social capital, trust, and adaptation to climate change...

SocialCapital,Trust,andAdaptationtoClimateChange: 1EvidencefromRuralEthiopia 2

3ChristopherPaul1,ErikaWeinthal2,MarcBellemare3,MarcJeuland4 4

1CorrespondingAuthor:[email protected];Phone:+1-919-260-0638;Fax:+919-681-7748 5NicholasSchooloftheEnvironment,DukeUniversity,Box90328,Durham,NC27708USA 62NicholasSchooloftheEnvironment,DukeUniversity,Box90328,Durham,NC27708USA; 7

[email protected] 83DepartmentofAppliedEconomics,UniversityofMinnesota,1994BufordAvenue,St.Paul,MN55108USA; 9

[email protected] 104SanfordSchoolofPublicPolicy,DukeUniversity,Box90239,Durham,NC27708USA,andInstituteofWater 11Policy,LeeKwanYewSchoolofPublicPolicy,NationalUniversityofSingapore;[email protected] 12

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Abstract 14

Climatechangeisexpectedtohaveparticularlysevereeffectsonpooragrarian 15populations.Ruralhouseholdsindevelopingcountriesadapttotherisksandimpactsof 16climatechangebothindividuallyandcollectively.Empiricalresearchhasshownthataccess 17tocapital—financial,human,physical,andsocial—iscriticalforbuildingresilienceand 18fosteringadaptationtoenvironmentalstresses.Littleattention,however,hasbeenpaidto 19howsocialcapitalgenerallymightfacilitateadaptationthroughtrustandcooperation, 20particularlyamongruralhouseholdsandcommunities.Thispaperaddressesthequestion 21ofhowsocialcapitalaffectsadaptationtoclimatechangebyruralhouseholdsbyfocusing 22ontherelationshipofhouseholdandcollectiveadaptationbehaviors.Amixed-methods 23approachallowsustobetteraccountforthecomplexityofsocialinstitutions—atthe 24household,communityandgovernmentlevels—whichdriveclimateadaptationoutcomes. 25Weusedatafrominterviews,householdsurveys,andfieldexperimentsconductedin20 26communitieswith400householdsintheRiftValleyofEthiopiaaimedatelicitingtrustand 27riskpreferences.Ourresultssuggestthatqualitativemeasuresoftrustpredict 28contributionstopublicgoods,aresultthatisconsistentwiththetheorizedroleofsocial 29capitalincollectiveaction.Yetqualitativetrustisnegativelyrelatedtoprivatehousehold- 30leveladaptationbehaviors,whichraisesthepossibilitythatsocialcapitalmay, 31paradoxically,bedetrimentaltoprivateadaptation.Policymakersshouldaccountforthe 32potentialdifferenceinpublicandprivateadaptationbehaviorsinrelationtotrustand 33socialcapitalwhendesigninginterventionsforclimateadaptation. 34 35Keywords:ClimateChange;Trust;SocialCapital;Adaptation;Ethiopia 36

Acknowledgements 37ThispaperwascompletedwithsupportfromaUSAIDConflictManagementandMitigation 38grant(#AID-OAA-A-12-00068),theDukeUniversityGlobalHealthInstitute,andthe 39NicholasSchooloftheEnvironment.CourtneyHarrison,TewodrosRango,EshetuLemma, 40andallourcolleaguesinEthiopiawereessentialforthisproject.Thisstudyismade 41possiblebythesupportoftheAmericanpeoplethroughtheUnitedStatesAgencyfor 42InternationalDevelopment(USAID).Theopinionsexpressedhereinarethoseofthe 43authorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofUSAID. 44

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1.Introduction 46

Climatechangeisexpectedtohaveaprofoundimpactonlivelihoodsaroundtheworldby 47

causingmoresevereweatherevents,risingsealevels,andhigheraveragetemperatures 48

(IPCC,2014).Buildingresiliencetoclimatechangedependsuponimprovingexisting 49

optionsforadaptation,especiallyamongvulnerablepopulations,suchaspoorrural 50

householdsindevelopingcountries.Thosehouseholdsadapttotherisksandimpactsof 51

climatechangeinmanyways,bothindividuallyandcollectively(Adger,2003;Tompkins 52

andEakin,2012).Theabilityofhouseholdsandtheircommunitiestoadapt,however,is 53

conditionedbyamyriadoffactorsthatareofteninshortsupplyforruralhouseholds, 54

includingaccesstofinancial,human,physical,andsocialcapital.Whileaccesstoalltypesof 55

capitaliscriticalforbuildingresilienceandfosteringadaptationtoenvironmentalstresses, 56

littleattentionhasbeenpaidtotheroleofsocialcapitalwhich,followingOstromandAhn 57

(2003),wedefineasthevalueofrelationshipsthatfacilitatescooperationandcollective 58

actionthroughtrust.Intheabsenceofotherformsofcapital,socialcapitalisparticularly 59

importantforpromotingadaptationtonewthreatsfromclimatechangebyfurthering 60

cooperationandcollectiveaction. 61

62

Thispaperaddressesthequestionofhowsocialcapitalaffectsadaptationatthehousehold 63

andcommunitylevelsinpoorruralcommunitiesindevelopingcountries.Specifically,we 64

(i)assesstheroleofsocialcapitalinpoor,ruralcommunitiesintheEthiopianRiftValley, 65

(ii)testmultiplesurveyandexperimentalmeasurementsofsocialcapitalbothqualitative 66

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andquantitative,and(iii)evaluatetherelationshipofourvariousmeasuresofsocial 67

capitaltoindividualhouseholdandcollectivecommunityadaptationbehaviors. 68

69

Althoughscholarshaverecognizedthepotentialimportanceofsocialcapital,mostworkon 70

theroleofsocialcapitalinadaptationtodatehasbeentheoreticalorbasedoncasestudies 71

orsmallsamples(Adger,2003;PellingandHigh,2005;Wolfetal.,2010).Thegapin 72

appliedresearchonthisrelationshipisevidentinreportsfromtheIntergovernmental 73

PanelonClimateChangethatstate“thecapacityforcollectiveactionisacritical 74

determinantofthecapacitytoadapttoclimatepolitics,”yetonlyhaveevidencefortheloss 75

ofsocialcapitalinconflict(Adgeretal.,2014).Empiricalworkonthistopicisparticularly 76

challengingbecausesocialcapitalandclimateadaptationarebothcomplexphenomena 77

withavarietyofpotentialmechanismsandeffects(Adgeretal.,2005;OstromandAhn, 78

2003).Furthermore,thereislimitedworkonhowsocialcapitalrelatestoadaptation 79

behaviors.Mostoftheempiricalliteraturefocusesonthepositivebenefitsarisingfrom 80

socialrelationshipsandtrustwhileignoringthepossibilitythatthecomplexityof 81

mechanismsandscalesofsocialcapitalmayinsomecasesreveala“darksideofsocial 82

capital”(Bagnasco,2008;DethandZmerli,2010;Portes,1998)whichpromotesnegative 83

outcomesforcertaingroups. 84

85

Thelevelsandmethodsformeasuringkeyvariablesmayalsohaveaninfluenceonthe 86

relationshipsbetweentrust,socialcapital,andoutcomes.Forexample,trustcanbe 87

measuredusingsurveys(byaskingabouttrustingeneralorabouttrustinthecontextof 88

specifictransactions)andexperimentalapproaches(bysimulatingtrust-based 89

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transactionsandrewardingsubjectsaccordingly).Themeasurementsobtainedusingthese 90

differentmethodsmaynotbeconsistentwithoneanother,andmaybedifferentially 91

influencedbyavarietyofothercharacteristicsthatalsoaffectadaptation(Boumaetal., 92

2008;NaefandSchupp,2009;Ostrom,2005).Inaddition,alternativemeasuresmayonly 93

berelevanttooneormorespecificlevels—individual,household,andcommunity—of 94

socialcapitalandadaptation(SmitandWandel,2006;TompkinsandEakin,2012). 95

96

Inordertobettertestempiricallytherelationshipbetweensocialcapitalandtrustatthe 97

householdandcommunitylevels,andclimatechangeadaptation,wecombinemultiple 98

methodsofdatacollection,includingsemi-structuredinterviews,surveys,andfield 99

experiments.Thismixed-methodsapproachallowsustobetteraccountforthecomplexity 100

andscalesatwhichalternativeinstitutionsinfluenceclimateadaptationbehaviors(Adger 101

etal.,2005;Poteeteetal.,2010;Vaccaroetal.,2010),andtoconsidertherelevanceof 102

differentmeasuresoftrustandsocialcapital. 103

104

Ouranalysissuggeststhatthesedifferentmeasuresmaybeindicativeofdifferent 105

constructs,anditrevealsthatsurveymeasuresoftrustaremorestronglyrelatedto 106

observedbehaviors.Wealsofindevidenceofamixedeffectofsocialcapitalinclimate 107

adaptation:socialcapitalisassociatedwithincreasedcooperativeoutcomes,butalsowith 108

reducedprivatehousehold-leveladaptation.1Thoughouranalysiscanobviouslynot 109

1Throughoutthepaper,weusetheterm“privateadaptation”torefertohousehold-leveladaptation,notingthatsomeofthesehousehold-levelbehaviorsdoinvolvelimitedcooperationwithotherhouseholds(e.g.,sharingoftools).Community-levelor“public

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identifycausalrelationshipsbetweenvariousmeasuresofsocialcapitalandadaptationto 110

climatechange,ourresultsraisethepossibilitythatsocialcapitalmay,paradoxically,be 111

detrimentaltoprivateadaptation,dependingonwhicheffectdominatesinhousehold 112

behavior. 113

114

Theremainderofthispaperisorganizedasfollows.Webegininsection2bydescribing 115

climateadaptationanddefiningthephenomenonofsocialcapitalanditsmechanismsin 116

thenextsection.Insection3,wedescribeourstudysiteintheruralRiftValleyofEthiopia, 117

andthespecificmethodsusedtoevaluatesocialcapitalandadaptation.Next,weprovidea 118

descriptionofthedatainsection4and,insection5,wediscussourresultsintestingof 119

eachofthehypotheses,showingthatwhilesocialcapitalisimportantincollective 120

adaptationactivities,itisnegativelyrelatedtoprivatehouseholdadaptation.Wethen 121

concludeinsection6withpotentialpolicyimplicationsanddirectionsforfutureresearch. 122

2.Climateadaptation,socialcapital,andcollectiveaction 123

Climateadaptation,“theprocessofadjustmenttoactualorexpectedclimateanditseffects” 124

(IPCC,2014),isaprocessthatisbothbio-physicalandhuman.Whilehumanshavealways 125

neededtorespondtoachangingenvironment,thecurrentperiodofglobalclimatechange 126

strainshumancapacityforadaptationbecauseofthecombinedrapidityandseverityofthe 127

changesitentails.Individualsmustmakecomplexdecisionsaboutadaptationthat 128

determinetheconsequencesofclimatechangeforlivelihoodsunderincreasing 129

adaptation”behaviorsrepresentcontributionorparticipationintheprovisionofcommunity-levelpublicgoods.

