september 10, 2013 | nepool markets committee

72
SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 | NEPOOL MARKETS COMMITTEE ISO NEW ENGLAND - MARKET DEVELOPMENT Complete Summary of NCPC Redesign for Out-of-Merit Operation to Address Offer Flexibility – as of 9/10/2013 NCPC Payments

Upload: leane

Post on 14-Jan-2016

29 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee. ISO New England - market development. Complete Summary of NCPC Redesign for Out-of-Merit Operation to Address Offer Flexibility – as of 9/10/2013. NCPC Payments. Preface. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 | NEPOOL MARKETS COMMITTEE

ISO NEW ENGLAND - MARKET DEVELOPMENT

Complete Summary of NCPC Redesign for Out-of-Merit Operation to Address Offer Flexibility – as of 9/10/2013

NCPC Payments

Page 2: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Preface

This document is a complete summary of the proposed NCPC design for credits related to out-of-merit operation, as of September 10, 2013.

Changes to the design from what was presented at the July 10, 2013 meeting , and the date the change was presented, are indicated as:

•“New Slide”

•“Updated Slide”

Minor changes to text are shown in red.

Deleted text is shown in light orange with a wavy underline.

2

New Slide – mm/dd/yy

Updated – mm/dd/yy

Page 3: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

NCPC DESIGN DETAILSDetailed overview of the proposed design for Offer Flexibility

Page 4: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

NCPC Detailed Design presentation overview

• Common Concepts– Commitment Decisions– Dispatch Decisions– Effective Offers– Best Alternative Framework– NCPC Settlement Periods

• Day-Ahead NCPC Settlement (DA NCPC)

• Real-Time NCPC Settlement (RT NCPC)– Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credits– Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits

4

Page 5: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

DAY-AHEAD AND REAL-TIME COMMON DESIGN DETAILSCommon design elements for both the Day-Ahead NCPC (DA NCPC) and Real-Time NCPC (RT NCPC) Credit Calculations

Page 6: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Commitment Decisions

• Occur when the ISO or a participant makes a decision to commit a resource to operate for some period of time

• Commitment Decisions have several properties that are considered in the NCPC evaluation– Who made the decision – ISO or participant (Commitment Driver)– Reason for the decision – links to cost allocation (Decision Reason)– Offer in place at the time of the decision (Effective Offer)– Time at which the decision occurred (Decision Time)– Duration of the commitment decision (Decision Interval)

6

Page 7: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Commitment Decision Occurrences

• Commitment Decisions occur throughout the resource scheduling processes. Examples of Commitment Decisions include:– Day-ahead schedule– Real-time schedule (additions to day-ahead)– Real-time fast-start dispatch– Real-time audit demonstration– Participant self-schedule request

• Day-Ahead schedules create real-time Commitment Decisions for all resources except for fast-start resources

• Commitment Decisions may continue into a subsequent day

7

Page 8: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

New and Modified Commitment Decisions

• New Commitment Decisions that create additional schedules do not alter previous Commitment Decisions– For example a day-ahead schedule for HE8-HE10 is not changed by

the creation of an additional scheduled in real-time for HE11-HE14

• Commitment Decisions may be canceled prior to the start or terminated ahead of the scheduled end time

8

Page 9: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Dispatch Decisions

• Occur when ISO makes a decision to dispatch a resource above its EcoMin limit

• Dispatch Decisions have several properties that are considered in the NCPC evaluation– Dispatch decisions are made by the ISO (Dispatch Driver)– Reason for the decision – links to cost allocation (Decision Reason)– Offer in place at the time of the decision (Effective Offer)– Time at which the decision occurred (Decision Time)– Duration of the dispatch decision (Decision Interval)

9

Page 10: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Dispatch Decision Occurrences

• Dispatch Decisions occur in the day-ahead market (cleared energy schedules) and throughout real time. Examples of Dispatch Decisions include:– Day-ahead schedule above EcoMin limit– Real-time dispatch– Real-time audit request– Real-time manual dispatch (for reliability constraint)

• For the purposes of NCPC, Dispatch Decisions are considered to occur with an hourly duration (consistent with the minimum settlement granularity)

10

Page 11: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers for Commitment Decisions

