. As far as -- 2

unless it is referring to, unless it is referring 3

to an assumption that investigators in the 4

original 08 file were speaking to the families, 5

but I am only speculating at this point because I 6

know that my first interactions with them were 7

with P Officer McLaughlin. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. 9


MR. FREIMAN: And it wasn't -- it 11

wasn't your -- it couldn't have been at the time 12

of the release anything to do with your meeting. 13

It had to have been with the investigators of the 14

08 file, because that's the only investigation 15

that was ongoing.? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: Hum. 17

MR. FREIMAN: And the question is: 18

Who could have compiled this account of the events 19

for transmission to the PAO and ultimately for 20

incorporation into these draft media response 21

lines? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't answer 23

that, I don't know. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Well, let's 25


90

look at tab 48 then, which deals again with 1

(speaking off the mike) a response right there, 2

the tab at Volume 2. 3

Much of this is concerned with the 4

back emails which are the first ones 5

chronologically, are concerned with dealings with 6

Mr. Pugliese of the Ottawa Citizen and who should 7

be talking to Mr. Pugliese and it needs not detain 8

us for very long, but if you look at the emails -- 9

well, we don't need to be detained on that. 10

Let's just look at the emails on 11

page 1 of 4 and we'll do this in reverse 12

chronological order. It's from you to Lieutenant 13

Colonel Sansterre and you're commenting on the 14

fact that Mr. Pugliese has asked to interview 15

General Jorgensen. And do you see this at the 16

bottom of page 1 of 4? 17


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. It says: 19

"I got this from " -- and 20

this is from you to 21

Lieutenant Colonel 22

Sansterre -- "and assume you 23

are aware. My thoughts are 24

that Pugliese may be trying 25


91

to back door the NIS by 1

interviewing General 2

Jorgensen. I would suggest 3

to the General Monday that he 4

direct them to yourself to 5

speak on NIS centric issues." 6

Can you comment on what that's a 7

reference to? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I can't 9

recall. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. In any event, 11

Lieutenant Colonel Sansterre answers shortly 12

thereafter, a couple of or a few hours later and 13

he says: "Thanks Dan" and addresses to Major 14

Poulin the question: 15

"Once we have a sense of 16

Mr. Pugliese's questions, we 17

will need to determine if we 18

are the most appropriate 19

point of contact for answers. 20

Are the extensive MRLs ours 21

or the BOIs?" 22

And the response from Major Poulin 23

to both Lieutenant Colonel Sansterre and to you I 24

think responds to both of the last two emails and 25


92

says: 1

"Dan has a very good point. 2

The extensive MRLs or the 3

BOIs, but we have a few 4

points in there." 5

And he talks about discussing 6

strategy. 7

So, am I correct that at this 8

point the media response lines as they are shaping 9

up, are an amalgam of points contributed by the 10

BOI and points contributed by the NIS? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: I would say that 12

you're correct in saying that the Public Affairs 13

Officers are coordinating in amongst themselves. 14

That's how -- that's how it appears to me and that 15

was a matter of -- a matter of routine. 16

The BOI external agency, your 17

external departmental from the NIS, MRLs typically 18

were kept very very sanitized, in the sense that 19

we would make sure that our independence, a team 20

of independence was continuously put in the lead, 21

who has the lead on investigations and things of 22

that nature. 23

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. Let's then 24

again continue with the saga of these developing 25


93

lines and look at tab 59. 1

And here I think the place to 2

start -- I just want to look. Let's see if we can 3

find the email from 922 and that will be on page 4

237 at the bottom, the second last page. And it's 5

from Major Poulin to Major Bolduc and you are not 6

copied on this at this point, so I am going to 7

have to ask you, looking backwards. 8

Oh, I'm sorry. You were sent a 9

copy of this 40 minutes later and asked to review 10

and here is what we now have and this is on page 3 11

of -- that's 238: 12

"Board of Inquiry into death 13

of Corporal Stuart Langridge. 14

Corporal Stuart Langridge 15

died in March 2008 at his own 16

hands. The Board of Inquiry 17

was not convened until 10 18

months after his death due to 19

the delays in finding 20

appropriate personnel. 21

Recently, the family received 22

a copy of Corporal 23

Langridge's suicide note, 14 24

months after the death. The 25


94

CFNIS had gathered the note 1

as evidence and, 2

unfortunately, did not 3

release a copy of it to the 4

family. 5

The CFNIS has revised its 6

procedures to ensure such a 7

situation does not happen 8

again." 9

And I would like to stop there. 10

At some point you did review this, and I don't see 11

any comments from you. So, were you satisfied 12

that this was an accurate representation? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: At that point, 14

yes. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, tell me, 16

to your understanding, what was the revised 17

procedure that we are talking about to ensure the 18

situation does not happen again? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. It was -- it 20

was very evident upon discussion that 14 months 21

was unacceptable. 22


MAJ DANDURAND: The discussion 24

then became centred around at what point is it 25


95

appropriate and at what point is it early? What 1

is the soonest point that we can release this 2

note? 3

There were -- there were 4

discussions on the spectrum of time line. For 5

instance instantaneously, right away. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. 7

MAJ DANDURAND: And then, there 8

were schools of thought that, let's look at it in 9

reverse chronological order from the opportunities 10

in this particular case, in an effort to look at 11

exactly what could happen in the future. 12

So, we looked at it from the point 13

of you, what's it then: 14 months obviously 14

unacceptable, what is the next logical tweak that 15

we should have that would jump out at us and that 16

would be at the very conclusion of a file, okay. 17

So, the question was then: The 18

discussion then revolved around: Is that the 19

appropriate time? Well, no. 20

So, then, it went all the way back 21

to what's the point of the note. It's seized as 22

evidence and, therefore, when you attend a sudden 23

death scene, you don't know what you are getting 24

into, you don't know what the circumstances of the 25


96

death are and, therefore, when you seize this, 1

you're holding it as evidence towards formulating 2

a -- formulating an idea of what's occurred. 3

So, therefore, at the point where 4

you have determined that foul play has been ruled 5

out, that is the next logical point. 6

However, it was also agreed that 7

there may be a period of time because of the fact 8

that we are relying as well on the Coroner's 9

Office and the medical examiner, that we are in 10

consultation with them and we often get a verbal 11

or we get a preliminary report of sorts and we 12

need not wait for the final report because those 13

can often take several months, or at times it 14

takes several months -- I should correct myself 15

there. 16

The issue then becomes: What is 17

manageable risk from a moral component point of 18

view? And that manageable risk was deemed at once 19

we have ruled out foul play and the investigators 20

are satisfied that what the coroner is telling 21

them, and in consideration of all the other 22

evidence and investigative activity that they have 23

undertaken, is not leading them to believe that 24

there is a possibility of foul play, then we 25


97

should be approaching the family at that point 1

and/or the rightful owner of that note and say: 2

We have a note for you and we would like to come 3

and discuss that. 4

MR. FREIMAN: So, was that the new 5

policy that had been adopted at the time that 6

these answers were being provided to the Public 7

Affairs Officers? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, it was. 9

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. How was that 10

new policy recorded and by whom? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, it started 12

off -- first of, we had had -- we had had very 13

challenging family briefings not just within 14

Western Region, but across the NIS, and it was 15

recognized that we needed to stand up a standard 16

operating procedure in order to deal with this. 17

So, the Officer Commanding of 18

Atlantic Region was given the task of being the 19

lead on this. 20

There were -- it was a multi prone 21

approach in terms of communications across the NIS 22

about the lesson identified within Western Region 23

and then, of course, being able to translate that 24

into a lesson learned, therefore which I define as 25


98

faced with a similar situation in the future not 1

reoccurring again. 2

So, the dialogue was occurring on 3

weekly tele-conferences to make Officers 4

Commanding and Command teams situation wherever it 5

was happening and as well getting their input from 6

their experience as to what they believe to be the 7

appropriate injection into that policy. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Well, I have a bit 9

of a problem with the chronology. This is a 10

series of responses compiled on the 15th of June 11

2009, right? 12


MR. FREIMAN: And from what you 14

have told us, the new policy, the CFNIS having 15

revised its procedures to ensure the situation 16

does not happen again was already in place? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't see that 18

as being indicative in there. 19

MR. FREIMAN: But you -- well, 20

that's what I wanted to ask about. The second 21

paragraph on page 3 says, the second line or 22

second sentence: 23

"The CFNIS had gathered the 24

note as evidence and, 25


99

unfortunately, initially did 1

not release the copy to the 2

family. The CFNIS has 3

revised its procedures to 4

ensure such a situation does 5

not happen again." 6

And you've told me that the 7

revision to the policy was the policy about 8

looking at the investigation and finding the 9

proper time. And you linked that to a committee 10

or a group of people who were meeting regularly 11

and were tasked to revise the procedures. 12

MAJ DANDURAND: But that was one 13

Officer Commanding that was tasked. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Right. The Officer 15

Commanding the Atlantic Region? 16


MR. FREIMAN: But he was only put 18

into that position and the initial meeting 19

occurred on the 12th of June, only three days 20

prior to this. So, was the -- was the policy 21

already revised at the time the first meeting of 22

the group occurred? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: No, it had not. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. So? 25


100

MAJ DANDURAND: And that policy 1

did not come out until, I believe, final draft, if 2

my memory serves me correctly, in the vicinity of 3

2011. 4

MR. FREIMAN: Right? 5


MR. FREIMAN: So, what's being 7

referred to then by the statement that the CFNIS 8

has revised its procedures to ensure such a 9

situation does not happen again? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: That's referring 11

to our best practices. That's not referring to a 12

particular tangible document that you can refer 13

to. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, how 15

widespread would knowledge of this best practice 16

be at the time that someone is making the 17

statement that the CFNIS has revised its 18

procedures? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: It is my belief it 20

was wide common knowledge across all the 21

detachments within the NIS. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Our next stop 23

is at tab 90. Just give me a second. This is a 24

revision to the June 18th 2009 media relation 25


101

line, so it's difficult and it was revised the 1

30th of November of 09, so it's difficult to know 2

which parts are where. I'm sorry. The first one 3

is -- the first -- let's go backwards. 4

The first media response line 5

which we are not going to deal with right now, was 6

one that was released on the fourth of May of 7

2011. 8

The next one which begins at page 9

699 of this collection is the media response lines 10

of June 09, which appear to have been revised on 11

the 30th of November 09. 12

And I just want to stop with you 13

on 699 to Key Messages. First of all, do we 14

know -- are these -- these are your own media 15

relation lines, right? These aren't CFNIS or, 16

sorry, these aren't CF media relations lines? 17


MR. FREIMAN: If we look back to 19

at page 700, we now have a new -- if pressed on 20

why CFNIS did not provide the suicide note to the 21

parents, we now have, CFNIS had gathered the note 22

as evidence and, unfortunately initially did not 23

release a copy to the family. 24

The CFNIS has since revised its 25


102

procedures to ensure such a situation does not 1

happen again. 2

A copy of the note should have 3

been provided to the family right away with the 4

original release to them after the completion of 5

the investigation. The CFNIS regrets the 6

situation and has revised its procedures to ensure 7

that it does not happen again. 8

The first and the last lines of 9

that paragraph are familiar, but we now have a new 10

line in the middle: 11

"A copy of the note should 12


family right away, with the 14

original release to them 15

after the completion of the 16

investigation." 17

Can you explain what's meant by 18

"right away"? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't explain 20

what the author's intent was with respect to right 21

away, but I can tell you what it means to me. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Yes? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: What it means to 24

me is it's a marked departure from what occurred. 25


103

That said, the integrity of the investigation is 1

paramount and right away does not, in my mind, 2

necessarily mean upon receipt of the note. It's 3

immediately, without delay, transferred to the 4

person to which it's addressed or to the executor 5

of the estate. 6

It means -- if I would have 7

drafted that, it would have been in comparison to 8

what has occurred in the past and that is that 9

evidently, within a few weeks of the investigation 10

commencing, provided that foul play has been ruled 11

out or the involvement of that note or the 12

significance of that note has been identified and 13

deemed to be disclosed, then it would be done so 14

at that time. 15

MR. FREIMAN: So, that's what 16

right away means to you? 17


MR. FREIMAN: Did you express that 19

view to anybody, because let me tell you frankly, 20

if I were reading this and read -- it should have 21

been provided to the family right away, I am not 22

sure that I would come to the conclusion that that 23

means anything other than right away, immediately. 24

MAJ DANDURAND: I would agree with 25


104

you that that's how it reads. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Do you recall having 2

any conversations about this? It stated that you 3

were consulted on this? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I did not 5

extrapolate that one -- that one sentence and take 6

issue with that at the time because I don't 7

believe I had identified that at the time. 8

MR. FREIMAN: And if we look down 9

further on page 700, the question is: 10

"If pressed on whether the 11

suicide note was mentioned 12

during the interview of the 13

mother and stepfather of 14

Corporal Langridge..." 15

We still have the same text: 16

"The mother and stepfather 17

did not ask about a note and 18

were aware of the coroner's 19

findings into the cause of 20

death. They did not ask 21

about a note and the 22

investigators did not mention 23

it as the investigation was 24

still ongoing. In hindsight, 25


105

a copy of the note should 1


family at the time. CFNIS 3

regrets the situation, has 4

revised its procedures to 5

ensure this does not happen 6

again." 7

At any point, have you conducted a 8

review of the file to see whether this corresponds 9

to what actually happened and to the sequence of 10

events? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: I had done a 12

review of the file in the sense that we were 13

preparing for the 28th of November meeting with 14

Mr. and Mrs. Fynes and I was anticipating 15

questions and was not preparing for any specific 16

questions as such. However, the suicide note 17

was -- was going to be discussed. 18

I cannot recall at this time 19

seeing these media release lines. 20

I mean, I would have to -- I would 21

have to see if these were forwarded to me in an 22

attachment on an email to be able to definitively 23

say if I'd actually seen them. 24

I agree they don't -- the 25


106

statement hasn't changed. However, at that time 1

in the calendar year, my attention was focused on 2

meeting with Mr. and Mrs. Fynes, not on media 3

release lines. 4

MR. FREIMAN: So one, I think -- 5

one further stop along the way. Tab 57. 6

This is an email chain. The top 7

email is a report, and you're copied on it by 8

Major Poulin giving information about Major 9

Muralt's interview on the Corporal Langridge 10

situation, which I assume happened on the 16th of 11

June. 12

And Major Muralt is the PAO for 13

the CF on this matter; right? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: In Western Area, 15

yes. 16

MR. FREIMAN: And if you look at 17

the email from Major Muralt, the -- there's a 18

paragraph saying: 19

"The following questions were 20

asked..." 21

And at the very bottom of that is: 22

"Asked about delay in 23

provision of suicide note. 24

Explained this was a mistake, 25


107

that a copy was provided to 1

the family as soon as we, 2

Edmonton, became aware of it 3

and CFNIS has changed the 4

procedures in providing Major 5

Poulin's contact information 6

if he has additional 7

questions." 8

I'm wondering about the addition 9

of the word "this was a mistake". 10

Was it a mistake? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: To not -- what was 12

what? 13

MR. FREIMAN: To not provide the 14

suicide note. 15

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, it was a 16

mistake. 17

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. At what point 18

did it become a mistake? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: At the point that 20

the relevance of that towards -- better yet, at 21

the point where foul play was ruled out and that 22

we could confidently start to say that this death 23

was as a result of suicide. 24

MR. FREIMAN: And talking 25


108

specifically in terms of the current file, when is 1

that? 2

Where in the chronology of the '08 3

investigation was that point reached? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: I would have to 5

say -- and my memory is not entirely crisp on this 6

one, but I would have to say that it's in around 7

the time that I believe the Medical Examiner was 8

having conversation with the lead investigator to 9

say that he had 10 out of 11 things brought back 10

to him and that, at this time, there were no, 11

metaphorically, red flags and that he was pretty 12

confident this was going to be ruled a suicide. 13


MAJ DANDURAND: What the specific 15

date is, it escapes me right now. 16

MR. FREIMAN: I think it's some 17

time in April. It may have been either the 9th or 18

the 22nd. I'm foggy on that. But it was one of 19

those two dates. 20

Now, looking over all of these 21

communications, it appears that the message here 22

is that there was an old policy and there's a new 23

policy. And you've told us you think under the 24

new policy the note should have been released when 25


109

the Medical Examiner had conversations about nine 1

out of 10 tests being consistent with suicide, 2

just waiting for the final, but unless something 3

drastic happens, one can assume that his 4

certificate is going to say that it was a suicide. 5

That's the new policy; right? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. I said that 7

10 out of 11 -- 8

MR. FREIMAN: Yeah. 9

MAJ DANDURAND: -- were received. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Tests. 11


MR. FREIMAN: So what was the old 13

policy? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, the old 15

policy -- there was no old sudden death policy or 16

SOP within the NIS. There was a practice. 17

MR. FREIMAN: What was the old 18

practice? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: The old practice 20

was that these items were held as evidence and -- 21

until such time as they were disposed of. 22

MR. FREIMAN: When were they to be 23

disposed of? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: As part of a 25


110

regular evidence review of holdings within our 1

evidence lock-up, they would -- they would come to 2

the surface and, at the time, we were not very 3

efficient at disposing of our evidence in a swift 4

manner. 5

There was -- it was not uncommon 6

for evidence to be held for several years. 7

However, the investigators had made assessment of 8

what we were holding prior to handing off the case 9

file box to our evidence custodian to have at 10

least confirmed that, in their mind, they had 11

returned all matters that were deemed private 12

property. 13

MR. FREIMAN: So did you satisfy 14

yourself that the old policy was complied with in 15

this case? 16

Was the processing of the suicide 17

note properly done under the old policy? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, what I know 19

now is that no, it had not. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. What was the 21

mistake under the old policy, then? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, let me 23

correct myself. 24

Under the -- under the old policy 25


111

that I'm referring to is the MPPTPs with respect 1

to holding of evidence. That is where my mind was 2

set at the time. 3

Under our new practices and our 4

new understanding of how we are to treat this, 5

this would have been -- if we had applied that 6

then, it would have been disclosed in April. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Right. I understand 8

that. 9

I'm still trying to understand 10

what the -- what the old policy was and what it 11

would have called for. 12

We talked about this being under 13

the MPPTP policies about evidence handling; right? 14


The old -- and the old policy 16

would -- when you read it verbatim would say that 17

this item should have been released much sooner, 18

at the point where it is no longer material to a 19

criminal investigation. 20

MR. FREIMAN: And what point would 21

that have been? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: At the point where 23

foul play is ruled out. 24

MR. FREIMAN: So isn't that 25


112

exactly the same as the new policy? 1


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So there 3

isn't a new policy. There's simply a codification 4

of the old policy? 5


the Standard Operating Procedure of the NIS is new 7

and that the manner in which we go about 8

exercising our understanding of what it is that we 9

seize at the scene and how we dispose of it 10

throughout the process of an investigation prior 11

to its conclusion has evolved. 12

MR. FREIMAN: I'm still trying to 13

understand, and I want to be sure. There is some 14

importance to getting this right. 15

I think we just established that 16

from your reading of the -- I'm never going to get 17

this right -- MPPTP on evidence and evidence 18

handling, the proper time to have returned, to 19

stop holding on to evidence would have been at the 20

point where foul play was ruled out. 21


MR. FREIMAN: And I think you've 23

told us that under the new policy the proper time 24

to release the suicide note would have been when 25


113

foul play was ruled out. 1


MR. FREIMAN: So it's the same 3

policy. What's changed? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: What's changed is 5

the way in which we apply it. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Does that mean that 7

the old policy was not applied before, or does it 8

mean that what's changed is now written as a 9

written-up policy? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: It's changed as in 11

it's a written-up SOP within the NIS which affords 12

amplification of the MPPTPs. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. I'd like to 14

