Political ScienceAlumni Newsletter

Spring 2013

FILIBUSTERS AND LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURESHUGO CHAVEZ AND VENEZUELAN POLITICSKEEPING POLITICIANS HONESTELECTIONS: ARE WE DOING THEM RIGHT?STUDENT RESEARCH AND AWARDS 2013

Filibusters & Legislative Procedures

jimmy stewart used the filibuster to heroic effect in the 1939 movie Mr. Smith Goes to Washing-ton, talking himself to exhaustion to oppose a corrupt legislator. That’s not the way the filibuster has worked for decades, however, and in recent years it’s gotten little but scorn from Democrats now in the Senate ma-jority, who have been threatening rule changes when the Senate con-venes on Jan. 3. Political scientist Gisela Sin, an expert on legislative rules and procedures, is completing a book on rule changes in the U.S. House.

Filibusters & Legislative ProceduresThe filibuster used to be a difficult maneuver, requiring someone to hold the Senate floor through continuous talking, and it was rarely used. Now just the threat of a filibuster does the trick. Why and when did a rule favor-ing the minority get so easy to employ?

Technically, a filibuster is any action that delays setting the time to vote on a piece of legislation. Before the 1960s, the filibuster was a true game of exhaustion. The minority was required to hold the floor by continu-ously speaking. This meant that the speaking senator had to literally stand at his desk and talk constantly without taking any breaks or even moving about in the Senate chamber.

At the same time, the majority had to ensure that they had enough senators on hand to form a quorum at a moment’s notice. If the majority could not form a quo-rum, the session would come to a halt and the Senate would adjourn. The consequence of an adjournment is that the minority would take a break and reinitiate the filibuster on the next legislative day. By having a quorum available, the majority thus forced the minority to con-tinue speaking indefinitely. Whoever could last longer won the game.

As you can see, the filibuster was onerous and costly for both sides. In reality, senators not only were unable to engage in other Senate business, but also were prevented from campaigning and fundraising. This sit-uation was exacerbated because the Senate’s workload had increased at the same time that its workweek had shortened to three days (Tuesday through Thursday). Keep in mind that in the mid-’60s, the increasing conve-nience of air travel permitted senators to easily return to their home districts.

The costs of waiting out a filibuster came to a head when civil rights legislation came to the forefront. Senators realized that a strong, determined and orga-nized minority could paralyze the Senate and senators themselves for weeks.

For these reasons, the majority decided that instead of waiting out a filibuster, it was going to utilize a cloture rule originally adopted in 1917. The approval of a clo-ture rule ends the debate and terminates any filibuster. This is the rule that we are familiar with today because cloture requires 60 votes. Thus, the magic number for the passage of any contested legislation is 60, not 51.

There have been many threats and attempts since then to reform the filibuster, from Democrats and Re-publicans. Why has it never happened?

The reality is that senators have chosen to maintain the filibuster at times when they had the opportunity to change the rules. Basically, the filibuster provides individual senators with leverage and bargaining power. Even the threat to filibuster can get senators conces-sions from the opposition, the House and the president.

It also increases the visibility of a particular senator or brings an issue to the public’s attention.

Is it fair to say the Senate has become truly dysfunc-tional under the current rules? Or is that just partisan talk from Democrats frustrated by Republican success in blocking their agenda?

In theory, a filibuster promotes bipartisanship and compromise. As mentioned earlier, both parties have used the filibuster to their advantage to extract concessions. However, the intensified polarization we have witnessed during the last 10 years, reflected in the skyrocketing use of the filibuster, means that the minority has the incentive to stick together with virtually no negative consequences. The reality is that senators can avoid a vote on a bill or nomination by simply send-ing a letter to the party leader indicating their intent to filibuster. The paralysis caused by filibusters is more damaging when the economic crises like the one we are experiencing demand urgent legislation.

What changes in the rules related to the filibuster would have the most effect on the movement of legisla-tion and other business through the Senate?

There are different things that could be modified. The most oft-cited solution is to simply change the number of senators necessary to invoke cloture (that is, end the filibuster) from 60 to 51. Other alternatives focus on putting the burden of filibustering almost entirely on the minority. Examples of this include requir-ing the minority to gather 41 votes to keep the debate going, or requiring the majority to have only one senator physically present on the floor while the minority engag-es in a filibuster. By shifting the cost of filibustering to the minority, the hope is that opposition for the sake of opposition will be precluded.

