STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA

Dr. Monika Chansoria

OUTLINE

Chinese WMD transfers to Pakistan Collaboration in realm of military hardware Further lowering N-threshold in South Asia

[NASR/TNWs] India’s Strategic Restraint in a “two-front”

scenario

CHINA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE TRANSFERS TO PAKISTAN

Geo-political and geo-strategic setting Drawing heavily from tumultuous historical

past Including wars, territorial/boundary disputes Heavily militarized borders China-Pakistan nuclear, missile collaboration

well acknowledged and amply documented Direct nuclear assistance to Pakistan beginning

in the 80s, and Indirect missile transfers through North Korea

CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT

Continuing contacts btw PRC entities & those associated with Pakistan’s NWs program

Chashma N-plant [2 Chinese companies involved in construction]

Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation China Nuclear Engineering Huaxing

Construction Co. Ltd. – a Chinese government-owned company

December 2012; Huaxing pled guilty in a US criminal case

Illegal export of high-performance epoxy coatings for Chashma 2 reactor

MILITARY HARDWARE TRANSFERS Nearly 50% of China’s surplus arms exported to

Pakistan at ‘subsidized’ prices Red Arrow-8 Anti-tank missile (Baktar Shikan) QW-1 Vanguard Portable Surface-to-Air Missile (Anza

2) Type-90-2/ Main Battle Tank (Al Khalid /P-90 version) JF-17 Thunder lightweight multi-role combat aircraft C-801/C-802 (CSS-N-8) Anti-ship missile for JF-17

combat aircraft/Azmat Fast Attack F-22 Frigate (Zulfiquar) K-8 Karakorum-8 lightweight trainer/attack jets A-100 300 mm Self-propelled MRL multiple rocket

launcher Type-041/Yuan Submarine, designation still uncertain

BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA Pakistan’s first-use N policy and posture, now in addition has ... Battlefield N-weapons including smaller bombs, short-range

missiles Are inherently destabilizing; further lower nuclear threshold Mounting N-warheads on extremely short-range, forward-

deployed ballistic missiles Requiring pre-delegation of the authority to launch – Early release of custody of the warhead to launcher batteries Thus increasing risk of inadvertent/unauthorized use Pre-delegation to battlefield commanders Stationed close to border/on the battlefield Putting C2 & physical security of the weapon under immense

strain Especially in crises/conflict situations Notwithstanding C2 structures in place, delegation of authority

to the field itself creates grave risks and potential escalation thereafter

LOWERING NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

Hatf IX (NASR), 60-km Short-Range Surface-to-Surface Missile

Carrier vehicle: AR1A / A100-E multiple launch rocket system

A100-E chassis with modified launching tube system -- adapted for launching NASR, procured by China

INDIA’S N-POLICY AND POSTURING

India: NWs were, and continue to remain, a political instrument

Not an instrument of war-fighting Sole purpose to deter the use, and threat of

use, of NWs Remain strictly limited in scope & operational

readiness Warheads, delivery systems with key

subcomponents ... not deployed in anyway Verified in forms of force structures, alert

levels, de-mated systems

CLASSIFYING TNWS ?????

Yield / mode of delivery often used as the criteria for classifying NWs as “tactical”

Any NW, of any quality, mode of delivery, yield, used against any type of target, will result in an impact that will be strategic

India’s N-doctrine does not differentiate between a “tactical” and a “strategic” N-weapon strike

The labellabel on a NW, used for attacking India, i.e., strategic/tactical/battlefield, remains remains irrelevantirrelevant from an Indian perspective

“TWO-FRONT” SCENARIO

Sino-Pak nuclear commerce remains politically, strategically driven

China’s growing and permanent strategic presence in PoK

Presence of PLA’s Construction Corps in PoK Pakistan’s strategic posturing coupled with

involvement in terrorist activities directed against India

Dec 2009, General Deepak Kapoor, at Army Training Command Doctrine Seminar “Indian Armed Forces must prepare for a two-

front war”

CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

CPEC route starts from Kashgar (Xinjiang province)

Enters Pakistan through the 1,300 km KKH

Includes reconstruction, upgrading of Karakorum Highway

Running across Pakistan

Finally reaching Gwadar Sea-Port (South of Baluchistan)

For China, PoK serves strategic, politico-diplomatic objectives

Provides quasi-diplomatic support to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir

IN CONCLUSION …

India has displayed immense strategic restraint

Threshold of India’s tolerance being severely tested

A terrorist strike causing substantial casualties in future…

With proven evidence of state involvement …..