look with you at an exchange that you had just 15

about the same time with Major Poulin, Corporal -- 16

Lieutenant-Colonel Sansterre, Colonel Grubb and 17

others that has to do with the questions that were 18

being asked and the answers that were being given. 19

And I'd like to look at Tab 56 20

with you. That's still in Volume 2. 21

And as I keep saying, because 22

these are emails, we look at them in reverse 23

chronological order. 24

And if we look at page 203 at the 25


114

bottom, Major Poulin is reporting to Colonel 1

Sansterre, to Colonel Grubb, Major Bolduc, with 2

NTU. You're also copied on this, as well as Major 3

Hanrahan, about a conversation that she had with 4

Mr. Pugliese. 5

And if we look at the middle of 6

the email that's on page 203, she recounts: 7

"He also asked of any 8

discipline measures that were 9

taken against the 10

investigators ref this and I 11

just repeated the line about 12

procedures being amended. He 13

called back and asked again 14

about discipline measures and 15

I spoke about process again. 16

He also asked why the CFNIS 17

never called the family to 18

apologize about not giving 19

them the suicide note." 20

And she then says: 21

"I then told him that I was 22

aware the family was 23

interviewed as per normal 24

process at the beginning of 25


115

the investigation and that 1

they were aware of the 2

finding -- of the coroner's 3

findings and the cause of 4

death and reiterated that our 5

process was reviewed to 6

ensure it did not happen 7

again." 8

And we know where that line comes 9

from. It's the one that we looked at. 10

The first page of Tab 56 at the 11

top has an email from you alone to Major Poulin 12

alone, which I think is giving her a little bit of 13

background. And I'd like to read this over with 14

you. You say: 15

"We are currently conducting 16

a quality assurance check, 17

i.e. audit of the file. From 18

there, we will be in a much 19

position..." 20

I think you mean a "much better 21

position": 22

"...to speak of the 23

shortfalls and areas of 24

improvement. Until such 25


116

time, end of this week, it is 1

premature to speak of whether 2

we did anything wrong. In a 3

nutshell [you say], the 4

investigator and the case 5

management team did 6

everything in good faith and 7

at no point was the family's 8

wellbeing pushed aside." 9

Let me just ask, do you know what 10

the basis for that statement was, that "the 11

investigator and case management did everything in 12

good faith and at no point was the family's 13

wellbeing pushed aside"? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe at that 15

point we had been able to discuss with Sergeant 16

Ritco what, perhaps, some of the thought processes 17

were with respect to this. But I don't 18

specifically recall. 19

MR. FREIMAN: All right. Well, 20

we're going to hear some more information being 21

passed on about that. 22

"As you can appreciate, 23

unless a person goes through 24

an identical situation, the 25


117

series of assumptions are -- 1

a series of assumptions are 2

made regarding what is in the 3

best interests of the family. 4

Those assumptions are based 5

on personal experiences in 6

dealing with such matters in 7

the past, and those involved 8

in this particular case, they 9

had many previous 10

investigations of suicide in 11

their repertoire." 12

So let me just stop there. You're 13

suggesting that the decisions made about the 14

release of the suicide note were based on what the 15

investigators thought was in the best interests of 16

the family. Is that right? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: At the time, 18

that's what my understanding was, yes. 19

MR. FREIMAN: And do you remember 20

where you got that understanding? 21


MR. FREIMAN: The next thing you 23

say is that: 24

"Those involved in this 25


118

particular case had many 1

previous investigations of 2

suicide in their repertoire." 3

What was the basis of that 4

statement? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe that was 6

a belief that I had formed based upon asking the 7

question not specific to this, but how -- how 8

often we do have suicides in Western Region, how 9

often do we -- do we investigate sudden deaths 10

and, more importantly, how often does the NIS do 11

this. 12

And I had formed an assumption 13

that the investigators involved had -- had 14

conducted several sudden death investigations. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Well, the fact is 16

that neither the lead investigator nor his case 17

manager had ever seen a sudden death 18

investigation. 19

MAJ DANDURAND: I realize that 20

now. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And you say: 22

"We do this constantly when 23

dealing with estates in 24

returning personal 25


119

belongings. There are 1

personal belongings that 2

families of deceased have no 3

reason to be given, and we 4

make those careful decisions 5

as and when required." 6

What's the basis of that 7

statement? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: The basis of that 9

statement is we had had since my arrival several 10

investigations involving very -- how do I put 11

it -- very sensitive material seized at the scene. 12

And in discussion with close family members, it 13

was decided that those items would not be boxed up 14

and sent back to the next of kin and that, in 15

fact, they would form part of our property that 16

was going for destruction. 17

MR. FREIMAN: And are you 18

suggesting to Major Poulin that the suicide note 19

is an example of something that there's no reason 20

to return to the family? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I'm not. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Well, then, isn't 23

that what you're talking about? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: I think I'm 25


120

blending numerous issues all in one email. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Was there an issue 2

of other things not being returned that, as you 3

say in the next sentence, "There personal 4

belongings that" -- sorry: 5

"By returning those items, 6

they only serve to tarnish 7

the remaining image a mother, 8

spouse, loved one has of 9

their deceased family 10

member." 11

What are you talking about there? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, that -- what 13

I'm speaking of there is the blending of issues 14

from across Western Region in my experiences. I'm 15

giving a general -- general comment not specific 16

to this file. 17

However, materials that we did 18

seize, I believe at the scene or that were present 19

at the scene such as pornographic material, that 20

is not something that, at the time, we would 21

routinely just hand over back to the family. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. But -- now, I 23

appreciate there was an issue with that. Well, 24

maybe we should ask about that now. 25


121

On what basis does the NIS make a 1

decision not to return things of an embarrassing 2

nature to the family? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: Investigators get 4

to know the family, the situation, the social 5

dynamic and at times -- at the time would make 6

judgment calls. And in consultation with the 7

families, the representative or the executor would 8

come to a determination. 9

We had done it on numerous other 10

files and I had assumed that this was what it is 11

that we were doing on this file. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Do you have any -- 13

did you have any basis for that belief? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: The basis would be 15

that the investigators that I had the pleasure of 16

working with always conducted themselves in good 17

faith and had no ulterior motives in anything that 18

they would ever do. 19

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Well, that 20

takes care of the good faith argument issue, but 21

it doesn't actually address the issue of whether 22

anyone made a decision about items that should and 23

shouldn't be returned based on their best judgment 24

of what was in the best interest of the families. 25


122

Did they do that or didn't they do 1

that? 2

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't know. 3

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So this was 4

simply speculation on your part. 5

MAJ DANDURAND: I would say so, 6

yes. 7

MR. FREIMAN: And wasn't the issue 8

that you were ostensibly addressing whether 9

anything had been done wrong in not returning the 10

suicide note? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: Sorry? 12

MR. FREIMAN: Wasn't the issue 13

that you were addressing with Major Poulin and the 14

subject matter of her note whether the 15

investigators had done anything wrong in not 16

returning the suicide note? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, it would have 18

been. 19

MR. FREIMAN: All right. So these 20

responses, unless I'm missing something, are not 21

relevant to that issue, the response about making 22

decisions in the best interests of the family. 23

Not returning items would tarnish the image of the 24

soldier to his loved ones, I don't -- I still 25


123

don't understand the relevance to those in the 1

context of a discussion of whether the NIS 2

investigators did anything wrong in not returning 3

the suicide note. 4

There isn't, is there? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: I gotta be honest, 6

I'm lost in your question. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Well, I don't think 8

the question is really that complex. The -- I'll 9

try to simplify it. 10

The subject matter of the 11

correspondence with Major Poulin was her 12

difficulty in answering the question, "Will there 13

be any disciplinary action taken against the 14

investigators?" 15


MR. FREIMAN: She didn't have a 17

line about that. 18


--- Technical difficulties / Problèmes techniques 20

COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry to 21

interrupt but the system has gone down. 22

THE CHAIRPERSON: We will take a 23

short adjournment until 1:00 24



124


THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes. 2

MR. FREIMAN: Good afternoon, 3

Major Dandurand. 4

Before the break, and before we 5

had an equipment failure, we were discussing a 6

document that you'll find at Tab 56. 7

And you had asked me to restate 8

the question and I was in the process of trying to 9

restate the last question when we had the 10

equipment failure. 11

And I think the question went 12

along the following lines: What we've seen from 13

this document at Tab 56 is that Major Poulin had 14

been asked a question about discipline and had 15

difficulty answering it, given that she did not 16

have any media response lines that directly 17

addressed the question. 18

Are we on the same page so far? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: So far. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. You write 21

this letter -- or this email to her dated 18 June 22

at 11:20 a.m. to respond, either in whole or in 23

part, to that difficulty, and we had gotten to the 24

line about investigators exercising their judgment 25


125

and not revealing things to the family that might 1

tarnish the remaining image of another's spouse 2

and loved one. 3

And I had suggested to you that 4

that wasn't an issue, the issue -- and you 5

referred us to the question of pornographic 6

material that might have been found. 7

I think where we were at was I had 8

asked you to confirm that Mr. Pugliese didn't ask 9

any questions about that subject to Major Poulin 10

that I recall. Is that also your understanding? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: That's my 12

recollection as well, yes. 13

MR. FREIMAN: So, what prompts you 14

to introduce a discussion of the judgment that is 15

exercised by the investigators in what they return 16

and don't return to the family in the context of 17

the question that Major Poulin was dealing with, 18

which was, will there be discipline because the 19

investigators didn't return the suicide note? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: In answering this 21

email, I believe that it wasn't just her intent to 22

ask about disciplinary matters, so I was 23

answering, if you will, several things at once and 24

discussing several things at once and providing 25


126

Major Poulin a bit of context with respect to what 1

it is that we were experiencing in Western Region 2

in totality. 3

Specific to the issue of 4

discipline, I was providing context to her with 5

respect to what actions or no action -- what 6

actions would be taken with the investigators and, 7

in this context, it was that no action was going 8

to be taken for formal disciplinary proceedings. 9

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Now, that was 10

a decision that you had made prior to receiving 11

the QA report; am I right about that? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't recall. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Well, maybe we 14

should look at the first line of the email. 15

"We are currently conducting 16

a quality assurance check, 17

i.e., audit for the file, 18

from there we'll be in a much 19

better position to speak of 20

the shortfalls and areas for 21

improvement. Until such 22

time, into this week, it's 23

premature to speak to whether 24

we did anything wrong." 25


127

MR. FREIMAN: So, I read that as 1

an indication that the QA report was still in 2

process. 3

MAJ DANDURAND: It was, yes. 4

MR. FREIMAN: And you didn't have 5

an answer from it yet? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: I had indications 7

in a discussion with the individual, Warrant 8

Officer Ross, who was doing it in passing about 9

how things were going. 10

MR. FREIMAN: And what impression 11

had you formed from those discussions? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: Those are 13

reflective in this email, that at this time there 14

was nothing to suggest that investigators had gone 15

outside of the norm of what is it that we had seen 16

in any other circumstances with respect to 17

evidence and how they handled it, so we were not 18

going to be proceeding with disciplinary matters 19

at that time. 20

MR. FREIMAN: So, what did you 21

expect Major Poulin to do in terms of getting back 22

to Mr. Pugliese? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: I had no 24

expectations of her. I didn't even know if she 25


128

would be then getting in touch with him, if it was 1

in anticipation of a return phone call. Her 2

interactions with Pugliese, I cannot make an 3

assumption at this time as to what I'd be 4

thinking. 5

MR. FREIMAN: So, what did you 6

mean when you said to her: 7

"Mr. Pugliese's persistence 8

in asking about disciplinary 9

measures needs to be curbed 10

because it would be 11

completely inappropriate for 12

any actions to be taken 13

against anyone in this case." 14

MAJ DANDURAND: I meant at that 15

time we had no indication that Sergeant Ritco or 16

other investigators had wilfully gone outside of 17

the normal practices of what it is that they were 18

doing. 19

MR. FREIMAN: I understand that 20

part of it, but I'm wondering about the first part 21

where you tell her that: 22

"Mr. Pugliese's persistence 23

in asking about disciplinary 24

measures needs to be 25


129

curbed..." 1

MAJ DANDURAND: That's a 2

discussion between Major Poulin and I, just saying 3

that her interactions with him need to clearly 4

reflect that disciplinary measures are not being 5

considered at this time. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So -- 7

MAJ DANDURAND: And it was my 8

understanding at the time that this was a 9

re-occurring discussion that kept coming up. 10

MR. FREIMAN: And you're telling 11

her, cut it off; right, you are giving her 12

instructions that it would be -- to tell him 13

there's nothing more to talk about here, or are 14

you not? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: I think it would 16

be inaccurate for me to say I'm giving her 17

instructions because she doesn't work for me. I'm 18

giving her my two cents' worth on this topic. 19

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And I just 20

want to get an idea from you as to what you think 21

the message was that you were offering to Major 22

Poulin. Were you telling her that the answer to 23

Mr. Pugliese's questions were, until the quality 24

assurance check is complete it's premature to 25


130

speak about anyone doing anything wrong, or were 1

you giving her the message that it's not 2

appropriate in this case for the military to take 3

disciplinary action and none will be taken? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: At the time when I 5

wrote that email I had not formulated any belief 6

that the investigators had done anything wrong. 7

MR. FREIMAN: I understand that. 8

I'm just trying to get a sense as to whether the 9

message you were giving her to take back to the 10

media was that it was too early to talk about 11

discipline, or that there would be no discipline? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: That I can't 13

answer. I don't know what I was thinking at that 14

time that was specific to those two courses of 15

action. 16

MR. FREIMAN: As this matter was 17

beginning to pick up steam and clearly had some 18

attraction in the media, what steps do you recall 19

taking to familiarize yourself with the underlying 20

issues, or did you feel you had enough of an 21

understanding by this time just from your 22

interactions with various people? 23

Did you have to sit down and 24

actually learn new things about the file or go 25


131

over the SAMPIS file and acquaint yourself with 1

the detail? 2


my understanding of the file back then probably 4

wasn't very -- well, it was not as in-depth as it 5

is now. 6

I did through -- in preparation 7

for our meetings with the Fynes start going 8

through the file specific to make sure that -- my 9

experience had been in ATI productions for 10

families that they're -- the copies provided don't 11

reflect the total holdings of what we have due to 12

redactions and I wanted to be able to at least 13

speak to the theme of what had been redacted, not 14

necessarily the information itself, to assure them 15

that this was not anything except for either 16

National Security police practice or private 17

information. 18

But as for an intricate delving 19

into the file, I had not -- I don't believe I had 20

done that at the time. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Did you at any point 22

actually find out what happened to the suicide 23

note and why it wasn't given back to the family? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe I had. 25


132

MR. FREIMAN: What was the answer 1

that you recall getting? 2

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe -- and 3

this is very hard for me to do, to differentiate 4

between what I know now and what I knew then with 5

respect to this, because what I do know now is 6

that I had the quality assurance analysis by 7

Warrant Officer Ross which spoke to the issue of 8

the note. Now, what I can't recall is whether or 9

not that resonated with me at the time when I had 10

it and whether I dissected that in great detail. 11

So, it would have been -- it would 12

have been in around the summer time when I found 13

out -- or when I assessed that the note hadn't 14

been provided and when I asked the 15

investigators -- when I asked people and started 16

searching around, it was under the explanation of, 17

this was evidence, everything else was returned 18

with the exception of a few articles, but it was 19

the opinion of people that this was still 20

evidence. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. It's rather 22

important we understand who the people were that 23

you were speaking to about this. 24

Do you recall who -- let me first 25


133

of all tell you that from my reading of the 1

quality assurance report, there is no statement 2

there as to why it was withheld, the statement is 3

that it was wrong not to return it and offers a 4

couple of dates, but it doesn't actually go into 5

the issue of the reasons it was not produced. 6

So, it is somewhat important for 7

us to understand whose information you relied on 8

for your understanding of the facts that the note 9

wasn't produced because it was evidence. 10

MAJ DANDURAND: I understand what 11

you're saying, but I can't recall right now. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Would it have 13

been Sergeant Ritco, or is it unlikely that it was 14

Sergeant Ritco? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: His availabil -- I 16

would say the most likely would be Sergeant Ritco 17

but, again, this is based strictly upon my 18

assumptions because I do recall being able to chat 19

with him casually with respect to this, as I 20

mentioned, through his comings and goings for 21

administrative processes with respect to his 22

secondment. 23

But it was not -- nothing stands 24

out. 25


134

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. That's fair. 1

There's reference in this email to 2

the quality assurance report, and I'm not going to 3

spend a lot of time on it, but since it's 4

mentioned, I think we ought to at least refer to 5

it. 6

It's at Tab 122 -- 27, rather. 7

And let me start at the back rather than the 8

front, not of the document, of the process. 9

What happened to this quality 10

assurance report after you received it? I'm 11

assuming, or maybe I'm wrong, that it was 12

addressed to you. 13

MAJ DANDURAND: It was addressed 14

to the Commanding Officer, the Deputy Commanding 15

Officer, myself, the Service Chief Warrant 16

Officer, the Operations Warrant Officer for 17

Western Region and the Support Operations Warrant 18

Officer Western Region. 19

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, what 20

happened to the report after it was circulated; 21

what action, if any, did it lead to? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, the report 23

is, first off, conducted and circulated for 24

lessons to be identified and issues to be learned 25


135

as a process of professional development and for 1

improving our manner in which we conduct 2

investigations. And in this case it would have 3

been done so specific to sudden deaths. That's 4

what I can recall as being action taken. 5

MR. FREIMAN: So did it lead to 6

any directives? Did it lead to any educational 7

sessions? Did it have consequences at the back 8

end? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: Absolutely. 10

MR. FREIMAN: So what were they? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: Numerous. First 12

off, it's important to understand that this does 13

not necessarily act as the catalyst for those 14

discussions. Those discussions are concurrent to 15

the activity that's occurring here. 16

Now, on the backend now we have 17

the actual accounts of what's occurred. As you 18

can see, it goes not only to our NIS Headquarters 19

but it goes to our senior non-commissioned member, 20

the Chief Warrant Officer of the NIS, and it goes 21

to our two key personnel on the command team as 22

well beyond the person who drafted it and myself, 23

the two warrant officers or, pardon me, warrant 24

officer positions. 25


136

And the intent of that is to 1

ensure that the information is quickly transmitted 2

and, as well, follows on as part of assisting in 3

that dialogue that's occurring with respect to how 4

do we not allow this to happen again. 5


MAJ DANDURAND: There were 7

numerous orders groups where regular businesses 8

discuss; case files are addressed, case file 9

meetings are occurring with respect to the 10

totality of investigations that Western Region is 11

undergoing and this topic was something that was 12

discussed routinely and moved forward towards the 13

ultimate conclusion or what I would suggest was 14

the ultimate conclusion of those discussions which 15

is the 2011 SOP. 16

Concurrent to those discussions 17

and that dialogue that's occurring within the NIS 18

is the fact that tragically we had had other 19

sudden deaths involving suicide within Western 20

Region and notes were left. It was immediately at 21

the forefront of not only the command teams and 22

the commanders involved and the warrant officers 23

and senior staff, but very much so on the front of 24

the minds of the investigators as to how to handle 25


137

that appropriately now that we had applied the 1

lessons learned. 2

MR. FREIMAN: So just so that I 3

understand a little better, what was the vehicle 4

for conveying the lessons learned down to a level 5

where it could have an effect on practice? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: The immediate 7

vehicle that was employed was verbal 8

communication. The fact is that the case manager 9

had intimate knowledge of this because they had 10

received a copy of this. And as well, they were 11

involved in weekly dialogue as a minimum with the 12

two most senior personnel within Western Region. 13

I would be speculating right now. 14

However, it was not uncommon practice for the 15

Warrant Officer, the Service Chief Warrant Officer 16

to circulate quality assurances amongst the 17

detachment so that they could draw the benefit of 18

lessons identified in other files. 19

In a lot of cases what would 20

happen in quality assurances, we're talking about 21

clerical and administrative housekeeping with 22

respect to files, missed entities; inappropriately 23

sequenced text entries, things of that nature. 24

But where they were investigative 25


138

steps that were potentially missed and as a result 1

were identified as perhaps a potential issue 2

across the board, then those would be circulated 3

around with a note to say "Take a read and any 4

questions to the headquarters". 5

So the investigators on the ground 6

would have known about this from periodic meetings 7

that we had within Western Region. Trying to get 8

everybody together all at the same time was very 9

difficult. Due to the nature of our work we were 10

all over the place all the time. We always had 11

somebody missing. 12

However, it was not a subject that 13

I shied away from discussing with the troops and 14

nor did any of the other three members of the 15

command team. 16

MR. FREIMAN: Were you aware of 17

any professional day -- professional development 18

days devoted to this topic? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I wasn't. 20