• When a Commitment Decision occurs, the Commitment Cost of the Supply Offer in place at the time is “locked in” for purposes of NCPC for the duration of the commitment– Commitment Costs include the Start-Up Fee, No Load Fee, Energy Cost

at the EcoMin limit• Start-Up Fee is from the offer for the commitment “release for

dispatch” start hour

• Commitment Cost are locked with each Commitment Decision– Resources with multiple Commitment Decisions through the day may

have different Effective Offer costs evaluated by NCPC

• Effective Offers for Commitment Decisions that span multiple days are used in settlement for subsequent days

11

Updated – 8/9/13

Page 12: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers for Dispatch Decisions

• When a Dispatch Decision occurs, the Dispatch Cost of the Supply Offer in place at the time is “locked in” for purposes of NCPC for the duration of the decision (for NCPC considered to occur hourly)– Dispatch Cost is the Energy Cost above the EcoMin limit

• The Dispatch Cost is the final offered value used for the day-ahead clearing or real-time dispatch

12

Page 13: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers after a Reoffer or Mitigation

• Commitment Costs used in the NCPC settlements will be based upon the lesser of the original Effective Offer at the time of commitment or a participant’s final re-offer

• For resources that are mitigated, the Commitment and Dispatch Costs used in NCPC settlement will be based upon the mitigated Supply Offer

13

Updated – 8/9/13

Page 14: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers and changes to EcoMin limit

• If the EcoMin limit is redeclared to a different level than was offered at the time of the Commitment Decision, the Commitment Cost is modified as follows:– an increase of EcoMin causes the Energy cost at the commitment

EcoMin limit to be applied as the cost of energy between commitment EcoMin and the higher redeclared EcoMin

– for reductions to the EcoMin the energy cost at the lower EcoMin level will be used to determine Commitment Cost

• During a Minimum Generation Emergency event, the EcoMin is set to the Emergency minimum limit and the Commitment Cost rule for a reduction of EcoMin limit is applied

• Dispatch Cost applies to the energy above EcoMin or the Emergency limit

14

Page 15: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Example of Commitment Cost with higher redeclared EcoMin limit

15

Commitment Cost for energy at EcoMin limit is shaded area under the curve

Commitment Cost energy offer

EcoMin limit = 90 MW

Marginal cost at EcoMin limit = $14/MWh

Offer requested offer slope

EcoMin limit redeclared to 110 MW

Marginal cost at commitment EcoMin

limit ($14/MWh) extended up to higher

EcoMin limit

90 90 110

Page 16: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers and Self-Scheduling – Day-Ahead

• For purposes of NCPC credit evaluation, a self-schedule request by a participant in DA is considered to be an offer of:– Start-Up Fee = $0/start– No Load Fee = $0/hour– Energy cost up to EcoMin @ floor price ($-150/MWh)– Energy cost above EcoMin @ prices in energy offer

16

Updated – 9/10/13

Page 17: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers and Self-Scheduling – Real-Time• In RT, resources are only committed by the ISO for reliability,

not economics.– An offline resource that needs/wants to run in RT cannot get online by

simply lowering its offer price to its RT cost– A RT self-schedule is the only way to ensure commitment in RT– Valuing EcoMin energy at $-150 is a significant penalty in this situation

• For NCPC purposes, a RT self-schedule will be evaluated as follows:– Energy cost up to EcoMin @ $0/MWh– Revenues for energy up to EcoMin excluded from calculation of RT

Commitment NCPC credit

17

New Slide – 9/10/13

Page 18: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers and Self-Scheduling

• When a participant submits an intra-hour request to dispatch at a specific output level:– energy cost up to the requested level is an energy offer at the

floor price for the entire hour– Startup Cost = $0 (no impact unless this was a startup hour)– No Load Cost = $0

18

Updated – 9/10/13

Page 19: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Best Alternative determinations for NCPC

• DA NCPC:– For a resource cleared to deliver energy at a price below its

offered cost, the best alternative is to not participate in the day-ahead market

• RT NCPC:– For a resource committed to operate over a period, the best

alternative is to remain online for the hours when profit is maximized

– For a resource dispatched above EcoMin limit to a level where incremental energy cost is greater than the real-time LMP, the best alternative is to operate at a feasible economic level