Gisela Sin was interviewed by UIUC News Bureau social sciences editor Craig Chamberlain. This interview appeared on the News Bureau’s website on December 27, 2012.

Hugo Chavez & Venezuelan Politics

venezuela’s inauguration day came and went on Thursday, Jan-uary 10, but with no sign of Hugo Chávez, the country’s populist pres-ident, known for his socialist pro-grams and anti-American rhetoric. Although re-elected in October to his third six-year term, Chávez was reported to be critically ill in a Cuban hospital, almost a month after cancer surgery there in December. Political scientist Damarys Canache is a native of Venezuela who studies the country’s politics and conducts pub-lic opinion research there.

Hugo Chavez & Venezuelan PoliticsAmerican news coverage in the past has focused on Chávez’s autocratic tendencies, yet he has been re-elected twice in popular votes. How would you explain this?

For the last 14 years, Venezuelan politics have been dominated by Hugo Chávez and his Chavismo move-ment. He was first elected in 1998 when the country was in the midst of a severe socio-economic and political crisis. At that time, the conditions for a political rupture were ripe, helping to explain why a political outsider like Chávez was able to win the majority of the popular vote. Once in power, Chávez relied extensively on his charisma and populist leadership style, and on the use of institutions and resources of the Venezuelan government to build and maintain a large base of elec-toral support. This has brought him and his party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), a number of electoral victories.

The regime that Chávez orchestrated defies neat conceptualization as democratic or authoritarian. What we have seen over the last years in Venezuela is how a democratically elected president has slowly but effec-tively worked to weaken the principles and institutions of liberal democracy. During Chávez’s rule, we have witnessed a growing concentration of powers in the hands of the president, the dwindling of institutional checks, the diminishing protection of civil and political rights, and the use of public-sector resources to benefit supporters and punish opponents.

Although Chávez has won three presidential elec-tions, many scholars contend that Venezuela today is best characterized as a competitive authoritarian regime. In such a regime, incumbents amass so much power for their own political gain that challenging those incumbents in elections typically is a futile, even quixotic, endeavor.

If Chávez dies or is unable to return to his duties, what should we expect in the transition?

This is a critical question, and the answer is necessarily uncertain. In the short-, and perhaps medium-term, I suspect that a likely scenario is that Venezuela will enter a period of “Chavismo without Chávez.” If the president cannot return to office, the constitution requires that a new election be held. Given the full control that Chávez’s party has over government institutions and the base of popular support that the party will inherit from Chávez, it seems likely that his political successor would win such an election. What is far less certain is how long “Chavismo without Chávez” could thrive.

Most observers of Venezuelan politics agree that there are two major factions within Chávez’s party. One is civilian, highly ideological, and closely aligned with Cuba. This faction’s leader is Nicolas Maduro,

who was endorsed by Chávez as his heir. The second faction represents military and business interests. If Chávez does not return to office, a key question will be whether these two factions will continue to co-exist or splinter into openly competitive movements. While that dynamic plays out, a second key question concerns the extent to which Venezuela’s current political opposition would be energized by the prospects of competing in a political arena no longer dominated by Hugo Chávez.

The Venezuelan government is very dependent on revenue from its oil exports, and about 40 percent of those exports go to the U.S. – yet Chávez, especially during the Bush administration, has often spoken out forcefully against the U.S. and its policies. Why?

Chávez’s vociferous and radical rhetoric against the United States is an element of a populist political strategy that he uses to strengthen his leadership both domestically and regionally. This strategy has never affected U.S.-Venezuelan economic relations. Venezuela has always been a significant supplier of oil to the U.S. If the United States is reliant on Venezuelan oil, Venezuela is even more dependent on the U.S. market. Although the United States is nominally one of Chávez’s worst enemies, it is also Venezuela’s best client. There is a relationship of economic interdependence that has not been dramatically altered during Chávez’s tenure.

What might the end of Chávez in office mean for Latin America?