MR. FREIMAN: We've asked a number 21

of the investigators and case managers who were 22

actually involved in this matter whether they ever 23

attended any professional development days or got 24

any briefings about this policy. 25


139

My recollection is none of them 1

recall doing so. Is that -- if that's correct 2

would that be surprising? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: No, that wouldn't 4

be surprising to me. 5


MAJ DANDURAND: Because, as I say, 7

there is no -- well, I will say there was no 8

specific professional development day to this 9

topic convened in order to discuss it. It formed 10

part of the professional development interests 11

that resonated throughout many meetings. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Again, I don't want 13

to go over the document in detail because it deals 14

with matters that occurred before you became OC, 15

but did you concur with the first line: 16

"Upon a review of General 17

Occurrence 2008-6544 the 18

totality of the investigation 19

conducted was found to be 20

technically sound." 21

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I did. 22

MR. FREIMAN: And did you also 23

concur with the finding that the element in the 24

investigation plan that was addressed to pursuing 25


140

possible negligence -- this is -- I'll refer you 1

to it. It's page 3 of 7. It's under "Invest 2

Plan" and it's point 2 under Invest Plan. So it 3

starts at 2 and ends at 3. Number 2 says: 4

"Concerns questions with 5

regard to investigative step 6

number 13 which states 7

'possible negligent actions 8

on behalf of CF regarding a 9

possible involvement in death 10

(completed).' This is not a 11

CFNIS mandate and falls 12

within the purview of a Board 13

of Inquiry, BOI." 14

Did you agree with that 15

conclusion? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't believe 17

that resonated with me at the time, and at this 18

time I would say that I do not agree with that 19

statement. 20


At some point later you met with 22

Mr. and Mrs. Fynes. It was on the 28th of 23

November. 24



141

MR. FREIMAN: Can you recall the 1

reasons for that meeting and who decided that 2

there was to be a meeting? 3

Well, let's just start with there. 4


specifically recall who decided that there was a 6

necessity for a meeting. However, I did certainly 7

agree that we needed to have a meeting. 8

I was a bit surprised that a 9

family briefing had not occurred with respect to 10

this investigation to them with respect to the 11

investigation because we typically do that. We 12

will conclude a sudden death investigation and we 13

will at least make an offer to the family to say, 14

look, you know, you're going to possibly have 15

questions with respect to how the investigation 16

was conducted and how we came to our conclusions. 17

Do you wish to have us attend? 18

This is not only borne out of our 19

deep interest in making sure that the family has 20

closure but also because it's been my experience 21

that reading through general occurrence reports as 22

they are printed off by ATI and forwarded off to 23

the families upon request, that making heads and 24

tails of how this file is constructed and what the 25


142

jargon means can be quite cumbersome, dependent 1

upon the reader. So it's been my experience that 2

we offer that up. 3

This was going to be a meeting 4

whereby we offered them a briefing as to what the 5

investigation involved and then of course afford 6

them the opportunity to have all sorts of 7

questions. 8

It was very evident at the time 9

that they had an interest in this and that, I 10

think, a request had been made. I believe a 11

request had been made for them to have a copy of 12

it prior to the meeting and that -- 13


MAJ DANDURAND: -- that vehicle 15

had been put into motion. 16

MR. FREIMAN: And that was one of 17

the questions I was going to ask. In preparation 18

for the meeting what was your awareness of where 19

the state of play was as between the Fynes and the 20

NIS? What sort of concerns were you aware of even 21

going into the meeting? 22


specifically recall if I had concerns. 24

MR. FREIMAN: No, what you knew 25


143

about their concerns. 1

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah. That's what 2

I mean, with respect to their concerns. 3

One thing that I did know is that 4

they had been in receipt of a copy of the 5

investigative file and it had come to my attention 6

that it was significantly redacted. 7

My immediate assumption was that 8

perhaps this was a clerical error in the manner in 9

which it was produced, being that they are the 10

next of kin, the executor. They have a right to a 11

privacy version of the report and therefore more 12

of the report would be availed to them than if 13

they were Joe Citizen requesting it. 14


MAJ DANDURAND: So I wanted to 16

make sure that that wasn't the case. And I 17

believe -- 18

MR. FREIMAN: And -- 19

MAJ DANDURAND: -- I believe that 20

it had come to my attention because I think I had 21

received a replica copy of what had been 22

disclosed. 23

I think I looked at it and said to 24

myself, "I believe there is an error in the way 25


144

that this was processed through ATI" and then 1

immediately sought to try and rectify this prior 2

to the meeting because I didn't want this to 3

become an issue of why do we not have the full 4

report. 5

I knew that we would have to speak 6

to not having the full report as in what gets 7

redacted on privacy but I wanted to be able to at 8

least remove the delta between a normal ATI and 9

privacy requests. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And what did 11

you understand would be the difference between 12

those two versions? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, my 14

understanding of it was that if you're Joe Citizen 15

again applying to have access to this report that 16

you get a full eight redacted version of it. 17

However if you are the person that is named in the 18

report making that request all references to you 19

and your private information is not redacted. 20

That was my understanding at the time. 21

So if you made a statement that 22

that is included in the report, that that 23

statement would be so reflected because it's 24

pointless for them to redact it. You're the one 25


145

that made this statement. 1

MR. FREIMAN: So we know that 2

there were a couple of instances where Mr. Fynes' 3

statements had been redacted. So that would 4

account for that. 5

Was it your understanding that 6

that was the major issue with redactions, that 7

some of the family's statements had been redacted 8

and here they were, the ones who were getting it? 9


MR. FREIMAN: Do you recall 11

anything about an issue as to whether the PEN 12

form, the personal emergency notification form, 13

was relevant to the issue of disclosure? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: It doesn't come to 15

mind right now. I can't remember. 16

MR. FREIMAN: So I thought I would 17

ask you just finally, what was your anticipation 18

of the desired outcome for the November 28th 19

meeting? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: I obviously would 21

have had a desired outcome and I can't recall 22

exactly what that would have been. 23

However, whenever doing -- 24

whenever I was doing family briefings my desire 25


146

was to make sure that the families had the 1

opportunity to ask all of their questions, to have 2

an open and frank dialogue with us with respect to 3

the investigation and if we were not able to deal 4

with anything at the time that we would take those 5

away and deal with them on the back. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Okay, well, that's 7

fair. Let's have a look at some of what happened 8

at the meeting itself. 9

For purposes of this meeting was 10

there a formalized process of taking notes or was 11

it a pretty casual meeting between you and the 12

Fynes? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: This meeting 14

occurred in my office. 15


MAJ DANDURAND: I had a corner set 17

aside with what I believed to be a comfortable 18

couch and chair, a couple of chairs and a coffee 19

table. 20

So it was very informal in that 21

sense. However, recognizing that my view on this 22

is to give them my full and undivided attention 23

that I would minimize the amount of notes that I 24

would be taking due to the fact that we were going 25


147

to be digitally recording the interview or the 1

meeting and therefore we would be able to refer to 2

that at a later date. 3

MR. FREIMAN: Now, do you have a 4

recollection as to the length of the meeting 5

itself and the length of the recording of the 6

meeting? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: I remember -- yes, 8

I would say it was in the vicinity of about three 9

and a half, four hours. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Was the entire 11

meeting recorded to your recollection? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: The entire meeting 13

as far as I can recall was recorded. However, 14

there was a lot of conversation that occurred 15

after the meeting. 16

MR. FREIMAN: Okay, because when 17

we look at the transcript -- and we're going to do 18

that in a minute so I might as well tell you where 19

to look. We're going to be looking at Tab 6 which 20

will be Volume 1. 21

--- Pause 22

MR. FREIMAN: If you look at the 23

end of Tab 6, page 136 of 139, this is what we 24

have in terms of the ending of the meeting. Mrs. 25


148

Fynes says: 1

"But you know what? When 2

somebody says to me, well, 3

you know we had to do a huge 4

investigation to make sure he 5

did not -- he did commit 6

suicide that I find 7

offensive. Like I said, 8

everybody on the base knew 9

Stuart committed suicide. 10

Everybody. He didn't need to 11

do this." 12

And you say: 13

"What if we were wrong?" 14

And Mrs. Fynes: 15

"Well, of course. Sorry, I 16

need to go. I'm sorry." 17

Major Dandurand: 18

"Can you turn off the 19

recorder for a minute?" 20

PO2 McLaughlin, as he then was, 21

says: 22

"I will definitely. I will 23

burn a copy right now." 24

"No, just turn it off. 25


149

And yes, we would like a 1

copy, please. Thank you. 2

Thank you for your time. 3

Whereupon the interview 4

concluded." 5

Which seems like a pretty sharp or 6

drastic -- drastic is the wrong word. It doesn't 7

look as though the meeting had quite wound down of 8

its own effect. It seems like an abrupt ending to 9

the meeting. 10

So what happened after? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: What happened 12

after is Master Seaman or now PO2 McLaughlin went 13

into his office and burned a copy of the meeting 14

for them to take away with them. 15

MR. FREIMAN: And was there 16

substantive discussion at the end of that meeting? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: We had -- upon his 18

return we had stood up and gone into the hall -- 19

stood up in my office at first, talked for a 20

length of time. 21

Then we had gone into the hallway 22

outside my office, talked for a little more and 23

then we had gone into the foyer and talked a 24

little more and then they made their way. They 25


150

were on their way. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So do I 2

understand that there was nothing of substance 3

that was discussed afterwards that would have 4

required notations somewhere or further action? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: There was, I 6

believe, some discussion of substance afterwards. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And would 8

that have been noted anywhere or would Master 9

Seaman McLaughlin have made a note of that or were 10

you -- 11

MAJ DANDURAND: I asked Petty 12

Officer McLaughlin to make note of their concerns 13

and questions and send that to me in an email so 14

that we would have quick references to what it was 15

they had left us with because there is a concern. 16

MR. FREIMAN: We will look at, in 17

a moment, at the series of questions but I just 18

wanted to confirm that your recollection is that 19

series of questions includes not only questions 20

that were asked in the recorded portion but 21

anything new that came up in the unrecorded 22

portion. 23

MAJ DANDURAND: That's my 24

understanding, yes. 25


151

MR. FREIMAN: So I'd like to talk 1

about a few things that happened at this meeting. 2

One of the topics, not surprisingly, that came up 3

was the suicide note and what had happened to the 4

suicide note. 5

I'd like to just review a couple 6

of the passages where you provided explanations 7

and there was an interchange. And the first is at 8

page 76. 9

--- Pause 10

MR. FREIMAN: It's at line 21 and 11

you say: 12

"I hope -- I really do hope 13

that you will be able to draw 14

some satisfaction from this 15

that there has been change as 16

a result of this. I'll 17

describe these changes to 18

you. 19

First off, we at the time had a 20

policy that we just -- we don't divulge all these 21

notes and you have to appreciate that at the time 22

when you're dealing with a death it's viewed as 23

suspicious. Now, until such time as we determine 24

that in fact we're dealing with a suicide as 25


152

opposed to a suspicious death, we're not going to 1

communicate on that note. Later on..." 2

And Mrs. Fynes interrupts and 3

says: 4

"That wasn't your note. That 5

was my note." 6

"Later on..." you continue: 7

"...the file, if I'm not 8

mistaken, the investigation 9

was completed in and around 10

three months." 11

Mrs. Fynes: 12

"It took three months before 13

you decided that he had 14

committed suicide." 15

Mr. Fynes: 16

"It was signed off on" -- 17

And you say: 18

"It was signed at -- that's 19

what I was getting at. It 20

was signed off as being 21

completed as a minimum." 22

And then there is a lot more 23

discussion about the BlackBerry and matters. We 24

don't actually get back to the suicide note until 25


153

page 93. 1

--- Pause 2

MR. FREIMAN: This is at line 5 3

and Mr. Fynes actually picks up just where the 4

last discussion broke off. He says: 5

"I understand what you're 6

saying is that processes and 7

policies and procedures have 8

been changed." 9

And you say: 10

"They have been changed. 11

Now, one of -- I'll walk you 12

through a scenario. You show 13

up. You find a note. The 14

investigation is a sudden 15

death investigation not 16

knowing whether it's 17

suspicious or whether foul 18

play is at stake." 19

And Mrs. Fynes says: 20

"Sorry, excuse me!" 21

Major Dandurand: 22

"Yeah. Is your arm okay, 23

Sheila? Do you need any 24

meds? 25


154

"No, I'm okay." 1

Sheila is -- and then there is a 2

personal note: 3

"Okay. So we have the note 4

and it would appear as though 5

it's addressed to a loved 6

one. What do we do? Right 7

away do we hand the note over 8

immediately? Do we because 9

we haven't made a 10

determination on whether it's 11

foul play or not? 12

Now, by the time -- Shaun, as 13

you know, you may not come to 14

the conclusion or the 15

determination that foul play 16

is ruled out until well after 17

the funeral." 18

Mr. Fynes: 19

"I understand but in our case 20

ostensibly the bulk of the 21

investigation was done within 22

two months. It was clearly a 23

suicide. The medical 24

examiner -- it was 14 months 25


155

before we found out about the 1

note." 2

And you say: 3

"I'm not disputing you're 4

angry one bit. You are..." 5


"Why would you -- what I'm 7

saying..." 8

Mr. Fynes continues: 9

"Operationally I can 10

understand holding it for 11

maybe two months but to hold 12

it for 14 months?" 13

And you say: 14

"I'm just addressing Sheila's 15

comment of..." 16

"No, you know what we were 17

told." 18

And you say: 19

"There was a comment in there 20

saying that he didn't want 21

anything fancy. The thing is 22

though is this, what if -- 23

what if it was foul play and 24

there was this left behind 25


156

and then you act on it? 1

Mrs. Fynes: 2

"Okay. [I'm not going to say 3

this once and then I'm 4

pretty -- sorry] I'm only 5

going to say this once and 6

then I'm pretty much done 7

with this bit about the note 8

because I'm not going to be 9

talked into thinking other 10

than what I already think, 11

okay? My son had a last 12

communication with me. I do 13

not believe for one second, 14

nor will I ever, that anybody 15

on the base thought there was 16

anything other than a suicide 17

in that room that day and I 18

don't believe that anybody, 19

even for a heart beat thought 20

that, and I think that to 21

expect us to believe that 22

that is, I think it's almost 23

insulting to our intention -- 24

to our intelligence." 25


157

What is the answer to this 1

assertion by Mr. and Mrs Fynes that the suicide 2

note should have been given to them and that there 3

is no question that this was a suicide and that it 4

shouldn't have had to wait for 14 months for sure 5

and you do write here and say: No, that was 6

wrong, it shouldn't have been 14 months. It 7

should have been sometime earlier. 8

Should it have been released 9

before the funeral? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: If a foul play was 11

ruled out, then yes. Now -- 12

MR. FREIMAN: How was foul play 13

ruled -- how was foul play ruled out? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, in the 15

investigation of a sudden death, three key 16

components. You need to look at the crime scene, 17

you need to look at the deceased such as the 18

medical examiner's portion and you need to look at 19

the history. 20

The investigator needs to 21

formulate the reasonable belief that based on all 22

the facts that they have, that -- and the 23

injection particularly in that try out of 24

considerations, that they are able to rule out 25


158

foul play. 1

MR. FREIMAN: So, do you need all 2

three of those things? Do you need the processing 3

of the crime scene, the medical examiner and the 4

history? 5


be premature to rule out foul play until such time 7

as you have all the information that you need. 8

MR. FREIMAN: So, is your 9

understanding of the policy that the note will not 10

be turned over until foul play has been ruled out, 11

using those three circumstances, those three 12

elements: Investigation of the crime scene, 13

medical examiner's input and an understanding of 14

the history? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: As part of the 16

criminal investigation, those three components are 17

critical. However, the investigation in itself 18

does not restrict itself to just those three 19

components and, therefore, as a totality, the 20

investigator uses that golden triangle as a guide 21

and, therefore, through their investigative 22

process, they are able to come to a determination 23

but, ultimately that determination is theirs to 24

make and they have to answer to that. 25


159

MR. FREIMAN: And in your view, 1

does that mean that in the current case, you had 2

to wait for the medical examiner's report before 3

you could release the note? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: No. However, I do 5

believe that you had to wait for the injection of 6

the information that the medical examiner had to 7

share with you which, I believe, in this case was 8

in early April. 9

MR. FREIMAN: April 9th. 10

MAJ DANDURAND: That they were 11

able to say to Sergeant Ritco: Look, I have -- I 12

have ten out of eleven tests and none are causing 13

me concern. And that, bearing in mind my comments 14

on this are strictly from a point of view -- I was 15

not involved in that 2008 investigation, as we 16

know. 17


I am going to ask you two things. But first, let 19

me just round at the discussion of the suicide 20

note and the last point was dealt with was a point 21

that I read with you first, on page 138. And this 22

is at line 6 and Mrs. Fynes comes back to the 23

point that she was talking about back on page 24

95-96. You know what she says: 25


160

"When somebody says to me: 1

Well, you know, we had to do 2

a huge investigation to make 3

sure he did commit suicide, 4

that I find offensive. Like 5

I've said, everybody on the 6

base knew Stuart committed 7

suicide, everybody. You 8

didn't need to do this." 9

And you say: "What if they were 10

wrong?" 11

Can you explain what that comment 12

is intended to explain to Mrs. Fynes? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: What I am trying 14

to explain at this point is that while everyone 15

may have an assumption that this is what has 16

occurred, it's far from my place as an 17

investigative body to simply jump on board a 18

public opinion bandwagon with respect to what has 19

transpired. 20

Our job, we do not know Corporal 21

Langridge, we do not know the individual for which 22

we are attending the scene most often and, 23

therefore, we do not know the history. We do not 24

know anything and we start from ground zero and we 25


161

build our picture and our understanding of what 1

has happened with respect to this individual. 2

MR. FREIMAN: Does that mean that 3

for practical purposes, the suicide note will 4

never be revealed before the funeral? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: No, that does not. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Well, how long does 7

it usually take for the medical examiner to 8

provide you with a certificate? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, that can 10

take -- that can take some time, and it's my 11

understanding. 12


MAJ DANDURAND: And that said is 14

that if you have a pathologist or a medical 15

examiner who is able to provide you a swift return 16

with respect to the -- with respect to the 17

information that you seek to support your 18

investigation and not knowing when a funeral is, 19

it can be the week after or it can be several 20

months after, it really depends upon the sequence 21

of events on whether or not we would be able to 22

provide that note to a family before a funeral. 23

MR. FREIMAN: Being realistic, 24

funerals usually occur within a week of the death, 25


162

but at -- 1

MAJ DANDURAND: Dependent upon 2

your culture, yes. 3

MR. FREIMAN: So, let's assume 4

that the funeral happens a week before(sic) the 5

death, in your experience, have you ever had a 6

medical examiner return information about the 7

crime scene and about his conclusions in less than 8

a week? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't recall any 10

that returned that quickly, no. 11

MR. FREIMAN: I would like to look 12

with you at Tab 8, which is your interview with 13

Major Parkinson because it's relevant to this 14

point and it's at page 44. 15

This is a point in the interview 16

where you are going over the list of 11 items that 17

have been compiled by the family, their concerns. 18

It was sent to Major Parkinson, and we are dealing 19

now with one of them, which was: 20

"The family was told there 21

was no suicide note and there 22

was, okay, and that would 23

have had a very real bearing 24

on the funeral service itself 25


163

because the note said 1

specifically he didn't want 2

any service. And you say: 3

Yes. Well, you and I spoke 4

on that, Major Parkinson, 5

yes, issue before. So, I 6

just jump in and I don't need 7

a, but no, yes, I have been 8

there. Major Dandurand 9

that's you, says: Yes. The 10

issue is very much a 11

recognition by the NIS that 12

you, you know, what, there 13

should have been a review of 14

the evidentiary holdings at 15

least at the end of the file 16

and we would have been able 17

to give it to them at that 18

point. I believe the file 19

was concluded within three 20

months. At that point where 21

it's determined foul play is 22

ruled out, hum, hum, we 23

accept and we have changed 24

our practices. Yes, 25


164

actually, it's at that 1

point." 2

So, first of all, let me just be 3

sure that we are on the same wave length. At this 4

point, you are telling Major Parkinson that the 5

point where you give it back is where you're able 6

to conclude the file? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: That's one of the 8

points that I highlighted. 9

The second point is where it's 10

determined that foul play is ruled out. 11

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, those are 12

two different points. It's not necessarily in the 13

file. It's a point where foul play has been ruled 14

out? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. I am 16

prepared to admit I don't effectively communicate 17

that point there, but they are both distinct 18

points. 19

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, let's 20

keep going. You say: 21

"We accept and we have 22

changed our practices. Yes, 23

actually, it's at that point. 24

The part where I think it 25


165

would have had no bearing on 1

the funeral dealings is that 2

the determination of no foul 3

play had not yet been made at 4

that point, at the point of 5

the funeral and we have 6

explained that at this" -- 7

I think it should have been: 8

"We have explained this at 9

length. I am explaining this 10

now because you do still have 11

contact with Sean and Sheila 12

Fynes and funny enough, not 13

funny, but oddly enough, this 14

still does come up even 15

though they have had it 16

explained twice to them. 17

Hum, hum. The issue is that 18

until that determination is 19

made, that's considered 20

non-disclosable evidence from 21

a police investigation point 22

of view. It's frustrating 23

for the family perhaps, but 24

had it been foul play, had it 25


166

been foul play and the note 1

had been falsified, hum, hum, 2

and then they had acted on 3

that for the funeral. Yes. 4

That could have been equally 5

traumatic. Yes. I 6

understand, Major Parkinson 7

says. Yes. And I know you 8

would, but why I mentioned 9

it, yes, because it's kind of 10

as long as we accept that the 11

circumstances, and I 12

described them what happened, 13

unacceptable and we have 14

changed that. It will not 15

happen again. But they are 16

insinuating that they should 17

have been told right away. 18

Major Parkinson says would 19

never happen. You say: I am 20

not. He says: Highly 21

unlikely. And you say: 22

Entirely sure. It's not 23

something we can get fiction 24

hold into. We can get back 25


167

into because it's not healthy 1

for the interest of the 2

investigation." 3

Is that your understanding of what 4

the process is and what the policy was, and I am 5

assuming it's the new policy that you are talking 6

about? 7


MR. FREIMAN: Although we have 9

heard that actually the new policy is the same as 10

the old policy would have been, just the practice 11

might have been different? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: I'm speaking to 13

the -- to our new understanding of how it is that 14

we would handle this situation. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. So, is 16