19

Page 20: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

NCPC Credit Calculations are formulated based on actual revenues and Best Alternative

• NCPC credit determinations are formulated to identify the payment necessary to make a resource no worse off for following ISO instruction (therefore willing to follow)

• NCPC credit =

Max[0, (Best Alternative Cash Flow) - (ISO Instruction Cash Flow)]

where Cash Flow = revenue - cost

• Both the DA NCPC and RT NCPC Credit calculations apply this approach

20

Page 21: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

NCPC Settlement Periods• For DA NCPC and RT Commitment NCPC, each discrete period

of contiguous scheduled hours are evaluated separately (i.e., NCPC Settlement Period)– May include one or more Commitment Decisions

• For RT Dispatch NCPC, each hour is evaluated separately

• No transfer of profit/loss between NCPC Settlement Periods

• A Settlement Period ends at the earlier of a) the last hour of a commitment in which energy is produced/consumed (including shutdown ramp) or b) the end of the operating day

• NCPC Settlement Periods are truncated at operating day boundaries– Commitment Decisions may continue into next day– Separate NCPC Settlement Period begins with the start of next day

21

Updated – 8/9/13

Page 22: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

NCPC Settlement Periods – Fast-Start Resources

• For Fast Start resources, the credits for DA NCPC, RT Commitment NCPC, and RT Dispatch NCPC are evaluated separately for each hour

• No transfer of profit/loss between hours

22

New Slide – 9/10/13

Page 23: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

DAY-AHEAD NCPC CREDIT DESIGNCredit design for Generators scheduled out-of-merit in the day-ahead market

Page 24: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Eligible Resources for Day-Ahead NCPC

• All generators scheduled in the day-ahead market are eligible for DA NCPC credits

• Requires the resource to submit Supply Offers into the day-ahead market

24

Page 25: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers for Day-Ahead NCPC

• Energy costs at EcoMin limit are the Supply Offers submitted to the day-ahead market for Commitment Decisions that originate in day-ahead– For resources scheduled in the day-ahead market for the purpose of

completing a prior day’s commitment, the energy costs at EcoMin limit are determined using Supply Offers captured at the time of the Commitment Decision

• Dispatch Costs (i.e., energy costs above EcoMin limit) are the Supply Offers submitted into the day-ahead market

25

Page 26: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

NCPC Settlement Period for Day-Ahead NCPC

• Each contiguous period of committed hours (i.e., day-ahead cleared schedule) is evaluated separately for DA NCPC credit– May include one or more Commitment Decisions

26

Page 27: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Self-Schedule Offers in Day-Ahead Must Respect Inter-temporal Offer Parameters• When a Day-Ahead Self Schedule is for less than the Min Run

Time, or violates the Min Down Time, the Day-Ahead Market will clear additional hours economically, as needed to create a feasible schedule.

• The NCPC Credit will evaluate the minimum required number of additional hours as self-scheduled, starting with contiguous hours prior to the self-schedule, and continuing with hours following the self-schedule, as needed.– All hours in between two self-schedule hours that violate the Min Down Time will be

evaluated as self-scheduled.

• If, as a result, the first hour of the DA schedule is now evaluated as self-scheduled, the resource will not be eligible for the Startup Fee.

• In the current rules, entire day is considered self-scheduled.

27

New Slide – 8/9/13

Page 28: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Day-Ahead NCPC Credit Determination

• Eligible Quantity: total day-ahead scheduled output

• Hourly cost: the Eligible Quantity cost determined using Effective Offers for commitment and dispatch cost

• Hourly revenue: (Eligible Quantity x DA LMP)

• Startup and No Load will be considered in DA Credit– Startup cost amortized over the commitment period

• NCPC credit = MAX [0, ∑(Hourly Cost) - ∑(Hourly Revenue)]– summation includes all hours in the Settlement Period

• Best alternative is to break-even ($0)

28

Updated – 9/10/13

Page 29: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

REAL-TIME NCPC CREDIT DESIGNCredit design for Generators committed and/or dispatched out-of-merit in the real-time market

Page 30: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Eligible Resources for Real-Time NCPC