There is no question that Chávez has been influential throughout Latin America. Using resources from record high oil prices, Chávez has followed a foreign policy course that includes initiatives that have moved Vene-zuela and other countries in the region away from their historic relationship with the United States. The future prospects of this foreign policy orientation will depend on the health of the Venezuelan economy and the will-ingness of Chávez’s successor to continue Venezuela’s regional activism.

Damarys Canache was interviewed by UIUC News Bureau social sciences editor Craig Chamberlain. This interview appeared on the News Bureau’s website on January 11, 2013.

Keeping Politicians Honest

Can the promises of politicians ever be believed? Very often the answer is yes, says political scientist Tracy Sulkin. In her 2011 book The Legislative Legacy of Congressional Campaigns, she makes the case that congressional candidates’ words generally match their deeds in office. Her research for the book involved analyzing campaign ads from the 1998, 2000 and 2002 elections and then matching them with legislators’ records.

Keeping Politicians HonestJust to be clear, what kinds of promises are you talking about and what qualifies as keeping them?

Promises in this case include any issue the candidate discussed in his or her campaign advertisements. In congressional races, it is not common for candidates to use specific promise-making language, but most do discuss substantive issues. To follow through on a cam-paign promise requires that the legislator do something tangible on that issue by the next campaign – introduc-ing or co-sponsoring a bill.

Does being more specific about an issue, as in hav-ing a detailed plan, make a candidate any more likely to pursue that issue as a legislator?

Interestingly, no. It is common to equate specificity with sincerity, assuming, for instance, that a candidate who lays out a plan for dealing with environmental issues is more intent on action than one who claims to want to “conserve the environment.” My study indicates that this is not the case. Compared to candidates who did not discuss an issue, those candidates who dis-cussed it, be it vaguely or specifically, were more active on it in the next Congress. But there is no difference between those who were vague and those who were specific. It turns out that this is because specificity is a reaction to the competitiveness of the race – can-didates in tight races are more likely to make specific appeals – not an indicator of how interested the candi-dates are in pursuing the issue.

Many members of Congress are in safe seats, free from serious challenge by a candidate from the other party. It’s tempting to think they would be less moti-vated about following through on promises. Is that the case?

Just the opposite, in fact. It is often the safer legisla-tors who do the best job at promise-keeping, following through on their campaign appeals at higher rates than their more vulnerable peers. At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive, but the logic becomes clearer if we ask ourselves why some legislators are safer than others in the first place. Savvy legislators may be better able to see the benefits of promise-keeping – or are more strategic in their campaigns, focusing on issues on which they know they can demonstrate real action – and so engage in it at higher rates.

My results show that this “good” behavior pays off; representatives and senators who keep their promises do better in the next election. Thus, they are returned to office with an incentive to continue this responsiveness. If we take a snapshot view at any one point in time, we will therefore observe a positive relationship between electoral security and promise-keeping. Of course, there is a small group of very, very safe members of Congress who consistently run unopposed or with only very token opposition, and, for them, rates of prom-

ise-keeping are relatively low.Of course, many candidates’ ads are negative ones

aimed at disparaging their opponents for their stands or actions on a given issue. Do those ads tell us anything about what the candidate running the ad will do?

Negative ads don’t tell us very much about a candi-date’s own priorities. This is one place where my find-ings correspond closely to the conventional wisdom. For example, candidates who air ads talking about their own views, no matter how vague, on an issue like health care, are more active on it in office than candidates who don’t discuss it. But candidates who only criticize their opponents on an issue are no more active on it than those who did not raise the issue at all.

This does not necessarily mean that the claims in negative ads are inaccurate, but that they don’t carry information about what the winner will do. This is one reason why we might be concerned about the preva-lence of negative ads. Most House candidates produce only a small handful of advertisements, so the more they focus on criticizing their opponents, the less voters will learn about what the candidates themselves will do once in Congress.

Tracy Sulkin was interviewed by UIUC News Bu-reau social sciences editor Craig Chamberlain. This interview appeared on the News Bureau’s website on October 30, 2012.