Major Parkinson right in saying that it's highly 17

unlikely that the family would ever get a suicide 18

note before the funeral if the funeral is within a 19

week or so of the death? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: It's very 21

circumstance dependent. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. I am just 23

wondering about that last hypothetical. Is that a 24

serious consideration that the note might have 25


168

been falsified and that the family might be acting 1

on false information at carrying out the wishes 2

recorded in the note? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: Is that what, sir? 4

MR. FREIMAN: Is that a realistic 5

consideration? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I believe it 7

is. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Was there anything 9

at all, to your recollection, in the current case 10

that spoke to anything at all other than suicide? 11

One fact? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, I would have 13

to be placing myself in the shoes of the 14

investigators at the time in order to be able to 15

answer that question. 16

Looking at it from the perspective 17

of the history of the individual, particularly in 18

this year leading up to his death, I would not -- 19

I would not dismiss the possibility with respect 20

to that note or perhaps an on toward situation 21

being staged that has been created here, due to 22

what he had been involved in. 23

MR. FREIMAN: So, let's just put 24

ourselves into the position of the investigators. 25


169

If your supposition were to square with what was 1

on Master Corporal has he then was with Sergeant 2

Ritco's orientation and his suspicions, what would 3

you have expected him to do with respect to the 4

crime scene in order to try to confirm or to deny 5

that possibility? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: Oh! He would have 7

to process the crime scene in its totality. 8

MR. FREIMAN: What does that mean? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: That means to 10

collect any -- any evidence that they believed at 11

the time to be able to speak to circumstances that 12

have evolved, leading up to the incident which 13

they are investigating. 14

MR. FREIMAN: You have now had an 15

opportunity to review the GO file off for a while 16

and I assume in some detail and you have also seen 17

the quality assurance review. 18

Can you pinpoint anything at all 19

that was done from the time that the investigators 20

came into the room to the time that the medical 21

examiner received -- sent his preliminary 22

assessment that's consistent with trying to 23

disprove foul play at the scene of a crime? 24

I am not talking about the 25


170

interviews about his background and past. Is 1

there anything at all that was done at the scene 2

of the crime that was intended to rule out the 3

possibility that this was staged, that the note 4

was a forgery, that someone else was in the room, 5

that something had been done, and there are 6

those -- an auto erotic issue, anything at all 7

that comes to your mind? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Nothing 9

specifically now, right now. 10

MR. FREIMAN: You recall of the 11

quality assurance review noted that there was no 12

effort to check anything that might have happened 13

outside because the window was open and we know 14

that the note was not fingerprinted. Should it 15

have been? 16


if I was doing that today, then yes I would. 18

MR. FREIMAN: We know there was no 19

handwriting analysis done. Should that have been 20

done? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: Again, if I was 22

doing this investigation today, I would. 23

MR. FREIMAN: And in terms of an 24

analysis of the position of the body and what the 25


171

body itself would tell someone about what had 1

happened, was there anything that should have been 2

noted by Master Corporal Ritco, as indicating 3

whether this was or wasn't a suicide? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe he did 5

take great notes with respect to this. My 6

recollection is that he -- there was video 7

footage. There was, I believe, photographs. He 8

had -- they had taken a -- they have been very 9

cautious to process the scene very carefully and 10

that took the amount of time that they deemed 11

necessary to be able to do that. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. We know that 13

they did take a good deal of time. They 14

videotaped everything. They made notes of 15

everything that they seized. 16

Are you aware of any analysis of 17

the crime scene with a view towards establishing 18

the probability or the improbability that 19

something other than suicide had occurred in that 20

room? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: By analysis, I 22

would -- I would assume you mean external 23

analysis, as opposed to their own. I don't know. 24

MR. FREIMAN: No. Even their own 25


172

analysis, is there any notation that you can 1

remember on the file of and I don't know -- I'll 2

use the cloak look as I am not an investigator -- 3

of Sergeant Ritco putting one and one together in 4

terms of the body is in such and such a position, 5

that must mean that you are -- or the furniture in 6

the room is in such and such a state that must or 7

that likely means that. 8

Did you see any sort of analysis 9

like that? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: I see where you 11

are going. The only -- the only thing that jumps 12

to my mind right now is the -- is the comment that 13

the room was in a state of disarray and that would 14

be -- that would be the only thing that would seem 15

to jump to my mind as to lead the -- lead a reader 16

of that comment to say perhaps there was a reason 17

for it, because there is a room that is in a state 18

of disarray because they are just a messy person 19

and then, there is a state of array as in 20

everything seems to be very meticulously placed, 21

with the exception of a particular sector of the 22

room. 23

MR. FREIMAN: Yes, yes. Now, that 24

was in fact an issue that you took some pains to 25


173

find out about; wasn't it? 1

MAJ DANDURAND: I did. I do 2

believe I asked about that particular comment. 3

MR. FREIMAN: Do you remember who 4

you asked? 5


MR. FREIMAN: Because we have a 7

note that says: "Disarray equals a bachelor's 8

quarters" and there is a comment in fact, in the 9

November 28th interview where to tell the Fynes, 10

when you talk about disarray, that's disarray the 11

way a young lad on his own would leave a room? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: That's correct. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So that 14

actually is a dead end in terms of an analysis of 15

crime scene. 16

MAJ DANDURAND: After the fact, 17

yes. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. There is a 19

discussion in the November interview of retention 20

of exhibits and that sort of connected with the 21

suicide note because the suicide note was retained 22

by the NIS and not returned to the family and they 23

thought it should be returned. And that leads, of 24

course, to the next question: 25


174

Is there anything else that was 1

retained? 2

Do you remember what you did to 3

satisfy yourself as to the how the personal 4

effects were gathered, stored, catalogued and 5

returned, so that I take it you are anticipating a 6

question like this, you could answer the Fynes' 7

questions? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. I believe 9

that I asked Petty Officer McLaughlin to be able 10

to look into exactly what the state of our 11

evidentiary holdings was at that time. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. What did you 13

find out? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe we found 15

out that we were holding -- I believe that we have 16

identified that we were holding pill bottles and 17

some other possible pharmaceuticals and a medical 18

employment limitations chit. I would assume it's 19

a MEL chit and a MED chit. 20

MR. FREIMAN: And during the 21

course of the interview, and we can look at it if 22

you like, but I don't think it's at all a 23

problematic question, but you say you've had Petty 24

Officer McLaughlin look at the exhibits and there 25


175

is no personal effects. 1

Was it your view that these items 2

were not personal effects? 3


MR. FREIMAN: Can you explain 5

that? What were they if they weren't personal 6

effects? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe that 8

they were the property of the Commanding Officer 9

who would be able to afford me the opportunity to 10

dispose of them. The issues of pill bottles, for 11

instance, not necessarily -- those are not 12

personal belongings. Those are prescription items 13

that need to be disposed of. It's not routine for 14

us to return pills to individuals once these -- 15

MR. FREIMAN: And what about the 16

note, the chit? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: The chit? 18


MAJ DANDURAND: I hadn't given 20

that any thought at the time. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Did you discover why 22

those items were still being held as evidence? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't believe I 24

posed the question because I was more concerned 25


176

with what we were holding, not why. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Well, given that one 2

of the concerns that was expressed was a concern 3

with the practice of identifying evidence and 4

holding evidence, I may be wrong, but it seems to 5

me that a natural question would have been: well, 6

how do we define evidence that has to be held that 7

these were seemingly irrelevant items but still 8

being stored? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: I could see where 10

that question would come to your mind. However, 11

at the time, I was not thinking in that light. I 12

was thinking that we were holding these items in 13

line with our evidence policy and, therefore, that 14

we were right to have them. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Was there any 16

part of the background check that you -- 17

background check is obviously the wrong word -- 18

the background information that you were gathering 19

to try to understand what in fact the evidence 20

retention policies were and the evidentiary 21

retention practices were throughout the period 22

leading up to the discovery of the suicide note, 23

so as to identify what went wrong? 24

Did you inquire into what the 25


177

process was that led to the suicide note and four 1

other items being held in an evidence locker and 2

not appearing as any manifest either personal 3

belongings or of evidence 4

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I did not. 5

MR. FREIMAN: As you mentioned 6

earlier in our discussions, one of the issues that 7

the Fynes were concerned about was the redactions 8

to the report. And there was a great deal of 9

discussion about why -- what was redacted and why 10

it was redacted. 11

I'm not sure that it's necessary 12

for us to go in great detail into the discussion 13

itself, but my recollection was that you explained 14

to the Fynes that the severances were made in 15

accordance with the Department of Access to 16

Information and to their requirements and that, in 17

fact, the NIS had no real say over any of these 18

things. 19

I think that's what -- what the 20

tenor of the discussion was. 21

Let's look at an interchange 22

because it's probably a good platform for us to 23

have a bit of a discussion about this. 24

MS RICHARDS: I'm sorry. Before 25


178

we move on to another topic, I just wanted to 1

address, Mr. Chair, a statement or assertion 2

that's just been made by Commission counsel which 3

I think may inadvertently leave a fact -- an 4

inaccurate representation of the facts. 5

Commission counsel asserted to the 6

witness that -- asked him whether or not he'd 7

inquired whether -- why those four items didn't 8

appear anywhere as a personal item or on an 9

evidence log. 10

They do, indeed, appear within the 11

GO as evidence. 12

MR. FREIMAN: They appear within 13

the GO as evidence and they are -- there is a 14

notation for continuity of when they were seized 15

and how they were held. I apologize for the 16

imprecision of my remarks. 17

What I had intended was in none of 18

the lists that were compiled for purposes of 19

informing the Fynes or, in fact, of informing the 20

chain of command of what articles were still being 21

stored, the list of evidence that was produced in 22

October has 12 or 13 items, and none of those four 23

items appear. 24

And they only appear in the GO 25


179

file as having been seized and in the file -- in 1

the portion of the records held by the NIS that 2

relate to continuity of items in the evidence log. 3

So with that clarification -- 4

THE CHAIRPERSON: I agree with 5

that. I don't think there's any question, is 6

there? 7

MS RICHARDS: I just wanted to 8

make sure that the record was clear on that issue 9

and, as I said, I'm sure it was inadvertent, but 10

it is an important distinction. 11

THE CHAIRPERSON: No, I agree. 12

That's what they were. 13

MR. FREIMAN: If we go back to -- 14

is there something that you think you might be 15

able to find that would help us with that? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: No. 17

MR. FREIMAN: Can we go back, 18

then, to -- 19

THE CHAIRPERSON: He forgot what 20

he was looking for, so maybe you can help. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Well, we actually -- 22

we're about to talk about the severances for 23

Access to Information. I hadn't posed a question. 24

I was going to direct his 25


180

attention to the interview transcript that appears 1

at Tab 6 at page 106. 2

Well, let's go back a little 3

because we might put some context into it to 4

understand what the Fynes were complaining about 5

and the nature of the answer that was given. 6

Starting at line 17 on page 98, 7

Mr. Fynes says: 8

"Why is the list of Stuart's 9

property that was seized 10

redacted?" 11

Ninety-eight (98), line 17. 12

THE CHAIRPERSON: Ninety-eight 13

(98)? 14

MR. FREIMAN: Ninety-eight (98). 15

"Why is the list of Stuart's 16

property [Mr. Fynes asks] 17

that was seized redacted?" 18

And you say: 19

"I want to make sure that 20

what you got is exactly the 21

same as what I got --" 22

And Mr. Fynes says: 23

"I'm sure it is." 24

And you say: 25


181

"-- because --" 1

And Mr. Fynes says: 2

"But like here, we've got 3

people who have got all kinds 4

of personal information --" 5

And you say: 6

"-- because you can page 7

numbers, right?" 8

And Mrs. Fynes is continuing: 9

"But different people -- we 10

don't have a list of his 11

things. There's all kinds of 12

information here that I don't 13

care about." 14

Mr. Fynes says: 15

"There's a cast of thousands 16

from the MP and the NIS." 17

"MRS. FYNES: Yeah. All 18

kinds of things, stuff. 19

Phone numbers and all kinds 20

of things." 21

And you say: 22

"So are there portions of the 23

report -- how about we do 24

that? I just want to make 25


182

sure that Shaun -- take one 1

of your examples and make 2

sure that that report --" 3


"See, your report is bigger 5

than ours." 6

And you say: 7

"I don't know. Is it?" 8


"Yes, it is." 10

And you say: 11

"I mean, yes, it is. I'm 12

sure you got an exact copy 13

and I'm sure you got an exact 14

copy." 15

And you say: 16

"Yeah, and this is a 17

redacted --" 18


"Well, like, what's on -- 20

what's on here? Yeah, that's 21

notes. Corporal Bruce Hayes. 22

But why don't we get that?" 23

And Petty Officer McLaughlin says: 24

"Police notes." 25


183

"But there are other pages, 1

yeah. But I was told the 2

police notes were available 3

through Access to 4

Information." 5

"No", you say. 6


"Yes. Yes." 8

What's the answer? Are police 9

files available through Access to Information, or 10

aren't they? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: Police files are 12

available for Access to Information. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Police notes. 14

Police notes. Are they? 15


is that they are not for ATI purposes. 17

Now, once you go to Court and once 18

you have disclosure, they are. But they are 19

redacted -- my understanding is they are redacted 20

in order to protect police practices and sensitive 21

information. 22

For instance, the information that 23

we redact in the entities is -- is originating, in 24

most cases, from the officers' notes and, 25


184

therefore, they must also be redacted even when 1

the totality of the file is disclosed during 2

proceedings. 3

That was my understanding. 4

MR. FREIMAN: All right. So we'll 5

go with that understanding. And let me just 6

follow up on that. 7

When police notes are redacted, 8

who does the redaction? Is that a DAIP redaction 9

or is that an NIS redaction or an MP redaction? 10


was that the -- the original -- it depends where 12

the request comes into whether or not the Military 13

Police would be flagged early enough -- notified 14

early enough on whether or not there would be a 15

disclosure of a particular investigation. 16


MAJ DANDURAND: ATI or DAIP, my 18

understanding was -- is that they would send it to 19

our Military Police ATIP coordinator and they 20

would be notified that certain redactions were 21

occurring and certain files were happening and 22

then that person would contact the respective 23

department and identify whether or not we believed 24

more needed to be redacted out of the report and, 25


185

if so, we could make that identified to DAIP. 1

However, they ultimately held the -- I would say 2

the trump card with respect to whether or not our 3

arguments and submissions for redactions were 4

deemed appropriate in line with the Act. 5

MR. FREIMAN: Well, as a practical 6

matter, if you say these are police notes that 7

reveal police practices, in what position are they 8

to say, "No, you're wrong. You don't understand 9

what police practices are?" 10

They're not, are they? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: I would agree. 12

MR. FREIMAN: So -- and is it also 13

not the case that you can decide to produce less 14

of a report even before it goes to Access to 15

Information? 16

You can decide on your own not to 17

provide certain portions of the report quite 18

independently of Access to Information. 19

MAJ DANDURAND: That's not my 20

understanding. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Again, I 22

hesitate to tread into areas of recollection and 23

evidence in these proceedings, and your counsel, 24

who knows these things much better than I do, will 25


186

correct me if I'm wrong. But my understanding of 1

the evidence is that the file that was provided 2

for severance to Access to Information, in fact, 3

was not the entire 2008 file, that a selection had 4

been made even before it got sent to Access to 5

Information. 6

And is -- do you have any 7

information or belief about that? 8


MR. FREIMAN: Then I won't pursue 10

it any further. 11

Did you ever get to the bottom of 12

the question of why severances were made to 13

information like the question of whether -- of 14

instruction being given to Sergeant Hiscock or by 15

Sergeant Hiscock to Corporal Hurlburt to cut down 16

the body? 17

That -- Mr. Fynes complains that 18

particular detail is severed in the copy that they 19

got. 20

Did you ever get to the bottom of 21

why that would be severed? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I did not. I 23

didn't pursue that. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Did you pursue the 25


187

issue of the various redactions that were 1

complained of? 2

MAJ DANDURAND: What I recall is 3

that we had an original disclosure or -- 4

disclosure copy, an original redacted copy 5

provided and that I had looked at it and I had 6

formed a belief that more was redacted out of 7

there than what I believed the privacy -- in my 8

interpretation, what a privacy request would 9

warrant. 10

And that I had -- I had identified 11

in my mind that Mr. and Mrs. Fynes would take 12

exception with that upon receipt of it and made 13

phone calls, I believe, to my Headquarters to say, 14

"Can we not engage with DAIP to say come on, this 15

is a privacy request. Can we not provide 16

something more indicative of what it would as 17

though Corporal Langridge were requesting this 18

report himself?" 19

And I -- I think we were able to 20

get to that, but there were still redactions in 21

there. And in my notes, that's why -- in 22

preparation for that meeting, that's why I 23

identified those redacted pages. 24

For instance, complete pages were 25


188

black and redacted. I wanted to be able to 1

identify what those redactions were for my own 2

knowledge so that if they were to say, "Well, I 3

believe it's X", I would be able to say, well, 4

either, you know, you're correct that, topically, 5

this is what it is, or topically, no, it's not or, 6

in some cases, maybe it's a blank page. 7

And I found that in the copy that 8

I had, a lot of the pages were blank pages. 9

MR. FREIMAN: All right. Well, 10

we'll -- let's leave that issue and go to another 11

issue. 12

One of the other issues that the 13

Fynes were concerned about in the meeting was the 14

length of time it took to cut the body down. 15


MR. FREIMAN: Had you done any of 17

your own research into this? Had you made any 18

inquiries as to why it took a long time to cut the 19

body down? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't remember 21

if I did any inquiries into that. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Let's look at the 23

passage where you're talking about it. This is 24

page 130, again at Tab 6. 25


189

Actually, why don't we look at 129 1

to get the full flavour of it? Mrs. Fynes says: 2

"Can you explain to me -- 3

sorry, can you explain to me 4

why my son was left hanging 5

for four or five hours? Why 6

was he just left hanging like 7

a piece of meat? Can someone 8

explain that to me, please? 9

It's a huge question that I 10

have." 11

And you say: 12

"I will get you the answer. 13

I'll speak to Matt because I 14

can't -- he should have been 15

here. I can't speak to that 16

decision." 17

The first question I wanted to ask 18

you was, why wasn't Corporal Ritco at the meeting? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: Because it's not 20

customary for us to put the investigator in 21

those -- in those meetings. It was a task that 22

was performed by the Detachment Commanders and as 23

high up the chain as possible, whether it be the 24

2IC or otherwise, whoever was available down the 25


190

line. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. You say in 2

the answer I just read to you that you were going 3

to speak to Matt, which is Sergeant Ritco, and get 4

an answer. 5

Did you, and what was the answer? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe I had -- 7