• All resources that are online and operating in response to ISO commitment or dispatch (up and down) instructions

• Requires the resource to have a Supply Offer in the real-time market and to be able to respond to ISO dispatch instructions

30

Updated – 9/10/13

Page 31: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Effective Offers for Real-Time NCPC

• Commitment Costs are based upon the offers in place at the time of the commitment (whether the commitment occurred in day-ahead or real-time)– Energy cost at EcoMin, Start-Up Fee, and No Load Fee are used for

determination of RT NCPC Credit

• Dispatch Costs are based upon the energy offers submitted to the real-time market and used to determine resource’s dispatch (DDP)

31

Page 32: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Economic Dispatch Point for Real-Time NCPC

• NCPC credit determinations for commitment and dispatch best alternatives use a common concept for the loading level at which a resource would be “economically” dispatched

• The economic energy dispatch point (EDP) between the resource’s EcoMin limit and DDP based on the hour’s Dispatch Costs and the real-time LMP

• The economic dispatch point is set equal to the DDP for upward and downward ramp constrained resources– DDP reflects the feasible change to output in response to price for a

ramp-limited resource

32

Page 33: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Example of the Economic Dispatch Point

33

Unit is not ramp constrained

Dispatch Cost energy offer

0 --> 50 MW $10/MWh

51 --> 150 MW $20/MWh

Offer requested offer slope

EcoMin limit = 70 MW

DDP = 140 MWMarginal offer cost at DDP = $19/MWh

RT LMP = $16/MWh

Range of possible EDP values

Based on the energy offer for dispatch and the RT LMP, the resource would

be economically dispatched at 110 MW; therefore EDP = 110 MW

EDP = 110 MW

Page 34: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC Credit Determination

• RT Commitment NCPC credits are determined in two parts, calculated separately:– A credit for the Min Run Time (MRT) hours– A credit for the post-MRT hours

• The credit for the MRT hours ensures a resource is no worse off for starting at the ISO requested commitment start time versus a delayed start – A resource that is unprofitable in the early hours could otherwise

improve its financial position by delaying its start time

• The credit for the post-MRT hours ensures a resource is no worse off for continuing to operate until de-committed by the ISO.

34

New Slide – 9/10/13

Page 35: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC Credit Determination During Min Run Time (“Claw-Forward” Credit)

• Eligible quantity: hourly energy amount for cost and revenue= MIN (revenue metering, economic dispatch point)

• Hourly cost: Energy Cost + Start-up fee + No Load fee– eligible quantity energy cost is determined using the Effective Offers

for Commitment and Dispatch Costs– portion of Start-Up fee from Effective Offer equal to one hour’s share

of the fee amortized over Commitment Decision duration– No-Load fee from the Effective Offer

• Hourly revenue: (Eligible Quantity x RT LMP)

• Credit for the MRT hours: Max[ 0, (total hourly cost – total hourly revenue)for the MRT period ]

35

Updated – 9/10/13

Page 36: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC Credit Determination Following Min Run Time• Eligible quantity: hourly energy amount for cost and revenue

= MIN (revenue metering, economic dispatch point)

• Hourly cost: Energy Cost + Start-up fee + No Load fee– eligible quantity energy cost is determined using the Effective Offers for Commitment

and Dispatch Costs– portion of Start-Up fee from Effective Offer equal to one hour’s share of the fee

amortized over Commitment Decision duration– No-Load fee from the Effective Offer

• Hourly revenue: (Eligible Quantity x RT LMP)

• Best alternative is to break-even ($0) or shutdown at max cumulative profit (>$0)

• Hourly profit = Hourly Revenue – Hourly Cost

• NCPC credit = MAX [0, Maximum Profit] – Final Profit over the period after MRT– Maximum Profit = maximum total profit (sum of hourly profits for the post-MRT hours)

possible by choosing to shutdown at any hour after minimum run time has expired– Final Profit = sum of hourly profits over the post-MRT Period

36

Updated – 9/10/13

Page 37: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Hours Evaluated for RT Commitment NCPC

• Cost and revenues are calculated for each hour of a commitment Decision Interval