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uncertainty,forexamplethatarisingfromwateravailability,variabilityincropyieldsand 130

greaterextremesofnaturaldisasters.Bydefinition,constraintsonadaptation,whicharea 131

functionoffinancial,human,andotherformsofcapital,wouldappearhighestfor 132

disadvantagedcommunities. 133

134

Adaptationoccursatindividual,household,community,andlargerinstitutionalscales 135

(Adgeretal.,2005).Inthispaper,weconsiderthreepotentiallevelsofadaptation: 136

household,community,andgovernment.Attheprivatehouseholdlevel,adaptationtakes 137

formssuchastechnologyadoption,migration,orchangesinlivelihoods.Communitylevel 138

adaptationmayoccurthroughcollectiveaction,theabilityofagrouptoachieveacommon 139

interest,andtheprovisionofpublicgoods(Olson,1971;Poteeteetal.,2010;Tompkinsand 140

Eakin,2012).Collectiveactionfacilitatesthepoolingofresources,knowledge,andefforts 141

forcommunityresponses.Wetreatcollectiveactionasabroaddescriptionofcooperative 142

interaction.Externalinterventionssuchasgovernmentprogramsandinterventionscan 143

affectadaptation,withorwithouttheinputofhouseholdsandcommunities,butdonot 144

alwaysbenefitruralareasbecauseofthelackofinfrastructureorstatereach,theabilityof 145

governmentstoimplementprogrammingandexertpower(e.g.,Herbst,2000).Thedegree 146

ofcooperationinruralareasisthuspotentiallymoreimportantindeterminingoutcomes. 147

148

Explanationsfortheemergenceofcollectiveactionhavefocusedonfactorssuchasgroup 149

size,leadership,andincentives(Olson,1971),butthevalueofcooperativesocialrelations 150

andhowpreciselytheyemergeremainscriticalandunclear(Ostrom,1994;Ostromand 151

Ahn,2003).TheoriesofsocialcapitalaroseoutofworksuchasthatofPierreBourdieu 152

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investigatingtheresourcesofsocialnetworksandthefunctionofsocialstructuresby 153

JamesColeman(Bourdieu,1986;Coleman,1988;Portes,1998).Thesetheorieshavebeen 154

furtherdevelopedandappliedtodiversefieldsincludingeconomicactivities,sustainable 155

development,andnaturalresourcemanagement(DaleandNewman,2010;DaleandOnyx, 156

2010;Fukuyama,1995;PrettyandWard,2001).OstromandAhn(2003),moreover, 157

specifythreecomponentsofsocialcapital:institutions,socialnetworks,and 158

trustworthiness.Institutionsarethesocial,economic,andpolitical“rulesofthegame”that 159

governinteractions(North,1990);theymediaterelationships,andthusinfluencethe 160

outcomesofindividualandcollectivebehavior(Agrawal,2009).Opportunitiesfor 161

cooperationthusarisefromthewebofrelationshipsthatmakeupsocialnetworks(Ostrom 162

andAhn,2003).Therelationshipsinthesenetworksarecommonlyclassifiedas:bonding, 163

theclosetieswithinagroup;bridging,thetiesbetweengroups;andlinking,thevertical 164

relationshipsacrosshierarchies(SzreterandWoolcock,2004;Woolcock,2001).Denseand 165

stablenetworksfacilitategeneralizedreciprocityand“trustworthiness,”whichareall 166

characteristicsthatfacilitatetrust(Putnametal.,1993). 167

168

Trust,theconfidencethatotherswillactoncommitmentsreliablyandwithreciprocity,isa 169

coremechanismofsocialcapitalforcollectiveaction(OstromandAhn,2003;Putnam, 170

2001).Trustisdependentuponcharacteristicsofindividualsandtheirsetting,including 171

institutions,thenatureandextentofsocialnetworks,andindividualcharacteristics.Trust 172

mayalsoberelatedtoanindividual’stoleranceforrisk,sincetrustinganotherindividual 173

mayinmanycasescarryrisks(Schechter,2007).Inthefaceofthreatsfromclimatechange, 174

trustaffectshouseholds’confidencethattheycanrelyonothersforresourcesharing, 175

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conflictresolution,andsustainedcooperation.Asaresult,highertrustmayenhance 176

opportunitiesforadaptation(Adger,2003). 177

178

Asanexample,thesharingoffarmequipmentcanhelpillustratethenatureofrelationships 179

betweentrustandsocialcapital.Inmanysituations,farmersmayhaveshort-termdemand 180

formorephysicalcapitalthantheypersonallyown.Individualswhoarewellendowedwith 181

suchphysicalcapitalmustdecidewhethertoloanorleasefarmingequipmenttotheir 182

neighbors,adecisionthatisinfluencedbymultipleaspectsofsocialcapital,including 183

bondingsocialcapitalandtrust.Bondingsocialcapitalhelpsgroupsleveragetheir 184

resourcesmoreeffectivelybysharingriskandcost(WoolcockandNarayan,2000).Here, 185

trustfunctionstoaidthelenderorlessortomakeadecisionbasedonahistoryofpast 186

interactionswiththepotentialborrower(i.e.,hisorhertrustworthiness)(Fafchamps, 187

2004;Platteau,2000,1994a,1994b),onhisownperceptions,oronothercommunity 188

members’perceptionsoftheborrower’strustworthiness.Thus,socialnetworksmay 189

contributeinformationaboutagents’trustworthiness,andmayproviderecourseinthe 190

eventthatthetermsofthetransactionareviolated.Meanwhile,existinginstitutions 191

structuretransactions,forexamplebyspecifyingthetimeoverwhichaloanisallowed,the 192

conditionsofenforcementoftheagreement(e.g.returningtheequipmentontime),orthe 193

termsofreciprocity. 194

195

Whenfacedwithenvironmentalthreats,suchasworseninggrowingconditions,farmers 196

mustdrawuponsocialcapital,amongotherformsofcapital,tocope.Forexample,if 197

additionallaborandtoolsareneededforterracingafieldtocopewithstrongerrainstorms, 198

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afarmermustdetermineinformationaboutbestpracticesandfindotherpeopleto 199

contribute,byhiringthemorleveragingsocialrelationships.Intheexample,thesenetwork 200

relationshipsmediateopportunitiesforinformation,suchasneworbestpractices. 201

Bridgingsocialcapitalallowsinformationtobesharedbetweengroups.Confidencein 202

informationcanbedeterminedbylinkingsocialcapitalacrossverticallevelsto 203

governmentoroutsideagencies.Ultimately,groupsofhighbondingsocialcapitalcanact 204

uponthisknowledge.Thesharingofinformationpromotesadaptationbycombiningthe 205

humancapitalofknowledgewiththesocialcapitalofnetworks(FalcoandVeronesi, 206

2013a).Trustis,moreover,essentialforassessingandactinguponsharedinformation 207

(CreechandWillard,2001).Finally,adaptationoccursthroughcooperationandcollective 208

actionsupportedbysocialcapital.Community-leveladaptationmayalsodependupon 209

externalfactors,suchasgovernmentinstitutionsandprogramming,whichcould 210

complementoroffsettheeffectofsocialcapital. 211

212

Socialnetworksspecificallyservemultipletypesoffunctionsforadaptationandcollective 213

action,asnetworkscanbehorizontalbetweenpeerswithinacommunity,orverticalacross 214

hierarchies(Putnametal.,1993).Particularlywhenhigher-level(e.g.state-level) 215

institutionsareabsent,thenetworkingfunctionofsocialcapitalsupportslocalinstitutions 216

andcollectiveactionresponsesthatareneededforaddressingcommunitychallenges, 217

includingthosearisingfromshocksorcrises(Adger,2003;Bratton,1989;Platteau,1994a, 218

1994b).Thus,thevalueofsocialnetworksisinbothfacilitatingtrustworthinessand 219

contributingtothepossibilityofaccessingdifferent(andperhapscollective)resources 220

throughmultiplevenues(WoolcockandNarayan,2000). 221

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222

Socialcapitaldoesnotnecessarilyhaveuniversallypositiveeffectsorserveasinsurance 223

mechanismsagainstadverseshocks.Socialcapitalmaybeineffectiveifthereisageneral 224

lackofresourcesorknowledgeofeffectivesolutions.Inthissense,thecommunitymaybe 225

theinappropriatescaleofactionnecessarytoadapt;rather,adaptationcoulddepend 226

primarilyonchoicesmadebytheindividualhousehold(e.g.,migration)orbythestate(e.g., 227

aidprogramming).Trustmaynotbeenoughtoovercomethetransactioncostsfor 228

collectiveaction.Therealsomaybea“darksideofsocialcapital”(DethandZmerli,2010), 229

inwhichstrongsocialinstitutionscangeneratenegativeoutcomesoroverpowerformal 230

legalinstitutions,asinthecaseofthemafia(Gambetta,1988).Groupsmaybeisolatedand 231

madelessdiversebyaprocessofhomophily,thetendencyofgroupstobecomemore 232

similar,reducingvaluablebridgingsocialcapitalbetweengroups(NewmanandDale, 233

2007).Decisionsinvolvingtrustandsocialcapitalmayalsobegovernedbyotherdecision- 234

makingcharacteristicssuchasriskpreferences(Schechter,2007).Inotherwords,an 235

individual’spropensitytotrustmaybepartiallygovernedbyherwillingnesstotakerisks. 236