I believe I had discussed with him what had 8

transpired in totality. And as -- as I recall 9

that discussion going, it was more along the lines 10

walk me through the sequence of events, generally 11

speaking, that happened. 12

And from what I can recall is that 13

he described how he attended the Military Police 14

detachment, awaited the arrival of the coroner. 15

They had a little bit of a briefing. They then 16

proceeded to the scene and then things transpired 17

from there. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Was that a 19

discussion you had before or after this meeting? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe it was a 21

discussion after. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Because it 23

would appear from this particular passage that 24

you're telling the Fynes you're going to go and 25


191

speak to Sergeant Ritco and you're going to give 1

them an answer. 2

And I'm wondering whether you 3

did -- whether you did give the answer that you 4

got from Sergeant Ritco. 5

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't recall if 6

I gave them the answer to that, in the end. 7

MR. FREIMAN: You then go on and 8

there's more of a discussion. 9

I just want to ask you quickly -- 10

it's not a matter of great concern, but just to 11

get a little better understanding. At page 130, 12

Petty Officer McLaughlin says: 13

"I can't speak to what the MO 14

or Matt or the other 15

investigators --" 16

And Mrs. Fynes said: 17

"But again, it goes to the 18

whole --" 19

And you say: 20

"Here's the thing. The thing 21

is, Sheila, the Medical 22

Examiner owns the scene. 23

Yeah. And? 24

It's actually not my scene 25


192

until he attends, until he 1

says what's to happen, 2

actually. 3

And he said suicide [Mrs. 4

Fynes says]." 5

You continue: 6

"The Military Police follow 7

his directions explicitly. I 8

mean, he's going to say if 9

he -- if he's going to -- if 10

he says 'Do this', then we do 11

it. If he says 'Seize the 12

bottle, grab the 26-ounce 13

bottle, grab that pill case', 14

then that's what we do." 15

Mrs. Fynes: 16

"So that's the Medical 17

Examiner?" 18

"Yes", you say. 19

"And once he's satisfied, or 20

she -- once they are 21

satisfied that their 22

direction has been followed, 23

they -- and they determine 24

what occurs, then we have the 25


193

scene and we can process it 1

for all the other criminal 2

forensic processing we need 3

to do." 4

Your -- was the point you were 5

trying to make that the Medical Examiner directs 6

the police in terms of what to do and what not to 7

do, or was it some other point that you were 8

making? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: The -- the initial 10

response to a scene, we very much rely upon the 11

Medical Examiner to arrive, to have first crack at 12

assessing what it is that they want to seize. 13

Where the scene has been secured 14

and it is not dissolving before our eyes, for 15

instance, in inclement weather -- 16


MAJ DANDURAND: -- then we will -- 18

we will wait for their arrival. 19

They understand what their 20

subsequent processes will be through their 21

investigation and in their -- in their work, so 22

they, in their experiences, will direct us to 23

seize the materials at the scene properly for 24

continuity of evidence and such. 25


194

Once that is done, then they can 1

leave and they -- they remove the body, we will 2

then proceed on with perhaps forging on with other 3

evidence that will speak to what has happened and 4

as well examination of the crime scene to try and 5

draw a better understanding of what has happened. 6

But they don't remain, 7

necessarily, there throughout the entire time that 8

we are processing a crime scene. 9

MR. FREIMAN: To your 10

understanding now, is that what actually happened 11

at the -- the scene of the death in this case? 12

Was the Medical Examiner directing 13

the activities of the NIS? 14


is that the two entities worked -- worked in 16

partnership during the duration of the time that 17

the Medical Examiner was present at the scene. 18


We talked about turning off the 20

tape recorder at some point and -- 21


MR. FREIMAN: -- you're asking 23

Petty Officer McLaughlin to compile -- sorry, 24

afterwards to compile a list of questions posed 25


195

during the briefing. 1

And we actually have those at Tab 2

169, page 30. And sadly, when I say page 30, 3

that's page 30 in my hand annotated list. 4

The way to find it is to flip 5

through and you're going to see -- 6

THE CHAIRPERSON: Where are we? 7

MR. FREIMAN: It's 169. 8

There are white pages with numbers 9

on them, 64, 65. You're already at 72. 10

The note I'm looking at is the one 11

that's facing handwritten 68 in Tab 169. 12

You're getting closer. It's 13

closer to the beginning than to the end. In fact, 14

it's quite close to the beginning. 15

If you get to 68, bingo. 16

That's the list of questions that 17

was compiled by Petty Officer McLaughlin. And at 18

a minimum, the last point: 19

"A member of the BOI had 20

requested a meeting with the 21

Fynes' lawyer vice speaking 22

with the Fynes directly. 23

This cost was incurred on the 24

Fynes. Why are they 25


196

responsible for paying for 1

this meeting if the member 2

requested to speak with their 3

lawyer vice speaking with the 4

Fynes personally?" 5

I don't recall -- and again, my 6

control over the documents is legendary for its 7

incompleteness, but I don't recall seeing that in 8

the transcript of this meeting. 9

If it's not there, would that mean 10

that this was one of the issues that might have 11

been talked about after the recorder was turned 12

off? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: That would be a 14

safe assumption, yes. 15

MR. FREIMAN: I understand that 16

another topic may have been discussed in the time 17

after the recorder was turned off, was the entire 18

issue -- I'll call it the Lieutenant-Colonel King 19

issue about an allegation that a repealed 20

provision had been quoted. 21

Do you recall that discussion 22

happening at that meeting? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: I do. I recall it 24

happening outside my office. 25


197

MR. FREIMAN: Because we don't 1

have any notation in Petty Officer McLaughlin's 2

notes about that particular piece of information. 3

And it's relatively important because it's going 4

to have -- 5

MAJ DANDURAND: M'hmm. 6

MR. FREIMAN: --- a subsequent 7

history, isn't it? 8


MR. FREIMAN: All right. So let's 10

just deal with the list as it exists. 11

At a number of points during the 12

interview with the Fynes, you tell them that 13

you're committed either to answering their 14

questions or to finding out what the answers are 15

and to satisfying their -- their questions and 16

ensuring that they feel good about the answers 17

that they've gotten. 18

Do you remember that 19

undertaking -- 20

MAJ DANDURAND: I remember 21

committing to -- 22

MR. FREIMAN: -- or that 23

statement? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah, I remember 25


198

committing to -- 1


statement? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah. I remember 4

committing to addressing their questions and I 5

also remember saying that I may not provide the 6

answers that they like, but that I would provide 7

them answers, yes. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Do you remember how 9

that follow-up took place, what happened? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: A few things. 11

First off, I distinctly remember providing them 12

all of my contact details. 13

The follow-up, quite frankly, on 14

my end was sparse and was not up to the standard 15

of follow-up that we would come to expect from an 16

NIS detachment. 17

MR. FREIMAN: I would like to 18

suggest to you that there was no follow-up. 19

Are you aware of a follow-up to 20

the list of questions that we just looked at, at 21

page 30 of Tab 169? 22


in our second -- I can't recall if it's our second 24

or third meeting I had described to them taking 25


199

administrative matters, matters that I deemed not 1

criminally relevant, and bringing them to the 2

attention of those who I believed would be in a 3

position to swiftly rectify those matters. 4

Issues such as their expenses with 5

respect to having their son's death certificate 6

amended, things such as the memorial, having him 7

identified in Calgary at the Western Area 8

Memorial, the Memorial Cross; highlighting that to 9

the chain of command. So I do believe that I had 10

in some degree followed up. 11

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Am I correct, 12

though, I haven't seen anything in writing to 13

follow up on these questions? 14

Am I correct that it wasn't a 15

written response to the questions that Petty 16

Officer McLaughlin had recorded? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah, I would say 18

that's a safe assumption. Most of the written 19

interactions, I believe, that I can recollect 20

between myself and Mr. Fynes was specific to the 21

BlackBerry issue and, as well, trying to identify 22

mutually agreeable times to meet. 23

MR. FREIMAN: One of the other 24

issues that arose that wasn't dealt with 25


200

immediately but was, in fact, dealt with was the 1

issue of the concluding remarks. 2


MR. FREIMAN: Can you put us into 4

the picture as to what your understanding was of 5

the Fynes' concerns and how you addressed those 6

concerns? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, my 8

understanding in speaking with the Fynes and 9

particularly hearing Shaun Fynes describe it is 10

that there were three sub-components of the 11

overall concluding remarks: 12

- One being that Corporal 13

Langridge had committed suicide and death by 14

asphyxiation apparent to his suicide; 15

- The second being that the 16

military provided structure; 17

- And the third being -- and I 18

would have to flip to the actual concluding 19

remarks to be able to recall those specifically. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Sure, well -- 21

MAJ DANDURAND: Maybe I should 22

just so I don't get it wrong. 23

MR. FREIMAN: We can do that. 24

Let's look at the 25


201

--- Off microphone / Sans microphone 1

MR. FREIMAN: -- file and there 2

are two versions of the concluding remarks. They 3

occur at 520 and -- 4

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah. 5

MR. FREIMAN: -- sorry, 521 and 6

522. 7

Sorry, 520 and 521 and then there 8

is an amendment that you made in March. 9

--- Pause 10

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah, so the 11

existing concluding remarks at the time of that 12

meeting, I believe, were the ones preceding mine 13

dated the 2nd of June, 1620. 14

MR. FREIMAN: So that's the second 15

version and we've heard that -- 16


MR. FREIMAN: -- how those second 18

versions come into being. 19

So that's what they would have 20

had. What's your recollection of their complaint 21

and what did you do about it? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: My recollection in 23

the transcript -- I believe the transcripts would 24

identify that was that basically the Military 25


202

Police is not in a position to comment on whether 1

the CF provided structure to prevent the death, 2

nor are we in a position to professionally speak 3

as to whether it was his alleged PTSD or his 4

substance abuse that would have led to the 5

suicide. 6

And, therefore, those two specific 7

lines had no bearing in concluding remarks that 8

would stand as their son's last public record of 9

his life. 10

They took great exception in that 11

inaccuracy, understanding that this was a document 12

that I'm sure that they understand would be ATI'd 13

be people examining perhaps this particular case 14

or this case in light of other issues. 15

So my understanding of that, I 16

looked at it. I hadn't thought of it in that 17

perspective, in that light and I said I would get 18

back to them. 19

Because one of the issues on that 20

given day that I wanted to look at was I wasn't 21

involved in this investigation. What place is it 22

for me to change these concluding remarks? 23


MAJ DANDURAND: And therefore I 25


203

wanted to discuss this with my Commanding Officer 1

in order to familiarize myself as to what would be 2

the appropriate course of action and would we be 3

able to address that for the Fynes as a matter of 4

a lasting last public record of their son's death? 5

MR. FREIMAN: And you -- at some 6

point you got an answer. What was the answer? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: I had proposed 8

that the concluding remarks being that they are an 9

investigation into the sudden death of Corporal 10

Langridge should reflect the cause of death and, 11

therefore, be kept short and be factually 12

representative of what has happened and not 13

editorialize. 14

The Commanding Officer agreed and 15

I proposed that a new concluding remarks be 16

inserted into the General Occurrence, 17

understanding that the final and most recent 18

concluding remarks is the public record. 19

MR. FREIMAN: When you say you 20

were speaking to your Commanding Officer was that 21

Lieutenant-Colonel Sansterre? 22


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. The file note 24

in the GO file at page 519 is recorded at Tuesday, 25


204

March -- sorry, Tuesday, the 2nd of March, 2010. 1

That was the day before you met with the Fynes. I 2

take it that isn't a coincidence. 3

MAJ DANDURAND: To be frank, 4

that's likely me catching up on my administration 5

and making sure that everything was done prior to 6

that meeting. However, that's not reflective of 7

the time and space of when I would have had that 8

conversation with Colonel Sansterre. 9

MR. FREIMAN: So that would have 10

happened earlier? 11


exactly when it occurred, but I don't recall it 13

occurring specifically right then and there. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Now, we've looked at 15

the transcript of the entry that you had. 16

Oh, sorry, there is one other 17

topic that was raised by the Fynes. The specific 18

topic was the suicide prevention protocols and Mr. 19

Fynes' allegation that something should have been 20

done pursuant to the suicide prevention protocol 21

as it wasn't done and that there was a fault 22

attached to that. Do you remember that 23

discussion? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: I remember that 25


205

being raised, yes. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Was anything 2

done about that complaint? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: That issue 4

specifically, no. 5

MR. FREIMAN: Was there a reason? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: None that I can 7

recall. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Well, I 9

wanted to suggest to you that there were a number 10

of complaints that were raised for which the Fynes 11

did not appear to have been satisfied by the 12

explanations that you gave. 13

I want to suggest to you that the 14

first one was about the treatment -- the note and 15

its treatment. We've already looked at it to a 16

great extent. In fact, the recorded portion of 17

the meeting ended with an apparent expression of 18

dissatisfaction by Mrs. Fynes about what had 19

happened and about the notion that if required a 20

long investigation would discover that Stuart had 21

committed suicide. 22

Am I correct that she hadn't been 23

satisfied by the explanation offered? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't know 25


206

whether she was satisfied, but I can tell you that 1

there was a definite air of displeasure throughout 2

the duration of that discussion. It was a very 3

fractious, all over the place discussion that was 4

very difficult to track. 5

MR. FREIMAN: And we noticed that 6

topics get brought up, they'd get side-tracked for 7

a while. They'd come back. They'd go off. 8


MR. FREIMAN: And it is hard to 10

get it all done or to get it all itemized. 11

But is it fair to say that one 12

topic of concern raised by the Fynes was that the 13

2008 investigation was overly intrusive? It went 14

into areas that were not necessary for the 15

investigation? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: I would say on one 17

hand they believed that it was overly 18

comprehensive. My interpretation of this 19

conversation was that it was overly -- well, it 20

was quite elaborate for what they believed to be a 21

very simple cut and dry suicide. And yet in the 22

same vein were quite complimentary about the 23

depths that the NIS went to with respect to the 24

investigation in itself. 25


207

So there were mixed messages in 1

that conversation. 2

MR. FREIMAN: Well, in fairness 3

isn't what they said that it's better to do too 4

much than too little, but that they objected to 5

the too much, the detail of the too much? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: I didn't interpret 7

their discussion as being objective to being too 8

much, just inquisitive as to exactly why the NIS 9

would be so protracted in its investigation. I 10

believe that was at the time borne out of Mr. 11

Fynes' experience as an RCMP police officer. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Am I right, 13

though, that there wasn't a resolution to that 14

issue which is related to the first one of why it 15

took two and a half to three months when Mrs. 16

Fynes said it should have been done in three and a 17

half minutes. 18

Do you want that quote? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, please. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Sure. I'll have it 21

for you in one minute. 22

It's at page 3 of 6 again. 23

--- Pause 24

MR. FREIMAN: If you look at the 25


208

bottom of page 3, at line 13: 1

"Our first question really is 2

what's the role of the NIS as 3

opposed to a board of 4

inquiry? Like what's the 5

scope of the sudden death 6

investigation? Where does 7

that begin and end? When 8

does the [NIS take over -- 9

sorry] BOI take over or 10

summary investigations or 11

whatever else happened?" 12

Major Dandurand: 13

"Did you want to jump in, 14

Sheila, at all? 15


"Well, I guess we are very 17

confused because we find out 18

there is a 568-page report 19

into the investigation of our 20

son's death and I was stunned 21

because I said to Shaun, 'It 22

seems to me that it's an 23

investigation that should 24

have taken about three and a 25


209

half minutes. The NIS is how 1

did he die, was it natural 2

causes? 3

Like there were four or five 4

questions in the pronounced 5

death by suicide and that 6

should have been the end of 7

the police part of it. And 8

then the board of inquiry was 9

the rest of it." 10

And farther down you say: 11

"Well, I want to make sure 12

I'm clear on your question. 13

Are you questioning me why 14

the report is as protracted 15

as it is?" 16


"We are questioning why there 18

was such a big investigation 19

on the part of the police." 20

Mr. Fynes: 21

"I was going to say 22

comprehensive but there is a 23

lot more than we had 24

expected, right." 25


210

"That's a fair question" 1

You say: 2

"That's a very fair question, 3

all three of your others as 4

well. I'll address them in 5

no particular order but I 6

will address the letter 7

first. 8

It's best not to compare 9

ourselves with other law 10

enforcement agencies, mainly 11

because of our pride in the 12

quality of our work. One of 13

the things we do note and 14

perhaps we can even share in 15

this avenue is that our 16

sudden death investigations, 17

particularly the ones with 18

suicide, are so comprehensive 19

all the time. 20

Why is that? I think it's 21

attributed that this is 22

merely my opinion on the 23

matter, not necessarily my 24

branch's policy or the 25


211

Military Police policy. We 1

don't have a caseload that 2

for instance the Major Crimes 3

division, our "K" division 4

RCMP have." 5


"Actually, we know exactly 7

how big the caseload." 8

You say: 9

"Right, we do." 10

"We can afford..." 11

You say: 12

"...the time to explore other 13

investigative questions that 14

perhaps they do not." 15

So that was the question and my 16

suggestion to you is that although it was talked 17

about a lot there was no resolution of that and 18

the Fynes did not, at the end of the day, in fact 19

in our last comments they did not accept that the 20

investigation had to be as big or take as long as 21

it did. 22

Would that be fair? 23


MR. FREIMAN: Did it resolve the 25


212

issue with -- 1

MAJ DANDURAND: I felt that it was 2

an issue that it was going to -- it would be 3

tantamount to a discussion of why did it need to 4

be so comprehensive. 5

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. 6

MAJ DANDURAND: And we would go 7

around and around and around discussing this only 8

to agree to disagree. 9

MR. FREIMAN: That's fair. 10

MAJ DANDURAND: But at the end of 11

the day it wasn't something that I saw was going 12

to be easily resolved. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Another issue 14

that we started to talk about was cutting down the 15

body. 16


MR. FREIMAN: And by the end of 18

that discussion I do not believe, and you can 19

correct me if I'm wrong, that there was a 20

resolution of that either. 21

And if you'd like to look at the 22

passage you'll find it at approximately page 133 23

of the transcript. Let me make sure that I can 24

find it. 25


213

--- Pause 1

MR. FREIMAN: 129? Yeah. The 2

question we asked, why it was left for now -- but 3

there is an answer. I apologize. I just can't 4

seem to find it right now. 5

COL (RET'D) DRAPEAU: Page 130, 6

line 10. 7

MS RICHARDS: Mr. Chair, I'm not 8

clear if Commission counsel is asking the witness 9

as to whether or not he knows if the Fynes were 10

satisfied with these issues, but what I would say 11

on the public record is we all in this room know 12

they weren't because we spent the last six months 13

looking into them. 14

So I'm not clear on what the 15

purpose of these questions are? 16

MR. FREIMAN: Well, if Ms Richards 17

would allow me to finish the questions I think 18

it'll become very clear. 19

THE CHAIRPERSON: Go ahead. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Did you form the 21

impression that they were satisfied with the 22

answer to the question about cutting down the 23

body? 24



214

MR. FREIMAN: They also had a 1

concern about inaccurate findings. We talked 2

about those as they were reflected in their 3

dissatisfaction with the concluding remarks but my 4

understanding is that they were also dissatisfied 5

about the causation aspect of it, namely that he 6

had an alcohol -- an addiction and alcohol problem 7

that led to mental health issues and they believe 8

that the opposite was true. 9

But as you said, these folks had 10

no -- the investigators had no qualifications to 11

make those decisions. That was a large issue for 12

them. 13

I was going to ask you whether you 14

thought that the efforts you made subsequently to 15

change the concluding remarks were enough to 16

address those issues. 17

MAJ DANDURAND: My efforts to 18

change the concluding remarks were to address the 19

issue that I believed I was dealing with, which 20

was their dissatisfaction that those concluding 21

remarks formed the last statement with respect to 22

the totality of the investigation and, therefore, 23

the public record of their son. 24

And I agreed that the 25


215

editorialization in the original copy that they 1

had had was not proper and that I would make it 2

right, to which I presented that to them and they 3

were most thankful. 4

MR. FREIMAN: They also 5

complained, and we've looked at it, about the 6

failure to return the items -- or we haven't 7

actually looked at it. 8

They had a complaint about the 9

failure to return Stuart's personal belongings in 10

a timely manner. 11


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And that 13

really wasn't a complaint about the RCMP, was it 14

or, I'm sorry, it wasn't really a complaint about 15

the NIS. That was a complaint about the Canadian 16

Forces, right? 17


MR. FREIMAN: The other complaints 19

were complaints about the investigation and how it 20

was conducted, weren't they, that the 21

investigation took too long, that they didn't cut 22

down the body in a reasonable time, that they 23

didn't -- that they made inaccurate findings, that 24

they didn't cut down the body in time. 25


216

Those are all complaints about the 1

investigation? 2


MR. FREIMAN: And of course they 4

complained about the suicide note as well. 5


MR. FREIMAN: And everything 7

around that. Should those complaints have been 8

referred to anyone after you received them? 9

Should they have been sent for processing as 10

complaints? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: I didn't believe 12

so. I believed at the time I was dealing with a 13

family who like all other families that I have 14

been involved in briefing, were full of questions 15

and perhaps a lack of understanding of 16

contemporary investigations and, therefore -- and 17

particularly with the manner in which the NIS 18

conducted investigations. 19

And therefore, I felt that while 20

those comments were made, I didn't believe that 21

they constituted a formal complaint. I believed 22

that they required discussion. 23

MR. FREIMAN: How formal does a 24

complaint have to be in order to engage in the 25


217

obligation to report it upwards, file it as a 1

complaint or do whatever it is that needs to be 2

done when a complaint comes to the attention of a 3

member of the NIS? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: It's been my 5

experience that we at the least validate whether 6

the individual is formally complaining. We pose 7

the question: Is this what you're complaining 8

about? 9

MR. FREIMAN: So from the fact 10

that you didn't formally pose the question do I 11

understand that you didn't think you were dealing 12

with possible complaints? 13


at the time that that's how I was thinking, yes. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Looking at it now do 16

you think that there ought to have been an effort 17

to file formal complaints on behalf of the Fynes? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: With respect 19

to...? 20

MR. FREIMAN: With respect to all 21

the matters that they talked to you about, the 22

length of the investigation, cutting down the 23

body, handling the suicide note, the works. 24

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I don't. I 25


218

think that if I had at the time believed that 1

there was a marked departure from normal 2

practices, then I would have referred that to 3

another body in order to investigate or I would 4

have recommend we investigate it ourselves. 5

MR. FREIMAN: Is that a criterion 6

for deciding whether a complaint should be 7

forwarded, whether you believe that it's 8

justified? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe at the 10

time I was making an assessment of the situation 11

and trying to conduct a briefing with the family 12

and deal with the matter that was coming out of 13

that. 14

What had been highlighted to me 15

through the process of that initial meeting was 16

their dissatisfaction with the -- and their 17

concern and what I believe to be their complaint 18

with respect to the primary next of kin. That is 19

what I set upon in order to explore. 20

MR. FREIMAN: When did that arise 21

in the November 28 meeting? 22


specifically at what point it came up. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And so do I 25