• When the resource is ramping from an offline state to its EcoMin limit, energy cost is not calculated because these costs are included in the Start-Up fee; however, revenues are included to offset the costs included in the Start-Up fee– Hourly cost is not calculated explicitly– Hourly revenue = (revenue metering x RT LMP)

• Similarly, shutdown costs are permitted in the Startup Fee– Therefore, revenues after release for shutdown are included

• During periods after the resource is released for shutdown, neither hourly cost or revenue are included in the NCPC credit determination

37

Updated – 8/9/13

Page 38: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Application of Start-Up Fee for RT Commitment NCPC Credits• Late Start

– Start-Up fee is included in the costs if the resource releases for dispatch not more than 30 minutes earlier or later than the scheduled commitment start

• Early Start (similar to current treatment)– If accepted by the Control Room as “pool-scheduled”, the eligible amount is

100% of Min(Early Startup Fee, Original Commitment Startup Fee)– Otherwise, resource must self-schedule: Startup Fee is not eligible

• The appropriate Start-Up fee for cold/intermediate/hot status is included based on status at the time of the start

• Start-Up fee is apportioned over the number of hours in the Commitment Decision duration– the Start-Up fee is amortized through the end of the commitment in which

minimum run time expires– the amortization period is not extended if a new commitment is added after

the time when minimum run time expires– Start-Up fee may be applied across Settlement Periods in two operating days

38

Updated – 8/9/13

Page 39: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Application of the Start-Up Fee for Resources released for dispatch before or after start time

• When a resource is released for dispatch more than 30 minutes later than the scheduled commitment start, the Start-Up fee will be reduced in proportion to the number of minutes later than planned the actual release occurs (discounting 30 minute grace period)– Example: when 54 minutes late to release for a 2 hour commitment

the Start-up fee reduction equals (54-30)/120 = 0.2

• When a resource releases for dispatch more than 30 minutes earlier than requested by the ISO, the Start-Up fee will not be included in NCPC

39

Updated – 8/9/13

Page 40: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Application of the Start-Up Fee for Resources that shutdown ahead of the end time

• When the ISO requests or approves a participant request to shutdown ahead of the end of the Commitment Decision duration, the total Start-Up fee will be considered for NCPC

• Resources that trip (or are otherwise forced to shutdown due to operational problems) will be considered for only the portion of the Start-Up fee apportioned to the hours when the resource was online

• A trip caused by a network equipment failure unrelated to plant operation will not disqualify consideration of the full Startup Fee in the credit determination (current treatment)

• If the ISO requests that a resource restart following a trip, the additional Start-Up fee will be apportioned to the hours of the Commitment Decision

40

Updated – 8/9/13

Page 41: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Settlement Period for RT Commitment NCPC

• Each contiguous block of committed hours (i.e., real-time online operation between times of startup and shutdown) is evaluated separately for RT Commitment NCPC credit– May include one or more commitment decisions

• Hourly profit = Hourly Revenue – Hourly Cost

• NCPC credit = MAX [0, Maximum Profit] – Final Profit ]– Maximum Profit = maximum total profit (sum of hourly profits)

possible by choosing to shutdown at any hour after minimum run time has expired

– Final Profit = sum of hourly profits over the Settlement Period

41

Updated – 9/10/13

The above text was relocated to the earlier slide describing Post-MRT RT Commitment NCPC Credit

Page 42: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Dispatch NCPC Credit Determination

• Eligible quantity: hourly energy amount for cost and revenue when DDP > economic dispatch point (EDP)– Eligible Cost Quantity = MIN (revenue metering, DDP) - EDP– Eligible Revenue Quantity = revenue metering – EDP

• Hourly cost: cost of Eligible Cost Quantity determined with Effective Offers for Commitment and Dispatch Cost

• Hourly revenue: (Eligible Revenue Quantity x RT LMP)– Revenue earned by operating above the DDP will offset cost

• Resource’s best alternative is to operate at economic dispatch point (revenue >= cost)

42

Page 43: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Settlement Period for RT Dispatch NCPC Credits

• Each hour is evaluated separately for RT Dispatch NCPC Credit

• NCPC Dispatch Credit =

MAX (0, Hourly Cost – Hourly Revenue)