237

Finally,itisimportanttodistinguishbetweensocialcapitalofhouseholdswithin 238

communities,andbridging(verticallinking)ofsocialtiesbeyondcommunities.Bridging 239

socialcapitalcanhelplinkindividualsandhouseholdstonewideasandresourcesbeyond 240

theircommunity,byeithersubstitutingorcomplementingtheroleofthestate(Adger, 241

2003).Inadaptation,communitiesthatorganizeandcooperatecanbetteraccessexternal 242

support(KarlssonandHovelsrud,2015).Thesetypesoflinkscanenhanceconnectionwith 243

outsideorganizationsandgovernmentofficials,generatingbetterprovisionofresources. 244

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245

Wehypothesizethatsocialcapitalinfluencestheabilityofhouseholdstorespondto 246

change.Thisisbecausetheconstituentpartsofsocialcapital,andaccesstocollectiveaction 247

processes,influencethequalityandsetofoptions(orconstraints)thathouseholdsface 248

whenthreatenedbyclimatechange.Specifically,trustshouldbeassociatedwithcollective 249

actionandincreasedadaptationbehaviors,perhapsduetoinformationsharing,knowledge 250

mobilization,andresourcecoordination.Householdswithhigherlevelsoftrustarelikelyto 251

possessmoresocialcapitalandarehypothesizedtoundertakemoreadaptationactivities. 252

253

3.StudySiteandMethods 254

3.1StudyLocation 255

Ethiopiaisoneofthefastestgrowingeconomiesintheworld,averagingover10%annual 256

growthingrossdomesticproductsince2004.Yet,Ethiopiaremainsapredominantlypoor 257

andruralcountry,withanationalaveragepercapitaincomeof$470andapopulationthat 258

is84%rural(TheWorldBank,2014a,2014b).ThroughoutruralEthiopia,farmerstypically 259

uselabor-intensiveagriculturalmethodsandpracticesubsistencefarming,asmostfarms 260

arerain-fedandyieldsareaccordinglylow(Mengistu,2006).Thesefactors,coupledwith 261

extremeandincreasingclimatevariability,suggestahighdegreeofpotentialvulnerability 262

toclimatechange,especiallyindrought-proneruralareassuchastheRiftValley(Notre 263

DameGlobalAdaptationIndex,2014).Theeffectofclimatechangeonwatersuppliesinthis 264

regioncouldbequitesignificant(Legesseetal.,2003).The13millionpeoplelivinginthis 265

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regionareprimarilysmallholderandherderhouseholds,andhaveminimalaccessto 266

financialcapitalandoutsideresourcesforcopingwithsuchdisruptions. 267

268

Thisstudyspans20villageslocatedinfourworedas(i.e.,districts)oftheZiway-Shalalake 269

basin;communitiesinthiszonesharecommonhydrologicalandagriculturalconditions. 270

Thestudycommunitiesaresmallandrelativelyisolated,andmostlyhomogenousin 271

religiousandethnicmake-up.Thefinalsampleconsistsof20randomlyselected 272

householdsfromeachofthesecommunities,foratotalof400households. 273

274

WechosetheEthiopianRiftValleytostudyadaptationbecausetheregion’srural 275

populationisalreadyexperiencing(andrespondingto)significantstressesduetoextreme 276

climatevariability,theeffectsofwhicharelikelytobecomemorepronouncedinthefuture 277

(Kassieetal.,2013).InruralEthiopia,climatechangehasbeenlinkedtoreducedincome; 278

intheabsenceofadaptation,furtherdeclineinhouseholdincomeislikelytooccur 279

(DeressaandHassan,2009).Moreover,thesemi-aridlowlandsoftheRiftValleyaresimilar 280

tomanyothersub-Saharanlocationsthatarefacingorexpectedtofacenewthreatsfrom 281

climatechange(Niangetal.,2014). 282

283

3.2DataCollectionStrategy 284

Thevillagesinoursamplewereselectedusingastratifiedmethod.Halfofthevillageswere 285

selectedfromall5936villageswithinthestudyarea,andhalfwererandomlyselectedfrom 286

alistof50siteswithknownpoorwaterquality.Thissamplingprocesscomportswitha 287

separatestudyonwaterqualityandhealthinthisregionandbuildsuponpriorresearch 288

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(Kravchenkoetal.,2014;Rangoetal.,2012).Withineachsamplecommunity,weuseda 289

structuredfieldcountingrandomizationmethodtoselect20householdswithinatwo- 290

kilometerradiusofthecommunitycenter.Ineachselectedhousehold,weinterviewedboth 291

themaleandfemalehouseholdheadwheneverpossible.Datacollectionoccurredprimarily 292

duringthemonthofFebruary,whichisimmediatelypost-harvestforteffandmaize,the 293

primarycropsinthearea. 294

295

Thefirstelementofthedatacollectionwassemi-structuredinterviews,whichestablishthe 296

institutionalconditionsforadaptationandresourcemanagementandalsoprovidecontext 297

forunderstandingthesurveyandexperimentaldata.Specifically,weinterviewed 298

communityrepresentativesineachofour20villages,aswellasregionalgovernment 299

officialslocatedattheworeda-level,withasetofguidingquestionsandallowingopen- 300

endedresponses.Localinterviewswerecomplementedbyinterviewswithofficialsfrom 301

thecentralgovernment,foreigndonors,andnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs).The 302

seconddatacollectioncomponentcomprisessurveysconductedwiththe400selected 303

households.Thethirdcomponentofdatacollectionconsistedoffieldexperiments. 304

Specifically,followingSchechter(2007)andTanakaetal.(2010),weplayedinvestment 305

andriskgamesdevelopedtomeasureindividualtrustandriskpreferenceswithamaleand 306

femalememberofeachhouseholdinoursample.Thesearedescribedinmoredetailinthe 307

followingsection. 308

309

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TheDukeUniversityInstitutionalReviewBoardapprovedthestudyandexperimental 310

gameprotocols.Allrespondentsprovidedinformedconsentpriortoparticipationinthe 311

study.Theconfidentialityandanonymityofsurveyrespondentshasbeenmaintained. 312

313

3.3MeasuresofSocialCapital,Trust,CollectiveAction,andAdaptation 314

Themultipledatacollectionactivitiesprovideuswitharichsetofempiricalmeasuresof 315

trustandsocialcapitalconstructs,andofcollectiveactionandagriculturaladaptation 316

outcomes.SurveyquestionscorrespondingtoourkeyvariablesarelistedinTable1. 317

3.3.1Trust 318

Wemeasuretrustthroughsurveysandexperimentalgames.Inthesurvey,weuse 319

standardizedquestionsfromtheGeneralSocialSurvey(Smith,Marsden,Hout,&Kim, 320

2011).ThespecificwordingofoursurveyquestionsislistedinTable1.Previousresearch 321

hasindicatedthatthissurveymeasureoftrust,albeitimperfect,isrelativelystableand 322

comparablewithrealworldbehavior(Glaeseretal.,2000). 323

324

Theexperimentalgames’measureoftrustreliesontheinvestmentgame,atoolthathas 325

beenwidelyusedandtestedinfieldexperiments(Bergetal.,1995;OstromandWalker, 326

2003).OurdesigncloselyfollowsthemodelofSchechter(2007),combiningariskgame 327

withatrustgameinwhichparticipantsinvestandentrustasumofactualmoneywith 328

anotherparticipant.Akeyadvantageofthisfieldexperimentalmethodologyisthat 329

participantshavethepotentialtoearnrealmoney,whichisthoughttoinducetruthful 330

revelationofpreferencesandbeliefsascomparedtohypotheticalpayoffs. 331

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332

Thetrustexperimentalgameisplayedinagroupwithhouseholdheadswhoparticipated 333

inthesurvey.Approximatelythreequartersofhouseholdheadsparticipatedinthegame. 334

Asdescribedfurtherbelow,therewerenosystematicdemographicdifferencesbetween 335

thosewhoparticipatedandthosewhodidnot.Eachparticipantisrandomlyassignedtoan 336

anonymouspartner,andbothpartnersplaytheroleofsenderandreceiver.Groupsforthe 337

trustgamewereseparatedbygenderbecausesmall-scalefinancialtransactionsinthe 338

studycommunities,suchasinterpersonalloans,areoftensegregatedbygender.Toplay 339

thefirstrole(sender),eachparticipantisgivenaninitialendowmentof10Birr 340

(approximately0.50USD,or25%ofaday’swageinthisregion).Thesenderisthentold 341

thatshecanchoosetoanonymouslysendnone,some,oralloftheinitialendowmentto 342

anotheranonymousreceiverinthegroup.Sheisalsotoldthatanyamountsentwillbe 343

tripled,andthatsomeofthemoneysentcouldthenbereturned,dependingonwhatthe 344

receiverdecidestodowithit.Thesentamountisplacedinanenvelopewithafacilitator, 345

whotriplesthesuminviewofthesender.Inthesecondstage,theseenvelopesare 346

randomlymixed,andeachparticipantisgivenadifferentenvelope(notherown).Atthis 347

point,eachindividualplaysthereceiverrole,anddecideswhatproportiontoreturntothe 348

originalsender.Envelopeswiththereturnedsumarethengivenbacktotheoriginal 349

sender. 350

351

WealsoimplementedanexperimentalprocedurefollowingSchechter(2007)andTanaka 352

etal.,(2010)toelicitriskpreferenceswiththesameindividualswhoparticipatedinthe 353

trustgames.Intheriskexperiment,respondentschoosebetweenbinarylotteries(of 354

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knownprobabilityandoutcomes)tomeasureparametersestablishingtheshapeand 355

concavityoftheindividual’svaluefunction,andthedegreeoflossaversion(Liu,2013; 356

Tanakaetal.,2010).Byincludingtheseriskmeasuresinouranalyses,wecanensurethat 357

behaviorweascribetotrustisnottheresultofunderlyingriskpreferences. 358

3.3.2CommunityAdaptation 359

Weevaluatecommunityadaptationactivitiesbyaskinghouseholdsinthesurveysabout 360

theirparticipationandcontributiontocommunityimprovementsandpublicgoods,suchas 361

watersourcemaintenanceandconstructionofcommunitywaterharvesting.Ininterviews, 362

wealsoaskedaboutcommunalactivitiesandorganization.Inourregressionanalysis,the 363

dependentvariable“communityparticipation”isabinaryvariablefromthesurvey 364

question“Doyouoranymembersofyourhouseholdparticipateinanyactivitiesfor 365

improvingyourcommunity(outsidetheimmediatelimitsofyourhouse)?”Thedependent 366

variable“communitycontribution”isabinaryvariablefromthesurveyquestion“Does 367

yourhouseholdcontributetovillageactivitiesorserviceswithmoneyorotherdonationsin 368

thepastyear?” 369

3.3.3PrivateAdaptation 370

Privateadaptationbehaviorsweremeasureddirectlyandindirectlyinthesurvey.We 371

askedhouseholdsdetailedquestionsaboutspecificchangesmadetoagriculturalpractices 372

andcropsinrecentyears.Adaptationacrossmultiplebehaviorsislikelycriticalforsuccess 373