219

understand that your current belief is that this 1

meeting would have been the genesis of following 2

up on the primary next of kin complaint? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't remember 4

what the exact genesis of it was. I do remember 5

having interactions with my counterparts in 6

Central Region with respect to a visit from the 7

Ombudsman's Office that they had received and the 8

subject in itself was introduced to the forefront 9

and it was something that we had ended up 10

discussing, I believe, on the 28th of November. 11

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Well, perhaps 12

since we're going to start talking about the next 13

of kin complaint this is a good place to take a 14

little bit of a break. 15

THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll break 16

until 20 after 3:00. 17



THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. 20

Before we start, just to -- it's a 21

long day for you and I want to just check on 22

timing and that and we had planned on going to 23

five, but depending on how you're feeling, we may 24

end a little bit earlier, so it depends on you as 25


220

the witness. 1

MAJ DANDURAND: Right now I feel 2

that five o'clock is fair timing. 3

THE CHAIRPERSON: We'll see what 4

we can do and where we end up. 5

Okay. Thank you. 6

MS RICHARDS: Do we have an 7

indication of how we're doing? We were just on 8

the break speaking amongst ourselves about ending 9

and starting -- 10

THE CHAIRPERSON: I didn't get to 11

ask him that. 12

MS RICHARDS: Fair enough. 13

MR. FREIMAN: It's very difficult 14

to know. I wouldn't think that we'll be finished 15

tomorrow. I think it's less likely that we'll not 16

finish tomorrow. I'll give it a try. There are 17

some answers that we've gotten today that will 18

raise a number of questions, but we're still not 19

halfway there, that's for sure. 20

THE CHAIRPERSON: Well, keep 21

working ahead. 22

MR. FREIMAN: We'll push forward 23

as long and as hard as we can. 24

There's a couple of things. We 25


221

were talking about the possibility of interpreting 1

what the Fynes told you at the November 28th 2

meeting being a complaint, and you told us that 3

you didn't think it was something that had reached 4

the point of a formal complaints process. 5

Did you think about the 6

advisability of informing the Fynes about the 7

existence of this Commission, which is Military 8

Police Complaints Commission for people to lodge 9

their complaints? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't say that 11

that would have been forefront in my mind. I can 12

say that my goal in that first meeting was to be 13

able to have a good relationship with them, to be 14

able to have them walk away with questions 15

answered and to feel as though their interaction 16

was what they would come to expect from a major 17

crimes unit, not at first sign of their 18

dissatisfaction with something to turn around and 19

say, well, it's all well and good that you've come 20

to me but here's another phone number to call to 21

raise your concerns with, because it was very 22

evident at that time that they were not satisfied 23

with their interactions with the Canadian Forces, 24

at the same time they were frustrated and my goal 25


222

wasn't to do that, it was -- as well, one of the 1

trains of thought that I had was it became evident 2

very early on through our first interaction that 3

they were very cognizant of -- my interpretation 4

was, they were very cognizant of various bodies 5

that were out there and avenues were open to them 6

and although I did not ask them if they were 7

cognizant of the Military Police Complaints 8

Commission, I had no doubt that they would have 9

been. 10

That was an assumption on my part. 11

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. There's 12

another question that I neglected to ask you and I 13

should have, prior to the meeting on the 28th of 14

November, it appears from the notes you had a 15

discussion with the President of the Board of 16

Inquiry, Major Parlee. 17


MR. FREIMAN: Do you recall that 19

discussion? Do you recall the purpose for the 20

discussion? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: I require -- I do 22

remember the purpose of the discussion and that 23

was to speak to him because at that point he had 24

had the most interaction with Mr. and Mrs. Fynes, 25


223

much more than I and the point was to simply get 1

an understanding of who it was I was about to meet 2

with the next day and potential issues or concerns 3

that may have been raised to him and what his 4

thoughts were. That's all. 5


remember what you learned, if anything, from Major 7

Parlee? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: I do believe I'd 9

made note of that for the purpose of my briefing 10

with them which I believe is in the 2008 file, if 11

I can refer to those. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Let's see if we can 13

find it. 14

MAJ DANDURAND: I was looking for 15

it earlier and I couldn't find it. 16

MR. FREIMAN: 2009 -- 17

MAJ DANDURAND: Ah, that's why I 18

couldn't find it. 19

THE CHAIRPERSON: What page is it? 20

MR. FREIMAN: 1339. No, I don't 21

think that's the one; is it? It's an earlier one. 22

I'll see if I can find it quickly, 23

I think I know where it is. 24

MS RICHARDS: 1339. 25


224

MR. FREIMAN: 1339, okay. 1

MAJ DANDURAND: Yeah, I took what 2

I had made note of for my briefing was, he had 3

conveyed Mr. Fynes was a former RCMP police 4

officer, he couldn't tell me exactly what that 5

entailed or the breadth of experience, and that of 6

course his assessment in those interactions were 7

that he found Mr. Fynes to be very rational, Mrs. 8

Fynes not as much, more on the emotional side than 9

I would suggest rationality of anything, and the 10

phone came up as an issue, the Blackberry and the 11

computer, I believe there was issues or concerns 12

that Rebecca Hamilton-Tree accessed them for 13

photos for a funeral, I believe is what came up in 14

discussion. 15

So, it was very quick. He -- if 16

I'm not mistaken -- if I'm not mistaken, he was 17

already in another posting at that time, but 18

again, it's been a long time, so that's what I can 19

recall. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Did you by the way 21

ever pursue the issue of the Blackberry since 22

we're open at that page? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I did. I 24

wanted to know what the issue was with the 25


225

Blackberry. My recollection with speaking to the 1

Fynes was that there were -- their discussion with 2

Rogers, which I believe was the service provider, 3

was that the person assessing the activity on the 4

phone was saying to them that, no, no, no, this is 5

Internet activity, not incoming calls or texts or 6

anything of that nature. 7

So, what I had asked for is 8

instead of taking this dialogue as it is, I asked 9

if they had any bills, anything of that nature, 10

because it would speak to those at the time and 11

they would go back and look for those. 12

And I think on one other occasion 13

I asked for, how we're making out with that, 14

either in writing or in person, and it was not 15

something that had been done yet. I was 16

formulating a bit of an impression that Mr. Fynes 17

was very busy, that his job was busy and that he 18

just hadn't had the opportunity and time to do 19

that. 20

What I did do on our end is speak 21

to the -- I believe it was the investigator, and I 22

asked the question of my Detachment Warrant 23

Officer to go into the -- into the research mode 24

to find out what was being pursued. 25


226

And what I came to learn is that 1

there was, I believe, in the interview -- I'm 2

going off memory here -- the interview with 3

Sergeant Ritco or one of the investigators that 4

there was an issue with the drugs and the question 5

had been raised by Mr. Fynes to say, "Okay, what 6

are you going to do to pursue that?" 7

And I think -- I believed at the 8

time that it was linked to the phone and perhaps 9

criminal intelligence that would be gained by what 10

was on that phone. 11

So this was sent away to our 12

Integrated Technical Crimes Unit, I believe, at 13

the time, which is reflected in the file. They 14

produce a separate analysis report. 15

And what I came to learn is that 16

in processing these phones, if we cannot crack the 17

code -- nine out of 10 password attempts -- such 18

that the last one is not our place to attempt it 19

because my understanding of the technology, which 20

is very weak, is that we would essentially zeroize 21

the Blackberry and, therefore, remove all future 22

possibility of getting any data off of it. 23

So that was believed to be the 24

family's place to do or the rightful owner of that 25


227

phone's to do; not ours. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Was this an 2

investigation you did or was this something that 3

you gleaned from reading the file? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe this was 5

something that we were able to extrapolate from 6

the file itself, but again supported by, I 7

believe -- I thought it was, discussions that we 8

had had with people who had been involved in that. 9

MR. FREIMAN: When you were 10

talking to Major Parlee, did you discuss at all 11

what he'd found in the Board of Inquiry? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't believe we 13

did, and if we did, it doesn't stand out right 14

now. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. While we're 16

here, we have another note that looks as though 17

it's at about the same time just above it. 18

Would I be correct in saying that 19

it was probably compiled just before the meeting 20

with the Fynes as well? 21

Same page, just above it. 22


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And this 24

reads: 25


228

"Incident log Room 314F Wing, 1

164 Ortona Road, ASU 2

Edmonton. Initial assessment 3

by AME at scene, asphyxiation 4

due to hanging. Black purple 5

arms from elbow down, black 6

chair directly behind 7

Corporal L. Room was in a 8

state of disarray equals 9

synonymous with bachelor 10

living style." 11

Do you recall why you compiled 12

these notes and where they came from? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, that says 14

"incident location", not "log". 15

MR. FREIMAN: Oh, sorry. 16

MAJ DANDURAND: But that would 17

have come from accessing the -- that level of 18

information, I would suspect, was coming from the 19

GO itself, not from speaking to anyone in relation 20

to it, with the exception of the room in a state 21

of disarray commentary. 22

I believe I would have, in the 23

process, come to ask the question, "What does that 24

mean?" 25


229

MR. FREIMAN: From whom? 1


remember. I would have, in all likelihood, had 3

discussions with PO McLaughlin on this because we 4

were working very closely on preparing for this. 5

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. What did the 6

other observations that you copied out from the GO 7

file tell you about the scene and anything that 8

was indicated about what had happened in that 9

scene? 10

Can you draw conclusions from 11

those observations, first of all, the ME saying 12

that it was asphyxiation consistent -- or from 13

hanging, the fact that the room is in disarray 14

equals a bachelor's lifestyle, the purple from the 15

elbows down and -- I put away my book, so I'm not 16

sure I've gotten the last one -- or the chair 17

directly -- or the chair behind Corporal 18

Langridge. 19

What do those details tell you as 20

an investigator? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, those 22

details tell me that the initial assessment at the 23

scene of the ME was asphyxiation due to hanging, 24

so that's being communicated -- my intention on 25


230

writing that down was that's going to be 1

communicated to the family. 2

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. 3

MAJ DANDURAND: As will the rest 4

of the relevant pieces of information that are 5

going to be communicated. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Well, do those 7

pieces of information tell you anything about 8

what -- you know, we were talking before about 9

processing the crime scene and drawing conclusions 10

from what you see. 11

Can you draw any conclusions at 12

all, as an investigator, from these pieces of 13

information, the purple -- 14

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. In isolation 15

you could, but that would be -- that would be very 16

irresponsible. 17

The point of writing these down is 18

we are briefing the family with respect to what 19

the cause of death was and what key pieces of 20

information led us to formulate -- to formulate 21

that. So I'm communicating some of those key 22

pieces of information. 23

The intent of the family briefing 24

is not to walk them through the minutiae of the 25


231

investigation. 1



MR. FREIMAN: I was more looking 4

at your assessment of what was knowable at what 5

time and wondering whether you were -- you, 6

yourself, as an investigator rather than as a 7

communicator with the family are able to draw any 8

conclusions from those pieces of information that 9

you've noted. 10

MAJ DANDURAND: I wasn't drawing 11

conclusions at the time. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Now, at some 13

point there was a discussion, as you've mentioned, 14

about the Fynes' next of kin allegations. 15

Do you recall how that entire 16

issue first came to your attention or to the 17

attention of the Western Region NIS? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't recall the 19

specific point where it did. However, I do 20

remember how I was -- I was not expecting the 21

phone call from Lieutenant (Navy) Mike Amirault. 22

He had gotten in touch with me to say that he had 23

been visited by the Ombudsman's office or 24

investigators by the -- from the Ombudsman's 25


232

office and was going to be sending me information 1

with respect to the primary next of kin issue. 2

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Did he send 3

it over? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. Yes, 5

eventually it did arrive. 6

And I believe it arrived in or 7

around this time, possibly -- possibly a day or 8

two beforehand. I don't actually recollect when 9

it arrived. 10

MR. FREIMAN: When it arrived, do 11

you recollect reading it over and drawing any 12

conclusions from the package that you got? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: I do not remember 14

specifically reading it over in great detail, but 15

it would not have been uncommon for me to open up 16

the manila envelope and leaf through the 17

documents. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. I understand 19

that several days -- two or three days before your 20

meeting with the Fynes, you had discussions with 21

members of the CF chain of command about the 22

Summary Investigation that you learned was about 23

to be started. 24

Do you remember those discussions? 25


233

MAJ DANDURAND: Which Summary 1

Investigation? 2

MR. FREIMAN: Summary 3

Investigation by the unit under the direction of 4

Major Chenette. 5



being a matter of some importance to you? 8


MR. FREIMAN: And can you tell us 10

what that was all about? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe I came 12

to learn that there was a -- going to be a Summary 13

Investigation in order for them to answer 14

questions in anticipation of having to answer them 15

in the future and recognizing that people were 16

being posted right, left and centre and time 17

was -- we were already -- we, the CF, were already 18

behind the ball with respect to the commencement 19

of the BOI and that, therefore, information was 20

needed. 21

What concerned me as the OC of 22

Western Region was to ensure that Major Chenette 23

understood where his lanes were. I wanted to know 24

specifically what it was he was going to go embark 25


234

upon and, without telling him what my 1

investigation may look into in the future, is what 2

is it that he's -- that he's looking into. 3

MR. FREIMAN: Did you have a 4

personal meeting with Major Chenette on this? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: I did go to his 6

office, yes. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So -- 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Now, one of the -- 9

one of the issues with respect to that meeting is 10

that when I went there, I also wanted to make sure 11

that he was -- I had no idea what his experience 12

was in conducting such investigations and I wanted 13

to make sure that if he -- I knew the BOI had been 14

so advised due to the fact that they had legal 15

counsel and various other entities involved, that 16

if you trip across something of a criminal nature, 17

I need to know about it right away. 18

MR. FREIMAN: Well, weren't you 19

concerned that the Summary Investigation was going 20

to be looking into exactly the same issues as the 21

Ombudsman's package disclosed as being of concern 22

to the Fynes? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: I hadn't 24

formulated that thought at the time, no. 25


235

MR. FREIMAN: Can we look at Tab 1

161, please? It's going to be in Volume 4. 2

And this is an email from -- dated 3

Wednesday, November 25th, so that would be about a 4

week after we know the Ombudsman's investigator 5

gave Lieutenant (Navy) Amirault a package and was 6

three days before you were to meet the Fynes. And 7

you write: 8

"Colonel, I respectfully 9

request 15 minutes of your 10

time in the morning to 11

discuss the SI being 12

conducted with respect to one 13

of our deceased soldiers. My 14

concern is that we, CFNIS, 15

have received a complaint 16

from the Ombudsman's office 17

relating to matters that most 18

likely overlap. In order to 19

determine whether the SI 20

needs to be stopped, I need 21

to meet with you to apprise 22

you of what we are facing 23

with the criminal 24

allegations. I am available 25


236

at any time to discuss." 1

So from this, it would look to me 2

as though you thought that there was a possibility 3

that the matters overlap. In fact, it was likely 4

that the matters would overlap. 5

MAJ DANDURAND: It would look like 6

it would be a possibility, yes. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Well, in fact, 8

wasn't it exactly the case that the -- the subject 9

matter of the Summary Investigation was an overlap 10

with the complaints to the Ombudsman's office? 11


recall. I can't recall. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Well, did you have 14

the discussion with Colonel Corbould? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I did attend 16

his office. 17

MR. FREIMAN: And what did you 18

learn? 19

Do you have notes from that 20

meeting, or was it simply a 15-minute oral 21

meeting? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: It was a verbal 23

meeting. I didn't take any notes on that meeting, 24

no. 25


237


MAJ DANDURAND: And it was even 2

less than 15 minutes. 3

MR. FREIMAN: What happened as a 4

result of that meeting? 5


MR. FREIMAN: Can we look over the 7

page? There's an email from you dated the 25th of 8

November, 2009 at 1705 p.m. It's from you to 9

Major Chenette. It reads: 10

"Major Chenette, we've never 11

met, so please allow me to 12

introduce myself. I am Dan 13

Dandurand, the OC of the 14

CFNIS in Western Canada based 15

out of Edmonton. I received 16

your name from Dave 17

Blackburn, who notified me 18

you were leading the SI into 19

the admin associated with the 20

death of one of our soldiers. 21

As you are likely aware, the 22

CFNIS investigated this death 23

and we are now facing 24

possible a second 25


238

investigation. I came to 1

learn of your SI by chance 2

and I am of the strongest 3

belief that matters being 4

looked into by your team will 5

overlap with our criminal 6

investigation. I am meeting 7

with Command 1 CMVG in the 8

morning to discuss this 9

matter, and all I ask for now 10

is that you do not proceed 11

with any further activity on 12

this SI until we can 13

determine if your activity 14

could taint our criminal 15

investigation. In speaking 16

with Dave, I understand you 17

are on exercise, so I suspect 18

the chances of you working on 19

this SI are slim. However, I 20

wanted to inform you of this 21

at the earliest possible 22

moment. Should you have any 23

questions, please do not 24

hesitate to contact me. Once 25


239

you are back in Edmonton, I 1

think it would be best for us 2

to meet and discuss the way 3

ahead." 4

So -- 5

MAJ DANDURAND: M'hmm. 6

MR. FREIMAN: -- what happened? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, I believe 8

Major Chenette stopped pursuing the SI until 9

further notice. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Do you know when he 11

began the SI? 12


recall, no. 14

MR. FREIMAN: I'll tell you 15

exactly when. 16

If we look at Tab 173, page 3 of 17

that document, you can see that the investigation 18

began with Major Lubiniecki the 27th of November, 19

2009. 20

So can we agree that Major 21

Chenette did not stop his investigation until 22

further notice? He started two days after your 23

email. 24

MAJ DANDURAND: That's how it 25


240

would appear, yes. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Did someone tell you 2

that he was going to continue with the 3

investigation? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: Not that I can 5

recall, no. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Did Colonel Corbould 7

tell you that he wanted the investigation to 8

proceed regardless? 9


recall. 11

MR. FREIMAN: If you wanted to 12

stop the Summary Investigation, what would you 13

have had to do? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: Say the word. 15

MR. FREIMAN: To whom? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: Colonel Corbould. 17