• When the dispatch Hourly Revenue exceeds Hourly Cost, the additional profit that the resource earned by exceeding the DDP will be used to increase revenue reduce cost in the RT Commitment NCPC determination

43

Updated – 8/9/13

Page 44: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Regulation Opportunity Cost in RT NCPC

• Regulation resources will already have been compensated for out-of-merit operation while regulating

• The hourly regulation out-of-merit cost compensation is included in revenues for the RT Dispatch NCPC credit determination to avoid double-compensation

44

Page 45: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

HOURLY NCPC CREDIT DESIGNCalculation of hourly DA NCPC Credits and RT NCPC Credits for the purpose of cost allocation

45

Page 46: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

DA NCPC and RT NCPC Hourly Credit

• Credits are apportioned to hours in the NCPC Settlement Period:– to those hours where Hourly Cost > Hourly Revenue (negative profit)– in proportion to each hour’s negative profit divided by the sum of the

negative profits for all hours in the Settlement Period

• NCPC Settlement Period duration:– one or more hours for DA NCPC and RT Commitment NCPC– one hour for RT Dispatch NCPC

• The Commitment Reason or Dispatch Reason corresponding to each hour will determine NCPC cost allocation type– The credit will be apportioned evenly in hours with multiple reasons

46

Page 47: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

EXHIBITS AND EXAMPLESMaterials prepared to explain NCPC redesign concepts and examples of detail design components

Page 48: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

NCPC CREDIT DESIGN COMPARISONSide-by-side existing NCPC credit design and proposed redesign for the Energy Market Offer Flexibility changes

Page 49: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Out-of-Merit NCPC Credits overview:existing and proposed designs

49

Design Element Existing Design Offer Flexibility Design

Day-Ahead NCPC Total as-bid cost (energy, startup, no load) for resources scheduled in the day-ahead market is compensated through NCPC when DA revenue is not sufficient

Same As-bid cost of energy for resources scheduled in the day-ahead market is compensated through NCPC when DA Revenue is not sufficient

Real-Time NCPC As-bid cost for additional energy, startup, or no load during RT operation is compensated through NCPC when incremental RT revenue is not sufficient (additions to DA)

Total as-bid cost (energy, startup, no load) for resources operating during real-time is compensated through NCPC when the RT revenue is not sufficient (independent of DA)

Accounting Period Full operating day evaluated as a single period to compare resource cost and revenue

Periods within the operating day are evaluated separately to compare cost and revenue

Updated9/10/13

Page 50: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Out-of-Merit NCPC Credits overview (continued)

50

Design Element Existing Design Offer Flexibility Design

Cost Occurrence Assume fixed costs paid DA will be incurred to operate in RT

Costs considered when incurred to follow ISO instructions

Offers Used to Calculate Cost

DA offer applied in DA NCPC and RT offer applied for RT NCPC

Offers in effect at the time that Commitment and Dispatch decisions are instructed

Credit Formulation Additional payment required for resource to break-even for following ISO instruction

Additional payment required for resource to be no worse off for following ISO instruction (relative to best alternative)

Hourly NCPC Credit Single, daily NCPC credit apportioned to hours of operation using ratio of hourly Load Obligation to total Load Obligation

Multi-hour period NCPC credit (sub-daily) apportioned to hours within the period using ratio of each hour’s losses to total losses

Page 51: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF “PENALTIES”Actions that reduce the Offer cost considered for NCPC under existing and Offer Flexibility designs

Page 52: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Actions that reduce Offer cost for NCPC

52

Action Existing Design Offer Flexibility Design

Infeasible Self-Schedule

Ineligible for NCPC for entire day if self-schedule request is infeasible given resource minimum run or down time

Additional hours required to honor minimum run and down time considered self-scheduled

Not Following DDP Excursion outside +/- 10% tolerance in any 5-minute interval makes unit ineligible for total hourly cost Cost up to DDP Revenue at RQM

No +/-10% tolerance or change to hourly cost eligibility

Cost is same Revenue is same

Page 53: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Actions that reduce Offer cost (continued)

Action Existing Design Offer Flexibility Design

Early Start Unacceptable then Start-Up, No Load, and Energy excluded

Acceptable then Start-Up, No Load, and Energy included

Unacceptable then same (considered self-scheduled)