(FalcoandVeronesi,2013b).Giventhatthereareavarietyofdifferentadaptation 374

behaviorsreportedbyhouseholds,weconstructedindicesofthese,usingasimplecount 375

methodandprincipalcomponentanalysis(PCA)onpolychoriccorrelations(Kolenikovand 376

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Angeles,2004).Inthemainregressionanalysisonprivateadaptation,weusetwo 377

specificationsofthedependentvariable.The“adaptationindex”isasimplecount(sum) 378

indexoftwelveadaptationbehaviorcategories,including:Proportionofdifferentcrops; 379

Typeofseed(traditionalvs.improved);Timingofplanting;Timingofharvest;Methodof 380

farming;Numberoflivestock;Amountofcrops;Farmequipment/assets;Workforincome 381

outsidethefarm;Changetotalareaharvested;Fertilizeruse;and,Other.The“adaptation 382

PCAindex”isaprincipalcomponentanalysisindexofthesetwelveadaptationbehavior 383

categories.Theresultoftheprincipalcomponentanalysisisalsopresentedintheappendix 384

(TablesA7-A8). 385

3.3.4ControlVariables 386

Anumberofsocioeconomicanddemographiccharacteristicsarelikelytobeimportantin 387

adaptationbehaviors,namelywealthintheformofassets,animals(i.e.livestock),andland; 388

income;householdsizeandtheratioofdependents;andindividualcharacteristicsofthe 389

householdhead,includinggender,age,education,andmaritalstatus.Wethuscontrolfor 390

thesevariablesinourregressions. 391

3.4Hypothesesandanalyticalmethods 392

Wemakethefollowinghypotheses: 393

H1.Ifcommunitiesandhouseholdshavelimitedaccesstoandsupportfrom 394

governmentinstitutions,thenthereshouldbemorehouseholdandcommunity-level 395

adaptationthangovernment-ledadaptation. 396

H2.Thereisapositiveassociationbetweensurveyandexperimentalgame 397

measuresoftrust. 398

18

H3.Thereisapositiveassociationbetweentrustandadaptationforhouseholds 399

becausetrustincreasesexposuretonewandtestedadaptationoptions,andfor 400

communitiesbecauseitfacilitatescollectiveaction. 401

402

WeanalyzeH1usingqualitativedatafromlocalinterviewswithcommunity 403

representativesoftheinstitutionsrelevanttosocialcapitalandclimateadaptation.This 404

analysisprovidescontextforthehousehold-levelandcommunity-leveladaptation 405

hypotheses.Weevaluatetranscribedinterviewsfordominantthemes,whichinclude 406

communityconcerns,climatechangeawareness,conflictrelatedtoenvironmentalfactors, 407

andaparticularfocusonwater.Wealsostudythevillageinterviewstodeepeninsightson 408

thetypesofchangesfromyeartoyearwithinandbetweenvillages. 409

410

WeanalyzeH2andH3usinglinearregressionusinghouseholdsurveyandfield- 411

experimentaldata.Wecontrolforindividualcharacteristics,socioeconomiccovariatesat 412

thehouseholdlevelandclusterthestandarderrorsofallestimatesatthevillagelevel. 413

Villagefixedeffectscontrolforunobservedheterogeneityamongvillages.Inthetrust 414

experimentanalyses,weadditionallycontrolfortheriskpreferenceparameters. 415

416

TotestH2,i.e.,thatthereisapositiveassociationbetweenexperimentalmeasuresof 417

trust—intermsofproportionofmoneysentbyindividuali(Ai)—andthebinarysurvey 418

measuresofindividualtrust(X1,i),weestimatethemodelinequation(1),wheretheother 419

controlsincludeindividualriskpreferences(𝑋!,!),individualcharacteristics(X3,i),avector 420

ofcontrolsforhouseholdj(𝑊!),andfixedeffectsforeachdistinctvillagek(Zk): 421

19

422

𝐴! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑋!,! + 𝛽!𝑋!,! + 𝛽!𝑋!,! + 𝛿𝑊! + 𝛾𝑍! + 𝜀!

423

ForH3,i.e.,thatthereisapositiveassociationbetweenadaptationatboththecommunity 424

andhouseholdlevels(Y)andtrust(X1,i),weevaluatethemodelshowninequation(2), 425

whereweagaincontrolforindividualriskpreferences(𝑋!,!),individualcharacteristics 426

(X3,i),householdlevelcharacteristics(𝑊!),andincludevillagefixedeffects(Zk): 427

𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝜃!𝑋!,! + 𝜃!𝑋!,! + 𝜃!𝑋!,! + 𝜁𝑊! + 𝜐𝑍! + 𝜂!𝜀!

Wereiterate,however,thatouranalysisofobservationalandfield-experimentaldatacan 428

onlyestimatepartialcorrelationsbetweentheseparametersandadaptationoutcomes.In 429

otherwords,theusualsourcesofstatisticalendogeneity,viz.reversecausalityor 430

simultaneity,measurementerror,andunobservedheterogeneity,arealllikelyto 431

compromisethecausalidentificationoftheparametersofinterestinequations1and2. 432

433

4.Data 434

Forourregressionanalysis,weusehouseholdsurveydatafrom400households,andrisk 435

andtrustexperimentswith614maleandfemalehouseholdheadsfromhouseholdswho 436

participated.Thequalitativedatausedinthispaperincludesinterviewswithlocal 437

representativesineachofthe20villagesacrossthethreewaves(2012,2013,2014),fora 438

totalof51interviews(ninevillagesaremissingoneofthewavesbecausearepresentative 439

wasunabletobecontacted;butallvillageshaveatleasttwowavesofinterviews). 440

441

(1)

(2)

20

Villagesinourstudyhadanaveragepopulationofapproximately2000people.Households 442

hadonaverageof6.3members(adultsandchildren),withameanpercapitaincomeof 443

2623Birr(USD137),farbelowtheEthiopianaverageof8995Birr(USD470)(TheWorld 444

Bank,2014b).Eighty-ninepercentofstudyhouseholdsareOromo,themostpopulous 445

languagegroupinEthiopia,and51percentofhouseholdsareMuslim(ascomparedto34% 446

nation-wide(CIA,2015)).Householdscultivateonaverage3.4hectaresofland.The 447

primarycropsweremaize,wheat,andteff.AsummaryofkeystatisticsisreportedinTable 448

2. 449

450

Asdescribedabove,weuseavarietyofsurveyquestionstoassesssocialcapital 451

characteristics.Respondentsindicatedhighlevelsofcommunityparticipation,especiallyin 452

collectiveactivities:93%ofhouseholdssaidtheyregularlyparticipatedinactivitiesto 453

improvethecommunity.Nearly80%ofhouseholdsreportedparticipatinginacommunity 454

meetingwithinthetwoweeksprecedingthesurvey.Fourteenpercentofhouseholds 455

indicatedbeingactivemembersofreligiousgroups,withaboutequalparticipationamong 456

ChristiansandMuslims.Anothermeasureforassessingcooperativebehavioristhesharing 457

ofresourcesorlabor.Justoverhalf(52%)ofhouseholdssharefarmingequipment.About 458

78%ofrespondentsindicatethattheyexpectaloantoberepaidwhenitisgiventoothers. 459

460

Regardingtrust,40%ofallindividualmaleandfemalerespondentsreportedthatmost 461

peopleintheirvillagecanbetrusted,while23%reportedthatpeoplecannotbetrusted 462

(andtheremainingproportionindicatethat“itdepends”).Thisleveloftrustishigherthan 463

a2007WorldValuesSurveyinEthiopia,whichfound21%ofrespondentsstatingthatmost 464

21

peoplecanbetrusted,aswellasaglobalmeta-analysisestimateof32%(Johnsonand 465

Mislin,2012;WVS,2014).Inoursample,aswiththeWorldValuesSurveyresults,males 466

wereslightlymorelikelythanfemalestoreporttrustingothersintheirvillage(44%vs. 467

37%,t-testp<0.05).Inaddition,mostrespondents(61%)saidthatitwasnotatalllikely 468

thataneighborwouldreturnlostmoney(e.g.100Birr),butonly40%saiditwasnotatall 469

likelyaneighborwouldreturnalosthen(ananimalhavingsimilarvalue),whichmay 470

indicatevaryingnormsfordifferentitems,ormayreflectchallengesinmonitoring 471

ownershipoflessidentifiableassetssuchasmoney.Theseratesdidnotvarysubstantially 472