MR. FREIMAN: Why didn't you? 18

From your -- 19

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't -- my 20

recollection of that meeting with Colonel Corbould 21

because that was -- that was a long time ago, is 22

very vague. 23

I remember being in the room. I 24

remember -- I do not remember the specifics of our 25


241

conversation. 1


remember -- were you aware at this point as to who 3

the potential suspects were in the complaint that 4

was filed by the Ombudsman? 5

Who was the complaint against? 6

MAJ DANDURAND: If I remember this 7

right, it would have been the Adjutant and those 8

involved in determining who is the primary next of 9

kin. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And so it's 11

the Adjutant who was involved in determining the 12

primary next of kin. 13

And what were some of the issues 14

that had to be determined in the course of the 15

investigation if you were going to take up the 16

investigation into the complaint? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: I'm not sure I 18

understand your question. 19

MR. FREIMAN: The investigation, 20

you've told us -- or the complaint, you've told 21

us, involved the Adjutant and the decision as to 22

who was going to be the next of kin. Is that 23

correct? 24



242

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So were you 1

also aware that there was a complaint about the 2

registration of death that had been proceeded with 3

by Ms. Hamilton-Tree and that there was a 4

complaint that the military was somehow involved 5

in a falsification of the information? 6


MR. FREIMAN: All right. Can we 8

look back, then, at page 3 of the document that 9

we've just looked at at 173? 10

Who's the witness that we were 11

just talking about? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: ON page 173? 13

MR. FREIMAN: On page 3. 14


MR. FREIMAN: The witness' name is 16

Major M.J. Lubiniecki. What was his role? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: At the -- 18

MR. FREIMAN: What was his -- 19

MAJ DANDURAND: He was the unit 20

Adjutant at the time of Corporal Langridge's 21

death. 22

MR. FREIMAN: So this is the 23

person who was potentially the suspect or, if 24

there were charges brought, the accused. 25


243


MR. FREIMAN: Look at the first 2

question. 3

This is a list of questions that 4

were being formulated. The first question is: 5

"Was the unit aware of a 6

change in marital status of 7

Corporal Langridge?" 8

Was that a question that would 9

have been relevant to an investigation of the 10

Ombudsman complaint as you understood it? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: As I understand it 12

today, I would say yes. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. As you 14

understood it then? 15


MR. FREIMAN: Two: 17

"Was there anything on 18

Corporal Langridge's personal 19

file indicating a revocation 20

of common-law status?" 21

Was this a question that would 22

have been relevant to the 2009 -- or to the 23

Ombudsman's complaint as you then understood it? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: Again, yes. 25


244

MR. FREIMAN: 1

"Did the unit participate in 2

the registration of death of 3

Corporal Langridge?" 4

Would this be a question that 5

would have been relevant to the Ombudsman's 6

complaint as you understood it? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: As I see it today, 8

yes. As I saw it back then, I would say no 9

because we were focused on the primary next of kin 10

determination, that key component, and viewed 11

everything that happened at the funeral home after 12

the fact as being a consequence to that decision. 13

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Number 5: 14

"Why did the unit send Second 15

Lieutenant Brown and Corporal 16

Larover with Ms Hamilton-Tree 17

to the funeral home on 28 18

March for the registration of 19

death?" 20

Would that have been relevant to 21

the -- to the complaint as you understood it from 22

the Ombudsman? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: Again, those would 24

have been issues after the fact, again associated 25


245

to the funeral home. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Was that part 2

of the complaint that the Fynes lodged? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: That's not how -- 4

no. My interpretation of what it was we were 5

going to investigate was the negligent performance 6

of duty with respect to the primary -- 7

determination of primary next of kin, which from 8

there, at the time, our understanding was 9

everything else was a consequence thereof. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So number 6: 11

"Following the death of 12

Corporal L, were multiple 13

versions of any key documents 14

or administrative forms 15

found?" 16

Was that an issue that was 17

relevant to the complaint from the Ombudsman as 18

you understood it then? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't recall if 20

that was relevant at the time. 21

MR. FREIMAN: Seven (7): 22

"Was it unclear as to whether 23

or not there was a change in 24

marital status?" 25


246

Was that relevant? 1

MAJ DANDURAND: That would have 2

been -- that would have been relevant, yes. 3

MR. FREIMAN: 4

"Was there conflicting 5

information held in the 6

relevant files relating to 7

the unit casualty assistance 8

and the next of kin?" 9

Would that have been relevant? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I would say 11

it would be. 12

MR. FREIMAN: And then there's 13

questions about what the actions of the unit were. 14

Well, I -- what were the actions of the unit 15

following discovery of multiple versions of key 16

documents or administrative forms after the death 17

of Corporal Langridge? Would that have been 18

relevant? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: It could have, 20

possibly, yes. 21

MR. FREIMAN: We'll pass over 22

number 10. Number 11: Explain the notification 23

process that occurred after Corporal Langridge's 24

death. Include (1) who was notified, explain 25


247

based on what documentation (2) when they were 1

notified; (3) how they were notified; (4) by whom 2

they were notified? Would that have been 3

relevant? 4


have featured in our investigation, but I don't 6

know if it would have been relevant to determining 7

the specific to the decision of the primary next 8

of kin. 9

MR. FREIMAN: The next question is 10

just to provide a written statement of that event. 11

13: What NOK status confirmation 12

if any, did the unit use? Would that have been 13

relevant? 14


MR. FREIMAN: 14: What role did 16

the unit play in the planning of the funeral? 17


MAJ DANDURAND: Not in the 19

determination of who is the primary next of kin, 20

unless you back up the funeral discussions all the 21

way to that point where the decision is made. 22

MR. FREIMAN: And so, number 15 as 23

well: Were Sheila and Sean Fynes consulted in the 24

planning of the funeral for Corporate Langridge? 25


248


MAJ DANDURAND: Not as far as we 2

were investigating, no. 3

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Did Corporal 4

Langridge ever meet with you to discuss or submit 5

to you documentation to revoke his common law 6

status with Ms Hamilton-Tree? Would that have 7

been relevant? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Not as far as we 9

were investigating, no. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Did Corporal 11

Langridge ever meet with you to discuss or submit 12

to you documentation to revoke his common law 13

status with Ms Hamilton-Tree? Would that have 14

been relevant? 15


MR. FREIMAN: Can you confirm what 17

date Corporal Langridge returned to work prior to 18

his death? Relevant or not? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: For the 20

determination of next of kin; it might have 21

featured in order to explore whether he had -- 22

whether he had access to be able to change it, but 23

that would have been to provide background to that 24

question. 25


249

MR. FREIMAN: What direction if 1

any, was passed to Second Lieutenant Brown or 2

Corporal Rohmer regarding their role when they 3

escorted Ms Hamilton-Tree at the funeral home on 4

the 25th of March for the registration of death? 5


MAJ DANDURAND: Again, we were 7

investigating that decision about the primary next 8

of kin, from which we viewed everything else 9

flowing and no, I don't think that would have 10

featured as front and centre. 11

MR. FREIMAN: 19: What process 12

and documents were used to confirm the status of 13

Corporal Langridge's next of kin after his death? 14


MAJ DANDURAND: I would say yes. 16

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Then, there 17

is another question about next of kin 18

notification, tasking of assisting officers, 22. 19

The record shows that on 11th of February 2008 20

Corporal Langridge and Ms Hamilton-Tree moved out 21

of their apartment. Corporal Langridge was living 22

in a single quarters on the base and not with his 23

common law spouse. 24

Did Corporal Langridge and 25


250

Ms~sHamilton-Tree ever present themselves in 1

public or at any regimental functions as a couple 2

after that date? Would that have been relevant? 3


today I don't see it as relevant. However, at the 5

time it may have been viewed as relevant. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. Does this 7

interview plan demonstrate a major and substantial 8

overlap with your investigation into the 9

Ombudsman's complaint? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, it does. 11

MR. FREIMAN: What would happen if 12

you subsequently or what is the usual NIS 13

procedure with respect to obtaining witness 14

statements? Do you have any views as to whether 15

anyone else should have a crack at a potential 16

witness before you, where there is an 17

investigation going on? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I do have a 19

view on that. 20

MR. FREIMAN: And what is that 21

view? 22

MAJ DANDURAND: I should get first 23

crack. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Should you have 25


251

gotten first crack at Captain Lubiniecki? 1

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe we 2

should have. However, at that time with respect 3

to interviews of Captain Lubiniecki, whether it be 4

through the BOI or whether it be on the original 5

sudden death investigation, the individual had 6

already been talked to perhaps not with respect to 7

the determination primary next of kin. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Yes. 9

MAJ DANDURAND: However, other 10

matters he had been and, therefore, I am not 11

minimizing the issue, but this was not a fresh 12

incident, a fresher occurrence, a fresh event 13

where we were going to get first tips of the 14

individual. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Let us go back to 16

that. Are you aware of anyone who had previously 17

questioned Captain Lubiniecki, now Major, as to 18

the matters that we have just read, that could 19

have been crucial to your investigation? 20


MR. FREIMAN: No. Are you aware 22

of any follow-up whatsoever that was done by 23

anyone, either on the NIS side, to determine what 24

the heck was going on on the SI or on the part of 25


252

the chain of command, to try to understand what 1

was going on with the NIS investigation with 2

respect to the potential overlap? 3


MR. FREIMAN: Alright. Were you 5

aware of who the legal advisor to the summary 6

investigation was going to be? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: I may have. I 8

can't recall at this time. 9

MR. FREIMAN: I can tell you that 10

the legal advisor that did this investigation was 11

Lieutenant Colonel King. Would that have had any 12

impact at all on the investigation that you may 13

wish to conduct as a result of the Ombudsman's 14

complaint? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: It may have, but I 16

would just be using hindsight in order to be able 17

to comment on that. 18

MR. FREIMAN: The point isn't, 19

sir, that Lieutenant Colonel King was one of the 20

people that was mentioned by the Fynes in their 21

complaint? 22


MR. FREIMAN: Now, I should hear 24

at this point, say something that I try to say, 25


253

any time I ask questions about the 2009-2010 1

investigation and you will understand this, but 2

it's good that the record could fix it. 3

I am not here today or tomorrow or 4

the next day if we have to be here for a third 5

day, suggesting that anybody at all did anything 6

wrong with respect to the matters complained about 7

by the Fynes in the 2009 investigation or the 2010 8

investigation. 9

I am not today suggesting that 10

anybody, that there were any offenses committed, I 11

am not today suggesting that anyone should have 12

been charged or even could have been charged with 13

respect to anyone of those investigations. And, 14

in fact, I am often enough tend to use names 15

because there may be overtones that there was 16

something on toward that happened. 17

We are just going to discuss the 18

investigation and how it was conducted and what 19

the steps were, but I don't do that and any 20

questions that I ask you are not -- don't come 21

from a position or I am assuming that anything 22

untoward happened, anyone did anything wrong, 23

there are any crimes or any offenses that should 24

have been or could have been any charges. Okay? 25


254

So, we are just -- we will take it 1

from there. But we now know that one of the 2

people whom the Fynes had named has potentially 3

been responsible for the matters they complained 4

of, was in fact interviewed the very first -- as 5

the very first act of the summary investigation. 6

And we also know that another of 7

the people whom the Fynes had named was acting as 8

legal counsel and legal advisor to that very same 9

summary investigation. 10

Looking at it in retrospect, would 11

that have had an impact on your ability to pursue 12

the complaint, had it gone any further than it 13

did? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: Are you asking me 15

to hypothesize in this? 16

MR. FREIMAN: Well, if you have an 17

opinion I would like to know it. Even looking 18

back retrospectively, if you feel it's best not to 19

speculate retrospectively, I will respect that. 20

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I would 21

prefer not to speculate, but, yes. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. The summary 23

investigation in its terms of reference states 24

that it is convened in contemplation of 25


255

litigation. Do you have a view as to whether that 1

orientation has any impact on the utility of 2

information that's obtained in that process in 3

terms of a criminal investigation? 4

So, let me -- let me ask the 5

question directly. Could you have used anything 6

that was discovered in the summary investigation 7

in aid of your criminal investigation? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Are you asking me 9

could I have used parts of the summary 10

investigation towards my own investigation? 11


MAJ DANDURAND: I would say I 13

could. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. Let's go 15

ahead then. Do I understand correctly that 16

following this first days activity which consisted 17

of several emails and at least a meeting with I 18

think it was Major Corbould or is it Colonel then? 19

I don't want to get the rank -- 20

MAJ DANDURAND: Colonel. 21

MR. FREIMAN: After those events, 22

nothing happened with respect to the summary 23

investigation or the issue of whether the summary 24

investigation ought to continue? 25


256


MR. FREIMAN: The reason I'm 2

asking is that email that we looked at looked 3

pretty definitive saying: "I have to ask you to 4

stop because of the potential overlap" and I am 5

having some difficulty understanding what happened 6

afterwards since it didn't stop and since you went 7

total -- whether it was going to stop or not? Do 8

you have any views on that, any explanation as to 9

why it just seems to arise, that is a pretty 10

strong statement and then it disappears from our 11

viewpoint? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: What my normal 13

practice is that when I have these meetings with 14

Commanders, if I walk in with a particular intent, 15

and I achieve it, it's a done deal. My intent 16

would have been to make sure that the 17

investigation does not encroach into ours. 18

What the specific topics were that 19

were discussed in that meeting, how it played out, 20

I can't remember, but what I do remember is not 21

being concerned leaving there because if I was 22

concerned -- for instance, if I walked into a 23

Commander's Office and Colonel or General, and 24

said I need a particular set of actions to be -- 25


257

to be prescribed by you in support of criminal 1

investigations and those were not forthcoming, 2

then I would have flagged those to Lieutenant 3

Colonel Sansterre. 4

MR. FREIMAN: Well, I apologize 5

for asking, but I have to, how could you not have 6

been concerned when you write an email to Major 7

Chenette saying: "I want you to stop because of 8

the overlap" and as it happens, there is a very 9

substantial overlap. How could you not be 10

concerned? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: I did. I don't 12

know. I cannot recall if during that meeting I 13

had assurances that this would -- that this would 14

cease or what not, I can't recall. 15

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, let's go 16

back then to the investigation as it did unfold 17

and while the summary investigation was going on 18

its own way around the same time. 19

In your view, who was the 20

complainant? 21

MAJ DANDURAND: With respect to 22

the primary next of kin? 23


MAJ DANDURAND: Yes. In my view, 25


258

that was the Fynes. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. What impact 2

if any, of the fact that it was the Ombudsman who 3

directed the initial questions and gave you the 4

initial materials? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: My view of that is 6

that they were a conduit from which that complaint 7

would come to us, not the complainants themselves. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Can we look 9

at the GO file, Volume 2 and looking at page 1369? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: Which GO? 2009? 11

THE PRESIDENT: He has it in 12

Volume 2. 13

MR. FREIMAN: 1369.? 14

MAJ DANDURAND: Which page, sir? 15

MR. FREIMAN: It's Follow-up 16

Report number 1, but it doesn't look as though 17

that I have given you the right page. I think we 18

meant -- I am not sure here. Give me one second. 19

I seem to have different pagination issues, but 20

1369 of 1434, you will see that Master Seaman is 21

he then was McLaughlin records his taskings, his 22

work with Major Dandurand to conduct an 23

investigative assessment into the Ombudsman's 24

complaint that an officer may have been negligent 25


259

in the performance of his duties while acting as 1

assisting officer. 2

I am not sure anything turns on 3

it, but it would appear that at least when the 4

file was being opened, it was identified as the 5

"Ombudsman's Complaint" and does anything turn on 6

that statement in the file? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: No, not at all. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Again it's 9

the Ombudsman's complaint that an officer has been 10

negligent in the performance of his duties while 11

acting as an assisting officer. Is that accurate? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: No and I don't 13

believe -- I may be -- I don't want to speak for 14

Warrant Hart, but I know that the office didn't 15

have the same view of what that complaint was that 16

we were investigating. 17

This is an administrative record 18

of tasking an investigator to commence an 19

investigation. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, let's not 21

get hung up on details. How and when was a 22

decision made to investigate the complaint? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: Again I can't 24

pinpoint a precise time. I do know that it was 25


260

evident from speaking with Lieutenant Amirault 1

receiving a briefing that there was something 2

possibly worth examining here that may be in the 3

form of a complaint. 4

Upon meeting with the Fynes, again 5

they resumated the issues that Mike and I had 6

discussed and I believe quickly following that we 7

started to formulate the belief that we were going 8

to need to look into this. 9

It was very -- I remember feeling 10

after meeting with the Fynes, that I could not -- 11

I could not believe that despite being listed as 12

primary next of kin, that they were not identified 13

as primary next of kin in the actions in so far as 14

what had taken place. 15

So, I was very much of the mind 16

sets that something wrong had happened. 17

MR. FREIMAN: Alright. We looked 18

at Petty Officer McLaughlin's description of a 19

complaint. I just wonder if we can look a Master 20

Corporal Mitchell's description of a complaint as 21

well. 22

This is on February 12 where I 23

understand you had a meeting with him to discuss 24

this file and we can find that in the 09 GO file 25


261

at 1105. 1

MS RICHARDS: I'm sorry and 2

perhaps I misheard. I just want to make sure that 3

I didn't miss it and get the records clear. The 4

summary at page 1369, I just wish counsel -- maybe 5

I misheard that you were describing Petty Officer 6

McLaughlin's description of the complaint and -- 7

MR. FREIMAN: It's Warrant Hart. 8

MS RICHARDS: -- Warrant Hart's 9

description of the complain, not Petty Officer 10

McLaughlin's. 11

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Fine. 12

MS RICHARDS: So, there is another 13

version with Petty Officer McLaughlin does 14

describe a complaint. I just wanted to make sure 15

of that. 16

MR. FREIMAN: That's fine. 17

MS RICHARDS: So it's clear. 18

MR. FREIMAN: That is -- that is, 19

in fact, the case. 20

But let's look at what the 21

description is at 1105. Page 1105. And this is 22

the first notation in his book. He says: 23

"About 1030 hours 12th 24

February 10, met with Major 25


262

Dandurand for assessment of 1

claims of negligence by 2

LDSHRC regarding Corporal 3

Langridge's death." 4

I am just wondering about that 5

description. Was there anything that you can 6

think of that would lead Master Corporal Mitchell 7

to assume that we are talking about negligence 8

with respect to Corporal Langridge's death? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't speak to 10

what those notes mean for him. He would have to 11

speak to that himself. 12

MR. FREIMAN: But we are in 13

agreement that that is not an accurate description 14

of what you told him on the 12th of February was 15

the subject matter of the potential investigation? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: If you read them 17

literally, no it's not an accurate reflection, in 18

the sense that we were not looking at claims of 19

negligence by LDSH regarding the death of Corporal 20

Langridge. 21


MAJ DANDURAND: What negligence 23

factor we were exploring at that point, Sergeant 24

Mitchell would have to speak to. 25


263

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. In fact, 1

there was a complaint about negligence involving 2

Corporal Langridge's death, but that didn't turn 3

into a project or a file for you until several 4

months thereafter? 5


MR. FREIMAN: And if we look at 7

Master Corporal Mitchell's notebook we can see 8

that by 1655 you had sent him an email to inform 9

the Fynes of the investigation, or is that an 10

email that you had informed the Fynes of the 11

investigation? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't say. I 13

don't know. 14

MR. FREIMAN: So, as I say, I'm 15

not sure that any of this matters very much, but 16

at some point the assessment was that this file is 17

a go, we should move forward with it; right? 18


MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And, as I 20

understand it, one of the first steps that you 21

took following the discussions with the Fynes on 22

the 28th which raised some of these allegations 23

but didn't explore them, was to explore the 24

allegations with the Ombudsman's investigator? 25


264


MR. FREIMAN: And that would have 2

been in December of 2009 while Petty Officer 3

McLaughlin was still on the file? 4


MR. FREIMAN: Do you recall; do 6

you have an independent recollection of what 7

happened at that meeting? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: Mr. Martel walked 9