Acceptable then same (costs limited to commitment offer)

Late Start No discount of Start-Up Start-Up cost discounted by number of minutes later than 30 minute grace period (comparable to early shutdown due to trip)

Page 54: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Actions that reduce Offer cost (continued)

Observations:

• Adjustments are largely the same or eliminate “step-change” in compensation to align severity of adjustment with system impact

• Late Start is the only new adjustment– Generators most often achieve ordered time within 30 minute window– Adjustment is gradual and preserves incentive to continue startup– Comparable to existing adjustment for Early Shutdown

54

Action Existing Design Offer Flexibility Design

Early Shutdown Trip then Start-Up cost discounted unless transmission-related Approved then no discount of Start-Up

Trip then same

Approved then same

Page 55: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

EXAMPLES OF NCPC CALCULATION STEPSDemonstration of how certain (previously described) elements of the calculations are performed

Page 56: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Example of multi-hour NCPC credit division among individual hours in the period

• Total losses of ($160) occurred over two hours• Hourly NCPC credit is apportioned based on each hour’s

contribution to total losses• NCPC costs are allocated in accordance with the reason for out-of-

merit operation56

Page 57: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Reduction of Start-Up fee when release occurs later than planned time (after 30 minute grace)

Start-Up is not reduced because actual release occurs within 30 minutes after planned time

57

Commitment OfferStart-Up fee $6,000

2 hour commitment“planned” and “actual” are release for dispatch time

Start-Up is reduced by 20% = (54 – 30) / 120

NCPC considers Start-up of $4,800 = (1 - .20) * $6000

ramp

ramp

Page 58: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

Calculation of Energy offer cost for RT Commitment and RT Dispatch NCPC eligible quantity amounts

• RT Commitment NCPC eligible quantity = EDP (= 90 MW)– Energy offer cost = $1,110 ( = $720 + $390 )

• RT Dispatch NCPC eligible quantity = DDP – EDP (= 110 – 90 MW)– Energy offer cost = $450

58

Commitment Cost energy offer*0 --> 50 MW $10/MWh51 --> 150 MW $20/MWh

Dispatch Cost energy offer*0 --> 50 MW $15/MWh51 --> 150 MW $30/MWh

*Offer requested offer slopeUnit is not ramp constrained

EcoMin Limit = 70 MW

EDP = 90 MWMarginal energy offerat EDP = $21/MWh

DDP = 110 MWMarginal energy offerat DDP = $24/MWh

RT LMP = $21/MWhCost to EcoMin at Commitment offer Cost above EcoMin

at Dispatch offer

Page 59: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT eligible quantity treatment during ramp-constrained resource dispatch

Resource’s total NCPC credits = $408 = ( $400 + $8 )

59

Commitment/Dispatch OfferEnergy $50 /MWh

Start-Up $350 /start

EcoMin 10 MWEcoMax 30 MW

Min Run Time 7 HrRamp Rate 6 MW/Hour

Hour 2: Resource is ramp-constrained up which is reflected in the DDP value; DDP is upper-limit for EDP

Example slide 1 of 3

Page 60: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT eligible quantity treatment during ramp-constrained resource dispatch (continued)

Resource’s total NCPC credits = $408 = ( $400 + $8 )

60

Hour 4: Resource is not ramp-constrained but dispatched to operate above the EDP RT Dispatch NCPC credit

Commitment/Dispatch OfferEnergy $50 /MWh

Start-Up $350 /start

EcoMin 10 MWEcoMax 30 MW

Min Run Time 7 HrRamp Rate 6 MW/Hour

Example slide 2 of 3

Page 61: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT eligible quantity treatment during ramp-constrained resource dispatch (continued)

Resource’s total NCPC credits = $408 = ( $400 + $8 )

61

Hour 6:Resource is ramp-constrained down EDP set equal to DDP (feasible dispatch) and cost included in RT Commit NCPC

Commitment/Dispatch OfferEnergy $50 /MWh

Start-Up $350 /start

EcoMin 10 MWEcoMax 30 MW

Min Run Time 7 HrRamp Rate 6 MW/Hour

Example slide 3 of 3

Page 62: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

DA NCPC CREDITSExamples of: including Start-Up and No-Load fees; credit calculations for Fast Start and non-Fast Start generator; and DA market self-schedule commitment hours