byreligion.Thesizablegroupofrespondentsreportinglowtrustofothersmayindicatea 473

significantchallengetocollectiveactionandsocialinsuranceinthesecommunities. 474

475

Ourfield-experimentalapproachallowsforadifferentwaytoevaluatetrustamongstudy 476

participants.ThemainresultsfromtheinvestmentgamearepresentedinFigure1.The 477

averageproportionoftheinitialendowmentthatwassentbyplayersinthefirststagewas 478

0.43.Thiswassomewhathigherthantheaverageproportionreturned,0.34,thoughthe 479

averagecashamountreturnedwassimilarduetothetriplingoftheamountsent.Men,on 480

average,sentandreturnedslightlyhigheramountsthanwomen(p<0.01).Theaverage 481

proportioninitiallysentwas0.47formalesand0.39forfemales,whiletheaverage 482

proportionreturnedwas0.37formalesand0.31forwomen(p<0.01).Sendersinthefirst 483

roundalsoshowedastrongtendencytosendhalfofthesum,acommonanchoridentified 484

inthesetypesofgames.Thecorrelationoftheproportionsentinthefirstroundtothe 485

proportionreturnedinthesecondroundis0.38.Theseresultsaresimilartothosefound 486

bySchechter(2007)inParaguay.Wewouldexpecttheretobearelationshipbetweenthe 487

22

“trust”behaviorinsendingtheinitialinvestment,andthe“trustworthy”behaviorofthe 488

altruisticreturn,butshouldnotexpecttheseparameterstobefullycorrelated. 489

4.1Constructionofthefinalanalyticalsample 490

Toavoidanalyzingoutcomesacrossdifferentsamples,ourfinalanalyticalsamplefor 491

regressionincludes360householdheadsofthe400householdsintheoriginalstudyfor 492

whomwehavethefullsetofexperimentalmeasuresoftrustandallothercovariates(as 493

describedaboveandlistedintable2).Weestimatedaregressionwithallhouseholds, 494

includingthosewithmissingdataforexperimentalmeasures(n=400),toseeifthese 495

householdsaresystematicallydifferentonothercovariatesfromthosewithfull 496

experimentaldata,andnocovariatesweresignificantatthep<.05level.Regressionswere 497

alsotestedforsensitivitytovariableswithoutliers,andtherewasnosignificantchangein 498

theregressionresults. 499

5.Results 500

5.1Community-LevelSocialCapital 501

Toevaluatetheimportanceofcommunity-levelsocialcapital,wetestH1,i.e.,thatthe 502

communitiesinourstudyhavelimitedaccesstogovernmentoroutsideinstitutionsand,in 503

theexampleofwater,dependprimarilyonlocalmobilizationofresourcestorespondto 504

hardship.Ourinterviewdatasuggestthatalargeproportion(45%)ofthecommunities 505

havelimitedaccesstogovernmentofficials(visitsbyofficialsonceamonthorrarer).Yet, 506

agriculturalandhealthextension,however,areprominentinstitutionsinEthiopia 507

includinginthesecommunities,withsignificantexpansioninreachoverthepriordecade 508

23

(Banteyerga,2011;Spielmanetal.,2011).Fortypercentofcommunitiesinthestudyhavea 509

fulltimeagriculturalextensionagent(knownasadevelopmentagent),butevenvillages 510

withoutanagentarevisitedatleastonceperweek.Villagerepresentativesreportedthat 511

developmentagentsmaydistributeorsellsubsidizedinputsiftheyhavethemavailable, 512

provideguidanceongovernmentrecommendationsorinstructions,andprovidetraining 513

onagriculturaltopics.Forty-fivepercentofstudycommunitieshaveafull-timecommunity 514

healthworker,andonlytwo(10%)receivelessthanweeklyhealthworkervisits. 515

516

Intheinterviewswithcommunityrepresentatives,theymostfrequentlycomplainedabout 517

poorattentionfromthewaterbureau.Onlythreevillages(15%)receivedevenmonthly 518

visitsfromwaterbureaurepresentatives,andonestatedthatwhile“thewaterbureau 519

comestoteachskills…therehasn’tbeenameetingthisyear”(Authors’Interview, 520

December2011).Onevillagerepresentativenotedthatthoughthewater“bureautakes 521

samples,buttheydonotreport”theresultstothecommunity”(Authors’Interview, 522

January2012).Anothersaid“wehavecommunicated[ourconcerns]withtheworeda 523

waterbureaumeetinginZiway,butthebureaudoesnotgiveanyresponse,sowehavehad 524

nofurthercommunication.Wedon’texpectapositiveresponse”(Authors’Interview, 525

February2014).Thelackofcommunicationisimportantbecausethewaterbureau 526

representativesbothperformmaintenanceactivitiesanddetermineprioritiesorallocation 527

ofgovernmentresourcesforwatersourcedevelopmentandimprovement.Some 528

communitiesreportedthattheyweresuccessfulinreportingproblemstothewater 529

bureau,butthatrepairstookmultiplemonths,astherearenotenoughtechnicians 530

(Authors’Interviews,January2012).Yet,manycommunityrepresentativescomplainedin 531

24

interviewsaboutnotreceivinganysupportorcommunicationfromthewaterbureau,even 532

whenthecommunityinitiatedaninquiry.Onecommunityleadersaid,“thegovernment 533

doesnotassistthem,andthewaterbureau‘knowsnothing.’Thewaterbureaudoesn’t 534

matter;itisjustasymbolicorganization”(Authors’Interview,January2012).Another 535

communitysaidtheyweretoldtostopdrinkingthewaterduetopoorquality,“butwere 536

notofferedanalternative”(Authors’Interview,February2013).Anothercommunity, 537

whosewellhadnotbeenworkingforeightmonthsasked“thewaterbureauforhelp,but 538

theyhavenot,”andsothecommunityrepresentativesalso“talkedtoanNGOsevenmonths 539

back,whichsaidtheywouldhelp,buttheNGOhasnotcome”(Authors’Interview,February 540

2013). 541

542

Withregardstowatersupply(aprimaryconcernofthesecommunities),ofthe12 543

communitiesthathadawell,fourhadserviceinterruptionsduringthethreeyearsofthe 544

studyperiod,andofthose,tworeportedhavingtroublegettingassistancefromthe 545

relevantagency(eitherthewaterbureauoranNGO)torestorewatersupplies.Sevenofthe 546

20communitiesreportedhavingtroublegettingassistancefromtheWaterBureaumore 547

generally.Manycommunitiesreportedthattheymustraiseallofthefundsneededfor 548

repairslocally;suchrepairsareoftencostlyandthusrequirestrongcollectiveaction.One 549

communitysaidtheyhad“reportedtheproblemtotheWaterBureau,andsomeonehas 550

cometwice,buthasnotfixedit.Thecommunitywilltrytogathermoneytofixourselves: 551

thisisourpersonalproblem”(Authors’Interview,February2013). 552

553

25

SomecommunitiesmentionedgettingoccasionalhelpfromNGOswhenfacedwithwater 554

supplyproblems,butmostwereheavilyreliantontheirownsavings,whichtypically 555

resultedindelayedrepairsandconsequentwatershortages.Inonecommunity,villagers 556

experiencingmonthsofwatershortageduetoabrokenpumpwouldhavetotravelfor 557

threehoursfordrinkingwaterandninehoursforlivestocktogetwater(Authors’ 558

Interview,January2012).Representativesfromcommunitieswhosoughthelpfromthe 559

waterbureaudescribedhavingtowaitfordaysintheworedaseatforthewaterbureauto 560

respond,andthenhavetocompensatethetechnicianforhistravelandperdiem.One 561

community“sent2peopletothewaterbureauofficefor6daystopetitionforhelp” 562

(Authors’Interview,February2013).Anotherwatermanagerdescribedthatwhena 563

techniciancomes,“wehavetopaytheperdiemheasksfor.Ifthetechnicianasksfor500B, 564

wepayitaswecan’targue”(Authors’Interview,December2011).Notably,thewater 565

bureauofficialsalsoemphasizedtheirextremelylimitedresourcesforrespondingto 566

communityneeds,includingaproblemofinsufficientvehicles(motorbikes)andmoneyfor 567

fuelneededtoreachremotevillages. 568

569

Anothermeasurementofengagementwithgovernmentinstitutionsishowthecommunity 570

dealswithconflict.Forlessseriousviolations,communitiesrelyoneldersandsocial 571

ostracizingtopunishthoseheldresponsibleforaconflict.Ifaconflictwastooseriousor 572

unabletoberesolved,thencommunityleaderssaidthattheywouldseektheassistanceof 573

thepoliceandformaljusticesystem.Acrossthetwentycommunities,15(75%)had 574

communityelderswhowerenotedasanauthorityforresolvingconflict,ascomparedto 575

only11(55%)mentioningofficialgovernment(kebeleandworeda)leaders. 576

26

577

Thehousehold-levelsurveydataareconsistentwiththevillage-leveldataindicatinglow 578

levelsofgovernmentinvolvement.Whenconfrontedwithworseningconditions,suchas 579

waterandfoodsupply,lessthan10%ofindividualhouseholdssurveyedsaidtheysought 580

helpfromthelocalornationalgovernment,andmostlyenduredgreaterhardship.Notably, 581

fewhouseholdsindicatedseekinghelpfromthecommunitywhenaffectedbypoor 582

environmentalconditions,andmostlyindicatedself-relianceandhardship.Only29%of 583

householdshaddirectinteractionwithgovernmentofficialsapartfromhealthand 584

developmentagents,yetsixtypercentofhouseholdsreportedhavingreceivedsomeform 585

ofgovernmentassistance,however,primarilyhealthcare,education,andfoodassistance. 586

Fifteenpercentofhouseholdshadreceivedfoodandnutritionaid,and17%hadreceived 587

governmenttraining.Theseresultssuggestthatgovernmentisneitherabsentnor 588

prominentinthelivesofthestudyhouseholds.Overall,ourqualitativeresultsfromthe 589

interviewsandsurveyssupportthehypothesisthatcommunitiesinourstudyhavelimited 590

accessandsupportfromgovernmentinstitutionsforclimate-relatedadaptation,especially 591

asitrelatestomanagementofwaterresources,andthereforemustdrawoninternal 592

resourcestomeetmanyoftheirneeds. 593

594

5.2TrustMeasurementResults(Hypothesis2) 595

ForH2,wetestthenullhypothesisofnoassociationbetweensurveyandexperimental 596

measuresoftrust(Table3).Inthiscase,arejectionofthenullduetoapositivecoefficient 597

wouldprovideevidenceinfavorofH2.Thecoefficientofexperimentaltrustregressedon 598

surveytrustispositive,asexpected,butitismodestinsizeandnotstatisticallysignificant. 599