us through the various documents that he had, 10

provided to us what he believed to be critical 11

areas from the Code of Service Discipline that 12

would be worthy of consideration, a list of people 13

that he believed would be -- or an account of 14

involved people that he believed would be worthy 15

of looking at very closely. And that's what I 16

remember. 17

I remember there was Mr. Martel, 18

another investigator and myself and PO McLaughlin. 19

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. There are 20

some notations from both Petty Officer 21

McLaughlin's notebooks and from your own notebooks 22

and I think maybe we should look at them. 23

The first comes, the description 24

from Petty Officer McLaughlin, we'll find that at 25


265

page 221 of the GO file. Now, I'll just read this 1

out to you. Petty Officer McLaughlin writes: 2

"At 0948 hours 18 December 09 3

Master Seaman McLaughlin and 4

Major Dandurand attended the 5

Ombudsman's Office ref 6

obtaining a briefing on their 7

ongoing investigation. It 8

was discussed during the 9

meeting that Mr. Martel had 10

identified that Captain 11

Lubiniecki was negligent when 12

he appointed Ms Hamilton-Tree 13

as the next of kin. Captain 14

Lubiniecki had no 15

documentation to support his 16

statement and as the unit 17

Adjutant should have known 18

better. It was further 19

identified that Lieutenant 20

Colonel King was negligent 21

when providing a legal 22

decision advising that 23

Corporal Langridge and Ms 24

Hamilton-Tree were legally in 25


266

a common-law relationship at 1

the time of his death." 2

MR. FREIMAN: Now, does that 3

description correspond to your recollection of 4

what went on at that meeting? 5

MAJ DANDURAND: Sounds about 6

right. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. And for 8

completeness, I'd like to look at your own 9

description which we'll find at 1263 in Volume 2 10

of the same file. 11

And I think I can read your 12

handwriting: 13

"18 December 09 0945 hours 14

Master Seaman McLaughlin and 15

I met with two Ombudsman 16

investigators in their Ottawa 17

office conference room, a 18

Patrick Martel and Philipe 19

Jolie. Since these two had 20

highlighted concerns with 21

respect to PNOK and legal 22

advice provided, we needed to 23

meet to discuss their 24

interpretation of the 25


267

policies. Master Seaman 1

McLaughlin was the primary 2

note taker for this meeting 3

and was the custodian of the 4

documents provided. In the 5

opinion of the investigators, 6

Captain Lubiniecki and 7

Lieutenant Colonel King were 8

negligent in their 9

interpretation of the 10

policies and documents..." 11

MR. FREIMAN: Something...? 12

MAJ DANDURAND: 13

"...knowing the situation..." 14

MR. FREIMAN: 15

"...knowing the situation 16

between Corporal Langridge 17

and Ms Hamilton-Tree. This 18

meeting solidifies my 19

assessment that enough 20

suspicion exists to merit..." 21

MR. FREIMAN: I'm having trouble 22

knowing where this continues because the next page 23

doesn't actually continues -- I'm sorry, it does. 24

"...to merit our 25


268

investigation into NDA 1

offence of negligence." 2

MR. FREIMAN: And I'm just 3

wondering about the notation that Master Seaman 4

McLaughlin was the primary note taker. 5

Have you seen any more notes that 6

he might have taken of this meeting than the one 7

that we looked at at page 221? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: No. And, frankly, 9

the meeting was dominated by poring over the 10

actual documents Mr. Martel had provided on the 11

table surface, so we were very much engaged in 12

that and I'm not sure -- I can't recall the PO 13

taking copious amounts of notes throughout. 14

MR. FREIMAN: Now, I apologize for 15

doing this, but we have to because we've had 16

conflicting evidence on this point. 17

I'd like to take you to the 18

affidavit of Mr. Martel that he filed in these 19

proceedings. And it's at Tab 132 of the 20

documents. I think it's page 2 at Tab 132. 21

I'm going to skip the introduction 22

and go to the heart of his description. He says: 23

"On December 18, 2009 Major 24

Daniel Dandurand and PO2, 25


269

then Master Seaman, Eric 1

McLaughlin visited the 2

Ombudsman Office to discuss 3

the NIS investigation. 4

Together we went through 5

documents I had faxed Major 6

Dandurand. The meeting 7

lasted approximately two and 8

a half hours." 9

MR. FREIMAN: And I think that 10

corresponds to what you just told us was the main 11

focus of the meeting. 12

Paragraph 9: 13

"During this meeting we 14

discussed the Fynes' 15

questions concerning whether 16

or not Corporal Langridge was 17

indeed in a common-law 18

relationship at the time of 19

his death and who the 20

appropriate primary next of 21

kin for purposes of funeral 22

planning and other 23

responsibilities would have 24

been. We also discussed the 25


270

discovery at Corporal 1

Langridge's unit of new 2

documents that had been found 3

shortly after Corporal 4

Langridge's death." 5

MR. FREIMAN: Is that still 6

accurate? 7

MAJ DANDURAND: So far, yes. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. 10: 9

"At no time did I indicate to 10

the NIS who might be 11

responsible for the 12

commission of any offences 13

under the Code of Service 14

Discipline if any were in 15

fact committed. I considered 16

these were questions entirely 17

within the investigative 18

purview of the NIS and were 19

for the NIS to determine. I 20

presented information in my 21

possession to the NIS 22

accordingly." 23

MR. FREIMAN: Is that accurate? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: That's not how I 25


271

interpreted what occurred at that meeting. 1

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Paragraph 11: 2

"Specifically, I did not 3

identify Major Mark 4

Lubiniecki, then Captain 5

Lubiniecki, Adjutant 6

Commanding Officer of the 7

Lord Strathcona's Horse Royal 8

Canadian as having been 9

negligent in determining 10

Corporal Langridge's primary 11

next of kin. I had included 12

relevant documents from 13

Captain Lubiniecki in the 14

documents provided to the 15

NIS. While his role in this 16

matter as Adjutant was 17

discussed, I did not believe 18

it was my role to determine 19

whether he had committed any 20

breaches of Code of Service 21

Discipline and I did not seek 22

to make such a 23

determination." 24

MR. FREIMAN: Is that accurate? 25


272

MAJ DANDURAND: Looking at it, I 1

think that he hinges his words on the word 2

determination to come out and say without a doubt 3

that Lubiniecki would be negligent and 4

responsible; he did not. 5

However, all discussion that we 6

had led us to -- led us to that understanding of 7

what it was he was presenting to us. 8

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. Paragraph 12: 9

"With regard to the matter of 10

Corporal Langridge's marital 11

status, I reviewed with Major 12

Dandurand the relevant 13

documents, including the 14

Regulations that Lieutenant 15

Colonel King was relying on 16

and the newer Regulations 17

that had superseded them." 18

MR. FREIMAN: So, that's correct; 19

isn't it, in terms of the document review? 20


MR. FREIMAN: Now 13 he says: 22

"Major Dandurand informed me 23

that he had spoken to 24

Lieutenant Colonel King 25


273

regarding the question of 1

whether Corporal Langridge 2

had a common-law spouse at 3

the time of his death and 4

that Lieutenant Colonel King 5

had told him there was no 6

issue with Corporal 7

Langridge's common-law 8

status. I suggest that the 9

NIS might wish to be careful 10

in determining who they speak 11

to about this matter as 12

Lieutenant Colonel King may 13

have been involved in the 14

decisions made." 15

MR. FREIMAN: Does that correspond 16

to your recollection of the meeting? 17


MR. FREIMAN: Had you in fact ever 19

had a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel King? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: Not on these 21

matters, no. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Had you had a 23

meeting with Lieutenant Colonel King in the past? 24

MAJ DANDURAND: I had had meetings 25


274

with Lieutenant Colonel King to discuss other case 1

files and with Lieutenant Colonel King to discuss 2

matters relating to his sphere of responsibility, 3

but not this file. 4

MR. FREIMAN: Okay. So, if I 5

understand correctly, you believe that Mr. Martel 6

is mistaken in his recollection that you had said 7

you had spoken to Lieutenant Colonel King about 8

specifically the common-law issue? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: Absolutely. 10

MR. FREIMAN: And 14: 11

"As well, the NIS 12

investigators asked me if I 13

thought Lieutenant-Colonel 14

King had made a mistake when 15

he determined Corporal 16

Langridge's status. I know 17

Lieutenant-Colonel King 18

referred to superseded 19

regulations that were taking 20

me an hour to find the 21

currently applicable 22

regulations." 23

Does that correspond to any 24

discussion that happened during the meeting? 25


275

MAJ DANDURAND: That formed part 1

of our discussion because we were discussing how 2

it is that Mr. Martel had formulated the opinion 3

that the legal officer involved in this had 4

perhaps misquoted regulations. His view was that 5

he had done a very quick search online and was 6

able to come up with these particular references 7

and, therefore, not being a lawyer and adept at 8

legal matters, he considered it quite concerning 9

that a legal officer would not have the ability to 10

do that or have erred in that regard. 11


We've spoken ever so briefly about 13

your understanding of the allegation with respect 14

to the determination of primary next of kin as it 15

affected the adjutant. Can you give us a capsule 16

summary of what the complaint against the JAG 17

officer in question was with relation to the 18

matters in discussion on this file? 19

MAJ DANDURAND: My recollection is 20

that it has to do with his role and function 21

within Western Area at the time. 22

I had not conducted research as to 23

determine his whereabouts or potential involvement 24

as a JAG officer within Western Region at the 25


276

time. However, his name kept featuring and one of 1

the issues that we were exploring was the 2

possibility that he had been involved in this and 3

rendered bad advice to the Commander. 4

MR. FREIMAN: Were you at any time 5

able to piece together the chronology in order to 6

identify with some specificity what was being 7

referred to in a complaint against this JAG 8

officer? 9


MR. FREIMAN: Did you ever 11

identify the decision document that was being 12

referred to? 13

MAJ DANDURAND: Yes, I believe he 14

was -- I believe the decision document that 15

particularly Mr. Martel -- I don't know what Mr. 16

Martel was referring to, but one that became very 17

relevant for us was CFAO 19-41 amongst others. 18

Exactly the process of identifying 19

what was available and current on the day and that 20

decisions were being made became part of the 21

initial actions of the investigation. 22

MR. FREIMAN: Were you able to 23

identify when it was that the JAG officer being 24

complained against made the decision that was 25


277

being complained about? 1


MR. FREIMAN: When? 3

MAJ DANDURAND: It would have been 4

at the Casualty Coordination meeting. 5

MR. FREIMAN: Was 6

Lieutenant-Colonel King present at the Casualty 7

Coordination meeting? 8

MAJ DANDURAND: As a matter of 9

these procedures it's come to my attention now 10

that, no, he was not. 11

MR. FREIMAN: So do I understand 12

that you first discovered that he was not there in 13

the course of preparing yourself for your 14

testimony today? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: Well, over the 16

last year, yes. 17

MR. FREIMAN: All right. And so 18

is it correct that during the currency of the 2009 19

investigation down to and including the decision 20

to close it, it had not come to your attention 21

that Lieutenant-Colonel King was not present at 22

the Casualty Coordination meeting? 23

MAJ DANDURAND: I can't say that 24

it never came to my attention but I can say that 25


278

it didn't resonate with me and it's not something 1

that stuck in my mind. 2

What stuck in my mind was that a 3

determination of the right documents and the right 4

decision was made at the time. Therefore, if that 5

was the advice provided to the Commander that 6

would have been the reasonable advice provided. 7

MR. FREIMAN: But again, just to 8

be sure, the complaint was about a decision 9

allegedly made by Lieutenant-Colonel King and his 10

citation of allegedly obsolete or superseded 11

revoked regulations in support of that decision. 12

And if I understand correctly, and 13

please correct me if I'm wrong -- the 14

investigation proceeded without a determination of 15

when the alleged incident happened, what the form 16

of the decision was, where it was recorded? 17

MAJ DANDURAND: What we were 18

investigation -- I just want to correct one thing 19

that you've said. 20

MR. FREIMAN: Sure. 21

MAJ DANDURAND: We were not 22

investigating a decision of the colonel, 23

Lieutenant-Colonel King. 24

We were investigating whether or 25


279

not the advice that he could have provided through 1

that Casualty Coordination meeting was negligent 2

in that had he been referencing the wrong 3

documents then that would have been -- and it was 4

evident to everyone else that these documents were 5

available, then that's what we would have been 6

investigating. 7

MR. FREIMAN: Yeah. 8

MAJ DANDURAND: But did we -- to 9

answer your original question, did we actually sit 10

down and identify that injection, no, because the 11

first step to determining whether or not he had 12

been providing proper advice and whether even the 13

spectre of negligent performance of a military 14

duty was relevant is whether or not the allegation 15

of citing wrong documents was correct. 16

MR. FREIMAN: Now, am I mistaken, 17

or am I correct that that determination occurred 18

when Sergeant Shannon did his legal and policy 19

review? 20

MAJ DANDURAND: I believe that's 21

when it occurred, yes. 22

MR. FREIMAN: It may be of some 23

relevance whether anyone up to that point had done 24

any analysis on this issue at all. Well, let me 25


280

ask the question in a slightly different way. 1

You said that the first point was 2

to analyse whether the policy referred to was 3

correct or was current or not current at the time 4

the advice was given. Was that the starting point 5

for a decision of whether to proceed any further? 6


what the first investigative step was in all of 8

this. 9

MR. FREIMAN: Well, had you made 10

the decision when you decided to proceed with the 11

complaint which we now know is the 2009 complaint 12

that the investigation was to consider the 13

allegations with respect to the adjutant and the 14

allegations with respect to legal advice that had 15

been given, both prongs of the complaint? 16

MAJ DANDURAND: I'm lost in your 17

question. It may be just that I zoned out. 18

MR. FREIMAN: All right. Well, I 19

think we're going to stop pretty soon. Both of us 20

are getting tired. 21

MAJ DANDURAND: No, I'm just -- I 22

just want to make sure I answer that question 23

correctly here. 24

MR. FREIMAN: Let me ask it again. 25


281

You decided I believe it was in 1

February, formally, but it would appear even 2

before February you had decided that this matter 3

should proceed to an investigation. That was your 4

investigative assessment. 5

Did that assessment extend to both 6

prongs of the allegation that you had reviewed 7

with the Ombudsman, both the one about the 8

Adjutant and the one about the legal advice? 9

MAJ DANDURAND: I see where you're 10

going. 11

My personal assessment of this 12

situation after I met with the Fynes and after I 13

had had the initial contact from the Ombudsman's 14

Office being the documents that were sent, was 15

that the primary next of kin issue needed to be 16

looked at very, very closely. 17

The issue of Lieutenant-Colonel 18

King did not necessarily galvanize in my mind 19

until after meeting with the Ombudsman's Office. 20

But we had not exactly -- we had not conducted 21

since the 28th of November in my mind a whole lot 22

of investigative activity prior to that. We were 23

still in the process of trying to wrap our heads 24

around what we were looking at. 25


282

So your question of were both 1

entities and both negligent investigations decided 2

upon at precisely the same time would be no, but 3

they did occur in a time and space in close 4

proximity. 5

MR. FREIMAN: But there was a 6

decision, was there not, to proceed on both 7

prongs, to look at both allegations that the 8

Adjutant had done something wrong or whoever at 9

the Casualty Coordination meeting, had made a 10

determination of next of kin. 11

He had done something wrong, one 12

allegation and that legal advice based on 13

superseded regulation had been given; second 14

allegation, and both were being proceeded with? 15

MAJ DANDURAND: And that makes 16

sense to me. In my view and in my experience 17

these are issues that are interwoven which is why 18

Captain Lubiniecki of the time was identified as 19

the number one subject in this. For me and for my 20

personal experience is that adjutants do not make 21

the decisions. Those invested with the 22

authorities make the decisions. 23

And my view was that this would 24

possibly involve other people both at the 25


283

coordination meeting and also in the chain of 1

command who would have ultimately made the 2

decision and be accountable for that decision. 3

MR. FREIMAN: In the ordinary 4

course of an ordinary investigation and your 5

experience, is it important to clarify the factual 6

basis for the complaint? 7


MR. FREIMAN: And is that in the 9

ordinary course done through interviews of those 10

who have information about the complaint? 11

MAJ DANDURAND: It can be. 12

MR. FREIMAN: Other than this file 13

do you have any experience with investigations 14

that start with a policy analysis? 15


MR. FREIMAN: What sort of 17

investigations start with a policy analysis? 18

MAJ DANDURAND: As a matter of 19

fact I would say quite a few. You would -- you 20

take the complaint as being an allegation of X and 21

the first thing the investigator needs to do is go 22

to what it is that they are alleging has occurred 23

and see does anything in the law apply to this? 24

MR. FREIMAN: Do I understand that 25


284

that sort of investigation starts from the premise 1

if every fact that is alleged by the complainant 2

is true is there a complaint made out or is it 3

something else? 4

MAJ DANDURAND: I don't understand 5

the question. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Well, do you need a 7

factual basis in order to do the policy analysis 8

or, as we were talking, it isn't as much policy as 9

elements of offence analysis? 10

MAJ DANDURAND: You need some, 11

yes. 12


And in the ordinary course that 14

means you investigate the facts. 15



Before the investigation was 18

formally or any further steps in the investigation 19

were taken, you had a meeting with the Fynes on 20

the 5th of May -- sorry, 3rd of March. 21


MR. FREIMAN: The 3rd of March, 23

2010. 24

Now, Mr. Chairman, it's 10 minutes 25


285

to 5:00. I don't expect we're going to get 1

through this now and I wonder whether it isn't a 2

good idea for us to start at that point tomorrow. 3

THE CHAIRPERSON: That's fine. 4

We'll start -- we'll adjourn until nine o'clock 5

tomorrow morning. 6

MR. FREIMAN: Thank you. 7

For those who are concerned, I am 8

certain we will be finished by noon on Friday but 9

I don't have an opinion as to whether we'll be 10

able to finish tomorrow. 11

COL (RET'D) DRAPEAU: Fine with 12

us. 13

MS RICHARDS: And I just want to 14

be clear. I cannot stay past noon on Friday. 15

MR. FREIMAN: I have made the 16

statement that I made. 17

MS RICHARDS: Well, no. I'm just 18

for the record -- 19

THE CHAIRPERSON: No, we just want 20

to make sure. You will be -- 21

MR. FREIMAN: Well, depending on 22

how extensive the cross-examination by both 23

Colonel Drapeau and Ms Richards which I can't now 24

anticipate, but judging from the history of these 25


286

proceedings, I think there will be adequate time 1

by noon. And it is an outside possibility that 2

we'll be able to finish tomorrow by five. 3

MS RICHARDS: And I only raise 4

that because I just wonder if we should be looking 5

at starting any earlier tomorrow. I know you have 6

administrative issues. I'm just mindful of the 7

fact that (a) we have scheduling issues and (b) as 8

I have said, Major Dandurand is preparing a 9

posting to Afghanistan and so the possibility of 10

bringing him back after this week is very slim. 11

THE CHAIRPERSON: I agree. 12

Potentially what we might do is we'll see how we 13

go tomorrow and we may go a little bit later 14

tomorrow. 15

MR. FREIMAN: We can take a really 16

abbreviated lunch. 17

THE CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. Well, 18

we'll see how we go. We'll see how that works 19

out. Yeah. 20

MR. FREIMAN: And again, I have to 21

say I'm notoriously bad about estimating things. 22

You have to take it with as many tonnes of sea 23

salt as you need but I don't have much doubt that 24

we'll be able to finish this by noon on Friday. 25


287

COL (RET'D) DRAPEAU: Mr. Chair, 1

we're not ruling out the possibility of meeting 2

earlier on Friday morning if we need to? 3

THE CHAIRPERSON: Sure could. I'm 4

up at five. 5

--- Laughter / Rires 6

MR. FREIMAN: Could we make it 7

five in the morning as well? 8

THE CHAIRPERSON: There is an 9

issue with starting earlier and some of that 10

relates to family issues. 11

MS RICHARDS: Yeah. If we're 12

going to start earlier I can do that tomorrow but 13

I'm going to have difficulty doing that on Friday. 14

COL (RET'D) DRAPEAU: Leave it as 15

it is. 16

THE CHAIRPERSON: We'll start 17

tomorrow at nine. Thank you. 18

Please move around. Go ahead. 19

Thank you. 20

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1652 21

to resume Thursday, October 4, 2012 at 0900 / 22

L'audience est ajournée à 1652, pour reprendre 23

le jeudi, 4 octobre 2012 à 0900 24

25


288

We hereby certify: 1

That the foregoing is a true 2

and correct transcript of the 3

reporting notes and 4

recordings so taken. 5

We further certify that none 6

of the reporting staff is 7

related to or an employee of 8

any attorney or of any of the 9

parties, nor financially 10

interested in the action. 11

We declare that the foregoing 12

is true and correct. 13

14

15

16

17

___________________ 18

Lynda Johansson 19

20

___________________ ______________________ 21

Monique Mahoney Susan Villeneuve 22

23

___________________ ______________________ 24

Karen Paré Beverley Dillabough 25

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