Are We Doing Elections Right?

fewer than a dozen battleground states are once again getting all the attention in this year’s presidential election, and Illinois isn’t one of them. And once again it’s easy to imagine, recalling Bush v. Gore in 2000, that a close vote in just one state could decide the election – possibly in favor of the candidate who lost the popular vote nationwide. Is this any way to run an election? Political scientist Brian Gaines, an expert on polling and elections, says what we have may be better than several alternatives, and there’s no perfect system.

Are We Doing Elections Right?First of all, let’s talk history. The 2000 election seemed such an extraordinary event in many ways, but it wasn’t the first time that one candidate got more popular votes, but lost in the Electoral College.

True. That also happened in 1876 and 1888, when Republican candidates won the electoral vote, but lost the popular vote. In both of those cases, rampant suppression of the black vote in the South depressed the Republican popular vote, contributing to the split. In 1960, Richard Nixon won more popular votes than John Kennedy, but most sources obscure that point by counting as Kennedy votes the votes actually cast for Alabama Democratic electors supporting Harry Byrd, even though those electors openly opposed Kennedy from the beginning of the primary campaign onward.

For many people, that kind of outcome seems an injustice, no matter which party benefits, and a good argument for getting rid of the Electoral College sys-tem. But is it?

I don’t think so. First, note that presidents world-wide are elected in all sorts of complicated ways other than by a nationwide plurality-of-popular-vote rule. Some countries use a majoritarian run-off system, with multiple rounds of elections. In others, voters rank all candidates, and then votes are transferred from the last-place candidate to the candidates ranked next best by those who favored that candidate, in sequen-tial rounds, until one candidate finally has a majority. Some other countries also use geographic districts, as we do through the Electoral College.

Second, the simplest answer to the complaint of unfairness is that the candidates – and now, even most voters – know the rules all along. Rules that are arbitrary are not thereby unfair or biased; there simply is not one unique set of fair rules. Is it fair that baseball games are won by most-runs, not most-hits?

It is also not obvious how campaigns would change were the rules changed here, and one should be wary of any claim that a nationwide popular vote would defi-nitely bring about some clearly good outcomes, such as higher turnout, candidates giving more attention to more states, etc.

Why is it so difficult to design a fair system?Different voting systems emphasize different goals,

from simplicity to permitting more elaborate expres-sions of preference – letting voters rank candidates, for example – to encouraging more candidacies or parties. There is no such thing as an electoral system that has every possible virtue, and no vice.

The 2000 election might have left some thinking the current U.S. system is tilted in favor of Republicans, but any such bias is sporadic: In 2004 and 2008, the Democratic candidates (Kerry and Obama, respec-tively) would probably have won had the popular

vote split 50-50. Moreover, in October 2000, some predicted that Gore would win the electoral vote while losing the popular vote. It didn’t happen, but it wasn’t a far-fetched scenario. In the long-term, the Electoral College is fair to the two major parties, and its short-term bias is unpredictable.

What’s the drawback to a system based only on winning the popular vote nationwide? Can you imagine a nightmare scenario under that system?

There is, in fact, a movement under way to estab-lish national popular-vote plurality, via an interstate compact. Illinois is one of eight states, plus the District of Columbia, that have already passed laws to join. The members have agreed to award their electors to the candidate who wins the most votes nationwide, regardless of their statewide totals. The compact doesn’t go into effect until enough states join to ensure that they collectively are decisive – in other words, their electoral votes total 270 or more. At present, the members have only 132 electors.

If more states join and the compact becomes op-erational, what could go wrong? In an extremely close election, both parties would send armies of lawyers into every county hunting for lost votes, seeking re-counts, and challenging administration and tabulation decisions. It would be a replay of Florida in 2000, but thousands of times over. In that scenario, settling on a winner in time for inauguration would be much harder than it was in 2000. An underappreciated feature of the current Electoral College system is that it confines the messy controversy that follows extremely close outcomes to just a few jurisdictions.

Brian Gaines was interviewed by UIUC News Bureau social sciences editor Craig Chamberlain. This interview appeared on the News Bureau’s website on October, 2012.

STUDENT RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM & AWARD CEREMONY 2013

Department of Political Science / University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 420 David Kinley Hall / 1407 W Gregory Drive / Urbana, IL 61801217.333.3881 / pol@illinois.edu / pol.illinois.edu

Cover: Hurricane Sandy approaches the East Coast, October 2012. (AP)