27

Thelackofastatisticallysignificantrelationshipbetweentheexperimentalandsurvey 600

measuresoftrustmayindicatethattheexperimentwasnotwellunderstood,thatthe 601

experimentalresultsprimarilyreflectriskpreferences(giventhatrespondentsmay 602

considertheinvestmentsenttoananonymouscommunitymembertoberisky),orthatthe 603

surveyandexperimentaltrustvariablesrelatetodifferentconstructs.Forexample,the 604

experimentalmeasuremaybespecifictosharedfinancialinvestments,whereasthesurvey 605

measuresmaymeasuremoregeneraltrustinotherpeople.Alternatively,thelackof 606

relationshipmayindicatethatthesurveyquestionsdonotyieldreliablemeasuresoftrust, 607

giventhattheyarefilteredthroughsubjectiveperceptionsandarepossiblyinfluencedby 608

respondent-enumeratorinteractionsordifferingrelativeconceptionsofwhattheword 609

“trust”actuallymeans.Thedivisionbetweenprivateandcommunitybenefitsofsocial 610

capitalmayalsoaffecttheresults.Thesurveyquestionsareaboutgeneralizedtrustand 611

communityactivities,whereastheexperimentalgameoutcomeresultsinaprivategain 612

fromtrustingbehavior,thesetoolsmaymeasuresomewhatdifferentcharacteristics. 613

Interestingly,neithersurveynorexperimentalmeasuresoftrustappearsignificantly 614

relatedtoriskpreferences. 615

616

5.3TrustandAdaptationResults(Hypothesis3) 617

Forhypothesis3,wetestwhetherthereisapositiveassociationbetweentrustandboth 618

communalandprivateadaptationactivities.Ourmainresultsforcommunaladaptationare 619

displayedinTable4.Theseresultssuggestthatobservationalmeasuresoftrust 620

significantlypredictcontributiontopublicgoods,andcollectiveactionthatmaysupport 621

adaptation,bothintermsofparticipationandcontributionsofmoney.Thisisconsistent 622

28

withthehypothesizedroleofsocialcapitalincollectiveaction.Wedonotfindevidenceofa 623

similarrelationshipbetweenourexperimentalmeasureoftrustandparticipationin 624

communityadaptationormonetarycontributionstopublicgoods.Intheappendix(Tables 625

A1-A3),wepresentadditionalresultsthattesttherobustnessoftherelationships 626

identifiedinTable4usingalternativemeasuresofcommunityparticipationfromdifferent 627

surveyyears,orbasedonanindexofparticipation,andalternativemeasuresof 628

contributions(fromdifferentsurveyyears).Wealsotestwhetherresultsaresensitiveto 629

theinclusionofcontrolsandvillagefixedeffects.Generallyspeaking,wefindthatthe 630

resultsareinsensitivetotheinclusionofthelattervariables,butthatsurveytrustfrom 631

2013isonlyweaklyrelatedtoparticipationandcontributionsin2014.Moreover,survey 632

trusthasaweaknegativerelationshipwiththeparticipationindex,whichislargelydriven 633

byarelativelysmallnumberofhouseholdswhoreportbothparticipationinmany 634

activitiesandlowtrust.Theexperimentaltrustmeasuresremaininsignificantacrossallof 635

theseadditionalanalyses.AlsonoteworthyisthefactthattheR-squaredvaluesarelow; 636

thisisnotuncommonincross-sectionalanalysesofheterogeneoussocio-economic 637

variables,butitneverthelesssuggeststhatourmodelsexplainrelativelylittleofthe 638

varianceinouroutcomevariables.Thisisconsistentwiththeideathatthereremain 639

unobservedfactors,suchasconfidenceininformationaboutadaptation,thatinform 640

decisionstoundertakeadaptationbehaviorsbesidesthesocialcapitalandothercontrol 641

variablesincludedinourmodelspecifications.Thequalitativeinterviewssuggestthata 642

varietyofsourcesofinformation,fromgovernment,traditionalknowledge,andpeers 643

influenceadaptationdecisionmakingbyindividualhouseholds. 644

645

29

Despitethepositivelinkbetweensurveytrustandparticipationandcontributions,survey 646

trustisnegativelyrelatedtoprivateadaptationbehaviorsasmeasuredthroughthetwo 647

indicesofthesebehaviors(Table5).Thisresultsuggeststhatsocialcapitalmaybe 648

detrimentaltoprivateadaptation.Theexperimentaltrustmeasuresareagainnot 649

significantlyrelatedtotheseoutcomes,butalsohavenegativesignsforbothprivateand 650

communaladaptationactivities.Inadditionalrobustnesschecks(AppendixTablesA4-A6), 651

wefindsomeconsistencywiththepatternsdescribedaboveforcommunityparticipation 652

andcontributions,inthattheresultsdonotappearsensitivetoinclusionofcontrols.Yet 653

therelationshipsareweaklypositivebetweenlongertermmeasuresofadaptationand 654

surveytrust.Thissuggeststheneedforadditionallongitudinalworktobetterunderstand 655

therelationshipsbetweenthesevariablesovertime. 656

657

Finally,wenotethatintheanalyses,therisklossparameter(lambdainTable5andin 658

TablesA4-A6)isconsistentlyandsignificantlyrelatedtodifferentmeasuresofprivate 659

adaptation:thehigherthelossaversion,thegreatertheengagementinprivateadaptation 660

behaviors.Socioeconomicfactorssuchaseducationandwealtharepositively,if 661

insignificantly,associatedwithbothformsofadaptation.Landarea,however,isnegatively 662

associatedwithprivateadaptation,whichmayreflectthehighimplementationcostof 663

adaptation,ormayindicatethatlargerlandownershipprovidesgreaterintrinsic 664

diversificationorbufferagainstshocks. 665

30

6.Conclusions 666

667

Weinvestigatedtherelationshipbetweensocialcapitalandclimateadaptation-relevant 668

behaviorsusingsurveyandexperimentalmeasuresoftrust.Insodoing,wefoundthata 669

surveymeasureoftrustispositivelyandsignificantlyrelatedtoengagementin 670

community-improvingactivities,butnegativelyandsignificantlyrelatedtoprivate 671

household-leveladaptationactivities.Thismaystemfromthefactthatpeoplewhocanrely 672

oncommunitymembersarelesslikelytotrynewactivitiesasindividuals,orthat 673

individualswhoengageinindividualadaptationarelesslikelytoengagewiththe 674

community,evenwhencontrollingforwealth.Anegativerelationshipbetweenhousehold 675

adaptationandtrustissurprising,asitsuggeststhepossibilitythatsocialcapitalis 676

unhelpfulorevendetrimentaltoadaptation.Conversely,trustandsocialcapitalcouldbe 677

consideredtosubstituteforprivateadaptation. 678

679

Asathirdalternative,andbecauseourstudycannotestablishcausalrelationships,the 680

negativerelationshipofhouseholdadaptationandtrustmayreflectanerosionoftrustdue 681

toprivateadaptation,ortheinfluenceofotheromittedvariablesthatarepositively 682

correlatedwithtrustthatalsoimpedeadaptation.Ourinterviewswithcommunity 683

representativessuggestthatgovernmentprogramsandinstructionsareconsidered 684

importantwhentheyoccur,thoughtheydonotoccuratahighfrequency.Ifgovernment 685

instructionsdictateactivitiesrelatedtoclimateadaptation,thismightalterpatternsof 686

privateadaptation.Withregardstomeasurementofhouseholdbehaviorand 687

characteristics,wefoundastatisticallyinsignificantrelationshipbetweensurveyand 688

31

experimentalmeasuresoftrust,suggestingthatfurtherdevelopmentoftheorylinking 689

socialcapitalandtrust,andadditionalempiricaltoolstomeasuretheseconstructs,maybe 690

necessary.Simulationsandinteractiveactivitiessimilartothetrustexperimentmayhave 691

thedualeffectofindicatingthelevelofsocialcapitalandprovidinganopportunityto 692

enhancecooperation. 693

694

Analternativepossiblecritiqueoftheunderlyingtheoreticallinkbetweensocialcapital 695

andadaptationarisesfromconcernsovertheeffectivenessofsocialcapitalforachieving 696

betteroutcomesatthehouseholdlevel.Itisusefultoconsidersocialcapitalasaformof 697

value,becausetheabilitytoshareknowledge,cooperate,andshareotherformsofcapital 698

remainsuseful,evenifallhouseholdsarenegativelyaffectedbyaclimate-relatedstresses. 699

Anotherpossibilityisthatsocialcapitalpresentsananalyticalparadoxifsmallerandmore 700

homogenousgroupshavegreatersocialcapitalorpossibilityofcollectiveaction.Theeffect 701

ofheterogeneitywithinagroupiscomplex,however,andinconsistent(Olson,1971; 702

PoteeteandOstrom,2004).Socialcapitalmayhavevalueforexplainingadaptivecapacity, 703

butatruetestofthecausalimpactofsocialcapitalrequiresexogenousmodificationof 704

socialrelationships,whichisdifficulttodoinanysetting. 705

706

AnempiricalimplicationofthisworkfortheEthiopiancontextisthatpolicymakersshould 707

beawareofthepotentialheterogeneityinsocialcapitalanditseffects:socialcapitalisnot 708

necessarilyuniformlygood,yetneitherisitunimportant.Socialcapitalmaybeusefulin 709

somesettings,butnotusefulorevendetrimentalinothers.Fromtheinterviewandsurvey 710

data,itisclearthatruralEthiopiansincommunitiessimilartothoseinthisstudystillhave 711

32

limitedsupportfromthestate,particularlyasdocumentedinthecaseofwatersupplies. 712

Givenourmainfindingthatsuggestsadifferencebetweenthoseengagedinhousehold 713

adaptationandthoseengagedincommunityadaptation,Ethiopianpolicymakersshouldbe 714

awareoftheimpactsofdifferentformsofadaptationbeingpromoted. 715

716

Whileitisunclearifpolicyshouldorcanbeusedtoincreasesocialcapitalwithregardsto 717

adaptation,someresearchsuggestsusefulinterventionsinthisarena,suchasinstitutional 718

designforparticipationandcommunitybuildingactivities(Aldrich,2012;Ostrom,1992; 719

Putnam,2001).Futureresearchinvolvingmultiplequalitativeandquantitativemethods,as 720

usedthisinthispaper,canbetteridentifytherelevantvariablesinfluencingclimate 721

adaptationbehavior.Further,usingmixedmethodsatmultiplescales,thoughintensivein 722

timeandresources,generatesmorerelevantpolicyprescriptions.Local-levelpolicymaking 723

istheappropriatescaleatwhichtointegratesocialcapitalintoclimateadaptation,yetitis 724

importanttodrawuponacomparativeperspectiveofexperiencesofadaptationinother 725

locationsandatdifferentpolicyscales(VogelandHenstra,2015).Policymakersmayneed 726

toaccountformultiplescalesandformsofadaptation,fortheindividual,household,and 727

community,whendesigninginterventions. 728

33

Figures 729 730

Figure1.TrustGameProportionSentandReturned 731

732

Note:Pooledsampleisdrivenbymaleresults,as82%ofhouseholdheadsweremale. 733

TablesTable1.SurveyQuestionsforKeyVariablesKeyIndependentVariables

Variable/QuestionText

Generaltrust(survey) “Ingeneral,wouldyousaythatmostpeopleinyourvillagecanbetrustedorthatyoucannottrustpeopleinyourvillage?”