Page 63: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

DA NCPC Credit including Start-Up andNo-Load offer (non-Fast Start generator)

• Hourly cost includes total offer cost for Energy, Start-Up and No-Load– Start-Up fee is apportioned over commitments containing min run time

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Sum(Cost) – Sum(Revenue)]– Summation of cost and revenue is for all contiguous cleared hours

63

New Slide9/10/13

Page 64: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

DA NCPC Credit including Start-Up andNo-Load offer (Fast Start generator)

64

• Hourly cost includes total offer cost for Energy, Start-Up and No-Load– Start-Up fee is apportioned over commitments containing min run time

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Cost – Revenue] each hour– Fast Start credit is determined for each cleared hour

New Slide9/10/13

Page 65: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

DA NCPC Credit including Start-Up and No-Load offer and self-schedule (non-Fast Start generator)

• DA self-schedule is offer of Start-Up = $0, No-Load = $0, Energy@EcoMin = floor price, and Energy above EcoMin at prices in Supply Offer

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Sum(Cost) – Sum(Revenue)]– Summation of cost and revenue is for all contiguous cleared hours

65

New Slide9/10/13

Page 66: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT COMMITMENT NCPC CREDITSExamples of: Fast Start generator RT Commitment NCPC credit; RT market self-schedule commitment hours; and RT Commitment NCPC credits within Minimum Run Time and after Minimum Run Time

Page 67: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC Credit (for Fast Start generator)

67

• ISO RT commitment of Fast Start initiates with dispatch order to start for min run time and each subsequent hour dispatched is a new commitment– Start-Up fee is apportioned over hours of initial min run time commitment

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Cost – Revenue] each hour– Fast Start credit is determined for each hour dispatched

New Slide9/10/13

Page 68: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC hourly cost andrevenue for self-schedule commitment• RT self-schedule is offer of Start-Up = $0, No-Load = $0, Energy@EcoMin =

$0/MWh, and Energy above EcoMin at prices in Supply Offer

• For RT self-schedule hour, NCPC calculation of hourly revenue excludes energy payments for output up to EcoMin

68

Note: the NCPC credit calculations are shown in next examples

New Slide9/10/13

Page 69: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC Credit in Min RunTime (for non-Fast Start generator)• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Sum(Cost) – Sum(Revenue)]

– Summation of cost and revenue for min run time hours in each commitment– Revenue during startup is apportioned to hours of min run time (not shown)

• This credit improves incentive to start when ordered: an unprofitable commitment is not subsidized by later profitable commitments

69

Example slide 1 of 2

New Slide9/10/13

Page 70: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC Credit after Min Run Time (for non-Fast Start generator)• NCPC credit is: MAX[0,Maximum Profit_POST-MRT] – Final Profit_POST-MRT

– Maximum Profit = maximum cumulative profit after minimum run time expires– Final Profit = cumulative profit for all hours after minimum run time

• This credit improves incentive to continue following dispatch after resource would choose to shutdown: maximum operating profit is preserved

70

Example slide 2 of 2

New Slide9/10/13

Page 71: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC Credit in Min Run Time with multiple commitments (for non-Fast Start generator)

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Sum(Cost) – Sum(Revenue)]– Summation of cost and revenue for min run time hours in each commitment– Revenue during startup is apportioned to hours of min run time (not shown)

• This credit improves incentive to start when ordered: an unprofitable commitment is not subsidized by later profitable commitments

71

Example slide 1 of 2

New Slide9/10/13

Page 72: September 10, 2013 | NEPOOL markets committee

RT Commitment NCPC Credit after Min Run Time(for non-Fast Start generator)

72

Example slide 2 of 2

New Slide9/10/13

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0,Maximum Profit_POST-MRT] – Final Profit_POST-MRT– Maximum Profit = maximum cumulative profit after minimum run time expires– Final Profit = cumulative profit for all hours after minimum run time

• This credit improves incentive to continue following dispatch after resource would choose to shutdown: maximum operating profit is preserved