CommunityParticipation

“Doyouoranymembersofyourhouseholdparticipateinanyactivitiesforimprovingyourcommunity(outsidetheimmediatelimitsofyourhouse)?”

Totaladaptationchanges

Anindexofresponsesto“Inthelast10years,ifyouhavechanged[PRACTICE],forwhatreasondidyoudoso?(Markallthatapply)”

Covariates PlayerMale Whatisyourgender?PlayerAge Whatisyourage?PlayerEducationLevel Whatisyourhighestlevelofschooling?PlayerMarried Areyoumarried?HouseholdSize NumberofmemberslistedondetailedrosterTotalLandArea(Ha) Sumof“Whatistheareaof[each]plotyouownor

rent?”DependencyRatio Ratioofnumberofdependentsunder16onrosterto

householdsizeNumberofBovineOwned

Howmanycows,bulls,oxen,andcalvesdoyouown?

Income “Pleaseestimatethetotalamountofmoneyyourhouseholdreceivesinanaverageyear”

HHAssets Thesumoftotalvalueoftenkeyassettypes(e.g.furniture,technology,transportation)

Table2.DescriptiveStatisticsofHouseholdSurveyData Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max KeyIndependentVariables Generaltrust(survey) 360 0.42 0.49 0 1 ExperimentalTrust(ProportionSent) 360 0.45 0.24 0 1 CommunityParticipation 360 0.94 0.27 0 1 CommunityContribution 360 0.43 0.50 0 1 Householdadaptationchanges(simpleindex) 360 4.50 3.26 0 12 Householdadaptationchanges(PCAindex) 360 -0.20 1.54 -2.32 3.43 Covariates Riskalphaparameter 360 0.70 0.19 0.05 1.45 Risksigmaparameter 360 1.23 0.34 0.05 1.5 Risklambdaparameter 360 1.53 1.93 0.12 7.85 PlayerMale 360 0.82 0.38 0 1 PlayerAge 360 40.84 16.75 14 101 PlayerEducationLevel 360 1.60 1.57 0 6 PlayerMarried 360 0.84 0.36 0 1 HouseholdSize 360 6.37 2.36 1 15 TotalLandArea(Ha) 360 3.49 12.13 0 201.5 DependencyRatio 360 0.46 0.23 0 1.5 NumberofBovineOwned 360 4.77 6.79 0 81 IncomePerCapita(Birr) 360 2645 18289 0 345015 LogofIncomePerCapita 360 7.0 1.06 2.01 12.75 HouseholdAssetPerCapita 360 278.43 762.599 0 11576.7 LogofHouseholdAssetPerCapita 360 4.39 1.84 -2.30 9.36

36

Table3.SurveyandExperimentalTrustMeasures (1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES Experimentaltrust Surveytrust Experimentaltrust Experimentaltrust Riskalpha -0.173 0.0245 0.0298 (0.183) (0.0573) (0.0570)Risksigma -0.00369 -0.00665 -0.00654 (0.0977) (0.0389) (0.0402)Risklambda -0.00258 0.00840 0.00848 (0.0146) (0.00638) (0.00641)Surveytrust 0.0279 0.0304 (0.0259) (0.0251)Constant 0.330*** 0.425* 0.345*** 0.332*** (0.0109) (0.224) (0.107) (0.109) Observations 360 360 360 360R-squared 0.211 0.118 0.254 0.257Controls No Yes Yes YesVillageFixedEffects Yes Yes Yes YesVillageClusteredStandardError Yes Yes Yes YesNotes:***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1 Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.OrdinaryLeastSquares(OLS)Model.Controls:Male,Age,Education,MaritalStatus,HouseholdSize,LogLandArea,DependencyRatio,Livestock,LogIncomePerCapita,LogHouseholdAssets.

37

Table4.TrustandCommunityAdaptation

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES Community

ParticipationCommunityParticipation


CommunityContribution



Surveytrust 0.0482** 0.0499** 0.161** 0.156** (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0678) (0.0678)Experimentaltrust -0.0492 -0.0568 0.187 0.163 (0.0404) (0.0429) (0.124) (0.135)Riskalpha -0.0828 -0.0899 -0.0811 -0.0425 -0.0749 -0.0474 (0.0795) (0.0847) (0.0810) (0.131) (0.140) (0.130)Risksigma 0.0628 0.0623 0.0624 0.0654 0.0660 0.0665 (0.0633) (0.0621) (0.0630) (0.108) (0.106) (0.105)Risklambda 0.00875 0.00904 0.00923 0.0245* 0.0225 0.0231 (0.00614) (0.00626) (0.00625) (0.0136) (0.0141) (0.0135)Constant 0.720*** 0.758*** 0.739*** -0.433 -0.429 -0.487* (0.196) (0.187) (0.193) (0.258) (0.254) (0.253) Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360R-squared 0.220 0.213 0.222 0.170 0.154 0.175Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageFixedEffects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageClusteredStandardError

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Notes:***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1 Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.OrdinaryLeastSquares(OLS)Model.Controls:Male,Age,Education,MaritalStatus,HouseholdSize,LogLandArea,DependencyRatio,Livestock,LogIncomePerCapita,LogHouseholdAssets.

38

Table5.TrustandPrivateAdaptation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES Adaptation

IndexAdaptationIndex

AdaptationIndex

AdaptationPCAIndex

AdaptationPCAIndex

AdaptationPCAIndex

Surveytrust -0.973** -0.956** -0.456** -0.448** (0.377) (0.369) (0.179) (0.175)Experimentaltrust -0.687 -0.542 -0.315 -0.247 (0.752) (0.758) (0.358) (0.358)Riskalpha 0.0154 0.200 0.0315 0.00729 0.0937 0.0146 (0.996) (0.984) (0.983) (0.476) (0.471) (0.469)Risksigma 0.493 0.492 0.489 0.229 0.228 0.227 (0.598) (0.592) (0.599) (0.278) (0.275) (0.279)Risklambda 0.187** 0.196** 0.192** 0.0850** 0.0888** 0.0871** (0.0721) (0.0718) (0.0708) (0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0334)Constant 0.672 0.495 0.852 -1.948 -2.033 -1.866 (2.519) (2.578) (2.639) (1.181) (1.210) (1.239) Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360R-squared 0.182 0.164 0.183 0.177 0.160 0.178Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageFixedEffects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageClusteredStandardError


Notes:***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1 Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.OrdinaryLeastSquares(OLS)Model.Controls:Male,Age,Education,MaritalStatus,HouseholdSize,LogLandArea,DependencyRatio,Livestock,LogIncomePerCapita,LogHouseholdAssets.

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44

Appendix:Additionalrobustnesschecks

TableA1.CommunityParticipation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES Community

ParticipationCommunityParticipation



CommunityParticipation2014

CommunityParticipation2014

Surveytrust 0.0709*** 0.0499** 0.0482** 0.0584* 0.0338 (0.0219) (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0304) (0.0291)Experimentaltrust -0.0102 -0.0568 -0.0492 0.0122 -0.0397 (0.0424) (0.0429) (0.0404) (0.0836) (0.0723)Riskalpha -0.0811 -0.0828 -0.0899 -0.0630 (0.0810) (0.0795) (0.0847) (0.0582)Risksigma 0.0624 0.0628 0.0623 -0.0206 (0.0630) (0.0633) (0.0621) (0.0521)Risklambda 0.00923 0.00875 0.00904 0.00613 (0.00625) (0.00614) (0.00626) (0.0116)Constant 0.974*** 0.739*** 0.720*** 0.758*** 0.914*** 0.624*** (0.0175) (0.193) (0.196) (0.187) (0.0317) (0.156) Observations 360 360 360 360 347 347R-squared 0.070 0.222 0.220 0.213 0.109 0.238Controls No Yes Yes Yes No YesVillageFixedEffects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageClusteredStandardError


Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

OrdinaryLeastSquares(OLS)ModelControls:Male,Age,Education,MaritalStatus,HouseholdSize,LogLandArea,DependencyRatio,Livestock,LogIncomePerCapita,Log

HouseholdAssetsThedependentvariable“communityparticipation”isabinaryvariablefromthesurveyquestion“Doyouoranymembersofyourhouseholdparticipateinanyactivitiesforimprovingyourcommunity(outsidetheimmediatelimitsofyourhouse)?”.Regressions1-4usethe2013survey,regressions5-6usethe2014surveyquestionregressedonthe2013covariates.

45

TableA2.CommunityParticipationIndex

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES Participation

IndexParticipation

IndexParticipation

IndexParticipation

IndexParticipationPCA

IndexParticipationPCA

Index Surveytrust -0.133 -0.315* -0.341* -0.0221 -0.114 (0.157) (0.169) (0.182) (0.0837) (0.102)Experimentaltrust -0.540 -0.859 -0.907 -0.431 -0.521 (0.509) (0.597) (0.602) (0.311) (0.344)Riskalpha -0.196 -0.221 -0.140 -0.119 (0.537) (0.552) (0.552) (0.372)Risksigma -0.240 -0.235 -0.239 -0.0738 (0.531) (0.523) (0.537) (0.289)Risklambda 0.0136 0.00631 0.0148 0.0280 (0.0985) (0.0979) (0.0983) (0.0555)Constant 5.715*** -0.715 -1.000 -0.832 0.556*** -1.965** (0.199) (1.624) (1.537) (1.661) (0.117) (0.797) Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360R-squared 0.056 0.209 0.204 0.205 0.059 0.157Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageFixedEffects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageClusteredStandardError




HouseholdAssetsThedependentvariable“participationindex”isasimplecount(sum)indexoftwelveadaptationbehaviorcategories,including:Sweepingpublicstreets;Cleaningdrains;Cleaningwatersources;Cleaningschoolarea;Removinggarbage;Plantingtrees;Cleaningcommunitylatrines;Wellmaintenance;Securitypatrols;Terracing;Bridgeorroadmaintenance;WaterConservation;Constructwaterharvesting.“ParticipationPCAindex”isapolychoriccomponentanalysis(PCA)indexofthesecategories.

46

TableA3.CommunityContribution (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES Community

ContributionCommunityContribution



CommunityContribution2014

CommunityContribution2014

Surveytrust 0.181*** 0.156** 0.161** 0.00926 0.00340 (0.0625) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0434) (0.0425)Experimentaltrust 0.185 0.163 0.187 0.126 0.0755 (0.124) (0.135) (0.124) (0.101) (0.0976)Riskalpha -0.0474 -0.0425 -0.0749 (0.130) (0.131) (0.140) Risksigma 0.0665 0.0654 0.0660 (0.105) (0.108) (0.106) Risklambda 0.0231 0.0245* 0.0225 (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0141) Constant 0.123*** -0.487* -0.433 -0.429 0.397*** 0.0847 (0.0419) (0.253) (0.258) (0.254) (0.0392) (0.313) Observations 360 360 360 360 347 347R-squared 0.113 0.175 0.170 0.154 0.033 0.079Controls No Yes Yes Yes No YesVillageFixedEffects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageClusteredStandardError




HouseholdAssets

Thedependentvariable“communitycontribution”isabinaryvariablefromthesurveyquestion“Doesyourhouseholdcontributetovillageactivitiesorserviceswithmoneyorotherdonationsinthepastyear?Regressions1-4usethe2013survey,regressions5-6usethe2014surveyquestionregressedonthe2013covariates.

47

TableA4.HouseholdAdaptationSimpleIndex (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES Adaptation

IndexAdaptationIndex

AdaptationIndex

AdaptationIndex

Adaptation2014Index

Adaptation2014Index

Surveytrust -0.851** -0.956** -0.973** 0.0649 0.0413 (0.352) (0.369) (0.377) (0.115) (0.116)Experimentaltrust -0.758 -0.542 -0.687 0.108 0.0586 (0.844) (0.758) (0.752) (0.189) (0.156)Riskalpha 0.0315 0.0154 0.200 0.00142 (0.983) (0.996) (0.984) (0.255)Risksigma 0.489 0.493 0.492 0.325** (0.599) (0.598) (0.592) (0.132)Risklambda 0.192** 0.187** 0.196** 0.0269 (0.0708) (0.0721) (0.0718) (0.0322)Constant 4.828*** 0.852 0.672 0.495 0.304*** -1.072** (0.339) (2.639) (2.519) (2.578) (0.0839) (0.483) Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360R-squared 0.123 0.183 0.182 0.164 0.069 0.124Controls No Yes Yes Yes No YesVillageFixedEffects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesVillageClusteredStandardError




HouseholdAssets

Thedependentvariable“adaptationindex”isasimplecount(sum)indexoftwelveadaptationbehaviorcategories,including:Proportionofdifferentcrops;Typeofseed(traditionalvs.improved);Timingofplanting;Timingofharvest;Methodoffarming;Numberoflivestock;Amountofcrops;Farmequipment/assets;Workforincomeoutsidethefarm;Changetotalareaharvested;Fertilizeruse;and,Other.Forregressions1-4,thisindexwasgeneratedfromthe2013surveydataforadaptationsdoneovertheprior10years.Forregression5-6,theindexwasgeneratedfrom2014surveydataforadaptationsovertheprior5years.

48

TableA5.HouseholdAdaptationPCAIndex

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES AdaptationPCAIndex AdaptationPCAIndex AdaptationPCAIndex AdaptationPCAIndex Surveytrust -0.401** -0.448** -0.456** (0.166) (0.175) (0.179) Experimentaltrust -0.354 -0.247 -0.315 (0.397) (0.358) (0.358)Riskalpha 0.0146 0.00729 0.0937 (0.469) (0.476) (0.471)Risksigma 0.227 0.229 0.228 (0.279) (0.278) (0.275)Risklambda 0.0871** 0.0850** 0.0888** (0.0334) (0.0340) (0.0339)Constant -0.0722 -1.866 -1.948 -2.033 (0.161) (1.239) (1.181) (1.210) Observations 360 360 360 360R-squared 0.120 0.178 0.177 0.160Controls No Yes Yes YesVillageFixedEffects Yes Yes Yes YesVillageClusteredStandardError Yes Yes Yes Yes



HouseholdAssets

Thedependentvariable“adaptationPCAindex”isapolychoriccomponentanalysis(PCA)indexoftwelveadaptationbehaviorcategories,including:Proportionofdifferentcrops;Typeofseed(traditionalvs.improved);Timingofplanting;Timingofharvest;Methodoffarming;Numberoflivestock;Amountofcrops;Farmequipment/assets;Workforincomeoutsidethefarm;Changetotalareaharvested;Fertilizer

use;and,Other.Thisindexwasgeneratedfromthe2013surveydataforadaptationsdoneovertheprior10years.

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TableA6.HouseholdAdaptationBinary (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)VARIABLES Adaptation

10yrbinaryAdaptation10yrbinary

Adaptation10yrbinary

Adaptation10yrbinary

Adaptation20145yrBinary

Adaptation20145yrBinary

Adaptation1yr2014Binary

Adaptation1yr2014Binary

Surveytrust 0.0205 0.00159 0.00224 0.124** 0.0963* 0.0842* 0.0614 (0.0502) (0.0510) (0.0501) (0.0537) (0.0480) (0.0447) (0.0418)Experimentaltrust 0.0558 0.0214 0.0216 0.209 0.185 0.133* 0.0875 (0.0897) (0.0923) (0.0900) (0.122) (0.116) (0.0724) (0.0868)Riskalpha 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.0132 -0.0319 (0.0961) (0.0971) (0.0989) (0.162) (0.133)Risksigma 0.120* 0.120* 0.120* 0.189** 0.158*** (0.0654) (0.0649) (0.0654) (0.0793) (0.0517)Risklambda 0.0317*** 0.0319*** 0.0317*** 0.0207 0.0188 (0.00924) (0.00924) (0.00929) (0.0215) (0.0133)Constant 0.709*** 0.228 0.235 0.228 0.350*** -0.444 0.182*** -0.286 (0.0314) (0.249) (0.248) (0.249) (0.0483) (0.281) (0.0326) (0.223) Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360R-squared 0.069 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.100 0.187 0.076 0.147Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No YesVillageFixedEffects

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

VillageClusteredStandardError

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes



HouseholdAssetsThedependentvariable“adaptationbinary”isabinaryvariableindicatingactionofatleastoneoftwelveadaptationbehaviorcategories,including:Proportionofdifferentcrops;Typeofseed(traditionalvs.improved);Timingofplanting;Timingofharvest;Methodoffarming;Numberoflivestock;Amountofcrops;Farmequipment/assets;Workforincomeoutsidethefarm;Changetotalareaharvested;Fertilizeruse;and,Other.Forregressions1-4,thisindexwasgeneratedfromthe2013surveydataforadaptationsdoneovertheprior10years.

50

TableA7.HouseholdAdaptationPolychoricCorrelationMatrix

AdaptationChanges

Areafarmed

Farmequipment/assets

Proportionofdifferentcrops

FertilizerUse

TimingofHarvest

Workforincomeoutsideofthefarm

Numberoflivestock

Methodoffarming

Otherchanges

Proportionofdifferentcrops

Typeofseed(traditionalvs.improved)

TimingofPlanting

Areafarmed 1

Farmequipment/assets 0.771 1

Amountofcrops 0.557 0.502 1 FertilizerUse 0.853 0.699 0.549 1

TimingofHarvest 0.837 0.640 0.697 0.843 1 Workforincome

outsideofthefarm 0.724 0.731 0.324 0.467 0.484 1

Numberoflivestock 0.131 0.561 0.547 0.572 0.695 0.116 1

Methodoffarming -0.004 0.531 0.302 0.401 0.530 0.150 0.697 1

Otherchanges 0.706 0.893 0.606 0.691 0.982 0.781 0.651 0.741 1

Proportionofdifferentcrops 0.766 0.535 0.742 0.605 0.697 0.345 0.328 0.340 0.969 1

Typeofseed(traditionalvs.improved) 0.668

0.486

0.568 0.622 0.583 0.409 0.330 0.359 0.973 0.763 1Timingof

Planting 0.638 0.595 0.631 0.718 0.942 0.365 0.563 0.681 0.965 0.725 0.734 1

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TableA8.HouseholdAdaptationPrincipalComponentAnalysis

k EigenvaluesProportionexplained

Cumulativeexplained

1 7.796 0.650 0.6502 1.604 0.134 0.7833 0.999 0.083 0.8674 0.747 0.062 0.9295 0.514 0.043 0.9726 0.325 0.027 0.9997 0.260 0.022 1.0208 0.174 0.014 1.0359 0.091 0.008 1.04310 -0.028 -0.002 1.04011 -0.141 -0.012 1.02812 -0.342 -0.028 1.000

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